CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS.

DESIERTO

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation
also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’
filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the
Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as
presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other
bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be
held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will
not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether
the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the
sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is
clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer
may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another).
 ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner
uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using
the facial challenge.

Ruling:

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free
speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is
more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.

Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the
element of the offense.

Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
“pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder –

We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports
to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
“willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite
mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of
the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
Gregorio Perfecto, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was
illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce
it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution thereof.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment
to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", salaries
of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers
when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and second, when the
Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off
the judges’ compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries
really impairs them.

FACT

In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members
of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may
be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office

ISSUE

Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution.

HELD

Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution
thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed
against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of
the Constitution.
 Endencia vs. David, G.R. No. L-6355, August 31, 1953
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a provision that removed all income
tax exemptions of public officers, including that of judges.

Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a case to declare it unconstitutional
before the CFI of Manila. The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and declared the said provision
unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of Internal Revenue, Saturno David, to refund the
income tax collected from the magistrates.

Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the collection of income taxes was a
diminution of magistrates’ compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution, which states that “members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts
shall receive compensation will not be diminished during their continuance in the office.”

The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was promulgated precisely because of the
unfavorable reception of the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer.

ISSUE/HELD: 

Whether Sec. 13 of RA no. 590 is constitutional – YES

RATIO:

Congress enacted Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 immediately after the Supreme Court interpreted Sec.
9, Article VIII of the 1987 Consitution in Perfecto V. Meer, where the High Court held that the
collection of income tax from judges and justices was a diminution of their compensation. The
congressional act explicitly counters the heart of the ruling. Because the constitution is above
every enactment of Congress, it follows that Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 should also be considered
null and void.

Moreover, Congress’ enactment of the RA 590 clearly manifests that it has a different
interpretation of of the constitutional provision. This act, however, violates the doctrine of the
separation of powers among the branches of the governmentis and invades the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is that of interpreting and
applying the laws and the Constitution.
 Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making
deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries.

According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a
violation of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that:

“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased”.

In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are being
decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis.

In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6,
Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to
revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries.

The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to representations
that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. While the question has been resolved, the Court decided to settle the
legal issues through a judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES

RATIO:

Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax

This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office. Further, the deletion of the grant of exemption
from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring the equality of
the three branches of government.

Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners.
The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10,
Article VIII further clarified the issue:

Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased”
and that the word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted.

Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after “decreased”, it is

Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Dencia vs David
were not applicable anymore.