Republic of the Philippines Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917.

SUPREME COURT Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga

Manila Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was
almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go
EN BANC around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior
G.R. No. L-14628             September 30, 1960 thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a
life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, 
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the
vs.
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as
AL., respondents.
apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner. promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents. was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
CONCEPCION, J.: defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action, which was commenced on or about
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco October 4, 1954.
Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals
modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be
noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and
referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, 44 of said Code provides:
Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not
paternity of child and expressed willingness to support give rise to an obligation to contract marriage.
the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the No court shall entertain any complaint by which
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered the enforcement of such promise is sought.
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of
alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due private instrument by an adult, or by a minor
course, later on, said court rendered a decision the with the concurrence of the person whose
dispositive part of which reads: consent is necessary for the celebration of the
marriage, or if the banns have been published,
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the one who without just cause refuses to marry
declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming expenses which he or she may have incurred by
the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to reason of the promised marriage.
pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of
thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the The action for reimbursement of expenses to
fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to which the foregoing article refers must be
pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND brought within one year, computed from the day
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the
damages; and the further sum of FIVE
Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees
Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to
for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, thereon. We quote from the report of the Code
respectively. Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer
recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to to the promise of marriage. But these articles
marry. The pertinent facts are: are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject
 is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only damages, both material and moral, to the
as to the aspect treated of in said articles but engaged person who is rejected.
also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish
legislative solutions to some questions that Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry,
might arise relative to betrothal. Among the the party breaking the engagement shall be
provisions proposed are: That authorizing the obliged to return what he or she has received
adjudication of moral damages, in case of from the other as gift on account of the promise
breach of promise of marriage, and that creating of the marriage.
liability for causing a marriage engagement to
be broken. 1awphîl.nèt

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress.

The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III,
Book I thereof: The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach
of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
made expressly or impliedly. The history of breach of promise suit in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
agreed directly by the future spouses. and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, Balm suit in many of the American States.
without the consent of the parent or guardian, be
entered into by a male between the ages of See statutes of:
sixteen and twenty years or by a female
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Without such consent of the parents or Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be Nevada 1943 — p. 75
the basis of a civil action for damages in case of Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
breach of the promise. New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
female under the age of fourteen years is not Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
civilly actionable, even though approved by the Michigan 1935 — p. 201
parent or guardian. New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding
articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a The Commission perhaps though that it has
male for seduction shall not be affected. followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
mutual promise to marry may be brought. creation of such causes of action at a time when
so many States, in consequence of years of
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry experience are doing away with them, may well
may be brought by the aggrieved party even prove to be a step in the wrong direction.
though a minor without the assistance of his (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79,
parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute
the action. The views thus expressed were accepted by both
houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction
shall include not only material and pecuniary actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of
losses but also compensation for mental and moral damages made by the lower courts is,
moral suffering. accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said
award:
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the
parents, guardians and grandparents, of the Moreover, it appearing that because of
affianced parties, who cause a marriage defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-
engagement to be broken shall be liable for appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him
finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of
 her age and self-control, she being a woman
after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is
liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the
new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article
2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the
language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
the "seduction" therein contemplated is
the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article
337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which
admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten
(10) years younger than the complainant — who around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as
a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind"
"by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay

the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the
support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income
that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as
actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as
moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum
of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection
with the parturiation, and the balance representing
expenses incurred to support the child — and increased
the moral damages to P7,000.00.

With the elimination of this award for damages, the

decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo,

Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.