INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1

Michael Grieves

To what extent has intelligence become reliant on technology

and how does this affect analysis?

Submission Date: 12 DECEMBER 2018

Word Count: 4998

(Excluding title and bibliography)

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 2

Technology has made collection of information safer and more reliable for intelligence

agencies through the use of open source data; continues to become more important in

intelligence analysis (Hulnick, 2002). Today, Big Data, large data sets, can be analysed

computationally to uncover trends and patterns - can be analysed via artificial intelligence (AI)

and used by security and intelligence agencies to make better, more informed decisions. Since

Big Data is freely obtainable, analysing it is very alluring and many agencies such as the “CIA,

NSA and GCHQ have teams devoted to its analysis, research and development” (Grieves, 2018,

p.2). The Chief Technology Officer of the CIA has stated that Big Data is central to extrapolating

key information to inform intelligence agencies on the intentions of adversaries (Hunt, 2018),

suggesting that intelligence is indeed reliant on technology. While it is now common for

organisations to use technology to gather, process, and analyse information in order to make

decisions, the question of how much automated processes and data can be relied upon to make

sound decisions needs to be addressed.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) and social media intelligence (SOCMINT) comprise

of individuals readily providing personal information useful to the intelligence community. AI

aids humans in decision-making processes and replicates some stages of the analytical process.

Although currently unachievable, complete replication of the human intelligence analysis

process and reliance on technology to analyse information and make decisions calls into question

the future role of humans in society. However, at this time human interaction is still required to

understand intelligence, and to make rational, ethical decisions.

Although current literature indicates that collection and analysis of information has

become so fundamentally reliant on technology, it is now regularly utilised without questioning

its reason, importance, or consequences (Resnyansky, 2010), it is however important to evaluate

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the extent of this dependency and how it influences the analysis of intelligence. Big Data can be

considered a valid source of intelligence and will become more significant as technology

advances and improves access to open source intelligence, and allows more specific, and

efficient, analysis of its meaning. However, for even greater success, there is a need for human

intelligence to work alongside technical intelligence (Margolis, 2013).

Big Data

Current literature shows that on-going advances in technology have made it

considerably more accessible and cost-effective for intelligence agencies to use Big Data to

inform their work. This technology has permitted the intelligence community to categorise, sift,

and analyse large volumes of information and data to develop trends and patterns which can be

used to inform operational or strategic processes and decisions (Resnyansky, 2010). This has

altered both the way open source information is viewed by the intelligence community, and how

secret and open source intelligence is handled.

Benes (2013) studied trends in new technologies that impact how intelligence is acquired

and analysed. Three significant trends all demonstrated a different facet of technological change

that has on intelligence: the development of cyberspace; the reshaping of society; impacts on the

way society operates, including the reshaping of information, as people increasingly make public

their private knowledge or information. Benes identified the development of cyberspace as key.

Today, intelligence analysts can speedily extract usable intelligence from huge volumes of raw

data due to information organisations having huge online databases, technology-based analysis

tools, and computational techniques. This enables intelligence agencies to increase the total

amount of data available for analysis. Software now has the ability to merge files, decode digital
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information, and simultaneously analyse data from a wide variety of sources in order to merge

data, and develop a single picture from all the information available (Britz, 1996).

Correspondingly, technology can provide intelligence agencies with the capacity to

analyse indicators and give forewarnings associated with the pursuits of actors and develop a

deep understanding of “the causes and factors that can contribute to the emergence of threatening

actors and, more importantly, … prevent them from occurring” (Resnyansky, 2010, p.7). Due to

an increase in social media being used to coordinate events, open source data can be used to

anticipate terrorist attacks and criminal activity (Ronczkowski, 2017). Sims (2007) also noted

that modern technology, and the ability to rapidly collect and analyse open source data, has made

it easier to track terrorist activities and predict potential threats. Similarly, Sullivan (2005) sees

the importance of focusing on both open source and traditional intelligence, when conducting

counterterrorism intelligence.

Social media platforms provide the intelligence community with the opportunity to

analyse information in real-time, which is particularly useful for tactical and operational

decision-making (Omand, Bartlett, & Miller, 2012). This is possible because those involved in

terrorist plots freely communicate with one another using social media (Weimann, 2012).

