ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

IN INDIAN TRADITION1

M.D.SRINIVAS
Centre for Policy Studies, Chennai
[email protected]

Importance of Commentaries in the Study of Indian Scientific Tradition

While there have been several extensive investigations on the history and achievements
of the Indian tradition of sciences, there has not been much discussion on the
foundational methodology of Indian sciences. Traditionally, such issues have been dealt
with in the detailed bhāùyas or commentaries, which continued to be written till recent
times and played a vital role in the traditional scheme of learning.

As regards Indian mathematics, it is in such commentaries that we find detailed upapattis

or "proofs" of the results and procedures, apart from a discussion of methodological and
philosophical issues. It has been the scant attention paid, by the modern scholarship of the
last two centuries, to this extensive tradition of commentaries, which has led to a lack of
comprehension of the methodology of Indian mathematics; and this is reflected in the
often repeated statements on the absence of logical rigour in Indian mathematics in works
on history of mathematics such as the following:2

As our survey indicates, the Hindus were interested in and contributed to the
arithmetical and computational activities of mathematics rather than to the
deductive patterns. Their name for mathematics was gaõita, which means ‘the
science of calculation’. There is much good procedure and technical facility, but no
evidence that they considered proof at all. They had rules, but apparently no logical
scruples. Moreover, no general methods or new viewpoints were arrived at in any
area of mathematics.

It is fairly certain that the Hindus did not appreciate the significance of their own
contributions. The few good ideas they had, such as separate symbols for the
numbers from 1 to 9, the conversion to base 10, and negative numbers, were
introduced casually with no realisation that they were valuable innovations. They
were not sensitive to mathematical values. Along with the ideas they themselves
advanced, they accepted and incorporated the crudest ideas of the Egyptians and
Babylonians.

1
Revised version of M.D.Srinivas, "On the Nature of Mathematics and Scientific Knowledge in Indian
Tradition," in J.M.Kanjirakkat et al. eds., Science and Narratives of Nature East and West, (New York:
Routledge 2015), 220-238.
2
Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1972), 190.

1
It is true that gaõita or Indian mathematics is quintessentially a science of computation
and texts of Indian mathematics essentially present systematic and efficient procedures or
algorithms for the solution of various mathematical problems. The ancient texts of
geometry, Śulbasūtras (prior to 600 BCE), give procedures for the construction and
transformation of geometrical figures. The classical text Āryabhañīya of Āryabhaña
(c.499) presents most of the procedures of arithmetic, algebra, geometry and
trigonometry, which are taught today in schools, in just thirty-two verses comprising the
Gaõitapāda. While the canonical texts such as the Āryabhañīya or the
Brāhmasphuñasiddhānta of Brahmagupta present only the results and procedures, it is the
commentaries written on them which explain these results and procedures and often
present detailed upapattis or demonstrations of them. Such commentaries formed an
integral part of the traditional scheme of learning and many great authors of seminal
works such as Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150), Parameśvara (c.1450) and Nīlakaõñha Somayājī
(c. 1450-1550) also wrote important commentaries, sometimes on their own works.

In his Vāsanābhāùya on his own treatise on Algebra, Bījagaõita, Bhāskarācārya II

(c.1150) explains that the tradition of upapatti has been for long a part of the oral
instruction (pāñha-nibaddhā).3 The following are some of the important commentaries
which are available in print and contain some discussion of upapattis for various results
and procedures of Indian mathematics and astronomy:

1. Bhāùya of Bhāskara I (c.629) on Āryabhañīya of Āryabhaña (c.499)

2. Bhāùya of Govindasvāmin (c.800) on Mahābhāskarīya of Bhāskara I (c.629)
3. Vāsanābhāùya of Caturveda Pçthūdakasvāmin (c.860) on Brāhmasphuñasiddhānta of
Brahmagupta (c.628)
4. Vivaraõa of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150) on Śiùyadhīvçddhidatantra of Lalla (c.748),
5. Vāsanā of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150) on his own Līlāvatī, Bījagaõita and
Siddhāntaśiromaõi
6. Siddhāntadīpikā of Parameśvara (c.1431) on the Bhāùya of Govindasvāmin (c.800) on
Mahābhāskarīya of Bhāskara I (c.629)
7. Āryabhañīyabhāùya of Nīlakaõñha Somayājī (c.1501) on Āryabhañīya of Āryabhaña
(c.499), K. Sambasiva Sastri (ed.), 3 Vols., Trivandrum 1931, 1932, 1957
8. Gaõita-Yuktibhāùā (in Malayalam) of Jyeùñhadeva (c.1530)
9. Yuktidīpikā of Śaïkara Vāriyār (c.1530) on Tantrasaïgraha of Nīlakaõñha Somayājī
(c.1500)
10.Kriyākramakarī of Śaïkara Vāriyār (c.1535) on Līlāvatī of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150)
11.Sūryaprakāśa of Sūryadāsa (c.1538) on Bījagaõita of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150)
12.Buddhivilāsinī of Gaõeśa Daivajña (c.1545) on Līlāvatī of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150)

3
Devchandra Jha, ed., Bījagaõitam (Varanasi: Chowkahmbha Prakashan, 1983), 399-400.

2
13. Bījapallavam of Kçùõa Daivajña (c.1600) on Bījagaõita of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150)
14.Vāsanāvārttika, commentary of Nçsi§ha Daivajña (c.1621) on Vāsanābhāùya of
Bhāskarācārya II on his own Siddhāntaśiromaõi (c.1150)
15.Marīci of Munīśvara (c.1630) on Siddhāntaśiromaõi of Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150)

Of these, the Malayalam text Gaõita-Yuktibhāùā of Jyeùñhadeva (c.1530) is a

compendium which is exclusively devoted to a systematic and detailed exposition of
rationales (yuktis) of various results and procedures in mathematics and astronomy.4

Upapatti and "Proof"

In the introduction to the section on spherics (Golādhyāya) of his treatise

Siddhāntaśiromaõi, Bhāskarācārya II explains the central purpose behind his exposition
of upapattis:5

मध्या ं ुसदां यद गिणतं तस्योपपि िवना

ौिढ ौढसभासु नैित गणको िनःसंशयो न स्वयम् ।
गोले सा िवमला करामलकवत् त्यक्षतो दृश्यते
तस्मादस्म्युपपि बोधिवधये गोल बन्धो तः ॥
Without the knowledge of upapattis, by merely mastering the calculations (gaõita)
described here, from the madhyamādhikāra (the first chapter of
Siddhāntaśiromaõi) onwards, of the [motion of the] heavenly bodies, a
mathematician will not be respected in the scholarly assemblies; without the
upapattis he himself will not be free of doubt (niÜsa§śaya). Since upapatti is
clearly perceivable in the (armillary) sphere like a berry in the hand, I therefore
begin the Golādhyāya (section on spherics) to explain the upapattis.

