Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr.

on 13 May, 1985

Allahabad High Court

Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985
Equivalent citations: AIR 1985 All 291
Author: M Shukla
Bench: M Shukla, H Seth, M Wahajuddin, R Shukla, A Dikshita
ORDER

1. We allow the petitioners two weeks' time from today to file their representations or objections
before the District Magistrate, Banda and order the District Magistrate to decide the same within
three weeks from the date of filing such representations or objections. It is not necessary to set aside
the impugned order and we accordingly dispose of these writ petitions without passing any such
formal order. There will be no order as to costs.

M.N. Shukla, C.J.

These two cases involve important questions interlinked with the daily lives of people, abiding in a
civilised society, the executive authorities entrusted with the sovereign duty of maintaining law and
order, extending certain privileges to citizens of the State who actuated by a desire to protect
themselves may desire to procure arms for themselves, the necessity of regulating and controlling
such privileges by rules of law and procedure, and making them liable to be withdrawn, altered or
abridged on the non-fulfilment of certain conditions or the supervention of new factors. The orders
impeached in these cases are orders passed by the executive authorities, significantly purporting to
have been passed under the legal sanction derived from a Full Bench decision of this Court in
Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of U. P., 1984 All WC 145. That decision was rendered by a Full Bench
of three Judges and consequently the hearing of the present writ petitions has necessitated
constitution of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court to decide the question of law canvassed
before us. The thrust of the argument has been both on the interpretation arid validity of the law
laid down in Chhanga Prasad Sahu's case (supra). In that judgment the following observations occur
:

"As already explained, if there already is material before that licensing authority and it becomes
apparent to it that possession of arms by the licensee is going to endanger public peace and safety, it
can straightway and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke/suspend the arms licence after
recording reasons therefor and if the licensee is aggrieved by such orders, he will have a right lo
ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority. However, if there is no such material before
the licensing authority and il is not apparent to it that there is an immediate danger to public peace
and safety and it, on some information being laid before it, proceeds to find out whether there is any
likelihood of public peace and safety being affected at some future date, it cannot be said that there
is any such urgency so as to justify the revocation/cancellation of the licence even before the
licensing authority gets so satisfied. In the circumstances, considering the nature and the object of
the enquiry which a licensing authority is required to make for finding out if the facts justifying
passing of an order for revocation/suspension of licence exist, it cannot be said that non-conferment
of the power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry has the effect of defeating the object for
which such a power has been conferred upon the licensing authority."

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 1

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

This passage perhaps forms the bedrock of the assumption which the District Magistrates have
made that the power resides in them, to cancel an arms licence without notice to the licensee.

2. The facts of the present cases which lie in a short compass may be briefly stated. Writ Petition No.
9379 of 1984 has been filed by six petitioners who have prayed for quashing of six orders
respectively by which the District Magistrate, Banda cancelled their gun licence and directed them
to deposit their weapons forthwith. Likewise the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9394 of 1984 has
prayed for quashing of the order passed by the District Magistrate, Banda whereby the petitioner's
gun licence was cancelled and he was directed to surrender his gun. The aforesaid order passed by
the District Magistrate revealed that he felt satisfied that there was an immediate apprehension of
breach of peace from the petitioner, that they were likely to use firearms for commission of crime
and that with the object of preserving peace and preventing the petitioners from using the firearms
for committing the crime, cancellation of their licences was essential. In both the writ petitions the
orders have been challenged on the ground that they were passed without any notice to the
petitioners or any opportunity of hearing being given to them prior to the cancellation of the licence.
It has been vehemently urged that this was in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice.

3. The law is well settled that before an action is proposed to be taken against an individual which
affects his rights and involves civil consequences, he must be given an opportunity to show cause.
This is the essence of the rule of 'audi alteram partem' which is the principal doctrine of natural
justice. This rule, however, must be confined to a case in which the adjudication of right of a party
arises and which involves civil consequences. A right is distinct from a mere privilege. The case of a
licencee to possess or use firearm is materially different from a case of licence to deal in or sell
firearms. Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959 deals with acquisition and possession of firearmsor
ammunition on the strength of a licence whereas Section 5 provides for a licence for manufacture,
sale etc. of arms and ammunition. The licence for acquisition and possession of firearms is
materially different from a licence for manufacture, sale etc. While the latter confers a right to carry
on a trade or business and is a source of earning livelihood, the former is merely a personal privilege
for doing something which without such privilege would be unlawful. In my opinion the obtaining of
a licence for acquisition and possession of firearms and ammunition under the Arms Act is nothing
more than a privilege and the grant of such privilege does not involve the adjudication of the right of
an individual nor does it entail civil consequences. I may, however, hasten to add that even an order
rejecting the application for grant of licence may become legally vulnerable if it is passed arbitrarily
or capriciously or without application of mind. No doubt, a citizen, may apply for grant of a licence
of firearms mostly with the object of protecting his person or property but that is mainly the
function of the State. Even remotely this cannot: be comprehended within the ambit of Article 21 of
the Constitution which postulates the fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty. It
deals with deprivation of life and as held in Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 : (AIR 1950 SC
27). Article 21 is attracted only is cases of deprivation in the sense of total loss and that accordingly
has no application to the case of a mere restriction upon the right to move freely or to the grant of
licence for possession and acquisition of firearms which stands on an entirely different footing from
the licence to carry on a trade or 'occupation. The rule of natural justice cannot be invoked unless
civil consequences ensue. A civil right being adversely affected is a condition precedent for attracting
the 'audi alteram partem rule'. The cases of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 2

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

1970 SC 158 and Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 were decided on the basis that the
action under challenge in those eases did not involve any civil consequences. Black's Law Dictionary,
Fifth Edition, at page 222 contains the following definition of "Civil" :--

"Relating to private rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with criminal
proceedings.

