SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 8776. March 23, 2015.]

ANTONINA S. SOSA , complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA ,

respondent.

DECISION

BRION , * J : p

Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza ) led on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa ( Ms. Sosa), for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from non-payment
of debt. 1
This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2
On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modi cation the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation. The IBP
resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six (6) months, likewise
ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest. 3
On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution and the records of the case. 4
The Factual Background
Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty- ve thousand
pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They agreed that a
penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall accrue in case of default.
5 HTcADC

To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note
and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00. 6
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to
pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and deferred
the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza's promise that he would later pay. The
check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime
in October 2006; it was "Drawn Against Insu cient Funds." Ms. Sosa then obtained the
services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera ( Atty. Cabrera ), to legally address Atty.
Mendoza's failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter 7 to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the
demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry Return
Receipt. 8 Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to
pay.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa led the complaint
for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on the
complaint in a Resolution dated January 10, 2011. 9 He led an Urgent Motion for
Extension on March 18, 2011, 1 0 which this Court granted in a Resolution dated October
19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief Comment on January 10, 2012. 1 1
Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and that it
is a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of the complainant. Atty.
Mendoza did not attach an a davit from Elenita nor any evidence proving that he only
received P100,000.00. 1 2
The Proceedings before the IBP
On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the Notice
of Mandatory Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.
When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty. Cabrera
marked the complainant's documentary exhibits and the mandatory conference was
subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then directed to submit their
respective veri ed position papers, documentary exhibits and/or a davits of their
witnesses, if any, within fifteen (15) days.
In her position paper, 1 3 Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her Complaint-
Affidavit. She argued that Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also civilly.
Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation, 1 4 admitted that (i) he arrived late during the
scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00); (iii) he
was advised by the Hearing O cer to communicate with the complainant's counsel; and
(iv) the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same .
Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express manifestation
he made. 1 5
The IBP Findings
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only
administratively but also civilly. He gave credence to Ms. Sosa's allegations that Atty.
Mendoza failed to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosa's attempts to collect. He also took notice
of Atty. Mendoza's admission that the obligation is valid.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modi cation the ndings of the
Investigating Commissioner. In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP ruled:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner . . . nding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that [the respondent] is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a
just and valid debt, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to Return the amount of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to [the complainant] with legal
interest.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in
his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential quali cation for the admission to and
continued practice of law. 1 6 Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-
professional , indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action. 1 7
Gross misconduct is de ned as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and de nite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." 1 8
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and
implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
We nd it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of
P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing he
received P500,000.00. 1 9 Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that
he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later
also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount. 2 0
Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon
maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the
postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza's request, and based on his promises that he would
pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check — when
finally deposited — was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with
the IBP Investigating O cer. 2 1 He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or
her counsel because he arrived late.
We nd Atty. Mendoza's excuse to be imsy. It could have been very easy for him to
deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa
wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his obligation because of
his manifestation that he already had the money. 2 2
It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa's request for settlement
after claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying he had the money,
or had no intention of paying in the rst place. Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the
IBP Investigating O cer when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to
pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all these
years.
In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez 2 3 this Court sitting en banc held:
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 gross misconduct , for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
pro ciency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations . They must conduct themselves in a manner that re ects
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis supplied.]

Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his
obligation, 2 4 Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his admission of
a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire nancial condition does
not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico. 2 5
We also reiterate that —
[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral
quali cation for bar membership is more important than truthfulness
and candor . To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the con dence of the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between

respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be
removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties , showing him to be un t for the o ce and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. 2 6 [Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted.]

The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza's failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his
personal integrity but his profession as well. 2 7
To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza's act of interjecting
imsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and
just debt. 2 8
While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with
its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus
legal interest.
We take exception to the IBP's order to pay only because the case before us is
solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for
collection of a sum of money . The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases
alone deters us from agreeing with the IBP's order to pay; the administrative complaint
before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a nding of liability, while a civil
action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
p r o c eed ing s involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare . 2 9
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue
acting as an o cer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. 3 0 The
purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 3 1
We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case to
collect an outstanding debt from a lawyer. 3 2 However, in the recent case of Heenan v.
Atty. Espejo, 3 3 this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP's recommendation to
order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant. We said in
this case:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
o cer of the court is still t to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Our only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability. Our
ndings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the
parties may choose to le against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers .
The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still t to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this
Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainant . 3 4 [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]

We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the
Heenan case also did not deny the validity of her loan nor did she proffer any reason for
issuing unfunded checks.
As a nal note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in
her present situation. However, because the matter before us is not a civil action for the
collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding loan. We can only
clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any future civil or criminal action
that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may le against Atty. Mendoza in the future. Our action
likewise is without prejudice to any action we may take that is not based on the violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, ** and Leonen, JJ., concur.\

Footnotes

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 * Designated as Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1955 dated March 23, 2015.

** Designated as Acting Member vice Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No.
1956 dated March 23, 2015.
1. Rollo, pp. 1-3.

2. Id. at 54.
3. Id., unpaged.

4. Id., unpaged.

5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 4-9.
7. Id. at 7-8.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 11.

10. Id. at 21.

11. Id. at 45-46.
12. Id.
13. Records of the case (CBD No. 12-3468), pp. 4-11; rollo unpaged.

14. Id. at 23-24; rollo unpaged.

15. Id. at 26-28; rollo unpaged.
16. Tomlin II v. Atty. Moya II, 518 Phil. 325 (2006).
17. Grande v. Atty. de Silva, 455 Phil. 1 (2003).
18. Santos, Sr. v. Atty. Beltran, 463 Phil. 372 (2003), citing Spouses Whitson v. Atienza, 457
Phil. 11 (2003).
19. Rollo, pp. 4-6.

20. Records of the case (CBD No. 12-3468), p. 23; rollo unpaged.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 650 Phil. 225, 230 (2010). See also Lao v. Atty. Medel, 453 Phil. 115 (2003).
24. Rollo, p. 45.

25. Supra note 23.

26. Constantino v. Atty. Saludares, A.C. No. 2029, December 7, 1993, 228 SCRA 233.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Tajan v. Cusi, 156 Phil. 128, 134 (1978).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 30. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Liangco, A.C. No. 5355, December 13, 2011, 662
SCRA 103.
31. Anacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA 352, 355.

32. Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro, 480 Phil. 661 (2004) and Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez, supra
note 23.
33. A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 290.

34. Id. at 301.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com