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Save 3. Neorealism-Neoliberalism. Baldwin, David..pdf For Later NEW DIRECTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS
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ism and the Low
1983
1983,
1983,
1983
1985
1985
1986
1986,
1986,
1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988.
988
1990
1990
1991
1992
1993
1998
1993,
NEOREALISM AND
NEOLIBERALISM:
The Contemporary Debate
David A. Baldwin, editor
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW YORKColumbia University Press
New York Chichester, West Sussex
Copyright © 1993 Columbia University Press
Allrights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Neorealism and neoliberalism : the contemporary debate
David A. Baldwin, editor.
p. cm. — (New directions in world politics)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-231-08440-4, — ISBN 0-231-08441-2 (pbk.)
1, International relations—Philosophy
2. International relations—Poltical aspects
3. Liberalism, 4, Realism,
I. Baldwin, David A. (David Allen), 1936- . IL Series
JX1395.N385 1993
327—de20 93-1701
e cP
Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books
are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.
Printed in the United States of America
¢ 10987654321
pl9s76
CONTENTS
Contributors
Acknowledgments
LL Introduction
1. Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics.
David A. Baldwin
Il. The Neoliberal Challenge and Neorealist Response
2. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic
World
Arthur Stein
International Cooperation in Economic and Security
Affairs
Charles Lipson
4. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane
5. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism
Joseph M. Grieco
I. Extension of the Debate
6. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations
Theory: A Critique
Helen Milner
7. _ Relative Gains and the Pattern of International
Cooperation
Duncan Snidal
29
60
85
16
170vi Contents
8. Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations
Theory
Robert Powell
9. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier
Stephen D. Krasner
10. Do Relative Gains Matter? American’s Response to
Japanese Industrial Policy
Michael Mastanduno
IV, Reflections on the Debate
11. Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the
Cold War
Robert O. Keohane
12. Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation:
The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future
of Realist Theory
Joseph M. Grieco
Bibliography
Index
209
234
250
301
339
363,
INSTITUTE OF WAR
AND PEACE STUDIES
Neorealison and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Diiie'soneof a 8°
of publications sponsored by the Institute of War ani Peace SWS
of Columbia University, More than eighty bens toe ben $0"
sored by the Institute since its founding in 1 othe; boa
related interest sponsored by the Institute are
Kenneth N, Waltz, Man, the State, and War, (1955)
William T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of inet Rei
(1959)
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense. (156)
W. T. R. Fox, The American Study of International Relaos (1968)
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave. (1968)
Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changin Wot 879
John G. Ruggie, ed., The Antinomies of interdepenton (983)
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft. (1985)
David A, Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power. (1989)
Robert Jervis, The Mic of American Nuclear Stray. (9%)
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (98)
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire. (1991)
Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes ani among)
W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Polis (192)CONTRIBUTORS
Robert Axelrod is Professor of Political Science at the Unive:
Michigan,
ty of
David A. Baldwin is Ira D. Wallach Professor of World Order Studies
at Columbia University.
Joseph M. Greco is Professor of Political Science at Duke University
Robert O. Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace at
Harvard University.
Stephen D. Krasner is Graham H. Stuart Professor of International
Relations at Stanford University,
Charles Lipson is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Univer.
sity of Chicago,
Michael Mastanduno is Associate Professor of Government at Dart.
mouth College
Helen Milner is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia
University,
Robert Powell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Univer
Sity of California, Berkeley.
Duncan Snidal is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Univer:
sity of Chicago.
Artiny Stein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Cali
fornia, Los AngelesACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This volume would never have appeared without the encour-
wepecht and support of Helen Milner, John Ruggie, and Kan Wit.
papers: The authors owe them an unusual amount of theske Joseph
GePito, Administrative Assistant of the Institute of Wie and Peace
pitdlies, deserves credit for organizing efforts to cone @ unified
bibliography, standardizing references, and Proofreading the manu-
Script. We are also grateful to Miriam Fendius for Preparing the index
and checking citations. Previously published articles hve bes slightly
here. In addition, the articles by Stephen Krasner anal Michael Mas-
‘anduno were shortened by elimination of case studies
rhe editor and publisher are grateful for permission to eprint the
following previously published materials:
Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anar-
chic World,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982): 294.
by permission of MIT Press,
Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Security and Eco-
Seni Allaits,” World Polites 37 (October 1984): 1-23, by permis-
sion of Johns Hopkins University Press,
Robert Axelrod and Robest Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under
‘Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Pots om (October
1985): 226-54, by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalisny” International Or-
Jen Mites. (A¥Bust 1988): 485-507, by permission of MIT Prose
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy im International Rela-
Lions Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Studies to anu-
ary 1991): 67-85, by permission of Cambridge University Press.
Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattera of International Co-
Speration,” American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991):ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This volume would never have appeared without the encour-
tent and stpport of Helen Milner, John Ruggie, and Kate Wit,
enberg. The authors owe them an unusual amount of thanks Joseph
BePito, Administrative Assistant of the Institute of War aut Peace
Studies, deserves credit for organizing efforts to crear n unified
bibliography, standardizing references, and Proofreading the manu-
Script. We are also grateful to Miriam Fendius for Preparing the index
here, In addition, the articles by Stephen Krasner and Michael Mas-
anduno were shortened by elimination of case studies
ithe editor and publisher are grateful for permission to Feprint the
following previously published materials
Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anar-
inic World,” International Organization 36 (Spring, 1982) 294-324,
by permission of MIT Press
Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Security and Eco-
com a ents” Worl Politics 37 (October 1984): 1-23, by permis,
sion of Johns Hopkins University Press
Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under
‘Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Polites 38 (October
1985): 226-54, by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press,
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Insitutionalism,” Internationa Or.
sentation 42 (August 1988): 485-507, by permission of MIT Prose
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Rela-
tions Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Stuties 17 (anu
ity 1921): 67-85, by permission of Cambridge University Press
Puncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of Intemnatinny Co-
Operation,” American Politica Science Review 85 (September 1991)ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This volume would never have appeared without the encour:
agement and support of Helen Milner, John Ruggie, and Kate Wit
fenberg. The authors owe them an unusual amount of thanks. Joseph
DePiro, Administrative Assistant of the Institute of War and Peace
Studies, deserves credit for organizing efforts to create a unified
bibliography, standardizing references, and proofreading the manu-
script. We are also grateful to Miriam Fendius for preparing the index
and checking citations. Previously published articles have been slightly
edited to eliminate confusing references to material not included
here. In addition, the articles by Stephen Krasner and Michael Mas-
tanduno were shortened by elimination of case studies,
the editor and publisher are grateful for permission to reprint the
following previously published materials:
Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anar-
chic World,” International Organization 36 (Spring, 1982): 294-324,
by permission of MIT Press,
Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Security and Eco-
nomic Affairs,” World Politics 37 (October 1984); 1-23, by permis
sion of Johns Hopkins University Press
Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (October
1985): 226-54, by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Or-
ganization 42 (August 1988): 485-507, by permission of MIT Press.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in Intemational Rela-
tions Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Studies 17 Janu.
ary 1991): 67-85, by permission of Cambridge University Press.
Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Co-
operation,” American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991)xii Acknowledgments
701-26, by permission of the American Political Science Associa-
tion.
Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Rela-
tions Theory,” American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991)
1303-20, by permission of the American Political Science Associa~
tion.
Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power:
Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (April 1991): 336-66,
by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.
Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Re-
sponse to Japanese Industrial Policy,” International Security 16
(Summer 1991): 73-113, by permission of MIT Press.
David A. Baldwin.
New York City
February 1993
| INTRODUCTIONNEOLIBERALISM, NEOREALISM, AND
WORLD POLITICS
David A. Baldwin
In 1986 Robert ©. Keohane edited a volume entitled Neorealisn:
and ts Critics, which focused on the reformulation of traditonsl
realist thinking about international politics by Kenneth Waltz (1973)
and reactions from a variety of scholars. Waltz had recast the tenets
of classical realism in order to delineate more clearly the effects of the
structure of the international system on the behavior of nation states
In addition, Waltz viewed his work as different from that of earlicy
realists in its treatment of power and of states as units of the system
(Waltz 1979; 1990), The crite, according to Keohane (198682), sought
fo move beyond the nation-state by “devising new international
institutions or regimes,” by reinterpreting the principles of sover
cignty, or by challenging the “validity of the ‘state as actor’ model on
Which neorealism relies.” Whereas some critics called for more atten,
tion to economic and environmental interdependence as well sy
changes in governmental functions, information, and international
regimes, others attacked the epistemology on which Waltz based his
argument.
In a sense, this volume picks up where Neorealism and lis Critics
ended. Unlike that volume, however, the contributors to this one
share many fundamental assumptions about the nature and purpose
of social scientific inquiry. This allows them to engage one another's
arguments directly and results in a more focused and productive
debate.4 David A. Baldwin
In recent years the most powerful challenge to neorealism, some-
times labeled structural realism, has been mounted by neoliberal insti-
tutionalists. The term distinguishes these scholars from earlier vari-
eties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican liberal:
ism, and sociological liberalism (Nye 1988; Grieco 1988a:4881; Keohane
1990a). Commercial liberalism refers to theories linking free trade and
peace; republican liberalism refers to theories linking democracy with
peace; and sociological liberalism refers to theories linking transnational
interactions with international integration, The immediate intellec~
tual precursors of liberal institutionalism are theories of international
regimes (Krasner 1983a),
NEOLIBERALISM AND NEOREALISM: TERMS OF THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Six focal points, described below, characterize the current de-
bate between neoliberalism and neorealism.
‘The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy
Although no one denies that the international system is anarch-
ical in some sense, there is disagreement as to what this means and
‘why it matters, Arthur Stein (1982a:324) distinguishes between the
“independent decision making” that characterizes anarchy and the
“joint decision making’ in international regimes and then suggests
that itis the self interests of autonomous states in a state of anarchy
that leads them to create international regimes. Charles Lipson (198422)
notes that the idea of anarchy is the “Rosetta stone of international
relations” but suggests that its importance has been exaggerated by
the neorealists at the expense of recognizing the importance of inter-
national interdependence. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane
(1985) emphasize the importance of anarchy defined as the absence
of government but argue that this constant feature of world politics
permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states. Joseph M.
Grieco (1988a:497-98) contends that neoliberals and neorealists fun-
damentally diverge with respect to the nature and consequences of
anarchy. He asserts that the neoliberal institutionalists underestimate
the importance of worries about survival as motivations for state
behavior, which he sees as a necessary consequence of anarchy.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics §
Helen Milner (1991:70, 81-82) identifies the
features of world polities amidst its seemi :
fk ' amidst its seeming chaos’ as “pethaps the
exntral achievement of nerealists" but she apices with nee ten
the idea of anarchy has been overemphasized while interdependence
as been neglected. Duncan Snidal (1991b) views Prisoner's Die
(PD) situations as examples of the realist conception of ana
while Grieco (1988a) associates PD with neoliberalism,
ne
“discovery of orderly
cna
chy,
in general
‘orealists see anarchy as placi Lape
behavior than do neoliberals. : oo sete
International Cooperation
Although both sides agree that international cooperation
sible, they differ as to the ease and likelihood of fis wecurrenee,
According to Greco (his volume), neorealste view nee
cooperation as “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintaras ect
more dependent on state power” than do the neoliberals. None of
the neoliberals represented in this book disagrees with this access
ment. Both Keohane and Grieco agree that the future of the fran
ean Community will be an important test of their theories It tha
trend toward European integration weakens or suffers reversals, the
neorealists will laim vindication. If progress toward integration cone
Uinues, the neoliberals will presumably view this as support for their
Relative Versus Absolute Gains
Although it would be misleading to characterize
concerned only with relative gains snd the ather oy ea
with absolute gains, the neoliberals have str
from international cooperation, while the
sized relative gains. The basic reference
in this volume is the following passage
other as concerned only
essed the absolute gains
neorealists have empha-
point for many of the authors
by a leading neorealist:
When faced withthe posibity of cooperating for mutual gan, stat
that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided Thee nee
compelled to ask not “Will both ol ge nam” beg
more?” Ian expected gain iso be died, ay
‘one, one state may use its disproportioné n
intended to damage or destcy the
They are
“Who will gain
in the ratio of two to
ate gain to implement a pol
ley
other. Even the prospect of large6 David A. Baldwin
operations long
absolute gains for bth pate doesnot i ther cooperation 5
ts each fas hove the wer ill seis nerensed epabtes (Wale
ro05)
Stein (1962a:318) depicts the Hberal view of self interest 25 one in
which actors with common interests try to maximize their absolute
gains. Actors trying to maximize relative gains, he asserts, have no
common interests. Lipson (1984:15-18) suggests that relative gains
considerations are likely to be more important insecurity matters
than in economic affairs. Grieco (1988a:487) contends that neoliberal
institutionalism has been preoccupied with actual or potential abso-
lute gains from international cooperation and has overlooked the
importance of relative gains. He suggests that “the furrdamental goal of
tls in any relationship i to prevent thers from aching ears
thr elt xpi” (Greco 198848; Has in origina). Shida
(19915) disputes the neoreait contention that concern about re
tive gains inhibit cooperation except in the special case of bipolar
relationships between states preoccupied with relative gains. He also
suggests that the distinction between relative and absolute gains is
not so clearcut asi might sem, The relative gains problem can
stated in terme of trade-offs Between long and short-term absolute
sains. Powell (1991b) uses deductive models to argue that concerns
tary force is high but not when the utility of force i low" Mastan-
duno (1991) uses empirical case studies to address the auestions 0
whether and how relative gains matter. His conclusions provide
some suppor for both sides of the debate, While he finds concerns
about relative gains present in the policy-making process in all of his
three cases, such concerns were not reflected in the policy outcomes
for all the cases. In his essay for this volume Keohane acknowledges
that neoliberal institutionalists have underestimated the importance
of relative gens in world polis under certain conditions. The im
portant thing, according to Keohane, is to specify those conditions
He notes that this may be difficult since the behavior of states pursu-
ing relative gains may be very similar to the behavior of states pur-
suing absolute gains.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 7
Priority of State Goals
Neoliberals and neorealists agree that both national se:
and economic welfare are important, but they differ in relative en.