The word is derived from the Latin civilis, a citizen. Originally, pertaining or appropriate to a
member of a civitas or free political community; natural or proper to a citizen. Also, relating to the
community, or to the policy and government of the citizens and subjects of a State."

The term 'Civil rights' is also defined in Black's Law Dictionary at page 1190 as under :

"Civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the State or Country, or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They
include the rights" of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedon of contract, trial by
jury, etc. Or, as otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a State or community. Such term may also refer, in its very general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. Also, a term applied to certain rights secured
to citizens of the United States by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution,
and by various acts of Congress (e.g. Civil Rights Acts) made in pursuance thereof."

Thus, civil rights are capable of being enforced in a civil action. On the other hand, privileges are not
amenable to such action. In such cases the action taken constitutes denial of a privilege and is
distinct from interference with a right. The denial of civil rights is visited with civil consequences
whereas no such result follows the withdrawal of privileges. In the case Ram Gopal Chaturvedi
(supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that the termination of the service of a temporary Civil
Judge did not involve any civil consequences and consequently no question of following the
principles of natural justice arose. The consistent trend of judicial decisions has been that the official
granting of the licence involves the exercise of discretionary licensing powers which are concerned
with privileges and not rights. See Randall v. Northcote Council (1910) 11 CLR 100, 117-119,
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Finlayson (1916) 22 CLR 340; Ex. P. Macarthy, re The Milk
Board (1935) SR (NSW) 47; Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66; R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr.,
ex p. Parker (1953) 1 WLR 1150; Modern Theatres (Provincial) Ltd. v. Peryman (1960) NZLR 191 See
also Merchants Bank Ltd. v. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 1 All NLR 598 (Nigeria) (revocation
of licence). The decision in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66 was to the effect that the Controller
of Textiles in Ceylon had cancelled a textile dealer's licence in pursuance of a power to revoke a
licence when he had 'reasonable grounds' for believing its holder to be unfit to continue as a dealer.
It was held that the Controller was not determining a question affecting the rights of subjects but
was merely taking executive action to withdraw a privilege. De Smith in his 'Judicial Review of
Administrative Action', Fourth Edition (page 188-189) remarks:

"This conceptualist approach has been in large part abandoned in favour of a more sophisticated
analysis towards the procedural duties of licensing authorities and a more realistic assessment of the

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 3

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

economic effect upon the individual."

In my opinion the above analysis cannol be legitimately extended to the exercise of such
discretionary power or grant of privileges such as the initial issuing of a firearm licence. The shift in
the cases is reflected only where the question determined is one "affecting the rights of subjects. The
rights affected may be rights to the enjoyment of personal liberty, to the tenure of an office or
pursuit of a profession or other calling, to the retention of unincumbered ownership and possession
of property, to the carrying on of trade and the free negotiation of other contracts, to the receipt of
compensation and social security benefits due under statute, or, in the case of the ex gratia awards
of compensation to criminal injuries, authorised by a non-statutory administrative scheme, to
immunity from fines, rates and other fiscal burdens, and to relief from such burdens. This catalogue
is'by no means exhaustive.

4. But the orders refusing to renew a licence or withdrawal or cancellation of an existing licence
share an entirely different legal complexion. They are more serious matters than mere refusal to
grant a licence in the first instance. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(Fourth Edition) sums up the distinction in the following words :

"Unless the licensee has already been given to understand when he was granted the licence that
renewal is not to be expected, non-renewal may seriously upset his plans, cause him economic loss
and perhaps cast a slur on his reputation. It may, therefore, be right to imply a duty to hear before a
decision not to renew when there is a legitimate expectation of renewal, even though no such duty is
implied in the making of the original decision to grant or refuse the licence.

To equate a decision summarily to revoke a licence with a decision not to, grant a licence in the first
instance may be still more unrealistic. Here the "privilege" concept may be peculiarly inapposite,
and its aptness has not been enhanced by the manner in which it has been employed. There ought to
be a strong presumption that prior notice and opportunity to be heard should be given before a
licence can be revoked. It should be especially strong where revocation causes deprivation of
livelihood or serious pecuniary loss, or is dependent on a finding of misconduct. The presumption
should be rebuttable in similar circumstances to those in which summary interference with vested
property rights may be permissible."

5. Under Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959 provision is made for grant of licence for acquisition and
possession of firearms and ammunition. It reads :

3. Licence for acquisition and possession of firearms arid ammunition. No person shall acquire,
have in his possession, or carry any firearm or ammunition unless he holds in this behalf a licence
issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder;

Provided that a person may, without himself holding a licence, carry any firearm or ammunition in
the presence, or under the written authority, of the holder of the licence for repair or for renewal of
the licence or for use by such holder."

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 4

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

The considerations which would weigh with the licensing authority in the matter of grant of licence
are set out in Sub-section (3) of Section 13 w hich provides :

(3) The licensing authority shall grant -- .

