[ G.R. No.

 233314, November 21, 2018 ] For her part, De Mesa claimed that she was employed as a "full-load faculty member" in 2003, as
indicated in her faculty employment contract dated November 2, 2003. She further advanced that as of
LUNINGNING Z. BRAZIL, SALVACION L. GARCERA, AND RITA S. DE MESA, June 2009, she was already considered a regular employee as she started to receive a fixed monthly
PETITIONERS, VS. STI EDUCATION SER. GROUP, INC. AND MONICO V. JACOB, salary for twelve (12) months.[6]
RESPONDENTS,
Petitioners alleged that they were required to submit letters of intent and to sign contracts with STI for
DECISION each semester. However, upon their alleged regularization, STI no longer required them to do so. In
addition, they enjoyed the same benefits granted to regular employees such as full payment of salary
TIJAM, J.: and statutory benefits during summer, semestral and Christmas breaks. [7]

Enshrined in our Constitution is the State's policy to afford full protection to labor and its right to On June 3, 2011, Rusty O. Lagatic (Lagatic), the school administrator of STI-Legazpi, handed to the
security of tenure. This, however, must be balanced against the State's policy to protect and promote petitioners separate job offers for the first semester of academic year (A.Y.) 2011-2012. The job offers
the right to quality education at all levels as embodied in our laws and regulations prescribing for Brazil and De Mesa were for part-time faculty members, whereas the job offer for Garcera was
qualifications for the teaching profession. Although this Court is mindful of the plight of teachers for a probationary faculty member. Petitioners refused to sign the said job offers because although
whose security of tenure is necessarily affected by the said laws, We can only afford relief that is the same stipulated a higher monthly salary, their security of tenure as regular employees would be
within the confines of the law. Neither estoppel nor equity can contravene a clear provision of law. taken away from them.[8]

