TORTS Preliminary Considerations

1. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santismo Rosario de G.R. No. L-3756,

Filipinas v. National Coconut Corporation
Date: June 30, 1952

Ponente: LABRADOR, J.

Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santismo Rosario de Filipinas, National Coconut Corporation,
plaintiff and appellee defendant and appellant

DOCTRINE: The occupant's obligation to pay rentals, like any other obligation, must arise from law,
contract, quasi-contract, crime, or negligence (article 1089, Spanish Civil Code). If an occupant took
possession of the property with the permission of the Alien Property Custodian, without any express or
implied agreement between them that rentals would be paid for the use and occupation of the enemy
property, none may be recovered by the pre-war owner.

FACTS:

The land in question belongs to Sagrada Orden in whose name the title was registered before the war. During the
Japanese military occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho.
After liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the USA took possession, control and custody of the property
pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act. The property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company
under a custodian agreement with US Alien Property Custodian. When it vacated the property, it was occupied by
defendant National Coconut Corporation. The plaintiff made a claim to the said property before the Alien Property
Custodian. However, the same was denied.

It bought an action in court which resulted to the cancellation of the title issued in the name of Taiwan Tekkosho
which was executed under threats, duress and intimidation; reissuance of the title in favor of the plaintiff; cancellation
of the claims, rights, title, interest of the Alien property Custodian; and occupant National Coconut Corporation’s
ejection from the property. A right was also vested to the plaintiff to recover from the defendants rentals for its
occupation of the land from the date it vacated. Defendant contests the rentals on the defense that it occupied the
property in good faith and under no obligation to pay rentals.

LOWER COURT: Declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese purchaser was void
ab initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired any right to the property, but that it held the same in
trust until the determination as to whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen. The court further declares that
defendant can not claim any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien Property Administration, and that as
defendant has used the property and had subleased portion thereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its
occupation.

ISSUE/S:

WON the defendant-appellant may be compelled to pay rentals

RULING:

No.

A party allowed by the United States Alien Property Custodian to occupy and use the enemy property is not liable
to pay rentals therefor to the pre-war owner prior to the annulment of the enemy's title to the property even when
the enemy acquired it by duress, because there was no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property
Custodian and the enemy owner, the former's title being based, by legal provision, on the right to seize enemy
property. The occupant's obligation to pay rentals, like any other obligation, must arise from law, contract, quasi-
contract, crime, or negligence (article 1089, Spanish Civil Code). If an occupant took possession of the property
with the permission of the Alien Property Custodian, without any express or implied agreement between them that
rentals would be paid for the use and occupation of the enemy property, none may be recovered by the pre-war
owner. As to the rentals collected by said occupant from its lessee, the same should accrue to it, as a possessor in
good faith.

Defendant appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with the
permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the Alien Property Administration.
Neither was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien
Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff
appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be
held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The
Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of
the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act of
the United States, 40 Stat, 411; 50 U. S. C. A., 189). Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee
herein, but a trustee of the Government of the United States (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 249; 50 U. S, C. A., 283), in its own
right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. (Youghiogheny ci Ohio Coal Co. vs.
Lasevich [1920], 179 N. W., 855; 171 Wis., 347; 50 U. S. C. A., 282-283.) From August, 1946, when defendant-
appellant took possession, to the date of the judgment on February 28, 1948, the Alien Property Administration had
the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it
by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. (U. S. vs. Chemical Foundation [C. C. A. Del. 1925], 5
F. [2d], 191; 50 U. S. C, A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property
Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the old owner, but to the
United States Government.

AGBUYA, DENISE FRANCHESCA R.

TORTS Concept of Torts

2. Naguiat v. NLRC GR No. 116123

Date: March 13, 1997

Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Sergio Naguiat, doing business under name and style Sergio F. Naguiat NLRC, National Organization of
ENT., Inc. and Clark Field Taxi, Inc., petitioner Workingmen and its members,
Leonardo Galang, et al.,, respondents

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence is wanting as to the de finite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a
breach of a legal duty.

FACTS:

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat
was its vice-president. It was a family-owned corporation. Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI
as taxicab drivers. During their employment, they were required to pay a daily "boundary fee" of US$26.50 for those
working from 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight. All
incidental expenses for the maintenance of the vehicles they were driving were accounted against them, including
gasoline expenses.The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the availability of taxicabs.

Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, the AAFES was dissolved, and individual
respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"),
through its local president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits which they
arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of service as severance
pay. Most of the drivers accepted but individual respondents refused to accept.

Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through the National
Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint
against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air
Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Paci c Region, and AAFES Taxi
Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-
out. Said complaint was later amended to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants,
and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.

LA: The labor arbiter, nding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay
them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration”.

NLRC: NLRC modi fied the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the private respondents.

Motionfor reconsideration of petitioners was denied by the NLRC. Hence, the petition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is corporate tort.

RULING

Yes.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled
their employment. It appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who
was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate
business. They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director of Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. Hence, Naguiat
Enterprises as a separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business. Sergio F. Naguiat,
admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C.
Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly
and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.

Jurisprudence is wanting as to the de finite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of
a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283 of
the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the
condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law- imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held personally
liable.

Court found no application to the rule that a corporate officer cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in
the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice. In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held
solidarily liable for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a
close corporation.

Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of "general manager" as well, it
had not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his participation
in the management or operation of the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for
the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.

Aguilar, Kyra Rose U.

TORTS CONCEPT OF TORTS

3. Title: BAKSH v. CA GR No. 97336

Date: 19 Feb 1993

Ponente: Davide

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner MARILOU GONZALES, respondents

DOCTRINE: While the existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong,
the New Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. In
between intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, which are governed by the RPC and
negligent acts or omissions which are governed by Article 2176 of the NCC is a vacuum of injurious acts
which could’ve been beyond redress. As such for its purpose, Article 21 has been intended to fill in such
vacuum and cover such injurious acts.

