CHINA AND THE KOREAN

SITUATION: TrIE CHALLENGE OF

PYONGYANG'S BRINKMANSHIP
Joseph Yu-shek Cheng

I. Introduction

In the eyes of Chinese strategists, the Korean Peninsula is a corri-

dor from the Pacific to the Eurasian continent. Its strategic importance
lies in the fact that it may be exploited by an enemy as a springboard to
attack China. Northeast China (i.e., the Liaoning and Jilin provinces)
shares a 600-mile border with the Democratic People's Republic of Ko-
rea (DPRK), with the Yalu and Tumen Rivers constituting the border
between the two countries. The southern tip of the Korean Peninsula is
only miles away from China's Liaodong and Shantong Peninsulas. In
view of the geographical proximity, military conflicts in the Korean Pen-
insula and their associated problems, such as a massive outflow of refu-
gees, will have a significant impact on China, especially on its
northeastern region. China therefore does not want the Korean Penin-
sula to pose a serious problem.
The Korean Peninsula to some extent serves as a buffer zone be-
tween China and potential hostile powers. Japanese strategists on the
other hand, perceived the Korean Peninsula as a convenient "invasion
corridor" to approach China. Hideyoshi Toyotoni invaded Korea in 1592
(late Ming Dynasty in China); and the Japanese invaders were only re-
 Cheng 53

pelled in 1598 with the help of the Chinese army. Later, the Sino-Japa-
nese War in 1894-95 was largely the result of the two countries' struggle
over the Korean Peninsula. After the annexation of Korea in 1910, the
peninsula served as a strategic base for the Japanese campaigns against
China in the 1930s and 1940s. The Japanese invasion taught China a
bitter historical lesson, that the control of the Korean Peninsula by a
hostile power posed a grave threat to China's security; and the historical
lesson was an important reason for China's participation in the Korean
War in 1950.1
The end of the Cold War has not significantly altered the division
of Korea, and the course of Korean reunification is still not in the hands
of the Koreans alone. The United States, China, Japan, and Russia con-
tinue to have significant influence on the political future of the Korean
Peninsula. As one Chinese analyst observes: "The future new interna-
tional political order in Northeast Asia depends on the relations among
the four major powers: the U.S., Japan, China and Russia. The interests
of the four major powers will affect the issue of Korean reunification.
Korean reunification will be decided by inter-Korean factors under the
influence of the political attitudes of the four major powers. ''2
Since the Soviet-American d6tente and the Sino-American rap-
prochement in the early 1970s, the major powers in Northeast Asia have
demonstrated a common interest in peace and stability in the region
through the maintenance of the s t a t u s q u o . 3 Officially the Chinese lead-
ership still supports the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea
in principle; but it has become more unsure of the consequences of Ko-
rean reunification, and more apprehensive about possible negative re-
suits. Since the mid-1990s, the collapse of the Kim Jong I1 regime has
been a distinct possibility, and reunification is increasingly the sole
prerogative of Seoul.
Kim I1 Sung did not follow the examples of Deng Xiaoping and
Mikhail Gorbachev in introducing economic reforms. From the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, the North Korean economy steadily declined,
and the Kim I1 Sung regime openly attacked Deng's reforms as unortho-
dox. In the mid-1980s, the pragmatic Chinese leaders also cut back
China's aid programs substantially, and North Korea was severely af-
fected. While China rapidly expanded its trade with almost every coun-
try in the world in the reform era, its trade with North Korea slowly
54 East Asia / Winter 2003

declined from US $560 million in 1989 to US $486 million in 1995. The

latter was only about 5% of Sino-South Korean trade in the same year.
According to Fei-ling Wang, 4 since the 1960s, Pyongyang has been oc-
cupying almost all islands in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, including those
on the Chinese side of the main navigation channel of the rivers. This
did not attract the serious attention of the Chinese leadership until the
early 1990s. In 1993, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) investigation
team considered North Korea's control of the three small islands at the
mouth of the Yalu River a potential threat to China's access to the Yel-
low Sea. The team also observed that Pyongyang banned mutual visits
and exchanges in the border area, and frequently mistreated Chinese
fishermen and sailors along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The team rec-
ommended that the Party Central Military Commission should consider
enhancing the Chinese military presence in the border area, strengthen-
ing intelligence work regarding North Korea, and securing influence in
Pyongyang by renewing aid?
The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China
and South Korea in 1992 introduced an important new element, and the
Chinese authorities have since then inclined to maintain an even-handed
approach to Seoul and Pyongyang. The major variables responsible for
this shift in China's policy included the rise in importance of China's
market-oriented modemization agenda since 1978, the appeal of the suc-
cessful South Korean economy as a partner and model of development
strategy, and the inability of reluctance of the North Korean regime to
adapt to the post-Cold War realities. 6
The expansion of economic exchanges between China and South
Korea in the past decade has indeed been impressive. In 2001,444,113
Chinese visited South Korea; and for the first time, the number of Chi-
nese visitors exceeded those from the United States. In the same year,
South Korea invested US $830 million in China, for the first time ex-
ceeding the investment flow from the United States. South Korean in-
vestment in China is expected to reach the US $1 billion mark in 2003.
South Korea is now China's third largest trading partner and the fifth
largest foreign investor, after the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and
Singapore. China has just replaced the United States as the largest trad-
ing partner of South Korea; their bilateral trade increased by about 20%
 Cheng 55

