Organizational

Psychology
Article Review

Organizational Psychology Review

2019, Vol. 9(1) 41–67
The social psychology ª The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
of whistleblowing: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2041386619849085

An integrated model journals.sagepub.com/home/opr

Farid Anvari
Flinders University, Australia
University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

Michael Wenzel
Flinders University, Australia

Lydia Woodyatt
Flinders University, Australia

S. Alexander Haslam
University of Queensland, Australia

Abstract
Whistleblowing is the disclosure of ingroup wrongdoing to an external agency and can have
important functions for the regulation of moral and legal conduct. Organizational research has
focused largely on the impact of individual and organizational factors, while overlooking the role of
group memberships and associated social identities. Further, social psychologists have so far paid
little attention to this phenomenon, or else have tended to subsume it within analysis of dissent. To
address these lacunae, we present a psychological model of whistleblowing that draws on social
identity theorizing (after Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This model describes when and how social
identities and different forms of power motivate group members to respond to ingroup wrong-
doing by engaging in whistleblowing. Our review of the literature points to the model’s ability to
integrate existing evidence while providing direction for future research. We also discuss the
model’s capacity to inform whistleblowing policy and procedures.

Keywords
dissent, organizational commitment, social identity, voice, whistleblowing

Paper received 6 June 2018. Received revised April 9, 2019; revised version accepted 10 April 2019.

Corresponding author:
Farid Anvari, School of Psychology, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia.
Email: [email protected]
42 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

Whistleblowers who voice opposition to observed seems likely that group memberships and
wrongdoing generally take on considerable risks associated processes have some role to play in
for themselves, including loss of income and whistleblowing decisions (see Dozier & Miceli,
career opportunities, and even imprisonment. For 1985; Near & Miceli, 1987). However, these
example, in 2015 the Australian government factors have not been integrated into models
passed antiwhistleblowing laws threatening 10 detailing the process.
years in prison for those who reveal governmental The present paper addresses this lacuna by
wrongdoing when the government considers the using the social identity perspective (after Tajfel
disclosed material to be classified (“Fact check,” & Turner, 1979) to explore the impact of group
2014). At the same time, legislation was enacted memberships and related group processes on the
that made it illegal for health professionals to dynamics of whistleblowing. In addition, our
report on problematic conditions and abuses in analysis expands upon current models of nor-
detention centres holding asylum seekers who mative conflict—defined as “a perceived dis-
reach Australian borders by boat.1 Nevertheless, crepancy between the current norms of a group
as an act of defiance, on the very day that these and another standard for behavior” (Packer, 2008,
laws came into effect, over 40 health workers and p. 4)—by including whistleblowing as a potential
humanitarian staff publicly disclosed abuses response to ingroup wrongdoing. We argue that
occurring at one of the detention centres (Farrell, whistleblowing is a response available to ingroup
2015). members that has hitherto been neglected in
Despite the considerable costs that it often the normative conflict (and more broadly in
entails, whistleblowing appears to be on the rise. the social identity) literature. Accordingly, the
High-profile whistleblowers such as Edward inclusion of whistleblowing as a distinct response
Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Julian Assange— to perceived ingroup wrongdoing, alongside
the most visible of cases in recent years—have dissent expressed within the group, paints a more
been referred to as “the first arrivals of the wave complete picture of how people can challenge
still to come” (T. Watson, 2013). This observation what they see as problematic group behavior.
appears to be borne out by the fact that in 1980,
26% of federal employees who observed wrong-
doing reported it, but 40% did so in 1983, and
48% in 1992 (Miceli, Rehg, Near, & Ryan,
The importance of whistleblowing
1999). More recently, the U.S. Securities and There are several compelling reasons for
Exchange Commission reported a consistent wanting to advance a theoretical understanding
upward trajectory of whistleblowing incidents of whistleblowing. First and foremost, whis-
from 2012 to 2017 (U.S. Securities and Exchange tleblowing is a critical instrument for a group,
Commission, 2017). organization, or society to promote and uphold
Given the potential for high personal costs, its moral standards. It is an important mechan-
this evidence raises one obvious question: What ism for preventing and detecting organizational
motivates people to engage in whistleblowing? wrongdoing (Brown, Mazurski, & Olsen, 2008;
To answer this, over the past 30 years, organi- Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010; Lavena, 2014;
zational researchers have examined the struc- Miceli & Near, 1988; Miethe, 1999), whether in
tural antecedents of whistleblowing, but in the public or private sector (Proost, Pavlinská,
the process provided only a limited examina- Baillien, Brebels, & van den Broeck, 2013).
tion of its psychological underpinnings (Waytz, This is particularly important in the context of
Dungan, & Young, 2013), in so far as they the increasing complexity and reduced public
focus largely on characteristics and motivations visibility of many organizational practices
of individuals as individuals. Nevertheless, it (Miethe, 1999).
Anvari et al. 43

Early in the 21st century, whistleblowing was Even when the actions of whistleblowers are
responsible for the detection of almost 20% of subjectively motivated by moral concerns, they
major corporate fraud cases in the US (Dyck may be perceived by others as ill-considered
et al., 2010). Moreover, a 2009 Pricewaterhou- and as having immoral (or at least proble-
seCoopers study of over 3,000 companies matic) side effects (e.g., Savage, 2017).
around the world revealed that 34% of incidents In the present paper, we do not consider
of economic crime were detected through whistleblowing that primarily serves the whis-
whistleblowing, a figure that rose to 48% in the tleblower’s own interests, or which takes the
US (Fredin, 2012). In science, the website form of a vendetta against an organization. We
Retraction Watch (www.retractionwatch.com) also do not consider whistleblowing that involves
shows that whistleblowers have been responsible deliberately passing on misleading or inaccurate
for uncovering several high-profile cases of data information. Our analysis starts from a point
fabrication and scientific fraud (e.g., Stokes, where a group actually has engaged in wrong-
2012). Indeed, whistleblowing may be the pri- doing (or is actually suspected of having done
mary mechanism for fraud detection in scientific so). We refer to “wrongdoing” as any illegal,
communities (Gross, 2016; Stroebe, Postmes, & immoral, or illegitimate act (or omission) as
Spears, 2012). judged by the perceiver. Following this, our
Whistleblowing (like other forms of defi- interest is in how members of that group, knowing
ance; e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012) can help to about the wrongdoing, then respond.
correct ethical breaches that are sometimes
costly to society. Without it, unreported orga-
nizational wrongdoing may continue, fester, A psychological definition of
and even become the organizational norm. whistleblowing
Certainly, whistleblowing may create instabil-
To explore its psychological underpinnings, it is
ity for an organization in the short term, but it
useful to unpack existing definitions of whistle-
can also help to reduce organizational costs in
blowing from a psychological perspective. For
the long term (Miceli & Near, 1985, 1988). In
this purpose, we draw on two existing definitions.
some cases, whistleblowing can prove critical
for an organization’s prosperity or its very sur- Probably the most influential is that provided by
vival. Not least, this is because a whistleblower’s Near and Miceli (1985; see also King, 1997),
which defines whistleblowing as “the disclosure
report of wrongdoing by their workgroup to an
by organization members (former or current) of
oversight unit in the same organization can help
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the
avoid negative publicity and legal issues asso-
control of their employers, to persons or organi-
ciated with public reporting, if the report is dealt
zations that may be able to effect action” (1985,
with effectively so that the organization itself
p. 4; see also Miceli & Near, 1985). Additionally,
does not become complicit in the wrongdoing
(Miceli & Near, 1985, 1988). Furthermore, the Jubb (1999) defines whistleblowing as:
high percentage (approximately 50%; Fredin, A deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure,
2012) of observed wrongdoing that goes unre- which gets onto public record and is made by a
ported may be reduced by processes that foster person who has or had privileged access to data or
whistleblowing. information of an organization, about non-trivial
This is not to say that whistleblowing is illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual,
necessarily or inherently a moral act. Some suspected or anticipated which implicates and is
whistleblowing may be designed to harm the under the control of that organization, to an exter-
organization against which it is directed, for nal entity having potential to rectify the wrong-
example, where it arises out of disgruntlement. doing. (p. 78)
44 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

