Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption: Kai Wu
Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption: Kai Wu
Disruption
August 2020 Executive Summary
Value investing has a long and distinguished pedigree but is currently in a deep
thirteen-year drawdown. We believe this is because value has rotated into a massive
Kai Wu losing bet against technological disruption. We isolate this exposure using machine
Founder & Chief Investment Officer learning and find it fully explains value’s losses. We offer takeaways for both
[email protected] stockpickers and asset allocators.
All fields have their hallowed tenets. In investing, it is that
value stocks - those trading below perceived intrinsic value -
beat the market. Value investing’s distinguished lineage
originates with Ben Graham in the 1930s and counts among
its practitioners such legends as Warren Buffett and Eugene
Fama. Nearly a century of empirical support for the
outperformance of value over growth stocks has solidified
its place in the investment canon.
Exhibit 2
Regardless of one’s beliefs, the value-growth spread has
Wait, So Is This Time Actually Different?
reached such extremes that investors simply cannot ignore it
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Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption | Aug 2020
The flipside is that this grave underperformance has driven Exhibit 4
valuations to extremely attractive levels. Value companies Russell 1000 Value vs. Growth Exposures
are trading at their deepest discount since the peak of the
tech bubble. The relative price-to-book ratio of Fama-French
value is now two standard deviations cheap compared to its
historical average. Many well-regarded value investors are
calling this the buying opportunity of a generation.
Exhibit 3
Mean Reversion Opportunity?
Source: Sparkline, iShares, FTSE Russell (as of 8/6/2020)
This is a very bold move. As the recent Congressional
hearings underscore, Big Tech has effective monopolies in
Source: Sparkline, Ken French (as of 7/31/2020) many critical verticals ranging from social networking to
online retail. The FAANG+M stocks comprise around 25% of
the market capitalization of the Russell 1000 index. In other
The Big (Tech) Short
words, six companies control a quarter of the stock market.
In the Great War, there are many battlefronts. Investors This extreme concentration would make even the Monopoly
furiously debate the role of low interest rates, outdated man blush.
accounting rules, and passive flows on value investing.
Rather than get caught up in an academic discussion, let’s Big Tech is paradoxically both disruptive and monopolistic.
look at the companies you actually get when you buy a value We will return to the value of monopolistic tech ecosystems
portfolio. Exhibit 4 shows the sector composition of Russell later. For now, let’s set this aside and focus on the concept of
1000 Value and Growth. disruptive technology. We will now (and for the rest of the
paper) focus on equal-weighted (opposed to cap-weighted)
Value investors are making an epic 34.7% short bet against portfolios. This means all stocks in the index get the same
the technology sector. Moreover, this bet is more than fully weight. This limits the influence of Big Tech, allowing us to
explained by their underweight to the FAANG+M companies. isolate the broader impact of technological disruption.
Value has a meager 1.4% position in FAANG+M compared to
Growth’s 39.4%. Not only are value investors short tech, but Equal weighting reduces the technology underweight from
they are short Big Tech. And in a big way. -35% to a smaller but still very significant -20%. As expected,
this somewhat mitigates the value factor’s drawdown but
still leaves plenty of losses unexplained.
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Exhibit 5 price-to-book ratio in the Russell 1000. Value is on the losing
Equal-Weighted Russell 1000 Value vs. Growth side of the tech disruption trade.
Exhibit 6
Value on the Wrong Side of History
Source: Sparkline, iShares, FTSE Russell (as of 7/31/2020)
Technological Disruption
For those of us who work with technology, the past decade Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
Exhibit 7
The pandemic-driven lockdown has only accelerated this Sector-Neutral Value
disruption, further shi ing demand from physical
businesses to the internet. Shopping malls, department
stores, and brick-and-mortar retail shops have struggled for
many years. COVID-19 has been the final nail in the coffin for
many. Dozens of iconic retailers have filed for bankruptcy,
including J. Crew, Neiman Marcus, JCPenny and Brooks
Brothers. On the other hand, Amazon as well as traditional
retailers who have managed to grow their online channels
have flourished.
