131654-1990-Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils.20180930-5466-1icqbki
131654-1990-Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils.20180930-5466-1icqbki
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
DECISION
This petition assails the decision of the NLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the
consolidated appeals of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows:
"1. In NLRC Case No. NCR-12-4007-85 and NLRC Case No. NCR-1-295-86 —
On December 20, 1985, UFE led a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of temporary restraining order, with this Court (G.R. No. 73129) assailing the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Minister. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction
against any concerted activity, and an absence of a restraining order, the union
members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear de ance of Minister Ople's Order
of December 11, 1986, staged a strike and continued to man picket lines at the Makati
Administrative O ce and all of Nestle's factories and warehouses at Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City. Likewise, the union o cers and
members distributed lea ets to employees and passersby advocating a boycott of
company products (p. 383, Rollo).
On January 23, 1986, Nestle led a petition to declare the strike illegal (NCR-1-
295-86) premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause
and the grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes.
On January 30, 1986, then Labor Minister Ople issued another Order, with this
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, in line with the Order of December 11, 1985, this O ce hereby
orders all the striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within
forty eight (48) hours from notice of this Order.
The Director of Labor Relations is designated to immediately conduct appropriate
hearings and meetings and submit his recommendations to enable this O ce to
decide the issues within thirty (30) days." (p. 383, Rollo)
Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a
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notice caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986, advising all
workers to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the o cers and members of
UFE continued with the strike.
On February 4, 1986, the Minister B. Ople denied their motion for reconsideration
of the return-to-work order portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and no further
motion of similar nature shall be entertained.prcd
"The parties are further enjoined from committing acts that will disrupt the
peaceful and productive relations between the parties while the dispute is under
arbitration as well as acts considered illegal by law for the orderly implementation
of this Order like acts of coercion, harassment, blocking of public thoroughfares,
ingress and egress to company premises for lawful purposes or those undertaken
without regard to the rights of the other party.
"Police and military authorities are requested to assist in the proper and effective
implementation of this Order." (p. 384, Rollo)
UFE de ed the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle led criminal
charges against those involved.
On March 13, 1986, the new Minister of Labor and Employment, Augusto B.
Sanchez, issued a Resolution, the relevant portions of which stated thus:
"This O ce hereby enjoins all striking workers to return-to-work immediately and
management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
previous to the work stoppage except as quali ed in this resolution. The
management of Nestle Philippines is further directed to grant a special assistance
as suggested by this Ministry in an order dated 30 January 1986 to all striking
employees covered by the bargaining units at Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and
Cagayan de Oro City in an amount equivalent to their weighted average monthly
basic salary, plus the cash conversion value of the vacation leave credits for the
year 1986, payable not later than ve (5) days from the date of the actual return
to work by the striking workers." (p. 385, Rollo)
On November 13, 1987 , after trial on the merits, Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno
issued his decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Declaring the strike illegal. LLjur
"2. Declaring all the respondent union o cers, namely: M.L. Sarmiento, R.M.
Alterejos, R.D. Paglinawan, C.G. Nuqui, C.Y. Sazon, R. Lucas, R. Armas, E. Abella,
A.A. Cañete, J.T. Capili, A.S. Castillo, Jr., P.C. Caringal, E. Leonardo, E.B. Mira, E.C.
Nuñez, P.D. San Jose, V. Solis, E. Villena, A. Ricafrente, M. Lantin, A. Mortojo, R.
Munsod, R. Diaz, R. Urgelles, C. San Jose, E. Bunyi, N. Centeno, R. Gacutan, G. de
Borja, N. Nipales, E. San Pedro, M. de la Fuente, C. Medina, C. Ponce, J. Castro Jr.,
R. Arevalo, R. Beo, F. Esguerra, R. Almenanza, E. Quino, M. Roxas, R. Arandela, W.
Ramirez, I. Natividad, S. Pampang, D. Canlobo, G. Noble, E. Sayao, C. Cenido, F.
Mijares, R. Calong-Calong, P. Quitlong, D. Completo, A. Avelino, L. Payabyab, I.