The same is echoed by the Gaõeśa Daivajña in his famous commentary Buddhivilāsinī
(c.1540) on Bhāskarācārya’s Līlāvatī:6

े वा संज्ञे यदुिदतमिखलं नोपपि िवना तत्

िन ार्न्तो वा ऋते तां सुगणकसदिस ौढतां नैित चायम्।
त्यक्षं दृश्यते सा करतलकिलतादशर्वत् सु स ा
तस्माद योपपि िनगिदतुमिखलम् उत्सहे बुि वृद्ध्यै॥
Without upapatti, whatever is stated in vyakta-gaõita (mathematics dealing with
manifest quantities – arithmetic and geometry) or avyakta-gaõita (mathematics
dealing with un-manifest quantities – algebra), will not be rendered free from

4
K.V.Sarma et al. ed. trans., Gaõita-Yuktibhāùa, 2 Vols (Delhi: Hindustan Book Agency, 2008).
5
Murali Dhara Chaturvedi, ed., Siddhāntaśiromaõi (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1981),
326.
6
V.G.Apte, ed., Līlāvatī with Buddhivilāsinī (Pune: Nirnayasagar Press, 1937), 1.

3
 confusion (nirbhrānta); nor will it have any value in an assembly of
mathematicians. Upapatti is indeed directly and pleasantly perceivable like a mirror
in hand. It is therefore, as also for the elevation of the intellect, that I proceed to
enunciate upapattis in entirety.

Thus, the notion of upapatti seems to be significantly different from the notion of "proof"
as understood in the Greco-European tradition of mathematics. According to the Indian
mathematical texts, the purpose of upapatti is mainly: (i) to remove confusion and doubts
regarding the validity and interpretation of mathematical results and procedures; and, (ii)
to obtain assent in the community of mathematicians. This is very different from the ideal
of "proof" in the Greco-European tradition which is to irrefutably establish the absolute
truth of a mathematical proposition.

Further, in the Indian tradition, mathematical knowledge is not taken to be different in

any fundamental sense from that in natural sciences. In fact, valid means for acquiring
and validating mathematical knowledge are the same as in other sciences: Pratyakùa
(perception), Anumāna (inference), Śabda or Agama (authentic text or tradition).

The following are some of the important features of upapattis in Indian mathematics:7

1. The Indian mathematicians are clear that results in mathematics, even those
enunciated in authoritative texts, cannot be accepted as valid unless they are
supported by yukti or upapatti. It is not enough that one has merely observed the
validity of a result in a large number of instances.

2. Several commentaries written on major texts of Indian mathematics and

astronomy present upapattis for the results and procedures enunciated in the text.

3. The upapattis are presented in a sequence proceeding systematically from known

or established results to finally arrive at the result to be established.

4. In the Indian mathematical tradition the upapattis mainly serve to remove doubts
and obtain consent for the result among the community of mathematicians.

5. The upapattis may involve observation or experimentation. They also depend on

the prevailing understanding of the nature of the mathematical objects involved.

6. The method of tarka or "proof by contradiction" is used occasionally. But there

are no upapattis which purport to establish existence of any mathematical object
merely on the basis of tarka alone.

7
M. D. Srinivas, "Proofs in Indian Mathematics", in G. G. Emch et al. ed., Contributions to the History of
Indian mathematics (Delhi: Hindustan Book Agency, 2005), 231-2.

4
 7. The Indian mathematical tradition did not subscribe to the ideal that upapattis
should seek to provide irrefutable demonstrations establishing the absolute truth
of mathematical results. There was apparently no attempt to present the upapattis
as a part of a deductive axiomatic system. While Indian mathematics made great
strides in the invention and manipulation of symbols in representing mathematical
results and in facilitating mathematical processes, there was no attempt at
formalization of mathematics.

Here, we may add a few remarks concerning the role of "proof by contradiction" in
Indian mathematics. Indian mathematical texts do employ this method of indirect proof
for proving the non-existence of an entity. For instance, we may cite the following
passage from Kçùõa Daivajña’s commentary Bījapallava (c.1601) on Bhāskarācārya’s
Bījagaõita, where he argues that negative numbers do not have any square-roots:8

वगर्स्य िह मूलं लभ्यते। ऋणाङ्कस्तु न वगर्ः कथमतस्तस्य मूलं लभ्यते। ननु ऋणाङ्कः कु तो वग
न भवित न िह राजिनदशः। …सत्यम्। ऋणाङ्कं वग वदता भवता कस्य स वगर् इित व म्। न
ताव नाङ्कस्य 'समि घातो िह वगर्ः' त धनाङ्के न धनाङ्के गुिणते यो वग भवेत् स धनमेव
'स्वयोवर्धः स्वम्' इत्यु त्वात्। नाप्यृणाङ्कस्य। त ािप समि घाताथर्मृणाङ्के नणार्ङ्कगुिणते
धनमेव वग भवेत् 'अस्वयोवर्धः स्वम्' इत्यु त्वात्। एवं सित कथमिप तमङ्कं न पश्यामो यस्य
वगर्ः क्षयो भवेत्।
The square-root can be obtained only for a square. A negative number is not a
square. Hence how can we consider its square-root? It might however be argued:
‘Why will a negative number not be a square? Surely it is not a royal fiat.’...
Agreed. Let it be stated by you who claim that a negative number is a square as to
whose square it is. Surely not of a positive number, for the square of a positive
number is always positive by the rule ... Not also of a negative number. Because
then also the square will be positive by the rule... This being the case, we do not see
any such number whose square becomes negative.

