#21

Fernandez vs. Botica Claudio

G.R. No. 205870 - August 13, 2014

Petitioner Fernandez was an employee of Botica Cluadio until her

dismissal. In her complaint for illegal dismissal, petitioner alleged among
others that during her employment, she was not paid overtime and holiday pay
as well as her SSS contributions were not paid by the employer. In defense, the
employer contended that the petitioner went AWOL and that her dismissal was
valid due to several infractions committed during her employment.
In ruling on the validity of her dismissal, the court affirmed the rulings of
the NLRC which found Fernandez to have been illegally dismissed by her
employer, Jose, without a valid cause and observance of procedural due process
[observing] that the pieces of evidence presented by Jose to substantiate
Fernandez’s purported infractions were merely fabricated, and that there was no
indication that Fernandez was apprised of her supposed offenses before her
dismissal.
Hence, the petitioner was awarded separation pay, back wages and
overtime pay.
 #22
Grace Christian High School vs. Lavandera
G.R. No. 177845, August 20, 2014

Lavandera filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal, non-

payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay, separation pay, service allowance,
damages, and attorney’s fees against GCHS which terminated her services, at
the age of 58, pursuant to a retirement plan which gives the option to the
school to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service
regardless of their age.
In its ruling, the Supreme court held that generally, under RA 7641, “an
employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)]
and other agreements shall not be less than those provided” under the same –
that is, at least one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that “[u]nless
the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (½) month salary
shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and
the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.”
The foregoing provision is [only] applicable where (a) there is no CBA or
other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b)
there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits
but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining factor in
choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits
provided.
Although there was a CBA which provided for a retirement benefit plan
for the employees, the court applied the above-mentioned law “considering that
GCHS computed Filipinas’ retirement pay without including one- twelfth (1/12)
of her 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of her five (5) days SIL. [Hence],
the NLRC and the CA correctly ruled that Filipinas’ retirement benefits should be
computed in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA
7641, being the more beneficent retirement scheme.
 #23
Quillopa vs. Quality Guards
G.R. No. 213814 - December 02, 2015

Herein petitioner was a security guard of Quality Guards who was placed
under floating status on September 28, 2010 and filed the first complaint for
money claims for underpayment which was later on amicably settled when he
withdrew his complaint in exchange for a certain amount. However, on
September 2011, petitioner subsequently filed a second complaint for illegal
dismissal due to the failure of respondent agency to reassign him a new post
for a year. In defense, the respondent raised the quitclaim executed by Quillopa
in the first complaint which was already settled.
The court reinstated the NLRC decision which found that petitioner was
indeed constructively dismissed from service given that he was placed on
floating status beyond the allowable period under the law.
Accordingly, the court held that the res judicata effect of [the] settlement
agreement should only pertain to the aforementioned causes of action and not
to any other unrelated cause/s of action accruing in petitioner's favor after the
execution of such settlement.
On the issue of constructive dismissal, the court further held that
placing a security guard on floating status relates to the period of time when
security guards are in between assignments or when they are made to wait after
being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one and
that he must not remain in such status for a period of more than six (6) months;
otherwise, he is deemed terminated.
Temporary off-detail or the period of time security guards are made to wait
until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute
constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six
months. The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security
guard can be assigned rests on the employer.
In the present case, petitioner was placed on floating status for more
than 11 months, a fact which was not denied by the employer nor did they
prove that there was indeed no post available for petitioner. Lack of vacancy
must be sufficiently proven by the employer which was not so in this case.
 #24
Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Santos-Falceso, et. al.
G.R. No. 227695 - July 31, 2017

Genpact is a corporation engaged in business process outsourcing which

hired herein respondents pursuant to its contract with Allstate. When Allstate
terminated its contract with Genpact, respondents were placed on floating
status with the option to voluntarily resign or to be involuntarily terminated on
the ground of redundancy and execute a quitclaim thereafter. Respondents
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that the termination of
Genpact and Allstate's agreement neither amounted to a closure of business
nor justified their retrenchment and that the company did not comply with
procedural due process.
The NLRC ruled in favor of the company and held that terminating their
employment were made in the exercise of its management prerogative in good
faith and in accordance with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be
said that respondents were illegally dismissed from service. Further ruling that
since respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by the closure of the
Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated on account of
redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now Article 301), in relation to Article 283
(now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they should be paid separation pay
amounting to one (1) month salary for every year of service, instead of the one-
half (1/2) month salary for every year of service. The NLRC further disallowed
any filing of motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the CA immediately denied the petition of herein petitioners
based on the ground that the petitioners did not file a motion for
reconsideration prior to the filing of the appeal.
The SC ordered the remand of the case before the CA for resolution on
the merits. While generally, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the court gave due course
to the present petition, taking into consideration the following (particularly d
and e):
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex-parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
 #25
Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co.
G.R. No. 191049, August 7, 2017

