BICINT 1UBISPHUBENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL UMM

(Bill of Rights)

By:

BTTY. U I R R Y D . GflCffYHfl
Professor of Law, College of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Baguio City
August, 2015

CPRS BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City, Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City, Tacloban City,
lloilo City, lligan City and Davao City)

POWERHAUS BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Manila, Dipolog City, Naga City, Santiago City, San Fernando City,
[LU] and Tagbilaran City)

EXCELLENT BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City and Tacloban City)

HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE BAR REVIEW CENTER

(General Santos City)

COSMOPOLITAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City)

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

Dagupan City
I »

Due process: May a respondent in a

criminal case More the Office of the
Ombudsman or Prosecutor's Office
entitledtobe furnished conies of the
Counter-Affidavits of his co-resoondents
to be abletoanswer and/or comment on
it?

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21,2015

The Facts

1. On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the
complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Levito Baligod, which
prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080
be conducted against Sen. Estrada.;

2. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-O313 on 9 January 2014. On 3

December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in
OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others,
that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed
his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.

3. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

4. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. Sen. Estrada's request was made "[pursuant
to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished' (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court)
and to 'have access to the evidence on record' (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).

5. On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-O313.

The pertinent portions of the assailed Order read:

This Office finds however finds Isic] that the foregoing

provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen.
Ua £ aII filinnc» r\4 rAcnnnrlantc OiiIa
 3

112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]: n(a) The
complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall
be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause...

6. On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-O313 and OMB-C-C-13-

0397 a Joint Resoiutiond which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his
co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA No. 3019. Sen. Estradafileda Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution
dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a
new resolution dismissing the charges against him.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's 27 March 2014

Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present PetitionforCertiorari under Rule
65 and soughttoannul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.

ISSUE:

Sen. Estrada raised the following ground in his Petition:

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE

CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN.
ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.

HELD:

The Ombudsman's denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada's Request did
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada's
constitutional righttodue process.

First There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent
with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial
of his Requestforthe counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however,foilsto specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsoryrequirementof due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada's
claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish theresDondentwith a CODV of the complaint and the supporting
 4

affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
therespondent.This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman when it states, a[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses]
have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to arei affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously,
the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the
issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada's Request. Although Section
4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a
respondent "shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be
construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that "the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The
"supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-
respondents.

Second. Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the
respondent" to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the
affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are
the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately
succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have "access to the
evidence on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of
Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with the "affidavits and other supporting documents" submitted by "the complainant
or supporting witnesses." Thus, a respondent's "access to evidence on record" in Section
4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.

Third. Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
"[t|he respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted bv the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A
respondent'srightto examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of
the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the correspondents should be furnished to a respondent.

Justice Velasoo's dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes
(Reyes case), an administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and
standards apply. Sen. Estrada's Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation
stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the
Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
applies in Sen. Estrada's Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory
character or by analogy.
 5

In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits happened in

the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes' dismissal from
the service. In Sen. Estrada's Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the
preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the
purpose of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen.
Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre^
trial or even during the trial. We shouldrememberto consider the differences in adjudicating
cases, particularly an administrative case and a criminal case:

Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quantum of proof and adjective rules vary
depending on whether the cases to which thev are meant to apply are criminal, civil or
administrative in character. In criminal actions, proof bevondreasonabledoubt isrequiredfor
conviction; in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a
judgment: and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of hisrights,such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, therightsof
a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

The quantum of evidence now required in

preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a

preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine
the witnesses which the complainant may present.
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound, clarfficatory questions to the parties
or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine.

Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional

right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right
to confront the witnesses aoainst him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with
 6

entirely without infringing the constitutionalrightof an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial.

Ref:

OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES, 658 SCRA 626

(October 5,2011) i

Due process: Is (here violation of the

petitioner'srightto due process of law If
he did not present evidence In his behalf
in the Sandioanbavan but merely
"adopted" the evidence presented bv his
co-accused therein based on the advise of
his lamer?

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No, 211703, December 10,2014

THE FACTS:

On January 9, 2014. petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, together with his co-accused, Governor RODOLFO G. VALENCIA. His Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan on March 14, 2014. Hence, this
Petition before the Supreme Court claiming violation of his right to due process because
"insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer*.

ISSUE:

Was he denied due process of law because of Insufficient legal assistance by his
former lawyer" who advised him just to adopt the evidence of his co-accused and not to present
his own evidence?

HELD:

Petitioner was not denied due process of law.

According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his

former lawyer" who informed him that "there was no necessity to present any evidence." His
former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said
counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare and file a
memorandum* and "merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused
Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings
and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner's defense." Thus,
petitioner avers that his constitutionalrightsto procedural and substantive due process and of
' •« » «...__ I . _ I _ A _ _J
 7

In its Comment dated September 30, 2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
opposed petitioner's plea to reopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing
Laaua v. CA. they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and resolution
since "a client is bound bv the action of his counsel."

The Offiqe of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an
opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process.
While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised bv his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is notenqernecessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify
as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the
proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the
Sandiganbayan's finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of
evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former

Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a
memorandum for him" since the records show that petitioner's former counsel had belatedly
filed a memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of
justice.

Ref.

TAN VS. TAN, G.R. No. 167139, February 25,2010

DBF VS. COURT OF APPEALS, January29,1999
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE 0. BAUTISTA vs. WINSTON JOSEPH
Z CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO, and EVELYN CORDERO, G.R. No. 144118,
July 21,2004.

Due process: Failure to present evidence

by the lawyer is not gross negligence
which results in violation of the client's
righttodue process of law.

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C.

ALMENDRAS, G.R. No. 179491, January 14,2015.

THE FACTS:

The petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker
Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil
Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:

This is to notify your good self and your staff that one
ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not
vested with any authority to liaison or transact any
business with any department, office, or bureau, public or
 8

otherwise, thai has bearing or relation with my office,

mandates or functions, xxx.

Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr.

Alexis "Dodong" C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is
a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who
ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused
pain to the family when he tiled cases against us: his
brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother. I
deemed that his act of transacting business that affects
my person and official functions is malicious in purpose,
done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of
harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and
evil objectives. May I therefore request the assistance of
your office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees of the
House of Representatives.

These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner,
assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad
faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras' good name. Hence, the
latter filed an action for damages arisingfromlibel and defamation against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.

in the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except
his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus
submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed.
For the sufferings, socialridicule,defamation and dishonor caused by petitioner's letters,
respondent was awarded damages, as follows: "P5,000,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorney's fees in
the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial
court. He appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming violation of hisrightto due process of law.
The CA, however, ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was
given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings
by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. The appellate court also ruled
that the letters were not privileged communications, since petitioner was not acting as a
member of the Congress when he sent them.

ISSUES;

(11 Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;

xxx

HELD:

Petition denied.
 9

Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged
communications. He insists that he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, being then a Congressman duty-bound
to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his elder
brother.

Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or published. They were
sent merelytowarn the individuals of respondent's nefarious activities, and made in good faith
and without any actual malice. Respondent's testimony that he learned the existence of the
letter from others cannot be countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it is only
hearsay.

On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his
own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner's
ailment and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the
hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctor's strict advice since he earlier
underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke's Medical Center-Heart Institute
in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial was filed. While his counsel represents him, the tatter's mistakes should not deprive him of
his day in courttopresent his side.

Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only
exception is when the neolioence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that
the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case and
allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However, perusing the
case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.

Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his
medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing lull well that he had a
pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of
the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he
rightfully expected counseltoamply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await
the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken
the initiative "of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status
of his case." For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow
petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no
knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case
and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

Presumption of innocence: Failure of the

apprehending policemen to comply with
the "chain of evidence rule" under Section
21 of RA No. 9165. including the 24-hour
period to turn over to the Crime
Laboratory an alleged confiscated
prohibited drugs against a suspect
 10

entitles the fatter to acquittal based on

presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS SUMILI, G.R.

No. 212160, February 4,2015

The Facts

On June 30,2006, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Sumiii of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 stating that That, on or about June 7,2006, in the City of lligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without having
been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1)
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as Shabu for
the amount of P200.00..."

According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency lligan City Sub-Office received a report from a confidential informant that Sumiii was
seing shabu. Acting on the same, SP02 Edgardo Englatiera (SP02 Englatiera) dispatched
SP02 Diosdado Cabahug (SP02 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumiii, which confirmed
the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently, SP02 Englatiera organized a team
divided into two (2) groups and briefed them on the buy-bust operation. He also prepared the
marked money, consisting of one (1) two hundred peso (P200.00) bill, with serial number
L507313.

At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team headed to the
target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili's house to buy shabu. After
Sumiii let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been
consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumiii escaped
by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house. The
poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SP02 Englatiera, who marked the
same with "DC-1," representing the initials of SP02 Cabahug. SP02 Englatiera then prepared
arequestfor laboratory examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Cariito Ong (NUP
Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. However, NUP Ong foiled to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime
Laboratory was already closed. It was only on June 9.2006. or two (2) davs after the buv-
bust operation, that NUP Ona was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.

Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

The Issue

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Sumili's conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Rulino
 11

The appeal is meritorious.

In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of

dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment. Note that what remains material for conviction is the proof that
the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus \
delicti. It is also important that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be
preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused
must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement removes any
unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.

As held in

Peopfe v. Viterbo:

In every prosecutionforillegal sale of dangerous drugs under

Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements
must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the corresponding payment for it As the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of
the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond reasonable doubt Thus, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over
the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from
the accused up to the time it was presented in court as
proof of the corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial
chain process, the Court, in the case of People v. Cervantes
[(600 Phil. 819,836 [2009])), held:

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody

rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain, x x x.

The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary

doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if
not altogether removed." (Emphases and underscoring
siinnltarfl
 12

To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending
team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items
were seized, or the accused's or the person's representative or counsel, a representative from
the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the
copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP CrimeLaboratoiy
within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sum! due to unjustified gaps
in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
may be gleaned from the established facts, the buy-bust operation was conducted on June 7,
2006. When SP02 Englatiera seized the sachet from Sumili, he marked the same with the
initials aDC-1" and, later, he returned to the police station to prepare the request for the
examination of the sachet's contents. Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong to bring the sachet as
well as therequestto the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

However, NUP Ong failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust operation as he
only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9,2006, or two (2) days after
the buy-bust operation. Undoubtedly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
hadteencompromised.

It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the

presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity
of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground ofreasonabledoubt becomes a matter ofright,as a
consequence of hisrighttobe presumed innocent.

Ref:

IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES AND VIOLATION

OF SECTION 21. RA 9165. ENTITLES THE ACCUSED OF
ACQUITTAL.

PEOPLE VS. NACUA, January 30,2013....marking

was done at the police station

PEOPLE VS. SAMMY ABDUL UMAPING, April 25,

2012...The marking were obviously made at the police station
because it was there that the police learned of the complete
initial of the accused as "SAU" which was the markings in the
seized shabu.

PEOPLE VS. MARAORAO, June 20 2012...a

mtnvtfi ikop rAnfienofaH ku tha nnlSoa urban nno nf hi/n
(2) persons allegedly selling shabu escaped. There is doubt
on who of the 2 men was holding it because 1 policeman
testified it was dropped by the man who was able to escape
while another policeman testified that it was dropped by
Maraorao.
PEOPLE VS. KIMURA. April 27, 2004...the shabu
was marked at the police station; i

PEOPLE VS. ALCUIZAR. April 6, 2011...The

accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation in the street.
After his arrest, the police searched his house revealing more
shabu. The shabu was marked only in the police station;

PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN. January 12, 2011...it was

marked by the police investigator to whom the seized shabu
was turned over. Obviously, it was marked at the police
station;

PEOPLE VS. ULAT. October 5, 2011—the private

poseur buver said he affixed his signature to the sachet of
shabu upon seizure but the policeman claims it was he who
marked the same..

ULEP VS. PEOPLE. June 11, 2011...RTC Laoag

City...The Police Chief Inspector claimed that he received the
tipfroman asset so that they went to arrest the accused.
Another policeman claims that he received the tip from the
asset then thev went to arrest the accused;

PEOPLE VS. GARRY PE LA CRUZ. June 8, 2011

no photographs submitted as evidence; no inventory;

BONDAD VS. PEOPLE. December 10, 2008...No

pictures

PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN. June 29,

2010...only one sachet of shabu taken from the alleged
shabu queen. Unbelievable and contrary to common human
experience.

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE. January 20. 2010.

One policeman claimed in his testimony that he was the
one who delivered a single sachet of shabu recovered
from the accused to the evidence custodian. Then, another
policeman claimed that it was he who delivered it.

The Reproductive Health Law Is Partly

 14

Unconstitutional. The Constitutional

Rights involved in the Reproductive
Health Law an the Right to life, freedom
of religion, freedom of expression, right to
privacy, family, efc.

JAMES IMBONG, ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, ET

AL., G.R. No. 204819, April 8,2014 and 13 companion
cases

Perez, J.

These fourteen (14) cases question the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, RA No. 10354, known as the RH Law because it
allegedly violates several constitutional provisions.

ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS

AND HOW THE SUPREME COURT
RESOLVED THEM

1. Therightto life (Section 12. Art II. Constitution) because of its declared
policy allowing the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and iniectables which are abortives despite the policy of the law
against abortion.

The petitioners claim that though the law prohibits abortion, it allows
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb thus sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
and prior to implantation contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life. The respondents are
of the view that life begins upon "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Majority of the members of the Supreme Court are of the view that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided though the ponente is of the belief that life begins at "fertilization" or when
there is union between the male sperm and the female ovum..

Based from the deliberation of the framers of the Constitution, life begins at
"conception" under Art. II, Section 12. The Constitution, however, did not ban
contraceptives. Contraceptives that kill or destroy a fertilized ovum should be
deemed abortive but contraceptives that prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum which takes place before fertilization SHOULD NOT BE
DEEMED ABORTIVE AND THUS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE. What the
RH Law prohibits are abodifacients.
 15

2. Theriahtto health and therightto protection against hazardous products

because contraceptives are hazardous to one's health as it causes cancer
and other health problems:

The petitioners claim that the law is unconstitutional because it allows the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intraurine devices, injectables, and family
i products and supplies though theriskof developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women
who never use them.

Section 15. Art. II. Sections 11.12. and 13 of Art. XIII as well as Section 9
of Art XVi of the Constitution all deals with therightto health of the citizen and
these provisions are all self-executory. There exists adequate safeguards in the
RH Law to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public because the distribution and dispensation of contraceptives
shall still require the prescription of a physician.

3. Therightto eoual protection is violated because It discriminates against the

ooor because it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use.

The argument has no basis. There is real and substantial distinction. In

fact, Section 11, Art XIII of the Constitution recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people.

4. Theriohtto free speech and religious freedom are violated because the law
requires a conscientious objector /to the RH Lawl to refer a patient to
another who is willing to do a particular procedure if it is against his belief
and it also uses government money to procure contraceptives.

The Supreme Court held that the provision which states that the conscientious
objectortothe RH procedure sought (who could be a phys/clan) has the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services and information to another
medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs is
unconstitutional. It amounts to requiring a conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do thereby violating his or her religious beliefs.

Section 5 of Art. Ill provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The first "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring
any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions". It mandates strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a statereligionand the use of publicresourcesfor the support or
prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. Under this, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestation of one's belief and faith.
 16

In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. As held in Estrada vs. Escritur,
"benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the "cpompelling

i state interest test" is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test s the
notion that free exercise is a fundamentalrightand that laws burdening it should
be subject to strict scrutiny.

The Supreme Court held that IT IS NOT WITHIN ITS PROVINCE TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES OR ONE'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE SUPPORT OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
MEASURES IS MORAL FROM A RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT OR WHETHER THE
SAME IS RIGHT OR WRONG ACCORDING TO ONE'S DOGMA OR BELIEF. The
SC declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of civil courts.

Finally, the provision which punishes a health care service provider who fails
or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient due to his religious beliefs is unconstitutional for it violates his
freedom of religion.

5. It violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude because

medical practitioners are compelled to provide 46 hours of pro bono
services to indigent women to be accredited under the PHILHEALTH
Program, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment

The argument has no merit because the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a
mere privilege and not aright.The practice of medicine is imbued with public
interest and it is both a power and duty of the State to control andregulatesuch
profession in order to protect and promote public health as it directly involves the
life of the people.

6. it violates the equal protection of the law because it discriminates against

the ooor as it makes them the target of the RH Law that promotes
contraceptive use. Likewise, the IRR which provides that provincial, citv or
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurses...who bv virtue of
their offices are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of this act CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS is unconstitutionaltorviolative of the equal protection clause.

Such provision is indeed unconstitutional. There is no real and substantial

distinction why medical practitioners are allowed torefuseto perform a procedure
because it violates their religious beliefs but the foregoing officials are not allowed to
follow theirreligiousbeliefs on the matter. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT. HOWEVER.
 17

THAT EVEN A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MAY BE FORCED TO PERFORM A

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURE EVEN IF IT IS AGAINST HIS RELIGIOUS
BELIEF IN LIFE-THREATENING CASES. THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE MOTHER
SHALL BE GIVEN PREFERENCE CONSIDERING THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER
MEDICAL PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF MEDICAL SERVICE
WHICH WOULD UNNECESARILY PLACE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE
DANGER.

7. The RH Law is avoid for vagueness In violation of the due process clause
because the law suffers from vagueness when it mentions "private health
service provider" who could be held liable but the same was not defined bv
the law.

The argument lacks merit since the law defines a public health care service
provider and "private health care service providerThe fact that "private
health service provider" was used in Section 7 should not be a cause of
confusion since it is definitely analogous to *private health care service
provider*

8. The RH Law violates the constitutional orovishns on the family when it

allows a spouse, without the knowledge and consent of the other, in
undergoing a procedure like vasectomy or tubal ligation.

The SC held this is indeed unconstitutional. This is so because "family" is shared

by both spouses. One person cannot found a family. There should be "mutual decision-
making."