There are five components of these defini- the wrongdoing is reported to. Some research-
tions that are important for our present pur- ers distinguish between whistleblowing through
poses. First, the disclosure must be made by channels that are internal versus external to a
someone from within the offending group; a given organization (see Dworkin & Baucus,
whistleblower cannot be an outsider. Near and 1998; Miceli & Near, 1984, 1985). However,
Miceli’s (1985) definition requires the whistle- the predictors of internal and external whistle-
blower to be a (former or current) member of blowing tend to overlap (Miceli & Near, 2005;
the organization, while Jubb (1999) implies Near & Miceli, 1987), and both are structurally
insider status by arguing for privileged access equivalent. That is, while whistleblowers may
to information. Consistent with both definitions use either internal or external organizational
but broader in scope, we suggest that the dis- channels, the channels are, by definition, exter-
closure must be of ingroup wrongdoing. Whis- nal to the group that commits the wrongdoing.
tleblowing thus involves reporting illegal or Although it is possible that there is a qualitative
immoral behavior on the part of one’s own difference between whistleblowing within an
group or its members, bringing with it the pos- organization and whistleblowing externally, the
sibility of loyalty conflicts. fact that they share the same predictors suggests
Second, from a psychological perspective, similarities in the psychological processes
group membership is subjectively defined (Turner, involved. Specifically, whistleblowing requires
1982; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, the report be made to an outgroup (or its rep-
1994). Therefore, while whistleblowing concerns resentative agent) at a higher level of inclu-
“ingroup wrongdoing,” the definition of this siveness than the ingroup implicated in the
ingroup is psychological and potentially variable wrongdoing. This differentiates whistleblow-
(Millward & Haslam, 2013). The psychological ing from intragroup dissent, which is the
nature of group membership means that a whis- expression of discontent made within the
tleblower need not formally be a member or group about the group’s behavior and aimed at
employee of an organization; it is enough that the seeking to change the group from within (Jet-
group being reported on is a psychological ten & Hornsey, 2014; Packer, 2008, 2009).
ingroup—that is, a group with which the whistle- Fourth, appreciation of the fact that both the
blower has (or has had) some degree of social offending ingroup and reporting agency are
identification. It also means that the group engaged subjectively defined and dynamic allows us to
in wrongdoing can be variously construed—more anticipate and explain the trajectory through
exclusively or more inclusively (Turner, 1985). which whistleblowing escalates (see Figure 1).
The offending ingroup can be identified as a This trajectory is illustrated in Stewart’s (1980)
workgroup within an organization’s department analysis of 51 whistleblowing cases, which
or, increasingly inclusively, as a department within showed that when they first became aware of
an organization, an organization, or an entire wrongdoing, whistleblowers typically reported
industry or profession. their concerns to their immediate supervisors.
Third, it follows that a further defining When their supervisors failed to act on this
quality of whistleblowing is that the disclosure report, they escalated their concerns to people
of the psychological ingroup’s wrongdoing higher up the organizational chain. If (and only
must be made to a reporting agency (a person or if) those people were perceived as having failed
group who receives the disclosure) that is psy- to respond adequately, whistleblowers then
chologically external (i.e., an outgroup) in reported the wrongdoing to relevant regulatory
relation to the offending ingroup. Thus, the bodies or the media. However, Stewart’s (1980)
level of inclusiveness at which the offending analysis provides no explanation of the psy-
ingroup is defined has implications for whom chology behind this whistleblowing trajectory.
Anvari et al. 45

Finally, fifth, whistleblowing is said to

Public
involve nonobligatory unsolicited disclosure
Industry (Jubb, 1999). This sets whistleblowing apart
Organization
from informing and role-prescribed reporting
Team due to the distinctive ethical and moral
dilemma that it poses for the would-be whis-
tleblower (Jubb, 1999). However, the distinc-
tion between role-prescribed and unsolicited
reporting may not be so clear-cut, since even an
individual whose role is to identify or report
Figure 1. The hierarchical structure of
whistleblowing. wrongdoing may decide not to do so, and hence
Note. Whistleblowing escalates as the boundaries of can be seen to exercise a degree of choice
the offending group are extended (e.g., due to inac- (Haslam & Reicher, 2011). Moreover, even
tion or collusion). The dotted lines indicate that though reporting may be prescribed by their
when whistleblowing fails, the definition of the role, those who reveal ingroup wrongdoing can
offending ingroup becomes more inclusive and hence still face the same risks as whistleblowers (Near
whistleblowing involves reporting to an outgroup
& Miceli, 1987). Nonetheless, we can say that
that is defined at a higher (more inclusive) level of
abstraction. whistleblowing typically involves voluntarily
reporting an ingroup’s (or its members’) pro-
One explanation may be that reporting to each blematic behavior.
successively higher level category is simply Putting these various elements together, we
required by organizational protocols. That is, an define whistleblowing as a voluntary disclosure
employee is required to first report wrongdoing to of ingroup wrongdoing (including omissions) to
their supervisor, then to their departmental head, a reporting agency (person or group) outside of
and so on. We argue, however, that a psycholo- an offending ingroup with a view to that agency
gical process of recategorization is implicated. taking action to curtail the wrongdoing. This
When a reporting agency fails to act on the report, definition has obvious points of contact with
then it and the group it represents may come to be those offered by other researchers (e.g., Jubb,
perceived as complicit in the wrongdoing, 1999; Near & Miceli, 1985) but, critically, it
expanding the perceived boundary of the stresses the importance of shared (and non-
offending ingroup. Hence, as the inclusiveness of shared) group memberships for the process.
the offending ingroup expands, there is a corre-
sponding expansion of the boundary of the
reporting agency. In line with the principles of The social identity approach
self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, It is thus apparent that people’s group member-
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner et al., 1994), ships are implicated in the motivation to engage
these shifting boundaries can be seen to reflect a in whistleblowing (see also Vadera, Aguilera, &
process of social categorization whereby the Caza, 2009). Therefore, a psychological frame-
would-be whistleblower iteratively comes to work that might be well positioned to inform
define (and redefine): (a) the group that is understanding of the dynamics of whistleblow-
responsible for, or implicated in, the wrongdoing; ing is the social identity approach—comprised
and (b) the wider group whose standards, rules, or of social identity and self-categorization theories
values have been violated and which the whis- (after Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985).
tleblower seeks to engage with in order to enforce According to social identity theory, people’s
these standards (whether through regulatory sense of self—and hence their cognition and
powers or external pressures). behavior—is determined as much (if not more)
46 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

