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Bloody Beaches:
The Marines at Peleliu
by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)

n D-Day 15 September
1944, five infantry bat-
talions of the 1st Ma-
rine Division's 1st, 5th,
and 7th Marines, in
amphibian tractors (LVTs) lumbered
across 600-800 yards of coral reef
fringing smoking, reportedly
smashed Peleliu in the Palau Island
group and toward five selected land-
ing beaches. That westward anchor
of the 1,000-mile-long Caroline ar-
chipelago was viewed by some U.S.
planners as obstacles, or threats, to
continued advances against Japan's
Pacific empire.
The Marines in the LVTs had been
told that their commanding general,
Major General William H. Rupertus,
believed that the operation would be
tough, but quick, in large part be-
cause of the devastating quantity and
quality of naval gunfire and dive
bombing scheduled to precede their
assault landing. On some minds were
the grim images of their sister 2d Ma-
rine Division's bloody assault across
the reefs at Tarawa, many months
earlier. But 1st Division Marines,
peering over the gunwales of their
landing craft saw an awesome scene
of blasting and churning earth along
the shore. Smoke, dust, and the geys-
ers caused by exploding bombs and
large-caliber naval shells gave op- surviving strongpoints or weapons
timists some hope that the defenders
which appeared at the beach as the
would become casualties from such
On the Cover: "Down from Bloody following troops landed. And just
preparatory fires; at worst, they
Ridge Too Late. He's Finished —Washed would be too stunned to respond ahead of the armored tractors, as the
Up—Gone As we passed sick bay, still quickly and effectively to the naval gunfire lifted toward deeper
in the shell hole, it was crowded with hundreds of on-rushing Marines targets, flew a line of U.S. Navy
wounded, and somehow hushed in the about to land in their midst. fighter aircraft, strafing north and
evening light. I noticed a tattered Marine
Just ahead of the first wave of south along the length of the beach
standing quietly by a corpsman, staring defenses, parallel to the assault
troops carrying LVTs was a wave of
stiffly at nothing. His mind had crum-
armored amphibian tractors (LVTAs) waves, trying to keep all beach
bled in battle, his jaw hung, and his eyes
were like two black empty holes in his mounting 75mm howitzers. They defenders subdued and intimidated
head." Caption by the artist, Tom Lea. were tasked to take under fire any as the Marines closed the defenses.
1
 The Divisions and their Commanders
he Peleliu operation was to be conducted by two
divisions, one Marine and one Army. In the Pacific
area since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was
a veteran, combat-tested organization which launched the
first offensive landing in the Pacific War when it attacked
Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. After a period in Austra-
lia of rest, recuperation, and training of newly joined Ma-
rines, the division made its second amphibious assault on
26 December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on New Britain Is-
land. When the division landed on Peleliu, its regiments
(1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, all infantry, and 11th Marines,
artillery) contained officers and enlisted Marine veterans
of both landings as well as new troops. Before World War
II ended, the 1st Division was to participate in one last bat-
tle, the landing on Okinawa.
Major General William H. Rupertus, the 1st Division
commander, had been with the division since early 1942.
As a brigadier general, he was the assistant division com-
mander to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift during
the Guadalcanal campaign. He took command of the divi-
sion for the Cape Gloucester operation. General Rupertus
was commissioned in 1913 and served as commander of
a Marine ship's detachment in World War I. During subse-
quent years, he was assigned duty in Haiti and China. Fol-
lowing the Peleliu campaign, he was named Commandant
of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. General Ruper-
tus died of a heart attack on 25 March 1945, while still
on active duty. MajGen William H. Rupertus
The Army's 81st Infantry Division — the Wildcats — was It saw action in France at the Meuse-Argonne in World War
formed in August 1917 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. I, and was deactivated following the end of the war. The
division was reactivated in June 1942. It went to several
MajGen Paul I. Mueller USA Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment,
the landing on Angaur. After securing Angaur, it relieved
units of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. When Peleliu
was secured, the Wildcats began training for Operation
Olympic—the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese sur-
rendered unconditionally after suffering two atomic bomb
attacks. As a result, instead of invading Japan, the 81st oc-
cupied it. On 10 January, the 81st Infantry Division was
once more deactivated.
Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, the commander of
the 81st Division, was a graduate of the famous West Point
Class of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion in
France in World War I, and during the interwar period he
had a succession of assignments to infantry commands,
staff billets, and schools. In August 1941 he assumed com-
mand of the 81st Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alaba-
ma, and moved his division during its training period
successively from Florida to Tennessee to California before
its commitment to the battle for Angaur and Peleliu. Gener-
al Mueller served on active duty until 1954, when he re-
- tired. He died in 1964.

2
 cave and tunnel defenses. The
— at
Japanese had made the most of what
this terrain provided during their ex-
tensive period of occupation and
defensive preparations.
The second imponderable facing
the Marines was the plan developed
by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, the
officer who was to command the
force on Peleliu, and his superior,
Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue,
back on Koror. Their concept of
defense had changed considerably
from that which was experienced by
Captions by the artist, Tom Lea General Rupertus at Guadalcanal and
"Going In—First Wave For an hour we plowed toward the beach, the sun above Cape Gloucester, and, in fact, negat-
us coming down through the overcast like a silver burning ball Over the ed his concept of a tough, but quick
gunwale of a craft abreast of us I saw a Marine, his face painted for the jungle, campaign.
his eyes set for the beach, his mouth set for murder, his big hands quiet now in Instead of relying upon a pre-
the last moments before the tough tendons drew up to kill." sumed moral superiority to defeat the
Meanwhile, to blind enemy observa- As seen from the air on D-Day, 15 September 1944, Beaches White 1 and 2, on
tion and limit Japanese fire upon the which the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, landed. Capt George P Hunt's
landing waves, naval gunfire was Company K, 3/1, was on the extreme left flank of the 1st Marine Division.
shifted to the hill massif northeast of Department of Defense Photo (USN) 253745
the landing beaches.
That "massif," later to be called the •1

Umurbrogol Pocket, was the first of

two deadly imponderables, as yet
unknown to the division commander
and his planners. Although General
It.
Rupertus had been on temporary
duty in Washington during most of
his division's planning for the Peleliu
landing, he had been well briefed for
the operation.
The first imponderable involved
the real character of Umurbrogol,
which aerial photos indicated as a
rather gently rounded north-south
hill, commanding the landing
beaches some 2,000-4,000 yards dis-
tant. Viewed in these early photos,
the elevated terrain appeared clothed
in jungle scrub, which was almost en-
tirely removed by the preparatory
bombardment and then subsequent
heavy artillery fire directed at it. In-
stead of a gently rounded hill, the
Umurbrogol area was in fact a com-
plex system of sharply uplifted coral
ridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes.
It rose above the level remainder of
the island from 50 to 300 feet, and
provided excellent emplacements for

3
 fire capability. More disturbingly, as
the leading waves neared the
beaches, the LVTs were hit by heavy
enfilading artillery and antiboat gun
fire coming from concealed bunkers
on north and south flanking points.
The defenses on the left (north)
flank of Beach White 1, assaulted by
the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieu-
tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol),
were especially deadly and effective.
They disrupted the critical regimen-
tal and division left flank. Especial-
iy costly to the larger landing plan,
these guns shortly thereafter knocked
out tractors carrying important ele-
ments of the battalion's and the regi-
ment's command and control
personnel and equipment. The bat-
talion and then the regimental com-
mander both found themselves
ashore in a brutally vicious beach
fight, without the means of commu-
nication necessary to comprehend
their situations fully, or to take the
needed remedial measures.
The critical mission to seize the
"The Point" dominating the division
left flank had gone to one of the 1st
Regiment's most experienced compa-
fly commanders: Captain George P.
Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal and
attackers at the beach, and then to fronting the landing beaches (White New Britain, (who, after the war, be-
use bushido spirit and banzai tactics 1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the trac- came a long-serving managing edi-
to throw any survivors back into the tors passed several hundred "mines," tor of Life magazine). Hunt had
sea, Peleliu's defenders would delay intended to destroy any craft which developed plans involving specific as-
the attacking Marines as long as they approached or ran over them. These signments for each element of his
could, attempting to bleed them as "mines" were aerial bombs, set to be company. These had been rehearsed
heavily as possible. Rather than de- detonated by wire control from ob- until every individual knew his role
pending upon spiritual superiority, servation points onshore. However, and how it fit into the company plan.
they would combine the devilish ter- the preliminary bombardment had Each understood his mission's criti-
rain with the stubborn, disciplined, so disrupted the wire controls, and cality.
Japanese soldiers to relinquish Peleliu so blinded the observers, that the D-Day and H-Hour brought heav-
at the highest cost to the invaders. defensive mining did little to slow or ier than expected casualties. One of
This unpleasant surprise for the Ma- destroy the assaulting tractors. the company's platoons was pinned
rines marked a new and important As the tractors neared the beaches, down all day in the fighting at the
adjustment to the Japanese tactics they came under indirect fire from beach. The survivors of the rest of
which were employed earlier in the mortars and artillery. Indirect fire the company wheeled left, as
war. against moving targets generates planned, onto the flanking point.
Little or nothing during the trip more apprehension than damage, Moving grimly ahead, they pressed
into the beaches and the touchdown and only a few vehicles were lost to assaults upon the many defensive
revealed the character of the revised that phase of Japanese defense. Such emplacements. Embrasures in the
fire did, however, demonstrate that
Japanese tactical plan to the five Ma- piliboxes and casements were
rine assault battalions. Bouncing the preliminary bombardment had blanketed with small-fire arms and
across almost half a mile of coral not disposed of all the enemy's heavy smoke, then attacked with demoli-
4
 . 1
'V

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94913

The skies over the landing beaches of Peleliu are blackened bined naval and aerial prelanding bombardment, as amphib-
with smoke rising from the ground as the result of the corn- ian tractors rush shoreward carrying the assault waves.
tions and rifle grenades. A climax clothing on fire and ammunition ex- munications got through to bring in
came at the principal casement, from ploding in their belts. That flight had supporting fires and desperately
which the largest and most effective been anticipated, and some of Hunt's needed re-supply. One LVT got into
artillery fire had been hitting LVTs on Marines were in position to cut them the beach just before dark, with
the flanks of following landing down. grenades, mortar shells, and water.
waves. A rifle grenade hit the gun At dusk, Hunt's Company K held It evacuated casualties as it depart-
muzzle itself, and ricocheted into the the Point, but by then the Marines ed. The ammunition made the differ-
casement, setting off explosions and had been reduced to platoon ence in that night's furious struggle
flames. Japanese defenders ran out strength, with no adjacent units in against Japanese determined to recap-
the rear of the blockhouse, their contact. Only the sketchy radio com- ture the Point.

The Changing Nature of Japanese Tactics

apan launched its December 1941 surprise the lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in the
attacks in the expectation that its forces could hands of the determined Allies.
J quickly seize a forward line of Pacific and Asian em-
pire. Thereafter, it expected to defend these territories stub-
bornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies and then to
To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions were
alarming, but cost-effective: It was easier, and less costly,
to mow down banzai attacks than to dig stubborn defenders
negotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony. out of fortified positions.
By spring of 1944, the lessons had permeated to the
This strategic concept was synchronized with the fanat- highest levels of Japan's army command. When General
ic Japanese spirit of bushido. Faith in their army's moral Hideki Tojo instructed General Inoue to defend the Palaus
superiority over lesser races led the Japanese to expect 19th- deliberately and conservatively, he was bringing Japanese
century banzai tactics to lead invariably to success. Expec- tactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth,
tations and experience meshed until their 1942 encounters Japanese soldiers would dig in and hunker down, to make
with the Allies, particularly with Americans in the Solo- their final defenses as costly as possible to the attacking
mons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalize Americans.

5
 and toward the edge of the clearing
looking east over the airfield area.
On the division's right flank,
Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst's
3/7 had to cross directly in front of
a commanding defensive fortification
flanking the beach as had Marines in
the flanking position on the Point.
- Fortunately, it was not as close as the
- — Point position, and did not inflict
such heavy damage. Nevertheless, its
enfilading fire, together with some
natural obstructions on the beach
caused Company K, 3/7, to land left
of its planned landing beach, onto
the right half of beach Orange 2,
_,:' 3/5's beach. In addition to being out
Marines and corpsmen scramble ashore and seek any cover they can to escape the of position, and out of contact with
incoming murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire. Behind them, smoking and the company to its right, Company
abandoned, are amphibian tractors which were hit as they approached the beach. K, 3/7, became intermingled with
The next afternoon, Lieutenant
Colonel Raymond C. Davis' 1/1
fl?
moved its Company B to establish
contact with Hunt, to help hang onto
the bitterly contested positions.
Hunt's company also regained the
survivors of the platoon which had
been pinned at the beach fight
throughout D-Day. Of equal' impor-
tance, the company regained artillery
and naval gunfire communications,
which proved critical during the se-
cond night. That night, the Japanese Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr
organized another and heavier— two Situated in a cave overlooking the airfield is this heavy caliber Japanese antiboat
companies — counterattack directed gun. It had a field of fire which included the invasion beaches and the airfield.
at the Marines at the Point. It was
narrowly defeated. By mid-morning, Damaged heavily in the D-Day bombardment, this Japanese pillbox survives on
the southern promontory of White Beach. Now vacant, its gun lies on the beach.
D plus 2, Hunt's survivors, together Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr
with Company B, 1/1, owned the
c.
Point, and could look out upon some
500 Japanese who had died defend- ?-
ing or trying to re-take it.
To the right of Puller's struggling i_. ..
3d Battalion, his 2d Battalion, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz
commanding, met artillery and mor-
tar opposition in landing, as well as
machine-gun fire from still effective
beach defenders. The same was true
for 5th Marines' two assault battal-
ions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W.
Boyd's 1/5 and Lieutenant Colonel
r - I. -
Austin C. Shofner's 3/5, which hi -' -
fought through the beach defenses

6
 Naval Gunfire Support for Peleliu
n their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal,
the primary experience of 1st Division Marines with
naval gunfire was at the receiving end. On New Bri-
tain, the character and disposition of Japanese defenses did
not call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did sub-
sequent operations ashore. The naval gunfire to which the
Guadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently and heavi-
ly damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upon
dug-in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarely
destructive.
During the planning for Peleliu, the division staff ini-
tially had no trained naval gunfire (NGF) planner. When
one arrived, he was hampered by the cumbersome com-
munications link back to higher headquarters, Lieutenant
General Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(FMFPac), in Honolulu, which would provide the essen-
tial targeting information for the division's NGF plan. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95115
FMFPac also would plan and allocate the available gunfire effect of inadequate NGF was that the flanking positions
resources to the targets deemed important by the division north and south of the landing beaches were not taken out.
staff's planners. The preoccupation of FMFPac with the on- The selection of naval gunfire targets could certainly have
going Marianas campaigns, as well as illness on the staff been done with more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B.
of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander, Naval Puller, the 1st Marines commander, had specifically asked
Gunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained the for the destruction of the positions dominating his land-
preparations. Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Man- ing on the division left flanks. Failure to do so was paid
anas reduced ammunition availability for Peleliu. for in blood, courage, and time during the critical battle
Surprisingly, during the delivery of U.S. preparatory for the Point.
fires, there was no Japanese response. This prompted 01- Subsequent to D-Day there were numerous instances of
dendorf to report all known targets destroyed, and to can- well-called and -delivered naval gunfire support: night il-
cel preparatory fires scheduled for D plus 3. An lumination during the night of 15-16 September, the des-
unintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in naval truction of two major blockhouses earlier reported
gunfire plan may have resulted in there being more shells "destroyed," and effective support of the Ngesebus landing
available for post-landing NGF support. But the costliest toward the end of the battle.