The provision which allows minors or minors who are already parents or has had
miscarriage to undergo a procedure without the consent of the parents is also
unconstitutional. It is precisely in these situations when the minor needs the comfort,
care, advice and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. This is based
from the constitutional provision giving the parents the natural and primaryrightsand
rearing their children for civic efficiency under Section 12, Art. Ill of the Constitution.
BUT ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY A MINOR ON MATTERS OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH PROCEDURES WITHOUT THE PARENTS' CONSENT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
PROCEDURES AND MODERN FAMILY PLANNING METHODS THEMSELVES
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PARENTS.

9. The law violates academic freedom when Section 24 mandates the teaching
of age-and development appropriate reproductive health education under
threat of fine and imprisonment This is so because it effectively forces
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even If thev
believe that the same Is not suitable to be taught to their students.

The Supreme Court held that this attack on the said provision of the RH Law
is premature considering that the Dep Ed has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education.
 18

10. The RH Law violates the non-delegation of legislative power:

It does not because the law is already complete in itself and that no other act
is to be done except to implement it.

11. The Implementing Rules and Regulations is invalid as it changes the i

definition of "abortifacienf which is "any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb0 as defined in the law to uanv drug or device that PRIMARILY
INDUCES ABORTION OR THE DESTRUCTION OF A FETUS INSIDE THE
MOTHER'S WOMB or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
Implanted in the mother's womb" as per said IRR.

The argument if valid. The IRR is invalid. The inclusion of the word "primarily" is
ultra vires.

12. The RH Law violates the ONE SUBJECT rule under Section 26111. Art VI of
the Constitution:

The petitioners claim that while the subject of the law in its title is
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD, but its true
intent is to act as a population control measure in violation of due process.

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the whole idea of
contraception pervades in the entire RH Law because it provides for a full range of
family planning products and methods but also has provisions on pre-natal and
post natal care. Be that as it may, the same does not violate the one subject rule
citing CAWAUNG. JR. VS. COMELEC AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH
ESCjJDERO where the Supreme Court held that "the one title-one subject rule
does not require the Congress to empby in the title of the eneactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue aff the contents and the minute
details therein. THE RULE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IF THE TITLE IS
COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH AS TO INCLUDE THE GENERAL OBJECT WHICH
THE STATUTE SEEKS TO EFFECT, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE PERSONS
INTERESTED ARE INFORMED OF THE NATURE, SCOPE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED LAW AND ITS OPERATION.' As such,
"reproductive health' and "responsible parenthood' are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth in achieving sustainable
human devetopment.

13. The RH Law violates the Natural law.

The Supreme Court held that the court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis
for upholding or invalidating a law. Its only guidepost is the Constitution.
 19

14. The RH Law violates the autonomy of local government and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao because thevare also tasked to Implement the
RHLaw.

The said contention has no merit. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government has still the say when it comes to national priority programs
which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest

Most provisions of the "Online Libel Law"

are constitutional and not violative of the
freedom of expression. Other provisions
are violative Of thefreedomof expression,
righttoorivaev and search and seizure
provisions of the Constitution.

JESUS DISINIET AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, February 18,2014, and
companion cases

Abad, J.
i
THE FACTS:

The above cases seek to declare as unconstitutional the following provisions of RA No.
10175, the Cybercrime prevention Act of 2012:

1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access;

2. Section 4 [a] (3) on Data interference;
3. Section 4 faj (6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4 [bj (3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4 [cj (1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography;
7. Section 4 [cj (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
8. Section 4 [c] (4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher;
11. Section 7 on the prosecution both under the Revised Penal Code and RA
No. 10175;
12. Section 8 on penalties;
13. Section 12 onreal-timecollection of traffic data;
14. Section 13 on preservation of computer data;
15. Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data;
1 fi Sertinn 17 nn rlestn irtinn nf rnmm iter data-
 20

17. Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data;

18. Section 20 on Obstruction of justice;
19. Section 24 on cybercrime investigation and coordinating center (CICC);
and
20. Section 26 [a] on CICC's powers on the crime of Libel.
21. Some petitioners likewise raised the constitutionality of related Articles
353,354, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of Libel.

Held:

1- Section 4 fal (1) on Illegal Access provides that it is an "offense against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer date systems" for -the
access to the whole oranv part of a computer system without right".

The said provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The SC held that nothing in the said
Section calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental
freedom like speech is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act-
accessing the computer system of another withoutright.It is a universally condemned
conduct.

[NOTE: The strict scrutiny standard deals with the test on the constitutionality
of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden, in these cases, is on the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. Later on, the strict scrutiny standard was
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or
race as well as other fundamentalrights,as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection. (WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA. 576 SCRA
416)1

2. Section 4 fal (3) provides that It is an "offense against the confidentiality,

integrity and availability of computer data systems" for "the intentional or
reckless alteration, damaging, deletion, or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document or electronic data message, withoutrightIncluding the
introduction or transmission of viruses.

The petitioners claims that this section suffers from "overbreadth" in that while it
seekstodiscourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedom.

Under the "overbreadth doctrine", a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally

subject to stateregulation,may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject BROADLY, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms (SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, 632 SCRA 146). Section 4 [a] (3)
does not encroach on these freedoms because it SIMPLY PUNISHES WHAT
ESSENTIALLY IS A FORM OF VANDALISM, THE ACT OF WILLFULLY
 21

DESTROYING WITHOUT RIGHT THE THINGS THAT BELONGS TO OTHERS, IN

THIS CASE, THEIR COMPUTER DATA, ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT, OR
LECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE. SUCH ACT HAS NO CONNECTION TO
GUARANTEED FREEDOMS. THERE IS NO FREEDOM TO DESTROY OTHER
PEOPLE'S COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.

Of course, all penal laws have ?n inherent chilling effect on the citizens. But to
prevent the State from enacting laws of this nature would render the State powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.

3. Section 4 fal (6) or "cvber-sauattina" provides that it Is an "offense against

die confidentiality, integrity and availabUitv of computer data systems" for
"the acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit
mislead, destroy the reputation and deprive others from registering the
same. If such domain is: 111 similar, identical or confusingly similartoan
existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the
time of the domain name registration: flil identical or In anv way similar to
the name of the person other than the registrant In case of a personal name:
and fim acquired withoutrightor with intellectual property interests in it"

The petitioners claim that the said provision violates the equal protection clause
because it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who
use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody or any other literary device.
The law is constitutional because the law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring
the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The
challenge based on equal protection is baseless.

4. Section 4 fal (6) on "Identity theft" punishes the "intentional acquisition, use,
misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information
belonging to another, virhether natural or juridical, withoutright:Provided,
that if no damage has vet been caused, the penalty imoosable shall be one
degree lower.

The petitioners claim that this provision violates the due process, privacy of
correspondence and freedom of the press provisions of the Constitution.

The right to privacy or therightto be let alone, is created by the constitutional

provisions on therightagainst unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence.

In this case, the right to privacy is not violated. The law punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without the right, implicitly to cause
damage. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name,
citizenship, his residence address, hisa contact number, his place and date of birth, the
name of his spouse, if any, his occupation, and similar data.

The claim that the same is overbreadth will not hold water since the specific
conducts prohibited do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms (ike speech. It simDlv
 22

regulates acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of

personal identification data of another. THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
ACQUIRE ANOTHER'S PERSONAL DATA.

5. Section 4 Icl ft) on Cvbersex or the "wilful engagement maintenance,

control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of anv lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor
or consideration."

The petitioner claims that the above section violates thefreedomof expression
clause of the Constitution because they fear that private communications of sexual
character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes -when done "for favor"
in cyberspace.

The said section is not unconstitutional where it stands a construction that it

applies only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling or
operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

This is based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress

which show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing between and among two
private persons...although that may be a form of obscenity to some. The
understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
"engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex." The Act
actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, pornography for favor and consideration
which includes interactive prostitution and pornography via the Webcam.

6. Section 4 fcl (2) on Pornography or the pornography described in RA No.

9775 committed through a computer system provided that the penalty
imoosable shall be one 11) degree higher than that provided for in RA No.
9775.

This is constitutional because of the "potential uncontrolled proliferation of a

particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

7. Section 4 © fl) on unsolicited commercial communication or "spam" is

constitutional Plough transmitting spam amounts to trespass to one's
privacy since the person sending out spam enters the recipient's domain
without permission. But these spam do not reduce the efficiency of computers.
They can be read or deleted outright by the recipient. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expressions and do not violate the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.

8. Whether the Ubel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4© 4 of
the Cvber Crime Law are unconstitutional.

The SC held that these are constitutional because freedom of expression is not
absolute and the government has the righttoprotect the citizens from defamation.
 23

9. Section 5 which deals with "aiding or abetting in the commission of

cybercrime" Is valid but unconstitutional if it is to be applied to people who
"Like", "share" or "Comment" to a post. This is so because thev are not the
"author" of the libellous articles.