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated November 9, 2016 and the Resolution[2] dated June 30, Upon inquiry, petitioners were informed by Lagatic that their 201 files did not contain their
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 134584. appointment papers, and that they failed to conform with the standards set out in the 2008 Manual of
Regulations for Private Higher Education (2008 MORPHE). Petitioners countered that Garcera already
completed her Master of Arts in Education – English on March 30, 2011, and that Brazil and De Mesa
Facts of the Case
were already writing their thesis in their chosen fields, Master of Arts in Public Administration and
Master of Arts in Physics Education, respectively. [9]
Petitioners were faculty members of respondent STI Education Services Group, Inc. (STI), a
Petitioners alleged that despite their repeated requests for the amendment of their respective job offers
proprietary higher educational institution duly organized under the Philippine laws.
on the basis of their belief that they are regular employees, Lagatic still handed to them the same job
offers on June 8, 2011. As they still refused to sign the said contracts, they were replaced with six (6)
Petitioner Luningning Z. Brazil (Brazil) was first employed by STI College-Legazpi (STI-Legazpi) on
newly-hired faculty members on the following day. They also did not receive any teaching load at the
June 3, 1997 as a part-time faculty member. Petitioner Salvacion L. Garcera (Garcera) and petitioner
start of the school year on June 13, 2011, although they still received their respective salaries for the
Rita S. De Mesa (De Mesa) were next hired in June 2000 and June 2001, respectively, also as part-time
period of June 1 to 15, 2011.[10]
faculty members by STI-Legazpi.[3]
In separate letters[11] dated June 24, 2011, Lagatic informed the petitioners that their respective
The services of Brazil, Garcera and De Mesa (collectively referred to as petitioners) continued until
employment contracts were based on the 2008 MORPHE being implemented by the Commission on
June 2011, for which they filed a Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal and non-payment of
Higher Education (CHED) and the General Academic Policies for Faculty Members of HQ-Owned
salaries/wages, separation pay and 13th month pay, with claims for moral and exemplary damages and
Schools. Pertinent portion of the identical separate letters reads:
attorney's fees before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch
(RAB) No. V in Legazpi City. The complaint, docketed as NLRC RAB V Case No. 07-00153-11, was
against STI and its President, respondent Monico V. Jacob (Jacob). [4] xxx. The employment contract outlined your updated employment classification based on your existing
qualifications as provided for by the MORPHE and STI's General Academic Policies. Indicated therein
Brazil claimed that she was hired as a "full-load faculty member" of STI-Legazpi in June 2002, when is an employment offer for you as a part-time full load faculty member [as for Brazil and De
she started receiving a fixed monthly salary. On February 1, 2004, she was regularized as evidenced by Mesa]/probationary faculty member [as for Garcera] and an addendum that gives you an additional
STI-Legazpi's Personnel Action Form. Likewise, Garcera claimed that in a written evaluation of her of two more years to comply with the minimum qualification standards of CHED.
teaching performance, acknowledged by her on October 12, 2004, STI-Legazpi categorized her
employment status as regular. Moreover, in an electronic mail correspondence dated April 24, 2008 xxxx
with Joseluis Geronimo of the STI Headquarters (HQ), the latter confirmed the status of Brazil and
Garcera as regular employees.[5] I am referring you to the attached memorandum dated June 16, 2011 coming from the Vice-President
for Channel Management Division on the Compliance Consideration Program for Faculty Members
1
Without the Minimum Qualification of a Regular/Permanent Faculty Member for further information.
[12]
 (Emphasis supplied) For their part, while respondents STI and Jacob (collectively referred to as respondents) admitted that
for years, Brazil and Garcera have been teaching in STI-Legazpi's General Education Programs, and
De Mesa had been teaching Physics, their employment as such was considered part-time only.
Respondents emphasized that since petitioners are not holders of a master's degree, they are considered
The attached memorandum mentioned in the said letters were from Resty O. Bundoc (Bundoc), Vice-
part-time academic personnel under Section 36 of the 2008 MORPHE. Under Section 117 of the 2008
President of Channel Management Division of STI HQ, the body of which is reproduced in its entirety
MORPHE, a part-time employee, such as the petitioners, cannot acquire regular or permanent status.
as follows:
This explains why Brazil and De Mesa were offered part-time full-load faculty employment; while
Garcera was offered probationary faculty employment, as she obtained her master's degree only in
The Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education (MORPHE), which took effect in 2008
March 2011.[15]
provides for the guidelines which an Institution of Higher Learning like STI Education Sevices
Group, Inc. (STI) must follow. Based on the MORPHE, particularly Section 36 thereof, a full time
In addition, respondents argued that their act of extending the part-time and probationary employment
faculty or academic personnel is one who possesses at least the minimum academic qualifications
contracts to the petitioners were validated by the CHED through an Advisory Opinion dated July 17,
prescribed in the MORPHE, which means that the faculty member must be a holder of a Master's
2011, wherein Atty. Julito Vitriolo, Executive Director IV of the CHED, clarified that any act of giving
Degree relevant to the field he/she is teaching. The "Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
permanent or regular status to academic teaching personnel who do not possess the required academic
(MRPS)" which took effect in 1992, Article IX, Section 44, Paragraph C, Sub-paragraph 1-a also
qualifications is not valid since it is contrary to the provisions of Sections 117 and 118 of the 2008
requires the same (same with MRPS 1995 Annotated, Article IX, Section 44, Paragraph C, Sub-
MORPHE.[16]
Paragraph 1a).
Consequently, since petitioners refused to sign their respective contracts, respondents posited that there
Faculty members who have yet to fulfill the minimum requirements (earn a relevant master's degree in
can be no illegal dismissal to speak of. Their previous employment contracts merely expired.
his/her field of specialization) shall thus be considered as Part Time/Full-Load Faculty member, and
will undertake a contract appropriate to his/her qualification. This adjustment is necessary in
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
compliance with the mandate as set forth in the MORPHE.