(a) A licence underS. 3 where the licence is required -

(i) by a citizen of India in respect of a smooth bore gun having a barrel of not less than twenty inches
in length to be used for protection or sport or in respect of a muzzle loading gun to be used for bona
fide crop protection;

Provided that where having regard to the circumstances of any case, the licensing authority is
satisfied that a muzzle loading gun will not be sufficient for crop protection, the licensing authority
may grant a licence in respect of any other smooth bore gun as aforesaid for such protection, or

(ii) in respect of point 22 bore rifle or an air rifle to be used for target practice by a member of a rifle
club or rifle association licensed or recognised by the Central Government;

(b) a licence under Section 3 in any other case or a licence under Section 4, Section 5, Section 6,
Section 10 or Section 12, if the licensing authority is satisfied that the person by whom the licence is
required has a good reason for obtaining the same."

A licence granted under Section 3 unless revoked earlier may continue for a period of three years.
This provision is contained in Section 17 which deals with variation, suspension and revocation of
licences and may for the sake of convenience be quoted here :

"17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences. -- (1) The licensing authority may vary the
conditions subject to which a licence has been granted except such of them as have been prescribed
and may for that purpose, require the licence-holder by notice in writing to deliver up the licence to
it within such time as may be specified in the notice.

(2) The licensing authority may, on the application of the holder of the licence, also vary the
conditions of the licence except such of them as have been prescribed.

(3) The licensing authority may, by order in writing, suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit
or revoke a licence, --

(a) If the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by
any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any
arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or

(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to
suspend or revoke the licence; or

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 5

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong
information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person in his behalf at the time of
applying for; or

(d) if any of the conditions of the licence have been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under Sub-section (1) requiring him
to deliver up the licence.

(4) The licensing authority may also revoke a licence on the application of the holder thereof.

(5) Where the licensing authority makes an order varying a licence under Sub-section (1) or an order
suspending or revoking a licence under Sub-section (3), it shall record in writing the reasons thereof
and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case
the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such
statement.

(6) The authority to whom the licensing authority is subordinate may by order in writing, suspend
or revoke a licence on any ground on which it may be suspended or revoked by licensing authority;
and the foregoing provisions of this section shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the
suspension or revocation of a licence by such authority.

(7) A court convicting the holder of a licence of any offence under this Act or the rules made
thereunder may also suspend or revoke the licence;

Provided that if the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the suspension or revocation shall
become void.

(8) An order of suspension or revocation under Sub-section (7) may also be made by an appellate
Court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision.

(9) The Central Government may, by order in the official Gazette, suspend or revoke or direct any
licensing authority to suspend or revoke all or any licences granted under this Act throughout India
or any part thereof.

(10) On the suspension or revocation of a licence under this section the holder thereof shall without
delay surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked or to such
other authority as may be specified in this behalf in the order of suspension or revocation."

Section 18 provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the licensing authority refusing to
grant a licence or varying the conditions of a licence or by an order of the licensing authority or the
authority to whom the licensing authority is subordinate, suspending or revoking a licence, may
prefer an appeal against that order to such authority (hereinafter referred to as the appellate
authority) and within such period as may be prescribed. Provided that no appeal shall lie against any

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 6

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

order made by, or under the directions of the Government.

6. A perusal of Section 17 makes it manifest that before exercising the power of revocation etc. under
that provision no notice is required to be given to the licence holder. Sub-section (5) merely requires
that for passing an order suspending or revoking a licence the licensing authority shall record in
writing the reasons thereof and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of
the same. Even this requirement can be dispensed with in a case where the licensing authority is of
the opinion that it will not be in public interest to furnish that statement. Thus, the Act or the Rules
made thereunder do not contemplate a notice being given to the licence holder before cancelling or
varying or suspending the licence of a licence holder. Nevertheless, the act of cancelling or refusing
to renew a licence leads to grave consequences. The licence may have been presumably obtained by
a person on satisfaction of the licensing authority about the circumstances of his individual ease and
for his protection and the withdrawal or cessation of such privilege may adversely affect the licence
holder's security or protection and may even be a slur on his reputation. The withdrawal or refusal
to renew the subsisting licence is in my opinion intrinsically a quasi-judicial act and, therefore, it
attracts the rules of natural justice. That is why the statute also insists on such action being taken in
a most circumspect and cautious manner. Both Sections 14 and 17(5) make the recording in writing
the reasons for such order mandatory and furnishing to the holder of the licence a brief statement of
the same is also mandatory, unless in an exceptional case it is not found expedient to furnish such
statement. In Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 Das, J. formulated two
tests to find out whether a proceeding before an authority is a quasi-judicial proceeding. They are : -

(i) That if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide
disputes arising o ut of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by
another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to
each other there is lis and prima facie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it
is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act
and

(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject,
then, although there are no two parties apart from the, authority and the contest is between the
authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the
authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act
judicially."

Thus, in the matter of cancellation of a licence even though there are no two parties and the contest
is only between the authority proposing to cancel the licence and the subject opposing it, the final
determination by the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act. The provisions about recording of
reasons in writing indicate that the authority is required by the slatut e to act judicially.

