Gürkan Biçen

Ethnic Terror against Iran: PJAK Example

Abstract

From one point of view, the last millennia of human history is the bulk of struggles
concerning to determine which nations will survive, and which nations will go out of
existence. The important researches conducted for the last two centuries presents that more
than six thousands of languages are spoken in the world, but the number is decreasing
quickly. Therefore, it is considered as a sign of the increasing power of strong nations to
assimilate the others.

The people arguing the nation state is one of the ways of protection from the
assimilation promote the idea that the future of a nation could be guaranteed by the policies of
the state. Although the current international system approves at least in theory the right of
self-government for each nation, sovereign state frequently considered the separatist
movements of the peoples who is located in the area of their authority, but do not share the
same sense of identity with the sovereign community as "terror", and develop a relation with
them as a way of fight against terrorism. Among them, the national Kurdish movement has a
unique importance because it affects a wide territory and four states.

This paper basing on the notions of ethnic terror, the Kurdish identity, national
Kurdish movements, PJAK and the foreign support, intends to examine the place of the Kurds
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, generally the Kurdish movement, and specially PJAK
currently appeared.

Keywords: Iran, Kurd, Kurdistan, PJAK, Israel

In-State Conflict and Ethnic Terror

Because of two controversial concepts in law and politics, it could not be met on an
agreed definition. One of these two concepts is ethnic problem and the other one is terror. In
both of them, it can be seen that target of a group becomes dominant in group members'
opinion about approaching an issue. In other words, active side of controversy and other
(passive) sides would access different solutions.

According to a definition, ethnic question is socio-political faction and disagreement

between groups which defining their own ''self'' and ''other'' on a base of ethnic attributes such
as common origin, language and culture. This kind of a problem not only emerges between
two different ethnic groups, but also between state and a certain ethnic group. Origin of
problem could be variable as well. While a state wastrying to found its own bases on
certain,dominant ethnic group, an ethnic group would struggle for its autonomy or
independence. In any cases, nationalism plays an important role in this issue. Many
conflictsemerge from two different definitions of ethnic identity and citizenship.1

1
*Sakarya University Middle Eastern Institute Ph.D. Candidate
ErolKurubaş, EtnikSorun-DışPolitikaİlişkisiBağlamındaKürtSorunununTürkDışPolitikasınaEtkileri,
 Ethnic movements use cultural, social and political ways, even armed-forces to show
their existence. To make themselves be accepted, these ethnic groups implement some
policies against dominant group or ordinary people. Actions based on violence, when it is
evaluated from a point of view of security, concept of ''ethnic terror'' emerges. Perspective of
clash-management gives a result that can be evaluated as ''in-state skirmish''. 2 Although there
is not an accepted certain definition of terror, it can be defined generally as ''Planned and
systematic actions based on violence against society to create fear and anxiety among people
for a political goal.''3Ethnic terror is defined as the actions of the groups that has emerged
from the ethnic groups who have a feeling of exclusion based on their ethnicity, and defined
as the actions aimed to pressure the party in power via terrifying the society through violence
in order to control the future of the people that they consider themselves as the agents of the
people or to have the right in the distribution of the power.4This definition is similar with
definition of ''clash''that is defined as ''to wound or abate possessors for gaining or claiming
right on their values, status, power or sources''.5 According to them, armed struggle takes
shorter time than peaceful ways to access their goals. 6 Also, central government's weakness in
solving problem becomes a propaganda tool in the hands of them. 7Terrorists perceive
themselves as unwilling warriors against oppressive state, plunderer ethnic or nationalist
groupsand insensitive international society.8 These kinds of groups are generally founded by
an educated elite9 and they try to expand their fields of activity 10 and also claim that they are
fighting for getting the right of self-determination and try to find support at international level
through their propaganda units' contact11 with political parties, intellectuals, academic
institutions and organizations.12 They have mechanisms for both military and political
activities and they believe that political achievement comes after military achievement.
Martin McGuinnes -can be seen as brain of Sinn Fein- was saying ''Sinn Fein will sit at the
table with guns'' and this quote become sign of this belief. 13 Although they have
administration mechanisms, in the organizations of countries of the Third World, leaders'
decisions cannot be indisputable.14