STI recognizes the services and the years rendered by the faculty members that will be affected by this
In a Decision[17] dated December 16, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared petitioners as regular
compliance, and as such, continuance of the benefits they are currently enjoying shall be allowed, and
employees. Thus, respondents were found guilty of illegal dismissal and were ordered to pay the
the two-year compliance consideration program shall be strictly observed to comply with the minimum
petitioners their respective separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as well as other monetary claims.
requirements.
The LA ratiocinated that although the 2008 MORPHE applies in the determination of whether a
Non-signature to the Semestral Part Time (Full Load) Faculty Contract effective this School Year 2011
faculty is a regular employee or not, it does not apply in a case where regular employment status has
– 2012 waives the faculty member's right to this compliance consideration program offered by the
already been achieved or had already been granted to faculty members.
school which may result to severing employment with STI. Further, non-completion of the relevant
master's degree on May 31, 2013 will automatically revert the faculty member's status to being a Part
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the NLRC.
time faculty member losing the benefits currently enjoyed and will enjoy under the compliance
consideration program. However, the faculty member's compliance to the minimum requirement
within the given period may qualify him/her to regular/permanent status.[13] (Emphasis and Ruling of the NLRC
underscoring supplied)
Initially, the NLRC partly granted the appeal of the respondents in a Decision [18] dated December 28,
2012, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioners averred that the addendum regarding the additional two years to comply with the CHED
requirement was absent in the job offers handed to them. The memorandum also came late as classes WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision appealed from
have already started on June 13, 2011. is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: the complaint of Rita De Mesa is DISMISSED for lack of
merit; accordingly the awards for payment of her backwages and separation pay are vacated and the
Since they were placed in a floating status and no longer received their salary for the period of June 16 damages awarded to all appellees are also DISMISSED for lack of merit. The attorney's fees shall be
to 30, 2011, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed complaints for illegal constructive limited to 10% of the amended judgment award.
dismissal with monetary claims.[14]
2
 In addition, the NLRC opined that even if the petitioners were earlier recognized as regular employees,
SO ORDERED.[19] it cannot estop respondents from denying them such status. It cited the case of University of the East,
et al. v. Pepanio, et al.,[22] wherein this Court held that "the operation of educational institutions
involves public interest, and such grant of regular status is against the public policy embodied in the
2008 MORPHE." The NLRC thus concluded that petitioners were not dismissed but merely separated
In essence, the NLRC affirmed the LA's finding of illegal dismissal except for De Mesa. Thus, it
from service by their own refusal to sign their respective job offers.
explained:
Petitioners assailed the NLRC Resolution dated December 27, 2013 before the CA by filing a petition
Appellees Brazil and Gargacera (sic) were regular faculty members. They were granted regular status
for certiorari under Rule 65.
in February 1, 2004 and April 2004, respectively. When the MORPHE took effect in 2008, they were
already regular employees. Thus, they enjoyed security of tenure.
Ruling of the CA
When Brazil and Gargacera (sic) were offered employment contracts as part-time employees, they
were considered constructively dismissed.
On November 9, 2016, the CA promulgated its Decision[23] denying the petition and affirming the
assailed NLRC Resolution.
As regards De Mesa, she cannot be considered as a regular teacher of the school. She was employed in
2001 as a part-time faculty member, and continued as such until March 2003. In June 2003, she signed
In sum, the CA ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
a contract as a full-load faculty member, and signed a separate semestral contract for each semester for
petitioners' complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims. Petitioners were merely separated from
the next 4 years. While she claims that in 2009, she was considered a regular teacher because she
service as a result of their stubborn refusal to sign their respective job offers which were made in
started to receive a fixed salary for 12 months, there is no evidence that before the effectivity of the
accordance with the 2008 MORPHE.
MORPHE in 2008, she had already attained regular status similar to appellees Brazil and
Gargacera (sic). The provisions of the MORPHE applied to her.[20] (Emphasis ours)
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated June 30, 2017.