7. We eannot also overlook the fact that the niceties or subtle distinction between an administrative
and quasi-judicial act have become nearly obsolete in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150. In that case the Supreme Court observed as follows
:

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 7

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

"The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put negatively to prevent miscarriage
of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words
they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has
undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two
rules, namely, (1) no one shall be judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and
(2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing taudi
alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial
enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the
course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very
recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law
under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of
natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural
justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made applicable
to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates
administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered
administrative at one time are now being considered quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just
decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust
decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a
quasi-judicial enquiry."

Thus, the prevailing judicial norm of the concept of natural justice is the paramount duty to "act
fairly" according to the circumstances of the case. In other words, an all pervasive legal obligation is
east on every authority which passes orders, which would adversely affect a person's enjoyment of
an existing benefit and are fraught with grave consequences, irrespective of the question as to
whether such act is administrative or quasi-judicial.

8. It is also not necessary that the duty to act judicially would depend entirely on express provision
to that effect in a statute. It need not be shown to be superadded. It has to be spelt out from the very
nature of the function to be performed. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC
1269 it was observed by the Supreme Court while discussing the principles of natural justice ;

'The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing
applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon
matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up
that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty
to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be
performed; it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the
prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials
of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity."

The dictum was still more clearly enunciated in the same case in these words :

"It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which
involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 8

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, (he evidence in support thereof
and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the
evidence."

Thus, before cancelling a licence for firearms the license holder must be given an opportunity of
being heard.

9. The concept of 'fair hearing' in accordance with the principles of natural j ustice varies in different
contexts. The precise requirement of procedural fairness would depend very much on the facts of
the case itself. As observed by the Supreme Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala,
AIR 1969 SC 198 :

"The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of
natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the tribunal and the
rules under which it functions."

The Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P., Allahabad v.
Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 ruled :

"The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act
judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the
rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the
effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute."

The powers to control or regulate activities by the licensing authority cover a vast spectrum. To
thrust every licensing authority inside a standard procedural straight jacket would be absurd. The
licensing procedures do, in fact, vary widely. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down a rigid formula
as to the precise manner in which the rules of natural j ustice should be given effect to in every case.
The circumstances would dictate their own pattern. One of the vital factors to be taken into account
in this regard is that an emergency may require a precipitate action to deal with an extraordinary
situation. Where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking
of prompt action, especially action of a preventive or remedial nature, the meticulous observance of
the rule of giving a prior notice would defeat the very object of the action proposed to be taken. After
all, the rules of natural justice are not ends in themselves and if they fail to serve the ends of justice
they can be suitably modified or adjusted. They should not be allowed to become the master instead
of the servants of justice. As Lord Devlin remarked in Re K. (Infants) (1965) AC 201 (238) :

"In a child custody case the House of Lords refused disclosure of confidence reports made to the
Court by the Official Solicitor because their disclosure to the parents concerned might damage
children whose welfare it was the paramount duty of the Court to protect; common-law duties to
abide by the rules of natural justice were not ends in themselves, and where they did not serve the
ends of justice, they could not be allowed to "become the master instead of the servant of justice."

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 9

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

Thus, for instance, the purpose of giving executive powers to detain security suspects in wartime or
.grave emergency would plainly be frustrated if the suspect were entitled to prior notice of its
intentions (See R. v. Halliday 1917 AC 260; Liversidge v. Anderson 1942 AC 206. It would not be
inapt to refer to the following synopsis of the law on this point contained in De Smith's Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition (at pages 180-191) :

"Summary action for the maintainance of public security or public order in normal times may also
be permissible. Orders may be made regulating the conduct of a public procession, or prohibiting
the holding of all public processions or all public processions of a specified class for a period in a
locality, if the police have reasonable grounds for apprehending serious public disorder. Although
the point has not been tested, it is unlikely that a Court would hold that the organisers of
processions affected were entitled to be notified of the intention to make an order or to make
representations against it beforehand.

The interests of public safely or public health may similarly justify summary interference with
property rights, as where an inspector from the Ministry of Agriculture destroys infected crops, or a
dangerous nuisance is abated without notice in the exercise of common-law powers, or a public
official deinfests verminous articles offered for sale, or an administrative order is made prohibiting
smoking in a theatre. That urgency may warrant disregard of the audi alteram partem rule in other
situations is generally conceded."

Normally or ordinarily a notice before an action should be given to the person affected but in such
extraordinary cases as mentioned above, the absence of hearing before the action can be adequately
compensated for by a hearing 'ex post facto'. A prior hearing may be better than subsequent hearing,
but a subsequent hearing is better than no hearing at all; and in some cases the Courts have held
that statutory provisions for an administrative appeal or even full judicial review on the merits are
sufficient to negative the existence of any implied duty to hear before the original decision is made.
See St. James and St. John, Clerkenwell, Vestry v. Feary, (1890) 24 QBD 703, R v. Randalph (1966)
SCR 260 (interim mail stop order) see also Pearlberg v. Varty (1972) 1 WLR 534 (tax assessments);
Furncl v. Whangarel High Schools Board, 1973 AC 660 (suspension of teacher pending full hearing);
see also Maynard v. Osmond 1977 QB 240, 253 (right of legal representation on appeal a reason for
not implying the same right in original proceedings). Likewise, a full judicial review on the merits
has also been regarded as sufficient substitute for a hearing before the proposed action is taken. See
Literature Board of Review v. H.M.H. Publishing Co. Inc. (1964) Qd. R. 261 (order prohibiting
distribution of Playboy magazine); Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106. The
rule is not inflexible. The ultimate test is whether in a particular context the procedure 'as a whole'
afforded the individual an opportunity for hearing.