in 2002 and was expected to exceed US $100 billion. On this basis,

China has reasserted its historic role as the largest trading partner for the
Korean Peninsula. In 2002, trade between China and North Korea re-
mained below US $500 million and investments were negligible. 7 It is
natural that Beijing sees North Korea as an economic liability and South
Korea as an economic asset.
China, however, has been prudent enough to retain its special rela-
tionship with North Korea, which gives it considerable political and dip-
lomatic leverage. Chinese leaders have been very concerned with the
unstable domestic situation in North Korea since the death of Kim I1
Sung in 1994. Political chaos and economic collapse in North Korea
will have a severe negative impact on China. China is already facing the
problem of North Korean civilians desperate for food in its Northeast
provinces, and a large-scale outflow of refugees into China will be a
nightmare. The Chinese authorities therefore decided to renew its assis-
tance to Pyongyang to help stabilize the situation. The Taiwan Straits
crisis in 1995-96 and the subsequent strengthening of the US-Japan se-
curity co-operation further highlighted North Korea's strategic signifi-
cance. China began to offer aid to its neighbor in 1996; and in the
following year, North Korea received most of its oil imports and half of
the two million tonnes of grain it needed from China. Food aid from
China, unlike that from the West, has no strings attached, and it can go to
satisfy the military needs first.
Apparently, China's relations with North Korea showed signs of
improvement beginning in 2000. Kim Jong I1 called the Chinese em-
bassy in Pyongyang in March, and then traveled to Beijing for an "infor-
mal visit" in May, just before the historic summit between North and
South Korea in the following month. It has to be appreciated that this
was Kim's first overseas trip in seventeen years. Kim again visited China
in January 2001, for talks with the top leaders in Beijing, he even toured
Shanghai's Pudong industrial zone. In July 2001, both governments cel-
ebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship
and Mutual Assistance. In the following September, General Secretary
Jiang Zemin formally visited North Korea. Kim Jong II's diplomatic
initiatives at this stage were not only limited to China. North Korea also
concluded a new friendship treaty with Russia in the first half of 1999,
56 East Asia / Winter 2003

and had begun negotiations with Italy, Australia, Britain and the Philip-
pines with a view to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. 8
Signs of trouble again emerged in the autumn of 2002. The North
Korean regime appointed Yang Bin, a Chinese tycoon holding a Dutch
passport, to run Sinuiju, a city in Noah Korea's border with China, as a
special economic zone with its own laws and legal system. Soon after
Yang's appointment in September, he was detained by the Chinese au-
thorities for tax problems. Diplomats in Beijing and Seoul believed that
Chinese leaders had been annoyed by the lack of consultation. 9
The real challenge came with North Korea's engagement in nuclear
brinkmanship. On October 4, 2002, the Kim Jong I1 regime admitted
that it had an ongoing nuclear weapons development program utilizing
highly enriched uranium. On January 10, 2003, North Korea further an-
nounced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after
its earlier decision to expel weapons inspectors from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA observed that Noah Korea
had been violating international nuclear weapons agreements, and de-
cided on February 12 to refer the matter to the United Nations (UN)
Security Council. At the same time, a senior US intelligence official told
the Congress that North Korea has an untested missile capable of reach-
ing western United States.L~
The Chinese authorities were alarmed by these developments.
There is a potential that North Korea's nuclear weapons program may
result in a nuclear arms race in East Asia. Chinese academics close to the
foreign-policy establishment openly articulated China's worries and con-
cerns. H The fact that they expressed such views to the Western media
reflected that the Chinese authorities would like to convey such mes-
sages to the international community, especially the Western countries.
This article attempts to examine the Korean situation in the Chi-
nese foreign policy framework, the basic objectives of the Chinese lead-
ership regarding developments in the Korean Peninsula, the strategies
and tactics adopted to realize such objectives, as well as to assess the
success and limitations of the Chinese authorities' performance in the
pursuit of their objectives.
 Cheng 57

II. Maintaining the Status Quo: China's Calculus

of the Balance of Power in Northeast Asia

Since 1982-83, China has been pursuing an independent foreign

policy line of peace and attempting to maintain a peaceful international
environment. 12 Striving for a peaceful international environment cer-
tainly involves establishing friendly relations with neighboring coun-
tries and avoiding conflicts with them.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, the "strategic triangle" could no longer be exploited
by China. In the post-Cold War era, it has been relieved of the direct
military threat from Russia and the United States, as they do not have
any motivation to attack China in the foreseeable future. Chinese lead-
ers, however, are concerned with the United States' attempt to "contain
China, and they believe that the United States does not want to see a
strong China emerge. In this context, the strengthening of the American
bilateral military alliances with Japan and South Korea is seen to affect
adversely China's security interests. The joint development of a Theatre
Missile Defense (TMD) program between the United States and Japan,
with the possible involvement of South Korea and even Taiwan, has
been perceived as a threat. Similarly, the Bush administration's cultiva-
tion of Vladimir Putin in the immediate aftermath of the September 11
incident generated considerable suspicion in Beijing, which believed this
to be an attempt to isolate China. But the Chinese leadership from Deng
Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao has been careful to maintain
good relations with the United States. It takes pain to avoid any sharp
deterioration in bilateral relations as a result of crises such as the tension
in the Taiwan Straits in 1995-96, the bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in May 1999, and the "spy" plane incident in April 2001.
Since the early 1970s, the major powers in Northeast Asia have
been sharing a common interest in maintaining the status quo in the
Korean Peninsula. In the early 1990s, South Korea too was not keen to
exploit the serious difficulties in North Korea, as reunification was per-
ceived to be too huge an economic burden on its population. North Ko-
rea therefore has been the only actor that may threaten the status quo.
The international isolation and the associated failure of its economy,
most evident in the serious famine in the years 1995-98, has forced
58 East Asia / Winter 2003

Pyongyang to resort to brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy to achieve

tangible results in negotiations as part of its strategy for survival. 13 In
contrast to the Cold War era, the Kim Jong I1 regime has been seeking
much more than just propaganda value in its negotiations with the United
States, Japan, and South Korea. Brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy
served North Korea quite well in its pursuit of its objectives during ne-
gotiations over nuclear issues, at least in the initial stage in the mid-
1990s. In recent years, the tough position of the Bush administration
toward the Kim Jong I1 regime, the inclusion of North Korea in the "axis
of evil," the enunciation of the legitimacy of pre-emptive military strikes,
the military campaign against Iraq, etc. have certainly made Pyongyang's
brinkmanship a much more risky venture. Meanwhile, North Korea is
on the verge of acquiring crude nuclear weapons, and there is a distinct
danger that it may follow the path of India and Pakistan of seeking inter-
national recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear power. These de-
velopments have heightened China's concern with the situation, and it
understands the high stakes involved in maintaining a non-nuclear Ko-
rean Peninsula.
A brief historical survey may be useful. The normalization of Sino-
American relations in 1971 had an enormous impact on the situation in
the Korean Peninsula. Both Seoul and Pyongyang were compelled to
initiate negotiations with peaceful reunification as the predominant
agenda item. The result was the joint communiqu6 released on July 4,
1972, in which North and South Korean leaders agreed to seek peaceful
and independent reunification of Korea "without being subject to exter-
nal imposition and interference" and to achieve national unity by tran-
scending "differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. ''14 The d6tente
process certainly made China accept the status quo, and it then had to
learn to respect US interests in Northeast Asia.
Dialogue and negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang contin-
ued after 1972, but not much progress had been achieved until the late
1980s. The prime ministers of the two Korean governments engaged
more serious negotiations in 1990 and 1991 which led to the conclusion
of an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and
Co-operation between the two Koreas, as well as the release of a Joint
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in Decem-
ber 1991. The latter became effective in February 1992. Similarly, it was
 Cheng 59