by their internalized group memberships (their profession, with each successive higher level
social identity as “we” and “us”; Tajfel, 1978) category subsuming the preceding ones (e.g.,
as it is by their idiosyncratic qualities (their Ellemers et al., 2004; Millward & Haslam, 2013).
personal identity as “I” and “me”; Turner, 1982). Self-categorization theory argues that when,
Much of organizational theory has focused on and to the extent that, people self-categorize as
the psychology of individuals as individuals members of a particular group they will tend to
(reflecting their personal identities), but social (a) see themselves as interchangeable with
identity theorizing suggests that a lot can be other ingroup members, (b) internalize the
gained by considering how people’s behavior group’s norms and values, and (c) act in accord
may be structured, at a higher level of self- with its interests (see Haslam, 2004). At the
abstraction, by their sense of shared social same time, though, the self-categorization pro-
identity (Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Ellemers, cess is context-sensitive (e.g., Haslam &
2005). Indeed, research has shown that social Turner, 1992); accordingly, in different con-
identity is a major determinant of several texts people will understand the self through the
organizationally relevant outcomes, including lens of different group-based standards. For
(a) effective communication (Morton, Wright, example, in her daily work, Jane may define
Peters, Reynolds, & Haslam, 2012); (b) work- herself as a tax accountant committed to
place motivation (Ellemers, de Gilder, & achieving the best outcome for her clients, but
Haslam, 2004); (c) organizational citizenship at an accountancy conference (attended by
behavior (van Dick, Grojean, Christ, & Wieseke, accountants and auditors alike) she may define
2006); and (d) social support and stress (van herself as a member of her profession, dedi-
Dick & Haslam, 2012). Importantly, social cated to upholding professional values and
identities do not require physical groups but can standards. Dynamics of this form clearly have
form on the basis of any attributes, including the capacity to create situations in which dif-
values and opinions, that are believed to be ferent groups’ values and goals come into
shared with other people (Bliuc, McGarty, conflict (normative conflict; Packer, 2008).
Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). This might be seen in the workplace, for
Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., example, if the wrongdoing of one ingroup
1987) argues that individuals can define their (e.g., one’s workgroup) violates the values of
self at varying levels of abstraction, as a func- another (e.g., the organization, which is a
tion of comparative and normative features of superordinate group in this context).
the prevailing social context and of the indi- Speaking to this dilemma, Packer’s (2008)
vidual (Turner et al., 1994). For example, in a normative conflict model details members’
context where it is fitting to do so (e.g., at potential responses when their group’s conduct
work), a person, Jane, may self-categorize as a is perceived to conflict with relevant norms and
tax accountant, and thereby see herself as rel- values. The severity of such perceived norma-
atively similar to other tax accountants, but also tive conflict and people’s strength of identifi-
as different from auditors who review the work cation with the offending ingroup are likely to
of accountants (e.g., in terms of her interests influence whether they conform, leave the
and commitments). In a different context, it group, or engage in intragroup change efforts
may be more fitting for her to self-categorize as (Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008, 2011;
an accountant (a more abstract, more inclusive Packer & Chasteen, 2009). Specifically, when
self-categorization that includes auditors). Like- perceived normative conflict is low, people who
wise, depending on the context, an employee of identify strongly with the offending ingroup are
an organization may self-categorize at the level of more likely to conform (Packer, 2008, 2011).
their workgroup, department, organization, or However, under high normative conflict (e.g.,
Anvari et al. 47

serious wrongdoing), the group’s behavior may people are motivated to do will depend on how
be seen as dangerous, harmful, or immoral, in much they identify with the relevant social
which case, strongly identified group members identities, and on the perceptions of power in
are more likely to try to change group behavior the given context.
through intragroup dissent (Packer, 2008, 2011).
Conversely, weakly identified group members
who perceive high normative conflict will be
more likely to disengage from the group or
The importance of social identification
leave, rather than attempting to change the group either with an offending ingroup or a
from within. Further, even those who identify superordinate group
strongly with the group and who perceive serious People can identify with social identities at
wrongdoing may sometimes engage in “uneasy different levels of inclusiveness and thus be
conformity” (where they disagree but comply; motivated to act in line with the norms and
Packer, 2008) instead of dissent—especially if values corresponding to the group with which
they expect intragroup change efforts to be they identify. When an ingroup or its members
unsuccessful (Hirschman, 1970) or if they per-
commit a transgression, other group members
ceive themselves to have little capacity to
may perceive this as a violation of group values.
influence the group (Packer, 2008).
Moreover, strongly identified ingroup members
However, there is another potential avenue
may perceive themselves as responsible for
through which ingroup members can change
such offences, feeling group-based shame or
group behavior. When the actions of the
guilt, and thus be motivated to take corrective
ingroup violate the values of another salient
action (see Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011).
social identity, both those who identify weakly
Hence, the more strongly people identify with
with the offending ingroup and those who lack
an offending ingroup, the more motivated they
power within it may engage in whistleblowing
for the benefit of the group whose values have will be to address the ingroup’s wrongdoing,
been violated. On this basis, we seek to apply particularly when they perceive the wrongdoing
and extend the model of normative conflict in to be in violation of the group’s own values
order to advance a social identity model of (Crane & Platow, 2010).
whistleblowing. However, group members can also identify
with a social identity at a superordinate level.
What may constitute the relevant superordinate
A social identity model of group depends on the context. For example, in
whistleblowing certain contexts, a profession or the public will
Based on the normative conflict model, people constitute superordinate groups of which the
can respond to perceived ingroup wrongdoing offending ingroup (e.g., an organization) is a
by conforming and remaining silent, disenga- subcategory. In other contexts, an organization
ging and exiting the group, or they can attempt will be a superordinate group, as might be the
to change ingroup behavior via internal means, case when the offending ingroup is a work-
using intragroup action such as dissent (Crane group within that organization. The more
& Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008, 2011) and voice strongly people identify with (and are loyal and
(Morrison, 2011, 2014; Morrison, See, & Pan, committed to) a superordinate group, the more
2015; Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, they would endorse its values and thus the more
2011). Alternatively, they can attempt change motivated they would be to act against an
via external means, through intergroup action ingroup’s wrongdoing when the superordinate
such as whistleblowing. We suggest that what group’s values have been violated.
48 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

To illustrate this more clearly, imagine that identity, at one of the aforementioned levels,
members of an auditing accountant team (an whose values have been violated.
offending ingroup) accept gifts from a company
they are auditing. This behavior clearly violates
The importance of power to effect change
the code of conduct and core values of the
accounting profession (the superordinate group). either internally or externally
Accordingly, if an accountant identifies strongly Once an individual is motivated to act against
with the profession’s values and/or the account- ingroup wrongdoing, the form of that action
ing profession itself, they will be likely to be will further be determined by perceptions of
motivated to act against the violation. Similarly, power. Turner (2005) explains that power is the
if an auditor identifies strongly with their team capacity to impact, change, or influence things
and perceives that the receiving of gifts violates in the physical or social world. He divides
the team’s own values, they will be likely to feel social power into two subcategories: power
responsible for the wrongdoing, desiring the through persuasion, and power through control
group to uphold its values. Here, then, ingroup (both described in what follows). In the context
wrongdoing could undermine the values of a of responding to ingroup wrongdoing, we refer
superordinate identity and/or the values of the to power as an individual’s capacity to influ-
offending ingroup, making one feel responsible ence the ingroup’s behavior, for which there are
for the offence. Each level of identification two broad sources of power that a person can
(ingroup and superordinate) is likely to be a draw upon.
motivating factor for efforts to change the
offending ingroup’s behavior. Intragroup power. The first source of power
In some circumstances, one could argue that relates to the capacity for group members to
ingroup wrongdoing does not violate the values influence group behavior internally. This power
of a superordinate group but, rather, it violates to directly influence group behavior differs
values derived from another social identity, between individual group members (e.g., Hogg,
which people project onto the superordinate 2001). Group members may perceive them-
group (Wenzel, Waldzus, & Steffens, 2017). selves to have power through their ability to
For example, an employee who identifies persuade other ingroup members that their
strongly with their organization may project behavior is immoral or inappropriate and that
values associated with their feminist identity changing their behavior is the right or moral
onto the organization and look for it to uphold thing to do (Turner, 2005). Here, a person’s
those feminist values (even if the organization power to persuade can emerge from a range of
has no particular commitment to them). If the factors, including: (a) their capacity to exert
employee’s workgroup displays sexist beha- leadership by virtue of being someone who
viors, then that employee will be likely to be represents the group’s goals and values
motivated to act against it. This corresponds to (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011); (b) their
the analysis we presented before, where the informal position or status within the group
perceived violation is to the values of a super- (Packer, 2008); (c) their general commu-
ordinate group (the organization in this exam- nicative and social skills and capacity to form
ple), albeit projected from the perspective of social networks and alliances; as well as (d) the
another social identity. degree to which the group has open communi-
In sum, social identity theorizing leads us to cation practices (e.g., Kassing, 2000). Alter-
expect that whether an individual acts to change natively, power may arise from a person’s
ingroup wrongdoing depends partly on the perceived ability to control the ingroup’s
degree to which they identify with a social behavior by wielding legitimate authority
Anvari et al. 49