10. Section 6 and Section 8 which imposes a stiffer oenaftv on cvber Ubel is
constitutional. Fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative prerogative. Further,
the offender in using the internet often evades identification and is able to reach far
more victims or cause greater harm. As such, the higher penalties appear to be
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The distinction, therefore, creates
a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. It does not violate the equal protection
clause by reason of the graver penalty. If the same article, however, was published
in print and also posted online or vice versa, CHARGING THE OFFENDER
UNDER BOTH LAWS WOULD BE A BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. Likewise, charging the
offender under Section 4 © 2 and the Anti-Child Pornography Act separately would
likewise be tantamount to double jeopardy.

11. Section 12 which allows law enforcement authorities. WITH DUE CAUSE, to
collect orrecordbv technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
which includes the communication's origin, destination, route,time,date,
size, duration or type of underlying service. BUT NOT ITS CONTENT NOR
IDENTITIES.

The said provision IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The authority given to the

authorities is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can prevent law enforcement
authorities holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their
sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the
citizenry to leaked information, or worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in
these agencies. The power is virtually limitless enabling the authorities to engage in
fishing expedition choosing whatever communication they want based on "due cause".
This provision violates a person'srightto privacy. In WHALEN VS. ROES. 429 US
589. the United States Supreme Court classified PRIVACY into two categories: HI
decisional privacy and 121 informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the
right to independence in making certain important decisions while Informational
privacyrefersto the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Informational
privacy is violated by Section 12. Further, informational privacy has two aspects:
111 therightnottohave private information disclosed, and 121 therighttolive
freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to therightto privacy, the Supreme Court had laid down a two-fold test. The
first is the subjectivetestwhere one claiming therighthave an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test where his
or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.

11 Section 13 on preservation of computer data for a minimum period of 6

months bv the service provider is constitutional because the service
 24

provider has no obligation from keeping said data forever. The user ought to
have a copy of the said date and he could keep it No violation of his right

13. Section 14 which allows disclosure of a data obtained through a search

warrant is constitutional since it does not violate the search and seizure
provision nor the privacy of communication since the same is done only after
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.

14. Section 15 which provides for securing a computer system, make and retain
a copy of the computer date, and maintain the integrity of the relevant stored
computer date AFTER THE SEIZURE BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT is
constitutional. It merely enumerates the duties of the law enforcement authorities
to ensure the preservation of computer system or data after seizure based from a
search warrant.

15. Section 17 which provides for the destruction of computer data under
preservation and examination obtained by means of a search warrant is valid in
order to prevent the storage system of the service provider for overloading. Such
destruction of computer data does not violate therightof a person to due process
of law for deprivation of property because if wants to preserve the same, he could
save them in his computer.

16. Section 19 which autiiorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block

access to computer date IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL for H violates the search
and seizure provision and freedom of expression. This would in effect allows
the government to seize and places a computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant The DOJ Order could not supplant a judicial
search warrant It would make the government the judge, iurv and
executioner rolled into one. It also restrainsfreespeech.

17. Sections 24 and 26 (a) on the creation of a Cybercrime Investigation and

Coordinating Center (CICC) is not a undue delegation of legislative power because
the law is already complete in itself. It is just mandated to formulate and implement
a national cybersecurity plan.

The right to Due Process of law on the

part of Mayor Maliksi was violated when
he was not notified of the dates when the
COMELEC conducted the decryption,
/ointing and photocopying of the ballot
images from the CF Cards by the First
Division of the COMELEC in an appealed
case.

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and

HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13,2013
 25

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan
the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi
was then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from
the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit
the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17,2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.

On August 15,2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC's decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied hisrightto due process because he had not been notified of
the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the
integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

On September 14,2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi's motion for
reconsideration. Maliksi went to the Supreme Court reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him in violation of his
constitutional right to due process of law, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in
the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

In the decision promulgated on March 12,2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7,
dismissed Maliksi's petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination
of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing
Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion
in decidingtouse the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of
the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Division's finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been
fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the
revision.

In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi again raised the alleged
violation of his right to due process.

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings andtobe present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights
 26

when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
the First Division; (c) that the March 28,2012 and April 17,2012 orders of the First Division did
not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue
of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (cf) that he was thus completely
deprived of the opportunitytoparticipate in the decryption proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court granted Maliksi's Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12,2013 on the ground that the First Division
of the COMELEC denied to him therightto due process byfoilingto give due notice on the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.

It beaTS stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which
no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The reoount
proceedings authorized under Section 6. Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804. as
amended, are to be conducted bv the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their
exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the
autonomousreoionsl.provincial and city officials.

We should not ignore that the parties' participation during therevisionand recount
proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the
COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELEC's proceedings attain
credibility as to theresult.The parties' presence would have ensured that the requisite
procedures have beenfollowed,including the required authentication and certification that the
images to be printed are genuine. In thisregard,the COMELEC was less than candid, and was
even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots
and therecountproceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines
that the First Division hadfollowedin the appreciation of the ballots and theresultsof the
recount. In short, there was vagueness astowhat rule had been followed in the decryption and
printing proceeding.

The Supreme Court held that the Resolution does not intend to validate the victory of
any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court
simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a
cornerstone of our legal system.

Dismissal of a criminal case based on a

Demurrer to Evidence results in double
jeopardy and that no appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration nor petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 may be entertained, as a
genera/ rule. Private complainants may
not, without the participation of the
Solicitor General, question said dismissal
before the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Coot
 LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-PANGILINAN, G.
R. No. 189754, October 24,2012

The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were
charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on> the complaint
of actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4,2002 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the

City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to
bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice andridicule,cause
to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro
Manila, which among others have the following insulting and
slanderous remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGILKA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta. the meaa-taba singer-actress. I'd

like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo
yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na
ganyansiya.

Maasalita ka. Missed Cuneta. at sabihin mong hindi

ito totoo. xxx Diosmb perdon, what she gets to see
are those purportedly biting commentaries about her
katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused
to acknowledge the good reviews we've done on her.

xxx

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4,2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the

City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully andfeloniously,and with malice and ridicule, cause
to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro
 28

Manila, which, among others, have the following insulting and

slanderous remarks, to wit:

"She doesn't want kasi her husband to win as a

senator because when that happens, mawawalan
siya ng hold sa kanyaour calleriopines. Pettizou is
really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a
wimo.

"in public," our source goes on tartly, "pa kiss-kiss

siya. Pa embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa
[na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya
si Kiko.' My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He's
really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears
to be brain dead most of the time.

Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-
trial and trial of the cases ensued.

On November 14,2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence,
which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of
the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written bv Ampoloauio were not libelous
due to absence of malice.

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19,2008, respondent Sharon
Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC
Order dated April 25,2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the cases against them.

in a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondents petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25,2008 and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
MotionforReconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated September 28,2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorarifiledby
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated theirrightagainst double jeopardy.

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the
Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer
interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend
 29

that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the
allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other
words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered,
which was not corrective by a petition for certiorari with the CA.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the
view she is advancing is erroneous. T?ie authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions ami special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only
by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent
the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case,
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the
petitionforcertiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have
been outrightly dismissed by the CA.

Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set
aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners' constitutionally-
enshrinedrightagainst double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court
could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the
reversal of the Order of the RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

taking into consideration not only therightsof the accused, but also therightof the private
offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the
accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such
instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right
against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are remindedtobe more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their
decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek
 30

redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis
for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

May an accused charged of "selling"

marijuana in the criminal information be
convicted of"possession9 of marijuana
without violating his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHAD

MANANANSALA, G.R. No. 175939, April 3,2013

The information filed on October 20,1994 against the accused alleges:

"That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of

October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being lawfully authorized did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage
in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing more or less 750grams or % kilo of marijuana
dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the
cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his
possession and control.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October 18,1994 the
Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the
PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City
(Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in
Manansala'sresidencelocated at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City.

SP04 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of
Manansala's house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750
grams of dried manjuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered
from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that
included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747
used during the test buy.

After trial, accused was convicted of "possession" of marijuana only under Section 8 of
RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

issue:
 31

Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him violated when he was charged of "sale" of marijuana under Section 4 of RA No.
6425 but was convicted of "possession under Section 8 of the same law— which entitles him
to acquittal?

i He|d:

The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425 or "sale" of prohibited drugs, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned
under such information, Manansala pleaded not guiltytoit. But instead of finding him guilty of
the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8, of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

The accused now questions said conviction based on the alleged violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

While no convictionforthe unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the
present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in
the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another
Quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered bv or included in the sale and which are
probably Intended for some future dealings or use bv the seller. In this case. it has been
satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were
the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals committed noreversibleerror in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.

To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the

conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege,
instead offora violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
him. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the
rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
of the essential elements or Ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA No.

9165 entities the accused to acquittal based
on his constitutional presumption of
innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY

UMIPANG, G.R. No. 190321, April 25,2012
 32

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling
drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the
[Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City
Police was dispatched on April 1,2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2]
Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a P500.00 marked money. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon arrival at the area, P02 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the
length of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential
informant and P02 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
"Sam, pa-iskor kami" Samreplied"Magkanoang iiskorin nyoT The confidential informant said
"Five hundred pesos." Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance with various price tags-500, 300, and 100. After making a .choice, P02 Gasid
handed the marked P500.00 to Sam whoreceivedthe same.

Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, P02 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team joined them. P01 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance
were recovered from Sam. P02 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which stood for
Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant].
Sam wasforthwithbrought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and
identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. P02 Gasid then brought the
confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.

THERE WAS NO INVENTORY NOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFORE THE

CONFISCATED ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE CRIME LABORATORY FOR TESTING.

Despite the above lapses, accused was convicted by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.

Before the Supreme Court, accused moves for his acquittal because said non-
compliance of Section 21, RA No. 9165 is fatal and in furtherance of his constitutional
presumption of innocence.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint
Decision in all respects because there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given
full faith and credence.

Held:

At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmedfroma buy-bust operation
conducted by the SAID-SOTF.
 33

Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official

duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-bv-steo procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment.

Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that oenal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, "the procedure
set out in the law will be mere lip service." The conduct of the buy-bust operations was
peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items from accused-appellant.

First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, P02 Gasid used the initials of the complete name,
including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated
sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However,
a careful perusal of thetestimonyof P02 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge
of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the tatter's full name, was not
clearly established.

Evidence on record does not establish that P02 Gasid had prior knowledge of
the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled
theformerto mark the seized items with the tatter's complete initials. This suspicious,
material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how P02
Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the tatter's statements at the
police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking
really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved. All that was established was that it was P01 Saez who asked
accused-appellant about the tatter's personal circumstances, including his true identity,
and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police
station.

Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek
the third-partyrepresentativesenumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under
the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in
the presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice
(DOJ). and from anv ejected public official.

Indeed, the absence of theserepresentativesduring the physical inventory and the

marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to
contact the baranaav chairperson or any member of the baranaav council. There is no
indication that thev contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show
whether the police officers tried to net in touch with anv DOJrepresentative.Nor does the
SAID-SOTF adduce anv justifiablereasonforfailing to do so - especially censjderino that it
had sufficient time from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused
until thfctimftrtf his armftt Thus find that thera was nn nonnino onA oiMriani nffnrt An 4ha
 34

part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so much

Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take
photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the
defense during trial, the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of
P02 Gasid - the arresting officer who prepared the certificate - thus making the certificate'
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor
offered anyreasonforfailingto do so. Wereiteratethat these requirements are specifically
outlined in andrequiredto be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted especially true when
the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds."-There
must also be a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were
thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason." However, when there is gross disregard
of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty
is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. This uncertainty cannot beremediedby simply invoking the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
As aresult,the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the
crimes charged, creatingreasonabledoubt on the criminal liability of the accused which entitles
himtoacquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

When the evidence is susceptibletotwo (2)

interpretations, one consistent with the guilt of
the accused and the other, his innocence, the
preemption of innocence was not overcome
and the accused is entitled to acquittal as a
matter of right

PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO. 174369, June

20,2012

Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4,2001 filed before the RTC of
Manila for llegal possession of shabu.

On March 19,2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.

For the prosecution, P03 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they
receivedreliableinformation at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that
an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the
early morning of the following day. On November 30,2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and P02
Mamelito Abella, P01 Joseph dela Cruz, and SP01 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center.
While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talkingtoeach other. Upon
 35

noticing them, one ran away. P02 Abella and P01 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.

Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He
was about to run when P03 Vigilla held him, while SP01 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The
man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the
contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white (Crystalline substance,
which they suspected to beshabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic
sachet "ZM-1" in the presence of the police officers.
The specimen was thenforwardedto the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/lnsp. Miladenia 0. Tapan, the
1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry
Report No. D-1121-00.

In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30,2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he
was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his
mother. He went there early because he had toreportfor work at the Port Area in Manila at
8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number
which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down. When
they turned around, they sawfourmen in civilian attire walking briskly. He onlyfoundout that
they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away,
the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of
what was inside the bag.

He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of shabu which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Held:

Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping

with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt
is proven beyondreasonabledoubt

Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or

the shabu in this case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyondreasonabledoubt the
following elements: (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the
appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the fact of possession by
appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place.

The testimony of P03 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the trial and
the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting officers P03 Vigilla, P02
Abella, P01 dela Cruz and SP01 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons
standing and seemingly conversing afewmeters ahead of them. "However, when one of them
noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind
the other person and a maroon colored bag with 'Adidas' marking in the pavement." In other
words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, P03 Vigilla
testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other, and
 36

upon noticing them, "one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while
the other one dropped a bag, sir. Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by
the one who did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part of his
testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as
to who between the two persons they saw talking to each other ran
away, P03 Vigilla categorically answered, "ftjhe one who is holding a bag, sir.
i
Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of
the prosecution's principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt for it
renders questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its
contents.

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While a lone
witness' testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must
be dear, consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is
consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible
witness and be credible in itself - tested by human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the
foregoing, the prosecution failedtoestablish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional

principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving
that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence, the prosecution's evidence failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have
been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy
of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted
as a matter of right.

There is violation of the right to due

process if the court grants a litigant more
titan the relief he prayed tor in his
pleadings—even If the defendant was
declared in default

DIONA VS. BALANGUE,

G.R. No. 173559, January 7,2013

On March 2,1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable

in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property
located in Manilas. Valen7iiela andrcwererihv Transfer nertifinato nf Titfo (Trm Nn \/-
 37

12296.7 When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus,
on September 17,1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint8 praying that respondents be
ordered:

(a) To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.
i
(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no
case be less than P10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorney's fee, plus P2,000.00
per hearing as appearance fee.

(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned
parcel of land, andforthe disposition of the proceeds [thereofl in accordance with law,
upon failure of the [respondents]tofully pay [petitioner] within the period set by law the
sums setforthin this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny).
On October 15,1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public
Attorney's Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested
extension, however, respondents failedtofile any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitionertopresent her evidence
ex parte.

In a Decisionl 1 dated October 17,2000, the RTC granted petitioner's Complaint. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner], ordering the

[respondents] to pay the [petitioner] as follows: a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5%
per month [s/c] reckoned from March 2,1991, until the same is fully paid; b) P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus cost of suit;

Held:

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to
due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not craved for in the pleadings or in
access of what is beino sought bv the party. Thev cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations
require that judgments must conform to and be supported bv the pleadings and
evidence presented In court In Devebpment Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court
expounded that

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to

enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings,
 38

absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged
in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid
obligation. "Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver
to contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as
well as applicable jurisprudence.

Private complainant could not file a

Motion for Recosndieradon of the
Supreme Court Decision acquitting the
accused based on misappreciation of
facts without violating the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864,

January 18,2011 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No.
176389, January 18,2011

On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and RTC of Paranaque and acquitted the accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, <
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28,2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the

victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the

accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense, xxx

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being

punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this
provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he
has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the Statefora sustained and repeated
 39

litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will
to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:

[AJt the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The
provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. Society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested In the
willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.

(X course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.

But the pounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused
gravely ^used its discretion,resultingin loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In
any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.

He ascribes grave error on the Court'sfindingthat Alfaro was not a credible witness and
assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private
complainant wants the Court toreviewthe evidence anew and render another judgment based
on such are-evaluation.This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely arepeatedattempt
to secure Webb, et ats conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al isfinaland can no
longer be disturbed. Double jeopardy has set in.

State'srighttodue process of law; when

the State may validly question by
Certiorari under Rule 65 a decision
acquitting and accused or to Increase the
penalty without violating the rule against
Double jeopardy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and
GILBERT DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7,2012

The privaterespondentswere the accused in two criminal informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging them with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
nhameft amse fmm the transactions that the rasnnnrients nartininateri in. in their official
 40

capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under
the MHS' Kabisig Program.

After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The
prosecution's chief evidence was based on the brietestimonyof Commission of Audit (COA)
Auditor lluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the
subject funds.

COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory
of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task
Force. She emphasized that the auditteamfoundit highly irregular that the motor vehicles
were registered in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this
reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS.

After COA Auditor Cortez* testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of
evidence and rested its case.

Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to

evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15,1997, January 5,1998
and January 28,1998; on January 27,1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating
thatftwas not opposing the demurrers to evidence.

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the

respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22,2002. In dismissing these criminal
cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the
two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.

The Issues

1. Whether the prosecutor's actions and/or omissions (of not presenting other
witnesses and for not opposing the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused) in these
cases effectively deprived the State of itsrightto due process; and

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the

demurrers to evidence of the respondents [and as such, double jeopardy has not
set in] for a review by the Supreme Court of the guilt or innocence of the private
respondents.

Held:

The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the
nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to
prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the State's interest in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case
of Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345, where the Court nullified the dismissal of
the criminal cases duetothe serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor.

The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amountingtolack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to
 41

the State's interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the
presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds
involved and the special prosecutor's failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence.

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to
an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy (PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449).
Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of
judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double
jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA
185, June 16,2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party's due process rights,
PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13,2000.

A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process
implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the
judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not
have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused's

demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based
on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of
additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special
prosecutor's conduct The special prosecutor's conduct allegedly also violated the State's due
process rights.