Additionally, social media provides a locus to obtain radicalising material, training manuals and

videos (Behr, Reding, Edwards and Gribbon, 2013). Social media delivers direct access to a

global group of like-minded individuals who can connect; and is a forum for them to provide

further instigation and direction to conduct activities. As such, Omand et al. (2012) found that

real-time access to this form of communication provides data that can be analysed in order to

determine who poses the most likely and most time-critical threat.
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Due to the ubiquitous nature of the internet, intelligence agencies use open source

information to not only anticipate national and international security threats, but also to monitor

violent extremist ideologies and views often posted in online platforms by terrorists (Eijkman &

Weggemans, 2013). Research indicates that social media has performed a fundamental function

in jihadists’ operational stratagem, and so it must also be a part of a counter-terrorism approach

to preventing attacks (Klausen, 2014). Although it is difficult to track lone-wolf terrorists and

stop terrorist groups as there is little to no division between extremist dialogue and planning

terrorist action, collecting open source data does allow intelligence agencies to follow the

ideation of hatred, and its growth, and to watch for the point when ideation begins to turn into

action, or the making of terrorist threats, which is a crime.

Human Factors

Though new technologies have had a positive impact on intelligence collection and analysis,

reliance on technology does not come without failures, some of which occur due to a lack of

adequate integration between technology-oriented intelligence and HUMINT (Cochrane &

Monaghan, 2012). HUMINT is covert or secret intelligence gathering by agents or other

specialised information sources. Currently, methods are limited for all-source integration, or

collective production of intelligence products that use information from disparate data sources

(Boury-Brisset, Frini & Lebrun, 2011). Margolis (2013) emphasises the necessity for HUMINT

to work alongside technical intelligence for greater success. Hedley, (2005) and Moran (2010)

also agree that technology needs to be aligned with other intelligence gathering platforms. This

integration would overcome the current shortcomings of using open source data, but the potential

for this is not currently realised. Although essential to sort through data, neither AI nor

specialised software provides a replacement for human decision-making.

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It is imperative that humans continue to design technology to gather data, and to

eliminate erroneous data, to prevent analysts from being misled. Whilst technology provides a

meaningful aid, it does not provide a replacement for human intelligence and analysis.

Technology that is used to collect and analyse Big Data essentially determines what is useful

data, providing a report that can be used by human analysts within the larger operational or

tactical setting, and in alignment with data collected from other sources like HUMINT (Eldridge

Hobbs and Moran, 2017). This however does not mean that the technology to perform this

analysis can be created without human input or used to make decisions without human review.

Miller (2015, p.1) studied the impact of Big Data on the intelligence and security community and

noted that one of the ways to make evaluation of Big Data most useful is by “focusing on the

intelligence requirements or the needs of politicians and commanders.” This requires the

discernment of human interaction, or human understanding of the issue at hand, directing the

technological sorting of information.

As such, the human element is required not only to create programmes that analyse data,

but also to review the analysis, and convert it into decisions. Currently, software has been

developed which allows Big Data to be analysed and reduced to meaningful information in

multiple ways, including: merging files or data sources, decoding digital information, and

reducing or removing redundancies and outliers to develop a single picture from all the

information available (Britz, 1996). However, software has been developed by humans not AI,

and is reviewed and improved by human understanding of intelligence needs, using that

understanding to improve the software further. Knowledge Databased Discovery (KDD) is an

example of a method that uses technology not to eliminate human intelligence, but rather to take

Big Data and yield usable information by reducing cognitive and information overload
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(Resnyansky, 2010) & (Shichkina, Degtyarev & Koblov, 2016). This enables the human data

analyst or intelligence personnel to put Big Data to use without being overwhelmed by its

volume, but without replacing the need for a human to look at and review the data outcomes.

It appears that Big Data, and its analysis, is likely to continue to be a major element of

intelligence in the years to come. Certainly, there is valuable information available through Big

Data, and given the volume of Big Data, the use of AI or specialised software to sort through that

data is essential. However, this technology does not provide a replacement for human decision

making. Lowenthal (2011) stated, “the main disadvantage of [Big Data] is the sheer volume of

information that is available and trying to make sense of that information.” This disadvantage

can be mitigated through use of technology that sorts and makes sense of the data, more

efficiently than a human analyst could. However, these machines, which use deterministic

algorithms, do not provide a service that can separate the need for traditional human intelligence.