Both parties moved for the partial reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners reiterated their assertion that De Mesa was already considered a regular employee in June Issue
2009 as she was enjoying the same benefits granted to regular employees. They insisted that the fact
she was granted a regular status after the effectivity of the 2008 MORPHE is immaterial.
Simply put, petitioners come to this Court to seek reliefs akin to those awarded in illegal dismissal
On the other hand, respondents contended that pursuant to the 2008 MORPHE, Brazil and Garcera cases, on the sole ground that they were already granted regular status, albeit illegally, by respondents.
could not have become regular employees because they did not even qualified for probationary status.
They argued that under the 2008 MORPHE, an academic teaching personnel cannot acquire the status The issue, therefore, revolves around the nature of employment and corollary rights of faculty
of a probationary employee without first possessing a master's degree to teach in his or her major field. members who failed to attain permanent status under the applicable law, i.e. 1992 Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MORPS) and/or 2008 MORPHE, but who were voluntarily
In a Resolution[21] dated December 27, 2013, the NLRC resolved the parties' respective motions for treated as regular employees by their employers.
reconsideration in favor of the respondents. It dismissed the petitioners' complaints for illegal dismissal
and other claims for lack of merit. Our Ruling
In the said Resolution, the NLRC declared that Brazil and De Mesa were ineligible for regularization
since they were not yet holders of a master's degree as required under the MORPHE. Thus, they are We deny the petition.
considered part-time faculty members in June 2011.
Prefatorily, the Court stresses that it is not a trier of facts. As a rule, only questions of law are
As for Garcera, the NLRC held that she could be considered a full-time faculty member qualified for examined by this Court in a Rule 45 Petition.
probationary status beginning A.Y. 2011-2012, as she earned her master's degree only in March 2011.
Further, in labor cases, this Court reviews the Decision of the CA in a Rule 65 Petition presented to the
3
latter. Thus, "the Court has to examine the CA's Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly semester; however, if he is made to serve the University further, in spite of the lack of a master's
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision."[24] degree, he shall be deemed to have attained tenure.[30] (Emphasis ours)

The NLRC commits an act of grave abuse of discretion when its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might Petitioners in Son were enrolled in a master's program but were unable to finish the same. However,
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Stated differently, no grave abuse of discretion may be since they continued to teach in the UST beyond the period provided in the aforequoted CBA
ascribed to the NLRC when its ruling has sufficient basis in evidence, and is not contrary to law and provision, they claimed that they had already attained regular status. Thus, they filed for illegal
jurisprudence. In such cases, the CA is constrained to dismiss the petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal upon UST's non-renewal of their appointments.
NLRC ruling.[25]
In denying the petition, the Court ruled that the CBA provision is null and void for being violative of
After applying the foregoing guidelines in Our careful review of the instant case, We find no reversible the 1992 MORPS that was in effect during its execution. Thus, the provision did not produce any
error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when effect as to the parties therein. The Court, through Justice Del Castillo, succinctly explained:
it dismissed the petitioners' complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims.
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining
We do not intend to disturb the factual antecedents of this case as found by the courts a quo. As aptly
professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite
observed by the CA, "the parties do not contest that, either expressly or impliedly, STI granted
knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be
petitioners the status of a regular faculty member."[26] As such, an examination of the evidence
employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST
pertaining to how the petitioners were granted a regular status by the STI is unnecessary.
continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground
for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are
Petitioners also do not question the applicability of the 1992 MORPS and/or the 2008 MORPHE to
in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching
them and their failure to qualify thereunder for lack of a master's degree. They merely insist that
personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties
despite the application of the 2008 MORPHE, an employer educational institution that has granted or
herein, they are in pari delicto.
treated its employees as regular or permanent employees can be held liable for illegal constructive
dismissal, and consequently liable to pay separation pay, back wages, etc. Subsequent compliance with
xxxx
the MORPHE is not an available defense for employers in such cases.
It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA,
On the surface, petitioners' plea is anchored on serving the broader interests of justice and equity.
respondents are deemed to be in estoppel or have waived the application of the requirement
Unfortunately, it has no legal leg to stand on.
under CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely contrary to
law. Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the rights of the students and the public, who have a right to
Courts may resort to application of equity only when there is insufficiency or absence of law. [27] The
expect that UST is acting within the bounds of the law, and provides quality education by hiring only
principle of equity cannot prevail over the positive mandate of the law, such as the 2008 MORPHE in
qualified teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of the Civil Code, "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
this case. Application of equity "would be tantamount to overruling or supplanting the express
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
provisions of the law."[28]
person with a right recognized by law." On the other hand, there could be no acquiescence –
amounting to estoppel – with respect to acts which constitute a violation of law. "The doctrine of
This is not a case of first impression. During the pendency of the instant petition, the Court
estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
promulgated its decision in Raymond A. Son, et al. v. University of Santo Tomas (UST), et al.,[29] the
vires." "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act.[31] (Emphasis ours; citations omitted)
factual circumstances of which are similar to this case.