Company K, 3/5, a condition fraught Gormley's unit was to tie into Hurst's deemed essential.
with confusion and delay. Major right flank, and re-orient southeast Following close behind Sabol's
Hurst necessarily spent time regroup- and south as that area was unco- 3/1, the 1st Marines' Colonel Puller
ing his separated battalion, using as vered. He was then to attack landed his forward command group.
a coordinating line a large anti-tank southeast and south, with his left on As always, he was eager to be close
ditch astride his line of advance. His Hurst's right, and his own right on to the battle, even if that location
eastward advance then resumed, the beach. After Hurst's battalion deprived him of some capacity to de-
somewhat delayed by his efforts to reached the opposite shore, both velop full supporting fires. With
regroup. were to attack south, defending limited communications, and now
Any delay was anathema to the di- Scarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southern with inadequate numbers of LVTs for
vision commander, who visualized landing beaches. follow-on waves, he struggled to
momentum as key to his success. The At the end of a bloody first hour, ascertain and improve his regiment's
division scheme of maneuver on the all five battalions were ashore. The situation. His left unit (Company K,
right called for the 7th Marines closer each battalion was to Umur- 3/1) had two of its platoons desper-
(Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) to brogol, the more tenuous was its ately struggling to gain dominance at
land two battalions in column, both hold on the shallow beachhead. Dur- the Point. Puller's plan to land Major
over Beach Orange 3. As Hurst's ing the next two hours, three of the Davis' 1st Battalion behind Sabol's
leading battalion advanced, it was to division's four remaining battalions 3/1, to reinforce the fight for the left
be followed in trace by Lieutenant would join the assault and press for flank, was thwarted by the H-hour
Colonel John J. Gormley's 1/7. the momentum General Rupertus losses in LVTs. Davis' companies had
7
 the Marines' map, which had been
reported destroyed by pre-landing
naval gunfire. As a similar situation
later met on Puller's inland advance,
the blockhouse showed little evi-
dence of ever having been visited by
heavy fire. Preparations to attack
and reduce this blockhouse further
delayed the 7th Marines' advance,
and the commanding general fretted
further about loss of momentum.

On the enemy's side, Lieutenant

General Sadae Inoue, a fifth genera-
tion warrior of stout military repu-
tation, commanding the 14th
Infantry Division, fresh from the
Kwangtung Army in China, met in
Tokyo in March 1944 with Japanese
Premier Hideki Tojo, who was also
Minister of War. Tojo had conclud-
ed that Japan was no longer able to
hold the Palaus against growing Al-
lied naval dominance in the Western
Pacific. Instead, he had decided to sell
the Palaus to the United States at the
highest possible cost to Americans in
blood and time. He ordered Inoue to
D— DAY
take his division to the Palaus, to take
After Rectifying 3/5)
command of all Japanese forces
Front Lines
Regimental Boundaries there, and to defend the Palau Islands
Phase Lines as long as possible, denying its use
Main Counterattack to the Americans—and killing as
Secondary Counterattacks
or Strong Pressure many as possible in the undertaking.
As his division sailed to the Palaus,
Inoue flew ahead, reconnoitered his
to be landed singly and his battalion a few of his troops were driven left- new locale by air for two days, and
committed piecemeal to the action. ward by the still enfilading fire from concluded that Peleliu (with satellite
On the regiment's right, Honsowetz' the south flank of the beach, and air strips on Angaur and Ngesebus)
2/1 was hotly engaged, but making landed on Orange 2, in the 5th Ma- was the key to his defenses. Earlier
progress toward capture of the west rines' zone of action. Gormley's bat- U.S. attention to Peleliu during the
edges of the scrub which looked out talion was brought fully together Task Force 58 March strikes seemed
onto the airfield area. He was tied on behind 3/7 however, and as Hurst's to confirm that judgment. To defend
his right into Boyd's 1/5, which was leading 3/7 was able to advance east, Peleliu, Inoue immediately settled
similarly engaged. Gormley's 1 / 7 attacked southeast upon a commander, a mission, and
In the beachhead's southern sector, and south, against prepared po- a force level. Peleliu had for some
the landing of Gormley's 1/7 was sitions. time been under occupation and ad-
delayed somewhat by its earlier loss- Hanneken's battle against heavy ministrative command of a rear ad-
es in LVTs. That telling effect of ear- opposition from both east and south miral, who had used his forces'
ly opposition would be felt developed approximately as planned. construction resources and capabili-
throughout the remainder of the day. Suddenly, in mid-afternoon, the op- ty to build blockhouses and many
Most of Gormley's battalion landed position grew much heavier. Hurst's reinforced concrete structures above
on the correct (Orange 3) beach, but 3/7 ran into a blockhouse, long on ground, while improving existing
8
 I
I a-

I "1

Caption by the artist, Tom Lea

"The Beach . . . My First View as I Came Around From the drew into himself when he ran down that ramp, into that
Ramp of our LVT We ground to a stop, after a thousand years, flame. Those Marines flattened in the sand on that beach were
on the coarse coral.
. And we ran down the ramp and camedark and huddled like wet rats in death as I threw my body
.

around the end of the LVL splashing ankle-deep up the surfdown to among them."
the white beach. Suddenly I was completely alone. Each man
caves and tunnels under Peleliu's rich antiaircraft guns, and rudimentary island command and to maintain
concealment of overlying jungle, rocket launchers for sending up large, "liaison" with Colonel Nakagawa.
scrub, and vines. unguided naval shells. Most signifi- Murai was young, highly regarded,
In these underground installations, cant, the regiment had Colonel and, as the personal representative of
the admiral's personnel had well sur- Nakagawa and his battle-disciplined Lieutenant General Inoue, was con-
vived the Task Force 58 March at- officers and noncommissioned sidered senior to the admiral. He left
tacks. Above ground, planes and officers. Nakagawa had already been Nakagawa's operational mission
installations were demolished. As awarded nine medals for leadership firmly in Nakagawa's hands, as In-
Task Force 58 departed, the Japanese against the Chinese and was viewedoue intended. Throughout the cam-
emerged, repaired what they could, paign,
as a "comer" within his officer corps. Nakagawa exercised
but continued to focus upon under- Immediately upon arrival, operational control, and was assist-
ground installations. Together with Nakagawa reconnoitered his ed and counseled, but not command-
a few Korean labor troops, their prospective battle area from the ed, by General Murai.
numbers totaled about 7,000, most ground and from the air. He identi- Nakagawa had a sound apprecia-
of them lacking training and leader- fied the western beaches, the Ma- tion of his mission, of the situation,
ship for infantry action. rines' White and Orange Beaches, as and of American firepower. He
Leadership arrived in the person of the most probable landing sites. He turned his attention to the fullest use
Colonel Nakagawa, with his immediately ordered his troops to dig of his principal advantage, the ter-
6,500-man 2d Infantry Regiment in and construct beach defenses. At rain. He so deployed and installed his
(Rein forced). They had long battle this time, a bureaucratic conflict forces to inflict all possible damage
experience in China. They were arose. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, who and casualties during the anticipat-
armed with 24 75mm artillery pieces, was the senior officer and the senior ed landing, and then to defend in
some 13-15 light tanks, about 100 naval officer on Peleliu, resented be- depth for as long as possible. On
.50-cal. machine guns, 15 81mm ing subordinate to an Army officer Peleliu, that offered a vertical as well
heavy mortars, and about 30 dual- much junior to him. as a horizontal dimension to the
purpose antiaircraft guns. Already From Koror, Lieutenant General defense.
on the island were a large number of Inoue dispatched Major General He surveyed and registered ar-
very heavy (141mm) mortars, naval Kenjiro Murai to Peleliu, to assume tillery and mortar weapons over the

9
 ally supporting defensive complexes,
with interconnecting communication
lines and trenches.
Although believing the western
beaches to be the most probable
route of attack, he did not leave the
southern (Scarlet) and eastern (Pur-
ple) beaches undefended. He com-
mitted one battalion to organize
defenses in each area. The Purple
Beaches were thoroughly organized,
with contingent orders to the
defenders to move into central Peleliu
if the battle developed from the west,
as expected. But the battalion com-
mitted to the south, Scarlet Beach,
had orders to defend those stronger,
more permanent emplacements to
the end. Nakagawa assigned about
500 infantry and artillery to defend
Ngesebus and about 1,000 naval per-
sonnel to defend northern Peleliu.
Not under his command were the
1,500 defenders of Angaur.
The major part of his force and ef-
fort was committed to the 500 caves,
tunnels, and firing embrasures in the
coral ridges of central Peleliu. The
naval units' extensive earlier tunnel-
ing into the limestone ridges rendered
occupants largely immune to gener-
t4. al bombardments. Only lucky hits
into the mouths of caves, or point-
blank direct fire could damage the
Caption by the artist, Tom Lea hidden defenses and their troops.
"The Price Lying there in terror looking longingly up the slope to better cover, I
The tunnels were designed for, or
saw a wounded man near me, staggering in the direction of the LVTs. His face was
half bloody pulp and the mangled shreds of what was left of an arm hung down adapted to, various purposes: bar-
like a stick, as he bent over in his stumbling, shock-crazy walk. The half of his racks, command centers, hospitals,
face that was still human had the most terrifying look of abject patience I have storage and ammunition magazines,
ever seen. He fell behind me, in a red puddle on the white sand." cooking areas complete with fresh
width and depth of the reef off both rails and logs, and ordered anti-tank water springs and seepage basins,
eastern and western beaches, with ditches dug. He emplaced troops in and of course firing embrasures with
planned heavy concentrations along machine gun and mortar pits along, elaborate concealment and protective
the fringe of the western reef. In this and inland from, the beaches, aug- devices, including a few sliding steel
he anticipated the American need to mented by all the available barbed doors. Colonel Nakagawa expected
transfer follow-on waves from land- wire. On the north and south flanks very heavy prelanding bombard-
ing craft to the reef-crossing amphib- of the beach, he constructed concrete ments. He expected his troops to sur-
ian vehicles. He registered weapons emplacements to shelter and conceal vive them, and then to carry out his
on, and immediately inland from, antitank and anti-boat artillery sit- mission of delaying and bleeding the
the water's edge, to subject landing ed to enfilade the expected waves of Americans.
troops to a hail of fire. Off-shore he landing craft. On Koror, Lieutenant General In-
laid 500 wire-controlled "mines." Inland, he incorporated the oue was busy with the bulk of his
Colonel Nakagawa directed con- already-built blockhouse and adja- forces, preparing for expected attacks
struction of beach obstacles, using cent reinforced buildings into mutu- against Babeithuap. The Allied
 /
V

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95253

Engaged in the bitter struggle to establish the Peleliu beach- LVT, while other Marines atop the amphibian tractor fire at
head, Marine riflemen get only momentary shelter behind an enemy targets. The name of the LVT was more than prophetic
"Stalemate" plan had indeed called cure the eastern half of the island. moved directly east, through the
for invasion of Babeithuap. As the Shortly after the scheduled H plus dunes and scrub jungle, into and out
anticipated invasion drew near, Inoue one schedule, the 2d Battalion, 5th of the antitank barrier, and to the
issued a proclamation to his troops, Marines, Major Gordon D. Gayle west edge of the clearing surround-
clearly reflecting Tojo's instructions commanding, landed over Beach ing the airfield. Passing through the
to delay and bleed. He pointed out Orange 2, in trace behind 3/5. It lines of 3/5, Gayle's battalion at-
the necessities to anticipate and en-
Embrasures in this well-sited, heavily reinforced position, possibly in the Pocket,
dure the naval bombardment and to indicate the location of Japanese weapons which devastated attacking Marines.
use the terrain to inflict casualties on Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 107934
the attackers. Without actually or-
dering troops to die, he included the
words, "we are ready to die honora-
bly:' He went on to say that dying,
and losing the territory to the enemy,
might contribute to the opening of a
new phase of the war.

As the 1st Marines battled to se-

cure the left flank, and as the 7th Ma-
rines fought to isolate and then
reduce the Japanese defenses in the
southern end of Peleliu, the 5th Ma-
rines, Colonel Harold D. Harris com-
manding, was charged to drive across
the airfield, cut the island in two, and
then re-orient north and drive to se-

11
 Sherman medium tanks, one-third of
which had been left behind at the last
moment because of inadequate ship-
ping, were landed as early as possi-
ble, using a novel technique to cross
the reef. This tank landing scheme
was developed in anticipation of ear-
ly Japanese use of their armor capa-
bility.
Movement of this fire and logisti-
cal support material onto a beach still
close to, and under direct observation
from, the commanding Umurbrogol
heights was an inescapable risk man-
dated by the Peleliu terrain. So long
as the enemy held observation from
Umurbrogol over the airfield and
over the beach activity, there was no
alternative to driving ahead rapidly,
using such fire support as could be
mustered and coordinated. Continu-
ing casualties at the beaches had to
be accepted to support the rapid ad-
vance. The commanding general's
PURPLE
concern for early momentum ap-
peared to be eminently correct. Units
on the left had to assault toward the
foot of Umurbrogol ridges, and
quickly get to the commanding
crests. In the center, the 5th Marines
had to make a fast advance to secure
other possible routes to outflank
Umurbrogol. In the south, the 7th
JAPANESE DEFENSIVE PLAN
— flitoCtiOt Ot p1 Ofl,00COUfltI,OttOCk
Marines had to destroy immediately
Di,.Ct 00 Ct tit., ,,titoflk anti — boot gun'
Ouoktion Ct tilt ,tCCh,40 gun' those now cut-off forces before be-
Tank,
coming freed to join the struggle
against central Peleliu.
tacked west against scattered of the airfield, but then lost contact. The movement of the 5th Marines
resistance from dug-outs and bomb By this time, the antitank ditch across the airfield and to the western
shelters near the southern end of the along the center and right of Orange edge of the lagoon separating the air-
airfield, and through the scrub area Beaches 1 and 2 was notable for the field area from the eastern peninsu-
slightly farther south. The 3d Battal- number of command posts located la (Beach Purple), created a line of
ion's mission was to clear that scrub, along its length. Shofner's 3/5 was attacking Marines completely across
maintaining contact with 3/7 on its there, as was Harris' 5th Marines that part of the island oriented both
right, while 2/5 was to drive across command post. Then an advance ele- east and north, toward what was be-
the open area to reach the far side of ment of the division command post lieved to be the major center of
the island. Advancing in its center under Brigadier General Oliver P. Japanese strength. The 7th Marines,
and right, 2/5 battled completely Smith, the assistant division com- pushing east and south, completed
across the island by mid-afternoon, mander, landed and moved into the splitting the enemy forces. Colonel
echeloned its left rearward to keep antitank ditch within sight of the air- Hanneken's troops, fully engaged,
contact with 1/5, and moved to re- field clearing area. Simultaneously, were generally concealed against ob-
orient its attack northward. The 2d important support weapons were servation from the enemy still north
Battalion's right flank tied for a while moving ashore. of the airfield and from the heights
into 3/5 in the woods to the south The 1st Tank Battalion's M-48A1 of Umurbrogol. There was a gap be-

12
 neither Selden's small CP group, nor
______
Berger's 2/7, could get past the trans-
fer line in their landing craft, and had
to return to their ships despite their
orders to land.
Into this division posture, at about
1650, Colonel Nakagawa launched
his planned tank-infantry counterat-
tack. All Marine commanders had
been alerted to the Japanese capabil-
ity to make an armored attack on D-
Day, and were well prepared. The at-
tack emerged from the area north of
the airfield and headed south, gener-
ally across the front of the 1st Ma-
rines' lines on the eastern edge of the
airfield clearing. The attack moved
directly into the 5th Marines' sector
'I
r where Boyd's 1/5 was set in, and
stretched across the southern area of
the airfield. Marines in 2/1 and 1/5
took the attackers under fire, infan-
'it. try and tanks alike. A bazooka gun-
a ner in 2/i's front hit two of the tanks.
The commanding officer of 1/5 had