Algorithms take away a considerable amount of context, which humans interrelate with data, and

are unaware of social pointers or hints of agreement (Puyvelde Coulthart & Hossain, 2017). This

supports the idea that human intelligence is still essential in making sense of results and applying

them to specific situations. It is for this reason that Miller (2015) insists that open source

intelligence, or the analysis of Big Data, will never be able to fully replace human gathered

intelligence and analysis.

Although open source information must be analysed by a human in order to be useful,

the application of KDD techniques demonstrates a way in which the advancement of new

technology increasingly blurs the distinction between gathering and analysing information. Many

other applications also simultaneously collect and analyse what is considered as valuable

information, which results in faster lead or reaction times (Bazzell, 2016). NATO considers that
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raw data collected via open sources must be analysed, filtered, and validated in order to verify

the information and determine what meaning can be inferred from it (Kernan, 2001). Thus,

applications have been developed to not only source the available data, but also to analyse it and

place it in a useable form. Overall, it can be said Big Data should be considered very useful in

filling the gaps in traditional intelligence, and in enhancing the intelligence picture as a whole,

making it more cohesive and comprehensive, but should never be considered a substitute for

HUMINT.

SIGINT

SIGINT refers to the electronic collection of data, which provides insight into a potential

threat (Staniforth, 2016). Early studies suggest that implementation of data mining and analysis

technologies makes it possible for agencies to rely on signals intelligence (SIGINT) to intercept

and decode foreign electronic communications (Margolis, 2013). This can include information

from ships, planes and other travel, or communication of information between two parties, which

can be intercepted (Staniforth, 2016). Historically, this information had to be collected covertly.

However, the spread of mobile technology, online communication and the abundance of open

source data has allowed greater access to communications and travel information, providing both

greater quantity and quality of data for analysis. Additionally, spoken words can now be

translated into readable text with transcription engines. Historically, transcription engines were

unable to recognise different dialects, therefore SIGINT used translators, and still does to a

degree. However, machine transcription of multiple languages, dialects, and accents has

improved over the last few years. Moreover, Microsoft announced in 2016 that its technology

could transcribe text better than a human (Weinberger, 2016).

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OSINT

It is common practice for intelligence and security agencies to deploy information

technology in the collection of Open Source Intelligence data (OSINT), which entails the

gathering of unclassified information contained in a multiplicity of sources. These range from

“(foreign) newspapers, government reports, public data, maps, academic sites to blogs, social

networking sites, apps, and web-based communities” (Eijkman & Weggemans, 2013, p.285).

This is distinct from SOCMINT, which gathers information exclusively from social media sites.

In contemporary contexts, it is possible for intelligence agencies to use the internet to

collect or retrieve a broad range of information and personal data with a click of a mouse to

inform operational and strategic decisions (Hulnick, 2002). Open Source Information (OSINF),

which forms the basis of OSINT, is raw data collected for analysis; it includes interviews,

photographs, social media posts, and other instances in which people have shared their personal

information online, in an open or freely accessible platform (Eijkman & Weggemans, 2013). As

this information is posted in public platforms like blogs and social media sites, it is open source,

or capable of being accessed by the public or by an intelligence agency without any special

software, classified access, or breach of personal privacy.

Historically, open source data was considered a secondary form of information - inferior

in both quantity and quality to classified data (Best & Cumming, 2007). However, in recent years

this paradigm has been increasingly shifting so that open source data is seen as a primary form of

data, and the analysis of that data is now seen as critically important to intelligence and security

endeavours. A former senior intelligence officer considers that the Intelligence Community still

undervalues open source information, “[OSINF] is no longer the icing on the cake, it is the cake

itself.” (Best & Cumming, 2007, p.3). So, while intelligence agencies may still lack confidence
INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 10

in this data, it is becoming increasingly important that it is analysed and used to draw

conclusions about security threats, compared to classified data.

Another benefit in the shift toward using open source intelligence data is its low cost

(Eijkman and Weggemans, 2013) and more available that clandestine services. This has also

been demonstrated in how open source intelligence is used by marketing intelligence specialists

to gain a competitive advantage in business (Fleisher, 2008). ONSINT has been the preferred

method in business because it comprises desirable personal information, which is easily and

inexpensively leveraged to produce a very large quantity of high-quality raw data for analysis.

