AN APPRAISAL OF MUGABEISM IN ZIMBABWE’S

FOREIGN POLICY: ZIMBABWE’S RELATIONS WITH

THE WESTERN BLOC (2000-2017)

BY

CHRISTOPHER P MURASI

(R144173K)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

FEBRUARY 2019
 DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to Robert Gabriel Mugabe, whose legacy will be left to history for
absolution.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my sincerest form of gratitude to all the people and organisations
who in their cooperation, have enabled me to compile and consolidate this
comprehensive study. Special thanks goes to my lecturers, Dr Lawrence Mhandara, Mr
Ashton Murwira, Mrs Eve Mazando and all the members of staff at the University of
Zimbabwe especially the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. My
gratitude also extends to my supervisor Professor Hasu Patel for his patience, Professor
Rungano Zvogbo for his mentorship and support and lastly the almighty God for his
guidance during this academic journey
 ABSTRACT

This study is an appraisal of Mugabeism in the context of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy

towards the West from 2000 up to 2017. It should be acknowledged that Mugabe as the
head of government was the chief formulator and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy. It can be noted that post-independence Zimbabwe enjoyed cordial relations with
the West, receiving budget supplements and development partnerships. The souring of
relations with the West only occurred towards the end of the 20 th century when in 1997
Tony Blair’s Labour Party took over the reins of government from John Major. Britain’s
refusal to honour its commitments stipulated in the Lancaster House Agreements with
regards to funding land expropriation led to the Third Chimurenga and the Fast Track
Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). That coupled by the problematic parliamentary
elections in 2000 and the controversial presidential poll of 2002 led to Zimbabwe’s
ostracization and sanctions by the US, UK, EU and other Western Powers. In 2002
Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth and subsequently withdrew from
the association in 2003, shifting its diplomatic efforts to the East. This study analyses
Mugabeism in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy and ascertains the logic behind Zimbabwe’s
foreign policy towards the West.
 ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank

AIPPA Access to Information Public Protection Act

AU African Union

BSAC British South Africa Company

CFU Commercial Farmers Union

CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

DFID Department of International Development

EU European Union

FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Programme

IMF International Monetary Fund

LP Labour Party

LRRP2 Land Reform and Resettlement Programme 2

MDC Movement for Democratic Change

NAM Non Aligned Movement

POSA Public Order and Security Act

RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

RF Rhodesian Front

SADC Southern African Development Committee

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNSC United Nations Security Council

WB World Bank

ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZIDERA Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery
Act

ZIDERA (2018) Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery

Amendment Act of 2018

 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

On the 21st of November 2017, the world saw the end of the reign of one of the most
controversial African Heads of State, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. An unapologetic anti-
imperialist who would not leave the podium without making damning anti West
rhetoric, he had been at the helm of Zimbabwean politics for close to four decades. The
events that culminated in his resignation on the 21 st of November 2017 were followed
by many of the global community in shock and in awe. Having been Zimbabwe’s main
domineering political figure, it would be necessary to take stock of the legacy left by the
former Head of State in positioning Zimbabwe in the global arena. Chan and Patel
(2006: 176-177) allude to the notion of ‘the centralisation of Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy’ and Mugabe’s role as ‘the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy’. This can be attributed to his experience as a nationalist and his ideology as a
pan Africanist. Being an intellectual he had a keen interest in foreign policy. Under
Mugabe’s administration, Zimbabwe has religiously guarded its sovereignty taking into
account apartheid South Africa’s destabilization policy (ibid. 177) ,the souring of its
relations with the West in the wake of the 21st century due to the FTLRP and the
strengthening of ties with the East through the Look East Policy especially China.

Mugabe has been at the pinnacle of Zimbabwe’ political discourse for almost four
decades. From guerrilla leader to President he has been seen as a prominent figure in
Zimbabwe’ political history. Scholars such as Ndlovhu-Gatsheni (2009: 1139) have
coined the term ‘Mugabeism’, describing the ideology predicating his 37 year reign of
the land locked Southern African republic. It is beyond reasonable doubt that Mugabe
had a firm hand on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Patel (1987: 8) alludes to this notion
quoting Mangwende (who was Zimbabwe’s Foreign Affairs during Zimbabwe’s first
decade of Independence) who affirms Mugabe’s monopoly over Zimbabwe’s
interaction with the international system on the 2nd of November 1981 at a reception of
trainee diplomats,

All Zimbabwean Diplomats must understand that the Prime Minister

(being Mugabe) defines foreign policy; the Minister of Foreign
Affairs articulates that policy and under the Minister’s direction, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements it.
From the above statement the logical conclusion would be that of the supremacy
enjoyed by the Head of State when it comes to the foreign policy making process. Patel
further makes an observation of Mugabe’s keen interest in foreign and global issues,
him being an intellectual and hence explaining what would appear to be a deliberate and
conscious decision to engage in an active or visible rather than a passive or reactive
foreign policy.In Chan and Patel (ibid. 176) the paradox of the attachment to and the
practice of democracy especially in line to the centralization of power in Foreign Policy
making is acknowledged. Mugabe’s personality, his views, ideas and experience as an
African Nationalist and a co-leader of the armed struggle for independence held salience
and still predicate aspects of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives, principles and
determinants.

Chigora and Dewa (2009: 92) accentuate the souring of Zimbabwe-West Relations at
the turn of the 21st century. These relations being predicated largely by Zimbabwe’s
heated debate with Britain over the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), the
enactment of the Zimbabwe Economic Recovery and Democracy Act (ZIDERA) OF
2001, the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 2002 and its subsequent
withdrawal in 2003, the imposition of targeted sanctions by the European Union (EU)
and the Look East Policy. This study critically interrogates and analyses how the
phenomenon of Mugabeism (the man and the ideology) has influenced the foreign
policy of Zimbabwe towards the West.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After his resignation from the presidency on the 21st of November 2017, questions have
arisen with regards to Mugabe’s legacy in the sphere of governance and politics.
Particular attention to foreign policy which is the preoccupation of this study, is one of
the key indicators of any Head of State’s legacy, especially in the case of Mugabe due
to his acute and vociferous interest in global affairs and foreign policy. One must
ascertain whether Mugabe in his capacity as the Head of State of the Republic of
Zimbabwe was pursuing Zimbabwe’s best interests in the international milieu, given the
ostracization of the nation state by the West.

In his speech at the World Earth Summit held in Johannesburg from the 26th of August
to the 6th of September 2002, Mugabe articulated lividly and virulently his disdain for
neo-liberalism whilst accusing the West of manipulative and intimidatory attempts of
promoting their hegemonic interests and ambitions at the expense of the Third World
(2002: 6),

For these reasons, we join our brothers and sisters in the Third World
in rejecting completely, manipulative and intimidatory attempts by
some countries and regional blocks that are bent on subordinating our
sovereignty to their hegemonic ambitions and imperial interests,
falsely presented as matters of rule of law, democracy and good
governance.
This study interrogates the correlation between Mugabeism and Zimbabwe’s
international relations with the West. Many scholars of foreign policy are in agreement
with regards to using the leader as a unit of analysis for foreign policy due to his or her
autonomy over a state’s diplomatic relations. Breuning (2007: 27-28) notes that some
scholars accept the notion of leaders “shaping the course of world politics” whilst others
are of the view that to a certain extent, leaders are subject to their historical and
environmental circumstances.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study is mainly concerned with assessing how Mugabeism influenced Zimbabwe’s
foreign policy formulation, articulation and implementation in the 21st century towards
the West, looking at nation states like the United Kingdom and the United States of
America and Regional blocs such as the EU and organisations such as the
Commonwealth. The set objectives of the study includes;

• Using Snyder’s Actor Specific Theory cited in Hudson (2005: 5-6) to

analyse a leader’s role in the formulation, articulation and implementation of
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy with regards to the West.
• To determine the syllogism behind Mugabeism within the framework of
foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe’s relations with the Western Bloc.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study will seek to ask the following questions which will guide the researcher
throughout the course of this research;

• With regards to the Actor Specific Theory cited in Hudson (ibid. 6) how
significant was Mugabe’s experiences, sentiments beliefs and ideas in the
formulation, articulation and implementation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy
towards the West?
• What were the characteristics of Mugabeism in the realm of foreign policy
paying particular attention to 21st century Zimbabwe-West Relations and the
syllogism behind it?