FACTS:

Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner Baksh for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleged in said complaint that:
- she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation;
- petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
- the petitioner courted and proposed to marry her and that she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married, in which they agreed to get married after the end of the school semester;
- petitioner then visited the Gonzales’ parents to secure their approval to the marriage;
- the petitioner forced her to live with him;
- she was a virgin before she began living with him;
- a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change and that
he maltreated and threatened to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
- during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to
someone living in Bacolod City.
Gonzales then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that:

- he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with Gonzales;
- he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment;
- he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport;
- and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
In his Counterclaim, petitioner insists that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.

RTC RULING: The trial court in applying Article 21 of the New Civil Code favored respondent Gonzales.
CA RULING: On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.

ISSUE/S:

WON Article 21 of the New Civil Code should apply. – YES

RULING:

YES.
While the existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong, the New Civil Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.

In between intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, which are governed by the RPC and negligent
acts or omissions which are governed by Article 2176 of the NCC is a vacuum of injurious acts which could’ve been
beyond redress. As such for its purpose, Article 21 has been intended to fill in such vacuum and cover such injurious
acts. It is postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts.

Indeed, where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress and that there is proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, the award of damages could be justified pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the case, private respondent Gonzales surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. As such, she may seek redress under Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.

Note: The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, Gonzales may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions (Barksh is soon to become a doctor), she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner.

[ALIGA, KELVIN JHONES]

TORTS Concept of Torts

4. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. First Farmers Milling GR No. L-29041

Co., Inc.
Date: March 24, 1981

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J

BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC, petitioner FIRST FARMERS MILLING CO., INC.,
etc.; RAMON NOLAN, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Sugar Quota
Administration, ET AL., defendants,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and
NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents

DOCTRINE: Liability for a tort does not arise from a lawful act.

FACTS

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc commenced, an action for Injunction and Prohibition with Damages against First
Farmers Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC), various named planters, and Ramon Nolan in his capacity as Administrator of the
Sugar Quota Administration. The complaint alleged that the defendants transferred their sugar quota allotments
and are actually milling their sugar to their co-defendant FFMC, the illegal transfer of which has been made over
the vigorous protest and objections of the plaintiff, but with the illegal approval of their co-defendant the Sugar Quota
Administration.

The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to admit amended supplemental complaint, which seeks to include as new
defendants the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC)
as they have become creditors of defendant FFMC prior to the institution of the case. It was alleged that NIDC and
PNB extended loans in the amount of P12,210,000 and P4,000,000 to the sugar mill to assist in illegal creation and
operation of the mill, hence a tortfeasor in trespass of plaintiff’s rights. PNB and NIDC contend that they extended
the loans in the ordinary course of business as authorized by their charters, hence they did not commit any tortious
action against the plaintiffs.

RTC RULING: The trial Court dismissed the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the PNB and the NIDC
after a preliminary hearing on the ground of lack of cause of action.

ISSUE/S

WON – NIDC and PNB are joint tortfeasors in the trespass of plaintiff’s rights by extending loans to the allegedly
illegally operating mill.

RULING:
NO.
Nowhere is it alleged that defendants-appellees had notice, information or knowledge of any flaw, much less any
illegality, in their codefendants' actuations, assuming that there was such a flaw or illegality. Although it is averred
that the PNB and NIDC’S acts were done in bad faith, the Complaint does not contain any averment of facts showing
that the acts were done in the manner alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any right or cause of
action on the part of the plaintiff. PNB and NIDC came into the picture in the ordinary and usual course of its business
after the borrowing entity had established itself as capable of being treated as new milling district (FFMC is officially
designated as Mill District No. 49) because it could already operate and had its array of adhering planters. “The
doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful will not render one liable as for a tort, simply because the unintended
effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a wrong”, assuming that there was such
a wrong.

[ Alba, Sean Adrielle Kyle]

TORTS Concept

5. Cinco vs. Canonoy GR No. L-33171

Date: May 31, 1979

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding

Judge of the Third Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, HON.
LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of
Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and
CARLOS PEPITO, respondents

DOCTRINE: The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage
to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property
injuries.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu for the recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven and operated by private respondents Hilot and
Pepito respectively. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Hilot, arising from the same
accident.

At the pre-trial in the civil case, the private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111 of Sec. 3(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides that “After a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising therefrom can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.”

CITY COURT RULING: ordered the suspension of the civil case.

CFI RULING: ruled that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the suspension of the civil
case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal
action – YES

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code
is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries
to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation"
for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.

In the instant case, the plaintiff made essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence
in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered
and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended,
among others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense
peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict, such action is principally predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New
Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case
may proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Art. 2177.

Alvaro, James Karl Daniel B.

TORTS a. Concept & Requisites

6. Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano v. Reginald Hill and GR No. L-24803
Marvin Hill
Date: May 26, 1977

Ponente: Barredo, J

Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as Ascendants of Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill,
Agapito Elcano, petitioner as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, respondents

DOCTRINE: Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law

FACTS

Petitioners filed a criminal action against the minor respondent for the killing of Agapito’s son in the CFI. After due
trial, the minor responden was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake”. Petitioners then filed in the CFI for recovery of damages from respondent Marvin Hill, father
of minor respondent. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the civil complaint is barred by the
prior judgement, and that the petitioner had no cause of action against him because he was relieved as guardian of
the minor respondent through emancipation by marriage.

CFI RULING: The CFI granted the motion of respondent and found it to be meritorious and well-founded and
dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

I. WON the civil action for recovery of damages is barred by res judicata
II. WON respondent is absolved from liability due to the minor respondents emancipation

RULING

I. NO.
Criminal negligence, which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, can be proved by preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under the Civil Code.
Art. 2177 of the NCC provides that, responsibility for fault or negligence of quasi-delicts is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from the negligence under the Penal Code. According to the Code Commission,
Art. 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on a reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a
bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

Art. 2176 of the NCC, where it refers to “fault or negligence covers only acts not punishable by law” (THIS IS NO
LONGER FOUND IN ART. 2176) but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the tow.