(Turner, 2005). In both instances (persuasion effects that each may have on whistleblowing
and control), perceived influence over ingroup behavior.
behavior is direct—that is, persuasion attempts The concepts of intragroup and vicarious
require a person to communicate directly with intergroup power represent a critical differ-
ingroup members, and control attempts require entiation of the power construct (as we will
the person to have direct authority over them. show next), as well as a differentiation of, or
We refer to this direct source of power, the from, related concepts such as self-efficacy.
power to internally influence group behavior, as Self-efficacy refers to a person’s perceived
intragroup power. ability to successfully achieve their goals (G.
Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). Such confidence
Vicarious intergroup power. The second source of in one’s abilities and resourcefulness resides in
power is the capacity to influence the ingroup’s the individual and is measured as an individual
behavior through the influence of an outside difference. In contrast, in the case of intragroup
agency. We refer to this less direct source as and vicarious intergroup power, perceived effi-
vicarious intergroup power, this being the cacy (as one element, next to costs) is a contextual
perceived ability to prevent or change the assessment of one’s impact within or through a
ingroup’s wrongdoing through the influence of group, and thus also involves an assessment of the
a person or group external to the offending relative power of the group as well as self. In this
ingroup, enlisted via whistleblowing. Research way, the concepts of intragroup and vicarious
into whistleblowing is yet to consider the con- intergroup power point to previously uncon-
cept of power through (e.g., power through a sidered (contextual and personal) factors that
collective or through the influence of an outside contribute to advance our understanding of what
agency) as a psychological construct. With an individual will do in response to ingroup
intergroup power, the perceived capacity for wrongdoing.
influence resides less in the individual and more
in the outside agency and its willingness and
Response to ingroup wrongdoing as an
ability to prevent or stop the wrongdoing.
Intergroup power therefore encompasses the
outcome of social identification and power
perceived effectiveness of whistleblowing to The arguments presented in the previous section
stop, prevent, or minimize the wrongdoing and/ suggest that people’s response to wrongdoing
or its consequences. We further propose that will be an outcome of two dimensions: social
perceptions of intergroup power include the identification and power. In what follows, we
perceived costs of whistleblowing, such as unpack the implications of this analysis in more
the potential for retaliation, social ostracism, detail. Table 1 presents an overview.
income loss, imprisonment, and physical harm.
This is because when perceived costs are pro- Conformity and silence. The previous reasoning
hibitively high, they are likely to contribute to a suggests that group members are most likely to
sense of powerlessness to effect change. Con- conform and/or remain silent in the face of
versely, a person may feel empowered to the problematic ingroup behavior when there is no
extent that there is protection from retaliation or (or low) motivation to act, such as when they
from other forms of adverse repercussion. identify weakly with the superordinate group
Although we propose that perceptions of both whose values have been violated. (Identifica-
efficacy and costs (of whistleblowing) can be tion with the offending ingroup has a complex
subsumed under the construct of power, they relationship with conformity and silence that is
are different facets; researchers and policy- detailed by Packer [2008].) On the other hand,
makers may want to consider also the unique people could also conform or remain silent
50 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

Table 1. Overview of social identity and power factors proposed to predict the response options to ingroup
wrongdoing.

Ingroup Superordinate
Response option identification identification Intragroup power Intergroup power

Conformity and   
silence (e.g., organizational (e.g., Morrison, (e.g., Morrison, 2011,
commitment; 2011, 2014; 2014; Morrison et al.,
Miceli, Near, & Morrison et al., 2015)
Schwenk, 1991) 2015)
Exit  þ
(e.g., Packer,
2008)
Intragroup action þ þ þ
(e.g., Crane & (e.g., Kassing, 2000;
Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008)
Packer, 2008)
Intergroup  þ  þ
action: (e.g., Packer, (e.g., C. P. Chen & (e.g., Callahan & (e.g., Alleyne, Weekes-
whistleblowing 2014; Rennie Lai, 2014; Cho & Dworkin, 1994; Marshall, & Arthur,
& Crosby, Song, 2015; Taylor Jackson et al., 2013; Near & Miceli,
2002; Waytz & Curtis, 2010, 2010; Miceli & 1987; Park &
et al., 2013) 2016) Near, 1992) Blenkinsopp, 2009)
Note. Positive symbol (þ) indicates a positive relationship (e.g., increasing identification with the ingroup will increase the
likelihood of intragroup action), and negative symbol () indicates a negative relationship (e.g., increasing identification with
the superordinate group will decrease conformity and silence). The referenced papers provide indirect support for these
propositions and the reader should refer to the main text for a full description of this. Empty cells reflect situations in which
the model of whistleblowing does not specify a clear relationship, such as the complex relationship between ingroup
identification and conformity described by Packer (2008).

when they identify strongly with a super- Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012), rationaliza-
ordinate group whose values have been violated tion and justification (van der Toorn, Ellemers,
but feel powerless to influence the offending & Doosje, 2015), or socialization (Near &
ingroup’s behavior either internally or through Miceli, 2011)—which could act as a self-
whistleblowing. protective mechanism without needing to
In line with these arguments, research sug- change or repair the wrongdoing behavior (van
gests that powerlessness, and the perception der Toorn et al., 2015). Together, conformity
that organizational change is unlikely, serve to and silence will be more likely when there is
inhibit voice and therefore predict silence weak identification with the group whose val-
(Morrison, 2011, 2014; Morrison et al., 2015). ues have been violated and/or when there is low
Indeed, even when group members are moti- perceived (intragroup and intergroup) power.
vated to act by their social identities, to the
extent that they perceive themselves to be Exit. Another potential response to ingroup
powerless to effect change, they are likely to wrongdoing is for a group member to dis-
remain silent. This silence may also be identify from the offending ingroup and sub-
accompanied by some form of legitimization— sequently leave (Glasford, Pratto, & Dovidio,
in the form of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 2008). Such exit strategies are more likely to be
1957), moral disengagement (Moore, Detert, considered by members who are weakly
Anvari et al. 51

identified with the offending ingroup but who expect that the more strongly a person identifies
identify strongly with a superordinate group with the offending ingroup, the more likely they
whose values have been violated. In addition, will be to express intragroup dissent. However,
exit is more likely to occur when the associated even those who identify weakly with the
costs are low, but it is often the case that exit offending ingroup may express dissent to the
costs will be high, such as when a person (a) has extent that they identify strongly (vs. weakly)
a strong sense of loyalty to the group or is with the superordinate group whose values have
strongly identified with it, (b) is materially been violated.
reliant on the group (e.g., for income), or (c) Furthermore, whether a person takes
fears retaliation (Hirschman, 1970). High exit intragroup action is likely to depend on their
cost situations can lead to silence and con- perceived capacity to directly influence other
formity (Hirschman, 1970; Packer, 2008), with group members and group behavior (Packer,
rationalization again likely to be used to reduce 2008)—that is, their perceived intragroup
the sense of responsibility (Near & Miceli, power. Dissent is more likely to be expressed
2011; van der Toorn et al., 2015). Hence a when people perceive themselves to have high
combination of being strongly identified with intragroup power. For instance, in a survey of
the superordinate group and weakly identified 232 employees, (intragroup) dissent was more
with the offending ingroup makes exit more likely for those who perceived there to be greater
likely when exit costs are low. freedom of speech within the workplace (Kas-
sing, 2000). In this way, those who perceived
Intragroup action. When members of an offend- themselves to have high intragroup power (an
ing ingroup, who feel responsible for its beha- ability to voice their concerns internally) were
vior (or experience group-based guilt or shame, more likely to express dissent. Accordingly, it
as discussed earlier), perceive possibility for appears that having power within a group can
positive change to the status quo, they will make a person more likely to engage in
generally be motivated to act (Haslam, 2004) intragroup change efforts through dissent and
because they will be most concerned about the voice (Morrison, 2011; Packer, 2008, 2011).
group and will be keen to restore their sense of This implies an interaction between intragroup
positive ingroup identity when there is an power and identity, such that group members who
opportunity for doing so (Ellemers, Spears, & identify strongly with the offending ingroup
Doosje, 1999; Johnson & Fujita, 2012; van der (experiencing group-based guilt or shame, a sense
Toorn et al., 2015). Those who are strongly of responsibility for the offence), and/or those
identified with the ingroup will tend to look who identify strongly with the superordinate
first at changing the ingroup behavior via group, will be most likely to express dissent when
intragroup action, including intragroup dissent they perceive themselves to have high intragroup
or creating/joining an intragroup movement power.
(Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008). This is
consistent with the view that those who identify
more strongly with a group will be more likely Intergroup action: Whistleblowing. The social
to go to the effort of exerting voice (e.g., identity model of whistleblowing is represented
speaking up with ideas and suggestions) to schematically in Figure 2 and identifies four
improve the group’s functioning (Morrison proposed pathways to whistleblowing. Whether
et al., 2011) even if acting for the benefit of the an individual is motivated to engage in whis-
group comes at personal cost (e.g., Jetten, tleblowing depends first on whether they iden-
Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003; tify strongly with the offending ingroup or with
Packer, 2008, 2011, 2014). We would therefore the superordinate group.
52 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

