MEMORANDUM OF LAW

______________________________________________________________________________
TO: Jennifer Yu
FROM: Associate 54716
DATE: November 16, 2020
RE: Jamie Smith: False Imprisonment Claim

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under California’s common law for false imprisonment, can the tortious act of an

unlawful violation of a person’s personal liberty be considered false imprisonment when an

unforceful actor locked the doors of a moving car for the safety of the passenger, the passenger

originally consented to the confinement for an appreciable time, and the passenger could have

escaped the alleged confinement?

BRIEF ANSWER

Probably not. It is unlikely a person who had the opportunity to flee the confinement can

succeed in asserting a claim for false imprisonment. They must also confirm that the actor had

an intent to confine without the victim’s consent for an appreciable amount of time. An actor

who does not use force and locks the doors of a vehicle for safety reasons doesn’t appear to have

ill-motive for false imprisonment. Additionally, the person must be confined without their

consent for any amount of time. A person is subjected to a longer amount of time when they

were able to leave confinement but chose not to. Therefore, a person who consensually gets into

a vehicle with the actor and could have left their alleged confinement will likely not be able to

claim false imprisonment.

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

In April, Jamie Smith (“Jamie”) and Paul White (“Paul”) started to become romantically

involved and continued their relationship for about six months.

At the end of August, Paul invited Jamie to come on a drive he planned. She initially

said no, but Paul told her he thought it would be good for her. She agreed in the hopes they

would talk about their relationship.

On the morning of the trip, Paul came to pick her up. Upon getting in, Jamie became

aware of an infomercial playing loudly through the stereo and the small area of the truck. He let

it blare for it’s 40-minutes entirety. She admitted she should have realized then that Paul was not

interested in talking about their relationship. The loud informercial caused her to be anxious.

After already hearing 30 minutes of the infomercial, and Paul barely speaking to her, they

stopped for gas. Jamie remained in the cabin of the car, while Paul left the vehicle.

Around 45 minutes into the drive, after already stopping for gas, she began to feel

claustrophobic and asked Paul to pull off the road again. She wasn’t sure if he ignored her, or if

he thought the traffic was too bad to stop, so they continued on. Paul tried to persuade her to

invest into his business. She declined. He became pushier and her anxiety continued. She

threatened to jump out once they missed another exit, so he laughed and said, “I don’t want you

to hurt yourself, so I have to keep you in here,” while locking the doors. Even though she was

uncomfortable and overwhelmed, she did not wave to bypassers for assistance while on the road

nor when they were stopped.

 About two hours in, Jamie began to sob. Upon seeing her upset, he turned around to go

home. Once they arrived back at her apartment, he began apologizing, but she got out of the car

and went inside.

Although he never touched her nor threatened her, Jamie was having a hard time dealing

with the situation. She, however, stated she did not think what Paul did was wrong. The client,

Jamie, hired the firm to see if there was a claim for false imprisonment against her ex-boyfriend,

Paul.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

While Jamie’s situation comes close to false imprisonment, it falls short due to missing the

element of clear intent. Jamie also originally gave consent on the drive but revoked it sometime

throughout the situation. Therefore, due to the ambiguity of both intent and consent, her claim

will likely not succeed.

In California Penal Code, false imprisonment is classified as any unlawful violation of a

person’s personal liberty by another. Cal. Penal. Code § 263 (2020). False imprisonment is

defined the same in both criminal and civil cases. Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264

Cal. Rptr. 640, 643 (Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, the elements of intent, consent, unlawful

privilege, and appreciable time of confinement are essential in determining false imprisonment

claims. Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 920 (Ct. App. 1996).

For Jamie’s false imprisonment claim, there was no unlawful privilege, but the elements of

intent, consent, and appreciable time are relevant to Jamie’s case.

 I. INTENT FOR CONFINEMENT IS UNCLEAR BECAUSE PAUL ONLY LOCKED
JAMIE INTO THE CAR FOR HER SAFETY AND TURNED AROUND WHEN
HE REALIZED SHE WAS UPSET.
In Jamie’s incident, it is unclear if Paul had the intention of confining Jamie by keeping her

in the vehicle. For false imprisonment, misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit can induce a victim

into confinement. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n of the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d

46, 64 (Cal. 1988). Additionally, a captor’s mental state only needs to be to confine or create a

similar intrusion. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 872 P.2d 559, 567 (Cal. 1994). Furthermore, the

action by the actor does not have to be to cause harm and claims often arise from initially

legitimate motive(s). Id. at 567.