The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective
legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents,
citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual circumstances
• (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was
insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take
the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence
when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial court's failure to require the
presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these
circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the State's right to due process, attributable
to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court.

In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor
deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be
secured.

We take this opportunity toremindthe prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in
behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the
State,forthe purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. Therefore, unless the petitioner
 42

demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions
from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the
finality-of-acquittal rule.

Double jeopardy when not applicable in a

petition under Rule 65 to increase tiie
penalty as a result of grave abuse of i
discretion by the trial court

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND people of the
Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
et al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1,2012

[THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]

FACTS

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien"
Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On1 the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to
Rufb's Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also
an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on whattoexpect during the initiationrites.The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiationriteswere scheduled to lastforthree days. After their "briefing " they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan Cityforthe commencement of their initiation.

The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallelrowsof Aquilans, eachrowdelivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express,"
which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiationrites),while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) arrived and demanded that theritesbe reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiationrites.Thefraternitymembers, including Dizon and
 43

Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it senttfimsprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. t

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans

After trial, the court held that:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants - Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,

Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Urn, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino ef a/.)
- were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants - Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony

Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson ef al.) - were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor.

3. Two of the accused-appellants-Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal-

were found guilty beyondreasonabledoubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The People of the Philippines filed a Petition under Rule 65 questioning the acquittal
and the lower penalty on the four (4) accused and also argues that the rule on double
jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court's finding of
conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

Held:

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated - either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused - the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle isfoundedupon the law
ofreason,justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found
in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the State from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. Therequisitesfor
invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is
filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant
 44

was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the defendant's express consent.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA
383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. The third instance refers to
this Court's judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner byreasonof passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be atriskof double jeopardy.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 PetitionforCertiorari, which seeks thereversalof (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al.forthe lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by D'izon and
Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa's consent to hazing. In our view, what the
Petition seeks is that wereexamine,reassess,andreweighthe probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petitionforreviewunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. - the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
.... \

The assailed Judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Santug - the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries has to be modified.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CAreasonedthus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the

exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and
Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the
duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required, xxx
And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should
be deemed only as slight physical injuries.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon - as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa - is contrary to the CA's own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the
 45

only logical conclusion is that criminalresponsibilityshould redoundtoaft those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.

The CA Decision was therefore MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson were found GUILTY beyondreasonabledoubt of reckless imprudenceresultingin
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 inrelationto Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term offour(4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months dfpriston correctional, as
maximum.

The Decision of acquittal could not bereviewedforit would violate the accused's right
against double jeopardy since it was not done with grave abused of discretion nor violated the
State'srighttodue process of law.

Double jeopardy after acquittal on the

merits; exceptions when no double
jeopardy has set in and that the Decision
of acquittal may be questioned under Rule
65.

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO vs. HON. TERESITA DE

CASTRO, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FIRST DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 190963, February 6,
2012

The Facts:

Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan,
for violation of RA No. 3019 for and failing to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal basis, her RATA
for the months of August, September, October, November and December, all in the year
2000.... and her Productivity Pay in the year 2000 and despite demands made upon...

In a decision dated October 1,2009, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held
that the second element of the offense - that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith - was not
present. The Sandiganbayan pronounced:

This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA.
However, the antecedent facts and circumstances did not show any indicia
of bad faith on the part of [Ysidoro] in withholding the release of Doner's
RATA.

In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in
honest belief that Doller was not entitled to her RATA based on the
 46

opinion of the COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual.

It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless,

[Ysidoro's] reliance to the same was a clear basis of good faith on his part
in withholding Doner's RATA.

The People filed a Petition under Rule 65 to reverse the decision of acquittal insisting
that Ysidoro was in bad faith and therefore, the second element of the offense was present.

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and
exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction in notfindingYsidoro in badfetthwhen he withheld
Doner's RATA and deprived her of her productivity bonus.

In his Comment, Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and
substantive infirmities. He insists that he can no longer be prosecuted for the same criminal
charge without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

Held:

Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to
appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before the Supreme Court. The first is by
ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The second is by a petitionforreviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is
by filing a special civil actionforcertiorari under Rule 65. Each proceduralremedyis unique
and providesfora different mode ofreview.In addition, each procedural remedy may only be
availed of depending on the nature of the judgment soughttobe reviewed.

Areviewby ordinary appealresolvesfactual and legal issues. Issues which have not
been properly raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case
are alsoresolvedin this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45
petition is generally limited to thereviewof legal issues; the Court onlyresolvesquestions of
law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under
this mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given
set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the
propriety of the trial court's jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction.

While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is

considered an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule
65 is characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial court's authority
to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition tackle errors committed by the trial
court in the appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65
petitionresolvesjurisdictional errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In
other words, errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45
petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.
 47

As applied to judgments rendered In criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65

petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45
petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno, the constitutionalrightof the accused against
double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of ordinary
appeal and a Rule 45 petition.

However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule
65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of
acquittalrenderedwith grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the
prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not
apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve areviewof facts and law
on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicialreviewdoes
not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the
evidence, it does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.
Areviewunder Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered
decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other words, the focus
of thereviewis to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.

Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was In the
case at bar, the imputed errorsfoilsto establish grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule, misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors
were committed,riseto the level of grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot review a
verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed by the
Sandiganbayan. Double jeopardy has set in.

A case for reckless imprudence resulting

to homicide, slight physical injuries and
damage to property may not be the
subject of more than one information.
Acquittal or conviction in other bars
prosecution in the other based on the
right against double jeopardy.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA

MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE,
G.R. No. 172716, November 17,2010

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367)forinjuries sustained byrespondentEvangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366)forthe death of respondent Ponce's husband Deputy Executive Secretary Nestor C.
 48

Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bad tor his temporary
release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004. petitioner pleaded auiltv to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
movedtoouash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in ieooardv of
second punishmentforthe same offense ofrecklessimprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

Issue: Is the right against double jeopardy violated?

Held:

Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars

his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366. Double
jeopardy has set in.

The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdictrenderedby a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Criminal
Case No. 82367 wasrenderedby a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus,
the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries Is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additionalfeetwhich the other does not."

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its

Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

As held by Mr. Justice J.B.L Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent

prosecutionfor"serious physical injuries and damage to property thrurecklessimprudence"
because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thrurecklessimprudence,"
with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or

acquitted of a specific act ofrecklessimprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted againforthat same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent acttiiat,if intentbnally done, would be
punishable as afelony.The Ism penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
 49

not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is oiily taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecuthns. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article

365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling

under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary meansforcommitting the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penaltyforthe most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony
but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of theresultingconsequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crimeresultingin one or more consequences.

Equal protection clause was violated

when the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 singled out only the officials and
employees of the "previous
administration" to be investigated for
graft and corruption and other crimes
committed by public officers.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE

TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 :
December 7,2010

President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30,2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent
provisions of said executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. - There is hereby

created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports
of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that
shnrk anH nffenri the mnrai anrt ethical SAnsihilitiPR ftf the
 50

people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-

principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration: and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to
be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
i
The Philippine Truth Commission's (PTC) primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

The petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional for violative of the
equal protection clause as it discriminates the public officials under the administration of former
President Gloria Arroyo even though there are reports of corruptions also in the administrations
before that of Pres. Arroyo.

Held:

Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of
the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality ofrightwhich is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Corrstftution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form ot undue favoritism or
hostility from the government.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning thereportedcases of graft and comiption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration of
former President Gloria Arroyo is plain, patent and manifest.

That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can
be gleaned from thefeetthat it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event orreportto befocusedon unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.''

Whether the grant of COLA to military and

police personnel to the exclusion of other
government employees violates the equal
protection clause.
 51

VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, et al vs. DEPARTMENT OF

BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 153266,
March 18,2010

Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, to rationalize the compensation of government employees.
Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances ahd additional compensation already
being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain
additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation
particularly those in the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police.

Issue:

Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police

personnel to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause.

Held:

Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the
exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other
national government officials does run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the Mowing requirements:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.

Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from
other national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the
maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere
in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost
areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is
intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.

Is tha provision of Hie Omnibus

Election Code declaring appointive
officials deemed resigned from their
positions upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy while elected
 52

officials are not violative of the equal

protection clause?

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR. VS.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22,2010

The main issue in this case is! whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed
automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (while the
elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

On December 1,2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio Nachura held that
the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws are unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause. The COMELEC moved for a reconsideration of the said
Decision.

Held:

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive

officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.

Accused are entitled to acquittal despite

the positive Identification of a witness
who is not credible and whose testimony
is full of inconsistencies and contrary to
common human experience

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864,

December 14, 2010 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No.
176389, December 14,2010

On June 30,1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old,
and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parafiaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.
 53

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NB1 announced that it
had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also
tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact,
i
The Regional Trial Court of Parafiaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart
remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying
they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb's alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed
that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition,
the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro's detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it,
the trial court found a credible witness in her. it noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court
remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro's April 28 and May 22,1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend,
accused Estrada and convicted all the accused..