Petitioner was hired by respondent on one of the vessels for its principals
when the former, while aboard the vessel, experienced severe headaches,
nausea, and double vision. This resulted in his repatriation to the Philippines
on February 4, 2005 after which the company-designated physician diagnosed
him with the same findings as the foreign doctors of Tolosa Hunt Syndrome
(THS). Dr. Cruz thereafter certified him to be fit to resume work. Dissatisfied,
Atienza sought the opinion of another doctor which diagnosed him unfit to
resume work. This prompted Atienza to file a claim for permanent total
disability benefits before the LA.
In its ruling on the issue of petitioner’s entitlement to permanent total
disability benefits, the SC laid down the legal presumption that "[t]hose
illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
work related” and that “the legal presumption of work-relatedness of a non-
listed illness should be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found
to be supported by substantial evidence.”
However, such presumption does not extend to compensability of
disability benefits as it merely outlines presumption on work-relatedness of an
illness. In the present case, it was laid down that under SECTION 32-A
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, for an occupational disease and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be
satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to
the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
As differentiated from the matter of work-relatedness, no legal
presumption of compensability is accorded in favor of the seafarer. As such, he
bears the burden of proving that these conditions are met.
 #26
Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
G.R. No. 192442 - August 9, 2017

Petitioner experienced persisting headache and blurring of vision after a

metal ceiling fell and wounded his head. He was repatriated to the Philippines
after being diagnosed of hemangioblastoma and undergoing left posterior fossa
craniectomy. The company-designated physician deemed his condition not
work-related and discharged him from further treatment. He sought the
opinion of another physician who diagnosed the same condition as work-
related which prompted petitioner to file a claim for permanent total disability
benefits. The employer defended that brain tumor is not an occupational
disease as listed under the POEA-SEC.
On the issue of entitlement to the disability benefits claim, the court held
that the NLRC correctly decided in denying the claim.
In its ruling, the court again laid down the following:
Under SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, for an occupational
disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the
following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to
the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Generally, work-relatedness is presumed. In the present case, however,
the company-designated physician, after due assessment of Romana’s
condition, found that his illness was caused by an abnormal growth of tissue
in the brain’s blood vessels (brain tumor) and therefore not work-related.
Hence, the burden of debunking this assertion by the employer rests on the
employee. Accordingly, the employee was not able to do so.
That the metal ceiling hit him in the head as the probable cause of his
disability does not show conditions which increased the risk of contracting his
illness. Hence, the court ruled in favor of the employer.
 #27
Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation
G.R. No. 223731 - August 30, 2017

Talaroc was hired under a 6-month employment contract where he

underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) prior to his
deployment and was declared fit for sea duty. Shortly after his deployment,
petitioner experienced illness aboard the ship which resulted in his
repatriation. He was found by the company-designated physician to be
suffering from several conditions, namely; gastric ulcer, duodenitis, and
hypertension as well as spinal and neurological conditions, which were
declared by the company-designated physician as not work-related. He
continued medical treatment until he was deemed cleared of his illnesses.
Unconvinced, he consequently sought the opinion of another doctor who found
him still unfit to resume work.
He filed a disability benefit claim averring that he was already entitled to
permanent total disability benefit given that he received medical treatment
beyond 240 days. On the other hand, Arpaphil claims that he is not so entitled
because his condition was not due to work accident and, therefore, not work-
related.
In the ruling of the case, the court laid down the following guidelines to
be observed when a seafarer claims permanent and total disability benefits:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification, then the
period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated
physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment
within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.
Based on the foregoing, the court held that the company was not able to
sufficiently assess and inform the seafarer of his fitness to work within the
120-day and 240-day periods.
 Likewise, the court did not give credit to the contention of respondent
company that the illness was not work-related. Accordingly, the court ruled
that under the 2010 POEA-SEC, a "work-related illness" is defined as "any
sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Corollarily, Section 20 (A) (4)
thereof further provides that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related…xxx… While said illness was
claimed to be degenerative in nature, the company doctor herself acknowledged
that it may be aggravated or precipitated by heavy work or lifting/pushing or
pulling of heavy objects, a manual task basically demanded from a seafarer.
[Hence], it can be safely concluded that the arduous nature of his job may have
caused or at least aggravated his condition more so since he was declared fit to
work prior to his deployment, hence, work-related.”
As to the issue of third-doctor referral which the petitioner failed to
comply with, the court held that a “seafarer's compliance with such procedure
presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with an
assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the
120-day or 240-day periods." In the present case, there was no showing that
petitioner duly received a conclusive and definitive assessment for his medical
condition. Hence, there was nothing to contest on the part of the seafarer.
 #28
Fabricator Philippines Inc. v. Estolas
G.R. Nos. 224308-09 - September 27, 2017