4 his tanks in defilade, just behind his

front lines. They opened up on the
Japanese armor, which ran through
the front lines and virtually into his
forward command group. Boyd's
lines held fast, taking the attackers,
infantry and tanks alike, under fire
with all available weapons.
Deparmen of Defense Photo (USMC) 96745
Cpl Peter P Zacharko stands by a captured Japanese 141mm mortar, which rained Major John H. Gustafson, in 2/S's
shells down on the landing beaches and on the Marines as they proceeded inland. forward command post mid-way
tween the 5th's right and the 7th's left, where it would not be in the way. across the airfield, had his tank pla-
but it did not appear to be in a criti- General Rupertus ordered it to land, toon close at hand. Although the
cal sector. remarking to his staff that he had enemy had not yet come into his zone
Nevertheless, it was by now appar- now "shot his bolt!" Ashore, it was of action, he launched the platoon of
ent that the D-Day phase-line objec- apparent that what was needed on tanks into the melee. Accounts vary
tives were not going to be met in this hectic beachhead was not more as to just who shot what, but in a
either the south or the north. troops, but more room in which to very few minutes it was all over. The
Alarmed at the loss of the desired maneuver and more artillery. attacking tanks were all destroyed,
momentum, General Rupertus began General Rupertus began to make and the Japanese infantry literally
committing his reserve. First, he or- plans to land himself and the main blown away.
dered the division reconnaissance elements of his command group. Ad- Colonel Nakagawa's attack was
company ashore, then, pressing com- vice from the ADC ashore, and his courageous, but proved to be a total
manders already on the island, he chief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden, failure. Even where the tanks broke
ordered his one remaining uncom- convinced Rupertus to stay on the through the Marine lines, they in-
mitted infantry battalion, Lieutenant flagship. He compromised that deci- duced no Marine retreat. Instead, the
Colonel Spencer S. Berger's 2/7, to sion by ordering Colonel Selden Japanese armor became the focus of
land. No commander ashore felt a ashore. By now, the shortage of LVTs antitank fire of every sort and caliber.
need for 2/7, but Colonel Hanneken was frustrating the timely landing of The light Japanese tanks were liter-
said he could find an assembly area following waves. In consequence, ally blown apart. More than 100
13
 is 5

PELELIU
SECOND OPERATIONAL
PHASE (D+I—D+8)
D fl*3

were reported destroyed. That figure, maximum advance of the day, over and control had been completely
of course, reflected the amount of fire the most favorable terrain in the di- knocked out by 1700. The battalion
directed their way; each Marine vision front. It provided needed executive officer, Major Robert M.
grenadier, antitank gunner, and space for artillery and logistic Ash, had been killed earlier in the
tanker thought he had killed the tank deployment to support the continu- day by a direct hit upon his landing
at which he shot, and so reported. ation of the attack the next day. LVT. About the time of the Japanese
With the counterattack over and However, that relatively advanced tank attack, a mortar barrage hit the
the Japanese in apparent disarray, 2/5 position had an open right, south, 3/5 CF in the antitank ditch near the
immediately resumed its attack, flank which corresponded to a hole beach, killing several staff and
moving north along the eastern half in the regimental command struc- prompting the evacuation of the bat-
of the airfield. The battalion ad- ture. At that stage, 3/5 was supposed talion commander. As of 1700, the
vanced halfway up the length of the to maintain the contact between three companies of 3/5 were not in
airfield clearing before it stopped to north-facing 2/5 and south-oriented contact with each other, nor with the
organize for the night. It was the 3/7. But 3/5's battalion command (Continued on page 16)
14
 A Horrible Place
A mong the few civilian news correspondents who
chose to share the fate of the Marines on shore
on Peleliu was Robert Tepper" Martin, of Time,
who furnished the following description of what it was like
there:
discovered that productive wells could be drilled almost
anywhere on the comparatively low ground, and person-
nel semi-permanently stationed near the beach found that
even shallow holes dug in the sand would yield an only
mildly repulsive liquid which could be purified for drink-
Peleliu is a horrible place. The heat is stifling and ing with halizone tablets. But it continued necessary to sup-
rain falls intermittently — the muggy rain that brings ply the assault troops by means of scoured-out oil drums
no relief, only greater misery. The coral rocks soak and five-gallon field cans. Unfortunately, steaming out the
up the heat during the day and it is only slightly cool- oil drums did not remove all the oil, with the result that
er at night. Marines are in the finest possible physi- many or most of the troops drinking water from the drums
cal condition, but they wilted on Pelellu. By the fourth were sickened. When the captains of the ships in the trans-
day there were as many casualties from heat prostra- port area learned of this and of the shortage of water, they
tion as from wounds . rushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks to the beaches to ease
Peleliu is incomparably worse than Guam in its the problem somewhat.
bloodiness, terror, climate and the incomprehensible The water situation presented a problem even in the case
tenacity of the Japs. For sheer brutality and fatigue, of troops operating on comparatively level and open
I think it surpasses anything yet seen in the Pacific, ground. Once the fighting entered the ridges, terrain
certainly from the standpoint of numbers of troops difficult merely to traverse without having to fight, the de-
involved and the time taken to make the island secure. bility rate shot upward so alarmingly that an emergency
call was sent to all the ships off-shore to requisition every
On the second day, the temperature reached 105 degrees available salt tablet for issue to the 1st Marines.
in the shade and there was very little shade in most places The statement that heat prostrations equalled wound
where the fighting was going on, and arguably no breeze casualties is apt to be misleading. Most of those evacuated
at all anywhere. It lingered around that level of heat as the were returned to duty after a day or two of rest and re-
days dragged by (temperatures as high as 115 were record- habilitation; hence, their absence from the frontlines did
ed). Water supply presented a serious problem from the not permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units.
outset. This had been anticipated and in actual fact the so- But such numerous cases did strain the already overbur-
lution proved less difficult than expected; the engineers soon dened Medical Corps elements.

The antitank ditch dug by the Japanese along the center and the 5th Marines' and 3/5's CPs were located there, as was the
right of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 soon after the landing be- 7th Marines shown here. BGen Oliver P Smith with the ad-
came the locations of command posts of various units, Both

yi;t ;tSt.
vance element of the division CP set up in the ditch also.
in, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94939

' ,,,0 ,
'1.
I.,.

r
a

¼.

15
 Special Reef-crossing Techniques
nasmuch as Peleliu's fringing reef would not permit Two other reef-crossing innovations were used on D-Day.
landing craft within 700 yards of the beach, such A large number of amphibious trailers were incorporated
craft deposited tanks at the reef's edge. There the into the logistic plan, to be towed behind landing craft, and
depths permitted tanks to operate in most areas, without later, at reef's edge they would be taken in tow by amphib-
being submerged, but not in all. A plan was devised to form ian tractors. Ashore, trucks took them into tow, enabling
tanks into small columns, each to be led by an LVT So long critical supplies to be moved well forward to supply points
as the LVT was grounded on the reef, the tanks could fol- just in rear of the fighting. Newly available crawler cranes
low in trace. But when the LVT encountered a depth which were emplaced on barges near the reef's edge. They could
floated it, tanks halted while the LVT literally "felt" out a lift nets full of ammunition and other vital supplies from
suitable shallow path. Then the tanks followed, still in boats to tractors at the transfer line. Other such crawler
small columns, and so arrived at the shore at the earliestcranes were landed early and positioned by the shore party
possible hour. The technique was one of the keys to time- to lift net-loads from L'VTs to trucks for expeditious deliv-
ly employment of armor ashore before D-Day was over. ery forward.
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95624. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95354.

(Continued from page 14) success, but they were persistent a crisis developing.
battalions to their right and left. enough to require resupply of ammu- At the end of the first 12 hours
The 5th Marines commanding nition to forward companies. Dawn ashore, the 1st Marine Division held
officer ordered his executive officer, revealed scores of Japanese bodies its beachhead across the intended
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, north of the Marine lines. front. Only in the center did the
to take command of 3/5 and to depth approximate that which had
Elsewhere across the 1st Division's
redeploy so as to close the gap be- front there were more potentially been planned. The position was
tween 5th and 7th Marines. Major threatening night counterattacks. strong everywhere except on the ex-
Gayle moved 2/S's reserve company None of them succeeded in driving treme left flank. General Smith, from
to his right flank and to provide a tie- Marines back or in penetrating the his forward command post was in
in position. Walt located and tied in lines in significant strength. The most communication with all three regi-
his 3/5 companies to build a more serious attack came against the Com- mental commanders. The report he
continuous regimental line. By 2230,pany K, 3/1, position on the Point, received from Colonel Puller, on the
at the 1st Marines' left.
he had effected the tie-in, just in time. left, did not afford an adequate per-
Beginning then, the salient which the In the south, the 7th Marines ex- ception of 1st Marines' tenuous hold
5th Marines had carved between perienced significant night attacks on the Point. That reflected Colonel
Peleliu's central and southern from the Japanese battalion oppos- Puller's own limited information.
defenders came under a series of ing it. But the Marines there were in The other two regimental reports
sharp counterattacks that continued comfortable strength, had communi- reflected the situations adequately.
throughout the night. The attacks cations to bring in fire support, in- In addition to the three infantry
came from both north and south. cluding naval gunfire illumination. regiments, the 1st Division had
None of them enjoyed any notable They turned back all attacks without almost three battalions of light ar-
16
 Marines were battling to retain the
position.
Colonel Nakagawa, on the other
hand, had reported that the landing
attempt by the Marines had been
"put to route." Inconsistently, he had
also reported that his brave counter-
attack force had thrown the enemy
into the sea.

With the dawn of a new day, the

Ti: two opposing commanders at Peleliu

awoke from whatever sleep they may
have gotten to face immediate grim
prospects.
General Rupertus, having been
frustrated by his earlier effort to land
his division reserve into the southern
Caption by the artist, Tom Lea
sector of his beachhead, was now
"This is Sad Sack Calling Charlie Blue We found the battalion commander [LtCol aware that his northern sector stood
Edward H. Hurst, CO, 3/7] sitting on a smashed wet log in the mud, marking posi- most in need of help, specifically on
tions on his map. By him sat his radioman, trying to make contact with company the extreme left flank. Rupertus or-
commands on the portable set propped up in the mud. There was an infinitely tired dered 2/7 into Puller's sector for em-
and plaintive patience in the radioman's voice as he called code names, repeating time ployment there.
and again, 'This is Sad Sack calling Charlie Blue. This is Sad Sack calling Charlie At division headquarters afloat,
Wary riflemen of the 5th Marines advance through a devastated Japanese bivouac
tillery ashore and emplaced. All 30 area to the northeast of the Peleliu airfield. The concealed enemy troops took full ad-
tanks were ashore. The shore party vantage of the rocky terrain, forcing the Marines to clear out each nook and cranny.
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96763
was functioning on the beach, albeit
under full daylight observation by
the enemy and under intermittent
enemy fire. The division necessarily
had to continue at full press on D
plus 1. The objective was to capture
the commanding crests on the left, to
gain maneuver opportunities in the
center, and to finish off the isolated
defenders in the south.
At least two colonels on Peleliu
ended their work day with firm mis-
conceptions of their situations, and
with correspondingly inaccurate
reports to their superiors. At day's
end, when General Smith finally got
a telephone wire into the 1st Marines'
CP, he was told that the regiment had
a firm hold on its beachhead, and
was approximately on the 0-1 objec-
tive line. He was not told about, and
Colonel Puller was not fully aware
of, the gaps in his lines, nor of the
gravity of the Company K, 3/1,
struggle on the Point, where only 38 n -a Si
17
 t '--.

.4

.:T-7 ?, nh, "

-; -

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95921

At about 1650 on D-Day, Col Nakagawa launched his tank- vision had been prepared for such an eventuality, and the at-
infantry attack from the north of the airfield and headed south tack was a total failure. More than 100 enemy tanks and their
across the front of the 1st Marines' lines. The 1st Marine Di- covering troops were reported as being literally blown apart.
more had been learned about the ex- Over on Colonel Nakagawa's side, Day, but were preparing to renew the
tent of Marine D-Day casualties: despite the incredible reports being fight. Predictably, their attack would
1,111, of whom 209 were killed in ac- sent out from his headquarters, he be launched behind a hail of naval
tion (KIA). While this was not a could see from his high ground a gunfire, artillery, and aerial attacks.
hefty percentage of the total rein- quite different situation. The landing They would be supported by U.S.
forced divisional strength, the num- force had not been "put to route." tanks which had so readily dis-
ber was grim in terms of cutting-edge Ashore, and under his view, was a patched the Japanese armor on
strength. Most of those 1,111 casual- division of American Marines D-Day.
ties had been suffered in eight of the deployed across two miles of beach- In his own D-Day counterattack,
division's nine infantry battalions. head. They had been punished on D- Nakagawa had lost roughly one of
Except in the center, Rupertus was Apparently covered by a returning 1st Marine Division veteran's graffiti,
not yet on the 0-1 line, the first of this Japanese light tank remains on the northwest corner of the Peleliu airfield. Its
eight planned phase lines. turret blown off, it is the only one left from the failed enemy attack of 1944.
Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr
Having received less than a com-
prehensive view of the 1st Marines'
situation, Rupertus was more deter-
mined than ever to move ashore
quickly, to see what he could, and to
do whatever he could to re-ignite the
lost momentum. That he would have Ii,...
to operate with a gimpy leg from a
sandy trench within a beach area still
under light but frequent fire, seemed
less a consideration to him than his
need to see and to know (General
Rupertus had broken his ankle in a
preassault training exercise, and his
foot was in a cast for the entire
operation.).

18
 ____ the south, the 7th Marines already
••Ca•.. held its edge of the airfield's terrain.
The scrub jungle largely screened the
regiment from observation and it was
opposed by defenses oriented toward
the sea, away from the airfield.
:., Puller's 1st Marines, which had al-
— ,— ready suffered the most casualties on
D-Day, still faced the toughest terrain
and positions. It had to attack,
relieve Company K, 3/1, on the
Point, and assault the ridges of

4 Umurbrogol, south to north. Sup-

porting that assault, Honsowetz had
to swing his east-facing 2/1 leftward,
and to capture and clear the built-up
area between the airfield and the
ridges. This his battalion did on D
plus 1 and 2, with the 5th Marines
assisting in its zone on the right. But
then he was at the foot of the com-
Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr. manding ridges, and joined in the
"Sick Bay in a Shelihole: The Padre Read, 'I am the Resurrection and the Light' deadly claw-scratch-and-scramble at-
About thirty paces back of the lap trench a sick bay had been established in a big tack of Davis' 1/1 against the
shell crater made by one of our battleship guns . In the center of the crater
. .