However, there are no instances where Indian mathematicians use the method of indirect
proof to establish the existence of an entity, the existence of which is not demonstrable
(even in principle) by other (direct) means of verification. In this sense, the Indian
mathematical tradition may be seen as adopting what is nowadays referred to as the
"constructivist" approach to the issue of mathematical existence.

It is important to note that this significant feature of Indian mathematical tradition is

closely related to the world-view of the Naiyāyikas or Indian logicians, who do not
accord tarka (or the method of indirect proof) the status of an independent source of valid
knowledge (pramāõa). Indeed the general philosophical approach of Indian logicians is
one of eliminating from logical discourse all reference to such aprasiddha or un-instantiated
8
T.V.Radhakrishna Sastry, ed., Bījagaõitam with Bījapallavam (Tanjore: Saraswati Mahal Library, 1958),
19.

5
entities, whose existence is not even in principle accessible to direct means of verification. In
fact, the Naiyāyikas would even reconcile to live with contradictions rather than allow the
use of such aprasiddha entities in their logical discourse. This is brought out very clearly
by Matilal by citing an important passage from Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya (c.
10th century) which deals with an argument between the Bauddhas and Naiyāyikas:9

Nyāya...[excludes] from logical discourses any sentence which will ascribe some
property (positive or negative) to a fictitious entity. Vācaspati remarks that we can
neither affirm nor deny anything of a fictitious entity, the rabbit’s horn. Thus
Nyāya apparently agrees to settle for a superficial self-contradiction because, in
formulating the principle that nothing can be affirmed or denied of a fictitious
entity like rabbit’s horn, Nyāya, in fact violates the same principle. Nyaya feels that
this superficial self-contradiction is less objectionable [than admitting fictitious
entities in logical discourse]... By way of documentation...[is given] below the
translation of an excerpt from Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka...10

‘(Proponent:) ... There are some other defects in this negative inference. The minor
term (the "subject" pakùa), the middle term (the "inferential reason" hetu) and the
example cited in such an inference cannot be established by any means of
knowledge. There cannot be any means of knowledge to establish a non-entity (i.e.,
a fiction, avastu). If it could be established by some means of knowledge, it ceases
to be non-entity.

‘(Opponent:) If so, then your talk about the non-entity becomes self-contradictory.

‘(Proponent:) Does this self-contradiction point out that there is a means of

knowledge to establish the non-entity? Or, (second question) does it reject the
prohibitive statement that we should not talk about non-entity? Or (third question)

9
Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 103-4.
10
The original text is reproduced below:
त ा यहेतुद ृ ान्तिस ौ माणाभाव: अवस्तुिन माणा वृ ेः माण वृ ौ अलीकत्वानुपप :े ।
एवं त र् वहारे स्ववचनिवरोधः स्यािदित चेत।्
तित्क स्ववचनिवरोधेन तेषु माणमुपदिशतं भवेत् वहारिनषेध वहारो वा खिण्डतः स्यात् अ मािणकोऽयं
वहारो अवश्याभ्युपगन्त इित वा भवेत।् न तावत् थम:। न िह िवरोधसह ेणािप िस्थरे तस्य मािदिवरहे वा
शशशृङ्गे वा त्यक्षमनुमानं वा दशर्ियतुं शक्यम्। तथात्वे वा कृ तं भौतकलहेन। ि तीयिस्त्वष्यत एव ामािणकै ः।
अवचनम् एव तिह त ा म् ।
िक कु म य वचनं सवर्थैवानुपप ं त ावचनमेव ेयः। त्वमिप पिरभावय तावि ष् ामािणके ऽथ मूकवावदूकयोः
कतरः ेयान्।
एवं िवदुषािप भवता न मूकीभूय िस्थतमिप तु वहारः ितिष एवासतीित चेत्।
सत्यम्। यथाऽ ामािणकः स्ववचनिवरु ोऽथ मा सङ्क्षीिदित मन्यमानेन त्वया चा ामािणक एवासित वहारः
स्वीकृ तः तथास्मािभरिप माणिचन्तायाम ामािणको वहारो मा सङ्क्षीिदित मन्यमानैर ामािणक एव
स्ववचनिवरोधः स्वीि यते। यिद तूभय ािप भवान्समानदृि ः स्यादस्मािभरिप तदा न िकिचदुच्यत इित ।

6
 does it imply that we must concede such statements (about non-entity), which are
unauthenticated, i.e., not established by any means of knowledge? The first
alternative is not tenable. Even a thousand of self-contradictions cannot
conceivably show that (the non-entity like) the stable object (i.e., the minor term)
or the absence of gradual efficiency, etc. (i.e., the hetu) or the rabbits’ horn (i.e., the
example cited to support the general premise) is amenable to (a means of
knowledge, such as) perception and inference. If it could, what is the use of this
silly fight over the nature of non-entities? The second alternative is acceptable to
us, because we admit only valid means of knowledge.

‘(Opponent:) If the prohibitive statement is rejected, no statement with regard to

non-entities will be possible.

‘(Proponent:)What else can we do but remain silent in regard to a matter where

statement of any kind will be logically incongruent? Silence is better in such cases.
(No statement is better than any statement in such matters.) You yourself may
please consider as to who is the better of the two: One who is making statements
about entities that cannot be established by any means of knowledge? Or, the other
person who remains speechless (on such occasions)?

‘(Opponent:) But although you are a wise man you have not remained silent
yourself. You on the other hand have made a prohibitive statement with regard to
our talk about non-entities.

‘(Proponent:) True, in order to avoid a self-contradictory object not established by

any means of knowledge, you have conceded that one can make statements about
the non-existent. Similarly, in order not to allow any statement about the non-
entities in our discourse on the means of knowledge, we concede that a self-
contradictory statement (prohibiting the use of non-entities) is possible, although it
is not supported by any means of knowledge. If you treated both the cases in the
same manner, we would not have said anything about non-entities. (We have made
the above self-contradictory statement because you first raised the question).’