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The importance of this study stems from acknowledging that after Mugabe’s departure
from the presidency, a need arose as to ascertain aspects of his political life and his
relationship with state institutions. It is an irrefutable fact that Mugabe left a mark on
Zimbabwe’s politics both domestic and international hence a legacy be it positive or
negative subject to interpretation. One cannot talk of Zimbabwean politics without the
mention of Mugabe’s reign as some scholars are of the notion that it gave Zimbabwe a
certain identity which distinguishes it from other small states. As foreign policy is
considered to be a means through which a state interacts with other states in the
international system, there is need to assess whether Mugabe, as Head of State and chief
articulator of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was acting in the best interests of the state. As
Mylonus and Kuo (2017: 6) posit, policy elites have the prerogative to construct
coherent national identities for their states which then manifest in their foreign policies.
In the case of Mugabe, as he was the ultimate policy maker, he had unquestionable
autonomy over foreign policy as acknowledged by Chan and Patel. The strained
relations between the West and Zimbabwe under Mugabe need scrutiny as the New
Dispensation under President Mnangagwa since assuming the presidency on the 21 st of
November 2017 has been preoccupied with a foreign policy thrust of re-engagement
with states considered to be hostile towards Zimbabwe and engagement with friendly
states. The study is key to interrogating whether leaders pursue the national interests of
their countries or rather construe their self-interests of power and self-preservation as
national interests. The study is vital in answering the following questions. Was
Mugabe’s foreign policy thrust with regards to the West based on a concrete premise or
rather it was a disingenuous attempt to counter critics and riddled in falsehoods? More
importantly what can future policy elites learn in fashioning the state’s diplomatic
trajectory?

1.6 METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes the qualitative social science paradigm. It is important to note that
what is considered to be of paramount importance in a qualitative research is ‘the
interpretation and observations in understanding social phenomena’ (Snape and
Spencer, 2007: 7). Therefore, this research uses qualitative data collection methods
comprising of mainly documentary search and key informant interviews.

1.6.1 Research Design

a) Documentary Search

This researcher made use of documentary search of published books, journal articles,
internet sources, Commonwealth documents, newspaper articles among others. The
researcher accessed material/data from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) library,
Zimbabwe Parliament Library, documents from the Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, audio visual material, Mugabe’s speeches and
statements to the media and his subsequent actions as head of state there forth.

b) In-depth Interviews

An in-depth interview is defined as a one on one method of data collection that involves
an interviewer and interviewee discussing specific topics in detail (Hennick et al 2015:
109). In-depth interviews may be described as conversation with a purpose (Ibid. 109).
Therefore, Biber and Leavy (2006: 128) describe in-depth interviews as ‘a meaning
making partnership between interviewers and their respondents which indicates that in-
depth interviews are a special kind of knowledge producing conversation’. The
researcher intended to conduct in-depth interviews with key informants such as
Officials in the Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
members of the academia, former Zimbabwean diplomats and to interview Robert
Mugabe himself. However due to the schedules and statuses of key participants, the
researcher had to rely mostly on documentary search.
1.6 LIMITATIONS

Every study has limitations and constraints hence it is important to note challenges that
hinder the study. One obstacle is that of accessing key informants who are qualified to
provide the necessary information for the study including Mugabe himself due to their
schedules and political statuses. Moreover subjectivity by participants in their pursuit to
convey their understanding or defending their positions may have compromised quality
of the study. Also, due to the sensitivity of certain issues and information the researcher
may be potentially restricted to access material that would make the study more
comprehensive.

1.7 DELIMITATIONS

The study focuses mainly on Zimbabwe’s relations with the Western Bloc and
institutions affiliated to them from the year 2000 up to the year 2017 when Mugabe’s
presidency ended.
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with presenting contributions by scholars of international

relations and foreign policy analysis. It is also concerned with giving a historical context
of the foreign policy of Zimbabwe in relation to the West and the human factor
associated in the foreign policy decision making process in the person of Mugabe and
what influenced his perception of the global environment.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 Constructivism

Constructivism is a distinctive approach to the international relations discourse that

emphasizes the social intersubjective dimension of global politics. Constructivism
insists that global politics cannot be minimalised to logical action and interface within
quantifiable constraints or within institutional boundaries at the international and
national levels. Griffitths et al (2002: 51) note that constructivism presents a model of
international interaction that explores the normative edifices and the relationship
between normative alterations and state identity and interests. Hobson (2003: 146) is of
the view that states do not know their interests theoretically and more importantly,
constructivism asserts that identities of states are constructed through norms which in
turn defines a state’s particular interests. As norms reconstruct so do interests and
identities ultimately leading to change in state policy. As norms inform identities and
interests, they guide actors (states) along certain channels of appropriate behaviour.
Hobson (ibid. 146) notes three approaches to constructivism

1. International Society Centric Constructivism: Low Domestic Agential power of

the state and high international agential state power;
 2. Radical Constructivism: Low Domestic agential state power and moderate
international agential state power;
3. State Centric Constructivism: low /moderate domestic agential power of the
state and moderate/ high agential state power.

2.2.2 International Society Centric Constructivism

One of this strand of constructivism’s major proponents is Finnmore cited in Hobson

(ibid. 149) who propounds that state interests and identities are defined by the normative
structure of the international society. Thus it would be true to say that Finnmore
prioritized structure over agency. This approach to constructivism contends that states
are normative adaptive entities who are not socialized by material structures but by the
socializing principle of the international normative structure. States have come to adapt
their policies and domestic structures so as to conform to the international norms that
prescribe civilized state behaviour.

2.2.3 Radical Constructivism

Radical constructivism begins by the deconstruction of the state. Radical constructivists

are of the view that concepts such as sovereignty, state boundaries, state legitimacy and
the political community are but social constructs. Hence, what is required is their
analytical differentiation. Radical constructivism is concerned with what is termed
normative statecraft, a process by which states create an imaginary domestic political
community which is harmonious and united. Hobson (ibid. 156) alludes to Webber who
expounds on what is referred to as ‘the logic of representation’. This involves the
creation of arbitrary distinctions between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’. The former
being the realm of peace and other whereas in the case of the latter it is a realm of
violence and necessity. States create the appearance of the threatening other against
which the ‘self’ is defined negatively. However states in correspondence to this have to
create internal boundaries to repress those who do not conform to the self. These
delinquent groups become the internal others. The notion radical constructivism posits
is that in the process of constructing a coherent and consistent states create a world of
‘others ‘which seems threatening and accordingly make a state’s military preparation
appear as a natural imperative of foreign policy. Thus the depiction of the international
realm as that of violence and necessity is an emanation of the internal process of state
identity construction which is undertaken through normative statecraft.
2.2.4 State Centric Constructivism

State centric constructivism is concerned with the importance of the national domestic
rather than the international sphere Katzenstein, cited in Hobson (ibid. 165) examines
the impact of a state’s domestic agential power upon norms as well as the impact of
norms upon the state. This approach conceptualizes a domestic normative structure
which generates a state’s identity at any given point in time. Three normative structures
are of paramount importance in Katzenstein’s approach in informing state policy
choices. These are economic security norms, military security norms and internal
security norms. Where norms are uncontested, state policy becomes flexible and the
state’s domestic and international agential power is enhanced. However where the
norms are contested state policy becomes rigid, diminishing domestic and international
agential power.

2.2.5 Realism

Griffiths (2007: 11) describes realism as the most dominant world view in the study of
international relations. Despite its variants, realism has remained consistent in the way it
characterises state relations and behaviour in the international environment. State
behaviour is driven by leader’s blemished human nature or by the pre-emptive
egregiousness required by a chaotic international system. Egocentric human appetites
for power or the need to accrue means to be secure in a self-help world explicate the
interminable succession of wars of conquest. Griffiths et al (ibid. 268) acknowledge
Carr and Morgenthau as pertinent figures in the development of realism being amongst
the first scholars to utilise the term realism and elaborating on its core assumptions
whilst juxtaposing it with the idealistic study of international relations prevailing during
the interwar period. Their claim is that there is no natural harmony of interests among
states and that it would be ludicrous and detrimental to hope that the struggle for power
among states can be tamed by international law, democratization and international
commerce (Kantian Liberalism). Griffiths (ibid. 12) recognises two variants of realism
and also elaborates on four manifestations of contemporary realism in the 21st century.
The former being classical and neorealism whereas the latter being rise and fall realism,
neo-classical realism, defensive structural and offensive structural realism. Though the
study acknowledges the variants and strands of realism, much attention will be given to
neoclassical realism which is much more pertinent to the study.
2.2.6 Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism asserts that states act in large part due to domestically derived
preferences. Scheweller cited in Griffiths, (ibid. 16) insists that state characteristics and
how state leaders perceive power help in understanding state behaviour. Schweller
asserts that States evaluate and adapt to changes in their external milieu partly as a
consequence of their unique domestic structures and political situations. More
specifically, complex domestic political processes act as conduits that channel, mediate,
and (re)direct policy outputs in responding to external forces (primarily changes in
relative power). Hence states often respond differently to similar systemic pressures and
opportunities, and their reactions may be less motivated by systemic level factors than
internal ones.

