SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 217022, June 03, 2019

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SALVE GONZALES Y

TORNO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal1 assails the Decision dated July 1, 20142 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06227 entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Salve Gonzales y Torno" for parricide.
It affirmed the Judgment dated May 20, 20133 of the Regional Trial Court-Quezon City, Branch
102, in Criminal Case No. Q-09-160855, finding appellant Salve Gonzales y Torno guilty of
parricide for killing her thirteen-year old son Ronald Gonzales4 and imposing on appellant
appropriate penalties and monetary awards.5

The Proceedings Before the Trial Court

By Information6 dated September 22, 2009, appellant Salve Gonzales y Torno was charged with
parricide, as follows:cralawred

That on or about the 16th day of September, 2009, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, being then the mother of the victim, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of RONALD GONZALES y TORNO, a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there hitting
her (sic) on his head with the use of broomstick ("walis tambo"), thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of her (sic) untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said RONALD GONZALES y TORNO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

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On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.8

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on appellant's identity and her relationship with the
thirteen-year old victim.9 During the trial proper, Rhey Gonzales, Racel Gonzales, Glena
Gonzales, and Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula, Jr. testified for the prosecution. On the other hand,
only appellant testified for the defense.

The Prosecution's Evidence

Rhey Gonzales
He was the eldest among appellant's four children and the brother of Ronald Gonzales. Their
father was already dead. At the time of the incident, he was fifteen years old while Ronald was
thirteen.10

On September 16, 2009, around 7 o'clock in the evening, he and Ronald got home from school.
Appellant also got home from work around the same time. Shortly after, she discovered they
had no current in the house because Ronald sold the bronze wire connected to the electric
meter. Then, appellant's co-workers came to fetch her. When she came back home, she was
drunk. Using a hanger, she hit Ronald several times until the hanger snapped. Still, she did not
stop. She got hold of the broom and using its wooden handle, hit Ronald's head and body. At
that time, Rhey was lying on the lower bunk of their double-deck bed. He cried when he saw
what was going on. His two other siblings Racel and Raymart also cried.11

When Rhey woke up around 6 o'clock the next morning, he saw vomit on Ronald's bed and his
jogging pants were wet with urine. Ronald could not eat and looked very weak. Meanwhile,
appellant asked Ronald why he sold the bronze electrical wire. Ronald confessed he sold the
bronze electrical wire because he needed money for his project. She then again took hold of the
broom and inserted its handle into Ronald's mouth. Later in the evening, when Rhey arrived
home, he learned that their aunt Glena Gonzales brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical
Center. Together with his uncle Teody Gonzales, he went to the hospital to check Ronald's
condition. Ronald died around 10 o'clock in the evening of September 17, 2009.12

Racel Gonzales

She was the younger sister of Ronald. She was eleven years old at the time of the incident. She
saw appellant scold and hit Ronald with a hanger while he lay on the bed. Appellant hit Ronald's
legs, arms, and head with the handle. The following morning, she saw vomit on Ronald's mouth,
on the bed, and on the floor. She also noticed that Ronald was very weak. Later in the
afternoon, she went to the East Avenue Medical Center to visit Ronald. Appellant was at the
hospital when Ronald was pronounced dead.13

Glena Gonzales

She was appellant's sister-in-law and Ronald's aunt. They were neighbors. About 9 o'clock in
the morning of September 17, 2009, she went to appellant's house. Only appellant and Ronald
were there. She saw Ronald unconscious and very pale. When she could not feel Ronald's
pulse, she carried him shouting they should bring him to the hospital. Appellant replied that
Ronald was just pretending. Together with a certain Mommy Ludy, she rushed Ronald to Tiga
Clinic in Manggahan where he was given oxygen. Appellant remained in the house.14

After an hour, the clinic caretaker told them to transfer Ronald to the East Avenue Medical
Center. There, the doctor said Ronald was comatosed and only had 50% chance of survival.
Ronald died around 11 o'clock in the evening.15

Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula, Jr.

He was the Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory who examined Ronald's body on
September 18, 2009. He found that Ronald sustained one external injury (swelling) and one
internal injury (brain hemorrhage). In his expert opinion, the injuries were caused by a forcible
blow using a blunt object. The direct cause of death was a blood clot in his head.16 The
possibility that the deceased sustained it because he fell from a high elevation was very
remote.17

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The Defense's Evidence

Appellant testified that on September 16, 2009, around 5:30 in the afternoon, she got home but
it was dark inside. Racel told her Ronald cut the electrical wiring and sold it. When Ronald
arrived from school, he admitted selling the copper wire to buy something. She ordered him to
lay his hands on the table. She hit them once with a hanger. Racel and Raymart18 saw her hit
Ronald's hands. It was painful for her as a mother so she went out and returned around 9
o'clock in the evening. At that time, her children were already asleep. She hugged Ronald and
told him, "pasensia ka na kong nasaktan kita, kasi kasalanan mo." She went to sleep shortly
after.19

Early the next day, she heard a noise and saw Ronald sitting and leaning on the ladder of the
double-deck bed. When she asked what happened, Ronald said he slipped and fell. Ronald
went to the comfort room and went back to sleep. About 5 o'clock in the morning, she told Rhey
to wake up Ronald. At that time, Ronald was vomiting. She gave Ronald a hot drink thinking her
son was "nalamigan." Meantime, Rhey left to bring Racel to school. When he returned, she told
him to help Ronald take a bath. After the bath, Ronald lay on the bed while she washed clothes
outside.20

When she noticed that Ronald was very weak, she told him to go to his Tita Glena's house.
Glena brought Ronald to the clinic for treatment. They were told though that his heartbeat was
very weak and they needed to bring him to the hospital. She followed them to the clinic, and
together with Glena, brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center. Between 9 o'clock and
10 o'clock in the evening, Ronald died.21

The Trial Court's Ruling

As borne by Judgment dated May 20, 2013,22 the trial court rendered a verdict of
conviction, viz:cralawred

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Salve
Gonzales y Torno, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and she is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perputua (sic) and to indemnify private complainants the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.23

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The trial court found that the elements of parricide were all present in the case. Rhey and Racel
Gonzales positively testified that appellant severely beat up their brother Ronald first with a
hanger until it broke, and then, with the broom's wooden handle. Appellant hit Ronald all over
his body, including his head. This caused traumatic injuries which resulted in Ronald's death.24
 The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding her guilty of parricide despite the
prosecution's alleged failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She denied killing her
son. She insisted Ronald just slipped.25 She also argued that even assuming she killed Ronald,
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must be appreciated
in her favor.26

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General
Karl B. Miranda and Senior State Solicitor Noel Cezar T. Segovia27 countered that the
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly established that appellant's acts
toward her thirteen-year old son were sadistic, not just corrective.28 Her defense of denial
cannot outweigh her children's positive testimonies.29 Lastly, the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot favor appellant since there was no notable
disparity between the means she employed in beating up Ronald and the resulting injuries
which caused his death.30

The Court of Appeal's Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of her own children.31 Also, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong cannot work in appellant's favor since her acts were reasonably
sufficient to cause Ronald's death.32

The Present Appeal

Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for her acquittal. In
compliance with Resolution dated June 17, 2015,33 both appellant and the OSG manifested that,
in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the Court of
Appeals.34

Ruling

We deny the appeal.

Parricide and its elements proven

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide, viz:cralawred

Article 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty
of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused is the killer; and (3) deceased
is either the legitimate spouse of the accused, or any legitimate or illegitimate parent, child,
ascendant or descendant of the accused.35

Here, the presence of the third element is undisputed. Appellant is Ronald's mother.36 Ronald's

birth certificate (Exhibit "C")37 showed this fact.
As for the first and second elements, appellant's minor children Rhey and Racel Gonzales
categorically identified appellant as the person who killed Ronald. They each gave an
eyewitness account of how appellant inflicted multiple blows on Ronald's head and body, first
using a hanger until it snapped, and then, the broom's wooden handle, thus:cralawred

Rhey Gonzales

Q: You said that after arrival of your mother she started hitting your brother Ronald Gonzales
with a hanger?
A: Yes, sir. After she arrived she hit Baron with a hanger. And then when the hanger was
broken she got a broom and the handle of the broom is yantok. She hit Baron with the
handle of the broom.
   
Q: You said that the handle of the broom is yantok?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: What part of the broom hit the body of Ronald?
A: The handle, sir.
   
Q: The yantok?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: Okay, what part of the body of Ronald was hit by that yantok?
A: At first on his legs, arms, body and after a while I heard that he was hit on his head.
   
Q: The yantok hit the head of your brother?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: As far as you know, how many times did the yantok hit the head of your brother?
A: Once only, sir.
   
Q: What did Ronald, your brother, the victim in this case do when he was hit by that yantok?
A: He was saying tama na, tama na, hindi na po mauulit. But my mother continued hitting
him.38
 
xxx
   
Q: By the way, did your mother stop hitting Ronald?
A: When he was hit at the head, and after hitting him again on his body for a few times and
then she stopped.39
 
Racel Gonzales
   
Q: What part of the body of your Kuya Ronald was hit by your mother?
A: His legs, arms and head, sir.
   
Q: What particular object was used by your mother in hitting your brother?
A: At first she used hanger but when the hanger was broken, she used the broom.
   
Q: And you said that your brother Ronald was hit by that tambo in different parts of his body,
what particular part of the tambo was used in hitting the body of your brother?
A: The handle, sir.40
   
Q: What was the position of Ronald when he was hit by your mother?
A: He was lying down sir.41
   
Q: Were you able to hear words coming from your brother while he was being hit by your
mother?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: What particular words were uttered by Ronald?
A: Huwag na po hindi na po ako uulit.42

The testimonies of Rhey and Racel Gonzales pointing to their own mother as the person who,
without mercy, beat up their thirteen-year old brother on the night of September 16, 2009, and
again the next morning, deserve full faith and credence. These children would not impute such a
heinous crime as parricide on their own mother if it were not true. More so because these
children, young as they were, only had appellant to take care of them as their father had already
died. The testimonies of children against their own flesh and blood are given great weight,
especially when no ill will is shown,43 as in this case.