Rieza, D. Belarmino, Q. Mateo, and C. Pre to have lost their employment status.
"3. Declaring the union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
"4. Dismissing the Union complaint for unfair labor practice." (pp. 380-381,
Rollo)
2. In RAB-X-2-0047-86:
Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU, renewed a
3-year contract, made effective from December 1, 1984 up to June 30, 1987.
Petitioners signed the CBA as the duly-elected officers of the Union.
On January 19, 1985, the union o cers, together with other members of the
union sent a letter to Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU), advising them "that
henceforth we shall administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the Union of
Filipro Employees (UFE) to where we have allied ourselves." WATU disregarded the
unions's advice, claiming to be the contracting party of the CBA. UFE led a petition
(Case No. CRD-M-88-326-85) for administration of the existing CBAs at Cebu, Davao
and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS and WATU.
From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986 , the rank and le employees of the
company staged a strike at the instigation of the UFE o cers, who had represented
themselves as officers.
Nestle led a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that
their strike was legal because the same was staged pursuant to the notice of strike
led by UFE on November 14, 1985 (BLR-NS-11-344-85), of which they claim to be
members, having disaffiliated themselves from CDO-FWU-WATU.
On November 24, 1987, Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his
decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Declaring the strike illegal;
3. In NCR-00-09-03285-87.
(a) On August 13, 1986, UFE, its o cers and members staged a walkout
from their jobs, and participated in the Welga ng Bayan. Nestlé led a petition to
declare the walkout illegal (NLRC Case No. SRB-IV-1831-87) (p. 392, Rollo);
(b) On September 21, 1986, complainants (UFE) again did not proceed to
their work, but joined the picket line in sympathy with the striking workers of Southern
Textile Mills, which became the subject of an Illegal Strike Petition (NLRC Case SRB-IV-I
1831-87) (p. 392, Rollo);
(c) On November 12, 1986, UFE its o cers and members just left their work
premises and marched towards Calamba in a demonstration over the slaying of a labor
leader, . . . hence a complaint for Illegal Walkout (NLRC Case No. SRB-IV-1833-87) was
filed by Nestle (p. 392, Rollo);
(d) On December 4, 1986, UFE led a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR-NS-12-531-86) (to protest the unfair labor practices of Nestle,
such as hiring of contractual workers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination)
(p. 392, Rollo);
(e) On December 23, 1986, then Minister Augusto S. Sanchez certi ed the
labor dispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly enjoining any
intended or actual strike or lockout (p. 392, Rollo);
(f) On August 18, 1987, UFE union o cers and members at the Cabuyao
factory again abandoned their jobs and just walked out, leaving un nished products on
line and raw materials leading to their spoilage. The walk-out resulted in economic
losses to the company. Nestle led a Petition to Declare the Walkout Illegal. (NLRC
Case No. SRB-IV-3-1898-87) (p. 407, Rollo);
(g) On August 21, 1987, UFE union o cers and members at the Alabang
factory also left their jobs in sympathy with the walkout staged by their Cabuyao
counterparts. Nestle led again a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (NLRC-NCR-Case
No. 00-08-03003-87) (p. 407, Rollo);
(h) On August 27, 1987, UFE union members at the Alabang and Cabuyao
factories, in disregard of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Union and
Management on August 21, 1987, (to exert their best efforts for the normalization of
production targets and standards and to consult each other on any matter that may
tend to disrupt production to attain industrial peace) participated in an indignation rally
in Cabuyao because of the death of two (2) members of PAMANTIC, and in Alabang
because one of their members was allegedly mauled by a policeman during the
nationwide strike on August 26, 1987 (p. 408, Rollo);
(i) On September 4, 1987, around 6:00 P.M. all sections at the Alabang
factory went on a 20-minute mealbreak simultaneously, contrary to the agreement and
despite admonition of supervisors, resulting in complete stoppage of their production
lines. Responsible o cials namely: Eugenio San Pedro, Carlos Jose, and Cesar Ponce,
were suspended from work for six (6) days without pay (p. 408, Rollo);
(j) From September 5 to 8, 1987, at the instigation of UFE union o cers, all
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workers staged a sitdown strike; and
(k) On September 7, 1987, Cabuyao's culinary section's union members