As such, some proponents argue that open source data could ultimately replace some forms of

secret and expensive data, by eliminating collection costs (Johnson, 2010). It has been suggested

that this could save as much as 80% of the funds diverted to pay for secret source methods

(Steele, 2007).

Another advantage of using open source data is that it delivers further information and

data that frequently is unable to be collected using other intelligence sources (Hulnick, 2002).

The Central Intelligence Agency noted that information does not have to be ‘secret' in order to be

valuable. They found that open source material can be used to answer new questions, including

tracking trends or perceptions over time, as well as collecting personal data on people of interest

(Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). It also simply provides a greater quantity of data than any

other source. This gives a greater number of samples from which conclusions can be drawn,

based on its analysis.

However, due to the overwhelming amount of incoming data regarding threats that

human analysts must consider before making recommendations, and the fact that a threat
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analyst’s time is in demand, it is almost an impossible task to keep up with demands. Moreover,

“information gathered concerning the intentions of foreign leaders remains best identified by

humans” (Grieves, 2018, p.2).

There is increased pressure on information and intelligence agencies to collect open

source data and analyse it, not as a simple supplementation for secret or classified data, but

instead as a primary source of highly valuable information, which could be acted upon to obtain

greater security. A second major area of study is how open source data is collected and analysed.

Recent advances in technology have provided new tools and platforms to collect and process

important information and data. Resnyansky (2010, p.364) argues that intelligence is becoming

increasingly dependent on technological tools and platforms that are conventionally grouped into

four fundamental categories: “sensors that collect data (optical, electronic, etc); platforms that

carry sensors (ships, satellites, etc); information and communication technologies that process

and transfer data and finished intelligence, and enabling devices (cameras, covert

communications, etc)”. As those technologies advance, so does the ability of intelligence

agencies to analyse data and reach rapid conclusions regarding the seriousness of a threat.

Anokwa, Hartung, Brunette, Boriello, & Lerer (2009) noted that open data source collection in

the developed world is both relatively easy and relatively advanced, whereas developing nations

are beginning to leverage their resources to help mature the use of data in more remote, and less

technologically advanced regions as well. Furthermore, the use of Big Data in the commercial

world involves highly developed software designed to collect data, including the ability to

“gather, filter, interrelate and manipulate data through automated processes” (Eldridge, Hobbs &

Moran, 2017, p.391). Thus, the gathering, filtering, interrelating and manipulations require little

human effort to access complex findings about patterns in data. As such, the software developed,
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and how it is used, can be analysed on a more detailed basis. Lefebvre (2004) “argues analysts

must be skilled in their use of technology as analysis involves assessing the reliability and

credibility of the data, and comparing it with the knowledge base available” (Grieves, 2018 p.2).

There has been some critique of the application of quantitative data, such as open source

data, when applied in the military intelligence setting (Bang, 2016). The perceived usefulness of

OSINT data is particularly high in a military setting if it is appropriately sourced, analysed, and

turned into useable information (Brueggemann, 2008). This means overcoming pitfalls like the

complexity of data, overload of data, and circular reporting, in order to extract reliable

information and use it to gain information about enemy movements in conflict situations.

While technology makes it significantly more convenient and cost-effective for

intelligence agencies to use publicly available information, the drawbacks of using such material

include unreliability, disinformation, and the availability of information to adversaries.

Brueggemann (2008) refers to circular reporting, where information emerges from what appears

to be numerous independent sources, but in reality, comes from only one source. There is also a

concern that misleading information may be intentionally leaked, with the intent of deception

and disinformation (Executive Protection and Intelligence, 2017). A second issue raised is that

this information is readily accessible to adversaries. According to the Interagency OPSEC

Support Staff Handbook (1996) adversaries have always used open source information and had

access to related intelligence. While it is true that adversaries also have access, this does not

actually make the information less applicable - open source information is still usable and should

not be ignored (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, 1996). Furthermore, if the adversary has

information that local intelligence agencies do not, then it creates a scenario in which the

adversary has more intelligence than local forces, which should be avoided. All-source
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intelligence works to pool both covert and open source intelligence, which provides the

advantage of unique conclusions or working knowledge. Hulnick (2002) argues that when

OSINT is properly used, the nonsense content and misinformation can be eliminated, and

significant information extracted.

SOCMINT

Technology makes it possible for the intelligence community to collect important

information and data through SOCMINT. As mentioned previously, one benefit of this is the

ability to track intelligence in real time. For example, during the Ukraine and Iraq conflicts in

2014, Russian backed separatists moved quickly, however they recorded their operations on

social media platforms (Symon & Tarapore, 2015). “Exploiting the content and metadata of

these sources, fused with data from traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR), could yield significant data about those forces’ tactics, social networks, and geolocation at

particular times” (Symon & Tarapore, 2015, p.1). This is evidence of how information shared

over social media can provide a tactical advantage to intelligence agencies.

Similarly, crowd-sourced information is also increasingly being used to inform decisions

in certain intelligence contexts, due to its capacity to provide a superior flow of data and

information (Omand et al. 2012). This data is collected directly from online contributors, or a

sample of the population. However, there is some debate regarding whether or not this can be

considered reliable intelligence (Stottlemyre, 2015). Crowdsourcing should be seen as a way to

augment and enhance data collection, by engaging with large populations that provide access to

information that would not be gathered via other, more traditional means (Randazzo, 2018).

Consequently, this can overcome issues like lack of placement and lack of access, or the risks
INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 14

involved in face-to-face development of intelligence through covert operations, while providing

access to similar data (Randazzo, 2018). Thus, while crowdsourcing may carry some risk of

misinformation, it should be seen as having potential value that is worth further exploration and

development. Since this data is open source, it can contain misinformation, misleading personal

information, intentional distraction and more. Furthermore, because crowdsourcing is taken from

a targeted subsection of the population, the collected sample cannot be said to be representative

of the total population, which may introduce bias into the intelligence collected and can pose

significant challenges.

Ethical Issues and Privacy

Historically, it was not thought possible that the capabilities of the Big Data environment

were able to prey on citizens of totalitarian regimes. However, Big Data does raise concerns over

civil liberties, which were brought to public attention during the release of the Snowden files

(Couch & Robins, 2013). It appears that the collection of OSINT and SOCMINT through

technology is often not performed in an accountable and responsible manner, leading to moral

and human rights issues (Eijkman & Weggemans, 2013; Omand et al., 2012). These include the

lack of accountability of intelligence agencies, the use of information collected and stored by

private companies which are not in accordance with their terms and conditions, and the lack of a

current legal structure or checks and balances for accessing the information (Eijkman &

Weggemans, 2013). As a result, information collected may not only represent a breach of

privacy, but might not be admissible in court, making the intelligence yielded unusable in this

instance. Thus, it is critical to carefully balance the needs and demands of national security

against individual rights (Etzioni, 2014).

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Hribar Podbregar, and Ivanuša, (2014) believe that open source information is more

intrusive than traditional intelligence collection methods and delves further into people’s private

data than is ethical. Similarly, Britz (1996) analysed ways in which the effect of technology on

access to information impacts the private lives of individuals and may ultimately create an

ethical dilemma for those collecting and analysing such data. However, paradoxically, although

the right to privacy was directly associated with the freedoms of an individual or a community

and human autonomy (Britz, 1996), open source information by its very nature, has already been

made public by the individual. Therefore, questions arise regarding the legitimacy of access to

information, and the right that organisations have to manipulate that information for their own

ends (Britz, 1996). This is further reflected by Eijkman & Weggemans (2013), who argue that

when collecting OSINT, human rights require an appropriate counterbalancing of influences. It is

therefore important to consider not only the technologies that are available and how they are

used, but also how the human analyst engages in the process, and what it means for the

application of information.

Protecting privacy is also problematic for the KDD technique. While being effective in

making data analysis more efficient, the approach poses serious problems for personal data

(Vedder, 1999; Tavani, 1999). Specifically, it does not differentiate between normative privacy,

or the individual right to categorical privacy, and public access, as relates to public policy’s

approach to private data. Nonetheless, KDD has proven valuable within the intelligence

community, improving national security by analysing large datasets to determine what is useful

and what is extraneous information (National Science Foundation, 2002). However, some

improvement is necessary in order to protect the overall privacy of individuals about whom

information is collected, especially as policy regarding privacy evolves.

