Arellano University School of Law

Andrew Ray E. Rosales

Criminal Law Review
Thursday 430-930pm

Atty. Reyante Orceo

 1. People vs. Tulagan – GR 227363, March 12, 2019

Facts: In September 2011, Salvador Tulagan through force, intimidation and superior strength
inserted his finger in the vagina of a minor AAA 9 years of age. The aunt of AAA discovered the
act when she noticed Tulagan looking differently at her niece and upon examination of genitals
they were swollen. In October 2011, Tulagan through means of force and intimidation had sexual
intercourse with AAA against her will and consent. Tulagan was charged with Article 266-A,
par. 2 of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610 for the first offense while Article 266-A, para 1 (D) for
the second felony. Tulagan merely denied the accusations and propounded that his mother had
issues with AAA’s grandmother hence the rumors of rape but ultimately the RTC and CA
convicted him on both accounts.

Issue: Whether Rape under the RPC or RA 7610 should be the charge?

Ruling: The Supreme Court en banc reconciled the provisions of rape, acts of lascivouness,
sexual assault under the RPC and RA 7610 for the guidance of the bench and the bar. Based on
the deliberations, R.A. No. 8353 defined specific acts constituting acts of lasciviousness as a
distinct crime of "sexual assault," and increased the penalty thereof from prision correccional to
prision mayor but it was never the intention of the legislature to redefine the traditional concept
of rape. In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child victim is covered
by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, the offender should be held liable for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. An important distinction between violation of Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 and rape under the RPC was explained in Malto v. People wherein the SC ruled in
that one may be held liable for violation of Sec. 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.7610 despite a
finding that the person did not commit rape, because rape is a felony under the RPC, while
sexual abuse against a child is punished by a special law thus said crimes are separate and
distinct, and they have different elements. Even if the girl who is below twelve years old or is
demented consents to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory rape under the
RPC, and the offender should no longer be held liable under R.A. No. 7610.
 2. Disini vs. DILG – GR 203335, February 18, 2014

Facts: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No.
10175. The Petitioners (Disini, et.al) argued that even though the Act is the government’s
platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights, namely the mandate on equal protection, the right to freedom of expression,
privacy and access to information. In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of
a temporary restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.

Issue:
1)Whether the RPC provisions and cybercrime law on libel are valid provisions of law?
2)Whether Section 7 as it allows prosecution of crimes such as libel and child pornography under
the cybercrime law distinct and separate from the prosecution under the respective SPLs is valid?

Ruling:
1. Disini et. al lament that libel provisions of the penal code and in effect, the libel provisions of
the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the
latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of actual malice as a basis for
conviction. They went further by saying that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “Actual malice” could easily be
overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People where the offended parties happened to
be public figures. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of
"malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public
figure. Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected
speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4 (c) (4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
2. The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a
single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special
law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws de ne two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact,
if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Online
libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be
libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of
two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
and the other a violation of Section 4 (c) (4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same
elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online
libel under Section 4 (c) (4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353.
Section 4 (c) (4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.
 3. Palaganas vs. People – GR 165483, September 12, 2006

Facts: On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 in the evening, brothers Servillano, Melton and
Michael, all surnamed Ferrer were having a drinking spree in their house. At 9:45 in the evening,
the three brothers decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner of Malvar and
Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, at
10:30 in the evening, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio
Bautista at Tidbits then started to drink and sing. While Jaime Palaganas was singing “My Way”,
Melton sang alongside Jaime thus angering him. A heated exchange ensued and a fight erupted
between the brothers Ferrer and Palaganas. The fight continued outside and the Palaganas asked
help from the sleeping Rujjeric Palaganas, herein accused defendant. Stones where thrown by the
Ferrer brothers prompting Rujjeric Palaganas to shoot a warning shot followed by gun shots
which lead to the death of Melton while Servillano and Michael survived due to timely medical
intervention. Palaganas was charged with two counts of frustrated murder, murder and violation
of the Omnibus election code.