sympathized with the sitdown strike at Alabang, followed at 12:30 P.M. by the whole
personnel of the production line and certain areas in the Engineering Department. These
sitdown strikes at the Alabang and Cabuyao factories became the subject of two
separate petitions to declare the strike illegal (NCR-Case No. 00-09-03168-87 and SRB-
IB-9-1903-87, respectively) (p. 408, Rollo);
(l) On September 8, 1987, Hon. F. Drilon issued the following order:
"All the workers are hereby directed to return to work immediately, refrain from
resorting to any further slowdown, sitdown strike, walkout and any other kind of
activities that may tend to disrupt the normal operations of the company. The
company is directed to accept all employees and to resume normal operations. LLjur
Parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts
that would aggravate the situation." (p. 394, Rollo)
(m) Despite the order, UFE staged a strike on September 11, 1987, without
notice of strike, strike vote and in blatant de ance of then Labor Minister Sanchez's
certi cation order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon's return-to-work
order dated September 8, 1987." (p. 409, Rollo);
(n) Nestle sent individual letter of termination dated September 14, 1987
dismissing them from the service effective immediately for knowingly instigating and
participating in an illegal strike, defying the order of the Secretary of Labor, dated
September 8, 1987, and other illegal acts (pp. 394-395, Rollo).
On September 22, 1987, UFE led a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, ULP and
damages (NLRC NCR-00-03285-87). Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on both
issues of dismissal and strike legality, upon the premise that the issue on validity of the
dismissal of the individual complainants from employment "depends on the resolution
of the issue on whether or not the strike declared by complainants was illegal."
The decision dated January 12, 1988, disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit; and
2. Con rming the dismissal of all individual complainants herein as valid and
legally justified." (p. 376, Rollo)
UFE appealed, assailing the three decisions, except that rendered in Case No.
NLRC-NCR-12-4007-85 (Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice Against UFE) "because it
was already rendered moot and academic by the return to work agreement and order
dated March 10 and 13, 1986, respectively." (p. 49, Rollo).
Upon UFE's subsequent motion, the three appeals were ordered consolidated
and elevated to the NLRC en banc (p, 95, Rollo)
The NLRC a rmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters which
declared the strikes illegal, premised on the view that "the core of the controversy rests
upon the legality of the strikes."
In the petition before Us, UFE assigns several errors (pp. 63-321, Rollo), which
We have summarized as follows:
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1. that Articles 263 and 264 are no longer good laws, since compulsory
arbitration has been curtailed under the present Constitution.
2. that the question on the legality of the strike was rendered moot and
academic when Nestle management accepted the striking workers in compliance with
the return-to-work order of then Minister of Labor Augusto Sanchez dated March 13,
1986, (citing the case of Bisayan Land Transportation Co. v. CIR (102 Phil. 439) and
a rmed in the case of Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) v. Feati University , G.R. No.
L-31503, August 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 395). LibLex
3. that the union did not violate the no-strike/no lock-out clause, considering
that the prohibition applies to economic strikes, pursuant to Philippine Metal Foundries
v. CIR , G.R. No. L-34948-49, May 15, 1979, 90 SCRA 135. UFE, it is claimed, premised
their strike on a violation of the labor standard laws or non-payment of holiday pay,
which is, in effect, a violation of the CBA.
4. on the commission of illegal and prohibited acts which automatically
rendered the strike illegal, UFE claimed that there were no ndings of speci c acts and
identi es of those participating as to render them liable ( ESSO Phils. v. Malayang
Manggagawa sa ESSO, G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 72; Shell Oil
Workers Union v. CIR , G.R. No. L-28607, February 12, 1972, 43 SCRA 224). By holding
the o cers liable for the illegal acts of coercion, or denial of free ingress and egress,
without specifying and nding out their speci c participation therein, the Labor Arbiter
resorted to the principle of vicarious liability which has since been discarded in the case
of Benguet Consolidated v. CIR, G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 465.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition failed to show that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in its a rmance of the decisions of the Labor
Arbiters a quo.