That is why it has been held that where the initial decision is only provisional in the sense that it
does not take effect at all until a prescribed period for lodging objections has expired, the
opportunities thus afforded to a person aggrieved are in substance a right to an antecedent
hearding. See Re Dabar Motors Ltd. and Maccormac (1975) 50 DLR (3d) 641. The efficacy of
post-decisional remedial hearing was underlined by the Supreme Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, Bhagwati, J. observed (page 630) :

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 10

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

"The Passport Authority may proceed to impound the passport without giving any prior opportunity
to the person concerned to be heard, but as soon as the order impounding the passport is made, an
opportunity of hearing, remedial in aim, should be given to him so that he may present his case and
controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport should not be impounded
and the order impounding it recalled. This should not only be possible but also quite appropriate,
because the reasons for impounding the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport
Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to
make a representation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his
passport. A fair opportunity of being heard 'following immediately upon the order impounding the
passport, would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and a provision requiring giving of such
opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by implication in the Passports Act,
1967. If such a provision were held to be incorporated in the Passports Act, 1967 by necessary
implication, as we hold it must be, the procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding a passport
would be right, fair and just and it would not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or
unreasonableness. We must, therefore, hold that the procedure 'established' by the Passports Act,
1967 for impounding a passport is in conformity with the requirement of Act. 21 and does not fall
foul of that article."

In the instant case the gun licences of the petitioners were cancelled without any prior notice to
them and in Wrif Petition No. 9379 of 1984 the operation of the impugned order which directed the
petitioners to surrender their guns was stayed by this Court. In Writ Petition No. 9394 of 1984
which was directed against a similar order the sole petitioner was directed to deposit his firearm
with the dealer who would keep the same in safe custody during the pendency of the writ petition.
The impugned order expressly recited that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace
from the petitioners if they were allowed to retain their firearms. Hence, cancellation of their
firearms licences without any prior notice to them might be justified but the ingredients of natural
justice would not be satisfied until the petitioners were subsequently afforded an opportunity of
hearing and making representations against the impugned order. This being the legal aspect of the
cast. I am of the opinion that the law laid down in para 16 in Chhanga Prasad Sahu's ease (1984 All
WC 145)(FB) (supra) extracted in the earlier part of this judgment must be supplemented by the
further observations that alter taking the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence
the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file
objections against the preliminary order and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which
may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. In other words, it is incumbent upon the licensing
authority to refrain from attaching finality to the order of cancellation until the aggrieved petitioner
has been heard by such authority and his objections have been adjudicated. The licensing authority
can also for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of
directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until the objections have been decided. It
follows that in the event of the objections being allowed the licence as well as the firearm must be
restored to the licence holder. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra) the
Supreme Court in its final order did not set aside the impugned order of impounding the passport,
instead it merely allowed the petitioner to make a representation and issued direction that the
representation should be dealt with expeditiously by the Passport Authority.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 11

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

10. In view of the law as stated above I allow the petitioners two weeks' time from today to file their
representations or objections before the District Magistrate, Banda and order the District Magistrate
to decide the same within three weeks from the dateof filingsuch representations or objections. It is
not necessary to set aside the impugned order and I accordingly dispose of these writ petitions
without passing any such formal order. There will be no order as to costs.

Wahajuddin, J.

I agree.

R.P. Shukla, J.

I agree.

A.N. Dikshita, J.

I agree.

H.N. Seth, J.

11. Each of the six petitioners in Writ Petition No. 9379 of 1984 (Kailash Nath, Husaina alias
Hardayal, Bhaiya Lal, Moti Lal, Bhagwandin Singh and Bala Prasad) and Jham Singh petitioner in
Writ Petition No. 9394 of 1984 held arms licences issued to them under the provisions of Arms Act.
District Magistrate, Banda has, by various orders made by him on different dates in the month of
July, 1984, cancelled arms licences of various petitioners on the ground that he felt satisfied that as
there was, on the part of the petitioners, an immediate apprehension of breach of peace and that
they were likely to use their firearms for committing crimes, it was necessary to cancel their licences
with a view to preserve the public peace as also to prevent the petitioners from using their firearms
for committing crimes. However, relying upon the observations made in paras 9 and 10 of a Full
Bench decision of this Court in the case of C. P. Sahu v. State, 1984 All WC 145, the District
Magistrate did not, before cancelling the arms licences of the petitioners, afford them any
opportunity to explain why such action be not taken against them. Aggrieved, the petitioners have
approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and contend that the
impugned orders having been made without complying with the principles of natural justice, are
liable to be quashed.

