US Intelligence and Soviet Armor
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STGNUS Intelligence and Soviet Armor
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Notes:
1. Judgment based on size, weight consideration.
2. BMP has passive I sight
3. BMP possesses collective protection, filter, chemical alarm,
4. BMP mounts 73:mm gun, hes firing ports
5. BMP mounts Sagger AGHA
By 1984, as the United States Infantry Fighting Vehicle becomes available, the
Army figures it may close the gap in quality, if not in quantity, compared with the
BMP follow-on
1979
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notes
1. _IFV will possess superior suspension, horsepawer/weight rato.
2. IFV will have thermal night sight
3. Judgment based on IFV Bushmaster. automatic cannon
‘4 Judgment based on IFV Bushmaster. automatic cannon
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“SEeREE (bx3)(c) Soviet Armor
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Confronted with the foregoing data, or comparable presentations, NATO
supporters usually adduce two arguments which they feel offset putative Soviet
strenth in armor
— In assessing armor, all of NATO's tanks, not just those of the United States,
should be counted
— NATO relies not just on tanks, but on antitank guided missiles (ATGM) and
other advanced weapons to counter Soviet armor.
NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Tanks
Warsaw Pact tanks now outnumber NATO's (2:1 in peace, better than 25:1
ostmobilization) and NATO is unlikely to improve its position by 1985
Quantitatively, the Warsaw Pact is likely to maintain about the same edge
The first argument has merit, but proffers little comfort. Over the past five years
(1975-1979) NATO's procurement of tanks has averaged less than half that of the
Warsaw Pact.
While NATO is expected to add some 8,000 tanks to its inventory between 1980
and 1985, these increases will be mainly from new British procurement (about 100
120-mm gun Chieftain Challenger tanks) and US. POMCUS (prepostioned overseas
aeaaae(5)(3)(np
Main Battle Tank Mobilization in Central Europe
1980-1985 : M Day & M+15
2 ‘SEEREH
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Soviet Armor (b)(3)(c)
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NATO and Warsaw Pact Main Battle Tank Procurement
1975 to 1979
oS EERE E aE RS
materiel configured in unit sets)—all M-60 series. Qualitatively, NATO will remain
dependent on tank types with 105-mm or smaller main guns, and okbstyle
homogeneous armor, while the Warsaw Pact will be turning out larger numbers of
tanks with guns of 120-mm or larger bore, and advanced armor. If only such large-
‘sun, advanced-armor tanks be counted, the Warsaw Pact will probably outproduee
NATO by more than 4:1
This difference in quality is significant. Presented below is a US. Army
‘comparison of the effectiveness of key tanks of the recent past and near future. The
US. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Ageney* has used for this purpose a dynamic
‘model of combat between two tanks (one-versus-one duel). The mathematical model is
informed as feasible by data from battles (for example, the October 1973 War), and
actual firings and other tess. It agsregates outcomes of duels at various combat ranges,
in which each protagonist is 50 percent of the time fully exposed in the attack, and 50
Percent in hull defilade defending. Variables in the model also account for time of
firing, probabilities of hit and of kill, round reliability, and probability of sensing
(using one shot to advantage in aiming the next). Thus, this duel model evaluates two
tanks by comparing the vulnerability and lethality of each, plus their respective rates
of fire and accuracy, combined significantly over range and engagement time. Thus
SAA generated this nara exresy for this paper: data are Confidential. Note, however, that the
XMILEL, due cect 1085, is not modeled
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(b)(3)(c) Soviet Armor
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‘measured, the current and recent So
in the chart labeled “Tank Quality,
advantage in quality, tank for tank, is evident
‘Tank Quality: The ANSAA View
(One vs. One Duels)
US Advantage
3
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Soviet Armor (b)(3)(c) ae
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The area on the chart labeled “Intelligence Shortfall” will be discussed at greater
length in the concluding section of this paper, but suffice to say here that possible
comparisons between current and prospective U.S. and Soviet main battle tanks are
defined by the upper curve (T-70 lines), which is the 1974 intelligence projection used
by the Army in seeking approval for its XM-1 development program, and the lower
curve (T-64/72, T-80 lines), which represent current intelligence projections erediting
Soviet armor with high protective prowess (upper bound, or worst case armor)
Information available now indicates that the actual state of affairs is much closer to
the bottom curve than the upper curve. In brief, the United States is now behind, tank
for tank, and even when our developmental XM-833 depleted-uranium round for the
105-mm cannon becomes available, the XM-1 is likely to be no more than an even
‘match for the T-80,
(b)(1)
USS. Army data, were it available in Moscow, would confirm Soviet sensings of
the superiority of their T-72 over contemporary US. tanks. The chart below draws on
data from the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, based on test firings, which
compare the four main tank-killing weapons of the U'S. Seventh Army in Europe
‘against three Soviet tanks: the T-62, and the T-72 with our high and low estimates of
its armor thickness, The T-72 LB is a lower bound or “best ease” version, the T-72 UB
is an upper bound or “worst case” version. The US. weapons include the DRAGON
and TOW antitank guided missiles, and two 105-mm tank cannon rounds: the M.735
is the current tungsten alloy fin-stabilized round, and the M-774 is the depleted
uranium (Staballoy), fin-stabilized round about to be issued. The plots depict
probability of kill assuming hit on an attacking, fully and frontally exposed tank:
P.