International actors come into scene in three different ways. Firstly, encouraging fight
and expanding it, secondly, reconciliation and thirdly, oppression/isolation. In other words,
impartiality, being intercessor and taking side of government or separatist organization are the
roles of international actors. Foreign powers supporting separatist organizations, not to be in
an illegal position in terms of law, they would do this through indirect ways. These assistance

Ankara Journal of EuropeanStudies, I: 8, N:1, p:42

2
Efegil, Devlet-içi Çatışmalar ve Çatışma Yönetimi (Ders Notları), Sakarya, 2014, p:8
3
Efegil, p:53
4
EminGürses, Uluslararası Sistemin Kıskacında Etnik Terör, Profil Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p:13
5
Efegil, p:15
6
Gürses, p:16
7
Gürses, p:17
8
Efegil, p:53
9
Gürses, p:18
10
Gürses, p:19
11
Gürses, p:20
12
Gürses, p:15
13
Gürses, p:21
14
Gürses, p:19
could be physical like money, gun, education, transportation, logistics and intelligence or be
diplomatic-political support like supporting political campaigns or giving official
declarations.15

Evolution of Kurdish Identity throughout History

The name Kurdistan emerged in the 12th century, after establishing of Seljukid
Empire. The field that Seljuqs called ''Kurdistan'' was in Iran. This province was founded by
Sultan Sancar and centre of it was Bahar Castle in the northwest of Hemedan and this
province was covering Hemedan, Dirvan and Kirmanşah in the east of Zagros Mountains,
Şehr-i Zur and Sancar in the west of it. 16Then this name, Kurdistan has spread and began to
cover all fields that Kurds live.17 Seljuqs andKurds' themselves were calling themselves as
''Kurd'' although they had separations based on religion, language and tribes. This was also
separating Kurds from Turks, Arabs and Iranians.18

Linguists argue that ''Kurd'' means ''warrior'' in Kurdish language. 19 It looks like
rebellionusness is a value in their culture.20According to another opinion, Kurdish identity was
shaped by rebellions against powerful people assimilating or abating Kurdish existence and
Kurds overcame this situation. According to Kurds, history is a place that fighting against
enemy peoples, so it is known that Kurds say ''Our only friend is mountains''21

This perception of Kurds led to this, Mesudi and Taberiwrote that Kurds mainly living
around Zagros Mountains.22There are different claims about origins of this people calling
themselves Kurd. These claims are Arabic origin, Turkish, Iranian and Armenian. 23Some
Kurdish writers claim that Kurdish history traced back to 2000 BCE, to Indo-European people
around Zagros Mountains.24Despite of some writers claiming a history approximately 7-8000
years, Kurdish history is begun with Med Empire established in 8000 BCE in
Persia.However, this view was also evaluated as a myth and many historians did not consider
it. In a close past, a group of ''Israelite'' researcher wrote that Kurds are genetically relatives of
Jews.25In any case, Venetian traveller Marco Polo's memories characterizing them as
bandits26, expressions of people visiting the field in the 16th century, official records and
linguistic culture show that they were identified themselves as Kurds.27

15
Kurubaş, p:45
16
Ahmet BURAN, KürtlerVeKürtDili, Turkish Studies - International Periodical For The Languages,
Literature and History of TurkishorTurkic Volume 6/3 Summer 2011, p:47
17
GhadaHashemTalhami, Diplomacy of the Kurdish territorial nation, International Journal of Contemporary
IraqiStudies, Volume 7,Number 1, p:22
18
Craig Douglas Albert, A History of Violence: Ethnie Group Identity and the Iraqi Kurds, Iran and the
Caucasus 17 {2013), p:223
19
Albert, p:224
20
Albert, p:223
21
Carl Dahlman, ThePoliticalGeography of Kurdistan, EurasianGeography and Economics, 43:4, p:273
22
BURAN, p:47
23
BURAN, p:50
24
Albert, p:224
25
SargisMamikonian, Israel And TheKurds (1949-1990), Iran and theCaucasus, 9.2, p:381
26
Dahlman, p:271
27
Albert, p:224
 This people called ''Kurd'' is living in a field approximately 500 thousand square
kilometre, that is from middle of Turkey to south Caucasus and then via Iran-Iraq border to
southern parts of the zone. Herewith, Kurds live not alone in this zone with water and patrol
sources.28Turks, Arabs, Iranians, Armenians, Assyrians and the others live here also and this
situation makes this area far away from homogeneity.29

There is not certain information about population of the Kurds living in that zone
because censuses are not base on ethnicity.30As average numbers, 25 million31 and 30
million32 claims of different groups about population of the Kurds. 10 million and 35 million
are extremities about this people's population.33It is thought that almost 10-12 million of these
people live in Turkey. 5-6 million people live in Iran and 1 million live in Syria. Also, it is
known that 80 thousand Kurds live in Azerbaijan and Armenia.34 Proportions of the Kurds in
these countries to total population is that %43 is in Turkey, %31 is in Iran, %18 is in Iraq, %6
is in Syria and %2 is in other countries. 35 It should be said that after these studies, in time,
Kurdish population continued to rise and proportions have changed a little bit.