a major breakthrough in the relations among the major powers that pro-
vided the impetus for the improvement in inter-Korean relations. The
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations marked by Mikhail Gorbachev's
visit to Beijing in May 1989, as well as the following collapse of the
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the So-
viet Union, forced the North Korean leadership to respond to the chang-
ing international environment. Obviously Kim I1 Sung could no longer
count on the Soviet Union to meet North Korea's security needs.
The normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South
Korea in 1992 was an important breakthrough in weakening US influ-
ence on the North Korean Peninsula and strengthening that of China. Its
relationships with both Koreas are advantageous for China, and contrib-
ute to its leadership position in Asia. Managing good relations with both
Seoul and Pyongyang has become a balancing act in which China must
carefully adapt changes and events on the peninsula.
Most experts tend to argue that China prefers the maintenance of
the status quo in the Korean Peninsula, while continuing to provide eco-
nomic, diplomatic and military support for the Kim Jong I1 regime. The
reasons given include the dangers of North Korean isolation and col-
lapse, the unpredictable foreign policy orientation of a unified Korea,
affinity with North Korea's one-party system, and the value of the Ko-
rean Peninsula in China's wider interactions with the United States and
Japan. 15 The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the temporary with-
drawal of Russia from North Korea left Pyongyang wholly dependent
on China, and allowed China's opening up to Seoul without damaging
too much its relations with Pyongyang. The close cultural and historical
ties between the Chinese and Korean leaderships have contributed much
to their mutual understanding and trust, and Beijing's good sense of
Pyongyang's sensibilities have enabled the bilateral relationships to sur-
vive despite the severe challenges.
In principle, the Chinese leadership supports the reunification of
the Korean Peninsula, and this commitment has been based on the bilat-
eral alliance and the Chinese mission of reunification with Taiwan. This
position is not expected to change in the foreseeable future. Arguably,
the peaceful and gradual reunification of the Korean Peninsula will re-
move a potential point of conflict in the region, and enhance the peace
and stability of China's surrounding a r e a s . 16 After all, Chinese leaders
60 East Asia / Winter 2003

have been striving to achieve a peaceful international environment to

concentrate on their modernization program.17 A violent reunification is
destabilizing and certainly undesirable from Beijing's point of view.
Analysts in China believe that a rough equilibrium of military forces
exists between the two Koreas, and "one side cannot swallow the other
side. ''s In recent years, because of the economic difficulties in North
Korea, its armed forces cannot maintain sustained fighting capabilities
simply because of the shortage of its oil supply, among many other fac-
tors. A peaceful and rapid reunification initiated by Seoul along the Ger-
man lines is considered unlikely too. South Korea is unwilling to assume
the type of economic burden that West Germany did in 1989-90; and
finally, despite the extraordinary economic difficulties in North Korea,
the Kim Jong I1 regime can probably be maintained for some years.
A package was concluded between the United States and North
Korea in the form of an Agreed Framework in October 1994. In return
for the new Kim Jong I1 regime's pledge to freeze and ultimately dis-
mantle its nuclear program and reveal its nuclear activities in the past,
the Clinton administration committed to organize a multilateral effort
(involving South Korea and Japan) to offer two light-water reactors with
about 2,000 MW power-generating capacity by 2003, and to deliver
500,000 tons of heavy oil annually. The Agreed Framework commits the
two countries to "work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula," to "move towards full normalization of political and
economic relations," and on the part of the United States, to "provide
formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons by the U.S. ''19
For a long time in previous years, China had insisted that the Ko-
rean conflict had to be settled between the two Koreas as well as be-
tween North Korea and the United States, and declined to get involved
in the negotiations to establish a peace mechanism in the peninsula. On
the whole, China's role in the quadrilateral talks has been seen as con-
structive. Jiang Zemin even made a positive response to the then South
Korean President-elect Kim Dae Jung's proposal on six-nation talks con-
cerning Northeast Asian security and peace in February 1998. 20 Theo-
retically, a four-party peace treaty may be a creative formula for
establishing a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula? ~ On the economic
 Cheng 61

front, China joined the Tumen River Area Development Programme

(TRADP3) with Russia, Japan, Mongolia, and the two Koreas.
Japan's perception of the North Korean threat and its people's strong
resentment against Pyongyang's aggressive acts such as the kidnapping
of Japanese citizens and violations of Japanese territorial waters remain
serious obstacles in the improvement of Japanese-North Korean rela-
tions.
In the eyes of Chinese analysts, Japan strongly prefers the status
quo over Korean reunification. They tend to believe that Japan has con-
siderable reservations about a united, economically and militarily strong
Korea because of the deep-seated hatred against the Japanese nation on
the part of the Koreans. Chinese experts consider that a unified Korea
will be on the side of China in any future Sino-Japanese conflict, just
like the present common stand on the Japanese prime ministers' visits to
the Yasukuni shrine, textbook controversies, Japan's gradual erosion of
its Peace Constitution, etc. Hence, Chinese experts believe that Japan
will continue to pursue a balanced "two Koreas" policy to avoid Korean
reunification that may produce a "second Japan." Compared with the
United States, Japan's preference for a stable but divided Korean Penin-
sula is even stronger. =
Chinese leaders take Russia very seriously in their considerations
of the strategic balance in East Asia. Since the early 1960s, there was a
keen competition for Pyongyang between Beijing and Moscow. The
Chinese leadership is acutely aware that the Kim Jong I1 regime will
likely try to play one off against another in this triangular relationship,
and this adds pressure on Beijing not to push Pyongyang too hard. China
has entered the Four-Party Talks without much accommodating Russian
interests, but it has no objection to the Russian proposal to hold six-
party talks on the Korean situation. However, Chinese leaders are not
actively in support of the proposal either, and they believe that opposi-
tion to Japan's participation from the two Koreas probably cannot be
overcome in the foreseeable future. Chinese leaders believe that Mos-
cow is not interested in Korean reunification, and that it also prefers
stability and the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. There may well be
some Sino-Russian competition when they both seek to establish close
relations with both Koreas, but there is no serious conflict of interests.
62 East Asia / Winter 2003