At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with
national interests, or to certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that
Arts. 263 and 264 are based on the 1973 Constitution, speci cally Sec. 9 of Art. II
thereof, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Sec. 9. . . . The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." (p. 801, Rollo)
UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the
1987 Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now "unconstitutional
and must be ignored."
We are not persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary,
both provisions are still applicable.
We quote:
"Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that:
'Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or
practice to the contrary.
xxx xxx xxx'
"In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be
considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is no
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showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover,
no court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution.
"On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of
the Labor Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the
Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise known as
Herrera Law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263
of the Labor Code.
"At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have
been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been de ned
as the power inherent in a Government to enact laws, within constitutional limits,
to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People
vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of
eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government
and does not need to be expressly conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is
submitted that the argument of petitioners that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the
Labor Code do not have any constitutional foundation is legally inconsequential."
(pp. 801-803, Rollo)
On the issue of the legality of the strike committed, UFE seeks to absolve itself
by pointing out qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of ndings on
speci c participation and/or liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic
strikes.
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the
settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certi cation orders are
executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during
the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given
to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor
disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this
authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certi cation order is
issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor
practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. Thus, the NLRC in its
decision, re-emphasized the nature of a return-to-work order within the context of Art.
264(g) as amended by BP Nos. 130 and 227:
"xxx xxx xxx
"One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is
issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not
correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the
status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who
contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to work to their work and
cause a standstill on the company operations while retaining the positions they
refuse to discharge or allow the management to ll. Worse, they will also claim
payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed
although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's interest.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, in the cases of Sarmiento v. Judge Tuico , (G.R. No. 75271-73; Asian
Transmission Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R. 77567, 27
June 88, 162 SCRA 676). We stated:
"The return to work order does not so much confer a right as it imposes a duty;
and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even
against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of
option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job
together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed
and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest."prcd
We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certi cation order of the
Secretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers,
whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus,
the striking workers erred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a
return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is clear. Once an assumption/certi cation order is
issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall
immediately return to work.
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certi cation order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended
(Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC , G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989; 178 SCRA
482). The Union o cers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
The NLRC also gave the following reasons:
1. The strike was staged in violation of the existing CBA provisions on "No
Strike/No Lockout Clause" stating that a strike, which is in violation of the terms
of the collective bargaining statement, is illegal, especially when such terms
provide for conclusive arbitration clause (Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., 91
Phil. 72; Phil. Airlines vs. PAL Employees Association, L-8197, October 31, 1958).
The main purpose of such an agreement is to prevent a strike and it must,
therefore, be adhered to strictly and respected if their ends are to be achieved (pp.
397-398, Rollo)
2. Instead of exhausting all the steps provided for in the grievance machinery
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute
amicably and harmoniously within the plant level, UFE went on strike (p. 398,
Rollo)
3. The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7-day strike and
after submission of the report of strike vote at Nestle's Makati O ces and
Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plants were not complied with (NLRC-NCR-124007-85 &
NCR-1-295-86), while no notice of strike was led by respondents when they
staged the strike at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant (RABX-2-0047-86) contrary to
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the pertinent provision of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, emphasizing
that "the mandatory character of these cooling-off periods has already been
categorically ruled upon by the Supreme Court" (National Federation of Sugar
Workers (NFSW) vs. Ovejera, et al., 114 SCRA 354) (p. 402, Rollo) llcd
Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the
corresponding dismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen
disregard of successive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto
Sanchez and Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30,
1986 and February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of
the Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor
and Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264),
providing in part as follows:
"ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. —
xxx xxx xxx
On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clari ed
that the question on the legality of strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter,
not only because the question is perfectly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue was not subsumed by the
Order of Labor Minister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the Notice of
Strike dated December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further clarifying that the
issue of whether or not the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its
o cials and members was illegal is a prejudicial question to the issue of whether or
not the complainants were illegally dismissed. We shall not belabor the issue any
further. cdll