Some scholars studied on the topic whether Kurds are a nation or not and they studied
their language, cuisine, clothes, literature, myths, religion and culture in this context 36. So it
can be said according to these studies that Kurdish language is in Indo-European language
family, similar with Persian language but have not similarity with Turkish and Arabic,
Kurdish literature is generally base on oral culture 37, Kurds are dominantly Sunni Muslim,
Shia comes after38 and a small group of Kurd is Jew.39

Kurdish National Movement in Iran

28
Michael M. Gunter, TheKurdishQuestion in Perspektive, World Affairs, Vol.166 No:4, Spring 2004, p:198
29
Michael Rubin, AreKurds a PariahMinority?,SocialResearch, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Spring 2003), p:295
30
Madih, p:12
31
Alexander Benard and J. P. Schnapper-Casteras, Northern Exposure Kurdistan After the Withdrawal, World
Affairs July / August 2010, p:83; Robert Olson, The Kurdish question in the aftermath of the Gulf War:
geopolitical and geostrategic changes in the Middle East, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992, p:475;
Michael E. Bonine, The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Commentary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002, 43,
No. 4, p:300; Rubin, p:295; Graham E. Fuller, TheFate Of TheKurds,ForeignAffairs, Spring 1993, p:109
32
Natali Denise. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq,Turkey, and Iran, Journal of Third
World Studies, Spring 2010, p:312
33
BURAN, p:48
34
Olson, p:475
35
Gunter, p:197
36
Albert, p:226
37
Albert,p:229
38
Dahlman, p:275
39
Mamikonian, p:385
 Today, Kurdish national identity is accepted but Kurdistan is using officially just in
Iran and Iraq as a term.41Herewith, Kurdish national movement went through many phase.
40

ShaikhUbeydullah, an Ottoman subject, passed Iranian border and controlled Mehabad and
Urumiye for a short time42 in 1880. This movement is accepted as the first example of
Kurdish national movement.43Second Kurdish uprising in Iran emerged in the chaotic
atmosphere of the World War I. In 1920, Ismail Agha Simku 44, a dissident to centralization
policies of Iran, organized an uprising but Rıza Han Pehlevi (later Shah Rıza) oppressed this
uprising.45Simkuwas assassinated and people in uprising places were disarmed. 46 There was
not an intellectual and national base in this uprising but it became an inspiration to rebellions
coming after itself.47

After World War I, in VersaillesPeace Conference, an intention showed to Kurds to

establish a nation state and this intention transformed into a promise in Sevres. 48 However,
England and Russia wanted to improve their relationship with Turkey and the Kurds, in this
situation, felt be betrayed49 because they were waiting for an independent state but they
separated into smaller parts.50

Then, English foreign policy used Kurds as a threat against Turkish, Iranians and
51
Arabs. Borders designated with a treaty between England-Turkey-Iraq dated 5th July 1926,
probably was showing the field between Kurdish state and Turkey. 52 With this treaty, England
became protector of Kurds and Shaikh Mahmud Hafid was appointed as local administrator,
Hafid then declared himself as Kurdish king.53Although the first target could not be accessed,
Sevres Peace Treaty and intention to establish an independent state perceived as a headstone.54

Because of all these reasons, Kurdish society and movement in Iran cannot be
considered as a separated movement than activities of Iraqi Kurds and Kurdish society. These
two always affected each other. After these, a party in Turkey raised its activities during Iran-
Iraq War, it was ''PartiyeKarkaren Kurdistan'' (Kurdistan Workers' Party) under Abdullah
Öcalan.55