Held:

Since Jessica Alfaro's testimony is contrary to common human experience and full of
inconsistencies, her positive identification could not prevail over the documented alibis of
Hubert Webb. Positive identificationtobe superior over denial and alibi, it should come from a
credible witness.

Inconsistenttestimoniesof prosecution's
witnesses on material points entities the
accused of acquittal based on his
constitutionalrightto be presumed
innocent

ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

158788, April 30,2008

On October 1,1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George
aid Rosemarie GantefriBarangay Pugos, Cabugao, (locos Sur,forciblytaking with them severed
valuables, including cash amounfrtgtoP600,000.00. The Cabugao Police appliedfora search warrant
which was granted by the MTC One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as
one of the several suspects in the crime.

On October 6.19%. aimed with the warrant. Dolinemen searched the nremises of oetitioner's
 54

house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Itocos Sur. The seantii resi/ited in the recovery
of a firearm and ammunitions which had no lioense nor authority to possess such wesson, and,
consequently, the Ing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K,forviolation of P.D. No.
1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.

The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search
i warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm wasfoundin the tatter's house. In particular, SP01
Cabaya testified that while poking at a closedrattancabinet near the door, he saw afirearmon the lower
shelf. The gun is a 38 caliber revolver with fivefiveammunitions which he immediately turned overtohis
superior, P/lnsp. Baldovino.

Petitioner anchored his defense on denial andframe-up.The petifaierarcJHB wife Loma assert
that petitioner does not own a gun Loma testified that she saw a "military" man planting the gun.

After trial, the FTC rendered Us Decision dated July 7,1999,findingpetitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt

inconsistencies h the testimonies of the policemen as witnessesforthe prosecution, which amounted to

failure bv the prosecutiontoprove his auft bevond reasonable doubt and therefore entitledtoacquittal
based on his constitutional presumption of Binocence,

HELD:

The accused should be acquitted.

In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SP01 Cabaya, who testified
that he disagreed the s u i ^ f i r e ^ in a closed The trial court brushed
aside peionei's defense of denialand protestations offrame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to
Cabaya'stesfenonyon the principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties
Tegu^^heh^noffimo^toframenjppetto
petitioner's negative testimony.

The conflictingtestimoniesof the prosecution witnesses astowho actually entered the house and
conducted the seach, who "discovered" the gun, aid who witnessed the "discovery" are material matters
because theyrelatedirectlytoafedin issue; in the present case, whether a gun has beenfoundin the
house of peioner; ortoa facttowhich, by the process of logic, an inference may be made astofoe
existenceornorvexistenceofafadin issue.

The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in thetestimoniesof

its witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of SP01 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on
material posits jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies are material as
they delve into tie very bottom of the question of whether or not SP01 CabayareaByfondafirearmin the
house of petitioner.

SP01 Cabaya tesied that he altered the house withfourolher policemen, among whom were
SPOI Jara, SP04 Peneyra, SP03 Bemabe Ocado (SP03 Ocado) and another one whose name he does
notremember.While searching, he discovered thefirearmin the kitchen, inside a closed c^inet near the
 55

door. He said that SP01 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of jusft one meter, when he
(Cabaya) saw the firearm and that he picked up the gun, held it and showed ittoSP01 Jara. He asserted
that SP02 Renon was not one of Ihose who went inside the house.

However, SP01 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SP01 Cabaya's testimony,
related a different story as to the circumstances of thefirearm'sdiscovery. SP01 Jaratestifiedthat he
merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the
house. SP01 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SP01
Cabaya shouted aid showed a gun, he was seventoeight meters away from him. He could not see the
inskie of the house and oould see Cabaya onlyfromhis chest up. He did nctf see ifoe firearm at the place
whereftwas found, but saw it only when Cabaya rased his 2rn1toshowttegm.whichwasaiBvolver.He
is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the fireann He furth^tesl^
that SF03 Ocado, who, aooordtngtoSP01 Cabaya was one of those near Him -Mien he (Cabaya)
discovered thefirearm,stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.

While the lone defense ofttieaccused &iat he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated,
this claim assumes importance whenfacedwith the rather shedcy nature of the prosecution evidence. It is
welltoremember tiat the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather
on its own proof which must be slrorg enoughtow n v ^ this Gwrt that the prisoner in the dcx^
to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is
weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

In People of the PhUppines v. Gonzales, fie Supreme Court held that where there was material
and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prasecutto
to ^consequential details buttothe alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent
improbable character of thetestimonygiven by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the
effect of vitiating the testimony given by the oSher principal prosecution witness. 7he Court ruled that it
cannot just (fiscard the improbable testimony of one offioer and adopt the testing of the other that is more
piausfcle. In such a situation, bothtestimonieslose their probative value.

Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the sane sale
transaction, which allegedlytookplace before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the
sane occasion?

In the present case,torepeat, the glaring contradictorytestimoniesof the prosecution witnesses

generate serious dotdtf astowhether afiresmiwas reaSyfoi^ The prosecution
utterly fatedtodischarge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms
beyond reasonable doubt The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demofished and therefore petitioner should be acx^itled of the crime he was with.

Accused in a rape case is entitled to

acquittal based on his constitutional
presumption of innocence when the rape
victim failed to immediately or
spontaneously identify the alleged
attacker when presentedtoher.
 56

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY

TUMAMBING, G.R. No. 191261, March 2,2011

THE FACTS:

The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in
Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26,2004 she went to
sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousin's rented room. She was startled when somebody
entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK
and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DK's clothes and undressed
himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned
the light on and she saw his face. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist

On June 27,2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any
sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.

Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26,2004 he slept
at the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke
up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employer's house that night. Ledesma
corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it
had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he
learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape.

When the accused was summoned by the Barangay Captain, the complainant did not
spontaneously identify the former.

HELD:

A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof
that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unabletoconvincingly prove
the offender's identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is
not demolished by an identification that isfoilof uncertainties.

DK's identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is farfromcategorical. A

reading of hertestimonyshows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually
pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested
to DK's uncertainties regarding the rapist's identity when the barangay chairman arranged for
hertomeet Tumambing.

DK's above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the
Court no confidence that, as she claimed in hertestimony,she was familiar with the looks of
her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousin's rented room
many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been
one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the
Koranfrai/ /»ha!rman'e aceiironrA that ho ii/aiiIH nmfo^f har if chn iHnrt+ifiaH htm In oeeoeeinn
 57

the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged
assault is of critical value.

There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. But this is
inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, "bigla
na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin." Since DK did not say that the
man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this
out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a
chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so
certain that he wore a yellow shirt?

With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK's Tapfet, the Court cannot
affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing as a result of the accused's constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Delay in complaining of the alleged race

coupled with the fact that the alleged rape
victim visited the accused in iall six /6)
times entitles the accusedtoan acquittal
based on the constitutional presumption
of innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERWIN

QiUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT v TARIMAN. FELIPE
QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANT! y JIMENEZ,
G.R. No. 184170, February 2,2011

PEREZ, J.:

On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo
(Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were
charged in an Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 29,2002, at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening,

in barangay [XXX], municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines,
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA], a minor 16 years of
age, against her will and without her consent.

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating

circumstance of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when
she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused.
 58

On Appeal, the Supreme Court based on the accused's constitutional presumption of

innocence, brought about by doubts as to the credibility of the testimony of the alleged rape
victim, the accused are acquitted.

This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAA's
testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay
kagawad, the purported confession put into writing and signed by all ithe accused; and the
subsequent incidents relating to the case.

First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However,
when the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation
and infeet,went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group
in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.

Second, AAA recounted that the nioa hut where she was brought bv the accused was
very dark. And vet. AAAreadilyidentified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who
raped her.

Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a "round-
the-clock abrasion in the labia minora." This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support
the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse, not raped.

Fourth, AAA's belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case,
especially when it appears that shereallyhad no intention at all to inform her mother, not until
the latter actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner.

xxx

Seventh, in an unusual twistrecordsshow that AAA was seen visitino Jerwin in

iail for at least six (61 times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in
court bvfeedefense and which was notrefutedbv the prosecution.

The right to speedy trial or speedy

disposition of cases is violated If the
delay is capricious, vexatious and
oppressive.

MONICO JACOB VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 162206,

November 17,2010

The delay in the trialforalmost 1 and % years while the Ombudsman isresolvingthe
MotionforRe-investigation may not be a valid ground to dismiss the criminal cases based on
speedy trial. Further, the verbal Order of dismissal by Justice Nario as the Presiding Justice of
the 4th Division is not valid since no written copy of the order signed by the other justices.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE DELAYS ARE OF SAID NATURE IS

RELATIVE AND CANNOT BE BASED ON MERE MATHEMATICAL RECKONING OF TIME.
PARTICULAR REGARD TO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL ALSO BE
rnMQinPDPn
 59

The delay must be VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE and this is so If

the following are satisfied:

a. Length of the delay;

b. Reasons for the delay;
c. Assertion or Mure to assert such right byfoeaccused; and
d. Prejudiced caused by the delay.