Japanese on and in the ridges.

at the bottom a doctor was working on the worst of the stretcher cases. Corps-
men, four to a stretcher, came in continually with their bloody loads . The. . .
As Colonel Puller was able to close
padre stood by with two canteens and a Bible, helping. He was deeply and visibly the gaps on his left, and swing his en-
moved by the patient suffering and death. He looked very lonely, very close to tire regiment toward the north, he
God, as he bent over the shattered men so far from home." pivoted on Sabol's 3/1 on the left.
his five infantry battalions. Elsewhere hidden fire to strike with dangerous Sabol, aided by Company B, 1/1, es-
he had lost hundreds of his beach effect. His forces were largely invisi- tablished contact with and reinforced
defenders in fighting across the front ble to the Americans, and relatively Company K on the Point. Then he
throughout D-Day, and in his uni- impervious to their fire superiority. headed north, with his left on the
formly unsuccessful night attacks His prospects for continuing to hold beach and his right near the West
against the beachhead. Nevertheless, key terrain components seemed Road along the foot of the western-
he still had several thousand deter- good. most features of the Umurbrogol
mined warriors, trained and armed. The Marines were attacking forti- complex. In Sabol's sector, the terrain
They were deployed throughout fied positions, against which careful permitted tank support, and offered
strong and well-protected defensive and precise fire preparations were more chances for maneuver than
complexes and fortifications, with needed. They were, especially on the were afforded in the ridges further to
ample underground support facili- left, under extreme pressure to assault the right. Hard fighting was in-
ties. All were armed with the dis- rapidly, with more emphasis upon volved, but after D-Day, Sabol's bat-
cipline and determination to kill speed than upon careful preparation. talion was able to move north faster
many Americans. With enemy observation and than the units on his right. His ad-
As he had known from the start, weapons dominating the entire Ma- vance against the enemy was limit-
Nakagawa's advantage lay in the ter- rine position, staying in place was to ed by the necessity to keep contact
rain, and in his occupation and or- invite being picked off at the hidden with Davis' 1/1 on his right.
ganization of that terrain. For the enemy's leisure. General Rupertus' The relative rates of movement
present, and until that time when he concern for momentum remained along the boundary between Sabol's
would be driven from the Umur- valid. flatter and more open zone and Da-
brogol crests which commanded the This placed the burden of rapid vis' very rough zone of action,
airfield clearing, he held a dominat- advance primarily upon the 1st Ma- brought the first pressing need for
ing position. He had impressive ob- rines on the left, and secondarily reserves. Tactically, there was clear
servation over his attackers, and upon the 5th in the airfield area. In necessity to press east into and over
19
 A Paucity of Reserves
P
lanning for the seizure of the southern Palaus progressed toward operations. The 1st Marine Division had
(Angaur and Peleliu-Ngesebus) had been the nine infantry battalions with which to attack more than
responsibility of III Amphibious Corps (Major 10,000 defending Japanese on Peleliu. Major General Paul
General Roy S. Geiger). But General Geiger and his staff J. Mueller's 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battal-
had been fully occupied during the critical planning weeks, ions with which to attack 1,500 (earlier reported as 2,500)
up to and including the capture of Guam, from 21 July to Japanese defenders on Angaur. Terrain and circumstances
10 August. The Guam operation ended more than a month on the two objective islands were similarly imbalanced.
later than originally contemplated. Meanwhile, someone Peleliu was considerably larger and had far more complex
else had to fill the corps planning function for the Palau terrain. Its defensive fortifications were obviously far more
undertaking. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, un- developed, and it offered fewer predictable landing beaches
der Major General Julian C. Smith was established. The than Angaur. Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plans
two major tactical tasks of the southern Palau operation and higher-level responsibilities can account for such force
were assigned to the Army 81st Infantry Division (Angaur) allocation imbalance not having been corrected at Corps
and 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st Di- or Expeditionary Troops level. The effect of all these im-
vision was also tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve. balances was still further magnified between 13 and 17 Sep-
This partition of division level-planning effort was con- tember. Higher level changes in plans and naval decisions
venient, but it slipped into a gross imbalance in force allo- stripped Ill Corps of all its reserves.
cation which was neither recognized nor corrected as plans

the rough terrain, and systematical- it in turn supported. The walls were able defenders in underground caves
ly reduce the complex defenses. That four-feet thick, of reinforced con- and fortifications within an incredi-
job Davis' 1/1, Honsowetz's 2/1, and crete. Happily, Davis was given a ble jumble of ridges and cliffs. Every
Berger's 2/7 did. But more troops naval gunfire support team which advance opened the advancing Ma-
than Sabol had also were needed to called in the fires of the the USS Mis- rines to new fire from heretofore hid-
advance north through the open ter- sissippi. Between them, they made den positions on flanks, in rear, in
rain to begin encirclement of the fairly short work of the entire com- caves above or below newly won
rough Umurbrogol area, and to find plex, and 1/1 could advance until it ground.
avenues into the puzzle of that ran into the far more insoluble Nothing better illustrated the tac-
rugged landscape. By 17 September, Japanese ridge defense systems. tical dilemmas posed by Umurbrogol
reserves were badly needed along the Major Davis, who was to earn a than did the 19 September seizure of,
1st Division's left (west) axis of ad- Medal of Honor in the Korean War then withdrawal from, Hill 100, a
vance. But on 17 September, neither in 1950, said of the attack into and ridge bordering the so-called Horse-
the division nor III Amphibious along or across those ridges, "It was shoe Valley at the eastern limit of the
Corps had reserves. the most difficult assignment I have Pocket. It lay in the sector of Lieu-
As Sabol's 3/1 fought up the easi- ever seen." tenant Colonel Honsowetz' 2d Bat-
er terrain on the 1st Marines' left, Da- During the 1st Marines' action in talion, 1st Marines, to which
vis' 1/1 drove into the center with his the first four days of the campaign, Company B of Major Ray Davis' 1st
left on the break between coral ridge all three of its battalions battled Battalion was attached. Company B,
country and Sabol's more open flat alongside, and up onto Umurbrogol's 1/1, having landed with 242 men,
zone. Among his early surprises, as terrible, cave-filled, coral ridges. had 90 men left when its commander,
he approached the foot of the ridge Berger's 2/7, initially in division Captain Everett P. Pope, received
area, was another of the blockhouses reserve, but assigned to the 1st Ma- Honsowetz' order to take what the
Admiral Oldendorf had reportedly rines on D plus 1, was immediately Marines were then calling Hill 100.
destroyed with pre-D-Day gunfire. thrown into the struggle. Puller fed The Japanese called it Higashiyama
Although it had been on the plan- two separate companies of the bat- (East Mountain).
ning map for weeks, those who first talion into the fight piecemeal. Short- Initially supported by tanks, Pope's
encountered it, reported the emplace- ly thereafter, 2/7 was given a central company lost that support when the
ment as "not having a mark on it!" zone of action between Colonel two leading tanks slipped off an ap-
The blockhouse was part of an im- Puller's 1st and 2d Battalions. The 1st proach causeway. Continuing with
pressive defense complex. It was con- Marines continued attacking on a only mortar support, and into the
nected to and supported by a web of four-battalion front about a 1,000 face of heavy defending mortar and
pillboxes and emplacements, which yards wide, against stubborn and machine-gun fire, Pope's Marines
20
reached the summit near twilight, ing mortars and by hand-to-hand ic of the Japanese defenders' skillful
only to discover that the ridge's brawls involving not only rifles but use of mutually supporting positions
northeast extension led to still higher also knives, and even rocks, thrown throughout Umurbrogol.
ground, from which its defenders intermittently with grenades, as sup- By D plus 4, the 1st Marines was
were pouring fire upon the contest- plies of them ran low. Pope's men a regiment in name only, having
ed Hill 100. Equally threatening was were still clinging to the ridge top suffered 1,500 casualties. This fact led
fire from the enemy caves inside the when dawn broke; but the number to a serious disagreement between
parallel ridge to the west, called Five of unwounded Marines was by now General Rupertus, who kept urging
Brothers. In the settling darkness down to eight. Pope was ordered to Puller onward, and the general's su-
Pope's men, liberally supported by withdraw and was able to take his perior, Major General Roy S. Geiger,
2/i's heavy mortars, were able to wounded out. But the dead he had III Amphibious Corps commander.
hang on. Throughout the night, there to leave on the ridge, not to be reco- Based on his own experiences in com-
was a series of enemy probes and vered until 3 October, when the ridge manding major ground operations at
counterattacks onto the ridge top. was finally recaptured for good. This Bougainville and Guam, Geiger was
They were beaten off by the support- action was illustrative and prophet- very aware of the lowered combat ef-
ficiency such losses impose upon a
Near the edge of a clearing, a Marine rifleman fires a rifle grenade with good effect committed combat unit.
into an enemy position up ahead into the northern, difficult portion of Peleliu.
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96106 On 21 September, after visiting
Colonel Puller in his forward CP and
observing his exhausted condition,
and that of his troops, Geiger con-
ferred in the 1st Division CP with
Rupertus and some of his staff.
Rupertus was still not willing to ad-
mit that his division needed rein-
forcement, but Geiger overruled him.
He ordered the newly available 321st
Regiment Combat Team (RCT), 81st
Infantry Division, then on Angaur,
to be attached to the Marine division.
_% ,_
a Geiger further ordered Rupertus to
stand down the 1st Marines, and to
send them back to Pavuvu, the divi-
S sion's rear area base in the Russell
Islands.
On 21 September (D plus 5),
•'l Rupertus had ordered his 7th Ma-
rines to relieve what was left of the
1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Ma-
rines. By then, the 1st Marines was
reporting 1,749 casualties. It report-
ed killing an estimated. 3,942
Japanese, the capture of 10 defend-
ed coral ridges, the destruction of
three blockhouses, 22 pillboxes, 13
antitank guns, and 144 defended
caves.
In that fighting the assault battal-
ions had captured much of the crest
required to deny the enemy observa-
tion and effective fire on the airfield
and logistic areas. Light aircraft had
begun operating on D plus 5 from
Peleliu's scarred, and still-under-

21
 brogol assault, the 5th Marines on its
right also faced an assault situation,
but one of substantially less opposi-
tion and easier terrain. Lieutenant
Colonel Boyd's 1/5 had to fight
across the airfield, from southwest to
northeast, and through the built-up
area similar to that which faced Hon-
sowetz's 2/1. The battalion was sub-
jected to observed fire from the
Umurbrogol and to small arms fire
from Japanese defenders in the
rubble-filled built-up area. Boyd's
coordinated tank-infantry attack
quickly carried the day. He soon had
control of that area, and the east-
west, cross-island road, which could
lead the 5th toward its next objective,
IC, the eastern peninsula of Peleliu.
On the 5th Marines' right, 2/5 had
a more difficult time. Its progress was
stubbornly opposed by infantry from
the woods on its right, and by ar-
1 "I tillery from Umurbrogol, which took
a particular interest in the tanks 2/5
was using to support its attack along
the edge of the woods. Whether the
Japanese infantry in those woods had
b- ' C
been posted to defend that position,
or whether they were just surviving
Japanese infantry from the D-Day
Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 95661
counterattack, was never established.
At a conference held in the 1st Marine Division command post, Col Harold D. The fight took all day and inflicted
"Bucky" Harris, 5th Marines commander, center, explains to MajGen Roy S. Geiger, heavier casualties on Gayle's battal-
Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, left, and MajGen William H. Ruper- ion than had D-Day. By dusk, 2/5
tus, commander of the division, his plan of operations in northern Peleliu. had battled beyond the north end of
repair airfield. With Purple Beach in also learned that when aerial observ- the airfield, and halted for the night
American control, the division's ers were overhead, they were no near the woods concealing the ap-
logistical life-line was assured. longer free to run their weapons out proaches to the eastern peninsula.
Although the Japanese still had some of their caves and fire barrages As the two-battalion attack of the
observation over the now operating toward the beach or toward the air- 5th Marines (D plus 1) was heavily
airfield and rear areas, their reduced field. When they tried to get off more engaged on its front and right, the
capability was to harass rather than than a round or two, they could regimental headquarters near the
to threaten. count on quick counter-battery, or a beach was hit by an artillery barrage
Furthermore, the Marine front much-dreaded aerial attack from which, coupled with D-Day's loss of
lines in the Umurbrogol had by now carrier-based planes, or — after 24 3/5's commanding officer and execu-
reached close to what proved to be September—from Marine attack tive officer, engendered a significant
the final Japanese defensive posi- planes operating from the field on rearrangement in command assign-
tions. Intelligence then available Peleliu. ments. The early D plus 1 barrage hit
didn't tell that, but the terrain and sit- the regimental C took out numbers
uation suggested that the assault re- of the staff, and buried the regimen-
quirements had been met, and that tal commander in the crumbling
in the Umurbrogol it was time for On D plus 1, when the 1st Marines Japanese antitank trench in which the
siege tactics. The Japanese defenders had launched their costly Umur- CF was "sheltered." Fortunately, the
22
burial was temporary, and Colonel That 5th Marines' forward posi- Now the 7th Marines, whose 2d
Harris emerged with a twisted and tion generally coincided with the Battalion was already in the thick of
battered leg, but still able to hobble. northeast sector of the airfield earli- the fight for Umurbrogol, was about
Two of his principal staff officers er mentioned. Possession of that to move out of its own successful bat-
were casualties, and his sergeant visual boundary meant that in most tle area and into a costly assault
major killed. Harris elected not to be places on the regimental right, front- which, by this time, might have been
evacuated, but he needed help in the line Marines were spared the hostile more economically conducted as a
regimental CP. Ordering Lieutenant observation and directed fire from siege.
Colonel Walt back from the 3d Bat- Umurbrogol. As with the 7th Ma-
talion to the regimental CP, Harris rines, largely hidden in the jungle of
directed the commanding officer of the south, this lessened the need for
2/5 to send his executive officer, headlong assault. There would now As the 7th Marines moved to its
Major John H. Gustafson, to take be freedom to maneuver more mission, the 5th Marines was again
command of 3/5. Then Harris direct- deliberately and to coordinate sup- successfully opening up opportuni-
ed Boyd to send his 1/5 operations porting fire more carefully. ties on Peleliu's eastern, "lobster claw"
officer, Major Hierome Opie, to join peninsula. Most of those opportuni-
3/5 as Gustaf son's executive officer. The 7th Marines' ties, unfortunately were never ex-
Fortunately, 3/5 was having a rela- Complete Destruction of ploited.
tively quiet day, unlike its hair-raising
regrouping on the night of D-Day.
Enemi,i in the South By the end of D plus 2, the 5th
Marines stood at the approach to the
After daylight, as 2/5 attacked north, In the south, from D plus 1 through
eastern peninsula, and astride the
3/5 stretched along the east edge of D plus 3, the 7th Marines was in
East Road just east of the 1st Marines'
the mangrove lagoon which separat- vigorous assault against extensive
ed Peleliu from the eastern peninsu-
terrible struggle in Umurbrogol. It
fortifications in the rear of the Scarlet
had fought somewhat clear of the
la. In that position, 3/5 also tied into Beaches. These were defended by a
galling fires from Umurbrogol, and
3/7 as that battalion attacked south. full battalion, the elite 2d Battalion,
Thus 3/5 protected each regiment's
planned an assault on the eastern
15th Regiment. Although isolated
peninsula across a narrow causeway,
flank against any Japanese move- and surrounded by the Marines, this
which the Japanese should certainly
ment across the intervening water, battalion demonstrated its skill and defend. Then a D plus 3 reconnais-
and into the rear of the attacking bat- its understanding of Colonel sance of the causeway revealed that
talions. No such threat developed, Nakagawa's orders and mission: to
the causeway was not defended. The
and as the afternoon grew on, there sell Peleliu at the highest possible
2d Battalion hastened to seize the op-
emerged a more pressing employ- price. The 7th Marines attacked with
ment for 3/5.
portunity and moved across in
3/7 on the left and 1/7 on the right. strength. The attack was hit by its
As Walt returned to his post beside They enjoyed the advantage of at- own supporting fires. The forward
the now only semi-mobile Harris, tacking the extensive and well- battalion CP group was strafed by
Major Gustaf son was told to get 3/5 prepared defenses from the rear, and
Navy planes and then hit by artillery
into position to bolster and then they had both heavy fire support and
airburst, causing the loss of 18 bat-
relieve 1/5, as it closed in on its 0-2 the terrain for limited maneuver in talion headquarters personnel to
objectives. their favor. Both sides fought bitter-
"friendly fire:'
Throughout the next day (D plus ly, but by 1530 on 18 September (D
2), the 5th Marines kept tied in with plus 3), the battle was substantially Nevertheless, a bridgehead across
the 1st Marines on its left and cap- over. The Marines had destroyed an the causeway was well established on
tured some control of the foot of the elite Japanese reinforced infantry bat- D plus 3, and the 5th Marines'
East Road. On the right, 2/5 hacked talion well positioned in a heavily Colonel Harris moved to exploit it.
and combed its way through the jun- fortified stronghold. Colonel Han- During the afternoon, he thinned his
gle and mangrove north of the air- neken reported to General Rupertus forces holding the East Road sector,
field, alongside the road leading that the 7th Marines' objectives he gave the former 3/5 mission to Com-
toward the eastern peninsula. The had set for D-Day were all in hand. pany L, 3/5, and gave the remainder
thick scrub, nearly impenetrable, The naval gunfire preparation had of 3/5 a new mission. He ordered
reduced progress to a crawl. It com- been significantly less than planned. Gustaf son into a position within the
pensated by concealing most of the The difference had been made up by bridgehead established by 2/5, and
advancing Marines from enemy ob- time, and by the courage, skill, and further ordered both battalions then
servation from high ground to 2/5's additional casualties of the infantry to capture and clear the eastern
north and northwest. companies of 1/7 and 3/7. peninsula. Earlier he had expected