In Son, petitioners were also faculty members of undergraduate programs who failed to obtain the The ruling in Son is on all fours with the instant case. Petitioners herein essentially claim estoppel on
required Master's Degree under the 1992 MORPS and 2008 MORPHE. As such, their appointments the part of the respondents in granting them a regular status despite the clear import of the 2008
were not renewed by the UST, their employer. Petitioners therein were members of a union with which MORPHE.
UST, at the time, had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that provides:
In their Reply to Respondents' Comment[32] required by this Court, petitioners specifically alleged that
xxx Although a master's degree is an entry requirement, a faculty member admitted to serve the the ruling in Son does not apply to their petition. They argued that unlike in the case of Son, the
University without a master's degree shall finish his master's degree in five (5) semesters. If he does treatment or grant of regular employment status in their case was not pursuant to a CBA, wherein both
not finish his degree in five (5) semesters, he shall be separated from service at the end of the fifth parties agreed to the regularization of the employees. In their case, the grant of regular status was
4
"unilateral and not a shared endeavor."[33] Thus, the fault or violation rests on STI alone. applied the general principles under the Labor Code in finding, for instance, that petitioners, "being
teachers, perform activities which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade" of
We failed to see any material distinction between a CBA and an employment contract that would respondents.[35]
justify a different ruling in this case. There is no dearth of evidence showing that petitioners
voluntarily accepted the benefits from the respondents' act of granting them a regular status. In fact, In this light, the Court finds it apt to discuss the interplay between the provisions under the 1992
their enjoyment of such benefits are among their allegations before the Court. MORPS and/or 2008 MORPHE specifically applied to faculty or academic personnel, and the Labor
Code as the general law applicable to all employees. The following discussion will be limited,
Otherwise stated, petitioners proffer that if they did not explicitly agree to the illegal terms (i.e., being however, to faculties who are teaching in undergraduate programs.
treated as a regular employee) of their employment contract, they should not bear the consequences of
its illegality. In effect, petitioners want to have their cake and eat it too. The provisions of the 1992 MORPS[36] and the 2008 MORPHE are practically identical in terms of
distinguishing between a full-time and a part-time faculty. Thus, the 1992 MORPS provides:
Although petitioners failed to present their appointment papers showing that they were expressly
granted regular status by the STI, the courts a quo were unanimous in finding that STI indeed granted Section 45. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. As a general rule, all private schools shall employ full-
them such regular status, whether expressly or impliedly. time academic personnel consistent with the levels of instruction.

We note, however, that even if petitioners were able to present employment contracts expressly stating Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:
their status as regular employees, Our conclusion would still be the same.
a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department
"Basic is the rule that the nature of employment is determined by the factors set by law, regardless of under this Manual for all academic personnel;
any contract expressing otherwise."[34] Ergo, a provision in an employment contract prescribing a
nature of employment that is violative of law, is deemed unwritten and has no effect as to the parties b. Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as provided for in the policies,
thereto. rules and standards of the Department and the school;

At this juncture, it is imperative upon this Court to explain the nature of employment of a faculty who c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to the school;
does not meet the minimum qualifications under the 1992 MORPS and/or the 2008 MORPHE.
d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work that will
For purposes of clarity, there are two ways to categorize the nature of employment of a faculty in a conflict with the working hours in the school; and
higher education institution.
e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.
First, a faculty may either be full-time or part-time. This manner of classification is unique to the
teaching profession. The criteria or basis for the said classification, as can be gleaned from the
provisions of the 1992 MORPS and 2008 MORPHE, primarily relates to the academic qualifications All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-
and teaching load of the faculty. time. (Emphasis ours)

Second, a faculty's nature of employment may also be classified under the general provisions of the
Labor Code and the applicable jurisprudence. Thus, a faculty may be considered a permanent, The minimum academic qualifications vary according to the grades and levels of instruction taught by
probationary, or fixed-term employee. In this manner of classification, the emphasis is on the rights the faculty. Thus, Section 44 of the same Manual provides:
of the faculty member as an employee, specifically his or her right to security of tenure or the lack of
it. The touchstone therefor is found not only in the 1992 MORPS and 2008 MORPHE, but in the Labor Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. The minimum qualifications for faculty for the different
Code and other applicable laws and jurisprudence. grades and levels of instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on file in the school shall be
as follows:
These two groups of categories or classifications are interrelated and does not operate to the exclusion
of one another. To Our mind, the interplay between the two may have caused confusion in determining xxxx
the nature of employment of a faculty in a higher education institution. To illustrate using the present
case, the LA, in ruling for the petitioners, opined that 2008 MORPHE is only applicable in determining c. Tertiary
whether a faculty is a regular employee or not under the standards of CHED. Thus, it erroneously
5
(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational: at the same time holding positions in the government, whether appointive or elective, shall also be
considered part-time. (Emphasis ours)
(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional courses, holder
of the appropriate professional license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any deviation from this
requirement will be subject to regulation by the Department.[37] As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the rule is simple – a faculty who does not meet ALL
the minimum academic qualifications is automatically a part-time faculty.