Too, the positive testimonies of Rhey and Racel Gonzales firmly interlocked with
the anatomical sketch44 and Medico-Legal Report45 of Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula, Jr. His
findings showed that the fatal blow caused blood clot in Ronald's head, causing his death,
thus:cralawred

Q: On the second paragraph of this Medico Legal Report there is a notation "HEAD: 1.
Swelling, left temporo-parietal region measuring 7x6 cm., 7 from the midsagittal line.
 There is a cavitation at the epidural area of the left temporo-parietal region, measuring
10x10 cm. filled with blood and blood clots". Can you explain this term in layman's view?
A: My findings is indicated in the anatomical sketch the location of the swelling on the left
side of the head and the swelling measures 7x6 cm. and 7 cm. from the midsagittal line
and when I dissected the head of the victim there is a cavitation on the left side of the
radium and this measures 10x10 cm. is filled with blood and blood clots which is the direct
cause of the death of the victim which is epidural hemorrhage.46
 
xxx
   
Q: What may cause the injury?
A: The swelling and the internal injury sustained by the victim which is blood is caused by
severe application called (sic) blunt caused by a blunt object, sir.
   
Q: So it may be caused by anything which is (sic) consists of wood or it would be any kind
of ...?
A: Anything that is solid, sir.
   
Q: So as far as your finding is concerned, how many injuries you found in the head of the
victim?
A: There is one external injury the swelling and one internal injury which is the brain
hemorrhage which is cause(d) by blunt application of force.47
 
xxx
   
Q: You also testified a while ago that in your findings the direct cause of death was the blood
clot you found on the head?
A: Yes, ma'am.48

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth. It rates highly in the hierarchy
of trustworthy evidence. The physical evidence here is compatible with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses but inconsistent with appellant's defense of denial. These testimonies,
therefore, must prevail.49 In any event, the Court has invariably ruled that denial is a weak
defense which becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses.50

Appellant's story that she only smacked Ronald's hands and that he fell from the top bunk of
their double-deck bed is unworthy of belief. Again, it cannot prevail over her children's positive
testimony that after beating up Ronald with a hanger all over his body, they also saw her hit
Ronald in the head with the broom's yantok handle and even inserted it in his mouth. Being in
the same room with appellant and Ronald, Rhey and Racel witnessed up close appellant's acts
of cruelty inflicted on their helpless brother Ronald.
At any rate, Dr. Porciuncula, Jr. specifically ruled out appellant's theory that Ronald's fatal head
injury resulted from his supposed fall from a relatively high elevation, viz:cralawred

Q: Would it be possible, Mr. Witness, that a person who might have fallen from a relatively
high days (sic) might have sustained the said swelling or internal injuries?
A: The possibility is very remote considering that there were no other injuries noted on the
victim except for the swelling on the head.
Q: Are you saying that it is not possible?
A: The possibility is very remote.
Q: So it could still be possible?
A: Yes for percentage there is 1%.51

Dr. Porciuncula, Jr.'s expert testimony deserves respect and great weight as against appellant's
incredible story.

No mitigating circumstance proven

In the alternative, appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated in her favor.

We are not persuaded.

Appellant was sufficiently shown to have used brute force on Ronald so much so that the
hanger she initially used snapped. Even then, appellant did not stop; she got hold of the broom
and using its wooden handle hit Ronald in the head and all over his body. The following
morning, appellant saw Ronald's critical condition. There was vomit on his bed and on the floor.
His jogging pants were wet with urine. He was so weak he could neither get up, nor hold a
spoon. He later fell to the ground. But appellant still did not take pity on her young child. Once
more, she got the broom and pushed its yantok handle inside Ronald's mouth.52 Rhey's
testimony on appellant's heartless assault on her thirteen-year old child was
unwavering:cralawred

Q: After you woke up what did you notice, if any?

A: When I woke up (I) noticed that there was vomit on the bed of Ronald as well as on my
bed. And his jogging pants was wet with urine.
   
Q: So your mother was there also?
A: A: Yes, sir.
 
xxx
   
Q: Was she able to see the vomit and the urine?
A: Yes, sir. 53
 
xxx
   
Q: What happened next after you cleaned up that mess?
A: After I was able to clean the mess, my mother already cooked our breakfast. And then she
instructed Ronald to get up from his bed. But Ronald was not able to get up from his bed. I
assisted him going down and my mother told him to eat but he could not eat because he
was weak.54
 
xxx
   
Q: What happened after Ronald seated at the bed of your mother?
A: My mother asked him again why Ronald sold the bronze despite giving him an allowance.
She again took the broom and put the end of the handle inside the mouth of Ronald.
   
Q: You said a broom, the broom used in that night in hitting your brother?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: So you are referring to the yantok which was put inside the mouth of your brother?
A: Yes, sir.
   
Q: Was the point of the yantok entered the mouth of your brother?
A: At his lips.
   
Q: But it was able to hit the mouth of your brother?
A: Yes sir. There was a wound in his lips.
   
Q: What did your mother tell Ronald while she was pushing the yantok in his mouth?
A: She was asking Ronald, "bakit mo ba ibinenta yung tanso?" Ronald cannot speak.
   
Q: So what happened after that?
A: After a while when he was being hit by my mother in his lips, he was able to answer that
he sold it because he will use the money for his project.55
 
xxx
   
Q: So what happened?
A: My mother stopped. After that the breakfast was ready so I was feeding Baron but he
could not eat. He was too weak and then he fell down.56
 
xxx
   
Q: So, who was the one who fed Ronald that following morning?
A: He was given food but he was not able to eat because he cannot hold the spoon anymore
and the food was falling.57
 
xxx
Q: You said that you notice that Baron/Ronald was too weak and he fell down?
A: Yes ma'am, I noticed that before I left for school.
   
Q: So, where was your mother at that time?
A: She was at home ma'am.
   
Q: You did not ask help from your mother?
A: No ma'am. My mother said not to mind Ronald because he was a drug addict, he was just
pretending.58

Undoubtedly, appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline Ronald tor his
mistake but by an evil intent to ruthlessly beat up the helpless little boy.59 She kept beating him
up despite seeing him already so weak and frail. Worse, appellant never showed any sign of
remorse, much less, love for her visibly dying child. She even refused to bring him to the
hospital, saying he was just pretending.60 As Rhey vividly recalled:cralawred

Q: Who brought him to the hospital?

A: My auntie ma'am.
   
Q: What is the name of your auntie?
A: Glena.
   
Q: Where was your mother at that time?
A: My mother was just at home.61
 
xxx
   
Q: What steps did your mother do to your brother, Ronald, inspite of the fact that his
condition was unusual as far as you were concerned?
A: My mother did not do anything, because according to her Ronald was just pretending.62

Glena Gonzales recounted that when she saw how pale Ronald was and felt he had already lost
his pulse, she immediately rushed him to the hospital. For her part, appellant did nothing,
merely stayed home, and even mocked Ronald as a mere pretender, viz:

Q: You said that you brought Ronald Gonzales to the hospital, how come what was the
reason why you brought Ronald to the hospital?
A: When Mommy Ludy called me and told me to see Ronald and when I opened the door, I
saw Ronald lying down very pale and when I looked at his pulse he has no pulse that's
why I shouted and told them that we brought (sic) him to the hospital.
 
xxx
   
Q: Who was there or who were there in that very particular incident?
A: There were only two (2) his mother and Ronald, sir.63
 
xxx
   
Q: So what happened after you saw Ronald?
A: I carried him up but she told me that he was just pretending so I brought him inside our
house and tried to give him milk.
   
Q: You said, "sabi niya nagkukunwari", whom you are referring to?
A: His mother, sir.
 
xxx
   
Q: By the way, what was the condition of Ronald during that very moment when you decided
to bring him to your house?
A: He was unconscious so we carried him, sir.64
 
xxx
   
Q: Where was the accused when you were at the clinic?
A: She was left inside their house, sir.
   
Q: So you want to impress the Honorable Court that the accused did not go to the clinic?
A: I was alone because she doesn't want to bring her child to the hospital.65

Appellant's cruelty toward her young child wickedly defies human nature especially the mother's
protective instinct toward her own. In the words of the Court of Appeals, "it is inexplicably tragic
that the very person who brought Ronald into this world, with the natural and unconditional
obligation to protect and nurture him, was also the one who brought his life to a premature end
at the very young age of thirteen (13)."66 Plainly, appellant's brutish acts sufficiently produced,
and did actually produce, her son's death. Appellant, therefore, cannot be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

All told, We affirm appellant's conviction for parricide. The penalty for parricide is reclusion
perpetua to death.67 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proven, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. We
affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.

In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,68 however, the awards of moral and exemplary

damages should be increased to P75,000.00 each. Temperate damages of 50,000.00, in lieu of
actual damages, are also granted. Finally, these amounts shall earn six percent interest per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06227 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Appellant Salve Gonzales y Torno is found GUILTY of parricide and sentenced to reclusion

perpetua. She is further required to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages of P75,000 each; and temperate damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Ronald
Gonzales. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this
decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

cralawlawlibrary
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019

ISIDRO MIRANDA Y PARELASIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio (Miranda), seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 dated May 15, 2017, and Resolution3 dated September 13, 2017, rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38523, which affirmed the trial court's ruling
convicting him of the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

The Antecedents

On September 28, 2011, an Information was filed against Miranda for the crime of frustrated
homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of August 2011 in Barangay Binonoan of Infanta, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, armed with [a] bolo, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, assaulted and repeatedly hacked a certain WINARDO PILO Y MORTIZ, on the
different part[s] of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the parts of his
body, thus, performing all acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless do not produce the same by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused. To wit: the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to the complainant (minor) which prevented his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on December 6, 2011, Miranda pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During
the pre-trial, he interposed self-defense, which led to a reverse trial of case.5

The antecedent facts show that in the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo)
attended the party of his niece at Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he and
his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they passed by the house of
Miranda and threw stones at the latter's home.6

While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his
left arm.7

In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed
possession of the bolo.8
In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed that his
acts were done in self-defense.9 He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00p.m., while
he was at home with his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door, followed by
several other thuds and stones hurled at their house. Miranda peeped through the window and
saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that before he peeped through the door, he heard Pilo
challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other.10 Miranda asked Pilo if something
was wrong, but the latter ignored him and continued hurling stones.11 According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms
downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo's arm with his
bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's oncoming attack. 12

At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter's bolo.
Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained injuries.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision13 finding Miranda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC held that Miranda's
claim of self-defense is biased, self-serving, inconsistent, illogical and contrary to the common
experience of man.14 The RTC further held that Miranda failed to prove that his act of hacking
Pilo was legally justified.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered against [Miranda], finding
him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide, and there being [sic]
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this
Court hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of imprisonment which is the
maximum of prision correccional in its medium period which is Four (4) years and Two (2)
months, as minimum, up to the maximum of prision mayor in its medium period which is Ten
(10) years, as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties, to pay private complainant [Pilo]
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as actual and/or temperate damages,
Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) as moral damages, Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Miranda filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On May 15, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision17 affirming the conviction meted by the
trial court against Miranda. The CA ratiocinated that Miranda's claim of self-defense had no leg
to stand on, considering that the act of Pilo of hurling stones at the house of Miranda cannot be
regarded as an unlawful aggression that wan-anted the latter's act of hacking Pilo with a bolo.18

However, the CA held that although the act may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression, it
may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation on the part of Pilo, which mitigates
Miranda's liability. Pilo's act of throwing stones at the house of Miranda is sufficient provocation
to enrage him, or stir his anger and obfuscate his thinking, more so, when the lives of his wife
and children were placed in danger.19
However, the CA held that there was no voluntary surrender on Miranda's part considering that
he did not actually voluntarily surrender to the police authorities. Thus, the CA modified the
penalty meted by the RTC unto Miranda, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 7,
2016 of the [RTC] of Infanta, Quezon, in Criminal Case No. 2011-150-I
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ISIDRO MIRANDA y PARELASIO is
found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to suffer imprisonment from four (4) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay WINARDO PILO the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00)
as temperate damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) as moral damages. The
award of exemplary damages is hereby ordered DELETED.