23
 elsewhere on the other islands, and
near Ngardololok, there appeared to
be many opportunities to attack by
fire against the cave-infested north-
south ridges of central and northern
Peleliu. Such positioning of heavy
weapons would be very difficult, but
relative to the intense infantry bat-
tles underway in Umurbrogol, such
difficulties seemed acceptable. Many
of the prospective targets could have
been vulnerable to direct, flat trajec-
tory fire across the front of U.S. units
advancing north in central Peleliu.
Corps artillery units had conducted
such direct fire training before em-
barking for the Peleliu campaign.
Such tactical advantages and oppor-
tunities from the eastern peninsula
were advocated but never exploited.
Only later, in the fighting for north-
ern Peleliu was the 5th Marines able
to secure point-blank, heavy, single-
gun fire support.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96936

A Marine war dog handler reads a note just delivered by canine messenger, a Dober-
man Pinscher, one of the breeds used in the Pacific This Marine has a pump shotgun. With southern and eastern Peleliu
captured, there now began an encir-
such an attack to be against the but the war dogs warned of, and ef- clement of the Japanese defenders in
strong defending forces originally fectively thwarted, the attempted central Peleliu, and an attack against
reported on the eastern peninsula. surprise. the Japanese defending northern
However, the apparent reduction of By the end of D plus 4, the two Peleliu and nearby Ngesebus and
defending forces now appeared to battalions had cleared the main body Kongauru. This was the obvious next
offer an opportunity to seize Purple of the eastern peninsula and had tactical phase for combat on Peleliu.
Beach quickly, a logistic prize of reached Purple Beach from the rear. However, securing it was less neces-
some significance. Harris knew that The defenses were most impressive, sary for the basic Peleliu tactical and
the division would need to shift its but many were unmanned. Those strategic goals than for the mopping-
logistical axis to Purple Beach, away enemy troops encountered seemed up of the island. As the 1st Marine
from the fire from Umurbrogol,and more interested in hiding than in Division's Assistant Commander,
away from the threat of westerly fighting, leading to speculation that Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith,
storms. Nakagawa's trained infantry had later phrased it, "by the end of the
Before dark, Gustaf son moved two been moved west to the fight on D- first week, the Division had control
of his 3/5 companies across the Day and/or D plus 1. By D plus 5, of everything on the island that it
causeway, and moved his own CP Purple Beach was cleared, as were then needed, or later used'
group in with the 2/5 CP, where the the long peninsulas southwest and The airfield had been seized, was
two commanders jointly planned the northeast of Purple Beach. On D under repair and improvement, and
next day's advance. Hoping for lit- plus 6, 2/5 seized the two islands im- in use. It was no longer any threat,
tle resistance, they directed rapid mediately north of the northeast if it had ever been, to MacArthur's
movement, but armed their point peninsula, and the next day occupied long-heralded return to the Philip-
units with war dog sections to guard the small unnamed islet just 1,000 pines. Peleliu's best logistical beach
against ambush. Their lead compa- yards east of the northern ridges of (Purple) had been secured, providing
nies moved out just after dawn. In Peleliu. a secure logistic axis to the main bat-
the 3 / 5 sector, there was an ambush, From that position, and positions tle areas. The Japanese defenders in

24
their caves, and in northern Peleliu fully developed would be premature. General Rupertus, who clung to a be-
and on Ngesebus, retained some His advice was ignored by Vice Ad- lief that his Marines could do it
capability to harass American rear in- miral Theodore S. Wilkinson. without help from the Army. The III
stallations, but that was sharply cur- A related decision on 17 Septem- Corps plan tasked the 81st Division
tailed by the Marines' counterfire. ber committed the III Corps' final to reinforce the Marines in seizing
reserve to the Ulithi landing. The task Peleliu and then to relieve the 1st Ma-
Only two significant Japanese
was assigned to the Western Attack rine Division for the mop up, but the
capabilities remained: they could bit-
terly resist from their cave positions
Force, which was ordered to seize general continued to exhort his com-
and they had a limited capability to
Ulithi with "available resources:' Over manders to "hurry up."
General Smith's advice, Wilkinson Earlier, General Rupertus and
reinforce Peleliu from Babeithuap.
chose to commit the entire 323d RCT,
Colonel Puller had shrugged off a
Such reinforcement could only be by
the 81st Division's other maneuver suggestion from the 5th Marines'
small-unit infiltration, which faced
element. The 321st subsequently and "Bucky" Harris that they take a look
U.S. naval screening operations in the
successfully occupied an undefend- at the Umurbrogol Pocket from the
area. Likewise, American encircle-
ed Ulithi while reserves were sorely newly available light planes of Ma-
ment of the stubborn Umurbrogol
Pocket faced two obstacles. First was
needed at Peleliu. rine Observation Squadron 3. Har-
the lack of additional maneuver regi- By 20 September, the 81st Division ris' own aerial reconnaissance, made
ments from III Amphibious Corps' had defeated or cornered all sur- immediately after those planes ar-
reserve. General Geiger in fact had vivors of Angaur's 1,400 defenders. rived on 19 September, had altered
no corps reserve pending the release The Slst's commander declared An- his view of the Umurbrogol from
of some units from the forces in- gaur secure. He tasked his 322d RCT sober to grave. It convinced him that
volved in the seizure of Angaur. That to complete the mop-up, and report- attacking the Pocket from the north
landing by the 81st Infantry Division ed to General Geiger that the 321st would be less costly than the origi-
(less the 323d RCT) had been RCT was available for further oper- nally planned and ordered attempts
launched on 17 September, after ations. The lack of enough troops to from south to north. Both Puller and
which there was no corps reserve. begin encircling Umurbrogol was no Rupertus responded to Harris that
longer an obstacle. they had their maps.
The operation on Angaur, the
planning which attended it and the The other obstacle to reinforcing The prelanding scheme of maneu-
decision on its timing, impacted the division on Peleliu and encircling ver was built on the tactical concept
heavily upon the Peleliu operation. the Pocket lay in the thinking of that, after capturing the airfield, the
The naval planners early on pro- Once the troops entered the Umurbogol Mountain, they found sinkholes and
posed landing on Angaur before difficult terrain much as pictured here. Japanese soldiers in the caves and heights
Peleliu. Only when Major General above could fire at will at the Marines, who were like so many "fish in a barrel."
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 108432
Julian C. Smith, commanding Ex-
peditionary Troops/X-Ray Planning ..'M-tt;1Zr4Vfl •ci7'r.1áLP
Group, explained that such timing
would invite the numerous Japanese
in northern Palau to reinforce Peleliu
was it agreed that Angaur be assault-
ed only after the Peleliu landing was
assured of success. However, the An-
gaur landing was initiated before the r4
Peleliu landing had been clearly
resolved. The commanding general
of the 81st Division wanted to land T
as soon as possible, and he was sup- 111
ported in his view by his naval task
unit commander, Rear Admiral Wil- I Iil
liam H. P. Blandy. Opposing the 17
September date for the Angaur land-
ing was Marine Major General Julian
Smith. Smith argued that committing
the element of III Corps Reserve be-
fore the Peleliu operation was more ' ,i'1

25
1st Marine Division would push The 5th's mapping team, launched ed ashore on the early morning of 23
north along a line across the width after Harris' regiment was commit- September. Colonel Nakagawa sud-
of the main or western part of the is- ted against the Pocket, encountered denly had reinforcements in the form
land. Once abreast of the southern Lieutenant Colonel Walt, the of a partially mauled infantry battal-
edge of Umurbrogol, that concept regimental executive officer, on Hill ion in northern Peleliu.
and maneuver scheme were reflect- 100 during their sketching, and so
ed in a series of four west-to-east named the hill. En circleinen t of Urnurbrogol
phase lines, indicating an expected Even after General Geiger had or- cnd Seizure of
linear advance, south to north. dered General Rupertus on 21 Sep- Northern Peleliu
Clearly, it was expected that the ad- tember to stand down Puller's
vance along the flatter zones west A plan to encircle the Pocket, and
shattered 1st Marines, General deny reinforcement to northern
and east of I.Jmurbrogol would be at Rupertus expressed the belief that his
approximately the same pace as that Peleliu was immediately formulated.
Marines, alone, would shortly clear
along the high-central ground of General Rupertus' staff was closely
the entire island. After taking a closer
Peleliu. Such thinking may have been attended by selected III Corps staff
look at the situation on the ground.
consistent with Rupertus' prediction officers, and General Geiger also was
Geiger ordered RCT 321 from An-
of a three-day assault. Developments present.
gaur and attached it to the Marine
in Sabol's sector to the west, and in The plan called for two regiments
division. Encirclement of the Umur-
the 5th Marines' sector to the east, brogol Pocket now became tactical- to move up the West Road, the Army
apparently did not change division- 321st Infantry leading in the attack,
ly feasible.
level thinking. Until additional forces and the 5th Marines following. The
became available, such a linear ad- Capture of northern Peleliu and Marines were to pass through the
Ngesebus became more pressing with Army unit after it had gone beyond
vance may have seemed all that was
possible. the discovery on 23 September that the Pocket on its right, and the 5th
some part of the enemy's substantial would continue then to take north-
Even so, there was no apparent troop strength in the northern Palaus ern Peleliu and Ngesebus.
reexamination of the planned south- was being infiltrated by barge from
to-north linear advance, and for days The 321st RCT, by now battle test-
Koror and Babeithuap into northern ed, was tasked to push up the West
after the Pocket was sealed off at its Peleliu.
northernmost extremity, the division Road, alongside and just atop the
commander kept ordering attacks Although the naval patrol set to western edge of coral uplift which
from south to north, generally fol- protect against just that reinforcing marked the topographical boundary
lowing the initial landing plan. As action had discovered and destroyed between the flat western plain, and
had been revealed to "Bucky" Harris some of the Japanese barges, most the uplifted coral "plateau." That
in his early aerial reconnaissance of enemy troops seemed to have wad- plateau, about 300 yards west to east,
the Umurbrogol Pocket, such attacks
would offer little but casualties.
Troops, heavily supported, could ad-
vance into "the Horseshoe" and into
"Death Valley," but the positions they
reached then proved untenable and
withdrawal was usual at day's end.
Some part of this thinking may
have well come from the inadequa-
cies of the map in use. The 5th Ma-
rines in early October produced a
new and more representative sketch
map. It located and identified the de-
tails within Umurbrogol sufficiently
to facilitate maneuver and fire coor-
dination.
That mapping effort, incidentally,
led to the misnaming of Honsowetz'
Hill 100, where Captain Everett P.
Pope earned his Medal of Honor.
26
constituted the western shoulder of
the Pocket. The plateau rose some
30-80 feet above the West Road. Its
western edge, or "cliff 7 was a jumble
of knobs and small ridges which
dominated the West Road, and
would have to be seized and cleared
to permit unharrassed use of the
road.
Once the 321st RCT was past this
up-lift, and the Pocket which it
bounded, it was to probe east in
search of any routes east through the
600 yards necessary to reach the
eastern edge of that portion of
Peleliu. Any opportunities in that
direction were to be exploited to en-
circle the Pocket on the north.
Behind the 321st RCT, the 5th Ma-
rines followed, pressed through, and
attacked into northern Peleliu. Han-
neken's 7th Marines relieved the 1st,
which was standing down to the
eastern peninsula, also relieving the
5th Marines of their then-passive
security role. The 5th was then
tasked to capture northern Peleliu,
and to seize Ngesebus-Kongauru.
This maneuver would involve the
use of the West Road, first as a tac-
tical route north, then as the line of
communications for continued oper-
ations to the north. The road was ISOLATION OF UMURBROGOL
comparatively "open" for a distance 26,27 SEPT
about halfway, 400 yards, to the Umurbrogol Front, 26 Sept
northern limit of the Pocket, and — Route of Task Force
paralleled by the ragged "cliff" which
constituted the western shoulder of
the up-lifted "plateau." That feature
was no level plateau, but a veritable
moonscape of coral knobs, karst, and of the Pocket and the coral "plateau" tered small units and individuals who
sinkholes. It had no defined ridges or was a virtually impassable shoulder did not sally forth, and who bitterly
pattern. The sinkholes varied from of the Pocket. resisted movement into their moon-
room-size to house-size, 10 to 30 feet The plateau was totally impenetra- scape. When Americans moved along
in depth, and jungle- and vine- ble by vehicles. The coral sinkholes the West Road, these Japanese ig-
covered. The "plateau" was general- and uplifted knobs forced any infan- nored individuals, took under fire
ly 30 to 100 feet above the plain of try moving through to crawl, climb, only groups or individuals which ap-
the road. Some 200-300 yards further or clamber down into successive peared to them to be rich targets.
to the east, it dropped precipitious- small terrain compartments of rough The only tactical option along the
ly off into a sheer cliff, called the Chi- and jagged surfaces. Evacuating any West Road was to seize and hold the
na Wall by those Marines who casualties would involve unavoida- coral spires and cliffs commanding
looked up to it from the southern and ble rough handling of stretchers and the road, and to defend such posi-
eastern approaches to the Pocket. To their wounded passengers. The area tions against infiltrators. Once those
them, that wall was the western edge was occupied and defended by scat- heights were seized, troop units and

27
trucks could move along West Road. -t
Until seized, the "cliff" offered con-
cealment and some cover to occupy-
ing Japanese. Until those cliff
positions were seized and held, the
Japanese therein could be only tem-
porarily silenced by heavy firepower.
Until they were driven from their
commanding positions, the road
could not be treated as truly open.
Those terrain conditions existed
'tV '

-a ij
for three-quarters of a mile along the
West Road. There, abreast the north
end of the Pocket, the plateau of
coral sinkholes merged into a more
systematic group of limestone ridges.
_
a- •....-t-
— •-. -
These ridges trended slightly north-
east, broadening the coastal strip to
an east-west width of 200 to 400
yards.
Into that milieu, the 321st RCT
was launched on 23 September, be-
hind an hour-long intensive naval
gunfire and artillery preparation
against the high ground command-
I
r
ing the West Road. The initial Army
reconnaissance patrols moved gener- Caption and photo by Phillip 0. Orr
Discovered during a trip to Peleliu in 1994 was this 1,000-man cave, littered with
ally west of the road, somewhat empty sake bottles, deep in the tunnels in the Amiangal Mountain in north Peleliu.
screened from any Japanese still on
the "cliff" just east of the road by for that cliff abandoned it, side- lar ridgelines, the 321st captured
vegetation and small terrain features. stepping down to the road. They then parts of a key feature, Hill 100.
These tactics worked until larger advanced along the road, and soon Together with an adjacent hill just
units of the 2d Battalion, 321st, reported that 3/7 was not keeping east of East Road, and designated
moved out astride the West Road. contact along the high ground. Hill B, that position constituted the
On orders from Colonel Han- northern cap of the Umurbrogol
Then they experienced galling fire
neken, the 7th Marines' command- Pocket. Seizing Hill B, and con-
from the heights above the road.
The 321st's 2d Battalion had ing officer, 3/7 then captured the solidating the partial hold on Hill 100
relieved 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, high ground which 2/321 had aban- would occupy the 321st for the next
along an east-west line across the doned, but at a cost which did little three days.
road, and up onto the heights just for inter-service relations. Thereafter, As the regiment probed this
above the road. Near that point, the 3/7 was gradually further committed eastern path across the north end of
1st Marines had been tied into the along the ridge within the 321st zone Umurbrogol, it also pushed patrols
forward left flank of 3d Battalion, of action. This of course stretched north up the West Road. In the vi-
7th Marines. The orders for the ad- 3/7, which still had to maintain con- cinity of the buildings designated
vance called for 3/7 to follow behind tact on its right in the 7th Marines' "Radio Station," it reached a promis-
the elements of 2/321, along the high zone, generally facing the southern ing road junction. It was in fact the
ground as the soldiers seized the suc- shoulders of the Umurbrogol Pock- junction of West and East Roads.
ceeding west edge of the cliff and ad- et. Further north, as the 321st pressed Colonel Robert F. Dark, command-
vanced northward. However, the on, it was able to regain some of the ing officer of RCT 321, determined
advanced elements along the ridge heights above its axis of advance, and to exploit that route, back south, to
were immediately out-paced by the thereafter held onto them. add a new direction to his attack
other 2/321 elements in the flat to Abreast the northern end of upon Hill 100/Hill B. He organized
their west. Instead of fighting north Umurbrogol Pocket, where the sink- a mobile task force heavy in armor
to seize the ridge, units responsible hole terrain blended into more regu- and flamethrowers, designated Task