II. NO. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, it is however, also clear that pursuant
to Art. 399 (NOW Art. 236(3) of the FC), emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Now,
under Art. 2180, the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

[Aquino,Gem Edward]
TORTS Quasi-Delicts: Concept and Requisites

7. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco GR No. 165732

Date: December 14, 2006

Ponente: Austria- Martinez, J.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,
petitioner VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO,
VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN
LAURIZ TANGCO, respondents

DOCTRINE: An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony,
e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33
of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal
case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from crime.The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not
an act or omission punishable by law.

FACTS:

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag
to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo. Respondents reserved their right to file
a separate civil action in the said criminal case.

The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was
affirmed with modification as to the penalty

Meanwhile, respondents filed with RTC a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's
negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages
and attorney's fees.

RTC: RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants
Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense.
It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting
incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled
that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary
care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly. Thus, Safeguard as
employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo.

CA: It affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.’s civil liability in this
case is only subsidiary. In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions
are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability
arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE/S

1. Whether or not Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline

2. Whether or not the provision in Art 2180 in relation to Art 2176 is applicable in this case.

3. Whether or not the petitioner should be held solidary liable for the damages.

RULING

1. Yes. Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank
and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence
in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that
Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bankmanning the entrance door.

2. Yes.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but
one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
punishable by law.

3. No. The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification that the civil liability of petitioner is
solidary and primary under art 2180 of the Civil Code.

[Ayunayun, Kriscel S.]

TORTS Quasi-Delicts: Concept and Requirements

8. INIEGO v. PURGANAN GR No. 166876

Date: 24 March 2006

Ponente: Chico-Nazario

ARTEMIO INIEGO, petitioner The HONORABLE JUDGE

GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, in his
official capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
42, City of Manila, and FOKKER C.
SANTOS, respondents

DOCTRINE: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the
recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The
damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by
the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal
relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the
complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES."

FACTS:

A vehicular accident happened when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney
which private respondent was driving at the time of the accident. As a result, private respondent Fokker Santos filed
a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident,
and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint prays for
actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary
damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount
of damages being claimed is P490,000.00.

Petitioner filed a Motion Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the cause of action as claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than
the fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.
According to the petitioner, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at bar are
not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent act. However, the motion was denied. According
to respondent Judge, the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, is not capable of pecuniary estimation and not the
amount of damage prayed for. From this, respondent Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-delicts
cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent
Judge in this respect. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not an action based on quasi-delict is not capable of pecuniary estimation.

(2) Whether or not only the exemplary and moral damages shall be included in the computation for damages to
determine jurisdiction.
RULING:

(1) NO. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum
of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of
pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would
depend on the amount of the claim.

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money
for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions
represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be
recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a
consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually
bears the caption "for DAMAGES."

(2) YES. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the
same or from different causes of action. The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in
a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the
damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence
of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision
are the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a cause of
action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still
proper. All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of
whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d)
of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Hence, RTC has jurisdiction.

Bautista, Mark Jorrel N.

TORTS Concept and Requisites

9. JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR. VS. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, GR No. 160283
INC.
Date: October 14, 2005

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., petitioner IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC.,

respondents

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit.

The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

FACTS

Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by Chan and is bounded on the south by the Chapel of INC. The gasoline
station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of
Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as
the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of
Agreement

Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that
the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was
affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. A complaint was filed
against the petitioner.

RTC RULING: After four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated its Decision holding that the diggings
were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find
hidden treasure.

CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the RTC, and modified the awarded damages.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for quasi-delict.

RULING

YES.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Based on this provision of law, the
requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to
the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of
the chapel. The excavation on respondent's premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.

For the damage caused to the respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily,
the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

Disalo, Al-Noor Majeed B.

TORTS Quasi Delicts - Concepts and Requisites

10. FGU Insurance Corporation v. CA GR No. 118889

Date: 23 March 1998

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR

TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE
INSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondents

DOCTRINE: To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

FACTS

This case involves a collision of two cars at dawn, along EDSA. One car is owned by Lydia F. Soriano and driven
by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car is owned by FILCAR Transport, Inc. and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen,
as lessee.

Consequently, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation paid Soriano an amount in accordance with their insurance
contract. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance Corporation as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address; in
fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.

RTC RULING: The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.

CA RULING: The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for a sum
of money based on quasi-delict. In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents FILCAR and Fortune are liable
on the strength of a SC ruling that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons
although the vehicle is leased to another.

ISSUE/S

WON an action based on quasi-delict may prosper against a rent-a-car company for damages suffered by a third
party, and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?

RULING

NO. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . ."

To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR,
because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It
should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that
Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was in the center lane. It is plain that the
negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his
personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides: “The obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx”

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 of the Civil Code arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of the
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise
due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Respondent
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such,
there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being the employer of the latter.

Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver,
if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . If the
owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." The provision of Art. 2184 of
the Civil Code is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between
respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.

[Endona, Gabrielle Anne S.]

TORTS Quasi-Delicts

11. Vergara v. Court of Appeals GR No. 77679

Date: September 30, 1987

Ponente:

VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
AMADEO AZARCON, , respondents

DOCTRINE: When an employee causes damage, the law has a disputable presumption that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage

FACTS

An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent against
petitioner The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence
of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.

Vergara’s argument: His driver Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that
the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his
brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff

Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said
cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant
insurance company.

RTC RULING: The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.

CA RULING: The CA confirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the petitioner can be held guilty of fault or negligence.