SO ORDERED.20

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the prosecution proved
the guilt of Miranda for frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt.

In Miranda's petition for review, he staunchly maintains that the CA erred in failing to exonerate
him, as he merely acted in self-defense.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that
the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of Miranda beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG
maintains that Miranda may not claim self-defense in the absence of an unlawful aggression
from Pilo. Moreover, the OSG avers that Miranda's intent to kill Pilo was evident from the kind of
weapon he used and the number and nature of wounds the latter sustained.

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

It must be noted at the outset that in criminal cases, the factual findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as
when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.21 Guided by this principle, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the RTC's factual findings, which were affirmed by the CA.

The Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that Miranda is Guilty of Frustrated
Homicide

Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that: "(i) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal wound but did not die because
of timely medical assistance; and (iii) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are present."22
It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take his
victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts
only through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of
the assault and immediately thereafter.23 Likewise, such homicidal intent may be inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.24

In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People,25 the Court, quoting Rivera v. People,26 enumerated the

factors that determine the presence of intent to kill, to wit:

(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused.27

In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The
hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal
area.28 Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while
the latter was already sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional
wounds. These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by
one-inch deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when
Damaso arrived and grappled with the weapon.29 Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the
injuries sustained show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries cannot
simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of which, was an
injury to the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely demise, if not for the
timely medical assistance.

Miranda's Claim of Self-Defense is Unbelievable

In a bleak attempt to exonerate himself from the crime charged, Miranda claims that he merely
acted in self-defense.

The Court is not persuaded.

To begin with, when the accused invokes self-defense, in effect, he admits to the commission of
the acts for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would exculpate
him. As such, the burden of proving that his act was justified, shifts upon him.30 This means that
the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attack was accompanied by
the following circumstances: (i) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (ii) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (iii) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.31 The accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted
his acts.32

It, likewise, bears stressing that the most important element of self-defense is unlawful
aggression. This is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense.33 Significantly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (i)
there must have been a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be unlawful. 34 To be sure, the
accused must show that the aggression caused by the victim in fact put his life or personal
safety in real and grave peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined threat.

Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the attack against the accused is
impending or at the point of happening. This scenario must be distinguished from a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong.35

Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all too apparent that the
evidence on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo employed unlawful
aggression against him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the
house of Miranda. Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did not throw stones at him,
much less, utter any invectives, or threatening words against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw
merely hit Miranda's roof and door.36

Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was throwing stones, the latter
did not respond but simply remained mum, and threw a stone at Miranda's iron door. Miranda
even further narrated that after throwing stones, Pilo even approached him, which made him
believe that Pilo was trying to make peace with him.37 This certainly belies an impending threat
to Miranda's life. The following exchange proves the absence of an unlawful aggression, viz.:

ATTY. CAYANAN:

Q: What did you do after you heard the thug (sic thud) which you felt to be caused by stones
that was [sic] thrown to your door?
A: I looked at the window to find out where those thug (sic thud) coming from and I saw Winardo
Pilo throwing stones, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you saw the private complainant throwing stones at your door, what did you do next, if
there was any?
A: I asked him why he was throwing stones at my door while the door did not commit any
mistake, sir.

xxxx

Q: After the said private complainant still continued to throw stones at your door, what
happened next, if there was any?
A: I went out of the house and asked him again why he was throwing stones at my house, sir.

Q: What did the private complainant answer to you, if there was any?
A: He remained silent and then he approached me and I thought that he was going to
make peace with me, sir.38

It is all too apparent that Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed
against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with
him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.

Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the
latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force
beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's attack—and is certainly
unjustified. Notably, in Espinosa v. People,39 which also involves the continuous hacking by the
accused even after the aggressor had been neutralized, the Court stressed that "the act of the
accused in repeatedly hacking the victim was in no way a reasonable and necessary means of
repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter."40

Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pilo stooped down to the ground,
which Miranda perceived as a threat that Pilo was going to pick up a stone, there is absolutely
nothing life-threatening in such a situation. It must be emphasized that imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim.41 Undoubtedly, Pilo's act of
simply stooping down to the ground was in no way a threat to Miranda's life.

It, likewise, bears stressing that Miranda cannot seek exoneration on the simple pretext that the
attack was initiated by Pilo. Suffice to say, in the case of People v. Dulin,42 the Court held that
the fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto show that there was unlawful
aggression. The Court elucidated that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor,
he ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the
accused did thereafter is no longer self-defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured
the aggressor.43 In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after the latter stopped
throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda's act constituted a retaliation against Pilo. Certainly at this
point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful desire of defending himself, but of the evil
intent of retaliating and harming Pilo.

In addition to the fact that there was no unlawful aggression, the Court, likewise, notes that the
means employed by Miranda was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. In Dela Cruz v. People, et al.,44 the Court emphasized
that, "the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. The means employed by a person
resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression."45 Here, the victim Pilo was armed with a stone, in contrast to the 1 ½-inch bolo that
Miranda was brandishing.

More so, as correctly observed by the CA, Miranda could have stayed hidden and protected at
his house. He himself even admitted that he hid among the banana shrubs before hitting Pilo. In
fact, he waited for Pilo to come out of his house, while he was hiding among the banana shrubs
outside of the yard of their house.46

Miranda is Entitled to the Mitigating Circumstance of Sufficient Provocation

Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression,
admittedly, however, such deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda into
anger. The fact that Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable considering that his wife
and daughter were at his home, and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the stones.
In Gotis v. People,47 the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an unlawful
aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as sufficient
provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime.48 "As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient
provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a
person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity."49 The victim must have
committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused.50 Likewise, in order to be mitigating,
the provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.51

In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although there may have been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have
given sufficient provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated. Such acts which were
deemed vexatious range from the victim's act of challenging the accused's family while armed
with a bolo;52 or thrusting a bolo at the accused while threatening to kill him with the lives of the
accused's wife and children placed in peril;53 and the victim attempting to hack the
accused.54 Certainly, Pilo's act of hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully enjoying
their supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of Miranda the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

The Proper Penalty

Article 249 of the RPC states that the penalty for homicide shall be reclusion temporal.
Considering that the crime committed was frustrated homicide, then the penalty imposed shall
be one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor in its minimum term, in
view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence shall be

imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC properly imposed
after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed.55 Accordingly, the
CA correctly meted the penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven
(7) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

However, the Court shall modify the amount of damages awarded in order to conform with
current jurisprudence. Guided by the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,56 the amount of
damages imposed against Miranda shall be as follows: (i) Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (ii)
Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. These
amounts shall be subject to the legal rate of interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of the Court's ruling until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated May 15, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38523,
convicting petitioner Isidro Miranda y Parelasio of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification, in that Miranda is hereby ordered to pay victim Winardo
Pilo the following amounts of damages in line with People v. Jugueta: (i) Php 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, (ii) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and (iii) Php 50,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The total amount due shall earn a legal rate of interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until the full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182750               January 20, 2009

RODEL URBANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 which affirmed with
modification the April 30, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 in
Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5028. The RTC found petitioner Rodel Urbano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

In an Information filed before the RTC, petitioner was charged with Homicide, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 28th of September 1993 in the evening, in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and maul Brigido Tomelden, inflicting upon him
mortal injuries and as borne out from the autopsy report the following findings:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

A- Softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches above
and posterior to the (R) ear.

B- Clotted blood over the (R) occipito-temporal area.

C- No lacerations noted.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

A- On opening the skull there is oozing of dark colored blood from the brain substances.

B- More darked blood vessels at the (L) side of the brain.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral

hemorrhage due to mauling incident.

Which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Brigido
Tomelden.

CONTRARY to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Following the parties’ waiver of pre-
trial, trial on the merits then ensued.

As summarized in the decision subject of review, the prosecution’s evidence established the
following facts:

On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were
at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-
workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated
altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting,
petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up
the fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by
eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and
prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious.

Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general
manager where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day, September
29, 1993. Upon arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife,
Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been rendered unconscious. He
complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him
to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his
lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness,
headache, and other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of
drowsiness and frequent vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison
Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon
Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider
cerebral hemorrhage."3

Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due
to financial constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition
improvement. Upon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme
head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr.
Arellano again attended to him. This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that
Tomelden appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any
stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident."

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that
hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.

The Ruling of the RTC

On April 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of
the RTC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said
accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim in the amount of PHP50,000.00, plus
cost of the suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the CA, his recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25371.

The Ruling of the CA

On January 25, 2008, the CA rendered a decision, affirming the conviction of petitioner, but
awarding moral damages to the heirs of Tomelden, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal of the accused-appellant is DISMISSED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that an award of P50,000.00
moral damages is GRANTED.

Remand of the records should immediately follow finality for the consequent execution of the
decision.5

The appellate court held that the commission by petitioner of the crime of homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 2496 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), had been proved beyond
moral certainty of doubt, pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate cause of Tomelden’s
hospitalization and ultimately his death. And like the RTC, the CA found no qualifying
circumstance to increase or lower the penalty.

Following the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, per the CA Resolution7 of April
24, 2008, he interposed this petition.