This goes to show the role of peculiar structural domestic political realities and how
they contribute to the understanding of state behaviour as it manifests in foreign policy.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.3.1 Foreign Policy

Jain (2018: 1) defines foreign policy as the policy states take in respect to operating at
the global stage with other states. For Jain, foreign policy should not be differentiated
from national policy but rather it should be seen as part of national policy or a
continuation of it. It consists of national interest that are to be furthered in relation to
other states. Jain makes reference to Northedge’s conception of foreign policy, that is,
‘the use of political influence in order to induce other state’s law making powers in a
manner favourable to the state in question’s inclinations or interests.’

Hudson (2005: 2) notes the explicandum of foreign policy analysis includes the process
and resultants of human decision making with reference to having known consequences
for foreign entities. Typically, the horizon of interest is focused on decision making
made by those with the authority to commit resources. Often one may assess a
decision/indecision or a pattern of decisions made with regards to particular
circumstances. In other aspects it is the process of decision making that is the focus of
study, including problem recognition, perception framing, and prioritization of goals,
option assessment and so forth. Hudson (ibid. 3) asserts that the most important
contribution of foreign policy analysis to international relations theory is the nexus
between the principal factors of state behaviour: substantial and normative factors. The
nexus is not the state but rather the human decision makers.

2.3.2 The Poliheurstic Decision Model

Mintz and DeRouen (2010: 60-79) note the centrality of decision maker/s in the foreign
policy decision making process. Of the decision models related to foreign policy
decision making, the one which can be considered relevant to the study is the
Poliheurstic Decision Making Model. The Poliheurstic Theory is a bridge between
rational and cognitive perspectives. According to Mintz and DeRouen (ibid. 78) the
Poliheurstic Theory stipulates that,

1. Foreign Policy Decisions are often made in a hyperbolic environment;

leaders typically focus on a narrow set of policy alternatives and decision
making dimensions whilst making decisions.
2. In making decisions leaders use a two stage decision process
3. Although international factors are important, domestic political realities are
quintessential to decision making
4. Decision making in foreign affairs involves multiple heuristics and is non
compensatory with respect to key dimension(s) and involves framing and
counter framing efforts
5. Most foreign policy decisions are taken in an interactive (strategic) setting.
Many foreign policy decisions are interactive and sequential.

The Poliheurstic Decision Model (ibid. 79) postulates that when making decisions
policy makers employ a two stage decision calculus consisting of:

1. Rejecting policies that are intolerable to the policy maker on a critical

dimension or dimensions
2. Selecting an alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives whilst
maximising benefits and minimising costs

The Poliheurstic Model is relevant to decisions by regimes considered to be non-

democratic or autocratic. Policy elites are concerned with threats to regime survival,
political power and legitimacy and therefore also adopt the ‘avoid major loss’ non
compensatory principle. This theory is concomitant to single party autocracies,
personality autocracies and military autocracies. Single party systems eliminate
alternatives that do not coincide with party interests and preferences. The same can be
said for personality autocracies which forgo the alternatives that may not satisfy the
leader’s need to maintain his/her political status.

2.3.3 The Leader or Policy Elite/s as Units of Analysis

Utilising the leader as a unit of analysis in foreign policy decision making is an

appropriate approach in understanding foreign policy as he or she is the major actor in
the process. Hudson (ibid. 10) notes the pertinence of individual traits and
characteristics of a foreign policy decision maker in the foreign policy decision making
process. She asserts the centrality of personality traits that predicate the leader in
comprehending foreign policy choices. Mylonas and Kuo (ibid. 6) also contend with
that view indicating that policy elites, especially individual decision makers are
responsible for constructing coherent national identities so as realise important strategic
goals or objectives of aristocratic or intellectual elites. Chan and Patel (ibid. 6) augment
this assertion making reference to Mugabe noting how “the centralization of
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy” was linked to him. His “ideas, views, personality and
experience as an African nationalist and a co-leader in the liberation struggle” that
brought about the birth of Zimbabwe. His identity as an intellectual with a keen interest
in global affairs is also a factor that is of prime relevance.

2.4 ZIMBABWE’S FOREIGN POLICY

2.4.1The Historical Context of Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy

There exists a relationship between the mode that was used to acquire independence
which is the armed struggle for liberation and Zimbabwe’s values, beliefs, domestic
policy and foreign policy. The Preamble of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment
(No. 20) (2013: 15) acknowledges the importance of the Chimurenga/Umvukela with
section 3 (1) noting the recognition of the Liberation Struggle as one of the founding
values and principles. Mugabe and other major stakeholders in the Foreign Policy of
Zimbabwe were leaders in the struggle for independence especially Mugabe, being one
of the last surviving founding nationalists. Thomas (2003: 692-694) notes that the
Berlin Conference of 1884 was the foundation of Europe’s colonial exploits. This
because it divided Africa in what were called ‘spheres of influence’ at the time for the
European states. As part of this endeavour the British in 1888 announced the existence
of a British Sphere of Interest between Botswana and the Zambezi Valley. The Ndebele
Monarch Lobengula, through the collusion of his entrusted advisor Lotshe and Cecil
John Rhode’s emissaries Rudd, Maguire and Thompson, was deceived into signing the
Rudd Concession which inadvertently gave Rhodes the authority to occupy
Mashonaland. Subsequently his company, the British South Africa Company (BSAC),
was given a Royal Charter by her Majesty Queen Victoria’s Government which
delegated governmental powers to the company. The area of present day Zimbabwe and
Zambia was ceded to the company and named Rhodesia. What followed were
subsequent clashes with the white settlers in the form of the Anglo Ndebele War (1893-
4) and the first Chimurenga/ Umvukela (1896-7).

2.4.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Program and Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy

The notion that Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is inextricably related to the means by which
it gained independence is based on a logical premise. Hence, its behaviour in the
international environment should be understood as a continuation of the revolution of
independence. Its domestic environment, political culture and the perceptions of major
political stakeholders have largely influenced its foreign relations, in particular the Land
question which has been a major element in the demonization discourses between
Mugabe and the West.

Thomas (ibid. 693) notes that during colonization the white settlers helped themselves
to the best, productive and arable land whilst displacing the indigenous inhabitants in
the process. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 allocated fixed reserves which were
poor, remote and inadequate for the natives. This resulted in a racially disproportionate
unequitable land distribution exercise that marginalized the majority whilst
aggrandizing the white minority’s commercial interests. This being one of the major
reasons of the second Chimurenga/Umvukela

The Lancaster House Conference of 1979 laid down the British terms of the legal
independence of Rhodesia now Zimbabwe. The most significant of these terms was that
all white farmers had the right to keep their land for 10 years (ibid. 694).The British
would only make funds available to purchase land from white farmers willingly ceded
for sale hence the clause ‘willing buyer, willing seller’. Only underutilised land could be
compulsorily purchased and that at the full market price which the land owners would
convert to foreign currency. In return the UK agreed to sponsor the cost of a
resettlement scheme for African farmers.

After the Lancaster House Agreement expired in 1990, the government amended its
Constitution in order to enable compulsory acquisition with little compensation and
limited right of appeal to the courts. What followed was the Land Acquisition Act of to
facilitate the purchase of the farms. Mugabe stated that half of the remaining
commercial would be purchased for resettlement. However donor pressure ensured that
the Lancaster conditionality persisted and with the escalation of land prices this meant
that very little land redistribution occurred. In 1997 the government chose to act by
beginning phase 2 of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP2) based on
compulsory acquisition with compensation for improvements only. The criteria to be
used for land acquisition was the one stipulated in the 1990 Land Policy Statement
which included farmers with more than one farm, absentee farmers, derelict or
underutilised farms and those that bordered communal areas. To address the issue of
compensation, at the 1997Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
Mugabe urged Britain to compensate white farmers of the land they were about to lose.

Zimbabwe’s land question and the crisis that ensued can be best explained by the
actions of the British government in relation to the funding process of the land reform.
A letter from the Department of International Development (DFID) by Claire Short
enunciated the British government’s refusal under Tony Blair to fund the programme,
hence Britain reneging on its responsibility as espoused in the Lancaster House
Agreement. Chigora and Dewa (ibid. 94) note that this is the background of the problem
especially in relation to the Zimbabwean government’s efforts to resolve issues based
on past agreements.