Issue: Whether or not a special aggravating circumstance can be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstance? NO

Ruling: With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm, we agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the same must be applied
against petitioner in the instant case since the same was alleged in the informations filed against
him before the RTC and proven during the trial. However, such must be considered as a
special aggravating circumstance, and not a generic aggravating circumstance. Generic
aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in
Article 14. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand,
special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the
penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the
next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.
Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. It is clear from the
foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are
exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance,
it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

As was previously established, a special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an

ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is merely an
ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum
period.
4. People vs. Apduhan – GR L-19491, August 30, 1968

Facts: On May 23, 1961, at about 7:00 PM in the evening, in Bohol, Philippines, the accused
Apduhan and five other men armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of violence, the dwelling house of the
spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano thereafter killed Geronimo Miano and Norberto
Aton while stealing Php 322. Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by
a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating
circumstances such dwelling, nighttime and superior strength. Apduhan plead guilty.

Issue: Whether or not robbery by a band can apply in robbery with homicide? NO

Ruling: Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4
and 5 of art. 294 are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum
periods. The circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility,
impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which are described in art. 294(1)
and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under art. 295, but
then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code. Hence, with the
present wording of art. 295 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in band." If
robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be
denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as
stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. A perceptive
analysis of the provisions of art. 296, SC considered opinion that the said article is exclusively
linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of art. 295 on robbery
in band, as the latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of
art. 294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in
relation to robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.

5. People vs. Orilla – GR 148939-40, February 13, 2004

Facts: On September 12, 1996 in Pangasinan, Philippines accused Orilla, by means of force or
intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice. Accused Orilla threatened his sister with a knife while
inserting his penis into her vagina thus consummating the rape. Orilla plead not guilty and used
the defense of alibi stating that there was a distance from his work to the house wherein his sis
Remilyn lived

Issue: Wheter or not the alternative circumstance of relationship is aggravating in rape? NO

Ruling: The SC did not agree with the Solicitor General’s opinion that relationship should be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. People
v. Baldino, the case invoked by the Solicitor General, appreciated relationship as an aggravating
circumstance but only for the purpose of assessing exemplary damages against the accused and
not for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states
the specific aggravating/qualifying circumstances. Other than the use of a deadly weapon, which
is already taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, not one of these
circumstances was alleged or proved in the case at bar. Hence, the penalty imposable is only
reclusion perpetua. The "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship cited in People v. Sagarino
and People v. Umbaña are aggravating circumstances listed in paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the aggravating
circumstances. Unlike mitigating circumstances under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
Article 14 does not include circumstances "similar in nature" or analogous to those mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 21 of Article 14. The term "aggravating circumstances" is strictly construed, not
only because what is involved is a criminal statute, but also because its application could result in
the imposition of the death penalty. The list of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive51 for the purpose of raising a crime to its qualified form.
Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code is
silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence considers
relationship as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity. . Any attendant
circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by Congress. SC
held that the aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the
graver penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not
an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

6. People vs. Jugueta – GR 202124, April 5, 2016

Facts: On June 6, 2002, at about 9:00PM, at Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,

Philippines, accused Jugueta, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine
Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age causing death. While appellant, together with Gilbert Estores
and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder. The malefactos approached
the hut and despite pleas, shot at the nipa hut. Both daughters were hurt but Mary Grace died on
the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to
revive her.

Issue: What is the proper rule on damages for felonies with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua?
100,000 Php

Ruling: Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by
the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may
be awarded or temperate damages in some instances. Civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity
authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. The second type of damages the Court awards are moral
damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides, in respect to exemplary damage also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment
for those guilty of outrageous conduct. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore,
can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. If,
however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act
done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design,
the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder
without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance,
but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty
shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

7. People vs. Valdez – GR 216007-09, December 8, 2015

Facts: The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and
Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo,
who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government.
Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private respondent
Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City. Based on the verification
conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips
were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the
total amount of P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of
P274,306.75. Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which were for Violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half were for the complex crime
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles
217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not bail is granted based on the prescribed or imposable penalty?

Held: In Mañalac, Jr. v. People resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua. SC, however, denied the petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue
of whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose imposable
penalty ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Citing People v.
Pantaleon, Jr., et al., in relation to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule
114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled to bail as a matter of right since he is
charged with a crime whose penalty is reclusion perpetua. The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and
analogous cases are in keeping with the provisions of the RPC; specifically, Article 48 of which
states that in complex crimes, "the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period." Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for malversation and falsification should be
taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount
of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. On the other hand,
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification
committed by a public officer. Considering that malversation is the more serious offense,
the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.