This narrative is borne out in the outstanding performance
of technology stocks. Exhibit 6 shows the performance of
FAANG+M and GICS Technology compared to the market. It
also shows the poor returns of the value factor, which we
Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
define here as the equal-weighted top vs. bottom deciles of
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Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption | Aug 2020
Industry neutralization improves performance leading up to Exhibit 9
2018, reducing the drag from the massive tech underweight. Biggest Value Tilts in GICS Communication and
However, it still fails spectacularly in the great value selloff of Consumer Discretionary
the past couple years. This is surprising given tech stocks’
exceptional performance over this period.
We can quickly resolve this issue by examining the actual
names held by Russell 1000 Value and Growth. We will start
with the tech sector in Exhibit 8.
Exhibit 8
Biggest Value Tilts in GICS Technology
Source: Sparkline, iShares, FTSE Russell (as of 8/6/2020)
We clearly see that industry classifications are a crude and
insufficient tool to capture the concept of technological
disruption.
FAANG Company Embeddings
Technology is reshaping all industries. However, o en this
disruption is being wrought not by pure tech companies but
by industry players employing technology to gain an edge
over their more staid incumbents. We need a more flexible
Source: Sparkline, iShares, FTSE Russell (as of 8/6/2020) way to identify disruptive companies than industry
classifications.
Even within the technology industry, there is significant
dispersion in companies’ disruptiveness. In addition to In Investment Management in the Machine Learning Age, we
Apple and Microso , the GICS Technology sector contains introduced the concept of company embeddings. In the
many “old economy” technology companies, which tend to “Business” section of their 10-K filings, companies are
be more favored by value investors. required to provide a description of their products and
services. We use machine learning to build a measure of
One interesting fact: 80% of the FAANG companies aren’t semantic similarity for all companies with each other. These
even classified by GICS as Information Technology. company embeddings provide us with a continuous
Facebook, Netflix and Google are in the Communication (opposed to binary), dynamic, and multi-dimensional map
sector, sitting alongside more utility-like companies such as of the corporate landscape. This mapping subsumes the
AT&T and Verizon. Amazon is considered a Consumer concept of industry, but also includes a multitude of other
Discretionary company along with the brick-and-mortar dimensions.
retailers that it is disrupting. Similarly, we see no distinction
made between Tesla and its legacy competitors.
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Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption | Aug 2020
Exhibit 10
FAANG Company Embeddings
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Exhibit 11 shows the proximity of a representative sample of
companies to the FAANG stocks in embedding space. As
expected, the most FAANG-like companies are those that
provide services in cloud, e-commerce, social media, and
SaaS. Like the FAANG companies, they have also been very
successful in the past several years.
Exhibit 11
FAANG-Like Companies
Source: Sparkline, SEC
Company embeddings are a powerful tool. However, as
mentioned, Big Tech conflates the themes of concentration
and disruption. Many other companies are also transforming
their respective industries. These companies are smaller and
span a more diverse set of industries. Or they are traditional
companies that have been early to embrace disruptive
technologies. Rather than build a long list of companies that
we (subjectively) believe to be disruptive, we will now turn
to another machine learning approach.
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The Disruption Metanarrative tell the grander story of a society reshaped by technological
change.
Textual documents can be viewed as a mixture of multiple
topics. For example, a single Wall Street Journal article Exhibit 12 shows how the various storylines flow together.
might cover a variety of topics, such as a company’s labor Cybersecurity, cloud, artificial intelligence, mobile and
practices, segment growth, and M&A activity. We can train a e-commerce together comprise the technological disruption
machine learning model to identify the presence of relevant metanarrative. From here, the e-commerce thread flows into
topics in texts ranging from 10-K filings to earnings calls. general retail, which connects to travel and then airlines.
Meanwhile, the oil and coronavirus topics form their own
Exhibit 12 distinct clusters.
The Disruption Metanarrative
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We train our models to recognize the presence of these We next examine the performance of portfolios built around
disruptive subthemes in text documents. Exhibit 13 shows each of these subthemes. These portfolios have all done
an example of the cloud computing topic appearing in a quite well, but some have done better than others. For
recent earning call. example, cloud computing has been consistently profitable,
while robotics has only heated up more recently.