The rate of land transfer was painfully slow under the LRRP2 programme resulting in
15 major land invasions in 1997 and 1998 (Moyo et al: 2000). Occupations by war
veterans started at a miniscule scale in 1999 but reduced after assurances from the
government that the process of land redistribution would be expedited. In February
2000, a draft Constitution which included the compulsory acquisition clause was
rejected in a referendum marking ZANU PF and Mugabe’s first major defeat since
Independence. The referendum defeat and the subsequent withdrawal of contested farms
made the war veterans livid. However what catalysed the FTLRP was the mere fact that
between 1998 and 2000 a mere 90 000 ha had been resettled in contrast to the 1000 000
ha initially envisaged. The FTLRP entailed a comprehensive redistribution of land
achieved with considerable anarchy, disorder and violence. An estimated 11 million ha
changed hands within a period of three years, becoming the largest transfer of property
in Southern Africa to occur in peace time. The program facilitated the replacement of
nearly 4000 white farmer with 7200 black commercial farmers and 120 000 black
recipients on small farms by October 2003.

Chigora (2006: 175) asserts that through the FTLRP Mugabe positioned himself
internationally as an adversary of neo-conservatism and neo-liberal economics. The
Land Reform policy has been widely interpreted as a challenge to the rich nations and a
refusal to conduct the economy according to the dictates of the World Bank and the
IMF. Mugabe presented this premise at the World Summit of Sustainable Development
in 2002 when he said,

In our situation in Zimbabwe, this fundamental question has pitted

the black majority who are the right-holders, and, therefore, primary
stakeholders, to our land against an obdurate and internationally well-
connected racial minority, largely of British descent and brought in
and sustained by British colonialism now being supported and
manipulated by the (Tony) Blair government. (ibid. 5)
2.4.3 Other Dynamics involving Zimbabwe-West Relations under Mugabe

The FTLRP was not the only bone of contention between the Mugabe Administration
and the Western bloc. Mugabe is government was accused of alleged electoral
malpractices which included rigging, voter intimidation and political violence targeting
the opposition. Taylor (2005: 368) makes reference to Zimbabwe’s suspension from the
Commonwealth made permissible by what they perceived as a deficit in democratic
principles as espoused by the Harare Declaration of the CHOGM of 1991 hosted by
Zimbabwe and their justification of Zimbabwe’s suspension was premised on the
Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme. Subsequently Mugabe withdrew from
the Commonwealth in retaliation. What prompted Zimbabwe’s suspension from the
Commonwealth was the Parliamentary Elections that had been preceded by the
referendum that Mugabe and his party had lost in February 2000. These elections were
viewed to have been handled grotesquely with the atmosphere intense due to violence
and political intolerance. The Presidential Election of 2002 was treated in the same vein.
The Parliamentary Elections of 2005 which were dubbed ‘the anti-Blair elections’ did
not receive recognition even though ZANU PF had won a landslide victory.
Zimbabwe’s condemnation also stemmed from what was viewed as an abrogation of
democratic rights and liberties manifesting in restrictive legislation like the Public Order
and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information Private Protection Act
(AIPPA).These pieces of legislation have been viewed in contempt as prohibiting
freedom of expression and press.

An important aspect to note in these acrimonious relations is that of sanctions. Sanctions

can be defined as embargoes of goods or services by a state or a group of states
instituted on another state as means of influencing the latter state’s behaviour
(Chingono, 2010: 70). Zimbabwe has been a recipient of sanctions from the beginning
of the 21st century up to date. In December 2001 the United States government enacted
what is known as the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA).
In addition, President George W Bush instituted Executive Order 13288 which provided
a list of people in Mugabe’s circle who had become subject to certain restrictions as
espoused by the government of the United States. The European Union (EU) likewise
imposed sanctions targeting officials in Mugabe’s government, party leadership or
individuals deemed closely associated with Mugabe and his party ZANU (PF). Mugabe
and his government perceived this as an elaborate plot by western nations to remove his
government from power, hence the notion of regime change comes into play. Mugabe
as it would seem in response shifted his diplomatic relations to the East where he was to
strengthen ties with countries like China, Russia and other nations of the Eastern bloc.

2.4.4 Mugabeism and the Global Political Discourse

Mugabeism like other isms associated with political figures i.e. (Stalinism, Maoism,
Leninism, Nkrumaism etc.) has been individuated or described in various ways. Moore
in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015: 29) describes Mugabeism as,

…what Mugabe and the context that in many ways he has created for
Zimbabwean and perhaps African society at large, what do his
persona and actions “say” about Africa and its world; what do they
evoke, how do they symbolize, how do they resonate with, how do
they illustrate some of the uniquely configured cultural, social and
political attributes of this very complex world? How has he
reinforced positive notions of radical negation of the colonial
negation?
Moore in his description opines what seems to be a dialectic definition to the
phenomenon of Mugabeism. A political manifestation of the resolution of colonialism
and imperialism through radical restructuring of cultural, social and political
institutions. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (ibid. 1139) describes Mugabeism as a summation of a
constellation of political controversies, political behaviour, political ideas, utterances
rhetoric and actions that have solidified around Mugabe’s political life. It is a contested
phenomenon with nationalist aligned academics understanding it as a Pan African
redemptive ideology opposed to all forms of colonialism and dedicated to a radical
redistributive project premised on redressing colonial injustices.

Rusere (2015: 9) depicts Mugabeism as a phenomenon with many faces. Firstly, it

refers to “a manifestation of a highly personalised political order in which the individual
sets the standard for what is acceptable for Zimbabwe”. Mugabeism treats the individual
as the leader of the nation leaving no room for plurality in the Zimbabwean political
terrain. It perpetuates binary identities with no nuanced conception of alternative
identities. A second conception of Mugabeism is that of an ideologically driven thrust
against Western domination and influence from former colonial powers when it is
convenient to the leader. It is important to note that Mugabe was not always in
antagonism with the West. However as time ensued, Mugabeism has painted the
Western perspective as a potential antithesis to the African imagination and
emancipation. Mugabeism presents a patriotism that has evolved into an “ethno
nationalism that favours Pan Africanism”. It is heavily defined by the liberation struggle
and ideals that drove the decolonization process in the 20th century. It is an ideology
based on historical facts and finds its self in a dichotomous relationship with supposedly
western ideals propounded by neo-modernist theories.

Rusere (ibid. 11) also posits that the aspect of Mugabeism is predicated by a strong
protection and defence of state sovereignty. Hence all that is done in the name of
Mugabeism is done in service of the nation’s interests and against Western hypocrisy.
Any western led coalition against Mugabe is perceived as an attempt to subvert the
state’s right to self-determination. Mugabeism derives its legitimacy from the colonial
experience with all rhetoric articulated exclusively in the positive light of gaining
independence from the minority oppressor. As a consequence, Mugabeism constructs
the Zimbabwean identity as that of a perpetual crusader against neo-colonialism and
imperialism, unfairly alienated by the international community for exercising its beliefs
of international equality. This identity then manifests in actions such as withdrawing
from the Commonwealth completely after suspension, labelling it an ‘Anglo-Saxon
club’ or in paradigm shifts in diplomatic relations, shifting attention to the East from the
West in the Look East Policy (LEP). As a result it becomes difficult for critics of
Mugabeism to enter into healthy critical debates with its advocates. All pro Mugabeism
discourses narrow down to the irrefutable fact that he played a key role in the 2nd
Chimurenga, ultimately being the face of the revolution and no supporter of
Zimbabwean independence can deny that. Hence, through fusing his politics and
identity to the liberation struggle, Mugabeism has made itself perpetually legitimate.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (ibid. 1142) acknowledges the face of Mugabeism that is left-

nationalist in nature. By referring to Mugabe’s ideological training at the Kwame
Nkrumah Institute at Winneba Ghana (1958-60) he points out that Mugabe’s embrace
and assimilation of leftist doctrine was systematic and institutionally ingrained.
Mugabe’s inclination towards the left was further solidified by the liberation struggle as
Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that Mugabe’s leftist ideology was further consolidated during
his 15 years of exile and armed struggle where he further subscribed to Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist ideologies.

Mugabe seemed to have shifted from the left as shown through the policy of
reconciliation and the Lancaster House legal provisions of the economic order as
opposed to wholesale nationalization. Left leaning scholars interpreted this as nothing
but “petit bourgeois leadership abandonment of the workers and the peasants as a means
to accommodate domestic and external capital”. It is only after the new Labour Party
under Tony Blair refused to fund Zimbabwe’s land reform that Mugabe switched back
to pre-1980 radicalism and left-nationalism. Mugabe began to justify land expropriation
as part of the national agenda to complete the decolonization process. Moyo and Yeros,
cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (ibid. 1446) define left nationalism as an advocacy of
delinking from the world economy and progressive nationalization of the law of value.
Those who interpret Mugabeism as left nationalism put emphasis on its rejection of
neoliberalism opting the pursuit of heterodox economic planning. Moyo and Yeros
argue that this heterodox plan emerged as a response to the conflict of sanctions whose
major conditionality has been regime change.