40
John R. Bradley, Iran’sEthnicTinderbox, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07, p:181
41
Rubin, p:296
42
Rubin, p:299
43
SabriAteş, In the Name of the Caliph and the Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of 1880–81, Iranian
Studies, 2014 Vol. 47, No. 5, p:736
44
HashemAhmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the
KurdishNationalistMovement in Iran, Middle East Journal Magazine Volume 64, No. 1, winter 2010, p:13
45
Rubin, p:318-319
46
Dahlman, p:283
47
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:13
48
Fuller, p:109
49
Albert, p:229
50
Olson, p:475
51
Olson, p:480
52
Olson, p:481
53
Talhami, p:24
54
Dahlman, p:285
55
Olson, p:489
 Between two world wars, Kurdish movement was weaker than others. Robert Olson
compares Iran and Turkey in terms of Kurdish movements and says that Iran is not secular as
much as Turkey and Iranian government is more tolerated about minorities. 56 However, as
Michael Gunter quoted from KerimYıldız, Iranian culture is very close to Kurdish culture and
Kurds don't feel themselves as foreign there so this situation has an impact on weakness of
Kurdish movement in Iran.57 During this period, none of the foreign powers supported
actually Kurdish movement except France, they thought that supporting central governments
is more proper for their interests. According to USSR, this policy was the best way against
threats coming from England.58

World War II and after Cold War years are the period of alliances and separations for
Kurdish national movement. After RızaPehlevi dethroned in 1941, Kurds founded many
political parties.In 1942, for example, founding with inspiration of KOMALA 59 (Resurrection
Organization of Kurdistan),PartiDemokratiKurdistani Iran (Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan) was one of them.60 To balance USA's existence in the Gulf, USSR changed its old
policy61 and supported Gazi Muhammad, leader of DPIK, under supervision of USSR consul
in Urumiye62 in 22th January 1946, promulgated Republic of Mehabat that live only one
year.63In Iranian borders, a state considering autonomy lived only one years but became a
symbol for Kurdish nationalist movement. 64Republic of Mehabat, in a short time, changed
school curriculums, began to education in Kurdish and translated lecture books into Kurdish,
published daily newspapers and monthly journals, security services was taken from Shah and
given to peshmerga and while doing this, Republic benefited from Barzani, he sent 20.000
peshmerga as assistance.65With its situation, Republic of Mehabat has spread fear also in
Turkey and Iraq.66Then, Rıza Shah's army took control and prohibited Kurdish, so Kurdish
movement in Iran obviously disappeared.67DPIK went underground and this party cooperated
with Tudeh Party68during 1950s. Then, DPIK moved its centre to Iraq.69Democratic Party of
Iraq Kurdistan is also a product of these years.70

There was an important effect of USSR in the process going to Republic of Mehabad
but another factor was also considered as effective about USSR's policy. In 1945's April,
Kurdish nationalist movement organized a ''Union of Kurds'' conference in San Francisco and
56
Olson, p:486
57
The Kurds in Iran: The Past, Present and Future, by KerimYildiz and TanyelB. Taysi. Reviewed by Michael
M. Gunter, p:540
58
Olson, p:483
59
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:14
60
Geoffrey F. Gresh, IranianKurds in an Age of Globalisation, Iran and theCaucasus 13 (2009,) p:189
61
Olson, p:484
62
Gresh, p:189
63
Gresh, p:189
64
Gresh, p:189
65
Gresh, s:190
66
Kirstin J. H. Brathwaite, Repression and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Kurdistan, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 37:6, 473-491, 2014, p:479
67
ShaneDonovan, KurdistanTheElusiveQuestforSovereignty, Harvard International Review Fall 2006, p:8
68
Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:15
69
Gresh, p:190
70
Brathwaite, p:479
then opened propaganda centres in Iraq, Iran and Syria. 71 Turkey, as a NATO member, got
prerogative of oppressing Kurdish activities72 as considered them terrorist movements 73 rather
than recognizing Kurdish identity.

