BOOK REVIEW
ASSIGNMENT JAFFNA
LT GEN SC SARDESHPANDE, UYSM, AVSM (RETD)
INTRODUCTION
1. Op Pawan can be termed as Vietnam of India. In late 80s Indian Army as sent to
fight a war on a forgein soil with no intelligence and prior preparation. This book gives a
detail account of the same from the divisional cdr perspectives.
2. This book is a personal relative of a divisional commander of the IPKF of Op Pawan
against LTTE in Sri Lanka, from 1987-1989 with considerable endeavor on military,
diplomatic and political front. In this book Gen Sardesphande has covered elaborately
about the local, their psyche, the militant gp LTTE along with other gps, their tac and
strategy. The author has comprehensively covered the issues in 8 chapters with an addition
of epilogue which includes annexure and letter to author.
(a) Part-I - Author and Physical Attributes.
(b) Part-II - Salient Contents of Chapter.
PART I : AUTHOR AND PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES
Author
3. Lt Gen (Retd) SC Surdeshpande is among those rare and special persons who were
successful in using both gun and pen. He was commissioned in to the Kumaon Regiment
on 3 Jun 1956, he held a number of command and staff appointments. He commanded the
12th Bn the Kumaon Regiment during the Indo-Pak War in 1971. He has served for long
duration in insurgency area of NE India. He commanded a Div at Palay as part of IPKF
during Op Pawan and was Chief of Staff of HQ, IPKF from 1988 till end. He was DG Infanty
prior to his retirement in 1990. He is India’s one of most respected and experienced
strategic and analyst, he regularly writes and gives his views on various forums. The
author’s lucid written and experience make an intimate reading of the book.
4. Other Wrks. In addition to this book the author has written eleven more books. But
the books on Op Pawan or IPKP are, “IPKF performance in Sri Lanka” and “LTTE’s self
destruction”.
Attributes
5. Genre . The book can be categorized under military history and military-diplomatic
analysis of Op Pawan.
6. Production Value. It has total of 178 pages excluding notes. The font size is
adequate and sequencing is appropriate. The book was published by Lancer International
in1992 and was then priced at Rs 180 (Present cost Rs 385)
2
PART-II : SALIENT CONTENTS
7. Chapter I : Arrival. For better understanding, the author initially gives a brief about
the cause of Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka, the up rise of LTTE as a major player. He brings
out that how the Indian Army was hastily sent to Sri Lanka without any intelligence or prior
preparation. His own Div, which was operating in desert was sent to operate in jungle
warfare with no prior trg for same.
8. After taking over the comd of Div at Palay, he has drawn the readers attention
towards the nonexistence of civil adm structure and how he has do the dual task of a
soldier and an administrator for civ population. He got tremendous support from Brig RIS
Kahlon, Town Commandant Jaffna (TCJ).
9. Chapter 2 : The People. In this chapter, Gen Sardeshpande describes the
demographic pattern of Jaffna, their profession and their psy. As a soldier he was pushed to
ensure the smooth functioning of local administration ; He mentions to able administrator
who were a great help : Mr Panchalingam and Mrs Rajani Thivanagana, who were brutally
murdered by LTTE for lending a supporting hand to IPKF to bring normalcy in Jaffna.
10. Chapter 3 : The Militants. In this chapter the author given the brief account on
rising of LTTE as an org right from a student led org in 1970 and LTTE as an insurgent gp
in 1976. He brings out that LTTE had a full fledged adm org and had its adm HQ at
Killinochhi district. He briefly brings out the characteristic and tactics adopted by the
terrorists gp against the security forces. He touches up on the other military/non military gps
like TULF, PLOTE, ERUS, EPRLF etc.
11. Progress of Oprations. In this chapter, the author brings out that after initial
feedback the LTTE got out of peninsula and weeded out to vanni jungles. This gave the
IPKF to estd its credibility as the well wishers of Tamil. For this the people of Jaffna were
made to understand the provision of ISLA and assured the people that the presence of
IPKF would grantee a satisfactory solution. For this reps of IAS & MEA were sent to Jaffna
to understand the Sri Lankan law and constitution and attempted to tackle the people who
had reservation about ISLA accord.
(a) Psy Ops. Gen Sardeshpande, emphasis the need to undertake psy ops to
tell & educate people, to separate the people sympathy towards LTTE and bring the
LTTE to main stream. He brings out that inspite inadequate exposure, the fds officer
were given the task of handling psy ops. Initially posters, leaflets, graffiti were put
out. This team talked to the citizen communities but psychologically, the LTTE
continued to maintain its lead over the IPKF in term of psy ops.
(b) Retaining Initiative. Here he clarify bring out the receipting of retaining
initiatives. the initiative needed was not only in terms of military ops but also on
strands like psy ops, economic resuscitation, political parleys & rehabilitation. But for
conducting these ops he never got any support from IPKF HQ, Madras & Army HQ
New Delhi.
(c) Rebuilding IPKF Credibility. Here the author give the credit for to the same
to TCJ’s efforts. He ensured that cdr at all level got hold of their men and moderated
their actions. He also ensured that essential services like banking, train, postal
medical functioned properly.
3
(d) Strategy. Here the author brings out that there was no support from higher
ups in fulfilling the task to implement the ISLA accord. Militarily there were no co-
ordinate effort except fed brigade level tactical ops like Op Vajra, Op Checkmate etc.
(e) Tactics. He says that IA tactics were predetermined predictable and reactive
but the to conduct such large scale CI ops demanded more innovation and
integrative formulation at all levels from coy to fmn.
(f) Naval Contribution. The author brief out that LTTE had freedom of mov
from Palk Straits to coasts of Tamil Nadu. Our own Blue Water Navy initially failed to
put a checkmate on same. It was difficult for navy to conduct CI ops in open seas.
12. Chapter 5 : Composition with CI Ops on in Nagaland & Mizoram. In this chapter
the author has compared the Ops in Sri Lanka with CI Ops in Mizoram and Nagaland. He
brings out the difference in terms of Politico-Economic from Military aspects for instance the
in Mizoram & Nagaland the insurgent had their own district council, State & Central Govt
which was not present under LTTE.
13. Chapter 6 : Extension of Ops. Here the author gives the detail description of the
ops carried out by IPKF right from build up to cease fire in Sept 1988. He also mentions
about the measures taken after the case fire like creation of CVF (Citizen volunteer Force).
14. Chapter 7 : Some Tactical Actions. In this chapter the author enumerates certain
ops undertaken at tactical level. The conduct these ops have been shown in panoramic
diagram for ease of understanding to a non military person.
15 Chapter 8 : Our Performance. In this chapter the author analysis own
performance in ops conducted over two and half years. He speaks high about the comn
facilities during this period. As per him, the army responded clumsily and conducted the ops
with less efficiency. The visits and views of generals to Fd Cdrs and tps did very little to
inspire them. The Army fought from one day to next with no teeth.
Critique Views
16. This book provide a personalised account of Div Cdr on Ops on a forgien soil to
suppress the insurgency. The language used in the book is simple and the military terms
used have been explained in simple language.
Recommendations
17. This book is recommended to be read by all military leaders and scholars. The
tactical ops explained in the book are the lessons learnt and can be incorporated by cdrs at
all level. Overall, a must read book to understand the nuances of ops undertaken by IPKF
during Op Pawan.
4