In Fermino, a store personnel manager, two security agents, and a loss prevention manager of

Fedco held the plaintiff, Fermino, for questioning concerning lost profits. Id. at 561. At some

point in this interrogation, Fermino attempted to leave but was blocked by one of the security

guards. Id. The employee was able to effectively claim false imprisonment by demonstrating

the ill-founded intentions behind the store’s action. Id. at 572. The court held that forcibly and

criminally depriving one of their personal liberty is false imprisonment. Id. at 571.

Regarding Jamie’s situation, Paul never exerted physical force. While only a factor, lack of

force could demonstrate a lack of intent to confine her. Comparatively, the security guard in

Fermino was explicit in his intent to confine her. Id. at 561. Fermino was prevented from

leaving the area of confinement with physical actions. Id. Conversely, Jamie was allegedly

confined in a moving vehicle. It could be argued that Paul was concerned for her safety when

she stated she would jump out of the car once they missed the exit. It could also be considered

that locking the doors of a vehicle is not using force to confine. Therefore, this could explain

why Paul locked the doors and not as an intent to confine Jamie.
 Furthermore, once they were stopped at the gas station, Jamie could have left the car to

escape the alleged confinement. This opportunity was unavailable to Fermino due to the force

exerted by the security guards. Id. As Paul was pumping gas, Jamie was by herself in the car.

Paul could argue that he did not intend to confine her, as he left her unattended and a means to

escape if she chose to. This, again, was unavailable to Fermio. Id.

In contrast, a limo driver intentionally confined a family of plaintiffs in order for the

defendant to get paid for his services. Wilson v. Hous. Funeral Home, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 171

(Ct. App. 1996). Once they arrived at the bank, the defendant Houston forced the plaintiffs

inside with him to cash the check. Wilson, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171. During the 45 minutes

defendant attempted to coerce the bank tellers, he eventually shouted that no one would be going

anywhere until he gets his money. Id. Therefore, the defendant expressed his intent to imprison

the plaintiffs at the bank. Id. Furthermore, it is implied that the intent to confine originally

stemmed from the beginning of the limo ride. Id. Even after the plaintiffs were physically upset

at the bank, the defendant did not acknowledge their emotional distress. Id. Additionally, the

driver’s lack of concern for the plaintiffs also demonstrated the defendant’s ill-intentions during

the imprisonment. Id. The court held the plaintiffs were compelled to remain in the car during

the drive and at the bank against while under duress. Id. at 174.

It is unclear what Paul’s motives were towards Jamie by keeping her in the car. Jamie claims

she wasn’t sure if he wouldn’t exit because “traffic was so bad” or if he was just “ignoring her.”

Conversely, it was evident in Wilson that the driver was ignoring the plaintiffs by continuing his

reckless behavior despite their pleadings. Id. at 171. In the current claim, once Jamie started to

sob, Paul realized she was upset and turned the car around to go home. Compared to Wilson,

Paul recognized the emotional distress of Jamie and ceased his actions, while the limo driver
disregarded the turmoil of the plaintiffs. Id. Due to this conflict between locking the doors,

lacking force, and turning around once he realized Jamie was upset, it is unclear of what Paul’s

intentions were regarding Jamie’s confinement.

II. JAMIE ORIGINALLY GAVE CONSENT, HER REVOCATION WASN’T

EXPLICIT TOWARDS PAUL, AND SHE ALSO COULD HAVE LEFT HER
CONFINEMENT ONCE THEY STOPPED BUT CHOSE TO REMAIN IN THE
CAR.
In contrast to the ambiguity of Paul’s intent for false imprisonment, Jamie gave explicit

verbal consent to Paul before the trip and the beginning of their ride. A victim who voluntarily

commits to the “confinement” without proof of duress or other legal forces, bars a claim for false

imprisonment. Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co, 404 A.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

In a similar case, the court ruled that a false imprisonment claim could not succeed if the

plaintiff consented to their alleged confinement. Snyder, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The plaintiff

Roberson voluntarily isolated himself from his loved ones in a motel for fear of the church

exposing infidelity secret. Id. However, during his alleged confinement, he was free to come

and leave the motel on his own accord despite stating he felt “trapped.” Id. The court held that

since his confinement was consensual and lacked physical force, his claim could not succeed. Id.