RULING:

YES.
It is undisputed that the private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner.The
issue of whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon
by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now
disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the police report
and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding
circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road
going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a
tricycle; and then another tricycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store-warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be considered as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defeats were curable and the accident preventable. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to
adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and
supervision of his driver.

[Garcia, May ]
TORTS Quasi Delicts - Concepts and Requisites

12. American Express International, Inc. v. Cordero GR No. 138550

Date: 14 October 2005

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC, petitioner NOEL CORDERO , respondents

DOCTRINE:

1. In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. A liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. When an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delict, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort.
2. The fault or negligence must be the proximate cause. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, it was Cordero's negligence that led
to his credit card being damaged. Nature of the case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

FACTS

American Express International is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards used to purchase goods and
services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was
issued an American Express charge card. The latter was also issued an extension charge card which he also
signed. Respondent and his family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. They went to the Watson’s
Chemist Shop and there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and used his American Express extension charge card
to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed him that she had to confiscate the card. She
cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. Respondent claimed this caused him
embarrassment and humiliation. Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.

The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for
the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of
unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the
holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved.
Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court against petitioner prayer for the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered.

RTC RULING: The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Noel and held that American Express should have informed
respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar
number to that of respondent’s card and that inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the “confiscation
and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which the petitioner
should be held liable.
CA RULING: Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification in the amount
of damages

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the public humiliation allegedly suffered by Cordero can be attributed to Amex

RULING:

NO.
As explained by the respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson
that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had the respondent talked to the
representative of Amex, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card.
Respondent refused to talk to the Amex representative as evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Johnny Chen during
the deposition in Hong Kong. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to Amex. If at
all, the cause of the respondent's humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to Amex representative.

To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by
the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is
determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent

Furthermore, pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed by the respondent, Amex can revoke
respondents card without notice, as was done in the present case. The subject card would not have been
confiscated and cut had the respondent talked to the petitioner's representative and identified himself as the genuine
cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of Amex. Therefore, the public
humiliation allegedly suffered by Cordero cannot be attributed to Amex

Jose, Janine R.
TORTS QUASI-DELICTS - CONCEPTS AND REQUISITES

13. CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INT’L INC. V. ABEJAR GR No. 170631

Date: FEBRUARY 10, 2016

Ponente: LEONEN, J.

CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, respondents

DOCTRINE: It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Art. 2176
and 2180, CC. Art. 2180 "should defer to" the registered-owner rule. The appropriate approach is that in
cases where both the registered-owner rule and Art. 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves
ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been proven. As
a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Art. 2180 has
arisen.

FACTS

Jesmariane Reyes was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita St., United Parañaque Subdivision IV
when a van on the opposite lane, found to have been owned by petitioner Caravan, swerved to its left and hit Reyes.
Alex Espinosa, a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the
driver, Jimmy Bautista to bring Reyes to the hospital, instead, the latter left the van parked inside a nearby
subdivision with Reyes still in the van. An unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.

Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died 2 days after
the accident. Respondent Ermilinda Abejar, Reyes’ paternal aunt who raised her since she was 9 years old, filed
before RTC Parañaque a complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged
that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
Summons could not be served on Bautista, hence, Abejar moved to drop him as defendant, which RTC granted.

Petitioner contention: Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista, the driver, acted
"within the scope of his assigned tasks" when the accident occurred. According to Caravan, Bautista's tasks only
pertained to the transport of company personnel or products, and when the accident occurred, he had not been
transporting personnel or delivering products for the company. Caravan also argues that "it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees." Caravan further claims that Abejar
should not have been awarded moral damages, actual damages, death indemnity, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Lastly, Caravan argues that it should not be held solidarily liable with Bautista since Bautista was
already dropped as a party.

Respondent contention: Caravan failed to provide proof that it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and
supervision of Bautista. She adds that the CA’s ruling that Caravan is solidarily liable with Bautista for moral
damages, exemplary damages, civil indemnity ex delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld. Abejar also argues
that since Caravan is the registered owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and solidarily liable for the tortious acts
of its driver.

RTC RULING: Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar.

CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification (reduced the award of moral damages)

ISSUE/S:

WON petitioner Caravan should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Art. 2180, CC
RULING:

YES, CARAVAN IS LIABLE AS EMPLOYER UNDER ART. 2180, CC.

Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict provided in Art. 2180, in relation to
Art. 2176, CC. Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to respondent's cause that she herself did not adduce
proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was the
registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.

The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Art. 2180's specification that "employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees…acting within the scope of their assigned tasks." Second, the operation
of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
vehicles. Art. 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the
registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the
vehicle. The registered-owner rule was necessary not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership
in vehicles is transferred, but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway. Its main aim
is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Art. 2176 and 2180, CC. Art.
2180 "should defer to" the registered-owner rule. The appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Art. 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner
of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption
that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to show that no liability under Art. 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is
concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to
uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in
relation to that employment. The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.

Consistent with the rule just stated, a presumption that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been satisfied arises. It
is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Art. 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of
any of the following: first, it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, Bautista acted outside the scope
of his assigned tasks; or third, it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Bautista. On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident. On the
second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the
time of the accident. On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the
selection and supervision of Bautista. Bautista was employed despite his submission of a non-professional driver’s
license. Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate another's motor vehicle violates
Sec. 24, Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when
it selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of law. To prove that it exercised the
required diligence in supervising Bautista, petitioner presented copies of several memoranda and company rules.
These, however, are insufficient because petitioner failed to prove actual compliance. The issuance of company
policies must be coupled with proof of compliance. For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of
Art. 2180 have been satisfied, Caravan must be held liable.

Landas, Marie Bjorn

TORTS Concepts and Requisites

14. St. Martin Polyclinic v. LWV Construction Corporation GR No. 217426

Date: Dec 4, 2017

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe J.

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., Petitioner LWV CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION, Respondent.

