Yick Wo v Hopkins First Instance of Manila.

After the Liberation of the Manila

Facts and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to
continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation
Yick Wo was imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden
issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
building in violation of a San Francisco statute. That statute
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts
vested in the board of supervisors the discretion to grant or
of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts
withhold licenses to operate laundries in wooden buildings.
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
Yick Wo had operated the laundry in the same building for 22
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
years and fire wardens and safety inspectors had inspected
Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under
the premises and found them safe. The board denied licenses
to all Chinese-American applicants but denied only one of 80 the Japanese).
non-Chinese Americans.
The court resolved three issues:
Yick Wo was fined ten dollars and was imprisoned for failing
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions
to pay. Yick Wo sued the Supreme Court of California for a
made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
writ of habeas corpus and the Court found that the board of
remained valid even after the American occupation;
supervisors had acted within the scope of its authority and
denied the petition. The Supreme Court of the United States 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
granted certiorari. MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the
Issues
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
1. May a city enforce an ordinance in a racially void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
discriminatory manner? of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments
2. Does a law or ordinance granting a person or entity and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry
on a lawful business violate the Fourteenth Amendment 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by
to the U.S. Constitution? MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue
Holding and Rule (Matthews) hearing the cases pending before them.

1. No. A city may not enforce ordinances in a racially Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts
discriminatory manner. and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
2. Yes. A law or ordinance granting a person or entity The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
on a lawful business violates the Fourteenth considered de facto governments, supported by the military
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
If the statute were discriminatory on its face the court would
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in
have applied strict scrutiny. In this case however the statute
force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil
was not discriminatory on its face and the court looked to
obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of
rational basis. The statute was ostensibly intended to reduce
a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of
the risk of fire; however the court also noted that only
Chinese laundries were affected by the statute. The court society, or do away with civil government or the regular
concluded that the statute was intended to reduce Chinese administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it
laundries rather than the risk of fire and ruled that the would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out
statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the with a proclamation abrogating them.
Fourteenth Amendment.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the
Disposition interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all
For Yick Wo.
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Japanese military occupation.

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, IF, according to international law, non-political judgments
initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of proceedings because such a construction would violate the
international law. law of nations.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if hearing the case pending before it.
any other possible construction remains.”
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or
particular construction, or great mischief done, such the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume of the rightful government)
that such construction was not intended by the makers of the
law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” through occupation (established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed through insurrection (established as an independent
to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
“processes of any other governments.” insurrection against the parent state)

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and Virtuoso v Municipal Judge
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and
the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1978, premised his
courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued
plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre
as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal
once established continues until changed by some competent Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict
legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether
OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by there was a probable cause. 2 He likewise alleged that aside
legislative act creates a change. from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure
followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired was clearly excessive. 3 It was in the amount of Pl6,000.00,
sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner.
the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus,
and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent
continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the
may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no
pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was
Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the
government. Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of
Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court 8,000.00.
of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of
and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally
no. 3012. argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course of
intensive questioning by the members of this Court,
Summary of ratio: especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was
ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor
1. International law says the acts of a de facto
entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth
government are valid and civil laws continue even during
Welfare Code. 4 a youthful offender being defined therein as
occupation unless repealed.
"one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the
at the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978 as set
could be provisionally released on recognizance in the forth above.
discretion of a court. 6 According accordingly, after the
hearing, the Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on Gonzales vs. Hechanova
the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco
Facts:
Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent
minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. created a rice procurement committee composed of the
Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, other respondents for the implementation of said proposed
without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case importation.
against petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to On September 25, 1963, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales — a
the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged
the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein,
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8 averring that, in making or attempting to make said
importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents
Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction",
upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or
respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the
cause was constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they Administration or any other government agency;" that
should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
due to the economic or social standing of the alleged the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction
offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights of is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties
an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment
is much more importance attached to the immunities of an therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore,
individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a that said petition be given due course; that a writ of
creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that respondent their agents or representatives from
there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to
excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due
excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage: 9 hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction
permanent.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If
there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no has already entered into two (2) contracts for the Purchase of
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
law. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive executive agreements under international law; that such
bail. As construed in the latest American decision, 'the sole agreements became binding effective upon the signing
permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of
presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the
than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the
'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 10 latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved —
under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one
which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails importation. However, the majority favors the negative view,
the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that
been consummated, the Government of the Philippines respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
having already paid the price of the rice involved therein authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not
said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that,
for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for
Issue: must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

W/N the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the Angara v Electoral Commission
theory that the proposed importation in question is not
governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for
military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1? district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said
Held: district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On
Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution
This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National
Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission
of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec
9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed
In the contracts with Vietnam and Burma, the Court is not
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive
election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts
NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative matter.
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the in taking cognizance of the election protest.
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. that in cases of conflict between the several departments and
He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the
the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
executive agreement providing for the performance of the finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
very act prohibited by said laws. boundaries.