8. People vs. Escote – GR 140756, April 4, 2003

Facts: On September 28, 1996, a passenger bus from Pasay to Pangasinan, accused Acuyan and
Escote rode the bus in Balintawak together with a police officer. While on the highway in Plaridel,
Bulacan, both malefactors suddenly shot their guns and called it a robbery. While searching the
passengers, the accused chanced upon the police officer and shot him with his own service pistol.
Thereafter, the accused alighted from the bus and the driver went to the authorities upon reaching
Dau. After sometime, in a separate check point, Escote was apprehended when he tried to show
the slain officer’s ID card but could not produce a pay slip. Charges were brought against the
accused in Bulacan. Both were found guilty and hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not treachery can be appreciated generic aggravating circumstance? YES

Held: This Court has ruled over the years that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at
the same time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible). Going by the letter of the law,
treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One
and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain has
consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against property.
Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish
Penal Code says that despite the strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery being
applicable to persons, treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide. Thus,
treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a
qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated
September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense. Treachery
is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable
by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing
the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime. In sum then, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is
killed by treachery.

9. Valenzuela vs. People – GR 160188, June 21, 2007

Facts: On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of
the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-
known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of
Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for
a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the
duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional
cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.

Issue: Whether or not the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated?
Consummated

Ruling: On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged
to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the
theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient
to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the
felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case.
The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in
the RPC as to when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of all the acts of
execution. So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary
to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory
definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the
law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "taking of personal property of another without
the latter’s consent." There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced
when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.
This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n
theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing
with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."
We can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

10. People vs. Mirandilla – GR 186417, July 27, 2011

Facts: In December 2, 2000, AAA was dancing at the fiesta in Albay, Bicol with her sister she
suddenly somebody pulled her arm and pointed a knife at her right side. She was forced to walk
for 4 hours until she was made to ride a tricycle and brough to Rawis. There, accused Mirandilla
to have sex at gun point. The next day she was brought to another location and raped again which
continued for 39 days. One day, she was able to escape when her captors were busy playing cards.
Mirandilla defended that AAA was his live in partner

Issue: Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of special complex crime of kidnapping with illegal
detention with rape? YES

Ruling: We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention
with rape. Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v.
Larrañaga, this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses.
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes
these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape
because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one
crime committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. However, for the crime of
kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd
designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia,
we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times,
the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the
forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape
constitutes distinct and separate count of rape. It having been established that Mirandilla’s act
was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion
thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape,
warranting the penalty of death.

11. People vs. Daos – GR L-40331, April 27, 1934

Facts: On June 7, 1933, the dead body of chauffeur Felino Dumalo of very poor physical
constitution was found inside car No. 771 of the Malate Taxi Cab Co., in an isolated place within
Rizal. His body bore marks of violence was according to the autopsy report died due to
asphyxiation via strangulation. The appellants submitted themselves to the officers stating that that
Sablada and his co-appellants Silverio Daos and Gerardo Bacarizas, after having planned among
themselves to take a taxicab by pretending to be bona fide passengers, kill the chauffeur thereof
and later take away his money. Ultimately each of the accused were able to get 50 centavos each
from the crime.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of robbery with homicide even if the value stolen is
small? YES

Ruling: The treacherous death of Felino Dumalo took place on the occasion of a robbery, which,
before its execution, had been planned and calmly meditated by the appellants, the small amount
of money, which they succeeded in taking from him after depriving him of his life, being of no
moment and because the cause of the alleged passion or obfuscation is not lawful, as it is not lawful
and it cannot be lawful, to resort to violence in order to maintain a strike and in that way compel
those affected by the strikers' demands to accede to the same. (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil., 217;
People vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil., 104.) The appellants' purpose in committing the crime was not
only to give a warning to the strike breakers but to satisfy their need for money, since it was already
several days that they were without employment or money. However, even considering, as a mere
hypothesis, that the crime committed by the appellants is murder, which cannot be the case for the
reasons already stated, the change would serve them no purpose, inasmuch as the fate would await
them in view of the circumstances under which they had committed it, to wit: with evident
premeditation and with craft and treachery. However, the truth, which we here reiterate, is that the
crime really committed by the appellants is not murder, but robbery with homicide defined and
punished in article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