Estolas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner

Fabricator Philippines who hired respondent as a welder. This is rooted from
an incident wherein Estolas was found sitting during work hours by her co-
worker Banayad who reported the same the Abaya, their Assembly Action Team
Leader. Thus, resulting in a confrontation between the three. Estolas was then
directed to meet the company President Lim who verbally and physically
attacked her by hitting her ear. She was then suspended from work and was
told not to report for work.
Consequently, she was terminated on the ground of serious misconduct
after refusing to resign and sign certain documents when she was ordered to
by Lim as well as for sitting down during office hours and disrespect towards
her superior.
The court ruled in favor Estolas and held the following:
Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text
and meaning of the foregoing provision, the following elements must concur: (a)
the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the
employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful
intent.
The court ruled that the verbal tussle between BAnayad and Estolas was
not serious enough to warrant dismissal and that Lim could not punish her
further since she was already given a three-day suspension in response to her
misconduct.
As the fact of illegal dismissal has already been established, respondent
is entitled to two (2) separate and distinct reliefs, namely: (a) backwages; and (b)
reinstatement or the payment of separation pay if the reinstatement is no longer
viable.
In granting the payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement, the
court held that “under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of
separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when
the latter option is no longer desirable or viable” given the atmosphere of
animosity and antagonism created between the employer and the employee
because of the unlawful termination.
#29
De La Salle Araneta University v. Magdurulang
G.R. No. 224319, November 20, 2017

Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal after she was re-
ranked lower and was hired on a contractual basis instead of being given a full-
time or permanent status as was recommended by the petitioner’s acting
assistant dean. In its defense, the University President that pursuant to the
university’s personnel handbook, she was not yet qualified. In her complaint,
she alleges that although she was re-hired, she was not given any teaching
load and that her administrative position was likewise discontinued. The
university raised the defense of her being a fixed-term employee.
The court ruled partially in favor of the University and held the following:
A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an
employer, during which the latter determines whether or not the former is
qualified for permanent employment.
Generally, probationary employment is governed by the Labor Code
which should not exceed a period of six (6) months. One of the exceptions to
this is the probationary period of employment of academic personnel such as
professors, instructors, and teachers - including the determination as to whether
they have attained regular or permanent status - shall not be governed by the
Labor Code but by the standards established by the Department of Education
and the Commission on Higher Education. In the case of respondent, provisions
of MORPHE applies.
Thus, for academic personnel to acquire a regular and permanent
employment status, it is required that: (a) he is considered a full-time
employee; (b) he has completed the required probationary period; and (c)
his service must have been satisfactory. However, it must be emphasized
that mere completion of the probationary period does not, ipso facto, make the
employee a permanent employee of the educational institution, as he could
only qualify as such upon fulfilling the reasonable standards for permanent
employment as faculty member…xxx…Thus, at the end of the probation period,
the decision to re-hire a probationary employee, and thus, vest upon him a
regular and permanent status, belongs to the educational institution as the
employer alone.”
 The court, however, rule that although Magdurulang was a probationary
employee, she was constructively dismissed due to failure of the university to
hire her during the remaining period of her probation.
 #30
Ventura v. Crewtech Shipmanangement Philippines Inc.
G.R. No. 225995, November 20, 2017

Ventura was hired by Crewtech as a Chief Cook on a 9-month

contract and underwent a PEME prior to his deployment. During his
employment, he was diagnosed as unfit for duty and was medically repatriated
upon which the company-designated physician treated and evaluated the
petitioner’s illness not work-related. He continued to receive treatment until
prior to the end of the 240-day, he was verbally notified that the company will
no longer shoulder his treatment without resolving the classification of his
disability.
The court ruled that “pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is
liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury
or illness during the term of his contract. In this regard, Section 20 (E) thereof,
mandates the seafarer to disclose all his pre-existing illnesses in his PEME,
failing which, shall disqualify him from receiving the same, to wit:
A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or
condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be
liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any
compensation and benefits. This is likewise a just cause for termination of
employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions.”
In the present case, however, the company was with knowledge regarding
the medical history of the seafarer. Nevertheless, they ruled that the illness was
not work-related and stated that even non-listed occupational disease “are
disputably presumed as work-related. However, the presumption does not
necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant
still has the burden to present substantial evidence that his work conditions
caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness.”
However, Ventura failed to substantiate such claim of work-causation
which prompted the court to rule in favor of the company and gave credence to
the assessment of the company-designated physician. More so because
petitioner failed to observe the conflict-resolution procedure in contesting the
findings of the company-designated physician.