Given the general acceptance of the status quo by the major pow-
ers involved, China does not have major difficulties in achieving its mini-
mum foreign policy objectives within the framework of regional balance
of power. Since the 1990s, Chinese leaders have been bolder in taking
initiatives as well as in responding to other powers' initiatives such as
the Four-Party Talks. While they carefully avoid challenging the vital
interest of the countries involved, they realize that China's influence
over Pyongyang is an invaluable diplomatic asset. But the Bush
administration's hawkish stand and the Kim Jong II's regime's belliger-
ency may generate new pressures on China exactly because of its influ-
ence in the Korean Peninsula.

III. Understanding North Korea's Vulnerabilities

Influenced by the mainstream international media dominated by

Western values, North Korea is commonly regarded as a "rogue state."
In the words of US President George W. Bush, it is a member of "the
axis of evil," operating outside the norms of global society, and presents
a threat to international security, especially that in Northeast Asia. Zhang
Xizhen, for example, argues that perhaps North Korea should be per-
ceived as a small and weak state constantly experiencing external hostil-
ity and pressure, and that it finds it difficult to identify a positive role to
play in regional security co-operation. 23
At the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe meant that North Korea
suddenly and traumatically lost its support system in the international
community. The shock came so suddenly that Pyongyang had very lim-
ited time to make adjustments. 24 The acute sense of isolation and inse-
curity prompted the Kim I1 Sung regime to be even more vigilant in
protecting its national identity. Even in the Cold War era, Kim I1 Sung
worked hard to preserve North Korea's independence in the international
Communist movement, and the Sino-Soviet disputes allowed North Korea
considerable room of maneuver through exploiting the contradictions
between its two giant neighbors.
The breakup of the Soviet Union had betrayed its trust in two sig-
nificant ways. In the first place, their economic reforms in the 1980s and
 Cheng 63

1990s were naturally perceived to be a betrayal of the cause of commu-

nism, threatening to destabilize the North Korean model of socialism.
Secondly, they were eager to cultivate the Western countries, especially
the United States; and they also normalized relations with Seoul without
much consideration for Pyongyang's interests.
Strengthening the nation militarily, including the development of
nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, appeared to be a natural
option to protect its ideology and political system. A process of engage-
ment initiated by North Korea's neighbors with the intention of eroding
the North Korean leadership's perception of threat and sense of insecu-
rity is, therefore, essential to encouraging Pyongyang to assume a legiti-
mate regional role as the other regional powers.
It was the Reagan administration which first recognized that North
Korea's increasing isolation was a dangerous destabilizing factor in
Northeast Asia, and it launched a "modest initiative" to begin a dialogue
with Pyongyang. The State Department was authorized in the fall of
1988 to hold substantive discussions with North Korean representatives
in neutral settings, and certain exports were allowed on a case-by-case
basis. 25 President Roh Tae Woo soon attempted to ease tensions and
promote peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula too. These efforts
were instrumental in persuading Kim I1 Sung to sign two inter-Korean
agreements in December 1991, i.e., the North-South Agreement on Rec-
onciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Co-operation, as well as
the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This
procedure then led to a nuclear safeguards agreement between Pyongyang
and the IAEA, which allowed IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear
facilities beginning in the spring of 1992.
These foreign policy adjustments took place when China was in
the process of normalizing relations with South Korea. While it did not
appear that Kim I1 Sung received much encouragement and support from
the Chinese leadership in such adjustments, the establishment of Sino-
South Korean diplomatic relations in August 1992 had no discernible
impact on China's military and strategic ties with North Korea. In fact,
from August 1992 until the death of Kim I1 Sung in July 1994 (i.e., dur-
ing the nuclear crisis period), bilateral high-level exchanges obviously
accelerated. On the other hand, from July 1994 to mid-1999, overall
64 East Asia / Winter 2003

military and security contacts between the two countries showed a steady
decline, both in frequency and in the level and type of military/security
exchanges. 26
According to some observers, Pyongyang has been acting ratio-
nally and its security policy is in accord with the tenets of neorealism.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs as well
as its buildup of conventional military capabilities constitute an act of
compensation to counterbalance the sharp deterioration of its external
strategic environment. 27 However, its massive expenditure on the mili-
tary has been the fundamental cause of its economic collapse in the
1990s. 28 The economic difficulties in turn have prompted the North
Korean leadership to engage in nuclear brinkmanship in order to secure
economic assistance from the United States, South Korea, and Japan. In
the 1990s, North Korea was receiving signals from the United States
and South Korea that they had no intention of altering the status quo in
the Korean Peninsula. 29 This meant that the North Korean leadership
could manage to gain time to engage in economic reforms. The success
of such economic reforms and opening up to the outside world would
have to depend on a massive inflow of foreign investment, which would
become available only if Pyongyang is willing to give up its nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles programs. There is one more catch too,
i.e., economic reforms and opening up to the outside world will destabi-
lize the existing totalitarian regime, and the Korean leadership may find
this challenge unpalatable.
Chinese leaders consider that economic reforms and opening up
to the outside world by North Korea along the lines of China's model
would contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia; and they had
applied pressure on Pyongyang to engage in such reforms. Beijing, for
example, followed Moscow's example in demanding hard currency cash
payments in bilateral trade, effective as of January 1, 1993. However, it
soon became clear that Pyongyang would be unable or unwilling to meet
such a demand. Since Chinese leaders would not like to see the collapse
of North Korea, and they wanted to maintain their influence in Pyongyang,
they had no choice but to waive North Korea's debt in "friendship prices"
for oil and food. By mid-1994, China accounted for about three-quar-
ters of North Korea's oil and food imports. 3~
 Cheng 65

In addition to the economic assistance, China also played an im-

portant supporting role in paving the way for the US-DPRK Agreed
Framework in October 1994. The threat of a Chinese veto on any draft
sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council was instrumental in
enabling Pyongyang to secure direct negotiations with the United States.
The North Korean leadership fully exploited its nuclear threat to capital-
ize on all the uncertainties and shifting goals in Washington, Seoul, and
Tokyo.
However, this strong support from China, as indicated earlier, did
not bring about closer relations with North Korea. Paradoxically,
Pyongyang's growing dependence on Beijing for economic and politi-
cal survival generated considerable distrust and resentment. You Ji, for
example, indicated that "'the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regu-
larly issues orders to the Chinese officials that they must not comment
on DPRK affairs within the presence of foreigners"; obviously Chinese
leaders were careful to minimize the perception of Chinese chauvinism
on the part of Pyongyang. 31 It was reported that between 1978 and 1991,
Deng Xiaoping repeatedly urged Kim I1 Sung to engage in economic
reforms and opening up to the outside world, but the responses were not
enthusiastic. 32 When Kim Jong I1 met the Chinese ambassador to
Pyongyang, Wan Yongxiang, in May 1999, Kim said that he supported
Chinese-style reforms, but in return he asked the Chinese leaders to re-
spect "Korean-style socialism. ''33
It was only when Pyongyang initiated its diplomatic offensives in
1999 that Sino-North Korean relations began to improve. It appeared
that the Chinese leadership was usually ready to support its neighbor's
attempt to secure a peaceful international environment to concentrate on
economic reforms. Chinese leaders appreciate North Korea's vulnerabili-
ties, and they believe that China has to offer Pyongyang economic aid
and diplomatic support to preserve the status quo, which is in China's
interest. While they are sensitive to the Kim Jong I1 regime's concerns
regarding independence, they also want to limit their commitments to
North Korea. Economic assistance has been important to Pyongyang,
but it has not been generous. Despite China's military alliance with North
Korea, it wants to show that it would not support Pyongyang if North
Korea attacked South Korea. During Jiang Zemin's state visit to South
66 East Asia / Winter 2003

Korea in 1995, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the

alliance does not commit Chinese troops to defending North Korea. 34
Chinese leaders therefore understand that they cannot afford to exert too
much pressure on the Kim Jong I1 regime. They have adopted a long-
term perspective and believe that pressure, whatever its short-term gains,
will be counterproductive in the longer term. Hence, carrots have to be
offered continuously; and, above all else, they have to help Pyongyang
to find an acceptable way out in order to defuse the crisis. They there-
fore have to try to persuade the Bush administration too to offer an ac-
ceptable way out to Pyongyang.

IV. Danger of a Regional Arms Race

In the recent nuclear brinkmanship of Kim Jong I1, China reiter-

ated its long-standing policy of opposing the nuclearization of the Ko-
rean Peninsula) 5 Most observers believe Beijing to be sincere as the
Chinese leadership supports the status quo in the Korean Peninsula and
is against nuclear proliferation in principle. China is also concerned with
the potential of an arms race in Northeast Asia. Japan's response, in par-
ticular, will be closely monitored.
In many ways, it was the North Korean threat that provided the
impetus for Japan's military modernization in recent years. In August
1998, Pyongyang test-fired its three-stage Taepodong ballistic missile
with a range of 1,500-1,600 km. It overflew northern Japan and landed
in the Pacific Ocean. North Korea claimed that it was a peaceful satellite
orbiting the earth beaming revolutionary hymns to Kim I1 Sung and Kim
Jong I1. At any rate, heightened fears about the threat from North Korea
dovetailed nicely with the Keizo Obuchi government's efforts to push
through a number of security-related measures. These included plans to
launch four spy satellites by 2003, starting joint research with the United
States on a TMD system, and increasing spending on the military in
1998 for the first time in three years. The proposed acquisition of in-
flight refueling tanker aircraft on the part of Japan's Self-Defense Forces
would also give Japan its first capability in half a century to project
military power beyond its shores. 36
In the eyes of Beijing, the North Korean threat was more of an
excuse used by the Japanese government. It considers that Japan's mili-
 Cheng 67

tary modernization has been directed at China. The Chinese leadership

is particularly concerned with the TMD system based on US destroyers
equipped with the missile-hunting Aegis radar system. The deployment
of a TMD system by Japan will force China to upgrade its tactical mis-
siles, and may well lead to a small-scale arms race. Chinese leaders per-
ceive such pressures as a conspiracy to slow down China's economic
growth because of resources diverted to military modernization. The TMD
system became more controversial in the spring of 2001 when Taiwan
became interested in the acquisition of US frigates equipped with the
Aegis system. Though it was not likely that the sale would be approved
by the Bush administration, the possibility of involving Taiwan in the
US-Japan TMD system joint venture much exacerbated Beijing's suspi-
cions.
Japan going nuclear is obviously a much more serious matter. Its
negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations on the regional balance of
power in Northeast Asia will be immense. During the course of North
Korea's nuclear brinkmanship in February 2003, a Japan Defense Agency
spokesman Shimamoto Manabu revealed that the Japanese government
had considered developing a nuclear arsenal in 1995 to counter the threat
of a nuclear-armed North Korea, but rejected the idea because it might
deprive Japan of US military protection and alarm Japan's Asian neigh-
bors. The study of the Japan Defense Agency therefore concluded that
the political and financial costs of Japan's possession of nuclear weap-
ons were too high and the consequences for the Asian region too weighty.
North Korea's recent military developments and its nuclear
brinkmanship may well further stimulate Japan's rising nationalism and
strengthen the gradual modification of the interpretation of its constitu-
tional doctrines. After Pyongyang's missile test on the eve of the inaugu-
ration ceremony of the South Korean new president, Roh Moo Hyun,
the Japanese defense minister, Ishiba Shigeru, indicated that in the past,
Japan was the shield, and the United States was the arrow, but it would
be high time at this stage for the Diet to review the appropriateness of
this arrangement. Ishiba said that according to law, if North Korea was
really ready to attack Japan with ballistic missiles, only the United States
could take action, and this situation would be intolerable.
China is naturally concerned that the North Korean threat will
strengthen US-Japan defense co-operation and further involve South
68 East Asia / Winter 2003