After 1966, Democratic Party of Iran Kurdistan elites turning back to Iran, unified
with Tudeh Party under the slogan ''Democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan'' and fought
together against Shah up to 1968. In 1969, Iranian Kurds founded an organization composed
of city dwellers and intellectuals. Actually this organization was not new, just reunion of an
old one. KOMALA (Society of Revolutionist Toilers of Iran Kurdistan), ideologically Marxist
and defending a democratic Iran with autonomous Kurdistan 74, was moving on its activities as
a part of Iranian Communist Party75.Townies and intellectuals were depicting traditional
Kurdish elites and leaders in Kurdish social order as people do not believe in strong and
national Kurdish movement.76

Conflict between Shah and Kurds was continuing but during the process going to 1979
Islamic Revolution, Kurds generally supported Imam Khomeini. 77 Leader cadre of the
revolution allowed DPIK leader to turn back from exiles that began in the reign of
Shah.78However, after Khomeini's return to Iran, DPIK repeated its autonomy demand and
declared a program with eight articles. In these, there were autonomy for Kurdish field,
Kurdish parliament, recognizing Kurdish language officially, supplying more economic
sources for this field, Kurdish representation in the central government, freedom of press and
organization.79Then foundation of local Kurdish security forces and appointment of local
leaders were added to these articles.80After they were rejected, DKIP defined themselves as a
revolutionist Kurdish organization rather than an Iranian party. 81According to liberal prime
minister Beni Sadr, they were counter-revolutionist and in Iranian press they were shown as
Marxist and Zionist, these Kurdish groups began to attack Iranian army three weeks after
coming of Khomeini.82Actually, a dominant proportion of Iranian Kurds in a positive attitude
about new regime but DPIK and other Marxist Kurdish groups were thinking that Kurds
should never reconcile with this regime, so, they have boycottedreferendum organizing in 1st
April 1979 for determining regime's shape. 83 Conflicts began in February, 1979 and in these
conflicts, Shia Kurds fought together with Khomeini's forces against Marxist and nationalist
Kurds. After 1980, Marxist and nationalist Kurds of Iran, began to attack again with support
of Turkish and Iraqi Kurds.84Moreover, support did not come only from Iraqi and
71
William Linn Westermann, Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion, fuly 1946 issue of Foreign
Affairs, p:50
72
Bonine, p:302
73
Olson, p:488
74
Talhami,p:37
75
Gresh, p:190
76
Gresh, p:188
77
Gresh, p:190
78
Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:17
79
Brathwaite, p:482
80
Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:19
81
Gresh, p:190
82
Rubin, p:319
83
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:18
84
Gresh, p:190
TurkishKurds, organizations like People's Mujahedin of Iran -a leftist organization fighting
against Baath regime and also Islamic regime- were supporting Kurdish movement as well
and playing a role in resuming war.85Opinion of central government became clearer after
joining of DKIP to National Resistance Council of People's Mujahedin of Iran in 1982 in
Paris.86After 3 years, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took control of Kurdish region and
armed Kurdish elements deported, in 1984, loss of Kurds raised to 20.000 militant 87 and this
led to decrease of volume of fights.88Decisive victory of the army came in
1988.89Abdurrahman Kasımlo, leader of DPIK who supports Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War90
and being seen as the most impressive Kurdish leader in the 20th century after Mustafa
Barzani, was assassinated in Vienna, 1989.91His successor's fate was the same with him, in
Berlin in 1992 he was also assassinated. 92Kurdish nationalist movement blamed Iranian
central government for both assassination.

As a result of positive cases during presidency of Mohamed Khatami, nationalist

Kurdish movement directed itself to socio-cultural policies. Kurds began to exercise rights
coming from Iranian constitution.93 In this case, many journals were published in Iranian
universities in Kurdish language. Cultural activities were performed in every Kurdish city.
Kurdish deputies presented themselves as a different group. Number of Kurdish students in
Iran universities raised and these students joined political and cultural debates actively.
Kurdish channels in TV also began to be watched and their effects increased depended on
these increasing rating. Kurdish movement took care of separating itself from
predecessors.94However, as we will explain below, this positive atmosphere also could not
prevent emergence of new armed groups.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was arming Iraqi Kurds against Baath regime and Iran
also played a role in increasing Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. 95PKK began its
actions in 198496 and with their approaches spreading violence, they were compared with
SenderoLuminoso of Peru and their leader Abdullah Öcalan was similar to Stalin because of
his uncontroversial extolled personality97, although Öcalan was seeing himself as Jesus.PKK's
main armed groups are in Qandil Mountains and after 1991, they fought sometimes with some
local political Kurdish parties in Iraq. PKK was ideologically Marxist at the beginning but