12. The Bench before which the petition filed by Jham Singh came up for admission, felt that the
point raised therein was of general importance and that some of the observations made by the Full
Bench in C.P. Sahu's case (supra), referred to in the impugned order, appeared to be inconsistent
with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commr.
of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1896. It accordingly admitted the petition and referred the case for decision
by a larger Bench. Inasmuch as the same controversy was involved in the petition filed by Kailash
Nath and others, that petition too was admitted and connected with the writ petition filed by Jham
Singh; and this is how the matter has now come up before us.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 12

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

13. In the case of C.P. Sahu v. State, 1984 All WC 145 the questions that came up for consideration
before a Full Bench were as to whether the licensing authority was empowered to suspend an arms
licence pending inquiry into its cancellation or suspension; and whether, in view of the statutory
provisions, was it incumbent upon the authority to afford an opportunity of hearing prior to
suspension pending inquiry. So far as the first question was concerned, no specific provision in the
Arms Act which empowered the licensing authority to suspend licence pending inquiry into its
cancellation or suspension, was brought to the notice of the Bench. It was urged that having regard
to the object and nature of the inquiry contemplated by the Arms Act in this, regard the authority to
suspend an arms licence pending inquiry into its cancellation had, by necessary implication, to be
conceded to the licensing authority. In order to deal with this submission it became necessary for
the Bench to first determine the true nature of the inquiry that the licensing authority is under the
Arms Act required to make before directing cancellation or suspension of an arms licence. The
Bench, after noticing the provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act, observed thus :
--

"A perusal of abovementioned provisions indicates that the licensing authority has been given power
to suspend or revoke arms licence only if any of the conditions mentioned in Sub-clauses (a) to (e) of
Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act exists. Sub-section (5) of Section 17 makes it obligatory upon
the licensing authority to, while passing the order revoking/suspending an arms licence, record in
writing the reasons therefor and to, demand, furnish a brief statement thereof the holder of the
licence unless it considers that it will not be in public interest to do so. According to this section, the
stage of recording of the reasons for cancelling or suspending an arms licence is reached only when
such an order is made and not before it. A brief statement of such reasons is to be communicated to
the licensee only if;

(i) the licensee asks for it, and

(ii) the licensing authority does not consider disclosure of such reason to be against public interest."

The Bench thereafter went on to conclude as follows : --

"The provision that the reason for revocation/suspension of an arms licence is to be recorded when
the licensing authority makes the order and that a brief statement thereof is to be communicated
only if the licensee demands it and that too only where the licensing authority does not consider
disclosure of such reasons to be against public interest, makes the legislative intention that, if at all,
the licensing authority is obliged to communicate to the licensee the grounds for
revocation/suspension of the licence only after the order of revocation/suspension has been made,
absolutely clean. This provision rules out any obligation on the part of the licensing authority to,
before making such order, communicate the grounds for revoking or suspending the license, to the
licensee. Accordingly, placing of any obligation on the licensing authority to notify the grounds of
revoking or suspending the licence, to the licensee before the order for revocation or suspension of
the license is made, would result in forcing the licensing authority to do something which the statute
does not oblige it to do. Such compulsion flowing from any source whatsoever would not be in
consonance with the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act."

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 13

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

The Court then went on to refute the submission that the licensing authority was, on the basis of
principles of natural justice, bound to, before cancelling or suspending an arms licence, afford an
opportunity to the licensee to show cause against the proposed action, by observing that the rules of
natural justice are not embodied rules, nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental
rights. Their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. They do not supplant the
law but supplement it. If a statutory provision can be read in conformity with the principles of
natural jusdce, the Courts should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by
necessary implication excludes the application of any rule of natural justice, then the Court cannot
ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and to read into the concerned
provision the principles of natural justice. Whether or not the exercise of power conferred should be
made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice depends upon the express words of
the provisions conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is
conferred and the effect of exercise of that power. The Full Bench held that in view of the statutory
provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act it was clear that the Legislature had in its
wisdom thought that in such cases an opportunity of being heard should be afforded to the licensee
at a stage following suspension/revocation of a licence and not prior to it. Thus the Legislature has,
in its own way specified the stage at which the principles of natural justice are in such cases to
become applicable and has thereby ruled out the application of such principles at any other stage.

Before us learned counsel appearing for the petitioners did not contend that the line of reasoning
adopted by the Full Bench in C.P. Sahu's case (1984 All WC 145) (supra) to the effect that there was
no scope for the applicability of principles of natural justice in a case where the Legislature clearly
intended to exclude the same and that in case of suspension/revocation of an arms licence under the
Arms Act the legislative intendment was absolutely clear, runs counter to any observation made by
the Supreme Court in the case of Purtabpur Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1896.
Instead, the learned counsel strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 and contended that the Full Bench was not
justified in holding that the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice stood excluded by the
statutory provision contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act and that the licensing authority
could revoke/suspend an arms licence without affording any opportunity to the licensee to show
cause against the proposed action.

14. In Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) the Central Government had made an order impounding
Maneka Gandhi's passport under the provisions of the Passports Act without affording to her any
opportunity of being heard in her defence. The Central Government had also declined to disclose the
reasons for impounding the said passport on the pretext that it would not be in the interest of
general public to do so, but then it was found that this action of the Government was wholly
unjustified and illegal. The validity of the order impounding the passport was challenged before the
Supreme Court inter alia on the ground that the impugned order had been made in contravention of
the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. While dealing with this question Mr. Justice
Bhagwati delivering the leading majority judgment of the Court observed that under the Act, a
passport can be impounded by the Passport Authority only on certain specified grounds set out in
Sub-section (31 of Section 10 of the Passports Act and the Passport Authority would have to apply its
mind to the facts and circumstances of a given case and decide whether any of the specified grounds