In comparison, Jamie consensually agreed to the trip with Paul. Jamie was also given an

opportunity to leave while they were stopped at the gas station but chose not to. In contrast,

Snyder willing left his alleged confinement after feeling “trapped.” Id. Additionally, Jamie

never waved to bypassers once she began to feel uncomfortable to alert someone of her

withdrawn consent. In Snyder, he demonstrated his lack of consent by leaving his confinement

and seeing his family. Id. at 644. Therefore, it is unclear if her consenting to the drive could
allow her claim of false imprisonment to succeed when she had an opportunity to escape her

confinement.

Despite her initial affirmation and lack of outward expression of her revocation, during the

drive, she began to feel confined and overwhelmed. Afterward, she admitted that during the trip,

she should have realized their relationship conversation would not occur. In a similar case, three

children also consensually took a trip under a false impression. Scofield, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918.

The court ruled that fraud, deceit, and duress can be alternatives to force in a false imprisonment

case. Id. at 920.

During this case, three plaintiff children were injured in a car accident that occurred in

Mexico. Id. at 917. The children were taken by a witness to the nearest hospital in Mexico and

their father was contacted in Los Angeles. Id. The father, through the help of the American

Consulate, quickly arranged an Air Evac care flight to San Diego after hearing that his son might

not make it through the night. Id. Due to competition between companies hired by the Bi-

National Health Committee, Critical Air intentionally cut off Air Evac during the flight to the

children. Id. at 918. Critical Air bore no identifying clothing nor emblems on their plane, so the

children believed the plane to be Air Evac. Id. After the incident, the daughter, Erin, claimed

she would have not gotten on the wrong plane if she knew it was the wrong flight service. Id.

Therefore, the children’s consent was given under false impressions of the service being

provided. Id. at 925.

Jamie was also under a false impression or purpose for the trip. Once she realized she was

deceived, she expressed discomfort. Her revocation of consent, while expressed passively to

Paul several times during the incident, was not clearly understood by him. In contrast, the

children in Scofield never became aware that their consent was misplaced until after the incident
had occurred. Id. Although Jamie was uncomfortable and anxious, she stated she did not think

what Paul did was wrong. Conversely, the Scofield children realized afterward that the

misrepresented flight was fraudulent. Id.

Although Jamie originally gave clear consent, her revocation was not as explicitly expressed

to Paul. Also, Jamie was able to leave the alleged confinement once her and Paul had stopped

for gas, yet she did not. Ultimately, her initial consent and her remaining in the car once stopped

demonstrates consent regarding the imprisonment more than her expressions of revocation.

III. PAUL AND JAMIE WERE TOGETHER IN THE VEHICLE FOR AN

APPRECIABLE TIME OF AROUND FOUR HOURS.
Jamie was in the vehicle with Paul for approximately four hours, which can be considered an

appreciable time. An appreciable amount of time is any lapse of time and could be as short as 15

minutes. Id. at 920. In Wilson, the plaintiffs were kept at the bank for 45 minutes until the

defendant could cash his check, in addition to the drive to and from there. Wilson, 50 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 171. The plaintiffs reasonably believed that the defendant would not let them conduct their

burial service unless they stayed at the bank. Id. at 174. Thus, their confinement was considered

an appreciable time, as it was longer than the recognized standard of 15 minutes or more. Id.

For Jamie’s incident, Jamie and Paul were driving for 30 minutes when they stopped for gas.

Afterward, they took almost another hour and a half towards his lab in which, upon Jamie’s

crying, returned home. In total, she and Paul traveled for around four hours in the small cabin.

In comparison to Wilson’s 45 minutes of confinement, Jamie’s confinement was significantly

longer and more than 15 minutes. Id. Therefore, four hours of alleged confinement in a tight

vehicle is considered an appreciable time.

CONCLUSION
 While Jamie does meet a lot of the elements necessary for false imprisonment, Jamie will

still be unable to make the claim. Jamie was confined for an appreciable amount of time;

however, it’s unclear whether Paul acted with intent to confine her and if her revocation of

consent was clearly expressed. Also, Jamie was already uncomfortable when they stopped to get

gas but she didn’t leave her confinement.