Korea and Taiwan, especially in the development of the TMD system. In

recent years, a number of Japanese cabinet ministers and politicians have
stated that the "surrounding areas" of Japan concerning the strengthen-
ing of US-Japan defense co-operation would naturally include Taiwan.
When pressed for clarifications by the Chinese authorities, the Japanese
government's official response has been that "emergencies in the sur-
rounding areas" of Japan is not a geographical concept, but a state of
affairs. The Chinese leadership remains suspicious.
While Beijing would like to see the ultimate withdrawal of US
troops from the Korean Peninsula, it is nonetheless concerned with its
destabilizing effect in the region, especially in Japan. The recent US
decision to move its forces out of Seoul and other frontline positions has
generated fears in South Korea, which is afraid that such relocation will
send the wrong signal to Pyongyang. It may give the impression that the
United States would be less committed to the defense of Seoul; it may
also make North Korea believe that the Bush administration is ready for
a military strike against its nuclear strikes, thus prompting the Kim Jong
I1 regime to carry out pre-emptive measures. 37

V. China's Options in Defusing Kim Jong II's Nuclear

Brinkmanship

From the discussions above, it is clear that the Chinese leadership

prefers the maintenance of the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. In its
assessment, the major actors concerned all share the same interest in not
wanting to rock the boat. Hence there are no fundamental conflicts of
interest among the key actors involved. Kim Jong II's nuclear
brinkmanship is therefore less threatening and less urgent in the eyes of
Beijing, which tends to believe that there is relatively more time to re-
solve the issue diplomatically.
While Chinese leaders do not support such nuclear brinkmanship,
it has more sympathy for Pyongyang's difficult situation and more un-
derstanding of its strategy. Arguably it is difficult to expect that North
Korea will give up its brinkmanship diplomacy. Unless there is a signifi-
cant improvement in the US-North Korea relations, it is probably also
difficult to expect that Pyongyang will abandon its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles programs. The Bush administration certainly wants
 Cheng 69

China to take a more active role in urging North Korea to abandon its
nuclear weapons program, and it considers that Beijing can assume such
a role.
Chinese leaders perceive the Chinese-North Korean relationship
on a long-term basis. They are reluctant to allow short-term consider-
ations to adversely affect long-term ties. They also realize that too much
pressure on Pyongyang may be counterproductive. A sharp reduction of
Chinese assistance may lead to a total collapse in North Korea; at least it
will lead to a flood of refugees to China and severely damage the bilat-
eral relationship for a long period. The Chinese leadership finds it diffi-
cult to accept advice from the United States to exert pressure on an ally,
given the Chinese diplomatic tradition of respecting state sovereignty
and avoiding interferences in the domestic affairs of other states. It is
acutely aware that Pyongyang sees Chinese aid as an instrument serving
Chinese strategic interests and maintaining their influence in North Ko-
rea. Hence, it prefers quiet diplomacy rather than overt pressure on the
Kim Jong I1 regime. As Colin Powell observed after his Beijing visit, "I
think they prefer to play their role quietly." At the same time, Chinese
Vice-President Hu Jintao was also quoted by Renmin Ribao as follows:
"Historical experience has shown that only through dialogue and con-
sultation can the DPRK nuclear issue be properly s e t t l e d . ''38
In Beijing's assessment, since the two key regional allies of the
United States, i.e., Japan and South Korea, have been reluctant to apply
sanctions to Pyongyang, it will be difficult for the Bush administration
to take military action against North Korea, not to mention the United
States' involvement in Iraq. Given the increasing Russian interest in the
Korean Peninsula, China would like to work closely with Russia at this
stage. Strategically, Sino-Russian co-operation to deter US unilateralism
and predominance in international affairs is what China wants. Chinese
leaders are suspicious too that the Bush administration intends to culti-
vate Russia and isolate China, hence they must not neglect Russian in-
terests in the Korean Peninsula. President Vladimir Putin visited China
in December 2002, and he was the first foreign head of state to meet the
new leader Hu Jintao after the Sixteenth Party Congress. Leaders of both
countries appealed to close direct contacts between the United States
and North Korea, and agreed on the common objective of the denuclear-
ization of North Korea. 39 In January 2003, Russian Deputy Foreign Min-
70 East Asia / Winter 2003

ister Alexander Losyukov visited Pyongyang and met Kim Jong I1;
Losyukov indicated that Russia would push for talks between North Korea
and the United States and that it would consider sending a second diplo-
matic mission to the Korean Peninsula? ~
In mid-January 2003, China made an unprecedented offer to host
talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve their dispute
over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. 41 Basically there is no rea-
son why the bilateral approach and the multilateral approach cannot be
adopted simultaneously. In fact, unofficial envoys from the United States
and North Korea already met in Berlin in February 2003. The US side
consisted of a former government official and two nuclear scientists,
while the North Korean side was made up of two junior officials from
the Atomic Energy Ministry and Foreign Ministry, as well as two diplo-
mats from its Berlin embassy. The results of the talks were conveyed to
the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, and might have been linked to
his offer to resume food aid for North Korea during his visit to Asia a
few days l a t e r . 42
Although Chinese leaders have more confidence than others that
Kim Jong II is far from a reckless leader, the danger of the crisis situa-
tion getting out of control must not be underestimated. North Korea may
well try to delay the reprocessing of the spent fuel rods to produce weap-
ons-grade plutonium, but it has been conducting missile tests. These
developments will provide support for Japan to strengthen its defense
capabilities, especially its TMD program. They will also enhance the
American public's perception that the Kim Jong I1 regime is recalcitrant
and should be dealt with on par with Saddam Hussein, albeit some time
after the war in Iraq.
The Bush administration is under considerable pressure not to be
perceived to be adopting double standards in its dealings with Saddam
Hussein and Kim Jong I1. The former declared that Iraq has no weapons
of mass destruction, and was ready to co-operate with United Nations
inspectors; the latter admitted that North Korea has violated the 1994
Agreed Framework, has been engaged in a nuclear weapons program,
and has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ex-
pelled UN inspectors. The Bush administration attacked Iraq in March
2003 without the endorsement of the UN, but is willing to offer food aid
to Pyongyang and engage in informal talks with it.
 Cheng 71