Phasis on these goals. Lipson (1984) argues that international coop.
eration is more likely in economic issue areas than in those concen:
ing military security. Since neorealists tend to study security issues
and neoliberals tend to study political economy, their differing est
mates of the ease of cooperation may be related to the issues they
study. Grieco (1988a) contends that anarchy requires states to be
Preoccupied with relative power, security, and survival. Powell (1991b)
constructs a model intended to bridge the gap between neoliberal
emphasis on economic welfare and neore:
In his model, states are assumed to be trying to maximize thely
economic welfare in a world where military force is a possibilty. For
the most part, neorealists or neoliberals treat state goals by assump.
tion. As Keohane (this volume) points out, neither approach is good
at predicting interests.
curity
alist emphasis of security.
Intentions Versus Capabilities
‘The classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau depicted concern about
the motives of statesmen as a fallacious way to understand foreign
policy. Instead he advocated assuming that statesmen “think and act
in terms of interest defined as power” (1967:5-6), which, he believed,
would enable analysts to understand the actions and thoughts of
Statesmen better than they themselves do, Although contemporary
neorealists are unlikely to take such an extreme position, they are
likely to emphasize capabilities more than intentions. Grieco (1988-498,
500) points out that uncertainties about the future intentions and
interests of other states lead statesmen to pay close attention to
capabilities, “the ultimate basis for their security and independence.”
Ina similar vein, Krasner (1991) criticizes the neoliberals for overem-
Phasizing intentions, interests, and information and underemphes,
izing the distribution of capabilities. Keohane (this volume) argues
that the sensitivity of states to the relative gains of other states is
significantly influenced by perceptions of the intentions of such states
Thus states worry more about relative gains of enemies than of allies
Stein (1982a) explains international regimes in terms of the pattern of8 David A. Baldwin
preferences of member states. In Stein’s analysis, capabilities count
only insofar as they affect the preferences and intentions of states.
Differing views of the relative importance of capabilities and inten:
tions thus provide another focal point of the debate.
Institutions and Regimes
Both neorealists and neoliberals recognize the plethora of inter-
national regimes and institutions that have emerged since 1945. They
differ, however, with respect to the significance of such arrange-
ments. “Much of the contemporary debate,” according to Keohane
(this volume), “centers on the validity of the institutionalist claim
that international regimes, and institutions more broadly, have be-
come significant in world politics.” The neorealists agree that this is
‘an important point of contention. They believe that neoliberals exag
gerate the extent to which institutions are able to “mitigate anarchy’s
constraining effects on inter-state cooperation” (Grieco 1988a:485)
‘These six focal points are not the only points of contention in
the debate, but they should help orient the reader to the main argu-
ments. Not every contributor to this volume addresses all six points,
and the careful reader will notice that individual scholars contribut-
ing to the debate may introduce qualifications that make the six focal
points seem overly simplified. And rightfully so. Any attempt to
characterize the carefully wrought arguments of eleven scholars in-
evitably oversimplifies.
Important as it is to clarify the terms of the debate, it is alsor
important to clarify what the debate is not about, Although the fol-
lowing four issues have figured prominently in cartier debates be-
tween realism and its critics, none is central to the current debate
between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. First, the current
debate does not revolve around techniques of statecraft. In 1977
Keohane and Nye listed the assumption that military force is a “usa-
ble and effective instrument of policy” (pp. 23-29) as one of the
fundamental tenets of realism, one that they proceeded to call into
question. Yet in 1988, Grieco’s description of the five central propo-
sitions of realism mentions only a concern for power and security
and says nothing about the utility of military force. Despite fleeting
Neoliberalism, Neoreatism, and World Politics
references to this issue by some of the authors (e.g., Grieco 1988a:491n;
Milner 1991:76, 78; Krasner 1991:342), only Robert Powell (1991b)
devotes much attention to the question of the utility of military
techniques of statecraft. It is not clear why this issue receives so little
attention since it does not seem to have been resolved. One should
not be surprised if tt resurfaces as the debate evolves.
Second, earlier critics of realism, especially in the 1930s, 1940s,
and 1950s, often cast the debate as one between altruistic moralists
and egoistic power calculators. In the current debate, however, both
sides argue from assumptions that states behave like egoistic value
maximizers. Moral considerations are hardly mentioned. Third, the
question of whether to treat states as the essential actors in interna-
tional politics has been pushed into the background. Although neo-
realists and neoliberals disagree on the relative importance of non-
state actors, both treat states as the primary actors. And fourth, this
is not a debate between conflict theorists and cooperation theorists,
‘The twin ideas that conflict and cooperation are intrinsic elements of
international politics and that both can be studied at the same time
are accepted by both sides. The books by neorealist Joseph M. Grieco
(1990) and neoliberal Robert ©. Keohane (1984) are contributions to
theories of conflict and cooperation. Although neorealists are more
likely to emphasize conflict and neoliberals are more likely to empha-
size cooperation, both sides have moved beyond the simple dichot-
omy between cooperation and conflict that characterized earlier dis-
The quality of scholarly debate in this volume is extraordinarily
high. That is to say, the authors genuinely try to understand and
address one another's arguments. The overall tone of the essays in
this volume signals a desire to advance knowledge rather than to
score debating, pui ¥ uf enuenched positions,
‘There is, however, one unsatisfactory aspect of the debate. This,
might be called the terminological dimension. Loaded terms and
semantic sleight of hand are anathema to scholarly debate. In this
volume each school of thought carries an unfortunate label. Research
programs, as Stephen Krasner (1991) points out, have connotations
as well as denotations. And the connotation of “realism” (or “neo
realism”) is one of looking at the world as it really is. This was not
only the connotation but the denotation as well for two of the intel-
lectual forefathers of neorealism. For E. H. Carr, realism focused on
sin de10 David A. Baldwin
what was and what is” in contrast to utopianism, which focused on.
what could and should be (Carr 1946:11). For Hans J. Morgenthau,
realism earned its name by concentrating on “human nature as it
actually is” and on “historic processes as they actually take place”
(Morgenthau 1967:4). Inis L. Claude's characterization of the usage
of the phrase “balance of power” by an earlier generation of realists
reminds us that scholarly debate can be impaired by loaded terminol-
ogy:
{There is a} widespread tendency to make balance of power a symbol
of realism, and hence of responsibility, for the scholar or statesman. In
this usage, it has no substantive meaning as a concept. It is a test of
intellectual virility, of he-manliness in the field of international rel
tions, The man who “accepts” the balance of power, who dots his
writing with approving references to it, thereby asserts his claim to
being a hard-headed realist, who can look at the grim reality of power
ithout flinching. The man who rejects the balance of power convicts
himself of softness, of cowardly incapacity to look power in the eye
and acknowledge its role in the affairs of states. (Claude 1962:39),
It is unfortunate that the current debate still uses the misleading,
terms realism and neorealism. The debate in this volume is not be-
tween those who study the world as it is and those who study the
world as it should be; it is between two groups of Scholars with
reasonable disagreements as to how to describe and interpret the real
world,
‘The term liberalism is objectionable less because of value loading
than because it is likely to confuse and mislead. Neither realism nor
liberalism has traditionally been considered the opposite of the other.
‘The usual opposite of liberalism is conservatism. The term liberalism
has figured more prominently in discussions of domestic politics
than in discussions of international politics. Except for the relatively
recent debate with respect to the propensity of liberal democracies to
‘make war, the term liberalism has been largely confined to the dis-
cussion of economic aspects of international relations.*
Despite such objections, the terms neorealism (or structural renlism)
and neoliberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) are so deeply embed:
ded in the literature that little can be done. Perhaps as the debate
progresses, we can develop more satisfactory labels for various schools
Of thought. Keohane (this volume) is also uncomfortable with the
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 14
labels. He suggests that liberal institutionalism “borrows as much
from realism as from liberalism.”"
This section has sketched the main outlines of the debate. The
remainder of this essay will discuss the historical roots of the contem-
porary debate and the related topics of anarchy, social order, and
power. After that, some possible directions for future research will
be reviewed.
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DEBATE
The previous section suggested that the current debate between
neorealism and neoliberalism has moved beyond a mere rehashing
of old arguments between realists and their critics. This does not
mean, however, that there are no historical antecedents for various
strains of the current debate
‘There have been many thinkers over the centuries who have em-
phasized international anarchy, reliance on self help, the utility of
military force, and the importance of balance-of-power calculations.
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes are frequently cited as
intellectual ancestors of realism.
Likewise, various thinkers have emphasized intemational eco-
nomic interdependence, international law and institutions, interna-
tional communication, and societal norms. The ancient Stoics’ con-
ception of themselves as citizens of the world could be viewed as a
challenge to a state-centric view of world politics. Early Christian
philosophers believed that “God had endowed different regions with
limited but varied products in order to give mankind an incentive to
trade, so that through a world economy they would become united
in a world society, and as children of one God they would lear to
love each other” (Viner 1937:100) -
The mercantilists, who dominated international thought in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, viewed both wealth and power
in zero-sum terms. That is, one country’s gain was another's loss. In
their emphasis on preparation for war and relative gains, the mercan-
Blt can be viewed a foreshadowing some ofthe concerns of ter
Perhaps the closest counterpart of the modern debate between
realism and neoliberalism is found in the works of the philosophes at12 David A. Baldwin
the end of the eighteenth century. They attacked almost all the ideas
embraced by realists. They espoused the idea of a world civilization
and world citizenship, promoted the idea of the primacy of domestic
affairs over foreign affairs, denounced military alliances, and dis-
puted the idea that the balance of power could ensure peace. They
emphasized the mutual interests of states and advocated free trade,
which they argued would help prevent war (Russell 1936; Gilbert
1951, 1961; Hinsley 1963)
In the twentieth century Woodrow Wilson joined the idea that free
trade promotes peace with the idea of a universal international orga-
nization to promote the same goal. According to Felix Gilbert, “intel-
lectually, a straight line leads from the enlightenment to Wilson's
concept. His ideas about a ‘new diplomacy’ were definitely depen-
dent on and influenced by the ideas which the eighteenth century
had developed on this subject” Gilbert 1951:37).
During the period between the two world wars, international
relations began to emerge as an academic field, especially in the
United States. William T. R. Fox describes this period as character-
ized by the assumption of an underlying harmony of international
interests coupled with a belief that improved understanding and
international institutions could rid the world of the scourge of war
(Fox 1949). He points to the “failing of events in the 1930s to accord
with the expectations generated by the academic study of interna
tional relations in the 1920s” (Fox 1949:67), The invasion of Manchu-
ria, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, and the failure
of League of Nations sanctions against Italy disillusioned interna-
tional relations scholars and planted the seeds from which modern
realism grew
‘after World War Il realism emerged as the dominant paradim
among international relations scholars. Although a debate between
realism and idealism occurred in the 1945-55 period, among political
scientists “authentic self-proclaimed idealists were hard to find” (Fox
1989:239; see also Wolfers 1949; Herz. 1950; Morgenthau 1952; Wright
1952; Cook and Moos 1953; and Schilling 1956). Despite the domi-
nance of realism, David Mitrany’s treatise on functionalism as an
approach to peace appeared in the 1940s (Mitrany 1943; Claude 1956),
and Ernst Haas's The Uniting of Europe appeared in 1958. Haas's
neofunctionalism spawned numerous studies of regional integration
in the 1960s,
Neoliberalism, Neoreatism, and World Politics 13,
During the 1970s and 19805 the debate between neorealism and
liberal institutionalism began to take more definite shape. Three es-
pecially important works on the liberal side were the special issue of
International Organization on “Transnational Relations and World Pol-
ities” in 1971 (Keohane and Nye 1972); Keohane and Nye's Power and
Interdependence in 1977; and the special issue of International Organiza
tion on “International Regimes” in 1982 (Krasner 1983a). The first
raised questions about the state-centric focus of realism and dis-
cussed such nonstate actors as the Roman Catholic Church, the Ford
Foundation, and multinational business enterprises. In the second,
Keohane and Nye, in their introduction and conclusion to the pub-
lished book, explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state-as-
actor assumption, the relative importance of military security on
foreign policy agendas, the role of military force in international
politics, and the fungibility of power resources among issue areas.
The third, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, set forth both realist and
liberal (labeled Grotian) views on international cooperation and insti-
tutions.
Three especially important works of neorealists during the 19
and TOR iced Kenneth Walt’s “Theory of International Rel
tions” in 1975, his Theory of International Politics in 1979, and Joseph
Grieco’s “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in 1988. The first was a pre-
liminary version of the second, which has become the touchstone for
neorealists, much as Morgenthau’s text (1948) served as a touchstone
for realists in the 1950s. The third explicitly challenged neoliberal
instittionalsm from a neoreait perspective and is included inthis
Although the realist vision has dominated thinking about world
politics much of the time since Thueydicles wrote his treatise on the
Peloponnesian War, alternative visions have always existed. The
contemporary debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is differ-
ent from, yet rooted in, a debate that has been going on for centuries
In order to lay the intellectual groundwork for the debate, the next
three sections address conceptual and theoretical problems raised by
the contributors. Two fundamental concepts used by both neoliberals
and neorealists are anarchy and power. The next two sections are
intended to alert the reader to some of the difficulties associated with
these concepts.14 David A. Baldwin
ANARCHY AND SOCIAL ORDER
Although the concept of anarchy has always been important to
realist theories of international politics, it has been less prominent in
liberal theories. In this volume, however, the assumption of anarchy
plays an important role for most of the neoliberal authors as well
The reader, however, should not be lulled into thinking that neoreal-
ists and neoliberals necessarily agree on the meaning of anarchy or
its consequences.
The term anarchy is one of the most slippery terms in political
discourse. Often it is used to denote chaos and disorder—a Hobbes-
ian war of all against all. Neorealists and neoliberals, however, agree
that world pol
agree on the nature, extent, and causes of that order. Thus, many
theorists define anarchy in terms of the absence of government. This
definition, however, begs the question of what is meant by “govern:
ment.” Many of the activities carried on by governments have coun-
terparts at the international level. Providing welfare support, man-
agement of economic affairs, interpreting laws, regulating commerce,
regulating mail delivery, regulating air travel, promoting, public health,
and ensuring public safety are all governmental activities with coun-
terparts at the international level. This suggests that conceptions of
anarchy as the absence of government are based on some distinc-
tively governmental characteristic that is missing at the international
level. As Helen Milner’s contribution to this volume demonstrates,
agreement is lacking, as to precisely which governmental charactens-
lic defines anarchy.
Readers should carefully scrutinize not only the definitions of
anarchy used by various authors but also the consequences they
attribute to it. In particular, readers should ask whether such conse-
quences can logically be deduced from an assumption of anarchy or
whether they should be treated as empirical hypotheses to be tested.
There is confusion among both neoliberals and neorealists on such
matters (Milner 1992).
Social scientists try to develop generalizations about social phe-
nomena. When asked to explain a social phenomenon, social scien-
tists are supposed to ask: “Of what is this an instance?” Perhaps the
debate about the nature and consequences of international anarchy
ics exhibits some order—even though they may dis
Neoliberalism, Neoreatism, and World Politics 15
would benefit from asking this question. The problem of explaining,
international order can be thought of as a subtype of the general
problem of explaining social order. Social science theories developed.
outside the field of international relations may provide helpful in-
ights. Kenneth Boulding, for example, suggests that the same three
social mechanisms that produce order in families are also responsible
for order at the level of the nation-state and the international political
system (Boulding 1963; 1978; 1989), He identifies them as exchange
relations, threat systems, and image integration. The first empha-
sizes rewards, the second punishments, and the third harmonization
of perceptions and interests. Boulding postulates that all social sys-
tems rely on some combination of these processes to achieve and.
maintain social order.
It is easy to see examples of each process at the international level.
Exchange processes are closely associated with trade, economic inter-
dependence, and other kinds of problems studied by neoliberal.
Threat systems relate to deterrence and similar phenomena of partic-
ular interest to neorealists. Image integration processes are the do.
main of those who study preference formation, learning, and misper-
ception. Boulding’s theory is but one example of the kind of general
social science model that might be helpful in illuminating the prob-
lem of social order in world politics. It illustrates how a single model
can incorporate the neoliberal emphasis on economic interdepen-
dence, the neorealist emphasis on military deterrence, and the psy-
chologists’ emphasis on preference formation.
CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION
“Although power is a key concept in realist theory,” Waltz
observes, “its proper definition remains a matter of controversy”
(Waltz. 1986:333). Another leading neorealist, Robert Gilpin, de-
scribes the “concept of power as one of the most troublesome in the
field of international relations’ (1981:13) and suggests that the “num-
ber and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment to political
scientists” (1975:24). Although power plays a less crucial role in
neoliberal theory, it has also proved to be a troublesome concept for
them (Baldwin 1989). In preparing the reader for the essays that
follow, therefore, it might be helpful to identify some of the problemas16 David A. Baldwin
of power analysis (or capability analysis). These include the specifi-
cation of scope and domain, the zero-sum problem, and the fungibil-
ity question.”
‘Scope and Domain®
When neorealists and neoliberals debate the significance of rel-
ative gains in international politics, they sometimes neglect to specify
precisely what kinds of gains they have in mind. Usually the answer
is gains in capabilities. This answer, however, begs yet another ques-
tion, namely: “Capabilities to get whom to do what?”
The most common conception of power in social science treats
power relations as a type of causal relationship in which the power
iwielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of
another actor. As Nagel points out, “Anyone who employs a causal
‘concept of power must specify domain and scope” (1975:14). This is
easier to see if one restates the phrase “country A has power” as
“country A causes.” The latter phrase prompts one to ask what
effects country A causes with respect to whom. Indeed, the phrase
makes little sense without answers to such questions. It should be
noted that the requirement that scope and domain be specified or
clearly implied says nothing about the level of specificity. Thus the
requirement is satisfied by either of the following two statements
“"The United States has the power to get Iraq to destroy its nuclear
weapons.” “The United States has the power to get lots of natigns to
do lots of things.” Although the phrase “lots of things” may be
rather vague, it does satisfy the minimum requirements for a mean-
ingful statement of a causal power relationship.
‘Waltz rejects the causal notion of power and proposes “the old
and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he
affects others more than they affect him’ (Waltz 1979:192). Waltz's
proposed alternative, however, does not eliminate the need to spec-
ify seope and domain. In terms of scope, one is entitled to ask which
effects matter. In terms of domain, one is entitled to ask which
“others” can be affected.” Some neorealist and neoliberal scholars
have sought to avoid the need to specify scope and domain by using,
the term capabilities (or power resources) in their theories. This merely
shifts the analytical focus from actual causes to potential causes. Any
statement about a state's capabilities is based on a prediction about
Neoliberalisnt, Neoreatism, and World Politics 17
which other actors can be affected in which ways. The observation
that a state has a great deal of capability to win a war against many
other countries is meaningful. The observation that a state has a
great deal of capability begs two vital questions— “capability to get
whom to do what?” Without some sort of answers to these two
questions, the attribution of capability makes little sense.
Waltz (1979:131) suggests that the capabilities of states can be
ranked according to “how they score on all of the following items:
size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic ca-
pability, military strength, poiitical stability, and competence.” It is
not clear, however, what criteria are to be used for the scoring,
Pethaps his reference to the need for states to use their capabilities to
“serve their interests” (1979:131) provides a clue as to the appropriate
criteria, but this isa little vague.
Lists of the determinants of national capabilities, such as that by
Waltz, resemble Morgenthau’s famous “elements of national power”
(1967:106~44). A careful reading of Morgenthau, however, provides
clues as to the scope and domain that underlie his elements of
national power. Why is the geography of Italy important? For,
under all conditions of warfare of which we know, this geographical
situation has made it extremely difficult to invade Central Europe
from Italy” (107). Why is self-sufficiency in food production impor-
tant? Because “‘countries enjoying self-sufficiency, such as the United
States and Russia, need not divert their national energies and foreign
policies from their primary objectives in order to make sure that
populations will not starve in war” (109). Why are raw materials
important? Because “what holds true of food is of course also true of
those natural resources which are important for industrial production
and, more particularly, for the waging of war” (110). Why is indus-
trial capacity an important element of national power? Because “the
technology of modern warfare and communications has made the
overall development of heavy industries an indispensable element of
national power. Since victory in modern war depends upon the
number and quality of highways, railroads, trucks, ships, airplanes,
tanks, and equipment and weapons of all kinds, from mosquito nets
and automatic rifles to oxygen masks and guided missiles, the com-
petition among nations for power transforms itself largely into the
Production of bigger, better, and more implements of war” (113)
And in discussing military preparedness as an element of national18 David A. Baldwin
power, Morgenthau removes all doubt about the policy-contingency
‘assumptions underlying his analysis: “What gives the factors of ge-
ography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual im-
portance for the power of a nation is military preparedness” (114).
Regardless of Morgenthau’s denials elsewhere of a military notion of
power, his analysis of the elements of national power leaves little
doubt as to what he has in mind.
Scholars who incorporate the concept of capability in their theories
need to come to terms with the works of Harold and Margaret Sprout
(1945; 1965; 1971). As realists during the 1930s and 1940s, the Sprouts
subscribed to the idea that national power could be reduced to basic
elements or foundations. Their Foundations of National Power (1945)
foreshadowed Morgenthau’s treatment of the elements of national
power, During the 1950s and 1960s, however, they came to believe
that the capabilities of nation-states could not be estimated outside
the context of a set of assumptions about who was trying (or might
try) to get whom to do what. As they put it
Without some set of given undertakings (strategies, policies), actual or
postulated, with reference to some frame of operational contingencies,
‘actual or postulated, there can be no estimation of political capabilites.
Failure to keep discussions of capabilities .. . within some such
policy-contingency frame of reference is all too common. Such failure
tends to reduce statements about the “elements” or “foundations” of
a given state's power and influence to various irrelevancies. The data
of physical geography, or of demography, or of economic production,
for of any other field have no intrinsic political relevance whatever.
Such data acquire political relevance and significance only when re-
lated to some frame of assumptions as to what is to be undertaken or
attempted in what operational contingencies (Sprout and Sprout
1965:215-16)."
The Zero-Sum Problem
The idea that power is zero-sum, in the sense that more for one
actor means less for another, is common in the literature of interna-
tional relations. Discussions of relative capability gains are especially
prone to employment of this notion. In its extreme form (Le., insi
tence that more power for one actor alzoays means less for another),
it is easy to refute. Logically, a single actual or hypothetical example
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 19
should do the job. I have discussed three examples elsewhere and
will only briefly mention them here:
1. Before Friday comes to live on Robinson Crusoe’s island, nei-
ther has any power. After Friday’s arrival, Crusoe may acquire power
with respect to Friday; but this power gain cannot be offset by a loss
in power by Friday, since Friday had no power to begin with.
2. If Crusoe handcuffs himself to Friday, he may increase his
ability to affect Friday's movements; but he simultaneously increases
Friday's ability to affect his (Crusoe's) movements.
3. The United States’ military involvement in Vietnam increased
not only American ability to affect Vietnamese policy but also Viet-
rnamese ability to affect American policy. (Baldwin 1971; 1989).
‘Those who espouse the view that power is necessarily zero-sum
are unlikely to be persuaded by such examples. They seem to be
using a unidimensional conception of power along the following,
lines: If battleships (or whatever) are the measure of power, it is
impossible for two countries to improve their power position v
vis one another at the same time. The question, of course, is whether
this sort of monolithic measure of power is useful. A multidimen-
sional concept of power, which allows for variations in scope, weight,
and/or domain, makes such monolithic measures problematic. Once
scope and domain are introduced, it is both possible and plausible to
describe an increase in battleships by both actors as an increase in
the ability of each to destroy (scope) the other (domain).
It is, of course, true that politics is sometimes a zero-sum game. In
presidential elections, for example, a win for Republicans is a defeat
for Democrats. In international politics, however, such situations are
rare. Thomas Schelling pointed out long ago that such a situation
“would arise in a war of complete extermination, [but] otherwise not
even in war” (Schelling 1960:4-5). “Winning” in a conflict, he ob-
served, means gaining relative to one’s own value system, not rela
tive to one’s adversary. Except for the rare situation of pure conflict,
Schelling’s approach enables one to envision conflict situations in
which everyone may be a winner or a loser. It is worth noting that
Schelling’s view of winning relative to one’s own value system cap-
tures the essence of Clausewitz’s conception of victory in war. The
important thing, according to Clausewitz, is to accomplish one's
political goals, not necessarily to destroy the enemy (Clausewitz,20 David A. Baldwin
1976), Several essays in this volume by authors on both sides of the
debate seem to employ a zero-sum conception of power. The reader
will have to decide whether such usage is appropriate in the context
of a particular essay
Fungibility
“Fungibility” refers to the ease with which capabilities in one
issue-area can be used in other issue-areas. Although the assumption
that power resources are highly fungible is often associated with
neorealism, it is also found in some neoliberal works. Robert Axel-
rod’s (1984) discussion of the strategy of TIT-for-TAT, for example,
implies an underlying standard in terms of which a TIT is equivalent
to a TAT (Baldwin 1990:112-15). In reading the contributors to this
volume, the reader should ask what level of power fungibility the
author is assuming and what the implications are for the essay in
which itis found,
The question of what assumption about the fungibility of power
resources (capabilities) is most useful for international theorizing, has
more than one good answer. It is instructive to note that one of the
‘most successful efforts based on an assumption of high fungibility is
the Correlates of War Project, which has a narrow focus in terms of
scope (i.e., winning wars), and a broad focus in terms of time Yi.e.,
everal centuries)
This is not surprising If one studies only one issue-area, then
variations in the utility of power resources from one issue-area to
another do not matter. And the longer the time frame of one’s
analysis, the more useful a high-fungibility assumption is likely to
be. In politics, as in economics, more things are fungible in the long
run than in the short, ;
Debates about whether the fungibility of power resources is high
or low often seem rootless in the sense that the criteria for judgment
are unspecified. Many would agree that Japan has much more influ-
ence on economic issues than on military ones, that “the power to
knock down a person does not give us the power to teach that person.
to play the piano,” and that the power “to bomb and burn a village
cannot be completely or easily transformed into the power to win the
sympathies of the inhabitants” (Deutsch 1988:30); but such examples
do not prove that power resources in general are low in fungibility.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 21
When addressing the question of whether to judge political power
resources high or low in fungibility, itis useful to ask, “Compared to
what?” The answer sometimes given is money
But why use money as a standard of comparison? In the first place,
it is the best example we have of fungible resources actually operat-
ing in social processes. In the second place, there is a large scholarly
literature describing and analyzing what money is and how it works.
In the third place, on the principle that it is useful to start from what
we know and move to what we understand less well, it may be
useful to compare money’s role in economic exchange with the role
of power resources in political exchange. In the fourth place, it is not
clear what other standard is available. Although one might use the
other end of the liquidity continuum as a standard of comparison
(ie., a situation in which each resource has only one use), most
people would probably find it more useful to compare political power
resources with the real-world phenomenon of money than with a
hypothetical case that has never been found in the real world. And
filth, it has often been suggested that power is like money (Parsons
1963; Baldwin 1971; 1989; Deutsch 1988). It is important to under
stand both the advantages and disadvantages of such an analogy
(Baldwin 1971),
Discussions of concerns about relative gains as motivators of state
behavior often assume that states calculate and compare the value of
capability gains more or less the way consumers calculate and com-
pare the value of goods in a market, Although states do attempt such
calculations, they face difficulties that consumers do not. Ina mone-
tized market, money serves not only as a medium of exchange but
also as a standardized measure of economic value. In politics, how-
ever, there is no generally recognized measuring rod of political
value to facilitate comparisons. It is sometimes suggested that money
facilitates theorizing about economic behavior and that the absence
of a political counterpart to money impedes theorizing about politics
Waltz (1990) has disputed this view, dismissing it as a mere measure-
ment problem. He concedes that political capability “cannot be ex-
pressed in units, such as dollars, that would have clear meaning and
be applicable to different instruments and ends” (1990:27-28); but he
Cites the absence of numbers in Adam Smith's theory in support of
his contention that the lack of a political counterpart to money has
nothing to do with theory construction.22° David A. Baldwin
From the standpoint of theory construction, however, the clarity
of key concepts is essential. Although it is true that numbers do not
play an important part in Adam Smith’s analysis, he devotes consid:
erable attention to clarification of the concept of money as both a
measure of value and as a medium of exchange. When Adam Smith
talks about the combined wealth of a country, it is clear what this,
means. When Waltz refers to the “combined capabilities” of a coun:
try, however, there is no comparably clear meaning. What makes the
absence of a political counterpart to money an impediment to theory
construction is not so much the difficulty of measurement; rather itis
the clarity of the concept of political value. We have a much better
idea of what it means to attribute economic value to something than
we have of what it means to attribute political value to something.”
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Anatol Rapoport (1960) once distinguished among “fights” (in
which opponents try to harm one another), “games” (in which op-
ponents try to outwit one another), and “debates” (in which oppo-
nents try to convince each other). The essays in this volume clearly
deserve to be classified as debates. Although neither side is likely to
convince the other completely, each can learn from the other and
thereby advance our understanding of international politics. Relative
gains may be important in politics, but in scholarship absolute gains
are what matter.
The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism continues to
evolve, Each of the essays in this volume constitutes an important
contribution to this debate, There are, however, several dimensions
of the debate that need further elaboration and research.
The most important research need is Letter understanding of the
conditions that promote or inhibit international cooperation. The
debate between neorealism and neoliberalism has generated at least
six hypotheses worthy of more research and testing,” The first con-
cerns the strategy of reciprocity. Both the theoretical and practical
conditions under which such strategies promote cooperation deserve
attention. The second hypothesis suggests that the number of actors
affects the likelihood of cooperation. Although cooperation might
seem easier with fewer actors, Milner (1992) has recently suggested
that the relationship may be more complicated than that. The third
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 23
hypothesis relates actor’s expectations about future interaction with
‘one another in their willingness to cooperate. Although this topic has
been studied deductively, relatively little empirical work has focused
on it, Fourth, international regimes have been hypothesized as pro-
motive of cooperation. The question of how much difference regimes
make, however, remains a matter of dispute. In 1992 the journal
International Organization devoted a special issue to a fifth hypothesis
focusing on “epistemic communities” in fostering cooperation. Al-
though the contributors to that volume test the hypothesis in several
issue-areas, many opportunities for further research remain. The
sixth hypothesis concerns the extent to which international coopera~
tion is affected by the distribution of power among actors. Although
hegemonic stability theory constitutes one variation of this hypothe-
sis, others deserve to be explored. These six hypotheses provide a
rich research agenda for both neoliberal and neorealist scholars
The question of whether and how to take account of domestic
Politics is another avenue of research. As the essays in this volume
demonstrate, one cannot blithely assume that neoliberals acknow!-
exige the importance of domestic politics while neorealists ignore it
In these essays for this volume, both Grieco and Keohane urge
greater efforts to forge theoretical links between domestic polities
and international relations, Milner (1992) argues that consideration
of domestic politics is relevant to understanding how states define
their interests, why they choose some strategies and reject others,
and the conditions under which states are likely to abide by interna-
tional agreements. And Mastanduno’s contribution to this volume
Provides an impressive conclusion that domestic factors are vital to
understanding the way in which relative gains concerns are trans-
lated into policy.
One traditional point of contention between liberals and realists
has been disagreement with respect to the utility of military force
Has this disagreement disappeared in the debate between neoliber-
alism and neorealism? The answer is unclear. Although some of the
authors in this volume raise the issue, only Robert Powell gives it a
Prominent place in his analysis. Without further clarification of each
school’s position, it is difficult to determine whether this issue has
been resolved or merely put on the back burner.
In any case the relative utility of various techniques of statecraft in
Promoting international cooperation is a potentially rewarding ave-24° David A. Baldwin
nue of research, Military statecraft, economic statecraft, propaganda,
land diplomacy can be—and have been—used to promote coopera-
tion. Both neorealists and neoliberals need to move beyond a priori
assumptions about the utility of these techniques. More empirical
research is desirable.
Looking back on the post-World War II debate between realism
and idealism, Inis L. Claude (1981:198, 200) challenged the “notion
of the essential opposition of realism and idealism” and suggested
that they “are more properly regarded as complementary rather than
competitive approaches to intemational affairs.” John Herz (1981:202)
agreed with Claude and described his own position as “realist hber-
‘lism.”" Joseph Nye (1988:238, 251) has echoed the view that the two
approaches are complementary and expressed the hope that “the
{1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic 1970s
and 1980s,” The essays in this volume are a step toward such a
synthesis.
‘The debate between those who emphasize the constraints on in-
ternational cooperation and those who stress the opportunities for
such cooperation, however, will not—and should not— disappear
Humankind needs a healthy tension between what Reinhold Nie~
buhr has labeled the “children of light” and the “children of dark-
ness”
Pure idealists [children of light] underestimate the perennial power of
particular and parochial loyalties, operating as a counter force against
re achievement of a wider community. But the realists [children of
darkness] are usually so impressed by the power of these perennial
farces that they fail to recognize the novel and unique elements in a
revolutionary world situation, The idealists erroneously imagine that a
ew situation automatically generates the resources for the solution of
its problem, The realists erroneously discount the destructive, 2s well
ts the creative, power of a revolutionary situation. (Niebuhr 1944:176)
NOTES
1. Powell refers to situations in which “the use of force is at issue.” 1
interpret this to refer to situations in which force is feasible o- high in
utility For a discussion of how the utlity of a technique of statecraft is
determined, see Baldwin (1985)
2, Fora poignant example of both the importance and difficulty of combin-
ing studies of conflict and cooperation, see the preface added in 1980 #©
Thomas C. Schelling’s classic The Strategy of Conftct (1960).
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics 25
3, For discussion of liberalism in the international context, see Doyle
1986); and Zacher and Matthew (1992). re ae cess
‘On mercantilist thought, see Viner (1948); and Heckscher (1955)
Enc these topic daca in more eal by Bain (98D)
Dinan refers f0 the actor or actors with respect to which power i
exercised, and scope refers to the dimension of their behavior
exec f their behavior that is
7, Waltz’s conception of power in terms of ability to affect others seems to
be just as much a causal notion of power as Robert Dahl's (1968). Causal
notions of power can be stated in a variety of ways. Walte’s definition of
power in terms of who affects whom more strongly is similar to the
Views of Harry Eckstein (1973) and Peter Blau (1968). For a critique of
such notions, see Baldwin (1978; 1989:114-18).
8. The Sprouts (1965:217n) cite their own earlier work (1945) as an examph
of failure to set the discussion of power in such a context, They cite SB.
Jones 0950) 4 an ample ofan ey ey on capabiis “in which
e essentiality of such assumptions is quite explicit.” Cl. §
eee iptions is quite explicit.” Cf. Sprout and
9. The concept of politcal value unconnected with a specific set of activities
is analogous to the concept of athletic prowess unconnected with a
specified set of athletic activites. It is not just difficult to meusure athletic
prowess in the abstract, it is difficult to conceive what it means, The
question of whether Babe Ruth was a beter athlete than Jack Dempsey
not only ses measurement problems, raises conceptual problems 3b
10, ‘The discussion of the six hypotheses is based on Milner
work for farther elaboration Rae (2. Sees