K/H*
CURRENT WEAPONS 7.62 1-72 (LB) 7-72 (UB)
DRAGON ATGM 65, 2 18
PRAGONATGM 65g
TOW ATGM 4 48 16
TOWATCM ag
7 22 22
M-735 APFSDS
COMING WEAPONS
M-i74 APFSDS 78 n 50
* Probability of Kill Given Hit, Firer and Target Stationary, Target Fully Exposed,
0° Azimuth (Front),
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Brobabiily of Kil Given,
Firer and Torget Stationary,
Target Fully Exposed, O°
imuth (Frond)
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Soviet Armor (b(3)(c) oereeet
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‘As may be seen, while all weapons have provided high assurance of kill against the
1-62, the M-735—planned to be the most numerous round aboard US. tanks—is
impotent against the T-72, Our two most powerful ATGM are marginal in a frontal
attack against the lower bound-best case T-72, and virtually useless agains the upper
bound-worst case T-72.*
‘To sum, whether one uses informed U.S. or Soviet calculations, the conclusion is
that NATO can expect, through 1984, no advantage over the Soviets in quality of
‘armor of antiarmor weapons, and only a modest redressing of its present quantitative
disadvantage.
{The srapieasessmenttechnigues wed here are In some cases orignal, nd, in all, sual. Among
ther problems intelligence faces, that of presenting combarzons i hs ield of armaments met doe
With vehicles erotected by homogeneous armor, it hasbeen easy to expres lethality a threat seasons
8 8 common denominator the ability of each to penctate some standard. armor such ss “rolled
homogeneous steel plate at 0° obliquity.” But with the advent of ronhomawsneous armors sch othe oc
believe the Soviets employ onthe T-64 and 7.72, ew comparative measur must be sught. As the Us,
‘Arty Ballstic Research Laboratory uti: "The Soviet Union has fcded wo new tan the T.ed ed te
‘7-72. As inleligence data on these tanks accumulated, it became apparent that (a) the Tt and Teo nee
21 sic in os respects, and (b) both appeared to have an unconventional armor over mos (or all) of
ins ofthe accumolating inteligence data has led to technica exits of
‘weapon in a complicated way.
{The advent of» new unconveational armor on fielded Sov! tanks causes two immediate problems
‘Te fin, bigest and most obvious problem is that we mut immediately recomlder the copaaing of
‘siting and developmental weapons systems, and deide what actions are prudent in the las of tha san
threat. The second, ls obvious, problem is that this reconsideration of the exvablitiea ae Ceecee
atems is made much more dificult by the complicated phenomena tavalved in the ternal ballet of
attacking munitions and the unconventional armor as we perce I mow
{When tanks were made of homogeneous steel armor, i was relatively cay to eta fal idea of the
lethality of most wenpont against such tanks by comparing the pet
Stel armor to the known or expected thicknes of stmor on the
tne of steel armor, and it had to penetrate Y min of steel armor to reach the inereal volume of the wae
then if X>Y the attacking weapon could be said to have some significant kel, and the meet
exceeded ¥ 1 14 point) Such simplistic concepts ere not
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(b)(3)(c)
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Soviet Armor
Antitank Missiles
Does NATO's hope lie in more and better antitank guided missiles? In precision
guided munitions? Here, too, near-future prospects are bleak. As indicated above,
even the numerous, once-formidable US. TOW ATGM is now a questionable asset. AS
the chart depicts,* when the Soviets deployed their T-64 and T-72 tanks, they ended
nearly two decades of U.S. ATGM superiority. While it is possible that an improved.