28
Force Neal, named for Captain Ge- able firepower fully before sending with strong forces challenging the
orge C. Neal. He sent it circling his infantry into assault. His aerial cave defenses, and in position to en-
southeast and south to join 2/321's reconnaissance earlier had acquaint- gage them fully on the next day.
efforts at the Hill 100/Hill B scene. ed him with an understanding of the The following day, 26 September,
Below that battle, the 7th Marines terrain. This knowledge strengthened as the 321st launched its three-
continued pressure on the south and his resolve to continue using all avail- pronged attack against Hill 100/Hill
east fronts of the Pocket, but still at- able firepower and employing B (northern cap of the Umurbrogol
tacking south to north. deliberate tactics as he pursued his Pocket) and the 5th Marines attacked
As those efforts were underway, regiment's assigned missions. four hills running east to west across
the 5th Marines was ordered into the On the afternoon of 25 September, Peleliu, dubbed Hills 1, 2, 3, and Ra-
developing campaign for northern 1/5 seized the Radio Station com- dar Hill in Hill Row. The row was
Peleliu. Now relieved by the 1st Ma- plex, and the near portion of a hill perpendicular to and south of the last
rines of its passive security mission commanding it. When 3/5 arrived, northern ridge, Amiangal Mountain.
on the eastern peninsula and its near- it was directed to seize the next high These hills and the ridge were
by three small islands, the 5th moved ground to the east of 1/S's position. defended by some 1,500 infantry, ar-
over the West Road to side-step the Then when 2/5 closed, it tied in to tillerymen, naval engineers, and the
321st action and seize northern the right of 3/5's position, and ex- shot-up reinforcing infantry battal-
Peleliu. Having received the division tended the regimental line back to the ion which landed the night of 23 Sep-
order at 1100, the 5th motored, beach. This effectively broke contact tember, in caves and interconnected
marched, and waded (off the north- with the 321st operations to the tunnels within the ridge and the hills.
eastern islets) to and along the West south, but fulfilled Colonel Harris' As the fight for Hill Row developed,
Road. By 1300, its 1st Battalion was plans to advance north as rapidly as Colonel Harris had his 2d Battalion
passing through the 321st lines at possible, without over-extending his side-step west of Hill Row and begin
Garekoru, moving to attack the ra- lines. By suddenly establishing this an attack on the Amiangal ridge to
dio station installations discovered regimental "beachhead' the 5th Ma- the north. Before dark, the 2d Bat-
by 321st patrols the previous after- rines had surprised the defenders talion had taken the southern end
noon.
In this area, the 5th Marines found
flat ground, some open and some co-
vered with palm trees. The ground
was broken by the familiar limestone
ridges, but with the critical tactical
difference that most of the ridges
stood alone. Attackers were not al-
ways exposed to flanking fires from
mutually supporting defenses in ad-
jacent and/or parallel ridges, as in the
Umurbrogol. The Japanese had pre-
pared the northern ridges for defense
as thoroughly as they had done in
the Umurbrogol, with extensive tun-
nels and concealed gun positions.
However, the positions could be at-
tacked individually with deliberate
tank, flamethrower, and demolition
tactics. Further, it developed that the
defenders were not all trained infan-
trymen; many were from naval con-
struction units.
On the U.S. side of the fight, a
weighty command factor shaped the
campaign into northern Peleliu.
Colonel Harold D. "Bucky" Harris
was determined to develop all avail-

29
 1%

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95375

Marines using rifle grenades, hand grenades, and "Molotov Note the torch in the foreground which was used to ignite the
cocktails" battle Japanese holed up in caves in northern Peleliu. "cocktails" and the flaming bottle of gas ready to be thrown.
and crest of the ridge, but was un- During the night of 27 September, one of the weapons from the 8th 155mm Gun Bat-
der severe fire from cave positions in talion was moved into position in 2/5's sector about 180 yards from Amiangal Ridge.
the central and northwestern slopes Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95941
of the ridge.
What was not yet appreciated was
that the Marines were confronting
the most comprehensive set of caves
and tunnels on Peleliu. They were
trying to invade the home (and
defensive position) of a long-
established naval construction unit
most of whose members were better
.3'
miners than infantrymen. As dark
fell, the 2d Battalion cut itself loose
from the units to its south, and .4 .111 b
formed a small battalion beachhead
for the night.
The next morning, as the 2d Bat-
talion, 5th Marines, tried to move
along the route leading to the north-
ern nose of Amiangal Ridge, it ran
into a wide and deep antitank ditch
which denied the attacking infantry
the close tank support they had so
successfully used earlier. At this •
point, the 5th Marines command
30
asked, again, for point-blank ar- shortened the fight for the northern trenched Japanese infantry. For some
tillery. end of the island. 35 hours, the battalion conducted the
This time, division headquarters As that fighting progressed, the most cost-effective single battalion
responded favorably. During the 5th Marines assembled its 3d Battal- operation of the entire Peleliu
night of 27 September Major George ion, supporting tanks, amphibian campaign.
V. Hanna's 8th 155mm Gun Battal- tractors, and the entire panoply of Much of the credit for such effec-
ion moved one of its pieces into po- naval gunfire, and air support to tiveness was due to supporting avi-
sition in 2/5's sector. The gun was launch a shore-to-shore operation to ation. VMF-114, under Major Robert
about 180 yards from the face of seize Ngesebus and Kongauru, 600 F. "Cowboy" Stout, had landed on
Amiangal Ridge. The sight of that yards north of Peleliu, on 28 Sep- Peleliu's air strip just three days pri-
threat at dawn elicited enemy tember. or to this landing, and immediately
machine-gun fire which inflicted There followed an operation undertook its primary service mis-
some casualties upon the artillery- which was "made to look easy" but sion: supporting Marine ground
men. This fire was quickly sup- which in fact involved a single, rein- operations. The Ngesebus landing
pressed by Marine infantry fire, and forced (but depleted) battalion was the first in the Pacific War for
then by the 155mm gun itself. against some 500 prepared and en- which the entire air support of a
Throughout the morning, the heavy
155mm fire played across the face of
Amiangal Ridge, destroying or clos-
ing all identified caves on the west
face, except for one. That latter was
a tunnel mouth, down at ground lev-
el and on the northwestern base of
the hill. It was too close to friendly
lines to permit the gun to take it un-
der fire. But by then, tanks had neu-
tralized the tunnel mouth, and a tank
bulldozer filled in a portion of the
anti-tank ditch. This allowed 2/S's
tank-infantry teams to close on the
tunnel mouth, to blast and bulldoze
it closed, and to press on around the
northern nose of Amiangal. Simul-
taneously, Marines swept over the
slopes above the tunnel and "seized"
the crest of the small mountain.
The term seizure is qualified, for
although 2/5 held the outside of the
hill, the stubborn Japanese defenders
still held the inside. A maze of inter-
connected tunnels extended through-
out the length and breadth of the
Amiangal Ridge. From time to time
the Japanese inside the mountain
would blast open a previously closed
cave or tunnel mouth, and sortie to
challenge the Marines. Notwith-
standing their surprise effect, these
counterattacks provided a rare and
welcome opportunity for the Ma-
rines actually to see their enemy in
daylight. Such tactics were inconsis-
tent with the general Japanese strate-
gy for Peleliu, and somewhat
31
 —

).t ''1011p1'

'p. .en

-'I n —
I'! Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95931
The crews of amphibian tractors board a severely damaged patrols when it carried troops attempting to infiltrate north-
Japanese landing craft which was intercepted by U.S. naval em Peleliu and reinforce Ngesebus Island off northwest Peleliu.
A western-looking aerial view of the northern end of Peleliu Island is in the upper right. Veterans of Peleliu will be amazed
showing Peleliu village and the Amiangal Mountain. Ngesebus to note how fully the island has been recaptured by vegetation.
Caption and Photo by Phillip D. Orr

32
landing was provided by Marine avi-
ation. As the LVTs entered the water
from Peleliu's shore, the naval gun-
fire prematurely lifted to the alarm
of the assault troops. Stout's pilots
immediately recognized the situation,
resumed their strafing of Ngesebus
until the LVTs were within 30 yards
of the beach. They flew so low that
the watching Marines "expected some
of them to shoot each other down by
their ricochets." This action so kept
the Japanese defenders down that the
(c
Marines in the leading waves were
upon them before they recovered
from the shock of the strafing planes.
The 3d Battalion got ashore with
no casualties. Thus enabled to knock
out all the Japanese in beach defenses
immediately, it turned its attention
to the cave positions in the ridges and
blockhouses. The ridges here, as with
those on northern Peleliu, stood in-
dividually, not as part of complex
ridge systems. This denied their
defenders opportunities for a mutu-
al defense between cave positions.
The attacking companies of 3/5
could use supporting tanks and con-
centrate all fire means upon each
defensive system, without being
taken under fire from their flanks
and rear. By nightfall on 28 Septem-
ber, 3/5 had overrun most of the op-
position. On 29 September, there was
a day of mopping up before Ngese-
A
bus was declared secure at 1500. As Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr
planned, the island was turned over Possibly one of the best preserved specimens of its kind in the Pacific this Model
to 2/321, and 3/5 was moved to di- 10 120mm dual-purpose antiaircraft and coastal defense gun is on the western shore
vision reserve in the Ngardololok of Ngesebus. The gun rests on its skid plate and was sited in a natural position.
area. Such concentated support enabled As 3/5 was clearing Ngesebus, the
Seizure of Ngesebus by one deplet- the heavily depleted 3d Battalion, 5th rest of the 5th Marines was fighting
ed infantry battalion gave a dramatic Marines, to quickly seize Ngesebus, the Japanese still in northeast Peleliu.
illustration of an enduring principle destroying 463 of Colonel Nakaga- After capturing Akarakoro Point be-
of war: the effective concentration of wa's battle-hardened and well- yond Amiangal Mountain, 2/5
means. To support that battalion, emplaced warriors in 36 hours, at a turned south. It swept through the
General Rupertus concentrated the cost of 48 American casualties. defenses east of that mountain with
bulk of all his available firepower: a Other maneuver elements on demolitions and flamethrowers, then
battleship; two cruisers; most of the Peleliu also were attacking during moved south toward Radar Hill, the
divisional and corps artillery; virtu- those 36 hours, but at an intensity eastern stronghold of Hill Row. That
ally all of the division's remaining ar- adjusted to the limited support con- feature was under attack from the
mor; armored amphibian tractors; all sequent upon General Rupertus' all- south and west by 1/5. After two
troop-carrying amphibian tractors; out support of the day's primary ob- days, the two battalions were in com-
and all Marine aviation on Peleliu. jective. mand of the scene, at least on the
33
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topside of the hills. Inside there still to commit it to the Umurbrogol rain as oversimplified, time-phased
remained stubborn Japanese Pocket. linear objectives to be seized concur-
defenders who continued to resist the rently with the flat terrain abutting
contest for Radar Hill, as did the it to the east and west.
defenders within Amiangal Moun- The southern slopes (generally
tain's extensive tunnels. All could be In a very real sense, the Umur- called Bloody Nose) dominated the
silenced when the cave or tunnel brogol Pocket typified the worst fea- landing beaches and airfield, over
mouths were blasted closed. tures of the post D-Day campaign for which the Pocket had to be ap-
As these operations were in Peleliu. It provided the scene of some proached. After those heights were
progress, the 321st at the north end of Peleliu's worst and most costly conquered by the heroic and costly
of Umurbrogol completed seizing fighting, and of some of the camp- assaults of Puller's 1st Marines (with
Hills 100 and Hill B, then cleared out aign's best and worst tactical judg- Berger's 2/7 attached), and after the
the ridge (Kamilianlul Mountain) ments. Its terrain was the most division had set in artillery which
and road north from there to the area difficult and challenging on the is- was controlled by aerial observers
of 5th Marines operations. On 30 land. Prelanding planning did not overhead, the situation changed rad-
September the 321st relieved the 1st perceive the Pocket for what it was, ically. The Pocket's defenders there-
and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines a complex cave and ridge fortress after retained only the capability to
in northern Peleliu. That regiment suitable to a fanatic and suicidal harass and delay the Americans, to
reassembled in the Ngardololok area, defense. Plans for the seizure of the annoy them with intermittent attacks
before it became once more necessary area treated the Pocket's complex ter- by fire and with night-time raids. But

34
 scramble up onto the bare ridge tops,
thereafter came under fire from fac-
ing parallel ridges and caves. They
were subject to strong night counter-
attacks from Japanese who left their
caves under cover of darkness.
During 20 September, D plus 5,
the 7th Marines had relieved the 1st
Marines along the south and south-
west fronts of the Pocket, and on the
21st the 3d and 1st Battalions re-
sumed the attack into the Pocket,
from southwest and south. These at-
tacks achieved limited initial success-
es behind heavy fire support and
smoke, but succeeded only in ad-
vancing to positions which grew un-
tenable after the supporting fire and
smoke was lifted. Assault troops had
to be withdrawn under renewed fire
support to approximately their jump-
off positions. There was little to show
for the day's valiant efforts.
Attacks the next day (22 Septem-
ber) against the west shoulder of the
Pocket, from the West Road, up the
western box canyon (Wildcat Bowl)
and toward Higashiyama (Hill 140),
all liberally supported with firepow-
er, again produced early advances,
most of which had to be surrendered
at day's end, as all three attacking
groups came under increasing fire
This sketch shows the floor plan of the largest and most elaborate tunnel system dis- from the Japanese hidden in mutu-
covered by Marines on Peleliu. It was prepared by Japanese naval construction troops ally supporting cave positions. The
and was so elaborate the Americans thought it might be a phosphate mine. 7th Marines had, unbeknown to it,
after D plus 4, Umurbrogol's de- the offensive effort into the Pocket reached within about 100 yards of
fenders could no longer seriously between 21 and 29 September was Colonel Nakagawa's final command
threaten the division's mission. directed from south to north, into the cave position. However, many sup-
Nevertheless, after the critical ene- mouths or up onto the ridges of the porting ridges, and hilltops, would
my observation sites were seized, twin box canyons which defined the have to be reduced before a direct at-
General Rupertus kept urging Pocket. Infantry supported by tanks, tack upon that cave could have any
"momentum," as though the seizure air, and flame-throwing LVTs could hope of success.
of the Pocket were as urgent as had penetrate the low ground, but gener- The fight for Umurbrogol Pocket
been seizure of the commanding ally then found themselves surround- had devolved into a siege situation,
heights guarding it from the south. ed on three sides. Japanese positions to be reduced only by siege tactics.
The stubborn character of the ter- inside the ridges of the canyons, hid- But the 1st Marine Division's com-
rain, and its determined defenders, den from observation and protected mander continued to cling to his be-
became entwined with the deter- in their caves, were quite capable of lief that there would be a "break-thru"
mined character of the general com- making the "captured" low ground against the enemy's opposition. He
manding the 1st Marine Division. untenable. Other attacks, aimed at insisted that continued battalion and
This admixture was sorted out only seizing the heights of the eastern regimental assaults would bring vic-
by time and by the reluctant inter- ridges, while initially successful, in tory "very shortly:'
cession of General Geiger. Most of that small infantry units could When the 321st's probes eastward