On the other hand, similar provisions under 2008 MORPHE provide: Moreover, a faculty who is deemed a full-time faculty after meeting all the minimum academic
qualifications does not perpetually become one. He or she may be reverted to being a part-time faculty
Section 35. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. – The minimum qualifications of a faculty in a higher for failure to comply with the requirements on the teaching load. Thus, Section 118 of the 2008
education institution shall be as follows: MORPHE provides:

1) For undergraduate programs: Section 118. Regular or Permanent Status. xxx a regular or permanent academic teaching personnel
who requests a teaching load equivalent to a part-time load, shall be considered resigned, and hence,
1. Holder of a master's degree, to teach mainly in his major field and where applicable, a holder of may forfeit his/her regular or permanent status at the discretion of the management of the higher
appropriate professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree for the professional courses. education institution and shall thereby be covered by a term-contract employment.
However, in specific fields where there is dearth of holders of Master's degree, a holder of a
professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree may be qualified to teach. Any deviation
from this requirement will be subject to regulation by the Commission. The next provision provides for the required teaching load for a full-time faculty to retain his regular or
permanent status, viz:
xxxx
Section 119. Regular Teaching Load. The regular teaching load of full-time academic teaching
Section 36. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. – As a general rule, all private higher education
personnel shall be determined by the higher education institution but in no case shall exceed 24 units
institutions shall employ full-time faculty or academic personnel consistent with the levels of
per semester or term.
instruction.

A full-time faculty or academic personnel is one who meets all the following requirements:
These provisions entail that a faculty may have regular teaching load but he or she may be considered
1) Who possesses at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed under this Manual for only as a part-time faculty for failure to meet all the minimum academic qualifications. In contrast, a
all academic personnel; full-time faculty who has part-time load ceases to become a full-time faculty even if he or she
possesses all the minimum academic qualifications. Note, however, that the requirement on the
2) Who is paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as provided for in the policies, teaching load is subject to the discretion of the employer, or the higher education institution. As such,
rules and standards of the Commission and the institution; the requirement on carrying a regular teaching load is not an absolute requirement.

3) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work a day to the school; We now delve into the second manner of classifying the nature of employment which is the crux of
controversy in most labor suits involving faculty members.
4) Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except
when permitted by the higher education institution; and 1. Permanent

5) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution. As already settled by this Court in a plethora of cases, a faculty who does not qualify as a full-time
faculty under the 1992 MORPS and/or 2008 MORPHE can never attain the status of a permanent or
regular employee.[38] It necessarily follows that only a full-time faculty can be considered a permanent
All faculty or academic personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered or regular employee.
part-time.
Note, however, that being a full-time faculty does not suffice to be considered a permanent employee.
Except when permitted by the higher education institution, all faculty or academic personnel who are As ruled in the landmark case of Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University,[39] in order for a faculty
6
teaching in the tertiary level to acquire permanent employment or security of tenure, he or she must: In cases where a faculty failed to attain a regular or permanent status, the next question is, whether the
(1) be a full-time faculty; (2) have rendered three consecutive years of service or six consecutive said faculty may be considered a probationary employee. Unlike a fixed-term employee, a
semesters (i.e., the probationary period); and (3) such service must have been satisfactory. [40] probationary employee is entitled to limited security of tenure.