Ingroup Superordinate
identification identification

1 2

– –

5 7
+ +
Intragroup 6 –
Vicarious
power + 8 intergroup
power
3 4

– +

– +
Whistleblowing

Figure 2. The social identity model of whistleblowing.

Note. Path 1 suggests that the likelihood of whistleblowing is reduced by strong identification with the
offending ingroup. Path 2 suggests that it is increased by strong identification with the superordinate group
whose values have been violated by the offending ingroup’s wrongdoing. Path 3 suggests that whistleblowing is
more likely if people perceive themselves to have low intragroup power. Path 4 suggests that it is also more
likely if they perceive themselves to have vicarious intergroup power to shape ingroup behavior through the
influence of an external agency.

Identification with an offending ingroup. People intragroup dissent (as discussed earlier), it
can have a sense of loyalty and commitment should reduce whistleblowing (Figure 2, Path 1).
toward a group engaged in wrongdoing due to De Graaf’s (2010) interviews with 25 whis-
being (or feeling) close to it and its members. tleblowers indicated that, during their delib-
Such identification and closeness with the erations about whether they would whistleblow,
wrongdoers should reduce the likelihood of an important factor (against whistleblowing)
whistleblowing because (a) it would foster was the possibility of negative consequences
greater tolerance for ingroup wrongdoing (see for the offenders. Consistent with this point,
also Packer, 2008), (b) the offending group’s relational closeness and loyalty to the wrong-
norms increase social pressure on ingroup doer have both been shown to reduce whistle-
members to conform and thereby to become blowing intentions (King, 1997; Waytz et al.,
complicit in the wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 2013) and, in a study on dissent, those who
1992), and (c) there will be concerns about the were strongly identified with the ingroup were
negative consequences that whistleblowing will less willing to express concerns about ingroup
have for the offender(s) and their ingroup (De behavior to outgroup members than to other
Graaf, 2010). Notably, when the ingroup has ingroup members (Packer, 2014). Furthermore,
norms of loyalty, then people strongly identified accountants’ whistleblowing intentions were
with the group will be more strongly bounded by lower when wrongdoers were their friends than
those norms. Hence, although strong identifica- when they were not (Alleyne et al., 2013).
tion with the offending ingroup, and other rela- Focus group discussions with medical students
tional ties with the offenders, would increase revealed that camaraderie was a key reason for
Anvari et al. 53

them not blowing the whistle on their colleagues significant relationship between organizational
(Rennie & Crosby, 2002). Survey data also indi- commitment and whistleblowing (e.g., Mesmer-
cate that smaller workgroups tend to be associated Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims & Keenan,
with less whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1988), 1998), the evidence nevertheless points to social
presumably because these are associated with identities (and strength of identification) as a
greater psychological closeness—and hence loy- motivating factor.
alty—to the offending ingroup (Haslam, 2004; Moreover, as suggested before, people can
van Knippenberg & van Schie, 2000). identify with and be committed and loyal to an
Although our theorizing integrates literature even more inclusive superordinate group, such
on whistleblowing and dissent, future research as their profession or the wider society and its
is required to test the model’s proposition that citizens. Others have argued that whistleblow-
closeness and identification with an offending ing may be the act of someone who perceives
ingroup can increase intragroup dissent but the public interest as overriding other interests
simultaneously decrease whistleblowing. This (Andrade, 2015; Culiberg & Mihelič, 2017;
would also serve to address the model’s critical Nader, Petkas, & Blackwell, 1972). People may
distinction between intragroup dissent and be motivated to speak out because to remain
whistleblowing as they correspond to the two silent would be perceived as a violation of
groups implicated in the whistleblowing deci- societal values (see also Pliskin, Goldenberg,
sion (the offending ingroup and the super- Amber, & Bar-Tal, 2017), and motivation to
ordinate group). serve the public interest is associated with whis-
tleblowing (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Cho & Song,
Identification with a superordinate group. People 2015). In this vein, Henik (2008) maintained that
can be loyal and committed to other groups, conflicting loyalties or values can emanate from
too, such as their organization, their profession, allegiances to “extra-organizational” principles—
or indeed their society as a whole. Loyalty to or that is, principles derived from sources external to
identification with such a superordinate group an organization—such as a professional code or
whose values have been violated by an the public welfare. This was confirmed in inter-
ingroup’s wrongdoing should increase the views with 50 whistleblowers and inactive
likelihood of whistleblowing (Figure 2, Path 2). observers (Henik, 2015). Moreover, a study with
In a survey of directors of internal auditing in practicing auditors from an international
North America, those with higher organiza- accounting firm found that strength of identifica-
tional commitment were more likely to have tion with their profession (i.e., the superordinate
engaged in (internal and external) whistle- identity) positively predicted whistleblowing
blowing about observed wrongdoing, whereas intentions in response to a hypothetical vignette
those with lower organizational commitment in which the accounting profession’s code of
were more likely to have remained silent conduct was violated (Taylor & Curtis, 2010; cf.
(Miceli et al., 1991; see also C. P. Chen & Lai, Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001). These findings
2014). We note that these studies did not therefore suggest that when an offending
explicitly indicate whether the wrongdoing ingroup’s wrongdoing violates a profession’s
violated organizational values. However, in values or threatens the public interest, group
another vignette study in which reporting was members are likely to whistleblow to the extent
said to be of benefit to the organization, orga- that they identify with that profession or wider
nizational commitment positively predicted public.
internal whistleblowing intentions among a People can self-categorize at even more
sample of public accountants (Taylor & Curtis, abstract superordinate levels, such as the human
2016). While not all studies have found a identity, perceiving humankind as the ingroup
54 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