35
 On 3 October, reinforced by the
attached 3/5 (back from Ngesebus),
the 7th Regiment organized a four-
battalion attack. The plan called for
1/7 and 3/7 to attack from the north,
against Boyd Ridge and the smaller
ridges to its west, while 2/7 would
attack Pope (Walt) Ridge from the
south. The attached 3/5 was ordered
to make a diversionary attack from
the south into the Horseshoe canyon
and its guardian Five Sisters on its
west. This regimental attack against
the Pocket committed four infantry
"battalions," all now closer to com-
pany than battalion strength, against
the heights near the southern end of
the Pocket (Five Sisters), and the
ridges at the eastern shoulder of the
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 98260
Pocket (Pope and Boyd Ridges). Af-
Many of the participants in the battle with a literary turn of mind best compared ter heavy casualties, the attack suc-
the ridge areas of Peleliu with the description of Dante's "Inferno." Here a flame ceeded, but the Five Sisters (four of
thrower-mounted amphibian tractor spews its deadly stream of napalm into a cave. which 3/5 scaled) were untenable,
near the northern end of the Pocket the west and southwest sectors of the and had to be abandoned after their
brought them within grasp of seal- Pocket, the division stripped hun- seizure.
ing off that Pocket from the north, dreds of non-infantry from combat The next day, 4 October, the 7th
they deployed two battalions (2d and support units (artillery, engineer, pi- Marines with 3/5 still attached made
3d) facing eastward to complete the oneer), and formed them into two one more general attack—in the
encirclement. composite "infantillery" units. Under south, again to seize, then give up,
This attack against Hill B, the stop- 11th Marines' Lieutenant Colonel positions on the Five Sisters; in the
per at the northern end of the Pock- Richard B. Evans and 5th Marines' north, to try to advance and consoli-
et absorbed the 321st Infantry's full Major Harold T. A. Richmond, they date the positions there earlier seized.
attention through 26 September, as were assigned to maintain the static In that 4 October action, the 3d
the 5th Marines was fighting in hold in the sectors earlier held by 2/7 Battalion, 7th Marines' push led to
northern Peleliu. The 7th Marines and 3/7. They faced the karst plateau an unexpectedly rapid advance which
continued pressuring the Pocket from between the West Road and the it pressed to get up onto Hill 120. It
the south, and guarding it on the Pocket. was hoped that this would provide
west. With the 321st victory on the The 7th Marines' flexibility re- a good jump-off for the next day's
26th, that unit's mission was expand- stored by this relief, its 1st and 3d operation against the next ridge to
ed to press into the Pocket from the Battalions relieved the 321st units on the west. However, Hill 120, as with
north. This it did, while simultane- 29 September, along the north edge so many others in the Umurbrogol,
ously clearing out the sporadically of the Pocket. Then on the 30th, they was then under enemy crossfire
defended Kamilianlul Ridge to its pushed south, securing improved which made it completely untenable.
north. Its attack south from Hill B control of Boyd Ridge and its The attacking company was with-
and adjacent ridges made very limit- southern extension, variously called drawn with heavy casualties Among
ed progress, but permitted some con- Hill 100, Pope's Ridge, or Walt Ridge. these casualties was Captain James
solidation of the American hold The latter dominated the East Road, V. "Jamo" Shanley, commanding
along the north side of the Pocket, but Japanese defenders remained in Company L. His company was at-
now 400 yards wide in that zone. On caves on the west side. The 7th Ma- tacking Ridge/Hill 120 when sever-
29 September, the 7th Marines was rines' partial hold on Pope Ridge gave al of his men fell, wounded. Shanley
ordered to relieve the Army unit in limited control of East Road, and dashed forward under heavy fire,
that northern sector. thereby stabilized the east side of the rescued two of the men and brought
To relieve 2/7 and 3/7 of their now Pocket. But the U.S. hold over the them to safety behind a tank. He
largely static guard positions along area needed improvement. then rushed back to help a third,
36
 _ ___
_____

when a mortar round landed im- also suggested. Still determined to se- sance during the first week on Peleliu
mediately behind him, mortally cure the Pocket with Marines, Gener- had convinced him that siege tactics
wounding him. His executive officer, al Rupertus turned to his only would be required to clear the mul-
Lieutenant Harold J. Collins ran out remaining Marine regiment, the 5th. titude of mutually defended posi-
to rescue him, only to fall by his side Colonel Harris brought two firm tions within Umurbrogol. As he had
instantly killed by a Japanese anti- concepts to this final effort for his 5th earlier expressed himself in the
tank round. Marines. First, the attack would be presence of the corps and division
For his heroism Captain Shanley from the north, an approach which commanders visiting his regimental
was awarded a Gold Star (second) for offered the greatest opportunity to CP, Harris continued with his poli-
the Navy Cross he had earned at chip off one terrain compartment or cy to "be lavish with ammunition and
Cape Gloucester, New Britain. one ridge at a time. His 1st Battal- stingy with . men's lives' He was
. .

There, his company was in the lead ion positions along the east side of in a strong command position to pre-
in seizing Hill 660, a key terrain fea- the Pocket Would be held statically, pare support thoroughly before or-
ture in the Borgen Bay area. perhaps incrementally adjusted or dering advances.
improved. No attacks would be
The 7th Marines had now been in launched from the south, where the The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
the terrible Umurbrogol struggle for 3d Battalion was positioned in relieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in
two weeks. General Rupertus decided reserve. position on 5 October, but did noth-
to relieve it, a course General Geiger Colonel Harris' aerial reconnais- ing but reconnoiter positions where

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37
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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97433
Marine riflemen accompanied by tanks push forward to the enemy water supply and rid it of Japanese troops once and for
inner recesses of Horseshoe Ridge in an effort to cut off the all. The going got no easier as the Americans pushed forward.

heavier firepower could come into suspected targets just south of the key tober sent a tank sortie into the
play. Engineer dozers were brought Hill 140, which 2/5 had selected as Horseshoe. This time, the mission
up to prepare paths into the north its key objective. was not to seize and hold, but to des-
ends of the box canyons, along which troy by fire all identifiable targets on
As 2 / 5 picked off successive firing
LVT flame throwers and tanks could positions in the north, 3/5 on 7 Oc- the faces of the Five Sisters, and on
later operate. A light artillery battery Marines who fought on Pope Ridge would not recognize it in this photograph of
was emplaced along the West Road the southern end of the ridge looking north showing how the vegetation took over.
to fire point-blank into the west- Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr
facing cliffs at the north end of the
Pocket, as were weapons carriers and
tanks later. Troublesome sections of
certain cliffs were literally
demolished by direct fire, and the
rubble dozed into a ramp for tanks
to climb toward better firing posi-
tions. Light mortars were used exten-
sively to strip vegetation from areas
in which firing caves were suspect-
ed, and planes loaded with napalm-
filled belly tanks were used to bomb

38
the western (lower) face of Hill 100 advances by 2/5 from the north. sembled mode, reassembled, sand-
(Pope Ridge). When all ammunition Light mortars were repeatedly used bagged, and then effectively fired
was expended, the tanks withdrew to to clear all vegetation from small ob- from its then-commanding position.
rearm then returned, accompanied jectives and routes of advance. Both It could fire into the mouth of a very
by LVT flame-throwing tanks and tanks and artillery were used at large cave at the base of the next
guarded by small infantry fire-teams. point-blank ranges to fire into all sus- ridge, from which serious fire had
Considerably more destruction was pected caves or rough coral areas. been received for days.
effected, a large number of Japanese Aerial bombardment with napalm Sandbagging this piece into posi-
were killed in caves, and many of the was used to clear vegetation and, tion posed special problems, since the
Japanese heavy weapons in those hopefully, drive some defenders fur- only available loose sand or dirt had
caves were silenced. Previous to this ther back into their caves. All ad- to be carried from the beach, or oc-
time, some single artillery pieces fir-vances were very limited, aimed casional debris slides. Nevertheless,
ing from within the Horseshoe had simply at seizing new firing posi- the use of sandbags in forward infan-
occasionally harassed the airfield. No tions. Advances were made by try positions began to be used in-
such nuisance attacks occurred after squads or small platoons. creasingly, and the technique was
the 7 October tank sorties. The last position seized, Hill 140, later improved and widely used when
For the next six days, the 5th Ma- just north of the Five Brothers, af- 81st Infantry Division soldiers took
rines headquarters afforded all avail- forded a firing site to which a 75mm over further reduction of the Pocket.
able support to small, incremental pack howitzer was wrestled in disas- By this mode of careful advance,

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SEIZURE OF EASTERN RIDGES

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Direction Enemy Fire Concentrations
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7th Marines Lines, Evening 3 October
-. - -+—
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39
 I'I the depth of the coral badlands, be-
tween West road and the China Wall.
.4 This clearing action allowed the com-
posite "infantillery" unit to advance
its lines eastward and then hold, as
far as the infantry had cleared,
toward the back of China Wall.
Overall, the actions of the 5th and
7th Marines in October had reduced
the Pocket to an oval some 800 yards,
north to south, and 400-500 yards,
east to west. According to Colonel
Nakagawa's contemporaneous radio
report back to Koror, he still had
.;-
some 700 defenders within the Pock-
et, of which only 80 percent were ef-
Ct- fective. In early October, some wag
had suggested that the Pocket situa-
1 tion be clarified by enclosing it with
barbed wire and designating it as a
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97878 prisoner of war enclosure. Spoken in
Maj Gordon D. Gayle, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, outlines in the bitter jest, the concept did recognize
sand proposed enemy targets in the north for LtCol Joslyn R. Bailey, Marine Air- that the Pocket no longer counted in
craft Group 11. Looking on are Col Harold D Harris, 5th Marines commander, the strategic balance, nor in complet-
center, and LtCol Lewis W. Walt, behind Gayle, 5th Marines executive officer. ing the effective seizure of Peleliu.
a number of small knobs and ridges Directly south of Hill 140, there But it still weighed significantly in
at the head of the two murderous box seemed no feasible axis for advance, the mind of Major General Rupertus,
canyons were seized. Direct fire could so 3/S's axis was shifted southwest, who wanted to subdue the Pocket be-
be laid into the west face of Walt and approximately paralleling the West fore turning over to Major General
Boyd Ridges, whose tops were oc- Road, and into the coral badlands in Mueller the 81st Division's previously
cupied by 1/5, but those cave-filled front of the containing lines manned specified mopping-up task. In point
western slopes were protected by by the composite groups guarding of fact, Rupertus' successful seizure
other caves on the opposite, parallel West Road. While the composite of Ngesebus and northern Peleliu had
ridge known as Five Brothers. groups held in place, 3/5 operated terminated the enemy's capability to
A week of such siege-like activity across their front, north to south. By reinforce the now-isolated Japanese
pushed the northern boundary of the this means the coral badlands were on Peleliu. Creation of that tactical
Pocket another 500 yards south. On cleared out for an average (east-west) situation had effectively secured
12 October, the 3d Battalion, 5th depth of 75-150 yards, along some Peleliu.
Marines was called in to relieve 2d 500 yards of the north-south front. Without pressing for a declaration
Battalion, 5th Marines. The relief This terrain, earlier judged unsuit- that Peleliu had been effectively se-
was seriously marred, primarily be- able for any but the costliest and cured, which would have formalized
cause the forward positions being most difficult advance, was now the completion of the 1st Marine Di-
relieved were so close to the oppos- traversed with the aid of preparato- vision's mission, General Geiger had
ing enemy. The incoming troops, in- ry fire-scouring by napalm bombs. for some days suggested that in con-
cluding a company commander, were Major "Cowboy" Stout's VMF-114 pi-
lots' bombs fell breathtakingly close tinuing his attacks into the Pocket,
picked off by snipers during this ex- Rupertus relieve first the 5th, then the
change, and a small group of enemy to both the advancing 3/5 front and
to the stationary composite units 7th Marines with his largest and
reoccupied a position earlier subdued freshest infantry regiment, the 321st
by frequent interdiction fires. Despite holding just east of West Road.
RCT, still attached to 1st Marine Di-
these losses and interruptions, the A similar effort was then launched vision. To all such suggestions,
relief was completed on schedule, from the south by what was left of General Rupertus replied that his
and on 13 October, 3/5 continued Lieutenant Colonel John Gormley's Marines would "very shortly" subdue
the slow and deliberate wedging 1/7. Together, these two advances the Pocket.
forward. seized and emptied about one-half of Two events now overtook Gener-
40
 ____

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al Rupertus' confidence. First, the directed to turn over that responsi- on 15 and 16 October. While that
81st Division was made whole by the bility to Vice Admiral John H. relief was in progress, Lieutenant
return of its 323d RCT, fresh from its Hoover, a sub-area commander. Colonel Gormley's 1/7 was still en-
critically important seizure of Ulithi. When relieved by the 81st Division, gaged in the earlier-described coral
Second, the perception that Peleliu the 1st Marine Division would em- badlands action, to make possible the
was effectively secured was validat- bark for return to Pavuvu. eastward movement of the contain-
ed by a message which so stated from During the movement and turn- ing lines protecting West Road. The
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com- over, tactical operations ashore relief of 1 / 7 was accordingly delayed
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Com- necessarily remained under 1st Ma- until the next day. On 17 October,
mander in Chief, Pacific Ocean rine Division control until the 81st a full-strength Company B, 1/323,
Areas. Major General Geiger was Division could move its command newly arrived from Ulithi, relieved
directed to turn over command to post from Angaur. General Mueller Gormley's surviving battalion, ap-
Major General Mueller, whose 81st established his CP near Peleliu's Pur- proximately man for man.
Division was now directed to relieve ple Beach on 20 October. The Wild-
the 1st Marine Division, to mop up, cat Division thereupon acquired
and to garrison Peleliu, as long "custody" of the Pocket, and respon-
planned. Rear Admiral George E. sibility for final reduction of its de-
Fort, Rear Admiral Theodore S. termined, able, battered defenders. When on 20 October Major
Wilkinson's successor as commander Meanwhile, the relief of the 5th General Mueller became responsible
of operations in the Palaus, was Marines by the 321st RCT took place for mopping up on Peleliu, he ad-
41
 Department of Defense Photo (USMC 98401
As a result of Maj Gayle's targetting of enemy positions in the iu's airfield, and returned to the field to be rearmed, in perhaps
Uniurbrogol, napalm-laden Marine Corsairs lifted from Pelel- the shortest wheels-down bombing run of the Pacific War.
ness of the 75mm pack howitzer was carried on within 25 miles of a
dressed the tactical problem as a siege
situation, and directed his troops to which the Marines had wrestled up much larger force of some 25,000
proceed accordingly. Over a period to Hill 140, they sought and found Japanese soldiers in the northern
of nearly six weeks, his two regi- other sites to which they moved pack Palaus. Minor infiltrations aside,
ments, the 322d amd 323d Infantry, howitzers, and from which they fired those Japanese were isolated by U.S.
plus 2/321, did just that. They used point-blank intQ defending caves. To Navy patrols, and by regular bomb-
sandbags as an assault device, carry- support their growing need for sand- ing from Marine Aircraft Group 11,
ing sand up from the beaches and bags on ridge-top "foxholes;' their en- operating from Peleliu.
inching the filled sandbags forward gineers strung highlines to transport Difficult and costly as the Ameri-
to press ever nearer to positions from sand (and ammo and rations) up to can advances were, the Japanese
which to attack by fire the Japanese such peaks and ridgetops. defenders in their underground
caves and dug-in strong points. They Notwithstanding these deliberate positions had a similarly demanding
made liberal use of tanks and and even more discouraging situa-
siege tactics, the 81st troops still faced
flamethrowers, even improving upon death and maiming as they ground tion. Water was low. Sanitation was
the vehicle-mounted flamethrower. down the bitter and stubborn crude to nonexistent. Rations were
They thrust a gasoline pipeline for- Japanese defenses. The siege of the short, and ammunition was even
ward from a roadbound gasoline Umurbrogol Pocket consumed the scarcer. As time wore on, some of the
truck, thereby enabling them, with full efforts of 81st Division's 322d Japanese, when afforded opportuni-
booster pumps, to throw napalm RCT and 323d RCT, as well as 2/321, ty, chose to leave their defenses and
hundreds of feet ahead into Japanese until 27 November 1944 (D plus 73). undertake futile, usually suicidal
defensive areas. Noting the effective- This prolonged siege operation night attacks. A very few succeeded
42
 _ _______________________________________