12. People vs. Salazar – GR 99355, August 11, 1997

Facts: f On March 10, 1989, at or about 3:30 (a.m.), Domingo Salazar and Monchito Gotangugan
together with an unidentified companion approach the security guard of Linda's Supermarket.
Salazar, Gotangugan and their companion talked to the security guard, who was later identified as
Crispin Gatmen. Thereafter, Miranda saw Salazar pull out a 9-10 inches long dagger from his
pocket, and pass the same to Gotangugan). Armed with the dagger, Gotangugan suddenly started
stabbing Gatmen. Thereafter they stole the service gun of Gatmen as they left the scene of the
crime. Gatmen died as a result of the stabbing. The accused were identified by eye witnesses and
offered the defense of alibi.

Issue: Whether appellants may be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide? NO, theft and homicide.

Held: In this case, the prosecution has convincingly proven that (1) appellants asported a gun with
violence and intimidation against the victim; (2) the gun belonged to the deceased; and (3) the
security guard was killed. Animus lucrandi is presumed when there is proof of asportation. All of
these facts are supported by the testimonies of competent eyewitnesses presented by the
prosecution. There is, however, no showing that the death of the security guard occurred merely
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on
appellants' primary criminal intent. Where the original design comprehends robbery, and homicide
is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the consummation of the former, the crime
committed is the special complex offense, even if homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable
interval of time. On the other hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend
robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the
homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single
complex offense. Robbery with homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate
connection, between the robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or
subsequent to the robbery. Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime.
The penalty for robbery with homicide is more severe because the law sees, in this crime, that men
placed lucre above the value of human life, thus, justifying the imposition of a more severe penalty
than that for simple homicide or robbery. In view of said graver penalty, jurisprudence exact a
stricter requirement before convicting the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is not
conclusively shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where
the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.

13. People vs. Larrañaga – GR 138874-75, February 3, 2004

Facts: On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, who lived in Cebu
City, failed to come home. Two days later, a body was found in cliff and was identified to be
Marijoy. 6 months later, Rusia confessed and recounted that together with the other accused, they
saw the Chiong sisters in Ayala Cebu, invited into the car but when denied, forcibly took both
sisters into the car. They rented a van and drove to a secluded place where they took turns raping
the sisters and thereafter killed them. Larrañaga put up the defense that he was in Quezon City
when the alleged rape and murders happened. Rusia was released as state witness while all others
were convicted with kidnapping and illegal detention with rape and homicide.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of kidnapping and illegal attention with rape? YES

Ruling: RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last
paragraph which provides—When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention,
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex
crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by
the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48,
nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659." Considering that the prosecution was able
to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection" between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein
special complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos, and People vs.
Mercado, interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and
serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as
separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical
designation of the crime is of no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering
that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still,
the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

14. People vs. Laog – GR 178321, October 5, 2011

Facts: On June 6, 2000 Patawaran-Rosal and AAA were walking along the rice paddies in Bulacan
where they were accosted by Laog holding an ice pick and lead pipe. Laog suddenly hit Patawaran-
Rosal then stabbed her. Then Laog also swung at AAA and stabbed her in her face, thereafter
raping her. Laog was charged with murder for the death of Patawaran-Rosal and Rape for AAA.
Laog gave the defense of denial and alibi that he was cooking at home when such events happened.

Issue: Whether Laog is guilty of separate crimes of murder and rape or special complex crime of
rape with homicide? Special Complex Crime

Ruling: Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and
the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA
or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not
witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. The facts established showed that the
constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the
person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be
drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of homicide,
physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant
is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.

15. Araza vs. People – GR 247429, September 8, 2020

Facts: Araza is married to AAA the private complainant. After some years, AAA discovered that
Araza is living with another woman in Zamboanga thus she instituted a concubinage case which
was amicably settled. Sometime after, Araza disappeared again but was discovered to be living
with the same woman in Zamboanga where they bore 3 illegitimate children. She looked for her
husband in Mindanao and petitioned a writ of habaes corpus. Upon learning that her husband
returned to his mistress, AAA suffered asthma and insomnia, she became gravely ill and
experienced mental anguish thereby prescribed anti-depressants. A VAWC case was filed against
Araza for psychological violence.