(Allport, 1954; Turner, 1982). Research sug- social identity whose values have been violated
gests that the more strongly an individual by an ingroup’s wrongdoing will positively
identifies with the human identity, the more predict the likelihood of whistleblowing (and
they would be concerned about human rights intragroup dissent). Future research can test
and humanitarian needs (McFarland, Brown, & whether identification with the offending ingroup
Webb, 2013; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, and identification with the superordinate group,
2012). We would therefore expect that strength at varying levels of inclusiveness, do indeed have
of identification with the human identity (or opposing effects on whistleblowing, but effects in
humankind) would motivate people to speak the same direction (perhaps even cumulatively
out in dissent or engage in whistleblowing so) on intragroup dissent. For example, research
when an ingroup’s wrongdoing violates basic may examine these propositions in contexts
human values. where the workgroup is the ingroup and the
In summary, past research on whistleblow- organization the superordinate group, and also
ing has tended to examine how personal attri- where the organization is the offending ingroup
butes such as level of education and status, and the profession (or other supraorganizational
cognitive processes such as psychological or categories) the superordinate group.
relationship closeness, and organizational
structure such as workgroup size and organi- Intragroup and vicarious intergroup power. As
zational position can influence whistleblowing. Alford (2001) notes, power is heavily implicated
In line with suggestions that group member- in the dynamics of whistleblowing. If people
ships and group processes are important (e.g., perceive themselves to have low intragroup
Miceli & Near, 1992; Near & Miceli, 1987), we power (e.g., because they have had their dis-
contend that a social identity analysis provides senting voice rebuffed in the past), they may look
a meaningful way of integrating and making to other sources of influence (Packer, 2008). They
sense of these various findings. Extant research would thus be more likely to whistleblow as an
provides reasonably consistent evidence for our alternative source of influence (Figure 2, Path 3).
hypothesis that whistleblowing will be more Existing literature suggests that whistleblowers
likely when loyalty and commitment—and tend to be people who feel responsible for
hence identification—are to a superordinate changing ingroup wrongdoing but who lack
group rather than to an offending ingroup. intragroup power to do so (e.g., Callahan &
Specifically, it appears that being strongly Dworkin, 1994; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Jackson
identified with a social identity whose values et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1992; Near & Miceli,
have been violated by an offending ingroup’s 1985, 1987). Moreover, because they lack the
wrongdoing generally increases the likelihood power or authority to change organizational
of whistleblowing, whereas being strongly behavior themselves, they must necessarily rely
identified with the wrongdoer(s) generally on other forms of power. This view is supported
reduces the likelihood of whistleblowing. by interviews with 11 nurses who had become
Nevertheless, future research is required to whistleblowers because they were unable to gain
test this core proposition of the model. We have support for their concerns within the organization
cited research showing that organizational (Jackson et al., 2010)—in other words because
commitment and professional identification are they lacked intragroup power. A survey of 8,500
associated with whistleblowing, although these employees revealed that whistleblowers who
findings have often been correlational. More used reporting channels external to the organi-
importantly, we have argued that they reflect a zation were less likely to be in supervisory
more general psychological principle—namely, positions (Miceli & Near, 1984). As argued
that identifying strongly with a superordinate elsewhere, those who blow the whistle outside an
Anvari et al. 55

organization (e.g., to the media) are likely to be However, working against this, the perceived
those who lack intraorganizational power, such as costs of whistleblowing, which, as noted earlier,
that which derives from holding supervisory we conceptually incorporate into perceptions of
responsibility (Callahan & Dworkin, 1994). We vicarious intergroup power, can reduce the
argue that people who perceive themselves to likelihood of people pursuing whistleblowing as
have adequate intragroup power to stop the a strategy. Fear of retaliation was cited as an
wrongdoing will use the path of intragroup dis- important reason against whistleblowing in both
sent identified by Packer (2008, 2011). an interview study with former whistleblowers
When they have low intragroup power, (De Graaf, 2010) and a survey of accountants
however, whistleblowing becomes a viable (Alleyne et al., 2013). Likewise, perceived per-
option for those who seek to change ingroup sonal costs have been found to be a negative
behavior, at least to the extent that it is per- predictor of whistleblowing intentions (Ayers &
ceived as likely to be effective (Miceli & Near, Kaplan, 2005; see also Cho & Song, 2015).
1984, 1992; Near & Miceli, 1987; Park & Conversely, a survey of employees found that
Blenkinsopp, 2009; Watts & Buckley, 2015; whistleblowing was more likely to be considered
Wortley, Cassematis, & Donkin, 2008). In other to the extent that respondents thought whistle-
words, an individual who perceives high blowers would be supported or protected from
vicarious intergroup power will be more likely retaliation (Wortley et al., 2008). Although some
to engage in whistleblowing (Figure 2, Path 4). literature suggests that people may become
Results from several studies are consistent with whistleblowers despite the potential costs and
retaliation for doing so (e.g., Brown et al., 2008;
this point. Public sector employees reported
Miceli & Near, 1985; Near & Miceli, 1987), we
being more likely to whistleblow when they
argue that the potential costs associated with
believed that the wrongdoing would be cor-
whistleblowing, and the likelihood of protection
rected (Wortley et al., 2008). Accounting
from them, should contribute to the overall
auditors had greater whistleblowing intentions
perceptions of vicarious intergroup power and,
when they trusted that their reporting would be
in turn, the likelihood of whistleblowing.
acted upon and investigated (Curtis & Taylor,
Importantly, the conceptual distinction between
2009; see also Taylor & Curtis, 2016). For perceptions of intragroup and vicarious intergroup
participants told about a lecturer who revealed power needs to be empirically tested. Scales to
exam questions to students prior to an exam, the measure the two constructs should be developed
perceived efficacy of whistleblowing was one and their psychometric properties and (convergent
of the strongest predictors of people’s willing- and discriminant) validities assessed. Hence,
ness to use this strategy (Jones, Spraakman, & although we have made a case for a more complex
Sanchez-Rodrı́guez, 2014). Other similar find- view of power in the context of ingroup wrong-
ings also speak to the importance of whistle- doing and presented past research that supports this
blowing efficacy among IT project managers view, empirical research specifically designed to
(Keil, Tiwana, Sainsbury, & Sneha, 2010), address this proposition is needed. Moreover,
employees of U.S. organizations (Kaptein, research would then need to be conducted to test
2011), Korean police officers (Park & Blen- whether intragroup and vicarious intergroup power
kinsopp, 2009), and internal auditors and distinctly predict intragroup dissent and whistle-
management accountants (Seifert, Sweeney, blowing, respectively (as the paths in Figure 2
Joireman, & Thornton, 2010). Unsurprisingly, suggest).
these studies all show that whistleblowing is
more likely to occur when it is perceived as Identity and power. Intragroup and vicarious
being likely to effect desired forms of change. intergroup power are likely to interact with
56 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

identity. Highly identified group members may a sense of loyalty) with the offending ingroup—
generally be reluctant to engage in whistle- that is, loyalty and/or the ingroup’s moral image
blowing because of the potential costs it may may trump superordinate values. In this case,
have for the group. However, when they per- whistleblowing would be most likely when there
ceive themselves to have low intragroup power, is strong identification with the superordinate
whistleblowing might present itself as another group and weak identification with the offending
(or the only) option to improve the moral ingroup. Conversely, being loyal or strongly
standing of a group perceived as having steered identified with the offending ingroup, members
away from its goals or values (Crane & Platow, should be protective of the group’s moral
2010; Near & Miceli, 1987). Conversely, strong image and less inclined to whistleblow, but
ingroup identification would decrease the like- this might be attenuated and members might
lihood of whistleblowing even more when still be willing to blow the whistle when they
intragroup power is perceived to be high (Figure are strongly identified with the superordinate
2, Path 5). In contrast, weak ingroup identifica- group whose values have been violated—so
tion would increase whistleblowing particularly that superordinate values trump ingroup loy-
for people with high vicarious intergroup power alty. In this case, whistleblowing would be
(Figure 2, Path 8). least likely when there is strong identification
Relatedly, intragroup and vicarious inter- with the offending ingroup and weak identi-
group power would respectively attenuate and fication with the superordinate group.
accentuate the effect of superordinate identifi- Given the novelty of the model we present,
cation on whistleblowing. With high intragroup we are not aware of any research testing the
power, dissent may be sufficient for change and various interaction effects between the power
thus superordinate identification will be less constructs and the identity factors proposed in
likely to lead to whistleblowing. And, once the preceding paragraphs. This provides ample
individuals are motivated to whistleblow, per- opportunity for future researchers to conduct
ceiving themselves to have vicarious intergroup empirical tests of the proposed social identity
power will further increase the likelihood of model of whistleblowing.
them doing so. Accordingly, group members
who identify strongly with a superordinate
social identity whose values have been violated Conclusion
will be more likely to resort to whistleblowing, The social identity model of whistleblowing
particularly when they perceive themselves to points to the importance of two fundamental
have low intragroup power (Figure 2, Path 6) issues: social identity and power. Regarding
and/or high intergroup power (Figure 2, Path 7). identity, the psychological definition of whis-
Strength of identification with the offending tleblowing implicates two groups: the group (or
ingroup and the superordinate social identity its members) who committed the wrongdoing,
may also interact. The specific pattern of the and the group represented by the agency to
interaction is likely to depend on whether loy- which the wrongdoing is reported. The whis-
alty to one’s ingroup or commitment to a tleblower is notionally a member of both, and
superordinate group’s values dominates. Spe- certainly both memberships have the capacity
cifically, being strongly identified with a to form part of their identity. The second point
superordinate social identity whose values are implied in the definition is that a whistleblower
perceived to have been violated is predicted to recruits an agent external to the offending
increase whistleblowing, but this effect is likely ingroup because of the agent’s position of
to be attenuated for those who are also strongly power to regulate, influence, or put pressure on
identified (or have relationship closeness and/or the ingroup. The act thus becomes an
Anvari et al. 57

