Plaintiff’s Negligence

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

1) Manila Electric v. Remonquillo, 99 Phil 117

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors
MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO,
SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.

FACTS:
Media Agua – A canopy over a window. Usually a scallop-bordered cloth or awning. In modern houses, it
could be as simple as a ledge shading window.

On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition.
The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno
received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion,
turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire
of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the
“media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children filed suit
to recover damages from the company.

“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the
street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s
house was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident
took place, although fortunately with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter
was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the
house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a result
Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but le ft the other
end where it was.

“At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance
from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which the deceased was making repairs was
only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept three feet
from the building.’ Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning
should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the side of the house and that, thus
measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is
manifestly groundless, for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the building to which it is
attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation.
Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city
regulations, should be measured from the edge of the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the
house involved herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of
said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter or
39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than
the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than
the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by the city
authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and that if he had not done so Appellant’s wire
would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three feet from the edge of the
‘media agua’. It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’ was constructed the owner was given
a final permit of occupancy of the house.

The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts. There was, according to
Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire; secondly, because the only insulation material that may be
effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive.

 Trial Court rendered judgment in their favor — P10,000 as compensatory damages; P784 as
actual damages; P2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs.
 Court of Appeals, affirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees
from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Magno was due to his own negligence.

HELD:
Yes. we are inclined to agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was
primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media
agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence.

Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was
actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even
considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any
projecting part thereof, such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms of the permit
given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide,
the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches.
In fixing said one meter width for the “media agua” the city authorities must have wanted to preserve
the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however,
the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches
and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally constructed and the
electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its a pproval by the city
through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance
and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The Company
cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance
between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced,
to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.

Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media agua” was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only one
meter-wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or
hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media agua” and
the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal
contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.

Company not Liable because:

1. The claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were
unrefuted as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept
them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or
wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate said wires.
2. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered
sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a
greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other
factors had to be considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting
them could not be located too far toward the middle of the street.
3. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that
although it is a well- established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages or
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not
insurers of the safety of the public.

The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he
was
called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua” just below the third story window, it is to be
presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a s tranger to
electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and
experience failed him, and forgettng where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both
hands and at arms-length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the
winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the la􀆩er’s length of 6 feet. For a
be􀆩er understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the
following citation helpful:
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a di stinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause . And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”
 2) PLDT v. CA, GR No 57079, 178 SCRA 94

FACTS

Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses
would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane,
then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The
spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms,
legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s
windshield was also shattered.

PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be
held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of
Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that
it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying
that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTC’s decision.
(SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and executory
because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

RATIO

The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not
imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen because the
jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to
the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but
should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in time. The
mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence
and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.
 The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes
their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.

The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the
injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of
the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have
completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient
evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving
testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The
absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where the
spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

Contributory Negligence
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages
that he may recover.

3) Genobiagon v. CA, 178 SCRA 422

NATURE

Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of
homicide thru reckless imprudence.

FACTS

- On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was
crossing the street. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old
woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so
fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake
the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at the middle of the road. The
appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the
appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant,
Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that
bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old
woman was unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3
hours later.

-trial court: Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed
- Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate
cause of the accident which led to her death

ISSUES

Whether contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon

HELD: NO

- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.

- "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs. Quiñones, 44 O.G. 1520)

Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner
which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is
devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA
198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.

4) Rakes v. Atlantic, 7 Phil 359

NATURE: Action for damages

FACTS

- The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the employment of defendant,
Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails
on 2 hand cars, some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At one point,
the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was
walking by the car’s side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the knee.

- The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon.
This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the
track or had any proper system of inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep the
rails from slipping off.

- However, the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. As Rakes was walking along the car’s
side when the accident occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury
inflicted, although not as the primary cause.

- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against
the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable.

ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner

HELD: YES

- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman.

-The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining
causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his
damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.

- Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5,000. SC deducted PhP2,500, the amount
fairly attributable to his own negligence.

SEPARATE OPINION: WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]

- the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident—it also required the
negligence of the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not be afforded relief

5) Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 269 SCRA 695

NATURE

Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case

FACTS

- the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the
former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had
made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited, and were instead deposited to
the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the
petitioner bank.

ISSUE

What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent
RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's?

HELD

- The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate, presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished.

Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Reasoning

- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.

- In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.

- Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.

- Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or
duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.

- The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should
not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy
lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have
proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account
holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have
been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect
that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space
later on. A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation
and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.
Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the
private respondent.

- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. In the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then
Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of
the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the
bank's validation procedures.

- It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February, 1983, or after the lapse of more than
seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's
accounts (May, 1975 to July, 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the
practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Undoubtedly, this is gross, wanton, and
inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees.
- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the
private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by
the petitioners.

- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the
act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene
Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.

- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This
doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The rule would also
mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus
providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it
cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

- In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to
treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.

- The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise
negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have
been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised
even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC, to
wit:

. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage
on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the
award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioner.

Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of
actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena
Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse
against Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

SEPARATE OPINION: PADILLA [dissent]

Fortuitous Event
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. (1105a)

6) Juntilla v. Funtanar, 136 SCRA 624

NATURE: Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu

FACTS

- Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro,
registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its
right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost
consciousness upon landing on the ground. When he came back to his senses, he found that he had a
lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back and also found
this “Omega” wrist watch was lost. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City
Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his
watch but the watch was nowhere to be found.

- Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu
against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer, alleging that the accident was beyond
their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the
time it blew up.

- City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu,
which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUES

1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a
fortuitous event

2. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event

HELD
1. YES

- The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co., that “a tire blow-out
does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all.”
This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v
De Jesus, et al, We held that, “ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co. not
binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain
in the case at bar.” In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the
respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was
running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a
public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire
blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the
accident. The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear.

- While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still
visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was
presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken
by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-
up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the
fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.

2. NO

Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics:

1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human will

2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid

3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner

4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor

Reasoning

- In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up
thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.

- Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al, that: “The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages
from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the
degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. with regard to inspection and
application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as
being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.
According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.

- It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage,
and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.

Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED

7) Hernandez v. COA, 179 SCRA 39

NATURE: A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief

FACTS

- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach
Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2
checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He estimated
that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the
same day. However, the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. The petitioner decided
nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the
following day. And so, he collected the cash value of the checks. The petitioner had two choices: (1)
return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money with
him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. He took a passenger jeep bound for his
house in Bulacan. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and
forcibly took the money he was carrying. Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately followed in
desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. Alvarez was
subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large
and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered.

- the petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from money accountability under
Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.

- however, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
petitioner's request, observing inter alia:

In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be
attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment
fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is
the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been
aborted.
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done
only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous
event over which he had no control.

- On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate, he
says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it, if only because his home in Marilao was much
nearer than his office in Ternate; that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger
in Ternate than in Marilao; that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably
been foreseen, especially on that busy highway.

- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds.
Later, however, his successor sided with the petitioner, agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any
negligence or, assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence, had made up for it with his efforts to
retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers, who was eventually convicted.

- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his
own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its
contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and
he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo concludes that in deciding to take
the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner
was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the
robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed.

ISSUE

WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the
petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money

HELD

NO

- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have
been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is
a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense and our own experiences, or our
intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner.

- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The
decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and
prudent person.

Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken
from him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.

8) Gotesco Investment v. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18

NATURE: Petition for Review

FACTS

- In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto
went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment
Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the
number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling
of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and
hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the
street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.

- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital
from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate
(Exh, "C") issued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries:

- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due
to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.

ISSUES

1. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial

2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure

HELD

1. NO

- there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the
cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a graduate of
architecture from the St. Louie University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the
government examination for architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse
of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that proposition is to
introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence.

2. NO

- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is
not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give
any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that
the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr.
Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Petitioner could have easily
discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real
reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer,
but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident
investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the
finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as
force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects
could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and
maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on
inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same.
That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects
in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove
that it was ever inspected at all.

- It is settled that - The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the
premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the
doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.

- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that - Where a patron of a theater or other place of
public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the
control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events
would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.

Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

9) National Power v. CA, 222 SCRA 415

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court

FACTS

- When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon
Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. This however
caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and
properties to be washed away.

- The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the
spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).

Plaintiffs claim:

- NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River

- despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise
due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam
- when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the
defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby
releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of
members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals

Respondents comments:

- NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric
plant

- NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees

- written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein
about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising
them to take the necessary Precautions

- the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid
greater damage to people and property

- in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted

- the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure
and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria.

ISSUES

1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence

2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused
by force majeure

HELD

1. YES

- A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et al. vs, Court of Appeals, et al.," involving the
very same incident subject of the instant petition. The court there declared that the proximate cause of
the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private
respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners,

- on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties in the
cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent found as conclusively established that
indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the
spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees
headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice"
supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
insufficient.

2. YES
- given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far
as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned.

- In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner
of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.

- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found
to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).

Disposition Petition dismissed.

10) Southeastern College v. CA, 354 Phil 434

NATURE

Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution dated
September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in “Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern
College, Inc.”, which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.
The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS

- Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a
four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the
morning, a powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondents’ house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Report dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
“5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the
area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road,
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those
located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.

6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses
is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars
embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the
trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are
not anchored at all to the roof beams.”

- It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of
persons living in the vicinity,” the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a “structural
hazard.”

- In their Complaint [6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on
culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses. And so they sought to recover from
petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorney’s fees; plus costs.

- In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating
typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it
has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is “in tip-top condition”; and furthermore, typhoon “Saling”
was “an act of God and therefore beyond human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for
the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

- The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city
engineer. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES

WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the
falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was,
within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event

HELD

YES

- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion
finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.”

- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an
event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Escriche elaborates it as “an
unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.” Civilist Arturo M.
Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as
earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion,
attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.

- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.. An act
of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not
trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of
God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that
the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention, or
neglect, or failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.

- After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise,
notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the records and
the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts
misappreciated the evidence proffered.

- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be
foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt
from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from
liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which
naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do
something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner
was negligent, such that if it were not, the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have
been avoided?

- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability
of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular
inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is
one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the
real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot
always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused
accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown.

- In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. Private respondents did
not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications.
Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed.

- Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974, admitted
in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged
before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly
anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even
stronger than “Saling.”

- In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the
appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house.

Assumption of Risk

11) Ilocos Norte v. CA, 179 SCRA 5

Facts:

In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its
wake.

Between 5:30 and 6:00

A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to
recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-
law, Antonio Yabes... and proceeded... northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of
which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged.

Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the
Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ
Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased.

Suddenly, the deceased... screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to
help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.

Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded.

Issues:

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been electrocuted, he acted
immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of
Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte

Electric Company or 1NELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on
Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that
the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to... fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death;

Ruling:

Principles:

12) Afialda v. Hisole, 85 Phil 67

FACTS:

Loreto Afialda was employed as a caretaker of the carabaos owned by spouses Basilio and Francisco
Hisole. On March 21, 1947, Afialda was gored by one of the carabaos, causing injuries which resulted to
his death. The mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure. Afialda’s sister, Margarita,
sued Hisole arguing that under Article 1905 of the Civil Code, “The possessor of an animal, or the one
who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him
or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hisole, as the owner of the carabao, is liable for the damage caused to its caretaker.

HELD:

No. The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal.” Afialda was the caretaker of the animal
and was compensated to tend the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, was the possessor and the
user of the carabao, and was thus the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a
position to prevent the animal from causing damage. It was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences.

Due Diligence

13) Ramos v. Pepsi, 19 SCRA 289

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners, vs . PEPSICOLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and
ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. 1 and Andres
Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958,
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time
of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor- truck was
then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.

CFI – rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI- COLA
had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. PEPSICOLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual
damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees
with costs.

CA – affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified
it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiff's contention,
PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PEPSI-COLA failed to show that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of its
driver in question.
HELD:

No.

DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION OF A DRIVER ILLUSTRATED. — The uncontradicted testimony of (the)
personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a
member of the bottle crop in the production department: that when he was hired as a driver, defendant
company had size him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, and later on, he
was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of, first, theoretical
examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the
defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view therefore, we are of sense that
defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver.

In the case of Campo vs. Camarote, No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our
Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that 'In order that the defendant may be
considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined
the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service.' Defendant
Company has taken all these steps.

DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEE DISCUSSED; ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE
CONSTRUED. — From Article 2180, two things are apparent;

(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection; or both; and

(2) that the presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.

As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in
the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is not surprising that appellants thus confine their
arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the record — as even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17)
reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSICOLA's witness — would show sufficient evidence to
establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.

14) Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. CA, 223 SCRA 521

Facts:

The case arose from Nenita who incurred injuries from being thrown out of the windshield of the
jeepney that she was riding that collided with a bus operated by MMTC (petitioner). Nenita filed for
damages for neither the operator of the jeepney nor the MMTC would pay for the damages sustained by
Nenita.
The RTC ruled that MMTC is abstained from liability for it has proven that it has shown diligence of a
good father of a family in employing and supervising its employees. MMTC stated that it goes through a
process of screening, interviewing, and seminar attending before they hire their employees.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC holding that the MMTC was not able to further prove that its
employees complied with its requirements.

Issue:

Whether or not diligence of a good father has been observed by MMTC.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that MMTC, being sued as employer of the bus driver Leonardo under Art. 2180 or
vicarious liability, was not able to prove that it had exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees as it has not proven that it exercised due diligence in
supervising its employees for mere imposition of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without
anything more is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed upon them by the
law.

The basis of the employer’s vicarious liability is that the responsibility imposed by the article arises by
reason of a presumption of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article
from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary by showing that
they exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. It is clear that it is the non-
performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon them that is why they are
made answerable for damages caused by their employee.

For the doctrine to apply, it must first be shown that there is employer-employee relationship and that
the plaintiff must show that the tort complained of was committed in the scope of his assigned task and
that is when the employer may find it necessary to interpose a defense of due diligence of a good father
of a family. The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by the employer to
prevent damages under Art. 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision the employees
to protect the public.

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Prescription

15) Kramer v. CA, 178 SCRA 518

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

FACTS:

1. On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its
fish catch.
2. Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry for the determination of the proximate
cause of the collission. The Board decided that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the
employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines.
3. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the
Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was
suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
4. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the
ground of prescription.
5. Respondents argue that the prescription period for actions based on quasi-delict is 4 years from when the
cause of action accrued as stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the period should be counted
from April 8, 1976 when the collision occurred.
6. Petitioners argue that the period should be counted from 1982, or when the date when the Decision
ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. They claimed that
maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and
experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve.
 7. RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the petitioners. It stated that prescriptive period under
the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V
Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained.
8. The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA stated that the decisions of an admin are not binding on the
courts. If an accrual of a cause of action has to be dependent on an action of an admin body, then it might
get delayed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the action has prescribed.

RULING + RATIO:

1. YES. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
a. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
i. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created
ii. An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right
iii. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
b. The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arise.
c. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four
(4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need
not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages.
d. The period should be counted from April 8, 1976.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

16) Allied Banking v. CA, 178 SCRA 526

Double Recovery
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.(n)