The Bush administration believes that it has to maintain a more

balanced approach, meaning more pressure on North Korea, which ob-
viously will not be conducive to direct negotiations. It has made known
that it is developing plans for sanctions against North Korea which will
include halting Pyongyang's weapons shipments and cutting off money
sent there by the Koreans living in Japan. 43 The United States has also
been setting up reconnaissance bases to monitor North Korea's nuclear
activities since early 2003. After the interception of a US reconnais-
sance plane by North Korea's air force, the Bush administration deployed
twelve B-52 and twelve B-1 bombers to Guam. 44
China's leadership succession does not seem to have been a handi-
cap preventing it from adopting bolder initiatives, an active role in de-
fusing the crisis in the Korean Peninsula will help enhance the prestige
of China's new leaders, and improve their standing in the eyes of the
Bush administration. Jiang Zemin, however, retains considerable influ-
ence in Chinese foreign policy, and this is one area that Hu Jintao does
not want to challenge Jiang, at least for the time being. Similarly, the
leadership succession in Seoul has exacerbated contradictions between
South Korea and the United States, and co-ordination between the two
in approaching North Korea has been made more difficult. But all these
difficulties can be overcome, given the political will.
As far as the Chinese leadership is concerned, its political will
may well be demonstrated by its active engagement with the United States
to push for bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Its persuasion of the
Bush administration to clearly indicate that it has no intention of seeking
a regime change in Pyongyang will be a significant breakthrough. China
can also assume a more active role in securing an aid package for North
Korea from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Gentle persua-
sion and more generous assistance in prodding the Kim Jong I1 regime
to promote economic reforms and opening up to the outside world will
be helpful, and incidents like the arrest of Yang Bin must be avoided.
Influence in Pyongyang may be strengthened by carrots; they are costly,
but will not generate an adverse impact.
At the end of 2003, Beijing has been working hard to set up a
second round of six-country talks on the nuclear program in North Ko-
rea. This follows the first round in August, in which the six parties laid
72 East Asia / Winter 2003

down the common objective of achieving a nuclear-free Korean Penin-

sula and resolving the crisis through peaceful means. 45 It is expected
that the second round would focus on the process of dismantling
Pyongyang's nuclear program. A recent report by the US Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which indicated that North Korea was speeding up its
nuclear weapons production, had added a sense of urgency to the talks.
Meanwhile, in late October, Wu Bangguo, chairman of China's National
People's Congress, visited Pyongyang. It was believed that Wu had
pledged continued assistance of fuel and food to North Korea, and reaf-
firmed that China would guarantee it protection from externally imposed
regime change. 46 The situation looked slightly more optimistic because
US President George W. Bush stated earlier in October that the United
States would offer North Korea multilateral security assurance in ex-
change for dismantling its nuclear program? 7
Senior officials from the other parties involved have also been
engaged in shuttle diplomacy to position themselves for the second round
of six-country talks. These activities showed that the talks were impor-
tant, and the multilateral meetings served useful purposes for all parties
concerned. Chinese leaders apparently had staked a great deal of their
international prestige on bringing all parties together and had sought to
make the process work.

VI. Conclusion

Maintaining the status quo in the Korean Peninsula seems to con-

form to the interests of all the key players involved. Though there are no
fundamental conflicts of interest among the major powers involved, North
Korea's nuclear brinkmanship remains a serious threat to regional peace
and stability. The Korean situation is critical to China's objective of
maintaining a peaceful international environment to concentrate on its
modernization, and expectations are high that China will play a major
role in defusing a crisis generated by North Korea, given its common
interests with the major powers concerned and its influence on the Kim
Jong I1 regime. Parallel bilateral and multilateral negotiations seem to
be a good strategy to resolve the present crisis through diplomatic means;
 Cheng 73

at least it should encounter no serious opposition. With the endorsement

of the United States, Beijing has been able to take the lead.
Chinese leaders have been careful not to alienate the Bush admin-
istration. Regarding the US attack on Iraq, the Chinese position main-
tains some distance from that of Russia and France; and Chinese leaders
imply that they will not exercise the veto over UN Security Council
resolution supported by the United States and its allies. On the Korean
crisis, China clearly indicates that it favors the denuclearization of North
Korea. While it is understandable that China has been reluctant to exert
pressure on North Korea, it feels the pressure to take the initiative to
defuse the crisis. Trying to maintain a balance alone may not be the best
strategy. There is obviously the danger that the situation may get out of
control, but China's influence on North Korea is not very strong and
China may end up pleasing nobody. 48
In the longer term, China may be in the best position to induce
North Korea to engage in economic reforms and opening up to the out-
side world, and investment from South Korea and Japan will be essen-
tial. Only through integrating with the regional economy, while being
able to maintain the stability of the regime, will North Korea gradually
give up its nuclear brinkmanship. The insecurity of the Kim Jong I1 re-
gime must be considered. But time is quickly running out, when North
Korea is already seen to be a de facto nuclear power, reversing the pro-
cess will almost be impossible.
The six-country talks represent an important initiative on the part
of the new Chinese leadership. They reflect a gradual transformation
from a conservative acceptance of the regional balance of power to a
more active, constructive approach to maintain and shape the balance in
favor. Multilateral diplomacy is only a recent endeavor on the part of
Beijing; it is in line with the Chinese leaders' push for multipolarity, and
it helps to demonstrate that China's increasing influence in the region
may not be a threat, but an asset contributing to regional stability and
peace. In more concrete terms, the Bush administration is openly grate-
ful for China's role in the six-country talks as well as for serving as an
intermediary between the United States and North Korea. 49 Chinese
scholars privately indicate that Beijing is seeking the help of the Bush
74 East Asia / Winter 2003