instrument of vicarious power for the whistle- number of promotions (Rothschild & Miethe,
blower. In this way, the model hypothesizes 1999; Sims & Keenan, 1998). This inconsistency
that being identified strongly with, and loyal to, may speak to the conceptual distinction between
the offending ingroup should increase the intragroup and vicarious intergroup power. These
likelihood of intragroup dissent but reduce the power concepts refer to different groups in dif-
likelihood of whistleblowing. On the other ferent situations, corresponding to the expanding
hand, being strongly identified with the super- boundary of the offending ingroup and relevant
ordinate group whose values have been violated superordinate group. For example, if the offend-
will increase the likelihood of dissent and ing ingroup is the workgroup and the super-
whistleblowing. Furthermore, once motivated ordinate group the organization, it makes sense
by social identification to engage in whistle- that higher status/position employees would be
blowing, the likelihood of whistleblowing is able to recruit greater vicarious intergroup power
increased when intragroup power is perceived within the organization, because they would be
to be low and/or vicarious intergroup power more influential beyond the ingroup. They may
high. also have lower exit costs—with greater ability
On the basis of this theorizing we have argued than others to leave and join another group or
that identification with the superordinate social organization—and thus perceive there to be
identity whose values have been violated will greater safety in whistleblowing. Hence, although
motivate people to engage in whistleblowing they may perceive themselves to have higher
(and dissent) because of their commitment to intragroup power, increasing the likelihood of
upholding the group’s values. However, people dissent and decreasing whistleblowing, they
may also blow the whistle to signal their com- would simultaneously be more likely to blow the
mitment to group values and may thus be striving whistle because they also perceive themselves to
for acceptance into the group. Although there have higher vicarious intergroup power.
may be complexities regarding exactly how Furthermore, given that we are concerned
superordinate identification motivates people to with perceptions of power, it is not always the
whistleblow, our analysis is limited to the pro- case that people who would seem to have power
position that it is the commitment—existent and/ will be more or less likely to blow the whistle.
or to be demonstrated—to a superordinate iden- Indeed, a person may have structural power such
tity and its values which drives their actions. as that derived from high status, rank, or position
Future theoretical and empirical work can within an organization, and yet not perceive
examine the various ways that this may be themselves to have any real influence (Ander-
evidenced. son, John, & Keltner, 2012; Fast & Chen, 2009;
The conceptual distinction between intragroup Tost, 2015; see also Miceli, Near, Rehg, & van
and vicarious intergroup power can help make Scotter, 2012, discussing “situational leverage”).
sense of inconsistencies in the whistleblowing It is thus important to attend to individuals’
literature. For example, while some studies have perceptions, as structural or personal variables
found whistleblowers to be higher performers, that may be related to power are likely to predict
more educated, and to hold higher level positions dissent and whistleblowing only to the extent
and status within the organization than other that they impact perceptions of intragroup and
employees (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Mesmer- vicarious intergroup power.
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, Notwithstanding the fact that our analysis is
1988; Miceli et al., 1991), other research suggests largely derived from theorizing and research in
whistleblowers and silent observers may not be predominantly Western cultures and should
distinguishable with respect to education levels, therefore be applied cautiously in other con-
organizational position, or performance such as texts, our model makes three distinct but
58 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

interrelated novel contributions to theory. First, There are also contextual factors that will
it addresses the failure of existing organiza- affect whistleblowing motivations. For exam-
tional theory to fully explain how group mem- ple, the motivation to act against a transgression
berships and associated social identities are may arise because the offending ingroup’s
implicated in whistleblowing behavior. Second, behavior directly victimizes the ingroup mem-
we extend psychological theory by remedying ber or another person or group with whom the
the social identity literature’s neglect of whis- ingroup member identifies (see also Curtis &
tleblowing as a distinct option for people faced Taylor, 2009). Indeed, in one study, personal
with ingroup wrongdoing. In this way, third, the victimization was one of the strongest pre-
model advances theorizing and research on dictors of whistleblowing (Cassematis &
whistleblowing by taking it beyond a consid- Wortley, 2013; see also De Graaf, 2010; Miceli
eration of structural antecedents to & Near, 1985, 2005). As another example, the
also consider its social psychological under- severity of the observed wrongdoing can impact
pinnings. Yet while the social identity model of whistleblowing motivations (Cassematis &
whistleblowing integrates many existing find- Wortley, 2013; Dungan, Waytz, & Young,
ings in the literature, it is clearly the case that 2015). How harmful or wrong (i.e., how seri-
further research is needed to test its specific ous) a wrongdoing is perceived to be may be
propositions directly. Our hope here is that the influenced by one’s personal values but also by
model will excite research interest in this shared values (see also Cassematis & Wortley,
important phenomenon and provide a testable 2013). In other words, one’s social identity can
framework for future examination. influence the perception of the seriousness of a
wrongdoing such that the more strongly the
individual identifies with the superordinate
Other contextual and
group whose values have been violated, the more
individual-level factors serious they will perceive that wrongdoing to be.
As briefly discussed earlier in this paper, other Furthermore, the perceived severity of wrong-
(individual-level) factors are also likely to play doing is also likely to play a moderating role. For
an important role in the motivation to whistle- example, identifying strongly with the super-
blow. These may include beliefs or theories ordinate group whose values have been violated
about one’s personal identity (e.g., Proost et al., will motivate people to whistleblow, but this
2013). For example, moral foundations of loy- motivation is likely to be stronger the more
alty and/or authority (e.g., moral foundations serious the wrongdoing is (e.g., the more it is
theory; Graham et al., 2013) are likely to work perceived to deviate from superordinate group
against any motivation for whistleblowing or values). These are yet further matters for future
dissent. In the same way, personality factors may research to pursue.
impact the motivation for whistleblowing. For We are unaware of research comparing the
example, extraversion has been found to be relative importance of social identities com-
positively correlated with whistleblowing (Bjør- pared to other contextual and individual-level
kelo, Einarsen, & Matthiesen, 2010). Such per- factors for people’s motivation to engage in
sonality factors, in addition to playing a direct whistleblowing. Although personal victimiza-
motivating role, may moderate the expression of tion was found to be one of the strongest pre-
social identity factors. For example, because dictors of whistleblowing (e.g., Cassematis &
extraverts tend to be more persuasive (D. Watson Wortley, 2013), it is possible that such con-
& Clark, 1997) they may be more likely to per- textual factors may interact with the group-
ceive themselves to have intragroup and vicar- level factors of social identity. For example, it
ious intergroup power. is plausible that being personally victimized
Anvari et al. 59