In relation thereto, the pertinent provisions of the 1992 MORPS are as follows: Article 281 of the Labor Code thus provides:

Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and school ART. 281. Probationary employment. - Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from
requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating
consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An
offered on the trimester basis. employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. Those who have served the probationary period shall be
made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their As held in Yolanda M. Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc.,[41] the Labor Code is
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. (Emphasis ours) supplemented by the 1992 MORPS with respect to the period of probation.[42]

Also, in Mercado, the Court reconciled the conflict arising from the grant of a probationary status
The same rule is reiterated in the following provisions of the 2008 MORPHE: under a fixed-term employment. Thus:

Section 117. Probationary Period. An academic teaching personnel, who does not possess the The provision on employment on probationary status under the Labor Code is a primary example of
minimum academic qualifications prescribed under Sections 35 and 36 of this Manual shall be the fine balancing of interests between labor and management that the Code has institutionalized
considered as part-time employee, and therefore cannot avail of the status and privileges of a pursuant to the underlying intent of the Constitution.
probationary employment. A part-time employee cannot acquire regular permanent status, and hence,
may be terminated when a qualified teacher becomes available. On the one hand, employment on probationary status affords management the chance to fully
scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of
The probationary employment of academic teaching personnel shall not be more than a period of six the Constitution comes into play. Based on the standards set at the start of the probationary period,
(6) consecutive semesters or nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service, as the case may be. management is given the widest opportunity during the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to
meet its own adopted but reasonable standards. These standards, together with the just and authorized
Section 118. Regular or Permanent Status. A full-time academic teaching personnel who has causes for termination of employment the Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds available to
satisfactorily completed his/her probationary employment, and who possesses the minimum terminate the employment of a teacher on probationary status. For example, the school may impose
qualifications required by the Commission and the institution, shall acquire a regular or reasonably stricter attendance or report compliance records on teachers on probation, and reject a
permanent status if he/she is re-hired or re-appointed immediately after the end of his/her probationary teacher for failing in this regard, although the same attendance or compliance record may
probationary employment. However, a regular or permanent academic teaching personnel who not be required for a teacher already on permanent status. At the same time, the same just and
requests a teaching load equivalent to a part-time load, shall be considered resigned, and hence, may authorizes causes for dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary teachers, so that they may
forfeit his/her regular or permanent status at the discretion of the management of the higher education be the first to be laid-off if the school does not have enough students for a given semester or trimester.
institution and shall thereby be covered by a term-contract employment. (Emphasis ours) Termination of employment on this basis is an authorized cause under the Labor Code.

xxxx
From the foregoing, a full-time faculty or one who possesses all the minimum academic qualifications
When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above probationary period rules, the
may either be permanent or probationary. He or she may also be a fixed-term employee for refusal to
situation – as in the present case – may at first blush look muddled as fixed-term employment is in
take full teaching load, as previously discussed.
itself a valid employment mode under Philippine law and jurisprudence. The conflict, however, is
more apparent than real when the respective nature of fixed-term employment and of employment on
2. Probationary
probationary status are closely examined.

7
 The validity of fixed-term employment contracts for teachers was upheld by this Court as early as 1990
The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the  period agreed upon between the in the oft-cited case of Brent School, Inc. v. Ronalda Zamora[48] provided that:
employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the term and ends on its own
when the term expires. In a sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of (1) the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without
the technical meaning "probation" carries in Philippine labor law – a maximum period of six months, any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to hear upon the employee and absent any other
or in the academe, a period of three years for those engaged in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends circumstances vitiating his consent; and (2) where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and
there, however, because of the overriding meaning that being "on probation" connotes, i.e., a process employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
of testing and observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job. exercised by the former over the latter.[49]

