People V Concepcion Alonzo V Intermediate Appellate Court
government is a party, the Solicitor General shall represent it.
1) People v Concepcion ruled that granting a credit by the Sec. 1684 of the same Code provides:
president of the Philippine National Bank to a partnership in "No private counsel shall be employed or appear in any court
which he was a partner constituted an indirect loan in in behalf of the Government or any of its branches, subdivisions
violation of Section 35 of Act 2747, which prohibited loans to or agencies, without the written approval of the Solicitor
bank directors. General."
2) Alonzo v Intermediate Appellate Court concerned the The law is clear that
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People V Concepcion Alonzo V Intermediate Appellate Court
government is a party, the Solicitor General shall represent it.
1) People v Concepcion ruled that granting a credit by the Sec. 1684 of the same Code provides:
president of the Philippine National Bank to a partnership in "No private counsel shall be employed or appear in any court
which he was a partner constituted an indirect loan in in behalf of the Government or any of its branches, subdivisions
violation of Section 35 of Act 2747, which prohibited loans to or agencies, without the written approval of the Solicitor
bank directors. General."
2) Alonzo v Intermediate Appellate Court concerned the The law is clear that
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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People v Concepcion Alonzo v Intermediate Appellate Court
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Facts:
Bank and a member of the Board thereof, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.” Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased National Bank. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."was a co- parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of partnership where Concepcion is a partner. Subsequently, Tarlac. Concepcion was charged and found guilty in the Court of First On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, Instance of Cagayan with violation of section 35 of Act transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for No.2747. Section 35 of Act No. 2747 provides that the the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated to agents of the branch banks. Counsel for the defense argue "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the concession of a By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after credit. They averred that the granting of a credit to the co- the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, is not subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747. their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. ISSUE: On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the co- coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, “loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747. however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own HELD: complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one party within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the loaned, with or without interest. The concession of a "credit" requirement of the law. necessarily involves the granting of "loans “up to the limit of Issue: the amount fixed in the "credit," Whether or not Article 1088 of the Civil code correctly In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the interpreted and applied. primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition against case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day man may serve two masters — that where personal interest period for redemption had expired long before the complaint clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. was filed in 1977? If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business Held: venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition. Art. 1088.Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has period of one month from the time they were notified in made it so difficult for the public to understand and know writing of the sale by the vendor. what the law is with respect to a given matter, is inconsiderable measure the unwarranted interference by In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared judicial tribunals with the English languages found in statutes that the notice required by the said article was written notice and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the The other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been that thereafter the 30-day period started running and submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during construction the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs There are two specific laws prohibiting private counsels made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in representing the government- Sec. 1683 of the Revised other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right Administrative Code states of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired. "The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except Ramos v CA in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme FACTS Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or •The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the to some other municipality or municipal district in the same services of the law firm of Cruz Durian &Academia (now Cruz province. When the interests of a provincial government and Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a case for land recovery of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial against MariaC. Ramos et al fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political •Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed Hagonoy entered their appearance as supervising counsel in by its council.” the case for land recovery Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. •Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as 2264, which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head counsel for the municipality of the legal division or office of a municipality, •Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that "Shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform private counsel only wanted to serve his native town such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to •Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certoriari with him by the council" the Court of Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the trial Estrada v Desierto court, thus the case is appealed to the Supreme Court Facts: ISSUE WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria to represent LGU is correct Macapagal-Arroyo’sassumption of the presidency of the RULING Philippines, filed by her immediatepredecessor Joseph Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes, Estrada.What actually happened: May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution overwhelming lead.Arroyo is elected as Vice- recognizing and expressingsupport for the Arroyo President. presidency. Other countries expressed the same. October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is Singson starts publiclyaccusing Estrada and his family nominated by Arroyo to be herVice-President of receiving jueteng payoffs. February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singson’s accusations terminating theImpeachment Court. resound in both the Senateand House of Representatives, mainly through opposition What the parties to this case did: members /members of the Minority. o February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, prohibition with a prayer for awrit or preliminary including Departmentof Social Welfare and injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from Development Secretary Arroyo. Estrada’s allies in continuingthe probe on the criminal cases filed theMajority defect to the other camp. Past against him (OMB Case No. 0-00-1629,1754-1758), presidents and Archbishop CardinalSin call for supposedly until his term as President is over. Estrada’s resignation. o February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. wanted to be confirmed as the “lawful November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process andincumbent President of the Republic of the formally starts, with 21Senators as judges, and Philippines” and Arroyo only astemporary / acting Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, president until he is able to resume his duties. Jr.presiding. o February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Estrada’s consolidatedpetitions. Impeachment trial proper.Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators vote against theopening 1.Petitioner’s Arguments: of “the second envelope,” which allegedly contains evidence toprove that Estrada indeed kept a secret •He has not resigned as President yet, and so bank account worth 3.3 billion pesosunder the name Arroyo’s presidencywas void since the position was “Jose Velarde.” These 11 outnumbered the 10 not vacant at the time she wassworn in. senators whowanted to have the envelope opened. •He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the President, andthat he is merely on leave. impeachmentproceedings, postponed indefinitely. •Given the above arguments, Estrada is still January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to President, especiallysince he was never impeached, EDSA in a mass movementcalling for Estrada’s and he thus enjoys PresidentialImmunity from all resignation (dubbed the “EDSA II Movement”). kinds of suit. January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support •The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since from Estrada, and moremembers of the Executive he hadalready developed a bias against him branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a (Estrada) from the“barrage of prejudicial publicity on snapelection for President “where he would not be a his guilt.” candidate.” 2.Respondents’ Argument: January 20, 2001: Estrada’s and Arroyo’s advisers start negotiations on a“peaceful and orderly transfer •The cases pose a political question (“ ‘the of power,” only to be cut short by legitimacy of theArroyo administration’ ”) and Arroyo’soathtaking as the 14th President of the are therefore out of the Court’s jurisdiction, Philippines. That same day, Estradaand his family especially since Arroyo became president leave Malacañang. Estrada releases a statement throughpeople power, and has already been which saidthat he was leaving Malacañang “for the recognized as such by othergovernments. They sake of peace and in order to beginthe healing compare the present case with process of our nation.” He also sends a letter to both Aquino’s“revolutionary government chambersof Congress saying that he “[is] unable to exercise the powers and duties of [his] office.” Issue: Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, theresignation or retirement of any public officer which makes Arroyo just anActing President. (Whether pending a criminal oradministrative investigation for Estrada resigned from his position) any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Code’s provisions on bribery. The Held: Estrada resigned from his position. There are two Court interpreted thisprovision according to the elements that must be present toconsider someone to have intent of the lawmakers, and that is that resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of theprovision was included supposedly to “prevent relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estrada’s the act of resignation orretirement from being used actuations before he left Malacañang, and so he must be … as a protective shield to stop the investigationof a considered to have resigned. pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent hisprosecution under [RA 3019]…” Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, Estrada therefore cannot invoke thisprovision to contemporaneous andposterior facts and violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance onthe issue), the Court found that Estrada’s acts to Gaanan v CA be tantamount to hisresignation. For intent: the Court mainly used Angara’s Diary, This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA “Final Days of JosephEjercito Estrada,” in order to 4200 or Anti-wiretapping Act intuit Estrada’s intent. The Diary, which waspublished in a major publication, described Facts: Estrada’s acts following themassive withdrawal of In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito support by former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living isquoted to have proposed a snap election of which room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the he would not be a part.He was also shown to have withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault conceded to the idea that he had to resign. For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned five. the appellant to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular a.Estrada acknowledged Arroyo’s oath-taking as lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. President of theRepublic. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to b.He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a the sake of peace butdid not say that he would telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed return or that he was leaving onlytemporarily. He did conditions for the settlement not specify what kind of inability it was thatprevented him from discharging his presidential Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask duties at that time. Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions, which the latter answered in affirmative. Complainant then told c.He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the them. The Courttook this as a “past opportunity.” money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted insisted that complainant himself should d.He also said he was ready for any future challenge, receive the money. And when he received the money at a and the Court tookto mean “a future challenge after restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of occupying the [presidency].” thePhilippine Constabulary. e.He called on his supporters to join efforts at Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit reconciliation andsolidarity. The Court said that stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00for the these would not be possible if Estradarefuses to give withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant then up the presidency. charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for listening to Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. as a matter of law sinceSection 12 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Telephone party The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the trial court, holding that the communication between the Act. complainant and Laconico was private in nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use such communication without the knowledge and consent of of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 . There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate Issue: WON extension telephone is among the prohibited installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a intercept, or record the spoken words. private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a In statutory construction, in order to determine the true telephone line. intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated Held: No. expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, Ruling: the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA4200, Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same persons such as government authorities or representatives of or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would organized groups from installing devices in order to gather be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. be presumed by the party or parties being overheard Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. recording a telephone conversation. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among The court also ruled that the conduct of the party would such devices or arrangements differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held There is no question that the telephone conversation out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico there is no distinction between that sort of action and was "private" made between one person and another as permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the distinguished from words between a speaker and a public; same purpose. the affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension annoying the call may be. telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Such the penal statute must be construed as not including an that ". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his extension telephone as ruled in PP vs.Purisima telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might Wherefore, the petition is granted, decision of the IAC is hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could annulled and set aside and petitioner is acquitted for the be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone crime of violating RA 4200 to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. Alfon v Republic Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v.Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name Facts: should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. Matabuena v Cervantes She was registered at the Local Civil Registrars Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was TOPIC: Nature and concept of statutory construction baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella FACTS: Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and the and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years defendant assisted by their respective counsels, are: with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended 1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris question; College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and 2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records vivos(referring to a transfer or gift made during one's lifetime, from elementary to college show that she was registered by as opposed to a testamentary transfer which is a gift that the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her takes effect on death)in favor of defendant, Petronila right of suffrage under the same name. She has not Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, committed any felony or misdemeanor. She filed a verified 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed 3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. took effect immediately was made during the common law Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners relationship as husband and wife, they were married on prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first March 28, 1962; name but not the surname. The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to 4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on change not only her first name but also her surname so as to September 13, 1962; be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs. 5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the 1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the Art. 364. “Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally estate and inheritance taxes thereon. use the surname of the father” is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix Matabuena legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its maintains that the donation made by Felix to Petronila mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void because they were lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of living without the benefit of marriage (common law Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use marriage). This is in pursuant to Article 133 of Civil Code the surname of her father. which provides "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. On 23 November 1965, the lower 2. Grounds for change of name court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made The following may be considered, among others, as proper before Cervantes’marriage to the donor. Hence this appeal. or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a ISSUE:WON the ban on a donation between the spouses petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a HELD: The lower court decision of November 23, 1965 consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural dismissing the complaint withcosts is REVERSED. The child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso (for an undivided part). The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disallowed the payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on the disposition in accordance with the above opinion. ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to RATIO:It is a principle of statutory construction that what is it. within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law personally liable for the amount paid for the construction of a is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be public school building on the ground that the infrastructure it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal contract is null and void for want of one signature? provision would not be attained. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar RULING: provision of the old Civil Code says clearly that if the policy of The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner the law is (in the language of the opinion of the then Justice and Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable and, J.B.L. Reyes of that Court) "to prohibit donations in favor of therefore, the petitioner should not be made to personally the other consort and his descendants because of fear of pay for the building already constructed. undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is In the case before us, the chief accountant issued a certificate every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons of availability of funds but failed to sign the contract as living together as husband and wife without benefit of witness. But since Section 86 states that the certificate shall nuptials be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his Melchor v Commission on Audit signature to the contract was somehow made up by his own FACTS: certification which is the basic and more important validating document. We agree with the petitioner's view that there Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of Phase I of in the execution of the contract. the home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000. Pablo LESSON: Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of It is a rule of statutory construction that the court may availability of funds to cover the construction cost. Narido, consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal however, failed to sign as a Witness to the contract, contrarily meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI) would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. No. 968.
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the
contractor, in a letter dated November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.
The contractor requested series of extensions for the
completion of the construction which the petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things, increased cost of construction materials and labor.