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Hribar et al. (2014) advocate the need for human evaluation of data, the need for

reasoning, and human discretion. They deem the use of Big Data a “grey area” since although

legal, it is extremely intrusive, and may invade privacy enough to be unethical. Privacy is

unequivocally connected to the human right to freedom of autonomy, so protection of that

human autonomy is central to the ethical efficacy of information accessibility, and the right of

information organisations or intelligence agencies to use that data (Britz, 1996). Eijkman &

Weggemans (2011, p.143) determined that “from a human rights perspective, the gathering of

OSINT demands proper checks and balances”, and these balances fully depend on the use of

HUMINT to provide discernment in the electronic gathering and analysis of information,

preventing humans from being replaced as the primary analysts and decision makers in the

intelligence process.

Conclusion

Technology has made it possible for intelligence agencies to collect information more

reliably and safely through the use of open source data, not least during war (Hulnick, 2002).

The more search software and analysis techniques advance, the more precisely intelligence

agencies will be able to use data to draw meaningful conclusions regarding threats, and the

growth of sub-groups or ideologies that could lead to future threats. Overall, the evidence

indicates that open source information is actively valuable, and that sources like social media,

where individuals readily provide personal information, can be useful to the intelligence

community. However, at the current time, there is limited technology available for its analysis

and no comprehensive framework for its legitimate use. Further research and development is

needed to ensure that it is used in ways that align with the greater purpose and moral fortitude of

existing covert means of gathering intelligence. AI has the capacity to aid humans in the
INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 17

decision-making process and replicate stages of the analytical process, but many components of

human intelligence have yet to be discovered and replicated. The shift towards complete

replication and reliance on technology to analyse information and make decisions calls into

question the future role of humans in society. However, human interaction is currently needed to

make sense of the intelligence, and to make rational, ethical decisions for the intelligence

community. Thus, human involvement must always be part of a sound intelligence approach, for

the security of the nation as a whole. While open source data can be accessed at low cost, and

quickly analysed, the quality of the yielded information is not yet known, and time wasted on

analysing unusable information may lead to inefficiencies.

Intelligence agencies will likely increasingly rely on technology in future, using open

source data to fill in gaps in their intelligence, and basing strategic decisions on it. This is not

surprising in an era where the internet provides ready access to such a large body of information.

However, it is critical that the intelligence community actively address the observed

shortcomings of this approach by seeking to advance technology and policy to account for

challenges; to further the integration of open source information with more traditional

information sources in order to create cohesive actionable knowledge; to prevent breaches in

national security during times of war, terrorist attack, and other similar scenarios.

Drawing from the intelligence literature, it is clear there is an over-reliance upon new

technology tools and applications to collect and process information, and a budding adoption of

social media platforms for use in intelligence, which has an affect on intelligence analysis. While

it is clear that Big Data, and the ready availability of open source intelligence provides an

opportunity to increase what is known within the intelligence sector, this increase in data does

not come without pitfalls.

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Nonetheless, technology is being developed that allows information and data to be

organised, filtered, and analysed in real-time, which could increase efficiency with greater

application. However, improvements in technologies to ensure problems relating to deception,

validity and quantity versus quality are yet to be developed. Whilst technologies using

algorithms can strip out a considerable amount of information, human judgment is crucially

needed to increase its value. In order to address the shortcomings of this approach, further the

integration of open source information with more traditional information sources is needed to

create cohesive, actionable knowledge, and to prevent breaches in national security during times

of war, terrorist attack, and other similar scenarios particularly as we become more reliant on

technology.

There are concerns over the ethical and moral implications of using open source data and

analysing it with technology that must be addressed. The information that is available through

open sources is, in many cases, provided to private businesses and online entities for their

personal use, and not intended for sharing with intelligence agencies. Ready access to such large

bodies of personal data could be easily misused, and the current legal policies and moral/ethical

codes for intelligence gathering are ill-equipped to answer the questions these new technologies

raise. Thus, it is critical that the ethical implications be further analysed, and policies created that

address the protection of the privacy and personal information of citizens before intelligence

agencies become more reliant upon technology.

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