Panlaqui v.
COMELEC and VELASCO
G.R. No. 188671 | February 24, 2010
CASE DOCTRINES:
It is proper for the COMELEC to deny Panlaqui’s `proclamation. Since Velasco’s disqualification
as a candidate had not become final before the elections, the Comelec properly applied the rule on
succession.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. To allow the defeated
and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning
of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.
RELEVANT FACTS:
Nardo Velasco (Velasco) was born in Sasmuan to Filipino parents. He moved to the United States
where he subsequently became a citizen. Upon Velasco’s application for dual citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and returned to the
Philippines.
Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, which application was denied by the
Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of
voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan which reversed the ERB’s decision
and ordered his inclusion in the list of voters of Sasmuan. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
reversed the MTC Decision.
Velasco filed his Certificate for Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Sasmuan. Mozart Panlaqui
(Panlaqui), another candidate for the said position, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco’s CoC based on gross material misrepresentation as to his residency
and, consequently, his qualification to vote. Velasco won in the elections. As the Comelec failed to
resolve Panlaqui’s petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his oath of office and assumed the duties
of the office.
Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec cancelled his COC and
nullified his proclamation which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051. As such, Panlaqui filed a motion
for him to be proclaimed as mayor but the COMELEC en banc dismissed the motion on the ground that
the rule on succession does not operate in favor of Panlaqui as the second placer because Velasco was
not disqualified by final judgment before the election day.
COMELEC then ordered Velasco to vacate his mayoralty post for the incumbent vice-mayor to
assume office as mayor.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the RTC Decision in the voter’s inclusion proceedings must be
considered as the final judgment of disqualification against Velasco, which decision
was issued more than two months prior to the elections.
(2) Whether or not it is proper for the COMELEC to deny the proclamation of Panlaqui
as mayor.
RULING:
(1) No.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take
cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no
jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether
there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public office. The
finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate
into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible. Besides, when the RTC issued the Decision, there was yet no COC to cancel
because Velasco’s COC was filed only on March 28, 2007.
(2) Yes.
It is proper for the COMELEC to deny Panlaqui’s `proclamation. Since Velasco’s disqualification
as a candidate had not become final before the elections, the Comelec properly applied the rule on
succession.
x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be
to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. To allow the defeated
and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning
of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.