The Issues
On essentially the same issues raised before the CA, petitioner now urges the Court to set
aside the appealed decision, or at least modify it, maintaining that the appellate court:

I. x x x erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

II. x x x erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation

on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the
petitioner.8

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Homicide Duly Proved

It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the fistic injury Tomelden sustained was not "the main
underlying cause of his death."9 In this regard, petitioner draws attention to the fact that the fist
fight in question happened on September 28, 1993. Tomelden, however, died only on October
10, 1993 or 12 days thereafter and that, during the intervening days, particularly September 29,
1993, the deceased regularly reported for work. Moreover, petitioner avers that days prior to the
fateful incident of September 28, 1993, Tomelden failed to come to work as he was suffering
from malignant hypertension and that this circumstance greatly engenders doubt as to the
proximate cause of the victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends that he could only be adjudged
guilty of physical injuries.10

We are not persuaded.

The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden right
smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his co-workers
averted that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right
after the September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospital
complaining of headache, among other pains, until his demise on October 10, 1993, or 12 days
after the blow that made Tomelden unconscious.

Significantly, Dr. Arellano testified conducting an autopsy on the body of Tomelden and stressed
that the "softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches above and
posterior to the (R) ear" of the victim could have been caused by a fist blow. She also opined
that the fist blow which landed on Tomelden’s head could have shaken his brain which caused
the cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed by that of
Rosario who related about her husband’s post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly
establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it.

The CA observed aptly:

It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired
during the fisticuff incident x x x more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face of
[Tomelden], taken together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which
described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the
"lucky punch" was the proximate cause of [Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had
satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident that transpired on September 28, 1993
that the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days later x x x. It
is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report for work during the
intervening days x x x.

We find no reason to depart from the doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual
findings of the trial court, particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of
witnesses. There was absence of any ill motive on the part of x x x Salazar who in fact testified
that he was a friend of both [petitioner] and [Tomelden]; more so on the part of the attending
physicians.11 x x x

Petitioner’s suggestion that Tomelden succumbed to heart ailment and/or that his death was the
result of his malignant hypertension is untenable, given that the post-mortem report yields no
positive indication that he died from such malady.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s
favor.

On this score, we agree with petitioner.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.––The following are mitigating circumstances:

xxxx

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded
the act.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone;12 it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying;13 the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act14 and should immediately precede the act.15 This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if
provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it
was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.16
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the
one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

Petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on the events immediately preceding the fisticuff and earlier
dovetails with the testimony of Salazar.

In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of
Bugallon for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro,
Chairperson of LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goat’s meat and drank
beer. When it was time to depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in
another table, to prepare to leave.

When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no business stopping
him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner
returned to his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already
consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half
hours before returning to the LIWAD.

Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him,
calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarro’s tricycle driver. Tomelden
allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him
despite his evasive actions. Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter’s blows.

The following testimony of Salazar attests to the provocative acts of Tomelden and to his being
the aggressor:

PROSECUTOR CHIONG

Q After you heard from the accused those remarks, what if any did the victim replied if any?

WITNESS

A They exchanged angry words, sir.

Q What were these words?

A Rodel Urbano said, "When you’re already drunk, you keep on insulting me."

Q And what was the reply if any?

A ‘Akina tua lanti".

PROS. CHIONG

Q Who said that?

WITNESS

A It was Brigido Tomelden, sir.

Q And what transpired next?

A After that they exchange words, sir. " If you like we will have a fist fight" he said.

Q Who said that?

A Brigido Tomelden said.

Q At that time, were you already inside the compound of the LIWAD?

A Yes, sir.

Q After the victim allegedly told the accused, "If you want a fist fight," what transpired next?

A Rodel Urbano said, "if it is a fist fight we fight."17

Q And when you were already in the compound of LIWAD Office, Brigido Tomelden was
challenging the accused for a fist fight?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the accused refused to accept the challenge?

A Yes because Mr. Brigido Tomelden is very much bigger than Mr. Rodel Urbano. He is
stouter than the accused.

Q But finally the fist fight took place?

A Yes, sir.18

PROS. CHIONG

Q When the victim and this accused had this fight, fist fight, they exchanged blows, but there
was this lucky punch that hit the victim because the victim fall down, is that correct?

A When I stop pacifying them x x x, I saw Biring the late Brigido Tomelden, he was much
aggressive than the accused, sir.

Q You mean that although it was the victim who was more aggressive than the accused here,
he also [threw] punches but sometime some of his punches most of which did not hit the victim?

A He tried to parry the blows of the late Brigido Tomelden, sir.

Q Because he tried to parry the blow of the Brigido Tomelden, when the accused throw
punches, the punch was directed to the victim but most of them did not hit the victim, is that
what you saw?

A Yes, sir.19 (Emphasis added.)

It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden. In
fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to
avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s
lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso,20 a case where the accused police officer shot
and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals,21 a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to
a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be
considered in favor of petitioner.

Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered
when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner
tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of
Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight.
And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and
would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-
knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the
potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that
lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial
means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of
"no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor
of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at
Tomelden’s face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium
that he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.

Withal, with no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances appreciable in favor
of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which pertinently provides:

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.––In cases in which
the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the
following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances:

xxxx

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period
that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or from 12
years and one day to 20 years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient provocation from the
victim, and the application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the
next lower penalty prescribed for homicide and this should be prision mayor or from six years
and one day to 12 years. Consequently, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner ought to be incarcerated from prision correccional as minimum and prision mayor as
maximum. In view of the circumstances of the case, considering that the petitioner never meant
or intended to kill the victim, a prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum period is proper while the period of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum period is reasonable.

We find no reason to modify the award of civil indemnity and moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 is, in the
light of the presence and the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in favor of petitioner,
hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment. As thus modified, petitioner Rodel
Urbano is hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with whatever imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the
service of this sentence. The rest of the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 140514-15. September 30, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUNE IGNAS y

SANGGINO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In the amended decision1 dated June 2, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas y Sanggino
guilty of murder aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Appellant was
initially sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,[2 but on motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was upgraded to death by lethal injection.
[3 Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.

Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where

he operated a bakery.[4 He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor
age.[5 Wilma Grace used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline
Gumpic.[6 Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he whom appellant fatally shot.
In the amended Information,[7 pursuant to Section 14, Rule 1108 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet charged appellant as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of March 1996 at Trading Post, Km. 5, Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, without any
authority of law or without any lawful permit did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession, control and custody a Cal. .38 hand gun and two (2) ammunitions, (sic)
which firearm and ammunitions were used by the accused in unlawfully killing NEMESIO
LOPATE at the above-mentioned place and date in violation of the said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the foregoing amended information. The case
then proceeded to be heard on the merits.

Gleaned from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:

Sometime in September 1995, appellants wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
Romenda10 Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate.11cräläwvirtualibräry

On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila.
Romenda and Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
as she was leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio
checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room.12 All three of them
stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various
dates. Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma
Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio.14 In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed
Romenda to reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.

It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom friends written
instructions, informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and
Nemesio. Romenda informed him that the two had spent a day and a night together in a room at
Dangwa Inn in Manila.15Appellant became furious. He declared Addan to aldaw na dayta nga
Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that
Nemesio).16 Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda.17cräläwvirtualibräry

That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellants neighbor who was presented at the trial as a
prosecution witness, had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes was an elder of the Kankanaey tribe
to which appellant belonged. He wanted to confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise
from the same tribe, 18 was having an affair with appellants spouse. Talk apparently had
reached the tribal elders and they wanted the problem resolved as soon as possible.19 A visibly
angry appellant confirmed the gossip.20 Mayamnes also testified that he advised Nemesio to
stay at the Mountain Trail Kankanaey community until things had cooled
down.21cräläwvirtualibräry

Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale.
Among the potential buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the
offer.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load his bakery equipment
on board a hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya.23cräläwvirtualibräry

At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie
Bayanes, a trader in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet.24 The
Trading Post is a popular depot where vegetable growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce
late in the evenings for sale to wholesalers and retailers. Witness Bayanes said she was at the
unloading area (bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the latters booth, when suddenly
two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.25cräläwvirtualibräry

Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified
that she saw a person falling to the ground.26 Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16
inches away,27 was another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually
walked away.28cräläwvirtualibräry

Initially, she only saw the gunmans profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his
face.29 She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar
with him as he was her townmate and had known him for several years. Witness Bayanes was
five or six meters away from the scene, and the taillight of a parked jeepney, which was being
loaded with vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of the bagsakan, aided her recognition of
appellant.30cräläwvirtualibräry

Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on
hearing gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the
gunfire came from. He saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on
the ground.31 Witness Manis saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he
had known since Grade 2 in elementary school.32 Manis then saw another person, some 25
meters away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the persons face very well,
but from his gait and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor, June
Ignas.33 Manis said that the scene was very dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights
of passing vehicles, but he was familiar with appellants build, hairstyle, and manner of
walking.34cräläwvirtualibräry

Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She said
they were co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad,
Benguet.35 Barredo declared that at around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to
her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served refreshments, appellant took out a
handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from the chamber.36 Appellant then told
her to throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she
complied.37 Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot his wifes
paramour.38 Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9 hours; he left only in the morning of
March 11, 1996,39 according to her. Police investigators later recovered the spent gun shells
from witness Barredos sweet potato garden.40cräläwvirtualibräry

According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim,
Nemesio Lopate, to the Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.41cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified during that
trial that she conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims cadaver. Among her
findings were:

1. Ovaloid hole, 2.0 x 5.0 cm. dms., with blackened edges (1.8 x 1.3 cms. span), on the right
side of the mouth, above the edge of the upper lip

xxx

3. Exit hole on the left side of the mouth, 5.0 x 1.3 cm. dms., with avulsion of the upper lip on the
left side

xxx

9. Circular hole, penetrating, on the back, right side, 0.7 cm. x 0.7 cm. diam., with blackened
edges (0.9 x 0.9 cm. span), at the level of the fifth intercostal space, subscapular area, 13 cm.
from the midline, directed to the left side of the chest, 38.0 cm. from the embedded bullet slug of
the left shoulder.42cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Jovellanos determined the cause of death to be Hypovolemia due to gunshot wound, back,
right, (Point of Entry fifth intercostal space subscapular area).43 She further stated on the
witness stand that she recovered a bullet from the victims left shoulder, which she turned over
to the police investigators.44 According to her, given the blackened edges of the gunshot wound
at the victims back, Nemesio was shot from a distance of less than three (3)
feet.45cräläwvirtualibräry

On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as
prosecution witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to
invite appellant to shed light on the slaying of Nemesio.The law enforcers found appellant
selling bread at Kayapa and brought him back to La Trinidad, Benguet.46cräläwvirtualibräry

Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly after they arrived from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to
talk with appellant at the La Trinidad Police Station. There, appellant disclosed to this witness
that he shot and killed Nemesio.47 Bayacsan, however, did not inform the police about
appellants revelation as he considered appellant his good friend.48cräläwvirtualibräry

Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic, the victims sister, testified that she and appellant had a
private talk, while the latter was in police custody, and appellant admitted to her that he killed
her brother.49 Gumpic declared that appellant revealed to her that he shot Nemesio for having
illicit relations with appellants wife and failing to ask for his forgiveness.50cräläwvirtualibräry

SPO4 Arthur Bomagao51 of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the
fatal shooting of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to him that
he shot the victim with a .38 caliber handgun.52 Bomagao further testified that
appellant surrendered to him the letters of Wilma Grace, wherein the latter admitted her affair
with Nemesio.53cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he
said, he entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a
bakery in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya.54 Appellant claimed that he was having a hard time operating
his bakeshop in La Trinidad as he had no helpers. When Anoma proposed a business
arrangement, he added, he immediately seized the opportunity.55 On March 8, 1996, he and
Anoma then transferred his equipment to Anomas bakery in Kayapa,56 which is some four (4) to
five (5) hours away from La Trinidad, according to appellant. He averred that he was baking
bread with Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio was killed.57 Under oath, appellant said that
he never left Kayapa since his arrival on March 8, 1996. He and Anoma were engrossed in
baking and marketing their produce, he testified, until the policemen from La Trinidad brought
him back to Benguet for questioning on March 14, 1996.58cräläwvirtualibräry

Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellants alibi. Anoma declared that during the last
week of February 1996, he met with appellant in La Trinidad. There, the witness said, he
proposed a partnership with appellant in the baking business to be based in Kayapa.59 Appellant
agreed and on March 8, 1996, they transferred appellants equipment to Kayapa.60 They
immediately commenced their operations and on the evening of March 10, 1996, he and
appellant baked bread at his bakery in Kayapa until 11:00 p.m., when they rested for the
night.61cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court disbelieved appellants defense and sustained the prosecutions version. Its initial
judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime
and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any
mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He
is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the VICTIM the following sums:

1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;

2. P1,800,000.00 for unearned income;

3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and

4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and

5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED in Chambers this 18th day of February 1999 at La Trinidad, Benguet,

Philippines.62cräläwvirtualibräry

Both the prosecution and the defense filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The
prosecution sought the imposition of the death penalty.63 The defense prayed for acquittal on
the ground of reasonable doubt.

On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion. It amended its judgment to
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime
and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any
mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim the following sums:

1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;

2. P2,040,000.00 for unearned income;

3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and

4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and

5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED in Chambers.64cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this automatic review, with appellant imputing the following errors to the court a quo:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE WEAKNESS
OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE

ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS
BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE KILLING OF THE DECEASED WAS
ATTENDED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, TREACHERY AND NIGHTTIME.

V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT APPRECIATED THE
ALLEGED USE OF AN UNLICENSED .38 CALIBER FIREARM AS AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT APPRECIATE IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE, PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

VII

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED EXCESSIVE

DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF FUNERAL EXPENSES AND UNEARNED INCOME OF THE
DECEASED WHICH WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN.65cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellants assigned errors may be reduced to the following pertinent issues: (1) the nature of
the crime committed, if any; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove appellants
guilt; (3) the correctness of the penalty; and (4) the propriety of the damages awarded.

1. Murder or Homicide

Assuming arguendo that the evidence on record suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for
the unlawful killing of Nemesio Lopate, the question arises: Was the killing murder as found by
the trial court or mere homicide? Note that the amended information under which the appellant
stands charged does not, unlike the original information, charge appellant with murder but with
mere unlawful killing albeit through the use of an unlicensed firearm. Note further that the
amended information does not definitely and categorically state that the unlawful killing was
attended by the aggravating or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
and nocturnity.

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information.66 Although the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of
Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective
application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for the trial court
to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the
amended information under which appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only
for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of
Article 249[67 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial courts order to
dismiss the information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No.
97-CR-2753.68 Under R.A. No. 8294,69 which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or
homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance.70 This Court has held in a number of cases71 that there can be no separate
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by R.A.
No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect over a year after the alleged offense
was committed, it is advantageous to the appellant insofar as it spares him from a separate
conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.72

2. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence

But is the prosecutions evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for homicide?

Appellant primarily contests the accuracy of the identification made by the prosecution
witnesses who testified that they saw him at the locus criminis, tucking a gun in his pants and
casually walking away. For one, he contends that the prosecution witnesses who were present
at the scene did not in fact see appellant as the person who allegedly shot the victim. Witness
Marlon Manis was not certain that the person he saw walking away from the fallen victim was
appellant. As per Manis own admission, he merely presumed that it was appellant. As to
witness Annie Bayanes, her identification of appellant as the assailant was equally doubtful. The
fact is she did not see the alleged gunmans face, considering that the only illumination on the
scene was a vehicles taillight. Appellant stresses that both Bayanes and Manis were in a state
of excitement and nervousness as a result of the incident, hence the resultant commotion and
fear distracted their powers of observation. Appellant insists that given these considerations, the
testimonies of Bayanes and Manis failed to show that he was at the scene of the crime, much
less prove that he was the gunman.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the failure of Manis to
see the actual shooting is irrelevant, as such was not the purpose for which his testimony was
offered in evidence. Rather, Manis testimony was meant to provide circumstantial evidence
tending to show the physical description of Nemesios attacker, and not as an eyewitness
testimony to positively identify said assailant. Neither was Bayanes presented to testify as an
eyewitness to the shooting, but to declare that she got a clear look at the face of the suspected
gunman.

We note that at the heart of the prosecutions case is the familiarity of Annie Bayanes and
Marlon Manis with appellant. Absent this familiarity, the prosecutions theory that circumstantial
evidence shows that appellant killed Nemesio would collapse like a house of cards. It was
precisely this familiarity with appellant, which enabled said witnesses to recognize him as the
person tucking a gun in his waistband and walking away from the fallen victim. Bayanes had
known appellant for some ten (10) years before the incident and even described him as a good
man.73 She was only five or six meters away from the scene of the crime and was able to fully
look at the face of the person tucking a gun in his pants and walking away. Familiarity with the
physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the
person.74 That the only illumination in the area came from the taillight of a parked vehicle and
the lights on the roof of the bagsakan does not discredit her account. We have held that
moonlight,75 starlight,76 kerosene lamps,77 a flashlight,78 and lights of passing vehicles79 may be
adequate to provide illumination sufficient for purposes of recognition and identification. Under
the circumstances of these cases, this Court believes that Bayanes was in the position and had
a fair opportunity to identify appellant as the person leaving the crime scene with a gun tucked
in his waist.

Her testimony was buttressed by that of witness Marlon Manis. A former neighbor of appellant,
he had known appellant since 1993. He was a frequent customer at appellants bakery. In the
rural areas, people tend to be more familiar with their neighbors. This familiarity may extend to
body movements, which cannot easily be effaced from memory. Hence, Manis testimony that he
could recognize appellant even just from his build and manner of walking is not improbable. His
declaration that he was some twenty-five (25) meters away from the person walking away from
the victim does not make recognition far-fetched. Once a person has gained familiarity with
another, identification is an easy task, even from that distance.80cräläwvirtualibräry

Evidence should only be considered for the purpose it was formally offered.81 As the Solicitor
General points out, the statements of Bayanes and Manis were not offered to positively identify
appellant as the assailant, but to provide circumstantial evidence concerning Nemesios
assailant, tending to prove that appellant did shoot the victim. Thus, the court a quo committed
no reversible error in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis for
the stated purposes therefor.

Appellant next assails the testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses: (1) Pauline
Gumpic for being inconsistent and flawed with contradictions; (2) Annie Bayanes and Julio
Bayacsan for their unexplained delay in giving their respective sworn statements to the police;
and (3) Mona Barredo for flip-flopping with respect to the alleged admission to her by appellant
and how the police investigators knew about said admission, after she claimed that she did not
tell anyone about his revelation. Appellant submits that the trial court erred in giving weight to
the aforementioned testimonies.

For appellee, the OSG argues that with respect to Gumpics alleged contradictions, they refer
only to unimportant and collateral matters; they do not affect her credibility. With respect to the
delay or vacillation by Bayacsan and Bayanes in giving their statements to the authorities, the
OSG points out that a reading of their declarations in court will show that the alleged delay was
adequately explained. As to Barredos testimony, a closer reading of her supposed flip-flopping
shows that the alleged contradictions were due to an honest misapprehension of fact on her
part.

When the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will not generally
disturb the findings of the trial court because the latter is in the vantage position of observing
witnesses through the various indicia of truthfulness or falsehood.82 However, this rule is not
absolute. One exception is where the judge who wrote the decision did not personally hear the
prosecutions evidence.83 In this case, the records show that Judge Angel V. Colet, who
authored the assailed decision, took over from Judge Benigno M. Galacgac only on April 29,
1997 or after the witnesses for the prosecution had testified. It does not follow, however, that a
judge who was not present at the trial cannot render a just and valid judgment. The records and
the transcripts of stenographic notes are available to him as basis for his decision.

After going over the transcripts of the witnesses testimonies, we find no reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court. With respect to the statements of Gumpic, we agree with the Solicitor
General that alleged inconsistencies refer only to irrelevant and collateral matters, which have
nothing to do with the elements of the crime. It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony
of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these
variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate
or dissemble.84 An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a
ground to reverse a conviction.85cräläwvirtualibräry
We likewise find no basis for appellants contention that Bayanes and Bayacsan failed to give a
satisfactory explanation for the delay or vacillation in disclosing to the authorities what they
knew. Bayanes gave a satisfactory reason for her delay in reporting to the authorities what she
knew. She had simply gone about her normal business activities for some months, unaware that
a case had been filed concerning the killing of Nemesio. It was only nine (9) months after the
incident that she read a notice for help posted by the victims relatives at the Trading Post,
appealing to possible witnesses to the killing to come forth and assist them in their quest for
justice. It was only then that she decided to reveal to the authorities what she knew.