Indian Grammarians’ View of Śāstra as Upāya

To understand the methodology of Indian sciences, one has to perhaps start with the
foundational works on Indian linguistics, not only because linguistics is the earliest of
Indian sciences to have been rigorously systematised, but also because this
systematisation became the paradigm example for all other sciences. It has been aptly
remarked that the Aùñādhyāyī of Pāõini (prior to 500 BCE) enjoys the same kind of
prestige in Indian tradition as the Elements of Euclid does in Greco-European tradition:11

11
J. F. Staal, "Euclid and Pāõini", Philosophy East and West 15 (1965): 113-4. It should however be noted
that the word ‘derived’ in this passage refers to derivation in the sense of logical demonstration in the case

7
 In Euclid’s geometry, propositions are derived from axioms with the help of logical
rules which are accepted as true. In Pāõini’s grammar, linguistic forms are derived
from grammatical elements with the help of rules which were framed ad hoc (i.e.
sūtras)...

Historically speaking, Pāõini’s method has occupied a place comparable to that

held by Euclid’s method in western thought. Scientific developments have
therefore taken different directions in India and in the West.... In India, Pāõini’s
perfection and ingenuity have rarely been matched outside the realm of linguistics.
In the west this corresponds to the belief that mathematics is the more perfect
among the sciences. Just as Plato reserved admission to his Academy for
geometricians, Indian scholars and philosophers are expected to have first
undergone a training in scientific linguistics. In India, grammar was called the
Veda of the Vedas, the science of sciences.

It is now generally appreciated that the Aùñādhyāyī of Pāõini, gives a systematic way of
generating all the valid utterances of Sanskrit, in terms of about 4000 grammatical rules
supplemented by an inventory of about 2000 verbal bases (Dhātupāñha) and some 261
lists of lexical bases (Gaõapāñha). In his famous commentary Mahābhāùya, on Pāõini’s
Aùñādhyāyī, Patañjali (c.2nd Century BCE) explains that the purpose of grammar is to give
an exposition of all valid utterances. An obvious way to do this is to enumerate all valid
utterances individually. Since that is humanly impossible, one should attempt to
encapsulate larger and larger class of valid utterances by means of a set of general
(utsarga) and exceptional (apavāda) rules. Patañjali further emphasises that the
utterances and their meanings are actually established in the world – one does not go to
a Grammarian to make utterances for him as one goes to a potter for pots.12

In thus characterising Pāõinian grammar, Patañjali expounds what is perhaps the basic
understanding of the Indian scientific effort:13

Science in India seems to start with the assumption that truth resides in the real
world with all its diversity and complexity. For the linguist, what is ultimately true
is the language as spoken by the people in all their diverse expressions... Linguists
do make generalisations about the language as spoken in the world. But these
generalisations are not the truth behind or above the reality. These are not the

of Euclid’s geometry, but it refers to derivation in the sense of generation of linguistic forms from
grammatical elements in the case of Pāõini’s grammar.
12
See for instance, S. D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, trans., Vyākaraõa Mahābhāùya Paspaùāhnika
(Pune: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 16-25, 70-117.
13
J. K. Bajaj, "The Indian Tradition of Science and Technology An Overview," PPST Bulletin, 13-14
(March 1988): 33. See also J.K.Bajaj, "Science and Technology Up to 1800", in F.Robinson ed.,
Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Cambridge: Universities Press, 1989), 496-7.

8
 idealisation according to which reality is to be tailored. On the other hand what is
ideal is the real, and some part of the real always escapes our idealisation of it.
There are always exceptions. It is the business of the scientist to formulate these
generalisations, but also at the same time to be always attuned to the reality, to
always be conscious of the exceptional nature of each specific instance. This
attitude seems to permeate all Indian science and makes it an exercise quite
different from the scientific enterprise of the west.

Many of these issues discussed by Patañjali are further investigated by the great
philosopher Bhartçhari (c.500 CE) in his treatise Vākyapadīya. Texts of Indian astronomy
often cite his famous dictum that the procedures taught in śāstras are only means (upāya)
to accomplish desired objectives in the world and they are not constrained or regulated in
any other manner:14

उपादायािप ये हेया तानुपायान् चक्षते।

उपायाना िनयमो नावश्यमवित ते ॥
अथ कथि द् पुरुष: कथि त् ितप ते।

Upāyas (procedures taught in śāstras) are to be discarded, even though they are to
be used for accomplishing an objective. There is no necessary limitation on such
upāyas. One accomplishes objectives by one means or the other.

In this context Puõyarāja, the commentator on Vākyapadīya, notes:

शा मुपाय: शब्दपिरज्ञाने। ज्ञातेषु तेषु योजनसम्प ेरनुपयोगः इित तस्य पिरत्यागः। उपाया
न िनयता इत्याह ।...कि दाचायर्ः पािणिनिवरिचतेन लक्षणशा ेण शब्दानिधगच्छित
कि दन्येनेित न िनयम:।

The science of grammar is a means for knowing the meanings of utterances. Once
these are known there is no further use and hence it is said that they are to be
discarded. He also states that there is no limitation on these upāyas.... One
preceptor (Ācārya) understands utterances by means of the grammatical framework
of Pāõini and another by means of another framework and thus there is no rule [that
only a particular grammar is to be followed].

This pragmatic approach to scientific theorisation indeed becomes folklore as it were in

Indian philosophical thought. The great eighteenth century scholar Nāgeśabhañña begins
his treatise on the philosophy of grammar, Paramalaghumañjūùā, with a reiteration of

14
Raghunatha Sharma, ed., Vākyapadīyam Vākyakhaõóam with Puõyarāja Commentary (Varanasi:
Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1980), 79-81.