Other scholars have interpreted Mugabeism as how Mugabe utilized domestic and
international contexts as means to interface with power whilst creating an image or
identity through which Zimbabwe is recognized. Grove (2011: 276) describes
Mugabeism as manifesting in four strategies he posits Mugabe utilized during his reign.
The strategies include buying off, broadening the audience, framing the threat and tying
hands. Below is a table from Grove (ibid. 177) that expounds on how these strategies
are implemented,
Table 1: Four Leadership Strategies

Strategy Definition Resource

Broadening Audience Expanding Coalition to International norms and

create legitimacy at home organisations with
or abroad so as to support sympathetic missions.
the message of a common
identity
Framing Threat Depicting Particular actors Repression, Military
as dangerous to Behaviour, Propaganda
constituents at home or
abroad to rally support
Buying off Using material resources Economic Aid
or promises of them to co-
opt opposition at home or
abroad
Tying Hands Limiting range of options International Law, Foreign
in one area to convince Aid and Conditions
the actor(s) that a
particular course is
necessarry

Of the four strategies posited by Grove, two are in tandem with the premise of this
study. The first of these strategies which needs elaboration is that of broadening the
audience. This approach entails the efforts of the leader in expanding a coalition so as to
create legitimacy for his or her policy goals abroad. It also may involve the leader
generating a message of a shared identity thereby creating a sense of solidarity amongst
the constituents being appealed to. This in the case of Mugabe can be considered to be
true. In his speech at the World Summit of Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
he created a broader appeal to gain support for the FTLRP whilst accusing the West
particularly the British and Tony Blair of neo-colonial machinations. He said:

Having said that, we wish no harm to anyone…We are

Zimbabweans, we are Africans, we are not English, we are not
Europeans. We are working together in our region to improve the lot
of our people. Let no one interfere with our process. Let no one who
is negative want to spoil what we are doing for ourselves in order to
 unite Africa. We belong to this continent. We do not mind having
and bearing sanctions barring us from Europe. We are not Europeans.
We have not asked any inch of Europe, any square inch of that
territory. So Blair keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.
(ibid. 7)
This excerpt from Mugabe’s speech is indicative of the strategy of broadening the
audience. In aligning the FTLRP with the regional agenda to consolidate African
solidarity he was able to rope in support from the continent and the SADC region.
Particular attention should be given to the phrases he mentioned the continent in his
rhetoric.

Second of these strategies is that of threat framing. As Grove (ibid. 276) would posit,
framing the threat is a strategy used by the leader as means to rally support for his or her
policy agenda. This can be accomplished by labelling particular actors as the adversary,
dangerous or malicious. How policy elites construct the political context is essential in
relation to whether constituents are mobilised towards peace or conflict, towards
cooperation with the outside world or isolation. Thus how the leader identifies the
country’s threats, their origin and how to deal with them are important in his or her
efforts to consolidate a following. In the case of Mugabe one can note his labelling of
the West, particularly the UK and the USA, labelling them as ‘racists’ or ‘imperialists’
who are bent on reversing the gains of independence and instituting regime change
through sanctions. Another example to illustrate this is the 2005 parliamentary election
dubbed by ZANU PF as the ‘Anti Blair elections’. By reclaiming the two thirds
majority they had lost in the year 2000 one can deduce that the strategy worked to
assure Mugabe of legislative control.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter put into perspective theories and concepts related to the study and
elaborated on how they best explain the role of the leader as a unit of analysis in foreign
policy. It also gave a brief background on the factors influencing Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy, especially historical factors and political. Lastly, it gave insight to Mugabeism
and how scholars have interpreted it in understanding Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.
 CHAPTER THREE

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the findings of the study alongside their critical assessment and
appraisal so as to determine the viability of Mugabeism in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy
towards the Western Bloc and institutions affiliated to the bloc. The chapter is
principally concerned with addressing the research questions and objectives of the
study. These include investigating the role of Mugabe’s ideology, persona, perception
and beliefs in guiding Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the West and affiliated
organisations. This chapter presents and discusses the findings of interviews,
documentary searches and other sources of material related to the study.

3.2 METHODOLOGY

3.2.1 Data Collection Methods

The researcher utilised in-depth interviews and documentary searches which include
audio visual material and government documents in collecting data on Mugabeism and
Zimbabwe’s foreign relations with the West.

3.3 RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

During the research process the research was bedevilled with a number of challenges
which had the potential of impeding the gathering of data. Of the challenges, chief
among them was participation of key informants with regard to interviews due their
time schedules or the aspect of the sensitivity they attributed to the subject matter.
3.4 RESPONSE RATE

During the course of the research, the response was not as satisfactory as anticipated.
This applies to interviews from key informants. Most key informants relevant to the
study were not available for participation hence the researcher had to mostly rely on
documentary search and academic articles related to the subject matter.

3.5 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

It is irrefutable that Mugabe had a strong grip on Zimbabwe’s policies, domestic and
foreign. His personal beliefs and perceptions influenced what policies were formulated
and how they would be implemented. Also as common characteristic among states, the
Head of Government has control over a state’s foreign relations both bilateral and
multilateral. Hence, consequentially his or her perceptions, personal attributes and
beliefs are part of the variables informing how foreign policy translates with the state’s
broader agenda. In more developed states with mature political institutions, there appear
to be checks to such unquestionable control. Decisions like declaring war or pulling out
of multilateral institutions are not the purview of the Executive only. It is important to
note that that the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) (2013) section 12 sets
out the Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe, being based on promoting and protecting the
national interests of the country, peaceful coexistence with other nations and the
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. One of the key concerns of this
study was to establish through Snyder’s Actor Specific Theory, the role played by
Mugabe’s personal beliefs, experiences and personality in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy
towards the west in the 21st century. The other being characteristics of Mugabeism with
regards to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the West in the 21st century.

3.5.1 HOW MUGABE’S BELIEFS AND PERCEPTIONS DETERMINED

ZIMBABWE’S FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE WEST.

In order to analyse Mugabeism in Zimbabwe’s relations with the West, it is imperative

to take note of the levels of analysis with regards to foreign policy decision making.
Mintz and DeRouen (ibid. 18) acknowledge the importance of the three levels of
analysis posited by Hermann .These levels include the individual, group and coalition.
Moreover, decision processes and actual choices are dependent on the decision makers,
primarily referred to as the decision unit. The magnitude and composition of the
decision unit has a direct influence on foreign policy decision making. The Individual
Decision Making model assumes that leaders act on how they interpret the dynamics of
the global political arena when making foreign policy decisions. One important variable
to note is the plausibility of individual decisions within a political system. In systems
where leaders have inordinate amounts of power, such scenarios make individual
decisions permissible since leaders are too powerful for institutional constraints. In that
respect leaders need not seek consensus when they make their decisions. This would
have been the case for Mugabe. Patel, in Chan and Patel (ibid. 176) acknowledges the
centralization Zimbabwe’s foreign policy around the Head of State, that is Mugabe at
the time, noting that his beliefs, personality, views, ideas and his experience as an
African nationalist and a co leader of the liberation struggle which brought about the
birth of Zimbabwe as a sovereign state. Hence he was the chief maker and articulator of
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. Patel, in Patel (ibid. 8) quotes Witness Mangwende, the late
former Minister of Foreign Affairs who asserted Mugabe’s role in Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy at a reception of trainee diplomats as the one ‘who defines Zimbabwe’s foreign
policy’.