As to Bayacsan, he candidly admitted in court that he considered appellant his friend and he
wanted to protect him and hence, he only disclosed appellants admission to him when the
police started questioning him. There is no rule that the suspect in a crime should immediately
be named by a witness.86 Different people react differently to a given situation and there is no
standard form of human behavior when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful
experience.87 The Court understands the natural reluctance or aversion of some people to get
involved in a criminal case.88 More so where, as in these cases, a townmate of Bayanes and
Bayacsan is involved. We have taken notice that when their townmates are involved in a
criminal case, most people turn reticent.89 Hence, the failure of Bayanes and Bayacsan to
immediately volunteer information to the police investigators will not lessen the probative value
of their respective testimonies. The delay, having been satisfactorily explained, has no effect on
their credibility.90cräläwvirtualibräry

We have likewise closely scrutinized the testimony of Mona Barredo regarding the alleged
admission by appellant to her that he killed the victim. We find nothing flip-flopping about her
testimony. Instead, we find a witness who admitted she was nervous that she might not be able
to answer all the questions.91 Said nervousness was engendered by her erroneous belief that to
be a credible witness, she must have personal knowledge of the crime.92Even the most candid
witnesses make mistakes and may give some contradictory or inconsistent statements, but such
honest lapses need not necessarily affect their credibility. Ample margin should be accorded a
witness who is tension-filled with the novelty of testifying before a court.93cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the verbal admissions
of guilt he made to Gumpic and SPO4 Bomagao inside the police station since said admissions
are inadmissible in evidence as uncounseled confessions.

The OSG submits that said verbal admissions of complicity, as well as those made to appellant
to Bayacsan and Barredo, are admissible as statements forming part of the res gestae. We
agree on this point with the OSG.

The requisites of res gestae are: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or
immediately prior or subsequent to thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.94 All these elements are
present in appellants verbal admission to Barredo that he killed the victim when he went to the
latters house half an hour after the fatal shooting of Nemesio.

The verbal admission by appellant to Barredo was made before appellant had the time and
opportunity to contrive a falsehood. Similar statements have been held to be part of the res
gestae: (1) a childs declaration made an hour after an alleged assault;95 (2) the testimony of a
police officer as to what the victim revealed to him some 30 minutes after the commission of an
alleged crime;96 and (3) a victims declaration made some 5 to 10 minutes after an alleged felony
took place.97 Note that since appellants admission was not solicited by police officers in the
course of a custodial investigation, but was made to a private person, the provisions of the Bill
of Rights on custodial investigation do not apply. The Rules of Court98 provides that an
admission made to a private person is admissible in evidence against the
declarant.99cräläwvirtualibräry

Prosecutions evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. But in the absence of an eyewitness,

reliance on circumstantial evidence is inevitable.100 Resort thereto is essential when the lack of
direct evidence would result in setting a felon free.101cräläwvirtualibräry

Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites are met: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.102 In our mind, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence show with moral certainty
that appellant was responsible for the death of Nemesio:

1. Appellant had the motive to kill Nemesio Lopate for having an affair with his wife, and
appellant had openly expressed his desire and intention to do so;

2. At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis heard two gun
shots at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet and saw Nemesio Lopate fall to the ground;

3. Bayanes saw appellant behind the victim, tucking a gun into his waistband, and walking
away;

4. From another angle, Manis also saw a person whose gait and built resembled that of
appellant walking away from the crime scene;

5. At around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant went to the house of Mona Barredo,
brought out a handgun, emptied it of two spent .38 caliber shells and instructed Barredo to
throw the shells out of the window, which she did;

6. Appellant then told Barredo that he had shot and killed his wifes paramour, after which he
stayed at Barredos house for the night;

7. On March 11, 1996, Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet
recovered a .38 caliber slug from Nemesios corpse and found two (2) bullet entry wounds on
the said cadaver;

8. On March 18, 1996, police investigators, assisted by Barredo, recovered two (2) spent .38
caliber shells from Barredos sweet potato patch, immediately outside her residence wherein
appellant had slept a week before.

The foregoing circumstances clearly show that appellant had the motive, the opportunity, and
the means to commit the crime at the place and time in question. Simply put, the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution has successfully overcome the claim of innocence by
appellant. Under the proved circumstances, appellants defense of alibi is untenable. More so, in
this situation where prosecution witness Bayanes unflinchingly declared that she saw appellant
standing behind the victim, tucking a gun in his pants, moments after the latter was shot. As we
held in People v. Salveron,103 and reiterated in People v. Sesbreo,104 where an eyewitness saw
the accused with a gun, seconds after the gunshot and after the victim fell to the ground, the
reasonable conclusion is that said accused killed the victim.

Appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Bayanes concerning appellants
identification and presence at the crime scene. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.105 Physical
impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places.106 In these cases, the defense admitted that the distance between La Trinidad,
Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be negotiated in 4 or 5
hours.107 Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail.

In sum, we find that the prosecutions evidence suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for
homicide.

3. Crime and its Punishment

As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot, under the provisions of
RA No. 7659, be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The penalty for homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Our task now is to determine whether
there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances which could modify the penalty.

More specifically, may the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm be
taken against the appellant?

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearm in the present case. Like the killing, said aggravating circumstance
must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt, says the appellant. On this point, he adds,
the prosecution failed to adduce the necessary quantum of proof.

We find merit in the appellants contentions. It is not enough that the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter must be
proven with the same quantum of proof as the killing itself. Thus, the prosecution must prove:
(1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to own or possess the
same.108 The records do not show that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that
appellant is not a duly licensed holder of a caliber .38 firearm. The prosecution failed to offer in
evidence a certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Division to
show that appellant had no permit or license to own or possess a .38 caliber handgun. Nor did it
present the responsible police officer on the matter of licensing as a prosecution witness.
Absent the proper evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. Hence such special circumstance cannot be considered for purposes of imposing
the penalty in its maximum period.
Coming now to the obverse side of the case, is the appellant entitled to benefit from any
mitigating circumstance?

Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court
should have considered at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense as well as that of passion and obfuscation. Appellant points out that the victims act of
maintaining an adulterous relationship with appellants wife constituted a grave offense to his
honor, not to mention the shame, anguish, and anxiety he was subjected to. Even the mere
sight of the victim must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional outburst on appellants part,
so that even a chance meeting caused in him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to
overcome all reason and restraint. Secondly, appellant points out that the trial court failed to
consider his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

The Solicitor General counters that there was literally no immediate vindication to speak of in
this case. Appellant had sufficient time to recover his serenity following the discovery of his
wifes infidelity. Nor could passion and obfuscation be appreciated in appellants favor because
the killing was not proximate to the time of the offense. Appellant became aware of the
treatment offensive to his dignity as a husband and to the peace and tranquility of his home two
weeks earlier. This interval between the revelation of his wifes adultery and the fatal shooting
was ample and sufficient for reason and self-control to reassert themselves in appellants mind.
As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the OSG stresses that his supposed
surrender at Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya was actually due to the efforts of law enforcers who came
looking for him. There he did not resist, but lack of resistance alone is not tantamount to
voluntary surrender, which denotes a positive act and not merely passive conduct.

According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply,
the vindication must be immediate. This view is not entirely accurate. The word immediate in the
English text is not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal
Code, which uses the word proxima.109The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time
between the grave offense and the actual vindication.110 Thus, in an earlier case involving the
infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted proximately though not immediately by
the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an extenuating circumstance in favor of
the accused.111 The time elapsed between the offense and the suspected cause for vindication,
however, involved only hours and minutes, not days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General
that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wifes infidelity and the killing of her
supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is
more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged the
unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a
grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.112Thus, in this case,
we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellants favor.

We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent. The
rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and
obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or
motive.113 In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave
offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded
him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
moral equanimity.114 To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his
wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect
and cool off.

Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.115 Records show, however, that leaflets and
posters were circulated for information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police
investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant
for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the
victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor voluntary.

Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of homicide the penalty
imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on
appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

4. Proper Award of Damages

Appellant and the Solicitor General are one in contending that the trial court awarded excessive
actual damages without adequate legal basis. Thus, the amount of P150,000.00 was awarded
for funeral and burial expenses without any supporting evidence on record.116 This cannot be
sustained in this review. In order for actual damages to be recovered, the amount of loss must
not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof, such
as receipts or other documents to support the claim.117 The records clearly show in this case
that only the amount of P7,000 as funeral expenses was duly supported by a receipt.118 Hence,
the award of actual damages should be limited to P7,000 only.

Appellant further contests the award of P2,040,000 for loss of earning capacity as
unconscionable. Since the victims widow could not present any income tax return of her
husband to substantiate her claim that his net income was P60,000 annually, then according to
appellant, there is no basis for this award at all. At best, appellant says, only temperate or
nominal damages may be awarded.

The OSG responds that the award for loss of earning capacity has adequate basis as the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence on the productivity of the landholdings being tilled by
the deceased and the investments made by the Lopate family from their income. Hence, said
the OSG, it was not a product of sheer conjecture or speculation. Nonetheless, the OSG
submits that the original amount of P1,800,000 for loss of earning capacity should be restored
as it is this amount which takes into account only a reasonable portion of annual net income
which would have been received as support by the heirs.

In setting said award at P2,040,000, amended from P1,800,000, for lost earnings, the trial court
took note of the following factors in its computations:
The Death Certificate of Nemesio Lopate shows that he died at the age of 29.119 His widows
detailed testimony shows that their average annual net income from vegetable farming
was P60,000.120 The victims share of the annual net income from the couples farm is half
thereof, or P30,000. Using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the life expectancy of
the victim at age 29 is set at 34 years.

Therefore, total loss of Earning Capacity (X) should be computed as follows:

X = 2/3 (80-29) x P30,000

X = 2/3 (51) x P30,000

X = 34 x P30,000

X = P1,020,000

This amount should form part of the damages awarded to the heirs.

We sustain the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. But there being no testimony or other
proof thereon, the award of P50,000 as moral damages cannot now be sustained. Instead,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 should be awarded.

The award of P20,000 in attorneys fees should be maintained. Records show that the victims
widow had to hire the services of a private prosecutor to actively prosecute the civil aspect of
this case,121 and in line with Article 2208 of the Civil Code,122 reasonable attorney fees may be
duly recovered.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in
Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDEas defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDEREDTO PAYthe heirs of the victim, Nemesio Lopate,
the following sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for loss of earning capacity;
c) P50,000 as civil indemnity; d) P25,000 as temperate damages; and e) P20,000 as attorneys
fees. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169533               March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime
of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,

Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by
striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said
minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop
kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here.
Bring your father here), which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and
which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City;
that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann
Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted
Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; 4 that the petitioner then went to
the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi
City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; 5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x
2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm.
scapular area, left.6

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters,
had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning
Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that
he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. 7

To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap
but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had
burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy."
She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She
described the petitioner as a loving and protective father. 8

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit: 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic
Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the
lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining
brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to human experience.