85
Dahlman, p:285
86
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:20
87
Olson, p:478
88
Rubin, p:319
89
Brathwaite, p:482
90
Talhami, p:37
91
Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan, Book Reviews, Iran and
theCaucasus 14 (2010),p:461
92
Talhami, p:37
93
In the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, other religions with the 12th article, freedom of speech and
press with the 15th article, equality of all ethnic groups with the 19th article are taken under guarantee.
94
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:21
95
Olson, p:489
96
Rubin, p:313
97
Rubin, p:314
then exercised a transformation toward democratic liberalism. Civil activists should be
protected by militants, according to them.98

After ending of Saddam Hussein's Baath regime, together with local Kurdish parties, a
group allied to PKK came to scene on Qandil Mountains. PKK inspired this group about
autonomous order in Iraq and their power in Turkey, then this new group named itself as
Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and announced existence in 2004. 99Group leader is
RahmanHacıAhmedi who has been living in Germany more than 20 years and PJAK shares
same ideological base and action methods with PKK, also there are Turkish citizens 100 are in
leadership council of the group.101PJAK announced its target as changing Guardianship of
Islamic Jurist to federal and democratic system with human rights, equality of gender and
freedom of speech, even, not only for Kurds but also forAzerbaijanis, Balochis and Arabs.102

In 2008, in an interview with Chris Kutschera, RahmanHacıAhmedi said that they are
different from other Kurdish parties, they are founded by Iranian and European young people
after a long preparation period, fighting for a confederal and democratic Iran, try to create a
common platform by raising awareness of people, will protect people with their guns if
necessary but don't believe that current situation couldn't be changed just with guns. Ahmedi
also said that they have a free area in Qandil but they don't want to liberated zones in the
cities, they are allied with groups against regime, moreover, they are siblings of PKK that
fighting in different areas for different aims: ''PKK's aim is recognizing of Kurds officially in
Turkish constitution but PJAK wants to a free Kurdistan in a confederal Iran regime.'' Also he
adds, they have a parliament administrating them and it iscomposed of 21 members with 8
woman among them, they are separating into three parts in Iran, another thing he said is that
people without being paid and civic life (family life), living in mountains, professional
warriors are called as guerrilla, not peshmerga and %35 of this guerrilla group is woman, they
don't have a relationship with Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan andPatriotic
Union of Kurdistan but he talks to Iranian dissidents in USA and they don't have a
relationship with USA government, lastly, they are leaning towards Iranian dissidents.103

When they are compared, PJAK looks like a weaker threat than PKK but PJAK's
actions against Iranian forces are not lesser than PKK. 104According to Iranian government,
120 soldiers were killed by PJAK just in 2005. More than 120 soldiers were killed in 2006.
James Brandon says that PJAK attacks on military forces, even, although government of Iran
calls them as a ''terrorist group'' but Iran doesnot blame PJAK as a group attacking civilians. 105
It is being thought that the organization has approximately 3000 guerrillas. 106 They use in

98
James Brandon, Iran'sKurdishThreat: PJAK, TerrorismMonitor Volume: 4 Issue: 12, p:2
99
Brandon, p:2
100
Brandon, p:2
101
EdBlanche, KurdishPowderKeg, TheMiddle East, January 2008
102
Brandon, p:2
103
ChrisKutscheraTheMiddle East August/5eptember 2008, p:21
104
TozunBahçeli, Peter Fragiskatos, Iraqi Kurdistan: Fending off uneasy neighbours, International Journal of
ContemporaryIraqiStudies Volume 2 Number 1, p:77
105
Brandon, s:2
106
Brandon, p:1
actions the tactic hit-and-run,they mix ordinary people or withdraw to their base in
Iraq.107Chairman of woman's branch of PJAK, Gülistan Dugan says that %45 of members of
PJAK is woman and women take responsibility in military operations. 108 Government of Iran
give answer through bombing PJAK bases and also these bombardments was including PKK
bases in Qandil Mountains.109 Also Iran copied village guard system from Turkey
successfully.110

According to The Middle East Reporter records and some writers, some Islamic
Revolution Guard Corps high-ranked officers were killed in conflicts between Iranian
government and PJAK.111 As a response to these, Iranian government attacked directly to
PJAK bases and killed many commanders of the group112. Also so many guerrillas of PJAK
were killed in these operations.113 High-ranked commanders of Iran say that operations,
especially against PJAK will continue until dissidents becoming ineffective or ending totally.
PJAK mouthpieces accepted that their bases are bombarded by Iran. 114After the intensification
of conflicts in Irak and operations of Iranian Army expanding to a few square kilometers
zone115, Iraqi Kurdistan President MesudBarzani summoned for a diplomatic solution to
PJAK and Kurdish groups.116Conflicts between Iran and PJAK reach a peak in 2011 and after
3 days, according to news sources close to the organization 117 PJAK ex parte118 declared cease
fire and then withdrew to Qandil Mountains from Casusan camp in Iran-Iraq border and
soldiers of Iran settled there.119