Breuning (ibid. 54) notes that leader’s perspectives are guided partly by their
experiences, beliefs, personalities and expertise. In the case of Mugabe his perception of
the West was guided in part by his experience as an African nationalist. Mugabe in a
speech he delivered at a Central Committee meeting held at Chimoio between August
31 and September 8 1977 cited by Shamuyarira and Utete (1983: 33) he noted the
partnership between Britain and the USA in undermining the efforts to pursue total
independence for Zimbabwe. He said,

The British and the Americans have just been holding a meeting in
London. We understand they have agreed on as set of proposals
whose general principles are:-
• Independence by September 1978;
• Elections on the basis of one man one vote
• Ceasefire before elections
To us the fundamental issue is none of all these ideas. It is precisely the
fact of effective control.
It would seem that this perception persisted into his presidency in the 21st century. This
can be corroborated by his remarks at the 44th ordinary session of the ZANU (PF)
Central Committee. Mugabe intimated a conspiracy to undermine the sovereignty of
Zimbabwe between the British Government and the opposition bent on destabilising the
country when he said:

We are aware that the British Government are working closely with
the opposition MDC and other hostile so-called civil groups to trigger
urban civil unrest, in the hope that a ZANU (PF) Government will
capitulate or fall in violent circumstances They have even considered
sponsoring hit squads to eliminate some of us. They are working to
pervert and divide our institutions of governance in the hope of
precipitating a constitutional crisis…
One would try to establish how Mugabe’s utterances to the Central Committee would
have any bearing on foreign policy in Zimbabwe. However it is important to recognise
that the Central Committee is ZANU (PF)’s highest decision making body according to
the party constitution. Moreover the organ is a major stakeholder in not only the foreign
policy of the state but domestic policies. Herbst (1997: 7) notes that once Mugabe
claimed that the ZANU (PF) Central Committee is above the cabinet. Hence his
statement at a Central Committee meeting would have bearing on ultimately the action
by government.

A leader’s perception is often guided by his or her personality. This can be considered
to be reflective of Mugabe’s perception of the world and how he would interact with it
in his official capacity as Head of State. Personality is defined as the complex of all the
attributes, behavioural, temperamental, emotional and mental that define a unique
individual. Many political scientists have attributed actions by politicians to their
personality. Their political behaviour that is, affiliation, rhetoric, responses to crises and
policy decisions, emanate from the components of their personality. According to
Gibson (1981: 105) personality and self-esteem have a positive correlation with political
action in the form of policy decisions and indecisions. Gibson further notes using
Laswell, political animals seek external validation of their political efficacy and
viability. In the case of Mugabe and the phenomenon of Mugabeism, one would say his
personality had a strong influence in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy approach to the West.
Holland (2008: 7) notes one of Mugabe’s relatives, the late James Chikerema, who
described Mugabe as ‘stubborn’ during his formative years,

If anyone argued with him while herding, Chikerema remembered

Robert simply detaching himself from the group, selecting his own
beasts from the herd and driving them into the hills far away from the
other boys. He never sought reconciliation or compromise in an
effort to fit in with those around him. His standard response to
 criticism was to warn that he would get even some day recalled
Chikerema…
In using Holland as a source one can establish a connection between Mugabe in his
childhood and Mugabe as an adult in office. Holland posits that there is an inextricable
connection between Mugabe’s response and interpretation of the social milieu during
his formative years and how he would in future respond to what he perceived as threats
to Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Withdrawing from the
Commonwealth in 2003 after Zimbabwe’s suspension in 2002 can bear testament to
that.

Mugabe identified himself as a Marxist hence his political inclination to the left.
Ndlovhu-Gatsheni also acknowledged Mugabe’s left inclination (ibid. 1142) His
inclination beginning with Fort Hare and being cemented in Ghana. However when
assuming office he rescinded his radical approach to assume a more moderate and
flexible approach which surprised many. He was only to reprise his leftist identity after
his fallout with the West. This socialist identity has possibly if not definitively
influenced his stance against the Western nations and their institutions. In an interview
conducted by Raeburn in a documentary (Zimbabwe Countdown 2003) Chenhamo
Chimutengwende, former Deputy President of the senate and a former Minister in
Mugabe’s administration echoed sentiments Raeburn thought were in tandem with
Mugabe’s perception of Western institutions,

…new methods and schemes are being devised to keep the

developing countries even further down. Through the WTO and other
institutions like the IMF and World Bank. The form of struggle has
to change and there can be schemes like south to south cooperation…
Institutions like the IMF and the World Bank are proponents of neo-liberal economic
practices, contrary to socialist economic practices of state involvement in the economy.
Mugabe in his speech in 2002 at the Earth Summit in Johannesburg exuded the same
sentiments,

We complained about the unequal economic power that existed and

still exists between the North and the South has historically reposed
itself in our international institutions including the United Nations…
That is why for example the International Monetary Fund has never
been a fund for poor peasants seeking sustainable development.
Chigora and Dewa (ibid. 94) are of the view that Mugabe positioned himself as an
antagonist of neo-conservatism and neo-liberal economic practises, refusing to manage
the economy as per the dictates of the World Bank.

An important factor which should be noted in the aspect of Mugabeism is his

experiences with the West, especially the British and the Americans. Part of the
paranoia and distrust that has characterised Mugabe’s acrimonious perception of the
West historical, a history in which Mugabe himself was a participant. It should be noted
that Mugabe’s uneasy relationship with Britain emanated from the contentious way in
which the Labour Government under Tony Blair had handled the Land Question.
Mugabe had a terrible experience with a Labour Administration during his time as a
nationalist. Tendi (2014: 1257-58) notes that in 1965 when Rhodesian PM Ian Smith
severed ties with the British Crown through UDI, Mugabe tried to dissuade the then
British PM Harold Wilson from solely relying on sanctions as a strategy to deal with the
RF’s apparent rebellion. He entreated Wilson instead to use military means as a way to
guarantee majority rule. However, Wilson’s response, as Mugabe contended was that
the British public wouldn’t take kindly to the use of force against its own ‘kith and kin’.
Mugabe later reiterated this in his remarks at Comrade C Hunzvi’s burial on the 8th of
June 2001,

We were to discover that it was all a monumental charade, an ill-

fated public relations exercise, devoid of real care of the plight of the
black majority in this country. Harold Wilson made it clear to us that
as the unfolding of history has testified, the British people and their
government would never contemplate abandoning of their kith and
kin in favour of the African cause…
Analytically deconstructing this excerpt of the speech, drawing from an actual historical
event, Mugabe framed it into a racially incensed issue with the British being
characterised as not interested with the needs and the demands of the African majority
but rather would protect interests of a privileged minority with whom they share a
heritage. A classic ‘us against them’ synopsis.

3.5.2 Characteristics of Mugabeism and the logic behind its manifestation in

Zimbabwean Foreign Policy towards the West

If Mugabeism is a combination of Mugabe’s political personality and the policies that

have characterised Zimbabwe domestically and internationally, it is important to
deconstruct traits of Mugabeism in line with Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. One of the
traits evident in Mugabeism’s foreign policy approach to the West is that of protecting
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Chigora and Dewa (ibid. 93) note
Mudenge the then Minister of Foreign Affairs who defined Zimbabwe’s foreign policy
objectives as fundamentally enhancing Zimbabwe’s image and prestige and
safeguarding its security.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on its website, affirms this
outlook, defining Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives to be hinged on safeguarding its
sovereignty and territorial integrity, protection of its prestige and image, the pursuit of
policies that improve the livelihood of Zimbabweans wherever they are and the creation
of a conducive international environment that enables the attainment of those objectives.
This staunch defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity has manifested in the form
of the Third Chimurenga. Patel, in Chan and Patel, (ibid. 177) affirms that the Third
Chimurenga was against the UK and its Western allies. This struggle can be illustrated
with what Patel terms ‘official currency’ of phrases such as The land is the economy
and the economy is the land’ (ZANU PF’s 2000 Parliamentary elections campaigning
slogan.) aligning with the FTLRP. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (ibid. 1143) notes that FTLRP
marked what Mugabe termed ‘the prevailing sovereignty of the people of Zimbabwe
over white minority rule.’ Hence acquisition of land was the completion of
decolonisation and Western condemnation was the antithesis of that.

Mugabeism’s strong mistrust of the West has a strong grounded syllogism, given that
Western powers in the past have been complicit in undermining the decolonisation
process. Mugabe in an interview with David Martin of the London Observer and Phyllis
Johnson of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1978 cited by Shamuyarira and
Utete (ibid. 113) intimated his mistrust of the USA during the negotiation process of
Independence after the Carter Administration invited Smith to New York. In his view,
the USA’s actions were tantamount to recognising an illegal regime which had been
declared pariah by the international community. This was in continuation of the Byrd
Amendment of 1971 (A piece of legislation which enabled Rhodesia to by-pass the
sanctions imposed on it by the United States). He said whilst responding on the question
as to whether they would attend any talks in New York,

We cannot see ourselves agreeing to go a country which is in the

process of granting recognition an illegal regime in defiance of the
position adopted by the international community.
Mugabe also intimated the same sentiments in his speech at the Southern Africa
Solidarity Conference in 1978 where he accused the British and the Americans of
imperialist collusion with regards to Smith’s invitation to New York when he said,

The Anglo-Americans began working on a strategy to legitimise the

Smith Regime and legitimise UDI. The readiness with which the
Carter Administration facilitated their visit to the USA not only by
Smith but by Smith and his entire executive council is an indication
in that direction. Now the British and the Americans are bent on
supporting Smith’s racist regime.
Hence it would be fair to note that these deliberate moves coupled by legislation which
enabled Rhodesia to trade whilst under sanctions would substantiate Mugabe’s
suspicion of neo-imperialist collusion.