(larger, faster) TOW-like missile may redress this deficieney vis-a-vis these current
tanks, Soviet armor on the T-80 and T-801 could stymie this development as well
“While the previous footnote deprecats such simplistic measures as thote of ordinate, these can be
‘wed with some validity to tate the comparable ATGM watheads shown
US ATGM vs. Soviet Tank
= T
ee al lu
“armor Atle Sed
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Soviet Armor (b)(3)(c) —SPCRE
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Here are diagrams generated by the computer of the Ballistic Research
Laboratory which portray the vulnerability of the T-62 and T-72 against frontal attack
by DRAGON and TOW, the two ATGM now deployed throughout the Seventh Army.
‘The depiction for DRAGON is valid for a 0° frontal attack from 100 to 1,000 meters
range; that for TOW for a 0° frontal attack from 500 to 3,700 meters range:
Weapon:
DRAGON
From ground mount
(12/7@)LOWER BOUND
PROTECTION
Target:
ee T-/2
a:
ral volume not parorated (02/78) UPPER BOUNO
one PROTECTION
Secret
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9
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Soviet Armor
(l2/78)LOWER BOUND
PROTECTION
key:
| = T=
FER] erat woe ot ptr
2/78) vepeR sound
PROTECTION
EBS 82 inerna volume horo
—Beeret=
(b)(3)(ny
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Soviet Armor N (b)(3)(c) “SPCRET
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‘These diagrams illustrate vividly the intelligence dimensions of the ATGM problem
facing US. commanders in Europe today: our ATGM clearly can defeat the T-62, but
the T-72—and the like-armored T-64—could be largely invulnerable to them. In fact,
chances are better than 50-50 that either TOW or DRAGON would explode without
effect against the nose of the T-72, even if that tank's armor is only of “lower bound,
‘best case” toughness, In the upper bound, worst case, the probability of kill declines to
less than .20. Prudence dictates a change in tacties to seek flanking, rear, or top shots
for our ATGM—adjustments which to some extent will require them to sacrifice their
range advantage, and render them more vulnerable to suppressive fires and infantry
attack. (The U.S. Army is now developing an improved TOW missile which uses a
larger wathead plus a nose probe to optimize penetration—but this will not appear
until 1982.)
Tactics of Suppressi
In any event, for coping with NATO ATGM the Soviets probably rely as much on
suppressive fires as on armor protection. Soviet doctrine stresses four types of
suppression for ATGMs and other antiarmor defenses; direct fire from tanks,
supporting infantry fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters, and indirect fire from
artillery and mortars,
‘The Warsaw Treaty Organization intends to use its tank superiority to overwhelm
NATO ATGM. They believe that a high density of attacking tanks can saturate the
defense in any given sector. They know tank guns ean fire more rapidly than ATGM,
and that Soviet tanks are heavily armored to the front, and built low to present a
minimal target. Their crews are drilled in frontal engagement of ATGM while on the
move. Whereas ammunition aboard US. tanks in Germany consists mainly of steel
darts for killing tanks (less than 20 percent high explosive or incendiary rounds), Soviet
tanks carry mainly high explosive antipersonnel rounds for ATGM suppression.
Aside from tanks, the Soviets prize for suppression other direct fire weapons
which can reach deep into NATO defensive positions to destroy defending tanks and
ATGM on vehicles or in bunkers, Here Soviet ATGM play a role, During the 1960s
and 1970s, while the United States has fielded just two ATGM systems—DRAGON
(range 1,000 meters) and TOW (range 8,000-3,700 meters)—the Soviets have fielded
six. The latest Soviet antitank missile is the AT-6 SPIRAL, a radio-controlled,
semiautomatic, command-to-line-of-sight system of 5,000 meters range. Although
NATO has many more antitank weapons than the Pact, and will substantially increase
its lead in numbers of fielded AT weapons over the next several years (through 1984),*
‘most such weapons will be of short range and of doubtful use against advanced armor
like that of the T-72. Considering only antitank systems with ranges greater than 1,000
meters, which are generally the more capable systems which figure in suppressive
fires, by 1984 the Warsaw Pact will have increased its advantage over NATO by 70
percent. As for armored vehicles to move these and other infantry support weapons
about the battlefield, the Pact has a clear superiority now, and will maintain a 5:1
superiority in infantry fighting vehicles through 1984,
Attack helicopters provide a type of mobile firepower most useful against ATGM,
for which the Soviets are pressing hard. As the table on page 3 makes evident,
helicopter procurement receives high priority in Soviet defense spending. Over the six
months (April-October 1979), in Central Europe alone, the Pact increased its ground
attack helicopters some 40 percent, and formed two new MI-24 regiments.