While conflicts were continuing between Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and PJAK,
a new originated in Iran has spread in Turkey and this new was that second man of PKK was
captured by Iranian forces. According to chairman of Iran Parliament Commission of National
Security AlaaddinBrucerdi, he doesn't give a name but he says in this new that together with
some members of terrorist organization, second man of them was also captured. Of course,
this man is Murat Karayılan but PKK refuted this new. However, a short time after Karayılan
came into scene and gave an interview to ANF News Agency. He said that they don't want to
fight against Iran, if Iran doesn’t commit violence, PJAK also should not do and this armistice
would be eternal and this issue would solve peacefully. 120In another interview dated March

107
Brandon, p:3
108
Brandon, p:2
109
Brandon, p:3
110
Brandon, p:4
111
Ed Blanche, Kurdish Powder Keg, The Middle East, January 2008, p:27
(Although Iran's side claims that helicopter while Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Sector
CommanderSeyyidKahhari was also in it, fell down because of technical problems, PJAK argues that helicopter
was felt down by their fire.)
112
TheMiddle East ReporterThursdaySept. 8, 2011
113
TheMiddle East ReporterFriday, September 30, 2011
114
TheMiddle East ReporterThursdayJuly 21, 2011
115
TheMiddle East ReporterMonday, June 7, 2010
116
TheMiddle East ReporterThursdaySept. 8, 2011
117
http://avasinweb.com/nucenaverok.php?HaberID=3336
118
TheMiddle East ReporterMonday, September 05, 2011
119
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-pjak-iran-dan-cekiliyor-78376/
120
http://www.lekolin.net/haber-2103-Karayilan-Idamlar-Durursa-PJAK-Siyasal-Alana-Cekilebilir.html ;
http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=64319
2013, Karayılan said ''Today, Iran is also loyal to armistice ceased by PJAK and there is no
fighting''121Actually after 2011, no fight that would lead to violating the armistice was
exercised.

Effect of Foreign Powers on Nationalist Kurdish Movement and Attitude of Iran

According to some writers, Kurdish groups assisted foreign powers for weakening
central governments. While England was using Kurds against Turkey during 1920s, USA and
Israel used against Baghdad and Teheran.122

Kurds had always a place in Zionist theorists and thinkers' Middle East plans. 123 Some
Kurds in Iraq were Jews and Alliance Israelite Universelle opened schools in the early 20th
century in Iraq, thus, Iraqi Kurds met Zionism before establishing of Israel. 124In these years, a
spy from Zionist secret service, Rubin Shila, managed to establish a intelligence network. 125In
the late 1930s, Kurds gained much more importance with ''Periphery Theory'' of David Ben
Gurion (later first prime minister of Zionist Israel). According to this theory, Israel was a state
surrounded by Arab states and it needed non-Arab alliances, also non-Arab minorities in Arab
states should be supported to weaken Arab states. Because of being an oil rich and its
promising situation126, theory began to be implemented with Iraq. 127In the late 1950s and early
1960s, Zionist Israel regime became main procurer of Iraqi Kurds an also thousands of
MOSSAD agents were sent to the field as agriculturalist, military advisor, doctor and human
right activists, even it is said that some agents were gathered from Amnesty International and
other charity organizations.128Before 1979, Zionist Israel's improving relationship with two
great non-Arab states of the field, Iran and Turkey is an indicator of this ideology as well. It is
thought that Zionist Israel regime, Turkey and Iran organized operations together with local
Kurds, to weaken Iraq.129Strategy of being dominant in Persian Gulf pushed Shah Rıza to be
an alliance of Israel and Iran became a transition point for American and Israel guns that are
sent to Iraqi Kurds.130Congress members Otis Pike said that Kissinger, Nixon and Shah never
have an intention to make Kurds victorious but weaken alliance Israel's enemy
neighbourhood.131