9
this point that grammatical derivations are upāyas and are otherwise unrestricted
(avyavasthita):15

त वाक्यस्फोटो मुख्य: तस्यैवलोके ऽथर्बोधकत्वा ेनैवाथर्समा े ेित। ...त ितवाक्यं

सङ्के त हासम्भवाद् वाक्यान्वाख्यानस्य लघूपायेनाशक्यत्वा कल्पनया पदािन िवभज्य पदे
कृ ित त्ययिवभागान् िवभज्य किल्पताभ्यामन्वय ितरे काभ्यां त दथर्िवभागं शा मा िवषयं
पिरकल्पयिन्त स्माचायार्:।…

मुख्यं वाचकत्वं तु कल्पनया बोिधतसमुदायरूपे पदे वाक्ये वा लोकानां तत एवाथर्बोधात्।

‘उपेय ितप यथार् उपाया अ विस्थता’ इित न्यायेन ाकरणभेदन
े स्थािनभेदऽे िप न क्षितः
देशभेदेन िलिपभेदविदित िदक् ।
There (amongst the syllable, word and sentence meanings), it is the sentential
meaning (vākyasphoña) that is the primary; for it is the sentence which is seen to
have import and completeness of meaning in the world....Since it is not feasible to
identify all the (valid) sentences, and (mere consideration of sentences) will not
provide any simple means for explaining sentence-meaning, the preceptors
(Ācāryas) have devised a fictitious procedure, wherein sentences are divided into
words and words into stems (prakçti) and suffixes (pratyaya) and, following the
procedure of mutual presence and absence (anvayavyatireka), they conceive of
imputed meanings for these units only for the purpose of grammatical derivation
(śāstra)...

Meaningfulness (vācakatva) rests mainly in the words or sentences which are made
up of these imagined entities; for, in the world, only these (words and sentences)
convey meanings. Indeed, following the well known principle that ‘the upāyas
(grammatical derivations) are only for the realisation of the desired result and are
otherwise unrestricted (avyavasthita),’ there should be no cause of concern even if
different substituends are employed in different grammars. It should be noted that
this is akin to the fact that the script may change with a change in locality.

Status of Planetary Models in Indian Astronomy

The tradition of astronomy in India goes back to the ancient texts of Vedāïgajyotiùa
which give simple algorithms for fixing the elements of Indian calendar (Pañcāïga). The
Vedāïgajyotiùa texts, as well as the later elaborate treatises on Indian astronomy, declare
the raison d’être of the science of astronomy to be the determination of time
(kālavidhānaśāstra), as well as position and direction, by means of the motion of the
celestial bodies. Hence, it is the pragmatic concerns of calculating the positions of the
various planets and eclipses of the Sun and the Moon reasonably accurately, which
informed the efforts of the Indian Astronomers and in this they seem to have been
eminently successful at least from the time of Āryabhaña.
15
Alakhdeva Sarma, ed. & trans., Paramalaghumañjūùā (Varanasi: Chowkhambha Prakashan, 1981), 4-5.

10
Though there are several references to earlier siddhāntas, the earliest available systematic
exposition of planetary theory is contained in the Āryabhañīya (c.499 CE) of Āryabhaña
and in the works of his commentator Bhāskara I (c.629). Here, the procedure for
calculating the geocentric longitudes of the planets, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and
Saturn involves essentially the following steps.16 First, the mean longitude is calculated
for the desired day and then two corrections, namely the manda-sa§skāra and śīghra-
sa§skāra, are applied to the mean planet to obtain the true longitude. In the case of the
exterior planets, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, the manda-sa§skāra is equivalent to taking
into account the eccentricity of the planet’s orbit around the Sun and the manda
correction coincides, to first order in eccentricity, with the equation of centre currently
calculated in astronomy. This is followed by the śīghra- sa§skāra, which is equivalent to
converting the heliocentric longitude into the geocentric longitude.

While explaining the planetary model as expounded by Āryabhaña, Bhāskara I notes that
notions such as the apsides (ucca, nīca), mean (madhyama), epicycles (paridhi) etc., are
conceptual tools which serve the purpose of arriving at the observed motion of planets
and there are no constraints on them except that they should lead to observed results:17

उ नीचमध्यमपिरिधिरत्येवमािदस्फु टगितसाधनोपाय [भूताना ] उपायानां नैव िनयमोि वार्

िव ते। के वलं तु उपेयसाधका उपायाः। तस्मािदयं सवार् ि या असत्या यया हाणां स्फु टगितः
साध्यते। एवं च परमाथर्िजज्ञासुिभः असत्योपायेन सत्यं ितप ते। तथा िह िभषजो
ह्युत्पलनालािदषु वेधादीन्यभ्यस्यन्ते नािपता: िपठरािदषु मुण्डनादीिन यज्ञशा िवदः शुष्के ष् ा
यज्ञादीिन शािब्दकाः कृ ित त्ययिवकारागमवणर्लोप त्ययािदिभः शब्दान् ितजानते।
एवम ािप मध्यममन्दो शी ो तत्पिरिधज्याका भुजाकोिटकणार्िद वहारे ण सांवत्सरा हाणां
स्फु टगित ितजानते। तस्मादुपायेष्वसत्येषु सत्य ितपादनपरे षु न चो मिस्त।
There are no constraints or limitations imposed on the notions such as ucca, nīca,
madhyama, paridhi and so on, which are essentially aids to the calculation of the
observed motion of the planets. They are only the means for arriving at the desired
results. Hence this entire procedure is fictitious, by means of which the observed
planetary motion is arrived at....Just as the linguists utilise notions such as prakçti,
pratyaya, vikāra, āgama, varõa, lopa, vyatyaya, etc., to comprehend (well-formed)
words.... In the same way in our science also astronomers employ notions such as
madhyama, mandocca, śīghrocca, śīghraparidhi, jyā, kāùñha, bhujā, koñi, karõa,
etc., in order to comprehend the observed motion of planets. Hence, there is indeed

16
For an overview of the development of Indian planetary theories, see K. Ramasubramanian and M. S.
Sriram, trans., Tantrasaïgraha of Nīlakaõñha Somayājī (New York: Springer Verlag, 2011), 487-535.
17
Kripa Shankar Shukla, ed., Āryabhañīya with Bhāùya of Bhāskara (New Delhi, Indian National Science
Academy, 1976), 217.

11
 nothing unusual that fictitious means are employed to arrive at the true state of
affairs [in all these śāstras].

Thus, the Indian astronomers were in the business to calculate and to compute, not to
form pictures of the heavens as they ought to be. Indian astronomers do employ various
models, analytical as well as geometrical, but (as we have seen above) the texts
themselves emphasise, these are no more than artefacts used in their calculations.