will motivate people to whistleblow but that Therefore, in addition to making their core
they would be more likely to do so when they values explicit and clear, institutions should
also identify strongly with the superordinate shape policy and practice to increase and
social identity. Moreover, future research may maintain their members’ shared superordinate
consider examining the relative importance of social identity. One approach that may prove
the group-level factors we have identified, such helpful in this regard is the ASPIRe (actualizing
as social identities and perceptions of intragroup social and personal identity resources) model
and vicarious intergroup power, compared to (see Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003). This
individual-level factors such as personality or seeks to build superordinate identification in a
contextual factors such as personal victimiza- four-phase process that starts by identifying
tion. However, we believe it may be more individual employees’ important social iden-
fruitful to consider how the individual-level tities and concludes by developing shared goals
factors may interact with the group-level fac- and values that provide a framework for orga-
tors that are likely to be so prevalent and salient nizational activity (e.g., Peters, Haslam, Ryan,
in organizational contexts. & Fonseca, 2013). In this way, a sense of shared
superordinate social identity is arrived at
through participative processes that increase the
Practical implications likelihood that employees share common val-
Although the morality of whistleblowing and ues and speak out when they are violated.
judgments about its side effects are likely to Further, organizations and regulatory insti-
vary, organizations may nevertheless want tutions may be interested in ensuring that their
whistleblowers to come forward with reports members feel empowered to draw attention to
about wrongdoing that violate organizational any wrongs they perceive within their group, so
values. To this end, the model we have outlined that moral failings can be addressed as much as
has implications for practice and policy in possible in-house, limiting negative public
applied settings. Any social group, organiza- image fallout. Regulatory superordinate bodies
tion, or institution that desires its members to need to be aware that their policies and actions
speak out against behaviors that violate insti- are a source of vicarious power, particularly for
tutional values would be well advised to con- those who lack power within their groups. It is
sider the different loyalties that may inspire or vital for the encouragement of whistleblowing
inhibit an observer to act in this way. An that individuals believe doing so is safe and
observer’s most proximal loyalty is likely to effective; that they are listened to, respected,
arise from their relational closeness and/or and protected from negative repercussions; and
social identification with the offender(s). While that their concerns are responded to swiftly and
this may inhibit whistleblowing, it may pro- decisively.
mote intragroup dissent if group members feel Importantly too, the dynamic nature of per-
responsible for the offence or if the group has ceived power (and social identification) sug-
acted against its own values. However, when a gests that organizations should take regular
superordinate institution’s values are violated, stock of their employees’ perceptions in this
an individual’s sense of loyalty to that super- regard. For insofar as motivations for whistle-
ordinate social identity may inspire them to blowing derive from social identities and per-
engage in dissent and/or whistleblowing. These ceived violations of their norms, it is critical to
observations have one common critical impli- know both what those identities and norms are,
cation for policymakers that speaks to the need and when they are being violated. Clearly, this
to encourage social identification, and hence will often be difficult information both to obtain
loyalty, to superordinate values. and to action, but as many celebrated cases of
60 Organizational Psychology Review 9(1)

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The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following predictor of commitment to political action. Eur-
financial support for the research, authorship, and/ opean Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 19–32.
or publication of this article: Work on this paper was doi:10.1002/ejsp.334
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Farid Anvari is a PhD graduate from Flinders
Van Dick, R., & Haslam, S. A. (2012). Stress and
University and a former endeavour postdoctoral
well-being in the workplace. In J. Jetten, C.
Haslam, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social cure:
fellow. Currently, he is a postdoctoral
Identity, health, and well-being (pp. 175–194). researcher at the University of Southern Den-
New York, NY: Psychology Press. mark, working in the Strategic Organization
Van Knippenberg, D., & van Schie, E. (2000). Foci Design Unit (SOD) in the Institute of Marketing
and correlates of organizational identification. and Management. His research has focused on
Journal of Occupational and Organizational the psychology of dissent and whistleblowing
Psychology, 73, 137–147. doi:10.1348/ from a social identity framework, and he inves-
096317900166949 tigates how people perceive dissent within a
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1997). Extraversion and collective. In particular, he researches how psy-
its positive emotional core. In R. Hogan, J. John- chology’s replicability crisis affects people’s
son, & S. R. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of person-
trust in psychological research and people’s per-
ality psychology (pp. 767–793). San Diego, CA:
ceptions of replication failures. He also has an
Academic Press.
interest in metascientific research projects and is
Watson, T. (2013, July 31). “Traitor or hero?” Ask-
ing the wrong questions about Manning and working on how researchers can determine the
Snowden. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.for smallest effect size of interest for their research
bes.com/sites/tomwatson/2013/07/31/traitor-or- projects to also help in effect size interpretation.
hero-asking-the-wrong-questions-about-man At the SOD, his research focuses on learning in
ning-and-snowden/ dynamic environments and he investigates judg-
Watts, L. L., & Buckley, M. R. (2015). A dual- ment and decision making in situations of com-
processing model of moral whistleblowing in petition and under hierarchical structures.
organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 146,
1–15. doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2913-9
Michael Wenzel is professor of Psychology at
Waytz, A., Dungan, J., & Young, L. (2013). The
Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. His
whistleblower’s dilemma and the fairness–loyalty
tradeoff. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
research focuses on justice and morality in both
ogy, 49(6), 1027–1033. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013. interpersonal and intergroup contexts, includ-
07.002 ing the implications of wrongdoing and victi-
Wenzel, M., Waldzus, S., & Steffens, M. C. (2017). mization from victim, offender, and third-party
Ingroup projection as a challenge of diversity: perspectives, with a focus on processes of jus-
Consensus about and complexity of superordinate tice restoration and moral repair. He has
Anvari et al. 67

published over 80 chapters and articles in jour- and health contexts. Together with over 200
nals such as Personality and Social Psychology coauthors around the world, Alex has written
Bulletin, Journal of Experimental Social Psy- and edited 12 books and published over 240
chology, Social Psychology and Personality peer-reviewed articles on these topics. He is
Science, Business Ethics Quarterly, and the best known for work with Steve Reicher on the
Journal of Applied Psychology. He has been BBC Prison Study, and for work with Michelle
President of the International Society for Jus- Ryan which examines the “glass cliff” that is
tice Research and is Fellow of the Society for often faced by female leaders. Alex is a former
Personality and Social Psychology. Chief Editor of the European Journal of Social
Psychology and currently Associate Editor of
Lydia Woodyatt researches at the intersection The Leadership Quarterly. In 2005 he won the
of social, organizational, and clinical psychol- European Association of Social Psychology’s
ogy. She is an early career researcher that Kurt Lewin Medal for outstanding scientific
applies the psychology of justice to understand- contribution; in 2013 he won the International
ing how people respond to and work through Leadership Association’s Outstanding Leader-
transgressions. She is the editor of The Hand- ship Book Award for The New Psychology of
book of the Psychology of Self-Forgiveness Leadership (with Steve Reicher and Michael
(Springer International, 2017). Lydia is an Platow); in 2016 he won the British Psychology
award-winning lecturer in Psychology at Flin- Society Presidents’ Award for distinguished
ders University in South Australia, and speaks contributions to psychological knowledge; in
regularly to organizations on emotions and 2017 he won the International Society for Polit-
motivation, and responses to transgressions at ical Psychology’s Sanford Prize for distin-
the individual and collective levels. guished contributions to political psychology,
and the Australian Psychological Society’s
S. Alexander Haslam is professor of Psychol- Workplace Excellence Award for Leadership
ogy and Australian laureate fellow at the Uni- Development (with Nik Steffens and Kim
versity of Queensland. His widely cited Peters); in 2018 he won the Australian Psycho-
research focuses on the study of leadership, logical Society’s Award for Distinguished Con-
group, and identity processes in organizational tribution to Psychological Science.