The writ of preliminary injunction

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
question whether or not respondents herein should be actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941,
of all authority. or the “Party-List System Act” and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated
the government. April 3, 2007.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the
Bantay vs. COMELEC/Rosales v Comelec various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private
May 4, 2007 respondents named therein be “declare[d] as unqualified
to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for
be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
participating in the elections.
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their ISSUE:
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14,
2007. 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the
Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their
A number of organized groups filed the necessary petition on the ground that these groups and their respective
manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the nominees do not appear to be qualified?
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic
Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP- 2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the
LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list violated the right to information and free access to
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07- documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
two letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law nominees.
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees.
Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein.
April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for keeping the groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
names of the party list nominees away from the public is the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-
nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the list groups,
names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise
assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private would require the Court to make a factual determination, a
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the
determining whether or not their respective nominees Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in
a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list
(note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. ) petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups
subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: lies.

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of Romulo v Yniguez

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, NATURE
transactions, or decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded Petition for prohibition to review the judgment of the
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
law. Government.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: FACTS

- Petitioners, more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan,

filed Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, President Marcos, w/ a verified complaint for impeachment.
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public The Speaker referred the matter to the Committee on Justice,
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found
the complaint insufficient in form and substance, disapproved
COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the Resolution and dismissed all charges.
the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A.
7941,which last sentence reads: “[T]he names of the - Ramon Mitra filed a motion praying for recall from the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified archives of the Resolution and verified complaint. Motion was
list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to disapproved by the Batasan
deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in
R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or .- Petitioners also claim that sections of the Rules on
even publishing through mediums other than the Impeachment are violative of the Constitution bec:
“Certified List” of the names.
- they empower smaller body to supplant complaint to
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the impeach endorsed by 1/5 of all members of Batasan
people have the right to elect their representatives on the
- they vest in Committee the power to impeach/not to
basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-
impeach when such is vested only in the Batasan
list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would ISSUES
eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would Procedural
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes
WON SC can order Committee to recall fr the archives the
in an election.
Resolution and complaint
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release
Substantive
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in
the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right WON Sections 4, 5, 6, 8 of Batasan Rules on Impeachment is
where the real parties in interest are the public, or the unconstitutional and WON the Committee Report dismissing
citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, the Resolution should be declared null and void
however, the right to information and its companion right of
access to official records are not absolute. The people’s HELD
right to know is limited to “matters of public concern”
Procedural
No.- Resolution of the constitutionality of the questioned Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments
provisions of the Rules is not even necessary. What and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he
petitioners want is for SC to compel Batasan to hear the could only be suspended and investigated in the same
impeachment case. manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and,
therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted
- When Batasan denied motion of Mitra to recall fr the to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to
archives, it in effect confirmed the action of the Committee. It section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A.No. 296) and Revised Rule
follows that a majority vote of the members of Batasan 140 of the Rules of Court.
confirming the act of the Committee makes impossible the
required at least 2/3vote of all members to support -On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication
conviction. signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie
- Dismissal by the Batasan is beyond the power of SC to case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct
review. SC can’t also order the Committee bec an order to the prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
Committee is an order to the Batasan itself. suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the
above charges."
Substantive
-On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court,
No.- The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of
reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the
proceedings may adopt rules of procedure on impeachment
Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of
proceedings. These rules are not inconsistent with the
discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer
Constitutional provisions.- Also, while the Batasan assigned to
respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
the Committee the task of determining whether petition is
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions,
sufficient, the Committee is still required to submit its report
or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
to the Batasan. The report may be approved or not.- That the
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised
rules on impeachment of the Interim Batasan are better is no
Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges
argument against the validity of the Rules on Impeachment of
against public officers is administrative or executive in nature;
the Batasan. The Rules are always within the power of the
that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-
Batasan to modify. These are merely procedural and not
judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental
substantive. Also, generally, courts may not take cognizance
to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation
of matters regarding rules of public deliberative bodies.
of the principle of the separation of powers.
Petition is dismissed.
ISSUE:
Noblejas v Teehankee
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
NATURE:
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment
Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
FACTS:
HELD:
-Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of NO
section 2 of RA1151, the said Commissioner is declared
- section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation,
"entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and
suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by
-On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is
disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner
"approving or recommending approval of subdivision, of Land Registration is a District Judge , or in fact a member of
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering the Judiciary.
areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original
titles."Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of because immediately after its promulgation, Congress
First Instance" includes by implication the right to be enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the
investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which
result in the same right being possessed by a variety of became Republic Act No. 590.
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of
the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the
Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic
and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear
process of impeachment(Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2). example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of
the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the
the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is
to otherofficers, provision to that effect is made in plain and
recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
unequivocal language.
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the
general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is
of the Court of First Instance "the right to be investigated by not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in
upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
charging this court with the administrative function of independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal
supervisory control over executive officials, and but of the other courts, whose present membership number
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the
Executive over such officials. judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries.
Disposition
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case
Writs denied, petition dismissed of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution
Endencia v David thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that
the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue,
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of
ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
especially when the interpretation sought and provided in
fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to the brief of
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of
given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, People v Vera
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of
for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be
the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.
Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President
Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
boards the power to provide a system of probation to
ISSUE:
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the
therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is ground that the President does not have the authority to
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 create municipalities as this power has been vested in the
of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The legislative department.
said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and
this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the RULING:
said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
the executive to provide pardon because providing probation,
in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. “The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of
The power of control under this provision implies the right of
penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is
the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government,
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so
governments are concerned. Such control does not include
protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act
the authority to either abolish an executive department or
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised
apply only in those provinces in which the respective
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
President more power than what was vested in him by the
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
Constitution.
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null
that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained
have a system of probation within their locality. This would from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement
officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. by the municipalities referred to.

Pelaez v Auditor General

FACTS: