MARCELO V.

CA
G.R. No. 131803, April 14, 1999

Facts:
In 1939, 2 parcels of land, Lot 3096 and Lot 3098, was originally owned by JOSE Marcelo and
his wife with CONTINUOUS POSSESSION of such since 1939.

In 1960, Fernando CRUZ purchased a property (13,856 sq.m.) which includes the encroached
portion from the SARMIENTOs pursuant to a KASULATAN PARTISYON SA LABAS NG
HUKUMAN AT BILIHING PATULUYARI. The land sold to Fernando CRUZ contained 6,000
sq.m. of PALAYERO or riceland and 7,856 sq.m. of PARANG or pasture land and was surveyed
in 1967 for taxation purposes.
In 1961, the adjoining property described and classified as “PARANG” (7,856 sq.m.) was
declared by CRUZ in his name which increased his landholding to 13,856 sq.m.
In 1967, after the death of JOSE, his HEIRS discovered that a portion of Lot 3098 (7,540 sq.m.)
had been encroached by defendant FERNANDO CRUZ
In 1968, Fernando CRUZ sold his property (13,856 sq.m.) to SERVANDO FLORES pursuant to
a KASULATAN NG BILIHAN which includes the encroached portion. FLORES immediately took
possession of the entire area in the concept of an owner and held it in that capacity for almost
14 years. 
Finally in Oct. 6 1982, the HEIRS of Marcelo filed with the RTC an action for the recovery of a
portion (“PARANG”Lot 3098 7,540 sq.m.)  of unregistered land in Bulacan. 
The RTC Ruled in favor of the HEIRS of Marcelo ordering CRUZ and FLORES to return the
“PARANG” to the former because such was never included in the Tax Declaration of the
SARMIENTOs at the time of the sale in favor of CRUZ. However, the CA Reversed the RTC’s
decision on the theory that Flores already has acquired ownership of the PARANG by ordinary
acquisitive prescription.
The HEIRS OF MARCELO contends that respondents never acquired the 7,540 sq.m. lawfully,
as the CA already stated that what was sold to CRUZ was the 6,800 sq.m. which he then sold to
respondent FLORES. They asserted that they have proven that the 7,540 sq.m. formed part of
19,231 sq.m. of their parents in their possession since 1939. They also asserted that the
property sold by the SARMIENTOs to CRUZ under a Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan covers only the “PALAYERO” or riceland (6,000 sq.m.) and that
the “PARANG” (7856 sq.m.) has not been included.

On the other hand, the respondents contend that the Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan pertained not only to the “PALAYERO” but also to the
“PARANG”. A new tax declaration was issued in 1960 in favor of CRUZ for the entire 13,856
sq.m. property, including the PARANG. They argued that FLORES had been in possession of
the entire area in the concept of an owner and holding it in that capacity for almost 14 years
before petitioners initiated their complaint. 
Issue:
WON Servando Flores acquired the disputed land (PARANG) through Acquisitive Prescription.

Ruling:
YES. Flores acquired possession of the disputed portion of land by ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION. Petition is denied. Acquisitive Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership
by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Acquisitive prescription
of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character. The requirements for ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION have indeed been
met.

Flores took possession of the question portion in good faith and with just title because the said
portion of 7,540 sq.m. was an integral part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Cruz
under public document.

In the document of sale executed in 1968, the disputed portion referred to as “parang” was
included in the sale to Flores since at the time of the sale, the whole area consisting of the
riceland and pasture land was already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Cruz and
further surveyed in his favor.

Hence, Flores’ possession of the entire parcel which includes the portion sought to be
recovered by the heirs of Marcelo was not only in the concept of an owner but also public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131803. April 14, 1999]

SOTERA PAULINO MARCELO, GABRIELA M. ANGELES,

SIMEONA CUENCO, EMILIA MARCELO and RUBEN
 MARCELO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
FERNANDO CRUZ and SERVANDO FLORES, Respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The reversal of the 28th November 1996 decision1 of the Court of

Appeals setting aside that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
19, of Malolos, Bulacan, is sought in this petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners seek the reinstatement of the RTC decision
which has ordered respondents Fernando Cruz and Servando Flores
to return the ownership and possession of a portion of unregistered
and untitled land located in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan, to herein
petitioners.

It would appear that on 06 October 1982, herein petitioners, heirs

of the deceased Jose Marcelo, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, an action for the recovery of a portion
of unregistered land in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan. The complaint,
later amended on 12 October 1983, averred that two parcels of land
in Sta. Lucia, declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declarations
No. 2880 and No. 2882, owned by the late Jose Marcelo and his
spouse, Sotera Paulino-Marcelo, had been encroached, to the extent
of 7,5402 square meters thereof, by respondents Fernando Cruz and
Servando Flores.

In their answer, respondent Cruz and Flores denied the allegations

of petitioners, assailing at the same time the jurisdiction of the trial
court to act on the complaint which, it was claimed, had effectively
asserted a cause of action for ejectment (unlawful detainer).

The appellate court adopted the summary of evidence made by the

trial court; thus:

Evidence adduced by the plaintiffs through the testimony of plaintiff

Gabriela Angeles showed that the parcel of land subject of litigation
covering Lot 3098 and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 2882
(Exh. A) was originally owned by spouses Jose Marcelo and Sotera
Paulino and they had been in continuous possession of said property
since 1939. Following the death of plaintiffs father in 1965, they
discovered in 1967 that a portion of said property had been
encroached by defendant Fernando Cruz. Plaintiffs caused the
relocation survey of said property and per plan of Lot 3096 and Lot
3098 of the Angat Cadastre as surveyed for the heirs of Jose
Marcelo (Exh. B), 7540 square meters of Lot 3098 had been
encroached by defendant Fernando Cruz as indicated in the shaded
portion of said plan (Exh. B-1).

Defendant Fernando Cruz sold his property with an area of 13,856

square meters to defendant Servando Flores pursuant to a deed of
sale (Kasulatan ng Bilihan) dated November 3, 1968 (Exh. C) which
sale, includes the encroached portion (7,540 square meters
of plaintiffs property) Defendant Fernando Cruz heretofore
purchased the said property from Engracia dela Cruz and Vicente
Marta and Florentino all surnamed Sarmiento, pursuant to
a Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang
Patulayan dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D) covering an area of
6,000 square meters. The Tax Declaration No. 4482 (Exh. E)
covering the property in the name of Jorge Sarmiento and Engracia
Cruz covered an area of 6,8003 square meters. As soon as the said
property was sold to Fernando Cruz, the adjoining property
described and classified as parang  with an area of 7,856 square
meters was declared by said Fernando Cruz in his name which
circumstance, increased his landholding to 13,856 square meters
(Exh. F). The said property was subsequently sold by defendant
Fernando Cruz to defendant Servando Flores.

According to Gabriela, they attempted to cultivate the disputed

portion sometime in 1968, but were barred from doing so by
defendant Servando Flores who claimed that the area was part of
the land he bought from co-defendant Fernando Cruz.

On the other hand, both defendants testified to refute plaintiffs

evidence. They invariably declared that the portion sought to be
recovered by plaintiffs is part of the land which defendant Fernando
Cruz acquired in 1960 from the Heirs of Jorge Sarmiento; that as
stated in their document (Exh 2), the land sold to defendant
Fernando Cruz contained 6,000 square meters of palayero or
riceland and 7,856 square meters of parang or pasture land; that
defendant Fernando Cruz caused the entire parcel to be surveyed
sometime in 1967 (Exhs. 3 & 4), which he then declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 8505 (Exh. F); that on
November 3, 1968 defendant Fernando Cruz sold the whole lot to
defendant Servando Flores (Exh. I), who thereupon occupied and
cultivated it.4
cräläwvirtualibräry

Evaluating the evidence of the contending parties, the trial court

found and ratiocinated:

The crux of the matter at issue apparently resolves on the so-called

pasture land (parang) supposedly sold by the Sarmientos and
Engracia de la Cruz to defendant Fernando Cruz. The
said 'parang' was never included and/or embraced in the Tax
Declaration No. 4882 (Exh. E) of the Sarmientos at the time of the
said sale in favor of defendant Fernando Cruz pursuant to an
extrajudicial partition with sale dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D).
This is evident as indicated by the fact that the same was only
declared by Fernando Cruz in his name in 1961 as evidenced by the
tax declaration issued in his favor (Exh. F). On the other hand,
the said parang is a part and parcel of plaintiffs property to
which they had been in possession thereof prior to World
War II and evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 2882 (Exh. A).
The plan of Lot 3096 and Lot 3098 of the Angat Cadastre (Exhs. B
and B-1) inevitably indicated that what has been encroached by
defendants refers to the parang of 7,540 square meters which
defendant Fernando Cruz declared the same in his name in 1961.
This explains the unnecessary increase of his property from 6,000
square meters which he purchased from the Sarmientos pursuant to
extrajudicial partition with sale and embraced under Tax Declaration
No. 4882 (Exh. E), to 13,856 square meters.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court thereupon ruled in favor of petitioners; the

dispositive portion of its decision concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants

ordering the following:
a. To return the ownership and possession of 7,540 square meters
to the plaintiffs as indicated in the relocation survey plan; and

b To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00;

No actual and/or moral damages (sic) is awarded for lack of factual

evidence.

The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of factual and/or legal

basis.6
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Respondents Cruz and Flores went to the Court of Appeals; in its

now assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the judgment of
the court a quo. Petitioners moved for a consideration; the motion,
however, was denied.

In this latest recourse, petitioners assail the holding of the Court of

Appeals that the action initiated in 1982 by petitioners against
respondent Flores would not prosper on the theory that Flores
already has acquired ownership of the disputed land by
ordinary acquisitive prescription. Petitioners argue that

1. The respondent court erred in not applying the doctrine laid down
by this Honorable Court in Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 105 considering
that respondents never acquired the 7,540 square meters lawfully,
as the respondent court already stated that what was sold to
respondent Cruz was the 6,800 square meters which he then sold to
respondent Flores, hence respondents cannot account as to how
they acquire said lot, whereas the petitioner proved the 7,540
square meters formed part of 19,231 square meters of their parents
in their possession since 1939.

2. The respondent court erred in disregarding the findings of facts of

the trial court, and substitute its own perception of the facts
contrary to the incontrovertible evidence.7 cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners assert that the property sold by the Sarmientos to

respondent Cruz on 19 November 1960, under a Kasulatan ng
Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan, covers only
the palayero or riceland, which measure about 6,000 square
meters, and that the parang, containing 7,856 square meters, has
not been included.

The petition must be denied.

Contrary to the insistence of petitioners, the Kasulatan ng Partisyon

sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan. executed on 19 March
1960 by Engracia dela Cruz (widow of Jorge Sarmiento) and her
children Vicente Sarmiento, Maria Sarmiento and Florentino
Sarmiento, pertained not only to the palayero but also to
the parang as well; this agreement provided thus:

1. Na akong si Engracia de la Cruz at ang aking yumao ng asawang

si Jorge Sarmiento (nuong nabubuhay ito) ay nakapagpundar ng
isang lupa na ang buong description ay gaya ng sumusunod:

Isang parselang lupang PALAYERO na may kasamang

PARANG  (Cogonales) na matatagpuan sa Barrio Ng Santa Lucia,
Angat, Bulacan, P.I.

Ang Palayero ay may sukat na 6,000 metros

cuadrados,  klasipikado 2-b, amillarado  P270.00 Tax No. 4482;  at
ang parang ay may sukat na 7,856 metros cuadrados.
Humahangga sa Norte, kay Antonio de la Rosa; Este, kina Fabian
Garcia at Juan Geronimo; Sur, Kina Miguel Illescas, Ciriaco Reyes, y
Juan de la Cruz; Oeste, Juan de la Cruz hoy Jose Marcelo y Mariano
de la Cruz hoy Felip de Leon. Walang mejoras at ang hangganan sa
paligid ay makikilala sa pamamagitan ng matutuwid na sikang o
pilapil na buhay.

2. Ayon sa Tax No. 4482 ay lupang palayero lamang ang nakatala,

subalit  itoy mayroong kasamang parang  na hindi lamang
naipatala niyang nakaraang pasukan ng lupa sa tanggapan ng
Assessor Provincial, kayat ngayon ay magalang naming hinihiling na
matala ang naturang parang.8 (Emphasis supplied)
 

Shortly after the execution of the deed of sale in his favor,

respondent Cruz declared both parcels, i.e., the palayero  and
the parang, for taxation purposes in 1960 in the Office of the
Provincial Assessor and forthwith a new tax declaration was issued
in his name for the entire 13,856 square meter property. The trial
court itself likewise found that the sale by the Sarmientos to
respondent Cruz covered both the riceland and the pasture land; it
said:

x x x. It is worthy to note that the ownership of the adjoining

property by defendant Fernando Cruz originated from an
extrajudicial partition with sale (Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan dated November 19, 1960 x x x.
Under the said document, Engracia de la Cruz and her children
Vicente, Marta, and Florentino, all surnamed Sarmiento, sold to
defendant Fernando Cruz a rice land containing an area of 6,000
square meters and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 4482 and a
pasture land (parang) containing an area of 7,856 square meters. x
x x9
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In turn, respondent Cruz sold, on 03 November 1968, the 13,856

square meters of land to respondent Flores under a Kasulatan ng
Bilihan. Respondent Flores immediately took possession of the
property to the exclusion of all others and promptly paid the realty
taxes thereon. From that time on, Flores had been in possession of
the entire area in the concept of an owner and holding it in that
capacity for almost fourteen (14) years before petitioners initiated
their complaint on 06 October 1982.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a

possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public
peaceful and uninterrupted.10 Thus, mere possession with
a juridical title, such as, to exemplify, by a usufructuary, a
trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of
an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription,11 unless the juridical relation is first expressly
repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the
other party.12 Acts of possessory character executed due to license
or by mere tolerance of the owner would likewise be
inadequate.13 Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueno, or, to use the
common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse; if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not
start the running of the period of prescription.14

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be

ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law;15 without good faith and just title, acquisitive
prescription can only be extraordinary in character.

As regards, real or immovable property, Article 1134 of the Civil

Code provides:

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable

property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands, as aforesaid, that the

possession be in good faith and with just title.16 The good faith of
the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could
thereby transmit that ownership.17 There is, upon the other hand,
just title when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is
neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the
right.18 In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa,19 the Supreme Court has explained
the law in Article 1130 of the Civil Code which states that the title
for prescription must be true and valid. Thus:

We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the

scope and effect of the provisions of this article of the Code in its
application to ordinary prescription. It is evident that by a titulo
verdadero y valido in this connection we are not to understand a
titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin
necesidad de la prescricion (a title which of itself is sufficient to
transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of the
prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a learned Spanish
law writer who holds that the titulo verdadero y valido as used in
this article of the code prescribes a titulo colorado and not merely
putativo; a titulo colorado being one which a person has when he
buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the
owner, and a titulo putativo being one which is supposed to have
preceded the acquisition of a thing, although in fact it did not, as
might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that
it had been bequeathed to him. (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda,
p. 541)20 cräläwvirtualibräry

The records of the case amply supports the holding of the appellate
court that the requirements for ordinary prescription hereinabove
described have indeed been duly met; it explained:

In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of

the controverted portion in good faith and with just title. This is so
because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral
part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Fernando
Cruz under public document (Exh. I) As explicitly mentioned in the
document of sale (Exh. I) executed in 1968, the disputed portion
referred to as parang was included in the sale to appellant Flores.
Parenthetically, at the time of the sale, the whole area consisting of
the riceland and pasture land was already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Fernando Cruz (Exh. F) and further
surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4). Hence, appellant Flores
possession of the entire parcel which includes the portion sought to
be recovered by appellees was not only in the concept of an owner
but also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it is true that the
possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest
(Fernando Cruz) may not have been peaceful as it was indeed
characterized with violence which resulted in the death of Jose
Marcelo, this cannot be said of appellant Flores possession of the
property, in respect of which no evidence to the contrary appears on
record.21
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This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the above findings of

the appellate court and thus gives its affirmance to the assailed
decision.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner for review on certiorari  is DENIED. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.