In their attempt to achieve concordance between their calculations and the observed
planetary motions, Indian astronomers were sometimes ready to accommodate
inexplicable or even seemingly contradictory procedures as component part of their
models. In the traditional planetary model of Āryabhaña, in the case of Mercury and
Venus, the mean Sun is taken as the mean planet and the equation of centre is applied to
it. This was indeed a feature common to all the ancient planetary theories (Indian, Greco-
European & Islamic). However, the traditional Indian planetary model managed to
achieve a far more accurate description of the planetary latitudes (than was achieved in
the Greco-European and Islamic traditions in the pre-modern period) by employing the
notion of śīghrocca which, in the case of the interior planets Mercury and Venus,
corresponds to the mean heliocentric planet. Āryabhaña’s prescription was that the
latitudinal motion of the interior planet is to be found from its śīghrocca. Brahmagupta
went on to suggest that one should actually employ the manda-corrected śīghrocca and in
this way he was able to ensure that the latitude is calculated from the true heliocentric
longitude of the planet.

Thus, we see that the traditional Indian texts did provide a fairly accurate theory of the
planetary latitudes. But, in the process, they had to live with two entirely different rules
for calculating latitudes, one for the exterior planets where the manda-corrected mean
longitude appears and an entirely different one for the interior planets which involves the
manda-corrected śīghrocca of the planet. This peculiarity of the rule for calculating the
latitude of an interior planet was repeatedly noticed by various Indian astronomers, at
least from the time of Bhāskara I (c.629) onwards. The celebrated astronomer
Bhāskarācārya II (c.1150) also draws attention to this peculiar procedure adopted for the
interior planets, in his Vāsanābhāùya on his own Siddhāntaśiromaõi, and quotes the
statement of Caturveda Pçthūdakasvāmin (c.860) that this peculiar procedure for the
interior planets can be justified only on the ground that this is what has been found to
lead to predictions that are in conformity with observations:18

ननु ज्ञशु योः शी ो पातयुित के न् ं कृ त्वा यो िवक्षेप आनीतः स शी ो स्थान एव भिवतुमहर्ित।

न हस्थाने। यतो होऽन्य वतर्ते। अत इदमनुपप िमव ितभाित। तथा च िस ान्तभाष्ये।
ज्ञशु योः शी ो स्थाने यावान् िवक्षेपस्तावानेव य त स्थस्यािप हस्य भवित।अ ोपलिब्धरे व
वासना नान्यत्कारणं व ुं शक्यत इित चतुवदेनाप्यध्यवसायोऽ कृ तः।

18
Murali Dhara Chaturvedi, Siddhāntaśiromaõi, 402.

12
 The latitude (deflection from the ecliptic) that is obtained by using the śīghrocca
and the node must be the latitude at the location of śīghrocca and not at the
location of the planet, as the planet is somewhere else. Therefore this (procedure
for the computation of latitudes of an interior planet) seems to be without any
justification. However even Caturvedācārya (Pçthūdakasvāmin) has concluded as
follows in his commentary on Brāhmasphuñasiddhānta: ‘The latitude at the
location of the śīghrocca of the planets Mercury and Venus, corresponds to the
latitude of the planet itself wherever it may be; here the upalabdhi (agreement
between the calculated results and observations) is the only justification as we are
unable to give any other reason.’

In fact, in an attempt to resolve this seeming contradiction in the traditional method of

calculation of the latitudes of the planets, the celebrated Kerala astronomer Nīlakaõñha
Somayājī (c.1444-1550) came up with a fundamental revision of the traditional planetary
theory. In his treatise Tantrasaïgraha (c.1500), Nīlakaõñha proposed that what was till
then thought of as the śīghroccas of Mercury or Venus should be identified with the
(mean) planets themselves. This led to a more accurate formulation of the equation of
centre and the latitude of the interior planets than was available either in the earlier Indian
works or in the Greco-European or the Islamic traditions of astronomy till the work of
Kepler, which was to come more than a hundred years later. (Incidentally, it may be
noted that the celebrated works of Copernicus (c.1543) or Tycho Brahe (c.1583) did not
bring about any improvement in the planetary theory of interior planets as they merely
reformulated the ancient planetary model of Ptolemy for different frames of reference). In
fact, in so far as the computation of the planetary longitudes and latitudes is concerned,
Nīlakaõñha’s revised planetary model closely approximates the Keplerian model, except
that Nīlakaõñha conceives of the planets as going in eccentric orbits around the mean Sun
rather than the true Sun.

In his Āryabhañīyabhāùya, Nīlakaõñha has presented the detailed rationale for his revision
of the traditional planetary theory:19

शी वशा िवक्षेप उ ः। कथमेत ुज्यते। ननु स्विबम्बस्य िवक्षेपः स्व मणवशादेव भिवतुमहर्ित।
न पुनरन्य मणवशािदित। सत्यम्। न पुनरन्यस्य मणवशादन्यस्य िवक्षेप उपप ते। तस्मात्
बुधोऽ ाशीत्यैव िदनैः स्व मणवृ ं पूरयित।… एत नोपप ते यदेकेनैव संवत्सरे ण
तत्पिर मणमुपलभ्यते नैवा ाशीत्या िदनैः। सत्यम् भगोलपिर मणं तस्यप्येकेनैवाब्देन। ...

एतदु ं भवित। तयो र्मणवृ ेन न भूः कबलीि यते। ततो बिहरे व सदा भूः। भगोलैकपा र् एव
तद्वृ स्य पिरसमा त्वात् त गणेन न ादशरािशषु चारः स्यात्। तयोरिप वस्तुत
आिदत्यमध्यम एव शी ो म्। शी ो भगणत्वेन पिठता एव स्वभगणाः। तथाप्यािदत्य--

19
S.K.Pillai, ed., Āryabhañīya Golapāda with Bhāùya of Nīlakaõñha (Trivandrum:Trivandrum Sanskrit
Series, 1957), 8-9.

13
 मणवशादेव ादशरािशषु चारः स्यात्। शी वृ स्य क यायाः मह वात्। शी ो नीच-
वृ स्याप्येकभागगमेव स्व मणवृ म्। यथा कु जादीनामिप शी ो ं स्वमन्दक या-
मण्डलािदकमाकषर्ित एवमेतयोरिप। अनयोः पुनस्तदाकषर्णवशादेव ादशरािशषु चारः इित।

The latitudinal motion is said to be due to that of the śīghrocca. How is this
appropriate? Isn’t the latitudinal motion of a body dependent on the motion of that
body only, and not because of the motion of something else? The latitudinal motion
of one body cannot be obtained as being due to the motion of another. Hence [we
should conclude that] Mercury goes around its own orbit in 88 days... However,
this also is not appropriate because we see it going around [the Earth] in one year
and not in 88 days. True, the period in which Mercury completes one full
revolution around the bhagola (the celestial sphere) is one year only [like the
Sun]...