DOCTRINE: Even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested
positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same medical state at the
time petitioner issued the Medical Report. In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon respondent to
show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was issued, may it be through
evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully observed or that there were already
palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case
when respondent only proffered evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report
was issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as
such, was no longer "fit for employment".

FACTS:

Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia.On the other
hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association
(GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas
employment
Respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to petitioner for a pre-deployment
medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. After undergoing the required examinations,
petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report
Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the
amount of P84,373.41.Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General
Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary), he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis
C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of
Raguindin. However, the results of the re-examination remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV. An
undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report13 likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding,
thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.
Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for employment"
when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint for
sum of money and damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent essentially averred
that it relied on petitioner's declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus, respondent prayed for the
award of damages in the amount of P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred in deploying Raguindin

METC RULING: MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the amount of
P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

RTC RULING: affirmed the MeTC

CA RULING: affirmed RTC, but deleting the actual damages and awarding temperate damages instead
ISSUE/S

WON petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical report declaring Raguindin “fit for employment” hence should
be liable for damages – NO

RULING

NO
An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which defines a quasi-delict: Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance
or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5)
no pre-existing contractual relation.

As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of action under
quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of damages.

In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis
for which damages may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent
mainly avers that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to Raguindin, respondent would not
have processed his documents, deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that
Raguindin was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41.52
Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the
incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 -
instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

As early as the case of Picart v. Smith,the Court elucidated that "the test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence." Corollary thereto, the Court stated that "[t]he question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view
of the facts involved in the particular case.

Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that
private transactions have been fair and regular.In effect, negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven
by him who alleges it. In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.

[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon
[the plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore,
if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has
the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The
quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to establish petitioner's
negligence are: (a) the Certification dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report. However,
these issuances only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own medical
examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General
Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at
least two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even assuming that
Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly
prove that he was already under the same medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January
11, 2008. In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at
the time the Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures
were not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for
deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only proffered evidence which demonstrate that
months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia,
tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".

In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his medical
examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports from the World Health Organization,
HCV or the hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is usually asymptomatic,
and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases. The incubation period for HCV is two (2) weeks to
six (6) months, and following initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms.
Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical examination and
hence, could have possibly contracted the same only when he arrived thereat.

While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the
same could not be construed as a certified guarantee coming from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the
time the report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit for employment) would remain the same up
until that date (i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening period could very well account for a number
of variables that could have led to a change in Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a different
environment in Saudi Arabia. If at all, the expiration date only means that the Medical Report is valid - and as such,
could be submitted - as a formal requirement for overseas employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any
means, create legal basis to hold the issuer accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of
issuance up until expiration. Truly, petitioner could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that
Raguindin's medical status of being fit for employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact that the Medical
Report's expiration date of April 11, 2008 was only seventeen (17) days away from the issuance of the General
Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification finding Raguindin positive for HCV should not - as it does not -
establish petitioner's negligence.

All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible evidence, petitioner
cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as above-discussed.

[Lorenzo, Luigi]
TORTS QUASI-DELICTS - CAUSE OF ACTION

15. L.G. FOODS CORP. vs. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR GR No. 158995

Date: September 26, 2006

Ponente: Garcia, J

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-
and General Manager, petitioner AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS.
FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents

DOCTRINE: An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender

FACTS

Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford
Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer.
Charles died as a result of the accident. an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was led
against the driver in the MTCC of Bacolod City. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused
driver committed suicide. Hence, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.

RTC RULING: The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial.
The said court ruled in favour of the respondent spouses.

CA RULING:The petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA, which the latter denied and upheld the trial court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained
by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

The spouses cause of action is derived from the Civil Code provisions.

The Supreme Court ruled that since nothing in the allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners
are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The spouses’
complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his
insolvency.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act
or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and
culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. If, as here, the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action
chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction
of its employee.

The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not
with the defendant who cannot ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the
defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of
the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for
failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident." Had the respondent
spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged
that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it
is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee
(driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

Loste, Cecil II
TORTS Quasi-Delicts as distinguished from a Crime

16. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People GR No. 147703

Date: 14 April 2004

Ponente: Panganiban, J

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents

DOCTRINE: What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.

FACTS

This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court assailing resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from
the judgment of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed.

On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages to several persons. The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall
be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become final and
executory.

Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule 124 of the rules of court authorizes the dismissal
of appeal when appellant jumps bail. The counsel for the accused hired by rabbit bus lines filed a notice of appeal
which was denied by the trial court.

CA RULING: The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer's
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner, who is not a direct party in the criminal case, be considered as subsidiary or
primary liable?

RULING
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., is only subsidiarily liable.

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, the petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion
-- including the appeal.The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal
action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may, subject to the control of the prosecutor, still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states
that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter's lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

[Malibiran,John Kirby]
TORTS Quasi-delict as Distinguished from Crime

17. MANLICLIC vs. CALAUNAN GR No. 150157

Date: January 25, 2007

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., MODESTO CALAUNAN, respondents
petitioner

DOCTRINE: Acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

FACTS

The vehicles involved are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by respondent Calaunan and driven by Mendoza. Respondent Calaunan
was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep and Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise
bound for Manila from Tarlac. At NLEX Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep. Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil
case.
RTC RULING: in favor of respondent Calaunan
CA RULING: affirmed in all respects RTC ruling
*In the present case, petitioners informed this Court of CA Decision acquitting petitioner of the criminal charge.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not petitioner can still be liable for damages in spite of acquittal in criminal case

RULING

Yes. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the
act complained of. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111 (Rules of Criminal Procedure), refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of. The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.

[Mallari, Juleen Evette dm.]