The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty, 10 viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of
₱5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.11

The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he
was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor
daughters.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the
CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an
appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead,
he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals: 12

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to
keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In
such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The
proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course
to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any
rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to
the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the
commission of the crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating
circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence
rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition
concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are
errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still
be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires
the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the
petitioner received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005, 14 but filed the petition only on
September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.

The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing
the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on
their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on
the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has
committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in
order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been
intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure
justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 16 This objective will be beyond realization
here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the noble ends of
justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and
equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now
awaiting our consideration.

The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without
due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case.
Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic
rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our
duty to correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not. 17

The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. –

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any
of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
 xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their
holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The
records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been
intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had
just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in
favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in
his favor.18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, 19 the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, 21 because
the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of
the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan
had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset
the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, 24 the petitioner shall suffer a
straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages
is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment:
(a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz
the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994

FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Melquiades P. De Leon for petitioner.

Eugene C. Paras collaborating counsel for the petitioner.

VITUG, J.:

An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex crime of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public document, reads:

That on or about August 25, 1983, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Caloocan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Captain of
Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify and attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it appear
that on August 25, 1983 the Barangay council of Panghulo met and identified T-shirt
manufacturing as its livelihood project, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully
well knew, no such meeting was held, where T-shirt manufacturing was identified
and approved by the Barangay Council as its livelihood project, and thereafter,
accused submitted the falsified resolution to the MHS-MMC-KKK Secretariat which
endorsed the same to the Land Bank of the Philippines, which on the basis of said
endorsement and the falsified resolution, encashed LBP check No. 184792 in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), which check was earlier received
by him as Barangay Captain of Panghulo in trust for the Barangay for its livelihood
project and for which fund accused became accountable, and upon receipt thereof
herein accused, with deliberate intent and grave abuse of confidence did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
out of the funds for which he was accountable, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the said amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  1

When arraigned by the Sandiganbayan, Nizurtado pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. During the pre-
trial, held on 17 July 1989, the prosecution and the defense stipulated thusly:
 1. That sometime in 1983 and 1984, accused Felix Nizurtado was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Panghulo of Malabon, Metro Manila and discharged his
functions as such;

2. That sometime in 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila
Commission and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) undertook a Livelihood
Program for Barangays in Metro Manila consisting of loans in the amount of P10,
000.00 per barangay.

3. That as Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo, accused received a check in the

amount of P10,000.00 for said barangay's livelihood program;

4. That the check, to be encashed, had to be supported by a project proposal to be

approved by the KKK;

5. That the accused encashed the check received by him in the amount of
P10,000.00 with the Land Bank of the Philippines; and

6. That the accused distributed the amount of P10,000.00 in the form of loans of
P1,000.00 each to members of the barangay council.  2

After evaluating the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan came out with its factual findings and
conclusions, hereunder detailed:

It appears from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, as well as from the
stipulations of the parties that accused Felix V. Nizurtado was the Barangay Captain
of Barangay Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila from 1983 to 1988.

In April or May 1983, Nizurtado and Manuel P. Romero, Barangay Treasurer of

Panghulo, attended a seminar at the University of Life, Pasig, Metro Manila. The
seminar was about the Barangay Livelihood Program of the Ministry of Human
Settlements (MHS), the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), and the Kilusang
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). Under the program, the barangays in Metro Manila
could avail of loans of P10,000.00 per barangay to finance viable livelihood projects
which the Barangay Councils would identify from the modules developed by the KKK
Secretariat or which, in the absence of such modules, the Councils would choose
subject to the evaluation/validation of the Secretariat.

After the seminar, Nizurtado received a check for P10,000.00 intended for Barangay
Panghulo and issued in his name. The check, however, could be encashed only
upon submission to the Secretariat of a resolution approved by the Barangay Council
identifying the livelihood project in which the loan would be invested. He entrusted
the check to Romero for safekeeping.

In one of its regular sessions, which was on the second Saturday of each month, the
Barangay Council of Panghulo discussed the project in which to invest the
P10,000.00. Among the proposals was that of Romero that a barangay service
center be established. But the meeting ended without the Councilmen agreeing on
any livelihood project.
A few days after the meeting, Nizurtado got back the check from Romero, saying that
he would return it because, as admitted by Nizurtado during the trial, the Councilmen
could not agree on any livelihood project. Nizurtado signed a receipt dated August 4,
1983, for the check "to be returned to the Metro Manila Commission."

After a few more days, Nizurtado asked Romero to sign an unaccomplished

resolution in mimeograph form. All the blank spaces in the form were unfilled-up,
except those at the bottom which were intended for the names of the Barangay
Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which were already filled-up and signed by
Councilmen Marcelo Sandel, Jose Bautista, Alfredo Aguilar, Alfredo Dalmacio, F.A.
Manalang (the alleged Barangay Secretary), and Nizurtado. In asking Romero to
sign, Nizurtado said that the MMC was hurrying up the matter and that the livelihood
project to be stated in the resolution was that proposed by Romero — barangay
service center. Trusting Nizurtado, Romero affixed his signature above his
typewritten name. When he did so, the blank resolution did not yet bear the
signatures of Councilmen Santos Gomez and Ceferino Roldan.

The blank resolution having already been signed by Romero, Nizurtado asked him to
talk with Gomez and secure the latter's signature. Romero obliged and upon his
pleading that his proposed barangay service center would be the one written in the
blank resolution, Gomez signed. But before he returned the resolution, he had it
machine copied. The machine copy is now marked Exhibit J.

Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the blank but signed resolution was later on
accomplished by writing in the blank space below the paragraph reading:

WHEREAS, the Barangay Council now in this session had already

identified one livelihood project with the following title and description:

the following:

Title : T-shirt Manufacturing

Description : Manufacture of round neck T-shirts of
various sizes and colors.

The other blank spaces in the resolution were also filled-up. Thus "Panghulo," "Brgy.
Hall," and "August 25, 1983" were typewritten in the spaces for the name of the
Barangay, the place where and the date when the council meeting took place,
respectively. In the blank spaces for the names of the members of the Council who
attended the meeting were typewritten the names of

Felix Nizurtado Barangay Captain

Marcelo Sandel Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Aguilar Barangay Councilman
Santos Gomez Barangay Councilman
Jose Bautista Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Dalmacio Barangay Councilman
Ceferino Roldan Barangay Councilman

The word "none" was inserted in the space intended for the names of the
Councilmen who did not attend. The resolution was given the number "17" series of
"1983." Finally, the last line before the names and signatures of the Councilmen was
completed by typewriting the date so that it now reads:

UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED this 25th day of August, 1983.

The resolution as fully accomplished is now marked Exhibit D.

Other supporting documents for the encashment of the check of P10,000.00 were
also prepared, signed, and filed by Nizurtado. They were: Project Identification
(Exhibit B), Project Application in which the borrower was stated to be Samahang
Kabuhayan ng Panghulo (Exhibit C and C-1), Project Location Map (Exhibit E), and
Promissory Note
(Exhibit F).

The application for loan having been approved, the Promissory Note (Exhibit F) was
re-dated from August to October 18, 1983, placed in the name of the Samahang
Kabuhayan ng Panghulo represented by Nizurtado, and made payable in two equal
yearly amortizations of P5,000.00 each from its date. The purpose of the loan was
stated to be
T-Shirt Manufacturing of round neck shirts of various sizes and colors.

Nizurtado encashed the check on the same day, October 18, 1983, and re-lent the
cash proceeds to himself, Sandel, Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan at
P1,000.00, and to Manalang and Oro Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and
Barangay Secretary, respectively, at P500.00 each.

On April 25, 1984, Nizurtado who was then on leave wrote Sandel, then acting
Barangay Captain, informing him that per record, he, Romero, and Gomez had not
made any remittance for the account of their P1,000.00 loans from the barangay
livelihood fund of P10,000.00 and advising him to collect, through the Secretary or
Treasurer.

Since Romero and Gomez had not borrowed any amount from the said fund, they
told Sandel to ask Nizurtado if he had any proof of their alleged loans. So Sandel
wrote Nizurtado on May 2, 1984, but the latter did not answer.

This attempt to collect from Romero and Gomez prompted them to make inquiries.
They learned that the check for P10,000.00 was indeed encashed by Nizurtado and
that the blank resolution which they had signed was filled-up to make it appear that in
a Council meeting where all councilmen were present on August 25, 1983, T-shirt
manufacturing was adopted as the livelihood project of Panghulo. But no such
meeting occurred on that day or on any other day. Neither was Nizurtado authorized
by the Council to submit T-shirt Manufacturing as the livelihood project of Panghulo.

On August 9, 1984, Romero and Gomez lodged their complaint against Nizurtado
with the Office of the Tanodbayan. After due preliminary investigation, this case was
filed.

As of September 7, 1984, the members of the Council who had received P1,000.00
each, as well as Bacani (also referred to as Manalang) and Soledad who had
 received P500.00 each had paid their respective loans to Nizurtado who, in turn,
remitted the payments to the MMC on these dates:

April 16, 1984 P1,450.00

August 14, 1984 3,550.00
September 7, 1984 3,000.00
————

Total P8,000.00

In June 1987, after demands for payment, Dalmacio remitted the balance of
P2,000.00 from his pocket because, as acting Barangay Captain, he did not want to
leave the Barangay with an indebtedness. 3

On the basis of its above findings, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused of the offense
charged. The dispositive portions of its decision, promulgated on 18 September 1992, read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Felix Nizurtado y Victa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of malversation of public funds committed through
falsification of public document and, appreciating in his favor . . . two mitigating
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes upon him the
penalties of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS, and
ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum; perpetual
special disqualification; and a fine of P10,000.00.

No pronouncement is made as to civil liability, there having been complete restitution

of the amount malversed.

With costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Nizurtado has filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan in that —

1. It has committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that Resolution No. 17, dated
August 25, 1983, of the Barangay Council of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila (Exh.
"D") is a falsified document and that the petitioner is the forger thereof; and

2. It has committed serious error of law and gravely abused its discretion in finding
petitioner guilty of malversation of the amount of P10,000.00 which he had received
as a loan from the then Metro Manila Commission in his capacity as representative of
the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Barangay Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila.  5

The Solicitor General Agrees in all respects with the Sandiganbayan in its findings and judgment
except insofar as it has found petitioner to have likewise committed the crime of falsification of a
public document.

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

 Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation. —
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundreds pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less
than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.

The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal
provisions are that —

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;

(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and

(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through

abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds
or property.

Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro
Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he received and later encashed a check for P10,000.00,
specifically intended by way of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood program; and the funds had
come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission and "Kilusang
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."