All this can be explained thus: Their [Mercury and Venus] orbits do not
circumscribe the earth. The Earth is always outside their orbit. Since their orbit is
always confined to one side of the [geocentric] celestial sphere, in completing one
revolution they do not go around the twelve signs (rāśis). For them also really the
mean Sun is the śīghrocca. It is only their own revolutions, which are stated to be
the revolutions of the śīghrocca [in the Āryabhañīya]. It is only due to the
revolution of the Sun [around the Earth] that they (i.e. the interior planets, Mercury
and Venus) complete their movement around the twelve signs [and complete their
revolution of the Earth]. Because the śīghra-epicycle is larger than their orbit, their
orbit is completed on one side of the śīghra-epicycle. Just as in the case of the
Jupiter etc. [the exterior planets] the śīghrocca (i.e., the mean Sun) attracts [and
drags around] the manda-orbits on which they move (manda-kakùyā-maõóala), in
the same way it does in the case of these [interior] planets also. And it is due to this
attraction that these [interior planets] move around the twelve signs.

The above passage also exhibits the clinching argument employed by Nīlakaõñha.
Starting from the fact that the motion of the interior planets was characterised by two
different periods, one for their latitudinal motion and another for their motion in
longitude, Nīlakaõñha arrived at what may be termed a revolutionary discovery
concerning the motion of the interior planets: That they go around the Sun in orbits that
do not circumscribe the Earth in a period that corresponds to the period of their latitudinal
motion and that they go around the Zodiac in one year as they are dragged around the
Earth by the Sun.

It was indeed well known to the ancients that the exterior planets, Mars, Jupiter and
Saturn, go around the Earth and that they also go around the Sun in the same mean
period, because their geocentric orbit was outside that of the Sun. Nīlakaõñha was the first

14
savant in the history of astronomy to clearly derive from the computational scheme, and
not from any speculative or cosmological argument, that the interior planets go around
the Sun in an orbit that does not enclose the Earth, and the period of their motion around
Sun is also the period of their latitudinal motion.

In his works, Golasāra, Siddhāntadarpaõa, and a short but remarkable tract

Grahasphuñānayane Vikùepavāsanā, Nīlakaõñha describes the geometrical picture of
planetary motion that follows from his revised planetary theory, according to which the
five planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn move in eccentric orbits (inclined
to the ecliptic) around the mean Sun, which in turn goes around the Earth. (This
geometrical picture is the same as the model of solar system proposed in 1583 CE by
Tycho Brahe, albeit on entirely different considerations). Most of the Kerala astronomers
who succeeded Nīlakaõñha, such as Jyeùñhadeva, Acyuta Piśārañi, Putumana Somayājī,
etc., seem to have adopted his revised planetary model.

In his other great work, Jyotirmīmā§sā, Nīlakaõñha has highlighted the importance of
preparing the practitioners of the science of astronomy for the onerous task of
continuously observing the skies, continuously checking their computations against
observations and repeatedly re-adjusting their parameters and theoretical procedures so as
to make their calculations accord with reality. Indian astronomers had always been
acutely aware that their astronomical parameters and even theoretical procedures could
get out of tune with reality sooner or later, and the Indian texts repeatedly emphasise the
need for updating and revising the parameters and theoretical schemes so that their
computations conform to observations. In Jyotirmīmā§sā, Nīlakaõñha has dealt with this
issue in great detail as is evident from the following somewhat long quotation from this
seminal work:20

नन्वेवमिप स्वकाल एव गीितको भगणा ाः [सू मा: यदा] गीतस्य हणस्य च त्यक्षसंवादः
स्यात् यत इदान न्थकरणकालात् तृतीये िद ाब्दे महान् भेद उपलभ्यते। गीितको कालतः
प ादेव हीदान सवार्ण्यिप हणािन दृश्यन्ते।...

एवमािददूषणं परै रु ा मानं पिरहतु परीक्षा कारमाह यदथ पद येण सकला यु यः दिशताः
‘िक्षितरिवयोगाद् िदनकृ द् रवीन्दुयोगाद्’ इित। अ ो ािभयुर्ि िभरे व बुि मि ः सम्यक्
परीक्षणं शक्यं कतुर्म्।

ननु तपोिभः स ो ा आयर्भटाय भगणपिरध्यािदकं हगणनसाधनभूतं

संख्यािवशेषमुपिददेश। तदुपिद ं पुनरायर्भटः सव यथोपिद मेव दशिभग ितिभः िनबबन्ध इित
के िचन्मन्यन्ते। तस्य कु तः परीक्षणं णः सवर्ज्ञत्वात् राग ष
े ा भावा अिवतत विन यात्
इित चेत् मन्द मैवम्। देवता सादो मितवैमल्यहेतुरेव। न च पुनः ा आिदत्यो वा स्वयमेवागत्य

20
K.V.Sarma, ed., Jyotirmīmā§sā of Nīlakaõñha (Hoshiarpur, Punjab University Indological Series, 1977),
1-8.

15
उपिदशेत्। एवमेव च व यित चानन्तरसू े ‘सदसज्ज्ञानसमु ात् समुद्धृतं देवता सादेन।
सज्ज्ञानो मर ं मया िनम ं स्वमितना वा॥’ इित ...

‘ज्योितश्शा े [ऽिप युगपिरवृि पिरमाण] ारे ण चन् ािदत्यािदगितिवभागेन ितिथनक्ष -

ज्ञानमिविच्छ सं दायगिणतानुमानमूलम्’इित वाि ककारोऽिप हगितज्ञानमनुमानेनाह ।

त ािविच्छ सं [दायपदमप्ये]वं ाच ।े ‘गिणतो ीतस्य चन् ादेः देशिवशेषान्वयस्य त्यक्षेण

संवादः ततो िनि तान्वयस्य परस्य गिणतिलङ्गोपदेशः ततस्तस्या ोपदेशावगतान्वयस्य
अनुमानं संवादः परस्मै चोपदेशः इित सम् दायािवच्छेदात् ामाण्यम्’ इित । ...