Exhibit 13
Cloud Computing Example Exhibit 15
Disruption Subtheme Performance
“Now I'll share some details on each of those four
Each stock gets a disruption score based on the quantity of
disruptive narrative in its associated texts. For simplicity, we Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
convert this continuous disruption score into a binary
classification (i.e., disruptor or non-disruptor). We can combine all our subthemes into an overall tech
disruption theme. The performance has been extraordinary,
Exhibit 14 shows the fraction of companies in each sector delivering a Sharpe Ratio over 1.0. More importantly, it
classified as disruptors by our model. While most technology encapsulates a purer version of the tech disruption factor
companies are disruptors, most disruptors are not than that which we were able to obtain earlier using GICS.
technology companies. There are companies innovating in
every industry - even stodgy fields like finance! Exhibit 16
Disruption Metanarrative Performance
Exhibit 14
Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
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Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption | Aug 2020
Value Investing Is Short Disruption
Exhibit 18
We already showed that value investors are short the GICS Disruption Explains Value’s Demise
technology sector. Thus, it should not be a surprise that they
are also short the pure tech disruption factor. We find that
the value factor has run a fairly constant -20% exposure to
tech disruption over the past decade.
Exhibit 17
Value Is Short Disruption
Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
The Oracle of Cupertino
Value investing’s rich pedigree is a blessing and a curse. It
has both contributed to its wide acceptance by the
investment community and made it difficult for newer
investors to stray from established value dogma.
Source: Sparkline, MSCI, S&P (as of 7/31/2020)
Ironically, it is value’s oldest and most famous practitioner -
This is completely intuitive and expected. Value investors Warren Buffett - who gives us a blueprint for adaptability.
favor companies that are cheap compared to book value or Buffett began his investing career working for Ben Graham,
historical earnings. However, a tech disruptor’s value lies not the father of value investing. Graham honed his cra in an
in its capital stock but its newer technology, business model, industrial economy of railroads and steel mills. Security
or other intellectual property. These businesses o en analysis came down to assessing the value of a company’s
reinvest heavily, reducing near-term profits. They are also hard assets and buying companies with prices below
commonly newer market entrants gradually chipping away liquidation value.
at the market share of industry incumbents but who have
not yet established market dominance. However, Buffett gradually evolved his approach beyond
that of his mentor. With the help of his partner, Charlie
In order to show the impact of value investors’ short Munger, he realized that Graham’s “cigar-butt” investment
disruption bet, we once again build a neutralized portfolio. style was neither scalable nor sustainable. Meanwhile, the
However, instead of simply neutralizing GICS sector economy was evolving, marked by the rise of the great
exposure, we neutralize our pure tech disruption theme. American consumer brands, such as Coca-Cola, which
enjoyed loyal customers and wide moats. Buffett embraced
Once we neutralize its anti-disruption bet, we find that a more holistic focus on brand and management quality. His
value’s lost decade disappears. Value’s drawdown is fully new blueprint: “Forget what you know about buying fair
explained by its big bet against disruption! businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful
businesses at fair prices.”
Buffett has a well-known reputation for staying away from
the technology sector. He has on numerous occasions
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described tech companies as outside his “circle of Developing an informed view on value is among the greatest
competence.” Thus, it is extremely striking that he spent priorities for allocators today. However, the value factor and
2016-2018 building up a $35 billion stake in Apple. A er technology sector have become inextricably linked. Value
Apple’s value tripled in a mere three years, Buffett now has managers are making a giant short bet on disruption. There
an enormous $100 billion position in Apple. This single is no way to form a view on value without first conducting a
position comprises over one fi h of Berkshire Hathaway’s thorough analysis of tech industry trends.
entire value!