Issue: Whether or not Araza is guilty of Psychological Violence under 5(i) of RA 9262? YES

Held: In Dimamling v. People, the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 are
enumerated: (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her , hild or children;: (2) The woman is
either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has: a common child. As
for the woman's child or children they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without
the family abode; (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
and ( 4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children
or similar acts or omissions. All were duly proven by the prosecution and the CA was correct in
ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing marital
infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering. Marital
infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA's
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.

16. People vs. Layug – GR 223679, September 27, 2017

Facts: On June 1, 2001, Analiza Paule after a shabu session met up with the deceased Victorino
Paule for a “date”. After being paid 500 to sleep with the deceased, they met up with Layug and
Buan and rode a tricycle Layug and Buan with intent to gain, mutually aided each other in the
stabbing and killing of Victorino Paule when they alighted from the tricycle and thereafter stole
the deceased’s necklace, wallet and watch. The accused were charged with robbery with homicide
but they denied the accusation and offered an alibi without evidence.

Issue: Whether or not evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property? YES

Ruling: Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking
of personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in
court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by
the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of
the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount
in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless
of the exact amount or value involved. Evident premeditation, on the other hand, cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide because
the elements of which are already inherent in the crime. Evident premeditation is inherent
in crimes against property.

17. Pascua vs. People – GR 250578, September 7, 2020

Facts: Pascua was charged with possession and sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
wherein he initially plead not guilty but subsequently entered into a plea bargaining agreement
wherein he plead guilty to Section 12 of RA 9165. In the RTC, the dispositive portion stated that
Pascua is ineligible for probation. Hence the appeal to the CA.

Issue: Whether or not Pascua is eligible for Probation? YES

Ruling: The CA is mistaken in disallowing plea bargaining based on Section 24 of RA 9165 which
provides only a CONVICTED for pushing and trafficking is ineligible for probation. Regardless
of what the original charge was in the information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense
to which the accused pled guilty. This mean that the penalty mete out, as well as all the attendant
accessory penlaties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for probation and
parole would be based on such lesser offense. Even if Pascua was originally charged with Section
5 but ultimately convicted of a lower offense of violation of Section 12. Since the foregoing
effectively removed Pascua’s case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II, he should at the
very least be allowed to apply for probation.

18. People vs. Prieto G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948

Facts: Prieto was charged with 7 counts on treason and was testified by two witnesses saying that
after an American aviator crashed, the accused followed the sled led by Japanese and filipinos.
Prieto was accused of being a member of the Japanese Military police and an undercover agent
who killed Filipinos and Americans.

Issue: Whether or not Prieto is guilty of complex crime of treason with homicide? NO

Ruling: The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was
patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One
without the other does not make treason. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling
in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a
separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of
murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit
specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder
or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they cannot be regarded separately
under their general denomination.

19. People vs Hernandez G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.

Facts: On March 15, 1945, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Hernandez as well as with the thirty-
one (31) defendants charged, who are high ranking officers and/or members of the Committee on
Labor Organization (CLO) together "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or
formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) rose publicly and took arms against the Republic of
the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing
the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws. The defendants
made armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear.

Issue: Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery? NO

Ruling: One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135,
is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence”
in the prosecution of said “war”. Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we
repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application
of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court
has never in the past, convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”.

20. People vs Hernandez G.R. No. L-6025, May 30, 1964

Facts: On March 15, 1945, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Hernandez as well as with the thirty-
one (31) defendants charged, who are high ranking officers and/or members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) together "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise
or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) rose publicly and took arms against the Republic
of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of
removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws. The
defendants made armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?

Ruling: In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism
would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of his
speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the
overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism. In view
of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act
of conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.

21. People v Mendoza G.R. No. L-39275, December 20, 1933

Facts: September 30,1932, in San Fernando, Pampanga, accused, Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil
of the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack and
lay hands upon her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she
was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the
premises of the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity.
Issue: Whether or not Mendoza is guilty of assault upon a person in authority or at least an assault
upon an agent of authority, or any other grave or light felony? NO

Ruling: A teacher is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase, as employed in
article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a directly vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an
agent of authority on the ground that, as has been held in the case of United States vs. Fortaleza
(12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in support thereof, agents of authority are only those
persons who, by direct provision of law, or by appointment by competent authority, are charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, and those
who come to the aid of persons in authority. There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person
in authority not only on the grounds already stated but also because the distinction between the
two may be inferred clearly from the very provisions of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.