“For example, the US. VIPER, replacing the M7242 LAW, will ad many thousands of short-range
[AT soxkets to the NATO inventory
“SEEREL 21
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SEER (b)(3)(c) Soviet Armor
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Both the HIND D and HIP E are heavily armed with direct fire weapons which
can suppress or destroy NATO tanks and ATGM. Both are being produced in large
numbers, and by 1984 the Pact is expected to have a 1.7:1 advantage over NATO in
attack helicopters.
Warsaw Pact Ground Fo. 1s
Attack Helicopters
Mone wasting
Ga V
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ina ow or 7
Nemo wot 4800 _
load (kilograms, fuel
‘and payload)”
Maximum combat 95 120
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"Maximum uselul oad and combat radius calulaed wit
mmatinum paylond at maximum gross weight using cling takeot
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(b)(3)(c)
As for artillery, which the Soviets regard as their main suppressive counter to
ATGMs, the Warsaw Treaty Organization will maintain its current overall superiority
in numbers of tubes (about 25:1) through 1984, Soviet artillery modernization
programs include both mechanization (self-propelled guns/howitzers) and upgraded
‘munitions, including bomblet dispensing rounds, flechette-type shrapnel, and
proximity fuzes calculated to be especially effective against ATGM, even if protected
by currently issued nylon blankets. The crucial difference for the force balance in
Europe is perhaps best measured by relative firepower surge capabilities. These
express on the Warsaw Pact (WTO) side the capability for fires to kill or blind
preparatory to an attack, or ATGM suppression obscuration during an attack. On the
22 ~seeRET_
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Soviet Armor (b)(3)(c) a
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NATO side, these show maximum counterbattery fires As the chart below makes
evident, by 1984 NATO's relative inferiority will increase:
were (b)(3)(n)
Comparative Artillery Surge Throw Weights
Central Europe 1979 & 1984
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To summarize, through 1984 at least, large numbers of Soviet armored vehicles
will weigh heavily in the balance of forces in Europe:
*+ The Warsaw Pact will retain numerical superiority in armor and will increase
their qualitative edge.
+ The Pact is building ever more effective counters to NATO ATGM in the form
of both direct fire weapons on armored vehicles and on helicopters, and a
preponderance of indirect (artillery) fires.
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Soviet Armor -SEERET—
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I, THE OUTLOOK FOR ARMOR
‘Trends in Armor-Antiarmor Warfare
‘Tanks are designed to provide direct fire from cannon, machinegun, guided
missile or flame weapons which are both armor-protected and mobile. Modern tanks
are significantly more lethal than the armored vehicles which fought in World War I.
‘Trying to hit another stationary tank at a range of 1,500 meters, the US. Army.
‘medium tank of World War II could fire 18 rounds, and would still have only a 50-50
chance of hitting. The standard U.S. medium tank of the mid-1970s commanded the
probability with a single shot.
Ie ee ee EOL ET UT
Arnaut
SHERMAN
Tan [
‘WORLD WAR I
"BOO METERS] 1000 METERS] 1800 METERS] 3000 METERS
cuRRENT
us meDIUM
TANK
tom German fev Pater tank Bear the Rronean Tomm gon eos Panee
‘trough the Goman's 4.8 inches of ont! srmor_ Curent US medium tanks can
‘The Sherman tanks of Goneral Patton's Thied Army hed woclose to within 500 meters
of the German P2V Panther tank before the American 76mm gun could punch
‘through the German's 4.8 inches of frontal armor. Current US medium tanks can
Penetrate nearly twice thet much armor at four times the range,
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TRREREE. (b\(3)(c) Soviet Armor
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‘These charts plot characteristics of the main battle tanks of the two major tank
producing nations over three decades, up to the mid-1970s. Each point secords the
year in which a significant improvement was introduced. By 1975, the technical
developments shown led many to conclude that the tank had been engineered to
‘expectable economic limits
TANK GUN SIZE v0
Modem tank guns are a
by one-third than the guns of G
a8, “
uzzLE VELocITY
‘The muzzle velocity of tank
Drojectiles has more. th
Goubled. Rounds travel
‘one mile por second.