TORTS Distinguished from a breach of contract

18. FGU Insurance Corporation v. GP Sarmiento Trucking GR No. 141910

Corporation
Date: 6 August 2002

Ponente: VITUG, J.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING

CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES, respondents

DOCTRINE: In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their
personality or their juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet
prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioner’s civil action against the
driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for
damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.

FACTS:

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corp. (GPS) undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one
of its truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., in Alabang, Metro Manila,
to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along
McArthur highway it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to
the cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the
covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company
failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its
driver Lambert Eroles with the RTC.

Respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it
was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was
purely accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of
demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.

RTC RULING: The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

CA RULING: CA rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor of GPS.

It held that the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the law on common carriers is not warranted and
the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of
goods during transport under Art. 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.
ISSUE/S:

WON GPS, either as a common carrier or private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods
it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody and possession. – YES.

RULING

YES. The Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an
exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual
or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.

However, GPS still cannot escape from liability.

In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set
free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may
have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his
"expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as
he would have been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any
benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers
or for society, unless they are made the basis for action.

Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and petitioner’s
assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In
such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation – in this case, the delivery of the goods
in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding
liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed
to do so.

Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered
to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal and
defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into
it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res
inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioner’s
civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would
require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.

Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary
course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. Res
ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from
the nature of the relation of the parties.
Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than those due to defendant’s conduct must first be
eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual)
tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately
attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa aquiliana, while he admittedly
can be said to have been in control and management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally
shown that the accident could have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res
ipsa loquitur to work against him.

[Marco, Vahlery]
TORTS Breach of Contract

19. Calalas v. Court of Appeals GR No. 122039

Date: May 31, 2000

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Vincent Calalas, petitioner Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga

and Francisco Salva,, respondents

DOCTRINE:. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.

FACTS:

At 10 o’clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas.

As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension
seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Her attending physician,
Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and
would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

RTC RULING: The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident.

CA RULING: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi delict, and that the common carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third party complaint against
Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not petitioner Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.

RULING:

Yes.

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena
liable for the damage to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it
is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and became
the duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Now, did the
driver of jeepney carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances” as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an “extension seat” amounted
to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner’s contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.

[Melendres, Patrick]
TORTS Breach of Contract

20. Saluda v. Far Eastern University GR No. 179337

Date: April 30, 2008

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Joseph Saludaga, petitioner Far Eastern University and Edilberto C.

De Jesus in his capacity as President of
FEU, respondents

DOCTRINE: Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their
obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a
safe learning environment, FEU is liable to Salaguda for damages.

FACTS:

Petitioner Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent FEU when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one
of the security guards on duty at the school premises in 1996. Salugada was rushed to FEU-NRMF Hospital due to
the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained the shooting was
accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.

Salugada thereafter filed a complaint for damages against FEU and Edilberto De Jesus, FEU’s president, on the
ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an
atmosphere conducive to learning. FEU, in turn, filed a Third-Party complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by FEU to provide security services within its premises and
Mariano Imperial, Galaxy’s President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of Saluda. On the
other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party complaint against AFP General Insurance.

RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of the petitioner and held FEU and Edilberto De Jeesus to pay solidarily Salugada
P35,298 for actual damages with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral
damages of P300,000; exemplary damages of P500,000; attorney’s fees of P100,000 and cost of the suit;

Galaxy and Imperial to indemnify solidarily 3rd party plaintiffs, FEU and De Jesus for the above mentioned amounts.

The 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of action.

CA RULING: Reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the shooting incident was a fortuitous event that exempts FEU from liability.

RULING:

NO.

In order to avoid liability, FEU contends that the shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not
have foreseen nor avoided the incident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in
selecting the security services of Galaxy. However, FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised
due diligence in providing a safe environment for their students. They failed to prove that the guards possess the
qualifications and were hired according to the requirements in the Security Service Agreement. There was no proof
as to the clearances, psychiatric tests results and other vital documents contained in their contract with Galaxy.
Total reliance on Galaxy about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards
is negligence on the part of FEU. Furthermore, in order for force majeure to apply, FEU must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. Even if the proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event, it would not exempt from liability a person found to be partly responsible
thereof, either from active intervention, neglect or failure to act.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable
for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, FEU
is liable to Salaguda for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily
proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's
acts.

In the present case, the P35,298 expenses for hospitalization and other medical expenses must have a proper
interest rate of 6% per annum since this involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan of forbearance
of money, such interest shall run from the time of the filing of the complaint until this Decision becomes final and
executory, thereafter, the rate shall be 12% per annum until satisfaction.

As to the transportation expenses and hiring of a personal assistant, it was not supported by receipts, hence eno
actual damages may be awarded, nonetheless, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be
claimed since Salugado suffered some pecuniary loss. Hence the amount of P20,000 as temperate damages be
awarded.

As to award of moral damages, it is clear that Salugado suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety and moral shock resulting from the shooting which justify the award of damages, however, moral damages
are awarded to compensate actual injury suffered and not designed to impose penalty for the wrongdoer, hence the
award of P100,000 of moral damages.

As to the award of exemplary damages, the same must be deleted considering absence of proof that the act of FEU
is wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent.

As to solidary liability of De Jesus, corporations have personality separate and distinct from those of the person
composing and may only be pierced in certain exemptions which is not present in this case, hence, De Jesus should
not be solidarily liable.

Montellano, Joseph Andrew

TORTS Quasi-Delicts: As Distinguished from a Breach of Contract

21. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. GR No. 180440

Date: 5 December 2012

Ponente: PEREZ, J.

DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, petitioner PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT

THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And FIRST
LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents

DOCTRINE: This Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict
(culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive
and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of "good
father of a family" is a
complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach
of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees. In
quasi- delict , there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the
negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of
contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the
burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the
contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.

FACTS

Delia, a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the
hotel’s swimming pool facility. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant informed them that the
swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two subsequently proceeded to take a shower and dress up.
However, they got locked up in the swimming pool area.

Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for a house phone. While
slowly walking towards the phone, a folding wooden counter top fell on petitioner’s head that knocked her down
almost unconscious. Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel telephone operator of the
incident. It took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the door was finally opened, three hotel
chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some ointment on her head. Dr. Dalumpines
approached petitioner and introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead of immediately providing the
needed medical assistance, she presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the
hotel management will not render her any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.

Petitioner decided to consult several doctors about her condition. Her x-rays, MRI scans and EEG show that she
has a permanent serious brain injury. By the reason of the unfortunate incident, petitioner also started to feel losing
her memory, which greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. Thus, she demanded
payment of an amount not less than P100,000,000.00 representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span. But,
petitioner’s demand was unheeded. Through the years, all the doctors that she consulted said that her condition all
rooted from the incident.
According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted on the glass door of the hotel leading
to the swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open
only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. When asked by Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor,
she was fine and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who went at the hotel’s swimming pool area right
after the accident. Having been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a
handwritten certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner
to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also refused further medical attention.

The trial court ruled that Huang’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of her injury, she cannot
recover damages. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Huang contended that an implied contract existed between them
since the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its service sits patrons and invitees. It follows then that
all those who patronize the hotel and its facilities, including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like
her, are generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, Dusit Hotel is responsible by implied contract for the
safety and welfare of Huang while the latter was inside their premises by exercising due care, which they failed to
do. She argues that a person who goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or hematoma and comes out of it with a "bukol"
or hematoma is clear case of res ipsa loquitur.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not respondents are liable for the injury sustained by the petitioner based on the theory of quasi-delict.

RULING

NO. It is evident from petitioner’s Complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance was on the alleged
tortious acts committed against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their management and staff. It is now
too late in the day to raise the said argument for the first time before this Court.

This Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and
breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in
breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-
existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper
defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a
complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees. In quasi- delict , there is no
presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant,
otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as
it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was
no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.

As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the
following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly established as
it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides
that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action
or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. The aforementioned
circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner
was due to her own negligence.

[Palomar, Andrei Anne U.]

TORTS Quasi Delicts - As Distinguished from a Breach of Contract

22. Air France v Carrascoso GR No. L-21438

Date: September 28, 1966

Ponente:

Air France, , petitioner RAFAEL CARRASCOSO, respondents

DOCTRINE: For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that
he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

RTC RULING: The Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in
fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and the costs of suit.

CA RULING: On appeal, the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.

ISSUE/S

WON Carasscoso is entitled to damages– YES

RULING

YES.

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly,
this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For,
"bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of
the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of
the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.

[Paril, Joshua]
TORTS Specific Cases of Liability
(Possessor of Animals)

23. Vestil v. IAC GR No. 74431

Date: 6 November 1989

Ponente: Cruz, J

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioner INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
DAVID UY and TERESITA UY,
respondents

DOCTRINE: Art. 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be
removed from his control. It does not matter, as petitioners contend, that the dog was tame and merely
provoked by Theness into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame
ones as long as they cause injury.

FACTS:

Three-year-old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of petitioners Purita and
Agustin Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, father of Purita, in Cebu. She was rushed to Cebu General
Hospital where she was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered anti-rabies. She
was discharged after 9days, but she was readmitted 1 week later due to vomiting of saliva. The next day on August
15, 1975, the child’s cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Respondents David and Teresita Uy sued petitioners Vestils for damages; alleging that Vestils are liable as
possessors of “Andoy”, the dog that bit Theness. Vestils insisted that the dog belonged to the dead Vicente, and no
one witnessed Andoy bite Theness.

CFI RULING: CFI dismissed the complaint.

IAC Ruling: IAC found that Vestils were in possession of the house and dog and thus should be responsible under
Art. 2183 of NCC for the injuries caused by the dog. IAC thus ordered Vestils to pay damages.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are liable for the death of Theness due to being bitten by petitioners’ dog where the house in
which the dog is kept is not owned by petitioners but are still part of Vicente’s estate.

RULING:

YES.
What must be determined is the possession of the dog that was staying in the house in question regardless of
ownership of the dog or of the house.

Art. 2183 states: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
In Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the
owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to
prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

While Purita is not really the owner of the house which was still part of Vicente Miranda’s estate, there is no doubt
that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident. She was the only heir residing in Cebu
and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only 6km from her own house.

Petitioners argue that even if they were possessors of the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that
she died as a result thereof. But Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, due to the dog bites and
second, broncho-pneumonia, which caused her death, was a complication of rabies. These are as testified by Dr.
Tautjo. Thus, the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been established.

Vestil’s contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is unacceptable. Art. 2183
holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be removed from his control. It does
not matter that, as petitioners contend, that the dog was tame and merely provoked by Theness into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, Theness was only 3 years old and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to
the dog.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or
on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

Porlucas, Nestor Jr
TORTS Quasi delicts as distinguished from contract

24. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. GR No.. 110295
LYDIA GERONIMO
Date: October 18, 1993

Ponente: DAVIDE, Jr.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO

DOCTRINE: The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor

FACTS:

This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a consequence of the big drop
in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. On 7 May
1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. On or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students complained
to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or
particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in
the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she
brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for
examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of Health informing her that the samples she
submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting
in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989;
she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by
it.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the complaint is based on a contract and not on a quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties

RULING:

No.

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon
may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as
defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only
negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

Tuvera, Veronica N.
TORTS Negligence - Concept

25. Tison v. Sps. Pomasin GR No. 173180

Date: August 24, 2011

Ponente: PEREZ, J

ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON , petitioners SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and
CONSORCIA PONCE POMASIN,
DIANNE POMASIN PAGUNSAN,
CYNTHIA POMASIN, SONIA PEROL,
ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA SESISTA,
and REYNALDO SESISTA ,
respondents.