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 14

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

exists and would justify impounding of the passport. The Passport Authority is also required by
Sub-section (5) of Section 10 to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making an
order impounding a Passport and. save in certain exceptional situations, the Passport Authority is
obliged to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons to the holder of the passport. When the
Passport Authority which has impounded the passport is other than the Central Government, a right
of appeal against the order impounding the passport is given under Section 11, and in the appeal the
validity of the reasons given by the Passport Authority for impounding the passport can be
canvassed before the appellate authority. Aforementioned factors led the learned Judge to conclude
that the test laid down by the Supreme Court in its various decisions for distinguishing between
quasi-judicial powers and administrative powers were clearly satisfied and that the power conferred
on the Passport Authority to impound a passport was a quasi-judicial power and that it had to be
exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge also observed that
even if the said power was to be considered to be an administrative power, the principles of natural
justice would, in view of the decision in Kraipak's case AIR 1970 SC 150 still govern the exercise of
such power.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that like the Passports Act the Arms Act also by
Sub-section (3) of Section 17 lays down that a licensing authority can suspend/revoke an arms
licence only if any of the conditions specified in Clauses (a) to (e) thereof exists. Sub-section (3) of
Section 17 obliges the licensing authority to, while making an order revoking/suspending an arms
licence, record in writing the reasons for taking the action and to, on demand, furnish to the licensee
a brief statement of the same unless it be a case where the licensing authority feels that it would not
be in public interest to furnish such statement. Section 18 then provides for an appeal by the
aggrieved person against the order made by the licensing authority revoking/suspending the arms
licence. He, therefore, contended that having regard to similarity of the procedures laid down in the
Passports Act for impounding passport and that laid down in the Arms Act for revoking/suspending
an arms licence, the ratio of Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra) becomes fully
applicable to the instant case and it has to be held that the licensing authority, while taking action to
suspend/revoke a licence under the Arms Act continues to be governed by the principles of natural
justice. According to him the rule of audi alteram partem, that is, no decision shall be given against a
party without affording him a reasonable hearing, is one of the essential ingredients of the principles
of natural justice; and any order made by a licensing authority revoking the licence without
affording a reasonable hearing to the licensee would, .therefore, stand vitiated.

16. In my opinion learned counsel for the petitioners is right in contending that in view of similarity
of procedure for impounding passport under the Passports Act and that for revoking/suspending an
arms licence under the Arms Act, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's
case fully applies and the conclusion is inevitable that the licensing authority has, while
revoking/suspending an arms licence under the Arms Act. necessarily to act in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. However, the learned counsel is not right in submitting that as per
principles of natural justice, the licensing authority is bound to afford an opportunity of hearing to
the licensee before revoking/suspending his arms licence.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 15

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

17. In Maneka Gandhi's case, while dealing with Attorney General's submission that having regard
to the nature of the action involved in impounding of a passport, the audi alteram partem rule must
be held to be excluded because if notice was given to the holder of the passport and an opportunity
was afforded to him to show cause why the same be not impounded, the very object of impounding
the passport may get frustrated, the Supreme Court pointed out that audi alteram partem rule which
is a wholesome rule designed to secure the rule of law which is a rule of vital importance in the field
of the Administrative Law must not be jettisoned, save in exceptional circumstances where
compulsive necessity so demands, and that Courts should not be too ready to exclude it in its
application to a given case. It ruled that merely because the traditional methodology of formulised
hearing may have the effect of stultifying the exercise of the statutory power, the audi alteram
partem rule should not be completely excluded. In such cases the Courts have to make every effort
to salvage the cardinal rule to the maximum extent permissible in a given case. It must not be
forgotten that natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is amenable to capsulation under the
compulsive pressure of circumstances. The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid mould and
judicial decision establish that it may suffer situational modifications. The core of it must, however,
remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the
hearing must be genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. What opportunity may
be regarded as reasonable would necessarily depend on practical necessities of the situation. It may
be a sophisticated full-fledged hearing or it may be hearing which is very brief or minimal it may be
a hearing prior to the decision or may even be post-decisional remedial hearing. The audi alteram
partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit modifications and variations to suit the exigencies of
myriad kinds of situations which may arise and that it would not be right to conclude that the audi
alteram part em rule is excluded merely because the power to impound passport might be frustrated
if prior notice and hearing were to be given to the person concerned before impounding the
Passport. The Passport Authority could proceed to impound the passport without giving any prior
opportunity to the person concerned to be heard, but as soon as the order impounding the passport
is made, an opportunity of hearing remedial in aim must be given to him. so that he may present his
case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport should not be
impounded and the order impounding it be recalled.

18. Aforementioned observations made by the Supreme Court make it absolutely clear that the audi
alteram partem rule of natural justice does not, in all cases, oblige the authority to give an
opportunity of hearing to the concerned party before arriving at a decision adverse to it. If the
exigencies and practical necessities of the case so require the rule would stand satisfied even if a
post-decisional hearing remedial in aim is given. Certainly, the exigencies and practical necessities
of the case mentioned above have to be assessed in the context of the statutory provisions as also the
object of the legislation. It was in this context that Bhagwati, J., while holding in Maneka Gandhi's
case (AIR 1978 SC 597) that the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice is applicable to and
would stand satisfied in the case of proceeding for impounding of passport, if the Passport Authority
gives to the concerned party post-decisional remedial hearing, observed thus : --

"This should not only be possible but also quite appropriate, because the reasons for impounding
the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and
the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a representation setting forth his case

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 16

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

andplead for setting aside the action impounding his passport. A fair opportunity of being heard
following immediately upon the order impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate of
natural justice and a provision requiring giving of such opportunity to the person concerned can and
should be read by implication in the Passports Act, 1967. If such a provision were held to be
incorporated in the Passports Act, 1967 by necessary implication, as we hold it must be, the
procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding a passport would be right, fair and just and it would
not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness."