After 1979, Iran cut its assistance to Iraqi Kurds and Israel had to review its Periphery
Theory. About this, a former diplomat OdedYinon was writing in his article ''A Theory for
Israel in Nineteen Hundred Eighties'' media organ of World Zionist Organization, Kivunim in
February 1982 that Israel had no choice except encouraging minorities.132After changing of
Iran's side, Israel began to organize operations in Iran by using Kurdsas well. In documents
121
http://firatajans.com/news/kurdistan/karayilan-karar-almamiz-kolay-degil.htm
122
Fuller, p:108
123
Mamikonian, p:391
124
Talhami, p:27
125
Talhami, p:27
126
Mamikonian, p:397
127
Talhami, p:28
128
Mamikonian, p:397
129
Olson,p:484
130
Talhami, p:27
131
Talhami, p:29
132
Talhami, p:28
captured in former USA Embassy building, it is understood that secret operations were
organized from Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey to Iran's inside and MOSSAD was generally a part
of these operations.133Iran thinks that USA, Zionist Israel and England secret services finance
and direct PJAK.134While there are some signs about joining of former Zionist soldiers to
operations against Iran, PJAK leader Ahmed says that they are ready to build relationship
with everybody who want to assist Kurds.135One of the founders of the party, Osman Öcalan
(brother of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan) says in an interview given Los AngelesTimes that
PJAK has a good relationship with USA and they are offered for military, economical and
medical aid by USA.136Also, Seymour Hersh told in New Yorker that Zionist Israel regime
trained Kurds in Iran and Turkey and gave equipments and also 1200 MOSSAD agents are
still in the field. However, this claim was severely refuted by Israel's diplomatic mission in
Washington.137Operations against Iran in two ways: in Iran's itself and Iraq-based. A claim
says that these operations are to prevent Iran from filling the gap emerging after withdrew of
USA from Iraq.138

Today, although current Islamic regime is cooperating with Turkey in security

139
issues , different from Turkey, Islamic regime does not feel itself indigent to USA and
Western powers and does not request their allowance for military and intelligence activities.
While Turkey organizing operations to Iraqi Kurdistan against PKK with Washington's air
attach permission and intelligence sharing140, Iran is organizing these kinds of operations with
its own capability and facilities 141, although PJAK is blaming USA because of intelligence
sharing with Turkey led to indirectly providing intelligence Iran.142 This situation provides
Islamic Republic a free movement zone and this capability prevents Iraqi Kurdistan from an
alliance against Iran.143

Islamic Republic of Iran, not only accomplished pacification of armed Kurdish

movement via its internal and external policies, but also assisted Kurdish forces against
currents which are enemies of all Middle East.

Conclusion

133
Mamikonian, p:396
134
Blanche, p:28
135
Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:25
136
Thomas Renard, PJAK in Northern Iraq: Tangled Interests and Proxy Wars, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6
Issue: 10, Yazıyaaşağıdaki web adresindenulaşılabilir:
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4924&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%55D=167&no_cache=1#.VIl9bNKsVVU)
137
Blanche, p:28
138
Blanche, p:28
139
ZiyaMeral and Jonathan Paris, Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity, The Washington Quarterly,
October 2010, p:81
140
Bahçeli;Fragiskatos, p:79
141
Bahçeli;Fragiskatos, p:76
142
Renard, writing is available in the link below:
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4924&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=167&no_cache=1#.VIl9bNKsVVU)
143
Bahçeli;Fragiskatos, p:77
 Although different theorists from sovereign countries of the fieldare claiming several
remarks and except Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurds cannot possess which is politically recognized,
there is no doubt that a folk exists and its members are identifying themselves as Kurd. They
are authentic people of the field and with their population concentrated in Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Syria, they are living together with Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Persians and Azerbaijanis
for more than one thousand years. However, nation-state structures are feeding ethnic based
separation, violence and even terrorism. This situation gives a chance to powers that want to
weaken ethnic identities, local people and their states for an intervention.

In Iran, there isn't any article prohibiting Kurds' exercising either religious or national
rights. However, a group of Kurds' relationship with field-out states and Zionist Israel regime
affects Iranian state about keeping itself apart from Kurdish nationalist movement and even
driving government to be watchfulness. While unwelcoming attitudes of USA and Zionist
Israel against Iran does not show a sign for promising a positive change, a movement close to
them would probably cannot gain a legitimized area and will be labelled as a ''terrorist action''.
Also, Iranian elite says that they are ready to overcome Kurdish problem by pluralist
participation models. Continuation of accomplishment against PJAK is attached to operability
of these pluralist participation models.

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