[G.R. No. 168827. April 13, 2007.
]
BENJAMIN P. MARTINEZ, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dean Dongui-is was a teacher at the Tubao National High School, La Union. Petitioner
Benjamin Martinez, a pedicab driver, was the husband of Dean's co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez.
On October 28, 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint for damages against the
spouses Martinez. They alleged that in March 1998, petitioner, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had
been peddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations; he even told Freda that
Elvisa was Dean's mistress. Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband from spreading lies, and
she replied that Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. Elvisa also filed a complaint against the
spouses Martinez. She alleged that on several occasions, petitioner went to the Shaltene
Pawnshop and Pharmacy where she was employed and accused her of having an illicit affair
with Dean.
On February 3, 1999 At about 1:40 p.m. that day, Dean went to the Tubao Credit
Cooperative (TCC) office to pick up the dividend certificate of his wife who was a member of
the cooperative. He left the building and walked to his car which was parked in front. As he did,
he read the dividend certificate of his wife. Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van
which was parked in front of the building when petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged
from behind the vehicle and stabbed him on the left breast. Dean instantly moved backward and
saw his assailant. Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry into the bank. Petitioner
ran after him and upon cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was able to parry the blow
with his right hand, and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to the floor and tried to
stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew on his left breast. 5 Dean managed to run to the
counter which was partitioned by a glass. Unable to get inside the counter, petitioner shouted at
Dean: " Agparentomeng ka tatta ta talaga nga patayen ka tatta nga aldawen (You kneel down
because I will really kill you now this day).
On March 10, 1999, SPO1 Sulatre filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder
against petitioner in the MCTC. The MCTC opted not to act on the crime pending the arrest
report and SPO1 Sulatre's submission of Dean's sworn statement.
The IRH issued a medical certificate on February 28, 1999, stating that Dean's wounds
would need medical attendance of more than 30 days. Barangay Captain Oller and SPO1 Sulatre
executed an affidavit on petitioner's arrest. Dean had his affidavit sworn before the Public
Prosecutor on March 30, 1999. On September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union
indicted Benjamin for frustrated murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 31, of the
same province.
1st Topic: Self-defense
Issue:
Whether the petitioner acted in self defense whether complete or incomplete.
Ruling:
No, In this case, the trial court gave no credence and probative weight to the
evidence of petitioner to prove that he acted in self-defense, complete or incomplete.
Like alibi, petitioner's claim of self-defense is weak; it is also settled that self-
defense is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Such a plea is both a confession and
avoidance.One who invokes self-defense, complete or incomplete, thereby admits having
killed the victim by inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on the
accused to prove the confluence of the essential elements for the defense as provided in
Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
...(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. ...
Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-
defense. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to
kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but
in retaliation against the original aggressor.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the accused proves
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression is a sudden and
unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or an
intimidating attitude.
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
First. Petitioner failed to surrender himself to the responding authorities who
arrived at the situs criminis,as well as the bolo he used in stabbing the victim. One who
acted in self-defense is expected to surrender, not only himself, but also the weapon he
used to kill or inflict physical injuries on the victim.
Second. The victim sustained three stab wounds on different parts of his body.
Two were fatal stab wounds at his left chest. The presence of a large number of wounds
on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead
indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.
Third. Petitioner testified that he was punched by the victim. However, there is
not a scintilla of evidence to show that petitioner suffered even a scratch as a result of the
alleged fist blows.
2nd Topic: Less serious physical injuries
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should only be convicted of a less crime or less serious
phyical injuries
Ruling:
No, the Court is not swayed.
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime
committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill
the victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder
if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of the
following: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the
crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim.
To begin with, as between petitioner and the victim, the former had more hatred to
harbor arising from the fact that the victim filed a lawsuit against him and his wife.
Petitioner thus had more motive to do harm than the victim. By his own account, he and
Dean had a history of personal animosity.
Secondly, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14 1/2-inch bolo.
Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean merely to defend himself, it
defies reason why he had to stab the victim three times. Petitioner's claim that Dean
suffered only a single non-life threatening wound is misleading. Dr. Rimando, who
attended to and operated on Dean, testified that the victim sustained three (3) stab
wounds, two (2) of which penetrated his heart and lung, causing massive blood clotting
necessitating operation; the other lacerated Dean's his right elbow. The presence of these
wounds, their location and their seriousness would not only negate self-defense; they
likewise indicate a determined effort to kill. Moreover, physical evidence is evidence of
the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
Neither does the non-presentation of Dr. Darius R. Pariñas, the doctor who signed
the medical certificate, would dent a bit the evidence for the prosecution. This is so
because Dr. Pariñas, who assisted Dr. Rimaldo during the operation of Dean, would
merely corroborate Dr. Rimaldo's testimony. As such, his testimony is not indispensable.
Fourthly,from the manner the crime was committed, there can hardly be any
doubt that intent to kill was present. It has been clearly established that petitioner
ambushed Dean and struck him with a bolo. Dean was defenseless and unarmed, while
petitioner was deadly armed.
Lastly,the words of the petitioner while he was assaulting Dean were most
revealing.
3rd Topic: Treachery
Issue:
Whether the treachery is present in the case .
Ruling:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.
In the present case, the prosecution had met the requisites for alevosia to be
appreciated: (1) at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or
form of the attack employed by him. Dean lived to tell about the swiftness of the attempt
against his life:
Q: After getting the dividend certificate where did you proceed next?
A: I went out from the bank, sir. I was able to go to school.
Q: Where you able to go to the school?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Why were you not able to reach the school?
A: Because I was suddenly stabbed by Benjamin Martinez.
Q: Where did Benjamin Martinez stab you?
A: In front of the bank, Sir.
Q: And how did Benjamin Martinez stab you?
A: I was about to go to my car, Sir. I was reading the dividend
certificate that I got from the bank but when I was about one
step away from the back of the L300 van that was parked in
front of the bank, I was suddenly stabbed by him.
Q: Where was Benjamin Martinez at that time when he was stabbed
you?
A: Probably he was hiding at the back of the L300 van, Sir.
When Dean was attacked he was unarmed. He had just exited the cooperative
building and had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he made his way towards his car.
Upon the other hand, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14 1/2-inch bolo. The attacked
on Dean was swift and unannounced; undeniably, petitioner's attack was treacherous.
3rd Topic: Frustrated murder
Issue:
Whether the petetioner is guilty of frustrated murder.
Ruling:
Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6,
first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete.
Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all
that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.