19. Inasmuch as the provisions concerning revocation/suspension of arms licence contained in the
Arms Act specifically require that the reasons for such revocation/suspension are required to be
supplied by the licensing authority after the order of revocation/suspension is made, the affected
person can be in a position to make a representation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside
the order revoking/suspending his arms licence only after the said order is made; and reading the
audi alteram partem rule of natural justice in the Arms Act in consonance with the statutory
provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Arms Act, it would follow that the action of
revoking/suspending an arms licence would be valid and be in accordance with law if the licensing
authority, after making the order, affords to the concerned person an opportunity of making a
representation setting forth his case and plead for its setting aside.

20. So far as the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in C.P. Sahu's case 1984 All WC 145 is
concerned, it had to, for answering the question referred to it, discuss the question as to whether in
view of the statutory provisions contained in the Arms Act a licensee was entitled to a hearing before
an order revoking/suspending his arms licence is made. It held that having regard to the statutory
provisions contained in the Arms Act the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice stood excluded
at the stage prior to making of the order of revocation/suspension of the licence. This conclusion of
the Full Bench does not, in any way fall foul with the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka
Gandhi's case (AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra). It was in paras 8 and 18 of the judgment of the Full Bench
in C.P. Sahu's case observed thus : --

"8. Again a reading of the provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, as forming part of
one integrated scheme, clearly brings out that the licensee is afforded ample protection when the
statute obliges the licensing authority to give, reasons for revoking/suspending a license in writing
and thereafter afford him an opportunity to be hoard by the appellate authority on all relevant
aspects of the matter. It is evident that having regard to the fact that the licences involved in such
cases are in respect of dangerous weapons, the Legislature in its wisdom, thought that an
opportunity of being heard should be afforded to the licensee at a state following
suspension/revocation of the licence and not prior to it. Thus the Legislature has, in its own way,
specified the stage at which principles of natural justice are in such cases to become applicable and
has thereby ruled out the application of such principles at any other stage.

xxxxx

18........ As already explained, if there already is material before the licensing authority and it
becomes apparent to it that possession of arms by the licensee is going to endanger public peace and

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 17

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

safety, it can straightway and without holding any inquiry proceed to revoke/suspend the arms
licence after recording reasons therefor and if the licensee is aggrieved by such orders, he will have a
right to ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority."

21. It was contended that aforementioned observations tend to indicate that according to the
decision in C.P. Sahu's case (1984 All WC 145) (supra) a licensee aggrieved by an order
revoking/suspending his arms licence can have his grievance redressed only by approaching the
appellate authority and cannot get any hearing before the licensing authority and that this view of
the Full Bench runs counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR
1978 SC 597).

22. In my opinion, the observations made in C.P. Sahu's case do not carry any such implication.
What was intended to be laid down therein was that in view of the statutory provisions contained in
the Arms Act the licensee could not, on the principles of natural justice, claim a right of hearing
before the order of revocation or suspension of his arms licence was made and that it was open to
him to have his grievances redressed by way of appeal wherein he was to get in accordance with
principles of natural justice a full hearing to defend himself. The question whether in accordance
with the principles of natural justice the party whose licence had been revoked/suspended was
entitled to a post-decisional remedial hearing before the licensing authority and whether the
question of principles of natural justice did not stand excluded to that extent was neither canvassed
before, nor dealt with by the Full Bench. Accordingly, we are of opinion that nothing should be read
in the Full Bench decision of this Court in C.P. Sahu's case which may imply that in cases of
revocation/suspension of arms licence the licensee is not, on the principles of natural justice,
entitled to post-decisional remedial hearing before the licensing authority itself. In such cases the
licensee has at his option, two remedies, namely, one to apply for post-decisional remedial hearing
to the licensing authority itself, and the other by going up in appeal against the order
revoking/suspending his licence. It is open to the licensee to follow either of the two remedies or
even to claim a post-decisional remedial hearing before the licensing authority followed by an
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Arms Act.

23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am clearly of the view that the impugned orders passed by
the District Magistrate, Banda cancelling the arms licences of various petitioners without affording
any hearing to them do not stand vitiated and no case has been made out for interfering with the
same. However, as the petitioners apprehend that in view of the observations made by this Court in
paragraphs 8 and 18 of its judgment in C.P. Sahu's case (1984 All WC 145) (FB) (supra), the District
Magistrate may feel that the petitioners are not entitled to any hearing by him and that the only
course open to the petitioners is to seek redress before the appellate authority, we make it clear that
even after passing the order revoking petitioners' licences the District Magistrate is, in accordance
with the principles of natural justice bound to, in case the petitioners approach him afford them an
opportunity of showing that the orders directing cancellation of their licences were not justified and
that they deserve to be set aside. In case the petitioners make applications for the purpose within a
period of two weeks from today's date, the District Magistrate must, after hearing them, dispose of
these applications in accordance with law within three weeks of the receipt thereof.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 18

 Kailash Nath And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 13 May, 1985

24. Subject to the observations made above, both the petitions fail and are dismissed. In the
circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1021267/ 19