administration to exert pressure on Taiwan regarding the referendum

and conditional amendment issues. 5~

Notes

1. Liaoming Zhang, "China's relations with the Korean peninsula: A Chinese view",
Korea Observer (Seoul), Vol. 32, No. 4, Winter 2001, Section 2: China's Na-
tional Interests on the Korean Peninsula.
2. Luetang Guo, "Chaoxian Bandao Tongyi: Wenti yu Qianjing (The Reunification
of the Korean Peninsula: Issues and Prospects)", Guoji Guancha (International
Observation) (Beijing), No. 5, May 1996, pp. 25-29.
3. See, for example, Fei-ling Wang, "Joining the major powers for the status quo:
China's views and policy on Korean reunification", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No.
2, Summer 1999, pp. 167-185.
. See National Bureau of Statistics, People's Republic of China (comp.), China
Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistical Press, various issues.
5. Fei-Ling Wang, op. cit., p. 3.
6. See, for example, Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1996.
7. James Brooke, "Threats and Responses: Northeast Asia; China 'Looming Large'
in South Korea As Biggest Player, Replacing the U.S.", The New York Times,
January 3, 2003.
8. See Lorien Holland and Shim Jae Hoon, "China's Korea Game", Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol. 163, No. 24, June 15, 2000, pp. 16-18.
9. James Kynge, Joe Leahy and Andrew Ward, "China arrests North Korea's favoured
tycoon", Financial Times (London), October 5, 2002.
10. Raviprased Narayanan, "China, N. Korea & The Nuclear Issue", The Hindu
(Delhi), February 8, 2003; and Gady A. Epstein, "China debates greater role in N.
Korean nuclear crisis; Longtime main ally wants Pyongyang to forgo arms", The
Baltimore Sun (Baltimore), February 13, 2003.
11. Shi Yin Hong, professor of international relations of Renmin University in Beijing
criticized North Korea as follows: "If your ally becomes one of our greatest threats
to security, I don't think you should keep the alliance just for alliance's sake ....
Whatever the consequences of this crisis (the North Korean nuclear brinkmanship).
Whatever the diplomatic choices China makes during this crisis, China-North
Korea relations have changed forever." Zhu Feng, director of the International
Security Programme at Beijing University's School of International Studies, simi-
larly observed: "There is increasing recognition here that if North Korea is fi-
nally armed with nuclear weapons, it will be a big threat to China . . . . I have a
strong sense at this crucial moment, my government will change its mind to re-
sort to another approach rather than just, say, use the veto right to block any
U.N.-imposed sanctions against North Korea." Zhang Liankui, a North Korean
 Cheng 75

expert at the Central Party School in Beijing, also commented: "What worries me
worst is if this will result in a nuclear arms race in East Asia, the worst thing that
anybody could imagine." Ibid.
12. See the author's "The Evolution of China's Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era:
From Anti-Hegemony to Modernization Diplomacy", in his edited work, China:
Modernization in the 1980s, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989,
pp. 161-201.
13. See, for example, Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge-North Korean Negoti-
ating Behaviour, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
14. See Ilpyong J. Kim, "China in North Korean Foreign Policy", in Samuel S. Kim
(ed.), North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 94-115, especially p. 96.
15. See, for example, Chae-jin Lee, op. cit.; Fei-Ling Wang, op. cit., and Samuel S.
Kim (ed.), op. cir.
16. See, for example, Dongxia You, "Fenxi Chaoxian Bandao Tongyi Qianjingjiqi
Yingxiang (Analysis of the Prospects of Korean Reunification and Its Impact)",
Dongbeiya Luntan (Northeast Asian Forum) (Beijing), No. 3, March 1997, pp.
67-68; and Li Fuxin and Qin Shisen, "Chaoxian Bandao Wenti Sigang Huitan
jiqi Yingxiang (The Four-Party Talks on the Korean Questions and Its Impact)",
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) (Beijing), No. 2,
February 1998, p. II.
17. See the author's "The Evolution of China's Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era:
From Anti-Hegemony to Modernization Diplomacy", in the author's edited work,
China's Modernization in the 1980s, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1989, pp. 161-201.
18. Luetang Guo, op. cit., pp. 26-31.
19. Robert A. Manning, "The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy", in
Samuel S. Kim (ed.), op. cit., pp. 153-156.
20. The Korea Herald (Seoul), February 13, 1998.
21. Tae-Hwan Kwok, "The Four-Party Treaty: A Creative Formula for Building a
Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula", The Korean Journal of Defense Analy-
sis, Winter 1997, pp. 117-135.
22. See Fei-Ling Wang, op. cir., pp. 176-177.
23. See Xizhen Zhang, "Policies toward North Korea: A time for new thinking",
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25, November 2000, pp. 535-545.
24. See Hans S. Park, "The DPRK and the Asia-Pacific peace regime: a phenomenologi-
cal account", Korea Christian Academy's Letter Dialogue, Summer 1999, p. 75.
25. See C.S. Eliot Kang, "North Korea's Security Policy: Swords into Plowshares?",
in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee (eds.), op. cit., pp. 195-215.
26. Taeho Kim, "Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang: Growing
Strains Amid Lingering Ties", in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.),
China's Military Faces the Future, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 306-
309.
76 East Asia / Winter 2003

27. See, for example, David Kang, "North Korea: Deterrence through Danger", in
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influ-
ences, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 234-263.
28. Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through", Foreign Affairs, Vol.
76, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 105-118; and his "North Korea's S. Kim and Tai
Hwan Lee (eds.), op. cit., pp. 165-193.
29. Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear", International Security, Vol. 20,
No. 2, Autumn 1995, p. 112; and Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear
Diplomacy with North Korea, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998,
pp. 46-50.
30. North Korea News, No. 724, February 28, 1994, pp. 5-6; and The Economist,
March 26, 1994, p. 39.
31. You Ji, "China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience",
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28, August 2001, pp. 389-390.
32. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South Korea and North Korea (lst
Quarter, 1999), p. 40.
33. AFP release, July 16, 1999.
34. Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, "Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing
Asymmetrical Interdependence", op. cit., p. 121.
35. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 14, 2003.
36. Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 2000 Yearbook, Hong Kong: Review Pub-
lishing Company Ltd., 2000, pp. 21 and 137.
37. Ibid., March 8, 2003.
38. Ibid.
39. Ming Pao, December 3, 2002.
40. South China Morning Post, February 12, 2003.
41. Ibid., January 15, 2003.
42. Ibid., March 7, 2003.
43. Ibid., February 18, 2003.
44. Ibid., March 7, 2003; and Ming Pao, February 28, 2003.
45. Sunday Morning Post, November 16, 2003. The six parties were the U.S., Russia,
China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.
46. Ibid., and South China Morning Post, October 30, 2003.
47. Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), November 7, 2003.
48. There is the opposing view that China wields very substantial influence on North
Korea. Hwang Chang Yop, the defected North Korean leader, for example, openly
stated that if China terminated its political and economic support for the Kim
Jong I1 regime, its downfall would come early. See Ming Pao, November 2, 2003.
49. South China Morning Post, November 7, 2003.
50. The author's private discussions with academics and think-tank researchers in
Beijing in the autumn of 2003.