Fy
5
if
FIRE CONTROL
INSTRUMENTS
3. computers of
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26 ~SEGREF
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(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)
Improvements in gun accuracy and range have increased the area a single tank
could command with its weapon,
Soviet Armor
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ACCURACY OF RANGE
FINDERS
‘Since most tank misses are
cused by inaccurat
estimation, the u
‘optical sights of WW I we
replaced first by stereoscopic
Fange 4
ADVANCE IN TANK
‘CANNON TECHNOLOGY
Taken together, th:
have inctoased hit
d
Ph: Probability of hit
ae
‘COMMAND OF GROUND
One implication of this
ines ange and biting
power is that the tenk
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50-50 PROBABILITY HIT
Modern tanks have not only bigger guns, improved ammunition, and more
sophisticated fire control apparatus, but armor protection roughly double that of
World War Il tanks. Nonetheless, the chief tank-producing nations have designed
their main battle tanks to constrain bulk, and to balance increases in engines, track and
suspension systems,
For example, while the modern U.S. main battle tank is one-third heavier than its
World War II predecessor, it’s equipped with an engine more than two times as
powerful, Its agility has actually increased: its horsepower-to-ton ratio has increased
by one-fourth, its ground pressure has decreased by one-fourth, and its maximum
‘tuising range has increased by three times. Both the United States and the USSR have
fielded amphibious light tanks, and many nations have developed various snorkeling
devices for underwater fording. Tanks of the United Kingdom have tended to be
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—SEERET— (b)(3)(0) Soviet Armor
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somewhat heavier than U.S. designs over the period; Soviet and German designs have
tended to be lighter. But virtually all new designs have added armor protection and
firepower
ww it 5
TANK MODERN MAIN BATTLE TANK Fa
WEIGHT (+)
K Ata 553
poeta Pa b
reer |
be een HP-TO-TON RATIO (+)
GROUND PRESSURE (-)
Peeerem} AX. CRUISING Binds GE (+)
At the same time, mechanical reliability has advanced. During the German thrust
through the Ardennes into France in May-June 1940, more than half the tanks
participating went out of action due to mechanical failures. Modern main battle tanks
are expected to average 300-400 km between mechanical failures
Tank development accelerated in the 1970s with emphasis on increasing
firepower and improving armor protection. Tanks appeared which can fire antitank
guided missiles as well as cannon rounds, The missiles have much higher aceuracy and
greater range than cannons—50-100 percent greater. Such missile-tanks can hit tank-
size targets nine out of ten times at @ range of 3,000 meters
Also, most modern tanks have been equipped with night vision devices. Active
sights let soldiers see targets illuminated with invisible infrared beams out to ranges of
1,500 meters. More significant, there are passive sights with comparable range
capability, which let the operator see targets by natural light (for example, starlight),
or by detecting the heat emitted by the target (thermal imagery sights). Thermal sights
are effective out to 4,000 to 6,000 meters.
Not the least of modern developments are tanks with stabilized turrets which
‘materially aid gunners acquiring a target, and facilitate firing on the move,
In sum, the capabilities of modern tanks have been extended to as far as the
tanker can see, What he can see, he can hit
THE TANK, WITH ITS CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILITY, ITS PROTECTIVE,
ARMOR, ITS FORMIDABLE FIREPOWER, HAS BEEN AND IS LIKELY TO
REMAIN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPON FOR FIGHTING THE
LAND BATTLE
28 “SPERE
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viet Armee
7 (by(3Xe)
(by(3)(n)
While tanks ae usually ated visas anater taki wll somemiber that
Iofanry-manned weapons are bth aman target for tanks and main thveat te thon
Tanks were invented fo defeat the ifantry defenses of World War Land seme
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