तस्मात् िशष्य िशष्यपरं परया सवरिप परीक्षणं कायर्म् ।...

आयर्भटीयस्य च परीक्षापरत्वादेव सकलदेशकालयोः स्फु टाथर्त्वं न पुनः तदु भगणािद-

वैिशष् ात् । अत इदमेव परीक्षासू ं िस ान्तान्तरे भ्योऽस्य गौरवमापादयित ।

मानस ाख्यातािप कि दाह ‘ननु पैतामहािदभेदन

े परस्परिवरु ा िस ान्ता भविन्त।
िस ान्तभेदे सित कालभेद:। कालभेदे सित कालाङ्गािन ौतस्मातर्लौिककािन कमार्िण
िवफलािन स्युः। कमर्वैकल्ये सित लोकया ोच्छेदः। हा िधक् सङ्कटे महित पितता: स्म:।’

अ ोच्यते ‘ऋजुमते स न शोिचत :। गुरुचरणपिरचरणपरै ः िकिमव न ज्ञायते।

प िस ान्तास्तावत् िचत्काले माणमेव इत्यवगन्त म्। अिप च यः िस ान्तः दशर्निवसंवादी
भवित सोऽन्वेषणीयः। दशर्नसंवाद तदानीन्तनैः परीक्षकै र्हणादौ िवज्ञात ः। ये पुनरन्यथा
ा निस ान्तस्य भेदे सित यन् ैः परी य हाणां भगणािद ज्ञात्वा अिभनविस ान्त: णेय
इत्यथार्त् तत् त इहलोके ऽहसनीया: परलोके ऽदण्डनीया ’ इित ।...

तस्मात् िशष्याणां हगितसामथ्यार्पादनमेव शा योजनम्। ते पुनः दृक्संवािदकरणं कृ त्वा लोके

स रे युः। करणनामेव िह ावहािरकत्वं सू मत्वं च स्यात्।

The number of revolutions etc., enunciated in the Gītikā [pāda of Āryabhañīya] are
accurate only at the time of its composition, when they would have been tested for
consonance with eclipses etc. Currently, in the third divine year [of 360 years each]
after the composition of the text, one finds great differences [between calculations
and observations]. All eclipses are now seen at times later than those computed
[according to Āryabhañīya]....

It is only to lay at rest such criticism, which is bound to be made by others, that
[Āryabhaña] gave the method of examination (parīkùāprakāra), all the techniques
of which are expressed merely by the three words ‘The Sun [is ascertained] by the
conjunction of the earth and Sun, by the conjunction of the Sun and the Moon [the
Moon is ascertained].’ By following these techniques only, the wise can do proper
examination.

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Some people indeed believe that, pleased by his penance (tapas), Brahmā
instructed Āryabhaña the number of revolutions, [dimensions of] epicycles etc.,
which are to be employed in calculating the motion of planets; and that Āryabhaña
encapsulated all that instruction faithfully in ten Gītikā verses. And so, [you may
argue], how can we conceive of putting that [instruction] to test, since Brahmā is
indeed omniscient and free from all mental aberrations such as attachment, hatred
etc., and is certainly free of error? You dim-witted, it is not so. The grace of gods is
only for attaining clarity of intellect. Again it cannot be that Brahma or Sun would
come himself and instruct. In fact [Āryabhaña] states more or less the same in a
later verse.

‘By the grace of Brahmā, the precious jewel of excellent knowledge [of Jyotiùa]
has been brought out by me by means of the ship of my intellect from the sea of
true and false knowledge, by diving deep into it.’...

The author of Tantravārttika [Kumārilabhañña] also has stated that the knowledge
of the motion of planets is through inference, by noting that ‘in astronomy also the
knowledge of tithi and nakùatra is founded on an unbroken tradition of calculation
and inference, based on the measure of yugas, and the rates of motions of the Sun,
Moon etc.’ The ‘unbroken tradition’ is also explained [in the commentary Ajitā of
Paritoùamiśra] as follows: ‘The correlation of the computed Moon etc., with actual
observation at a particular place, the inferred revised computation on the basis of
such correlation being transmitted as tradition, it being correlated again (with
observation and again revised) and transmitted further down to others ... this is how
tradition is continued without interruption, and hence its continued validity.’

Therefore parīkùā (examination) is to be done continuously, following the tradition

of disciples and their disciples etc., by all...

It is only because Āryabhañīya has enunciated the supremacy of parīkùā, that it is a

relevant and valid text for all places and times, and not because of any specialty of
the revolution numbers and other parameters stated therein. It is this rule of parīkùā
which gives it an exalted status in relation to other siddhāntas....

A commentator on the Mānasa (Laghumānasa of Muñjāla) has lamented: ‘Indeed,

the siddhāntas, like Paitāmaha, differ from one another [in giving the astronomical
constants]. Timings are different as the siddhāntas differ (i.e. the measures of time
for any particular event as computed by the different siddhāntas differ). When the
computed timings differ, Vedic and domestic rituals, which have [correct] timings
as a component [of their performance] go astray. When rituals go astray, worldly
life gets disrupted. Alas, we have precipitated into a calamity.’

Here, it needs to be stated: ‘O faint-hearted, there is nothing to be despaired of.

Wherefore does anything remain beyond the ken of those intent on serving at the
feet of the teachers? One has to realise that the five siddhāntas had been valid at a
particular time. Therefore, one should look for a siddhānta that does not show

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discord with actual observations [at the present time]. Such accordance with
observation has to be ascertained by astronomers during times of eclipses etc.
When earlier siddhāntas show discord, observations should be made with
instruments and revolutions etc. obtained, [which would give results which accord
with actual observation] and a new siddhānta enunciated. Thus, nobody will be
ridiculed in this world nor punished in the next’....

Therefore, the purpose of the śāstra is to create in students the capacity for
examining the motion of the planets. They, in turn, should function in the world by
composing a karaõa [computational manual suitable for their epoch] which is in
accordance with observations. Only such karaõas can be accurate and of use in
worldly affairs.

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