DOCTRINE: To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites must be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:

The parties figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Albay last 2012. Respondent Laarni was
driving the jitney while petitioner Jabon was driving the tractor-trailer.

Respondent’s version: Laarni’s father Gregorio, who was seated at the passenger side, testified that they were on
board the jitney passing through a curve going downward and saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite
direction and encroaching on the jitney’s lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further
causing death and injuries to its passenger.

Petitioner’s version: Jabon noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it
began running in a zigzag manner and headed towards the direction of the tractor-truck. Jabon immediately
swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left
fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.

Some of the passengers of the respondent’s jitney died and were injured while the passengers of the tractor-trailer
suffered injuries.

Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the RTC of Antipolo alleging that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence, and carelessness of petitioners (tractor-
trailer). They prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the accident.

Petitioners, on the other hand, countered that it was Laarni’s negligence which proximately caused the accident.

RTC RULING: Rendered a judgment in favor of petitioners (jitney) dismissing the complaint. Found the testimony
of Jabon (tractor-trailer driver) more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorio’s.

CA RULING:
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon (tractor-trailer)
caused the vehicular collision. In support of such finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gregorio' s testimony
that Jabon was driving the tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney.
ISSUE/S

Who is the negligent party?

RULING

Laarni, the jitney driver.

The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite
conclusion reached by the CA that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision. One reason why
the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as a driver is more focused than
that of a mere passenger. In addition, the declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward
and consistent. The testimony of Gregorio changed from "curving and downward" to “uphill.” On this point, Jabon
and his testimony is more credible. It is this conclusion that gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that
the jitney, "loaded with passengers with top-load, was running in a zigzag manner."

Clearly, the negligence of Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident. According to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites
must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to
the restriction imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. Driving without a proper license is a
violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at
the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, we have held that a causal connection
must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation
of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. In the instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

[Usita Zofia Jill A.]

TORTS Negligence; Concept

26. Gaid v. People, GR No. 171636

Date: 7 April 2009

Ponente: TINGA, J.:

NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

DOCTRINE: Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of
a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.

FACTS

At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road
where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. His
jeepney was filled to seating capacity. At the time several students were coming out of the school premises.
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto
(Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road.8 However,
neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride
at that point.The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which,
he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also
situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard "a strong impact coming from the
jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle."Dayata was then seen lying on the
ground and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the
vehicle tilted to the right side.Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney
to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. Mellalos loaded the victim
on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it
was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was
brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. She testified that the
head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.

MTCT RULING: Found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held
petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point
of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney’s left rear tire jolted causing
the vehicle to tilt towards the right.

RTC RULING: AFFIRMED

CA RULING: AFFIRMED with modification in that it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in
homicide.
ISSUE/S

WON Petitioner was negligent – NO

RULING

NO.

The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to
the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged
down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney.
The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point
when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act. In Pangonorom v. People, a public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed to slow down and hit a
swerving car. He was found negligent by this Court.

In the instant case, the petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses.
Understandably, the petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board the jeep which was then
running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he
heard a strong impact coming from the jeep. With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the
first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial
court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying
to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.

The award of damages must also be deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

[Villa, Genesis Kirby V.]

TORTS NEGLIGENCE - Concept

27. St. Luke’s College of Medicine v. Spouses Perez GR No. 222740

Date: 28 Sept 2016

Ponente: Perez, J.

ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA SPOUSES MANUEL AND

MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND DR. ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO P. ORTIGAS , petitioner ERIC AND JURISITA QUINTOS,
respondents

DOCTRINE: Negligence is "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury."
Elements of simple negligence as follows: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

FACTS

Petitioner St. Luke’s sent four senior medical students, one of which is the respondents’ daughter named Jessa, to
the community clinic in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for their rotating clinical clerkship. During one of the nights during their
clerkship, they bought an alcoholic beverage and consumed the same with soda. At around three in the morning
after the night they drank, one of the medical students was awakened because he heard a fellow medical student
shouting that there was a fire. Some of the medical students, including Jessa, were trapped inside the bathroom
during the fire. Although there were earnest efforts to save them from the fire, Jessa and two other female medical
students died due to smoke inhalation resulting to asphyxia. As a result of the said deaths, St. Luke’s compensated
the parents of the three deceased students. The Bureau of Fire Protection ruled that the fire was purely accidental
in nature due to unattended cooking. Respondent parents had their doubts, causing them to seek the help of the
NBI. The NBI later found out that the construction of the Cabiao community clinic was in violation of the Revised
Fire Code of the Philippines, and that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke’s
negligence is criminal in nature. This prompted respondent parents to file a complaint for damages against the
petitioner claiming that their negligence caused the deaths of respondents' daughters.

RTC RULING: The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic was not
a fire trap as there were two (2) fire exits, and that respondents failed to present any report or finding by a competent
authority that the said Clinic was not a safe and secure place for the conduct of St. Luke's clerkship program. The
RTC did not take into consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not presented.

CARULING: The CA reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the case to the RTC for reception of evidence on
the amount of damages to be awarded. Moreover, the CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its
students against all risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims was within the reach of petitioners and the
hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable. Also, while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their decision to
house their students in a place where there are no means of escape in case of such an emergency shows a blatant
disregard for the students' welfare.

ISSUE/S

WON the petitioner was negligent.

RULING
YES. In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St.
Luke's. In the course description of the clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is stated that
the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation of the clerkship program. As such, petitioner had the
same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was
incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats to
life and limb, and that peace and order was maintained thereat. After all, although away from the main campus of
St. Luke's, the students were still under the same protective and supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones
detailed in the main campus. Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students against
foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao
Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. These precautions could have
minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to
a virtual fire trap. As found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions
of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or
clearances from the appropriate government offices.

[Yoshiy, Yumiko M.]