The only point of controversy is whether or not Nizurtado has indeed misappropriated the funds.

Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a resolution of the
Barangay Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that a livelihood project, i.e., "T-
shirt manufacturing," had already been identified by the council. The money, however, instead of its
being used for the project, was later lent to, along with petitioner, the members of the Barangay
Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted "misappropriation" within the meaning of the law. 6

Accused-appellant sought to justify the questioned act in that it was only when the members of the
Barangay Council had realized that P10,000.00 was not enough to support the T-shirt manufacturing
project, that they decided to distribute the money in the form of loans to themselves. He submitted,
in support thereof, a belated   certification issued by Rodolfo B. Banquicio, Chief of District IV of the
7

Support Staff and Malabon Sub-District Officer of KKK, to the effect that Barangay Captains were
given discretionary authority to invest the money in any viable project not falling within the list of
project modules provided by the MHS-NCR Management. Lending the unutilized funds to the
members of the Barangay council could have hardly been meant to be the viable project
contemplated under that certification. Furthermore, it would appear that only Regional Action Officer
Ismael Mathay, Jr., and Deputy Regional Action Officer Lilia S. Ledesma were the officials duly
authorized to approve such projects upon the recommendation of the KKK Secretariat.  We could
8

see no flaw in the ratiocination of the Sandiganbayan, when, in rejecting this defense, it said:

The defense evidence that the Barangay Council changed the T-shirt Manufacturing
to whatever business ventures each members of the Council would select for
investment of his P1,000.00 has, as already stated, little, if any, probative value.

But assuming there was such a change, the same is of no avail. The Resolution
marked Exhibit D expressly stated that the P10,000.00 "shall only be appropriated for
the purpose/s as provided in the issued policies and guidelines of the program." The
guidelines, in turn, prescribed that the livelihood project shall be identified from the
modules developed by the KKK Secretariat or, as stipulated in the Resolution itself,
in the absence of such modules, shall be chosen by the Samahang Kabuhayan
"subject to the evaluation/validation of the KKK Secretariat." There is absolutely no
showing that the alleged substitute projects which each lendee of P1,000.00 would
select were among those of the developed modules or were submitted to the KKK
Secretariat for evaluation/validation.
9

Accused-appellant criticizes the Sandiganbayan for its having failed to consider the fact that no valid
demand has been made, or could have been made, for the repayment of the loaned sum. Demand
merely raises a prima facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and not indispensable to constitute, malversation.
Even without a demand, malversation can still be committed when enough facts, such as here, are
extant to prove it. 
10

Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime through the falsification of a public
document punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

The pertinent provisions read:

 Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. —
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;

In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph, the document need not be an authentic
official paper since its simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification. So, also, the
signatures appearing thereon need not necessarily be forged.  11

In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution, Exhibit "D,"   was a falsified document for which
12

petitioner should be held responsible, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimonies of
Barangay Councilman Santos A. Gomez and Barangay Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The two
testified that no meeting had actually taken place on 25 August 1983, the date when
"T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided to be the barangay livelihood project. The
Sandiganbayan concluded that Nizurtado had induced Romero and Gomez to sign the blank
resolution, Exhibit "J"   on the representation that Romero's proposal to build a barangay service
13

center would so later be indicated in that resolution as the barangay livelihood project.

The established rule is that unless the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are bereft of substantial
evidence to support it, those findings are binding on this court.

The Sandiganbayan has considered the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution in favor of Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of Court Luisabel Alfonso Cortez, on 17 January 1989,
has certified to the voluntary surrender of the accused thusly:

CERTIFICATION

THIS CERTIFIES that accused FELIX NIZURTADO in criminal Case No:

13304 voluntarily surrendered before this court on JANUARY 17, 1989 and posted
his bail bond in said case.

Manila, Philippines, JANUARY 17, 1989

(sgd.)

LUISABEL ALFONSO CORTEZ

Deputy Clerk of Court  14

Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be treated as a
modifying circumstance independent and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner
(Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code). We are convinced, furthermore, that petitioner had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code),
entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same (the penalty) to be applied in the maximum
period. The penalty prescribed for the offense of malversation of public funds, when the amount
involved exceeds six thousand pesos but does not exceed twelve thousand pesos, is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period; in addition, the offender
shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the amount
malversed (Art. 217[3], Revised Penal Code). The penalty of prision mayor and a fine of five
thousand pesos is prescribed for the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. The former (that imposed for the malversation), being more severe than the latter (that
imposed for the falsification), is then the applicable prescribed penalty to be imposed in its maximum
period. The actual attendance of two separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution, also found by the Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General, entitles the
accused to the penalty next lower in degree. For purposes of determining that next lower degree,
the full range of the penalty prescribed by law for the offense, not merely the imposable penalty
because of its complex nature, should, a priori, be considered. It is our considered view that the
ruling in People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as opposed to that of People vs. Fulgencio, 92 Phil.
1069, is the correct rule and it is thus here reiterated. In fine, the one degree lower than prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum is prision mayor minimum to prision
mayor medium (being the next two periods in the scale of penalties [see Art. 64, par 5, in relation to
Art. 61, par 5, Revised Penal Code]) the full range of which is six years and one day to ten years.
This one degree lower penalty should, conformably with Article 48 of the Code (the penalty for
complex crimes), be imposed in its maximum period or from eight years, eight months and one day
to ten years. The presence of the third mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem (lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed) would result in imposing a period the court
may deem applicable.   Considering, however, that the penalty has to be imposed in the maximum
15

period, the only effect of this additional mitigating circumstance is to impose only the minimum
portion of that maximum period,   that is, from eight years, eight months and one day to nine years,
16

six months and ten days, from which range the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
taken.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (which can apply since the maximum term of imprisonment
would exceed one year), the court is to impose an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which
shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree (i.e., prision correccional in
its medium period to prision correccional in its maximum period or anywhere from two years, four
months and one day to six years) and the maximum of which is that which the law prescribes after
considering the attendant modifying circumstances. In view of the mitigating circumstances present
in this case, the fine of P10,000.00 may also be reduced (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code) and, since
the principal penalty is higher than prision correccional, subsidiary imprisonment would not be
warranted. (Art. 39, par. 3, Revised Penal Code).

The law and the evidence no doubt sustains Nizurtado's conviction. Given all the attendant
circumstances, it is, nevertheless, the personal and humble opinion of the assigned writer of
this ponencia that appellant deserves an executive commutation of the statutory minimum sentence
pronounced by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Nizurtado for malversation of public
funds through falsification of public document is AFFIRMED but the sentence, given the
circumstances here obtaining, is MODIFIED by imposing on petitioner a reduced indeterminate
sentence of from two years, four months and one day to eight years, eight months and one day,
perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 178145, July 07, 2014

REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination
of the proper penalty imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be
guilty of the offenses charged or proved. Their correct determination is the essence of
due process of law.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated
murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter’s jeep in
the information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan
(RTC), viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat,

Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the
use of the motor vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one
Ferdinand de Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which ordinarily
would have caused the death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon.

Contrary to law.1

The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his
owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife,
Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de
Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his
owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-
up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just
attended a worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano
stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However,
Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand
hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of
Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo “magpasensiyahan na
lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand.” Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the
advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his

mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front
of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a
moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness. Urbanita shouted,
“Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie.” She identified the fast moving vehicle that
bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.

On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of
Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5)
to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an
oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep,
lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop
his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him
and his companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender
and report the incident.

Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed
for two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00 On
September 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon
City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses
amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise spent P909.50 for medicines, P2,900.00 for
scanning, P8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and P12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers
and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple
facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural
hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued
by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita, received the
amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance, as
evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.2

Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the
petitioner of frustrated homicide,3 to wit:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo
Mariano GUILTY for the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum and is hereby directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the
amount of P196,043.25 less P50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 29, 2006,5 modifying the
felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling thusly:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and accused-appellant

Reynaldo Mariano is found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify
Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.6

In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere
accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving
his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.

The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the
jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook
the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4)
meters away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast
speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo
admitted that he has known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they
have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo
should have foreseen the possibility that Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go
inside the house of his mother where the store is also located.

xxxx

As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal
rate of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s
injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist
must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with
the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:
“A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and
for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side
of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted
from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least,
minimizing his injuries.7

The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower
courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged
except for the RTC’s conclusion that malicious intent had attended the commission of
the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for
it is a well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Court.8

“Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”9 To constitute the offense
of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences
is required.10 The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between
the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v.
People,11 the petitioner was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that he had driven the
Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People,12 a
public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because
he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In the absence of any cogent
reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had
driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and
in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.

Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal
Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code. “The rationale of the law,” according to People v. Medroso,
Jr.:13

x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary
from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in
order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have
ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the
mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis
of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article
64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor
with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries. The error should be avoided because no person
should be condemned to suffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for
the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime
must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing
the punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty
exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is
the essence of due process of law.

The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony,
the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted
a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to
Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance
with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law
punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the
commission of which a penalty of either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00,
or both is provided.

In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the principal afflictive

penalties to be reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, and prision mayor; the
principal correctional penalties to be  prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension
and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menor  and fine not exceeding
P200.00. Under this provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.

The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the
gravity of the physical injuries, to wit:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use
of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an
arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become
incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use
thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which
he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in
Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248,
the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number
2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period;
the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall
inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

In its decision,14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage
secondary to severe head trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to
time, place and person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial that he
was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to
temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a
masseur until October 31, 1999.

With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries
did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the
petitioner’s act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed
the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical injuries,
had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263,
3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he
was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.

Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As
earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the  Revised Penal Code are not applicable
in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of
imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law inapplicable,15 the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto
mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.

The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral damages
amounting to P58,402.75 and P10,000.00, respectively.

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. This is because the courts
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount
of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of
the actual loss suffered, which should be based on the amounts actually expended by
the victim,16 or other competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution
proved the expenses actually incurred amounting to P108,402.75, but such aggregate
was reduced by the victim’s earlier receipt of P50,000.00 from the petitioner in the
form of financial assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid portion of
P58,402.75.

Moral damages are given to ease the victim’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should
reasonably approximate the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.17 Accordingly, the CA properly reduced to P10,000.00 the moral damages
awarded to Ferdinand.

In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum  on the actual and moral damages
reckoned from the finality of this decision until the full payment of the obligation. This is
because the damages thus fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per
annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by the Office of the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, subject

to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a
straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and
moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum  commencing from the finality of
this decision until fully paid.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.