Encapsulated in Mugabeism’s foreign policy approach to the West was the preservation
of the right to self-determination. This right of self-determination, according to Mugabe
was under siege from the West in their pursuit to influence the domestic policies of the
Zimbabwe. Mugabe has often accused Western powers for undermining Zimbabwe’s
sovereignty by sponsoring regime change. Chigora and Ziso (2011: 106) define regime
change as essentially a replacement of a regime by another or a change of a system by
another. It can be conceptualised as a system overhaul be it economic, social or
political. In essence regime change orchestrated by the West usurps the people’s right to
determine their affairs and as a former nationalist who fought the same powers to
guarantee the people of the state that right to choose. This has been illustrated by the
banning of election observers from the European Union by Mugabe from observing the
2002 presidential election. According to an article in The Telegraph (February 17 2002)
The Zimbabwean government expelled the chief EU observer Pierre Schori and
declined to give observer status to EU observers under the pretext that they favoured the
opposition. Mugabe in an interview done by Mark Davis articulated his position,
expressing his disdain for Western involvement in Zimbabwe’s electoral processes. This
he said towards the 2002 Presidential election, characterising the EU as biased and
racist whilst responding to the question as to whether he is denied legitimacy by the
international community,

We are an African country in an African continent. We are going to

invite African countries to be here to witness the election…The
International Community can go hang! The rest of the world. Once
we know we are right, that’s it. Their bias and racism, we will not
 recognise at all. There has to be authority here whether Britain likes
it or not, whether America likes it or not. (Killing Mugabe. 2002)
Mugabe was of the view that the West was attempting to derail the prospects of
accruing the gains of independence by owning the means of production. The Third
Chimurenga emanated from the belief that the West particularly was undermining the
decolonisation process with regards to the Land Question. As land ownership was an
indicator of sovereignty and economic independence, Mugabe asserted that the British
were attempting to usurp the people’s revolution by impeding the process of land
reform by refusing to fund the program as per what was agreed at the Lancaster House
Conference. Also in his interview with Mark Davis Mugabe (Killing Mugabe 2002)
highlighted his displeasure with the Labour Government of Blair, accusing them of
reneging on past concessions between the British Crown and the Zimbabwean
Government with regards to funding the land expropriation process. He said, “They
have papers left on their table by Major. They didn’t want to look at them.”

Mugabe further made reference to the infamous letter from Claire Short which he
claimed instigated the whole process of the FTLRP,

The reply came from Claire Short that we should not talk about
colonial responsibilities. They will not inherit any responsibilities in
that regard. After all you cannot talk to me about colonialism, Ireland
was once colonised by the British so what? So dismissive. So we said
okay, they are dismissive, we shall also adopt a stance that is firm
and dismissive of them and this is what started it.
Mugabe’s perception can be justified given that if the concept of state succession is
utilised, the Labour government had an obligation to honour their part of the agreement
which was quintessential to the Lancaster House negotiations. Moreover, given
Mugabe’s adverse experience with the duplicity of Harold Wilson’s Labour government
in 1965, this further emboldened and substantiated his mistrust. It would have appeared
that history had repeated itself through Blair’s Labour Party.

Mugabeism as an ideology has been framed to be the antithesis of neo-imperialism. An

ethno-nationalism, as Rusere (ibid. 13) notes, which seeks to curb efforts by the
erstwhile coloniser. It presents itself as a response to Western hypocrisy. Mugabe
alleged that the West was out to facilitate a regime change agenda, removing him and
his party out of power replacing it with a more complacent regime amenable to their
requests. In his address to the 61st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Mugabe
articulated this view point. He said,
 Is it not a paradox that whilst we are denied resources for
development funding is made readily available to support elements
bent on subverting the democratically expressed will of the majority
of our citizens and to unconstitutionally effect regime change. We
condemn this interference in our domestic affairs and may I repeat
what I have said before. That regime change in Zimbabwe is indeed
in any country a right for the people of that country and can never be
a right of people of other countries. The golden key to regime change
is in the hands of our people, the people of Zimbabwe…No one from
Washington or from London has a right to that key…And let it be not
forgotten that those who want regime change are the same people
yesterday we fought against. They represent British Colonialism and
British Imperialism. We spent many years in jail, I spent eleven years
in jail…
His allegations hold currency, in the sense that activities that fit into Mugabe’s narrative
have been funded by the West, a particular example being the USA. According to an
article published by the magazine New African in May (2007: 100) the US State
department admitted to funding activities that facilitate the agenda of regime change.
The article makes reference of a report published on the 5th of April 2007 by the State
Department established what it called the Defenders Fund which provided funds to the
CSOs and other elements the Zimbabwean government considered to be harbouring
dissent. Voice of America Studio 7 (VOA) a radio channel considered to be
disseminating information that discredits the government was also encapsulated in that
package.

The issue of sanctions has been part of Mugabeism’s discourse in Zimbabwean foreign
policy towards the West. Mugabe deemed the sanctions placed on Zimbabwe illegal and
unjustified. A political tool used promote the regime change agenda and an indicator of
Western imperialism. Chingono (ibid. 66) notes that between 2000 and 2003 Zimbabwe
was a recipient of sanctions from the USA, UK, EU, Australia and Canada. The
rationale behind the sanctions is highly disputed by both the givers and the recipients of
the sanctions. One must also note in understanding the concept of sanctions in the
context of Zimbabwe. Sanctions are dispensed in two ways. The most common are
comprehensive sanctions which involve the embargo of goods and services by a country
to another country. Smart or targeted sanctions are on the other hand meant to exert
coercive influence on certain individuals through the freezing of assets both capital and
financial, travel bans and the suspension of diplomatic relations.
The Zimbabwean Government has argued that the nature of US sanctions imposed on
the state are comprehensive in nature by referring to ZIDERA (2001) section 4(c) (later
to be amended as the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Amendment Act
of 2018) which prohibits any loan or credit or guarantee to the Government of
Zimbabwe by international financial institutions and any cancellation or reduction of
debt owed by Zimbabwe to the US or any financial institution barred. Under this
legislation, the IMF, WB and the ADB cannot extend loans or credit guarantees to
Zimbabwe without the approval of the US President. According to the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe (2006: 3) sanctions have negatively impacted Zimbabwe as they have
negatively affected the country’s Balance of Payments (BOPs), limited Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and significantly constricted its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is
also important to note that under Smith Rhodesia was under sanctions but economically
was performing, however it is important to note that the Byrd Amendment of 1971
negated the effects of the unilateral sanctions imposed on Rhodesia as they made
permissible exports of chrome to the USA.

Mugabeism has been able to deal with the ostracization it has been subject to by the
West utilising a wide array of strategies. One of those strategies is that of adopting the
Look East Policy (LEP). Patel, in Chan and Patel, (ibid. 176) notes that smaller states
need to utilise the dispersal of dependence strategy to ensure their sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Shifting diplomatically towards the East has worked in that fashion
as it ensured that Zimbabwe would not experience a censure after the controversial June
27 election run off. A draft resolution by the United Nations Security Council was
rejected as permanent members of the UNSC, namely China and Russia vetoed the
resolution. Moreover economically China has been able to assist Zimbabwe with
bilateral trade between the two countries has been in huge volumes. Mugabe on the 15th
anniversary of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) he intimated in an
interview with CCTV reporter Su Yuting (2015) his sentiments on Zimbabwe’s reliance
on China as her ‘all weather friend’. When asked about his thoughts on the accusations
by the West of China plundering Africa he said,

That’s nonsense. Who has plundered Africa? It’s not China. These
great suckers and exploiters must get out of Africa and allow Africa
to be the ultimate owner, possessor of their natural resources…
It is important also to note that LEP was not adopted as a retaliation to the acrimony that
had arisen from the West but was a policy premised on a strong foundation. In 1992 as
Patel notes in Chan and Patel (ibid. 178) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its
economic thrust to foreign policy anticipating major trade, investment and joint ventures
coming from the East as it was an emerging market. This may have informed Mugabe’s
sentiments in 2004 (Maroodza 2011: 7):

The West is not the only source of assistance, nor the only area of
market. Time has come not just for Zimbabwe but for the third world
to realise that the sun rises in the east. Let’s look to the East where
the majority of the world are, that’s where we also get the greatest
support because the East is the third world. It sees things the same
way we see them, so they are our greatest friends.
However Chan in Chan and Patel (ibid. 181) is of the view that Zimbabwe’s LEP was a
move of desperation after Mugabe had trashed many other foreign policy options, going
to posit that China was on a capitalist momentum and would not ride to Zimbabwe’s
economic rescue. Rather it would use Zimbabwe as springboard to inter into Africa.