xxxx
In Mercado, the Court also enunciated the following on the nature of a fixed-term employment in
Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that in a situation where
contrast to probationary employment:
the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it
offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give
way. xxx"[43] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied) To highlight what we mean by a fixed-term contract specifically used for the fixed term it offers, a
replacement teacher, for example, may be contracted for a period of one year to temporarily take the
place of a permanent teacher on a one-year study leave. The expiration of the replacement teachers
contracted term, under the circumstances, leads to no probationary status implications as she was never
In addition, it bears stressing that only a full-time faculty may be granted a probationary status. As employed on probationary basis; her employment is for a specific purpose with particular focus on
expressly provided under Section 117 of the 2008 MORPHE, "an academic teaching personnel who the term and with every intent to end her teaching relationship  with the school upon expiration 
does not possess the minimum academic qualifications prescribed under Sections 35 and 36 of this of this term.[50] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring ours)
Manual shall be considered part-time employee, and therefore cannot avail of the status and privileges
of a probationary employment."[44]
In all, under a fixed-term employment, the employer-employee relationship is severed upon the
Although the same rule was not expressly provided under the 1992 MORPS, since employment on expiration of the term or period stated under the contract without the necessity of any notice to the
probation could lead to a permanent status, it ineluctably follows that only those who may attain a employee.[51] Non-renewal of the contract, by no means, equate to dismissal. In other words, there is no
permanent status can be granted a probationary employment. A part-time faculty could never attain a security of tenure in a fixed-term employment.
permanent status for lack of academic qualifications. Said rule is also consistent with the nature and
purpose of hiring someone on a probationary period – "to observe the fitness, propriety, and efficiency As such, the practice of hiring teachers per semester or school year by educational institutions is
of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment."[45] Employment on a generally governed by the rules on fixed-term employment unless the circumstances provide for either
part-time basis may be inadequate for purposes of determining if one is qualified for permanent a probationary or a regular employment status.
employment as a part-time faculty does not possess the qualifications in the first place.
To recapitulate, since a part-time faculty can neither attain a probationary nor regular status due to lack
Accordingly, in the recent case of De La Salle Araneta  University, Inc. v. Dr. Eloisa G. of all the academic qualifications, the only conclusion therefore is that a part-time faculty will always
Magdurulang,[46] the Court, in counting the period served as a probationary employee for purposes of be a fixed-term employee.
regularization, did not include appointments on a part-time basis even those that commenced prior to
2008 or the effectivity of the 2008 MORPHE. Applying the yardsticks or guidelines as thoroughly discussed above, the petitioners in this case are
clearly part-time faculty with a fixed-term status. First, they were hired on a semestral
To further illustrate, a full-time faculty, by default, is given a probationary status unless: (1) the basis. Second, they do not possess the required master's degrees. In fact, their failure to obtain the said
employer decides to cut short the probationary period for causes provided under the law; or (2) said degrees is the same reason why they cannot attain the status of probationary employees even for the
faculty is hired merely as a substitute of a permanent faculty who is on leave. [47] On the other hand, a past couple of years that they served the STI. For Garcera, however, she would have been considered a
part-time faculty can never be a probationary employee. full-time faculty with a probationary status if she signed her respective job offer as such. Finally, there
is no showing that the terms of contracts under which petitioners served as faculty in STI were illegal
Consequently, if a faculty is not deemed probationary, he or she is considered a fixed-term employee. according to the criteria set in Brent.

3. Fixed-term The Court also takes note of the allegation by the petitioners that the two-year compliance program
was not presented nor included in their job offers by the respondents. The said allegation, being factual
8
in nature, requires this Court to examine evidence adduced in the case for the purpose of ascertaining
the truth of the same. Again, the Court generally does not entertain question of facts in a Rule 45
Petition.

Nonetheless, even granting that the addendum was not present in the job offers, We reiterate the rule
that under a fixed-term employment contract, nothing binds the parties to one another after the
expiration of the term of the contract. Thus, STI was not obliged to offer the said compliance program
to the petitioners. Further, to Our mind, if indeed the addendum is material to this case, the petitioners
should have communicated their interest to avail the same to STI. No allegation to such effect was
made by the petitioners.

Petitioners' allegation of bad faith that would justify an award of damages is also bereft of legal basis.
STI has the right to hire replacement faculty in light of the petitioners' refusal to be hired. Petitioners
left respondents with two options for the continuity of their institution's operations – either they give in
to petitioners' demands or hire new faculty. The former is tantamount to violating the law. Thus, bad
faith cannot be imputed to the parties who merely chose to abide by the law.

On a final note, this does not mean that the Court countenance illegal acts of STI. We are constrained
to rule in favor of the respondents as there is no relief for petitioners under the law. Anent the
respondents being scathe-free, as aptly stated by Justice Del Castillo in Son:

xxx The fact that government has not cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly
implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring educational institutions,
including the parties herein: it simply means that government will not punish these violations for the
meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the
overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved – as they now fiercely
advocate to their favor – they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated. [52]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The November 9, 2016 Decision and the June 30,
2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134584 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.