in being captured. the 81st Division's engineers pressed cluding two officers, were killed.
Toward late November, even forward and improved the roads and Another soldier was captured the fol-
Major General Murai apparently ramps leading into or toward the lowing morning. His interrogation,
came to this point of view. Still not heart of the Japanese final position. together with postwar records and in-
in command, he nevertheless pro- This facilitated the tank and terviews, led to his conclusion that
posed, in a radio message to Lieu- flamethrower attacks to systematical- Colonel Nakagawa and Major Gen-
tenant General Inoue on Koror, a ly reduce each cave and position as eral Murai died in the CP, in ritual
banzai finale for their prolonged the infantry pushed its sandbag "fox- suicide.
defense. But General Inoue turned holes" forward. The final two-day advance of the
down the proposal. By this time, On 24 November, Colonel Nakag- 81st Division's soldiers was truly and
Nakagawa's only exterior communi- awa sent his final message to his su- literally a mopping-up operation. It
cations were by radio to Koror. As perior on Koror. He advised that he was carefully conducted to search out
he had anticipated, all local wire had burned the colors of the 2d In- any holed-up opposition. By mid-
communications had been destroyed. fan try Regiment. He said that the fi- day on 27 November, the north-
He had issued mission orders to car- nal 56 men had been split into 17 moving units, guarded on the east by
ry his units through the final, phase infiltration parties, to slip through the other Army units, met face-to-face
of defense. American positions and to "attack the with the battalion moving south,
As the tanks and infantry careful- enemy everywhere" During the night near the Japanese CP later located.
ly pressed their relentless advances, of 24-25 November, 25 Japanese, in- The 323d's commander, Colonel Ar-

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FINAL MARINE ACTION

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43
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*
S
K
C
On 27 September 1944, the U.S. flag was raised over Peleliu, comprised of 1st Marine Division Band members. The general
symbolizing that the island was secured. The honor guard was editor of this pamphlet, Benis M. Frank, is eighth from the left.
thur P. Watson, reported to General Japanese to carry out their emperor's that a final banzai attack was under
Mueller that the operation was over. war aims was starkly symbolized by consideration.
Not quite. Marine air on Peleliu the last 33 prisoners captured on The Navy garrison commander
continued to attack the Japanese po- Peleliu. In March 1947, a small Ma- moved all Navy personnel, and some
sitions in Koror and Babeithuap, rine guard attached to a small naval 35 dependents, to a secure area and
joining the patrolling Navy units in garrison on the island encountered sent to Guam for reinforcements and
destroying or bottling up any re- unmistakable signs of a Japanese a Japanese war crimes witness, Rear
maining Japanese forces in the north- military presence in a cave in the Admiral Michio Sumikawa. The ad-
ern Palaus. A late casualty in that Umurbrogol. Patrolling and ambush- miral flew in and travelled by jeep
action was the indomitable Major es produced a straggler, a Japanese along the roads near the suspected
Robert F. "Cowboy" Stout, whose seaman who told of 33 remaining cave positions. Through a loudspeak-
VMF-114 had delivered so much ef- Japanese under the military com- er he recited the then-existing situa-
fective air support to the ground mand of Lieutenant Tadamichi tion. No response. Finally, the
combat on Peleliu. Yamaguchi. Although the straggler Japanese seaman who had originally
reported some dissension within the surrendered went back to the cave
The stubborn determination of the ranks of that varied group, it seemed armed with letters from Japanese fa-

44
milies and former officers from the Palaus group, it destroyed facilities nications from Hawaii, and from the
Palaus, advising the hold-outs of the which survived Admiral Marc A. Marianas, to the Philippines. The
end of the war. On 21 April 1947, the Mitscher's devastating strike of holding was a convenience, but not
holdouts formally surrendered. Lieu- March 1944. It insured total denial a necessity.
tenant Yamaguchi led 26 soldiers to of support to the enemy from Koror's Such judgment could be disputed,
a position in front of 80 battle- submarine basing facilities, in-
however, by the survivors of the In-
dressed Marines. He bowed and crementally decreasing the already dianapolis' 29 July 1945 sinking.
handed his sword to the American waning Japanese submarine capabil- Having delivered atomic bomb parts
naval commander on the scene. ity east of the Philippines. The Unit- to Tinian shortly before, the ship was
ed States position on Peleliu headed for the Philippines, when it
completed the neutralization of the
was suddenly torpedoed at night.
some 25,000 Japanese troops in The ship went down in 12 minutes,
northern Palau. The landing on and no report of the contact or the
What advantages to the United Peleliu did not contribute to the sinking was received. The fourth day
States' war effort grew from the con- Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 323 after the sinking, its 316 survivors
quest of Peleliu? It assured absolute unopposed seizure of Ulithi. Admiral (from a crew of 1,196) were sighted
domination of all of the Palaus, William F. Halsey had earlier be- by a Navy patrol bomber working
thereby adding, marginally, to the lieved that his forces could seize out of Peleliu. The sighting led direct-
security of MacArthur's right flank Ulithi without first seizing Peleliu. ly to their rescue, and most certain-
as he continued westward, then The most visible benefit of a sub- ly would not have occurred, but for
northward from New Guinea into his dued Peleliu lay in its use as a link American occupation of Peleliu.
Philippines campaign. Within the in the flight path and line of commu- (Continued on page 48)
With the senior officers present, division chaplains dedicate extreme right are: BGen Smith, assistant division commander;
a new cemetery created at Orange Beach 2. The 1st Division Col Harrison (11th Marines), and, Col Harris (5th Marines).
commander, MajGen Rupertus, with a cane, is near the center Not present at this time was the 7th Marines' commander, Col
and to his right is Col Puller (1st Marines). Grouped on the Hanneken, whose regiment was still engaged with the enemy.
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96989

45
 Tom Lea's Paintings

T
om Lea, the artist of the paintings which illustrate to smile, or show expression, or talk. Mercifully, you're out
this pamphlet, wrote of his experiences on Peleliu of it for a while; unmertifully, down in the center of that
in Battle Stations, published in 1988 by Still Point numbness, though, you know you will have to come back
Press in Dallas. Some of the sketches from this book were eventually:'
reproduced with commentary in Volume 14. Number 2 of Reprinted by permission of Discovery, the University of Texas at
Discovery, a journal published by the University of Texas Austin. Tom Lea's artwork in this pamphlet is reproduced with
at Austin. In this issue, James Jones, author of From Here the permission of the artist. The captions under each of the Lea
to Eternity, wrote: "Lea was one of the artists put in the paintings are the artist's own words. Benis M. Frank
field by Life . Various of his works appeared in the
magazine, and up until the time he went into Peleliu, most ABOVE RIGHT "Artillery Support" At the southern end on our side of
the field opposite the hill our artillerymen had dug holes and carried
of them could be pretty well classified as excellently done 75-rum field howitzers to the sites. As we came down to them these bat-
but high-grade propaganda. There was very little Ameri- teries were firing continuously, throwing shells into the lap hangars and
can blood, very little tension, very little horror. Mostly, buildings at the foot of the hill, and at caves in the bill where lap mortar
it was what could be called the Bravo America! and This and artillery and machine-gun fire was dealing out misery to marines,
is Your Boy type of war art. His almost photographic style BELOW RIGHT "The Blockhouse" Looking up at the head of the trail
easily lent itself to that type of work . I could see the big lap blockhouse that commanded the height. The thing
"But something apparently happened to Lea after going was now a great jagged lump of concrete, smoking. I saw our lead man
meet a front line detail posted by the blockhouse while the other troops
into Peleliu. The pictures painted out of his Peleliu ex- advanced down the hill with the three tanks and the flumethrowers. Iso-
perience show a new approach. There is the tension of ter- lated lap snipers were at work on our slope, small groups of marines
ror in the bodies here, the distorted facial expressions of fanned out on both sides of the trail to clean them out, while we climbed
the men under fire show it, too . toward the blockhouse.
"One of the most famous, of course, is the Two- BELOW "Counterattack" The phone rang. A battalion CO reported the
Thousand-Yard Stare portrait of a young marine who has laps' infiltration and the beginning of the counterattack. He asked what
had all, or more than, he can take. The staring eyes, the reserves were available and was told there were none. Small arms fire
ahead of us became a continuous rattle. Abruptly three star shells burst
slack lips, the sleepwalker's stance. I've seen men with that in the sky. As soon as they died floating down, others flared to take their
look on their faces. I've had it on my own face. It feels stiff, place. Then the howitzers just behind us opened up, hurling their charges
and the muscles don't want to work right when you try over our heads, shaking the ground with their blasts.

Life Magazine artist Torn Lea accompanied Marines on Peleliu.

46
47
 (Continued from page 45) F. Halsey's recommendation through be cancelled. By that time, it was too
What did the seizure of Peleliu Admiral Nimitz to the Joint Chiefs late. And Peleliu was added to the
cost? Marine casualties numbered of Staff on 13 September 1944, two long list of battles in which Marines
6,526, including Navy corpsmen and days before D-Day, that the landing fought and suffered, and prevailed.
doctors, of whom 1,252 were killed.
The 81st Division totalled 3,089
casualties, of whom 404 were killed
in action. Total U.S. troop casualties
was 9,615 for Peleliu, Angaur and
Ngesebus, with 1,656 dead.
By inflicting that many casualties,
the Japanese were successful in im-
plementing their longstanding "delay
and bleed" strategy. The actions cost
them an estimated 10,900 casualties,
all but a tiny fraction killed. Just 202
prisoners of war were captured, only
19 of whom were Japanese military
(seven Army, 12 Navy). The others
were laborers, largely Korean.
Among the Japanese military
defenders, less than two per thou-
sand were captured.
The costs at Peleliu held warnings
aplenty for the remaining Allied
operations to be conducted across the
Pacific to Japan. Even with total 10-
cal air and naval superiority, with
lavish naval gunfire and bombs, with
the dreaded napalm weaponry, and
with a 4:1 troop superiority, the sei-
zure of Peleiju consumed one Ameri-
can casualty and 1,589 rounds of
heavy and light troop ammunition
for each single Japanese defender
killed or driven from his prepared
position. A few months later, the at-
tacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawa
would confirm this grim calculus of
For Extraordinary Heroism
war against determined Japanese

T
he Secretary of the Navy awarded the Presidenlial Unit Citation to the
defenders, ably led, in prepared 1st Marine Division, and its reinforcing organizations, for
defenses. "extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at
The question of whether the Peleliu and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944." In addition, Marine
Peleliu operation was necessary re- Aircraft Group 11 and the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion were awarded the
mains moot, even today, some 52 Navy Unit Commendation. On an individual basis, 69 participants in the
years after the 1 September 1944 battle for Peleliu were decorated with the Navy Cross, the second seniormost
landing. The heroism and exemplary combat award in the Naval service.
conduct of the 1st Marine Division, The nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, was presented to eight
its Marines and Navy corpsmen, and Marines in the fight for Peleliu; five were decorated posthumously, as indi-
cated by ('): *CorporaI Lewis K. Bausell., USMC, 1/5; Private First Class Ar-
the soldiers of the 81st Infantry Di- thur J. Jackson, USMC, 3.7; 'Private First Class Richard E. Kraus, USMCR,
vision on that miserable island is 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; * Private First Class John D. New. USMC,
written in the record. But there is an 2. 7; *Private First Class Wesley Phelps, USMCR, 3/7; Captain Everett P. Pope,
enduring question of whether the USMC, ill.: 'Private First Class Charles H. Roan, USMCR. 2/7: and First
capture of Peleliu was essential, es- Lieutenant Canton R. Rouh, USMCR, 1/5.
pecially in view of Admiral William
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 440—649/40002
48
 rigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC
The basic source work for this pamph-
let is the Marine Corps' official mono- B (Ret), graduated from the U.S. Naval Acade-
graph, The Assault on Peleliu, by Maj my in June 1939 and was commissioned a Ma-
Frank 0. Hough, published by the Govern- rifle second lieutenant. After completing Basic
ment Printing Office in 1950, while LtCol School in Philadelphia in 1940, he was assigned
Gordon D. Gayle was serving as deputy to the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division with
director of Marine Corps history and edi- which he served in three Pacific campaigns:
tor of the monograph series. Other books Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. For
used in this narrative were: George W. his extraordinary heroism while commanding the
Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on Peleliu, he was
Western Pacific Operations, vol IV, History awarded the Navy Cross.
of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World
He returned to 1st Marine Division in the Korean war to serve first as the execu-
War II (Washington: Historical Division,
HQMC, 1971); George P. Hunt, Coral tive officer of the 7th Marines, then as G-3 on the division staff. He is a graduate
Comes High (New York: Harper & of the Army's Command and General Staff College. In 1963-65, he chaired the Long
Brothers, 1946); E. B. Sledge, With the Old Range Study Panel at Quantico, developing concepts for the Corps' operational,
Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Presidio organizational, logistical and R&D needs for the 1985 period. He was promoted
Press, 1981); Edward S. Miller, War Plan to brigadier general in 1964. Retiring in 1968, he joined Georgetown University's
Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan Center for Strategic and International Studies.
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991);
Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth
(New York: Vantage Books & Random
House, 1989); Bill D. Ross, Peleliu: Tragic
Triumph, The Untold Story of the Pacific
War's Forgotten Battle (New York: Random
House, 1992); James H. Hallas, The Devil's
Anvil: The Assault on Peleliu (Westport, 945 a
Connecticut: Praeger, 1944); Harry A.
Gailey, Peleliu 1944 (Annapolis, WORLD WAR II
Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publish- THIS PAMPHLET HIS1DRY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
ing Inc., 1983); Masataka Chihaya, Fading World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Ugaki, 1941-45 (University of Pittsburg
Press, 1962); Larry L. Woodward, Before Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
the First Wave: The 3rd Armored Amphib- of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
ian Tractor Battalion — Peleliu and Okina- Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
wa (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Univ. a grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and a bequest from
Press, 1944); Burke Davis Marine: The Life the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M.
of Lieutenant General Lewis B. (Chesty) Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart.
Puller, USMC (Ret) (Boston: Little, Brown
Company, 1962). WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
The Oral History and Personal Papers DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS
Collections in the Marine Corps Histori- Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)
cal Center, Washington Navy Yard, GENERAL EDITOR,
Washington, D.C., hold a number of in- WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
terviews and diaries of participants in the Benis M. Frank
Peleliu operation. These documents from CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT
the following were particularly useful: George C. MacGillivray
LtGen Oliver P. Smith; BGen Harold D.
Harris; BGen Harold 0. Deakin; and EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
LtGen Lewis J. Fields, along with numer- Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information
ous personal interviews with campaign Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician
veterans — officers and enlisted men.
Marine Corps Historical Center
The author wishes to thank the Army Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
Center of Military History for the loan of Washington, D.C. 20374-5040
the photographs of Tom Lea's artwork ap-
pearing in this pamphlet. He also wishes 1996
to thank Phillip D. Orr for permitting use PCN 190 003137 00
of the interesting photographs of Peleliu as
it appeared in 1994.