3.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the data collected and interpreted it so as to address the main
objectives of the study. The main objectives of the study were to look at Mugabeism’s
influence on foreign policy and how it related to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the
West and the logic behind it or rather the rationale.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarises the study. The findings and discussions have been helpful in
analysing and taking a position in relation to the subject matter of the study. This
chapter elaborates on Mugabeism and its correlation with Zimbabwean foreign policy
towards the West and explains the rationale behind Zimbabwe’s foreign policy
paradigm. This chapter also presents recommendations based on the findings which are
premised in giving Zimbabwe a distinct international personality.

4.2 CONCLUSIONS
Mugabeism, in relation to Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the West, has to be
understood in the context of the post-colonial state. Rusere (ibid. 10) asserts that
Mugabeism is a creature of the post-colonial imagination, highlighting its intransigence
towards globalization. Mugabeism has in that sense created a Zimbabwean identity to
the international environment as that of a state in an ideological war seeking affirmation
and respect. This is substantiated in the leftist rhetoric in his speeches at international
forums like the United Nations and other regional bodies.

Mugabeism draws justification from historical experience in an effort to connect

rationale and action. To those who acknowledge the negative legacies of colonialism,
they are likely to appreciate Mugabe’s world view of the international environment and
would characterise Zimbabwe’s foreign policy approach as well thought out and not
reactionary as others would think. Mugabe indicated his historical grievance on Western
complicity in African oppression and what he views as their tendency to be hypocritical,

When the British racial autocracy brutalized us the so called

democratic world would not lift a finger or even an eyebrow to help.
For we were dubbed the world’s supernumeraries, a race of no rights
beyond those of a chattel. We were the white man’s hewers of wood
and drawers of water…We worked the land not so our children could
eat but so we could feed their own children and kind. When all that
happened the free world was there; Britain, America, Germany and
Holland were there. British, American and German citizens came
here as mercenaries to fight alongside Smith’s soldiers… The
American Senate and Congress were there! At no point did they think
of supporting our struggle here by crafting a sanctions bill against the
Rhodesians who had overthrown the supreme law of the land, the
constitution. If anything the same senators who today work with our
own people in the opposition to craft the iniquitous so called
(ZIDERA), were part of the infamous international right wing
Friends of Rhodesia (FOR) movement meant to defend overseas
white interests (August 11 2001, Heroes Day)
Mugabeism through historical reference has framed and identified the enemy against the
Zimbabwean people must rally behind. An enemy with a nefarious racial agenda to
recolonise a state that acquired its sovereignty through bitter sacrifice and an enemy
using the state’s own people to achieve this objective.

Mugabeism is justified in that perception of the West and its desire to protect the
country’s sovereignty and right to self-determination. History has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that Western nations have a propensity to subvert governments they do
not find amenable to their interests. A case in point is that of the current Venezuelan
Political crisis. America and some European powers recognised Guaido as the
legitimate interim president whereas a duly elected President Maduro is still in office.
Other cases include Chile whose democratically elected President Allende was removed
in 1973 from power by a CIA sponsored coup that saw Pinochet rise to power. Hence,
Mugabeism holds currency with regards to its foreign policy approach to the West.
Sovereignty is an important principle in international relations and diplomacy and hence
undermining a state’s sovereignty undermines the concept of diplomacy and dialogue.

However inasmuch as sovereignty is an important part of international relations, so is

globalization. Globalization has become an integral part of the international arena
promoting the confluence of ideas, culture and economies. Koehane and Nye have
termed it complex interdependence (Rana 2015: 290) whereas Kant dubbed it liberalism
(Waltz 1962: 331). Mugabeism may have been justified but the ostracization that
ensued significantly damaged the country’s economy and the country was vilified as an
‘outpost of tyranny’. Hence there was need to limit the obstinacy thus solving the
diplomatic impasse that existed between Zimbabwe and the West.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The administration of President Mnangagwa after Mugabe’s exit from office has been
making concerted efforts to solve the diplomatic standoff between the Zimbabwean
Government and Western nations. President Mnangagwa has dubbed his foreign policy
“Zimbabwe is open for business” (Ndimande and Moyo 2018: 3), indicating his desire
for Zimbabwe to re-join international community and benefit from the global market
value chains. This multilateral approach is commendable in that Zimbabwe requires all
the support it can get. However, Zimbabwe can only benefit in an international
environment that is respectful of a nation’s autonomy of its own affairs with no´
‘invisible hand’ influencing the body politic of the country.

Part of the re-engagement process in Zimbabwe should involve the Land Question. It is
publicly known though not said in the open enough that Britain had a colonial
obligation to aid in the land redistribution process, part of which became the precursor
of the crisis of nearly two decades. An honest dialogue between Zimbabwe and Britain
should take place on the basis of mutual respect. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, should
acknowledge part of the problem and address concerns held by Western states and make
an effort to help them understand the dynamics in Zimbabwe.
Part of the problem that existed between Mugabe and the West was the lack of
recognition of the internal dynamics of Zimbabwean politics and the organic link that
existed between the mode of independence and the domestic and foreign policies. The
British under Tony Blair failed to appreciate history with the intention of establishing
relations on a totally new basis. That which was unacceptable for Mugabe and his
government, considering the colonial nationalist experience. Tendi (ibid. 1256) makes
reference to Lord Carrington’s sentiments on the letter by Claire Short in response to the
issue of compensation, noting that the Labour Government should not have done that
and should have followed the line of the Tories.

Mugabe’s personal experiences influenced his world view and undoubtedly had an
influence on Zimbabwe’s foreign policy practice especially with regards to the West.
Holland (ibid. 211-212) notes one of Mugabe’s memories as brought to light by
Lawrence Vambe, a childhood contemporary of Mugabe. When Fr O’Hea, a Jesuit
priest with a profound influence on Mugabe during the latter’s childhood was courting
the then British Governor to Rhodesia Cecil Rodwell in 1933. Rodwell made a dastardly
comment on Fr O’Hea’s lobbying for the funding of a hospital he wanted to establish
for the natives. “Why do you worry about a hospital? After all, there are too many
natives in the country already.” Vambe recalls Mugabe resenting that comment and still
vivid in his mind and possibly his perception of the British was never extinguished,
further to be ignited by the refusal of the British Government to honour its Lancaster
House obligations. However the propensity of personal sentiments influencing foreign
policy decision making can have catastrophic implications. As Goldstein and Pevehouse
would note (2014: 129) individual decision making in foreign policy revolves around
the question of rationality.

It is the perogative of national leaders to make rational decisions in the national

interest- if such interests can be defined. As individuals differ in values and beliefs, they
also possess peculiar personalities that in turn affect how they make decisions. Like any
other individual, Mugabe had his misperceptions and biases which may have affected
his decision making. He possessed an acute level of intransigence that would not create
room for compromise. This personality trait would subconsciously influence how he
would process information and how he would react towards it. The young Mugabe who
would detach himself from his peers after a quarrel not seeking compromise whilst
vowing to get even one day and the Mugabe who told Blair to ‘keep his England whilst
he keeps his Zimbabwe’ and later withdrew from the Commonwealth in December
2003 are one and the same person.

4.4 CONCLUSION

Mugabeism has undoubtedly had a profound impact on Zimbabwe’s foreign relations

with the Western bloc. His ideology, experience, personality and perceptions shaped
Zimbabwe’s international personality. It is contentious whether the legacy of this former
nationalist should be awarded accolades or condemnation. Undoubtedly Zimbabwe
under Mugabe has chartered the international terrain under turbulent conditions in
defence of its sovereignty. When asked in an interview by Dali Tambo how he would
want to be remembered he gave what one can interpret as a modest rendition:

There was a man called Robert Mugabe, who in the interests of his
own people fought the struggle to liberate them and had ideas of
ownership of resources for his own people and the fact that the
people should be united and remain revolutionary, to guard against
colonial and imperial powers that seek to undermine the authority of
governments and what he desired up to the end that his own people
should be masters of their own destiny. That is all. I don’t desire to
be known as anything greater than that. (Chimurenga Man 2013)
One can only wonder if his desire to be remembered in that way shall be fulfilled, or as
Fidel Castro famously said “History will absolve me” (1953: 6). Only time will tell if
history will absolve Robert Gabriel Mugabe.

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