Long value (i.e., short tech) is not necessarily a bad bet. It is
Buffett explained his investment in his 2018 shareholder extremely difficult to know with certainty if we are living
meeting, “I didn't go into Apple because it was a tech stock... through a bubble or paradigm shi . Technology is clearly
[but] because of the value of their ecosystem and how changing the world, but, as we saw in 2000, the disruption
permanent that ecosystem could be.” In other words, Apple narrative can become overblown. There exists compelling
is just like the high-quality, wide-moat consumer brands he evidence that the recent returns, valuations, and
feasted on in the ‘80s and ‘90s. In the same meeting, he concentration of tech companies are unsustainable. A full
acknowledged that Graham's style would have to once again analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but we will make
be adapted to the modern information economy: “The four a couple quick suggestions.
largest companies today by market value do not need any
net tangible assets. They are not like AT&T, GM, or Exxon First, investors should determine their overall portfolio-level
Mobil, requiring lots of capital to produce earnings. We have exposure to technological disruption. We have shown that
become an asset-light economy.” (h/t Adam Seessel) value managers tend to be short disruption. However, many
allocators also hold venture capital or growth-oriented
Buffett has had a legendary career spanning multiple equity funds, which provide positive exposure to disruptive
economic cycles. He has established himself as one of the companies. These positions may balance each other out,
best investors ever. Yet his greatest legacy is perhaps his resulting in a hedged overall position.
adaptability. As the world changed around him, he evolved
his investment style in response. The technology sector now Second, investors should not view tech as a monolith. We
makes up 25% of the S&P 500. Buffett has wisely realized have already pointed to the related but distinct theme of
that it can be ignored no longer and has found a way to monopoly power in tech ecosystems. Investors should
incorporate it into his investing blueprint. consider the role of Big Tech in their portfolio differently
from that of smaller and newer firms that have not yet
Value investors would benefit from following the Oracle’s established such dominance. Valuations can (and should)
lead. They should discard any blind prejudice they have differ widely between cap ranges and between public and
against companies simply because they are in the tech private markets.
sector. Technology is, for better or for worse, a fundamental
part of our lives. They should also adjust their measures of Conclusion
intrinsic value to reflect the reality of today’s “asset-light”
economy. They should develop ways to assess the Value investing has rotated into a massive bet against
considerable value of the tech ecosystems. If the 89-year-old technological disruption. This position cuts across diverse
Buffett can continue to evolve, so can we all. industries but can be isolated using machine learning. The
anti-tech bet explains value’s ongoing drawdown. We
suggest that value investors evolve their framework to
We Are All Tech Investors
accommodate the rising role of technology in our economy.
Many allocators have a significant tilt to value managers. In Meanwhile, we believe allocators must invest in developing
the past, justifying these allocations was easy. One merely an informed view on technological trends in order to truly
had to cite the Gospel of Graham and point to the underwrite their value managers.
outstanding historical performance of his disciples.
However, thirteen years in drawdown has put many
allocators in a tough position.
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Value Investing Is Short Tech Disruption | Aug 2020
Kai Wu
Founder & CIO, Sparkline Capital LP
Kai Wu is the founder and Chief Investment Officer of
Sparkline Capital, an investment management firm applying
state-of-the-art machine learning and computing to uncover
alpha in large, unstructured data sets.
Prior to Sparkline, Kai co-founded and co-managed
Kaleidoscope Capital, a quantitative hedge fund in Boston.
With one other partner, he grew Kaleidoscope to $350
million in assets from institutional investors. Kai was solely
responsible for the models and technology driving the firm’s
investment processes. He also jointly managed all other
aspects of the company, including operations, trading,
investor relations, and recruiting.
Previously, Kai worked at GMO, where he was a member of
Jeremy Grantham’s $40 billion asset allocation team. He
also worked closely with the firm's equity and macro
investment teams in Boston, San Francisco, London, and
Sydney.
Kai graduated from Harvard College Magna Cum Laude and
Phi Beta Kappa.
Disclaimer
This paper is solely for informational purposes and is not an offer
or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security, nor is it to be
construed as legal or tax advice. References to securities and
strategies are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute
buy or sell recommendations. The information in this report should
not be used as the basis for any investment decisions.
We make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in this report, including
third-party data sources. The views expressed are as of the
publication date and subject to change at any time.
Hypothetical performance has many significant limitations and no
representation is being made that such performance is achievable
in the future. Past performance is no guarantee of future
performance.
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