Ref:

JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20,2004

Right to assembly and power of the Citv

Mavortochange the venue of the rally,
requisites.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANILA

MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241,
February 24,2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and
Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28,2006 Decision and the October 26,2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito"
Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP.

On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter applicationfora permit to rally
at thefootof Mendiola Bridge on June 22,2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated
in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19,2006 allegedly due to his findings that there is clear and
present dangerforthe rally to take place in Mendiola.

ISSUE:

Was the Mayor correct in denying the application for a rally permit based on his claim
that there is evidence of clear and present danger if the rally will push through in Mendiola?

Held:

Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

CoaKati ft A Minn bi ha ialsan nn tha annlinaiinn .

 60

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mavor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application
[s/c] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mavor or anv official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant mav contest the decision
in an appropriate court of law.

in modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when He
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of
his perceived Imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that mav warrant the
changing offeevenue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit
since the applicant mav directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which. It bearsrepeating,is an
Indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,renderillusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, hererespondentMayor, is not devoid of discretion in

determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.

Itiaht to cross examine: effect of the

death of a witness before she could be
cross-examined through no fault of the
adverse party

SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA

CRUZ vs. RAMON PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899, December
8,2010
 61

ABAD, J.

This case is about the plaintiff's lone witness who passed away due to illness before
the adverse party could cross-examine him.

In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for
cancellation of titles, recovery of properties worth millions of pesos, and damages against
several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela
Cruzes) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-
3816. On October 21.1999 the Estate presented Mvron C. Papa. its executor, to testify on the
substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of Mvron's testimony on that day, the RTC
required the Estate and the latter agreedtopresent Mvron anew at the neaft scheduled hearing
to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counselsforthe defendants, would begin
to cross-examine him.

But the Estate never got around recalling Myrontothe witness stand. He was taken ill
and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent
Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estate's co-administrator,toseek repeated postponements of
hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment Later, the Estate filed a
motionforleave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by deposition at the hospital
where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on February 22,2001 and eventually set
the deposition-taking on September 7,2001 but Myron passed away on August 16,2001.

On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myron's direct
testimony which the RTC granted.

The Issue;

Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron's testimony after the RTC ordered the
same stricken off the recordfordepriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him.

Held:

But having their turntocross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an
opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on September 7,2001
but Myron died before that date, on August 16,2001. Consequently, it was not the defendants'
fault that they were unabletocross-examine him.

Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated
through Myron's testimony, it stands toreasonthat the striking out cfifrretetter'stestimony
altogether wiped out the required authenticationforthose exhibits. They become inadmissible
unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate
to rectify its mistakes.

Ref:

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SENERIS, 99 SCRA 92

 62

ORTIGAS VS. LUFTHANSA, 64 SCRA 610

No double ieopardv if the dismissal was

made after arraignment with the express
consent of the accused and the motion to
dismiss was not based on speedy trial or
Insufficiency of evidence after trial.

JOSEPH CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE
AFULUGENCIA, G.R. No. 185230, June 1,2011

The Facts

On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against
respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well
as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).

Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
(OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the
RTC.

Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-

evaluate Prosecution's Evidence before the OP-QC.

in its resolution dated November 20,2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3,2003. Purina the intervening
period, specifically on November 24. 2003. respondents were arraigned. All of them
entered a "not guilty" plea.

in deference to the prosecutor's last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case
dismissed in its Order dated March 17,2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the
November 20,2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same
was the subject of a PetitionforReview filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC
deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ.

On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and
setting aside the OP-QC's November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile
the earlier Information for libel.

On October 24.2006. the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary.
reinstated the case.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTC's
semnH accaibHftrrterriateriPohmaru 9fi 9f)TY7
 63

Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated
their constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals agreed and stopped the
RTC from proceeding with the case since double jeopardy had allegedly set in.

The Issues

Petitioner raised the following issues:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was Double
Jeopardy, specifically on the alleged existence of the requisites to
constitute Double Jeopardy;

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that there was
NO refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one in arriving [at] its
conclusion that Double Jeopardy sets in to the picture;
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was 1.) a valid
termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated
17 March 2004, and allegedly 2.) without the express consent of the
respondents.

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court's bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment mus\ be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the
March 17,2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to
make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima fade case to hold
respondentsfortrial. Hefoiledto make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits
of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the
prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion
to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be
uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

The same holds true with respect to the October 24,2006 Order, which reinstated the
case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of
the DOJ Secretary.

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power andrefusedto perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated
the complainant'srightto due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced
no effect whatsoever.
 64

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so thattoelatter can rule on
the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.

It is bevond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double ieopardv exists
when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when
the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Since we have held that the March 17,2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was
committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a
valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case; Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the
conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double ieopardv has not set in.

Constitutional presumption of innocence

prevails over presumption of regularity in
tiie performance of oficlal functions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL PALOMA,

G.R. No. 178544, February 23,2011

ABAD, J.

The Facts:

The public prosecutor charged the accused Manuel Paloma (Paloma) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116898 with violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

At the trial, P02 Bernard Amigo testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on April 23, 2003 the
Batasan Police Station got a tip from an informant that accused Paloma was selling illegal
drugs at Pacomara Street in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief directed P02
Amigo and P01 Arnold Pefialosa to conduct a buy-bust operation involving Paloma. The
police officers went to Pacomara Street with the informant and brought with them a P100.00 bill
marked with the initials "AP."

When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw
Paloma standing beside a man and a woman. P01 Pefialosa and the informant approached
them; P02 Amigo, the witness, stood as back-up some 15 meters away. From where he
stood, he saw P01 Pefialosa talking to Paloma. Momentarily, P01 Pefialosa waved his hand,
signifying that he had made the purchase. On seeing the pre-arranged signal, P02 Amigo
anrwnarhoH and arrested Palnma- PD1 Peftalnsa fnr his nart arrested Palnma's rnmnaninns
 65

later on identified as Noriel Bamba (Bamba) and Angie Grotel (GroteV). P02 Amigo recovered
from Paloma's pants pocket a plastic sachet with a white crystalline substance and the marked
P100.00 bill.

After the police officers informed Paloma, Bamba, and Grotel of their rights during
custodial investigation, they brought them to the police station and turned them over to the
desk officer. The arresting officers also turned over the three sachets of suspected shabu that
they seized. According to P02 Amigo, two of these sachets were those that P01 Peftalosa
bought from Paloma. The police eventually let Bamba and Grotel go for the reason that the
police officers found no illegal drugs in their possession.

In his defense, Paloma denied that such a buy-bust operation took place. He claimed
that at the time of the alleged buy-bust, he was with his 80-year-old mcfrier alt their house on
Pacomara Street, taking a nap. Suddenly, five armed men in civilian clothes barged into the
house and woke him up. Two of them held him by the arms while the others searched the
house. Although the men found nothing, ttiey handcuffed him and brought him to the police
station.

On June 10,2005 the RTCfoundPaloma guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal

Case Q-03-116898 of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment andtopay a fine of P500,000.00.

On February 13,2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 affirmed the
RTC's ruling in toto.

The Issue;

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution
succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that Paloma sold prohibited drugs to P01
Pefialosa.

HELD:

To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the
prosecution is required to prove

(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object and consideration of
the sale; and

(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment given forfoesame. Further, the
prosecution must present in court evidence of corpus delicti.

Here, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is wanting.

One. Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution
must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely,

a. the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,

b. the offer to ourchase.
 66

c. the promise or payment of the consideration, and, finally,

d. the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be
the informant alone or the police officer.

This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit the offense.

All that P02 Amigo could say was that P01 Pefialosa and the informant approached
Paloma, talked to him, and then P01 Pefialosa made the pre-arranged signal that the sale had
been consummated. Since he was standing at a great distance during the purported buy-bust,
P02 Amigo could not provide the details of the offer to buy the drug and the acceptance of that
offer. Indeed, he did not see Paloma take money from P01 Pefialosa nor Pefialosa take
delivery of the prohibited substancefromPaloma.

While law enforcers eniov the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over tha
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. The totality of the evidence
presented in this case does not support Paloma's convictionforviolation of Section 5, Article II
of RA. 9165, since the prosecutionfoiledto prove beyond reasonable doubt ail the elements of
the offense.

Righttoinformation; right of an examinee in

the CPA Board examination to look at her
answer sheet questionnaire and answer
sheets

HAZEL MA ANTOLIN VS. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 165036 & 175705, July 5,2010

Fads:

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA]
Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997. The examination
results werereleasedon October 29,1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately,
petitioner did not make it When the results werereleased,she received failing grades infourout of the
seven subjects.

Subject Petitioner's Grade

Theory of Accounts 65%
Business Law 66%
Management Services 69%
Auditing Theory 82%
Auditing Problems 70%
Practical Accounting I 68%
Practical Acoounting II 77%

Convinced that she deservedtopass the examinations, she wrotetorespondent Abelaido T.

Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer
 67

sheets bereoonected.On November 3,1997, petitioner was shown her answer siheets, but these
consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unabletodetermine why she failed the exam. Thus, on
November 10,1997, she again wrotetothe Boardtorequestforcopies of (a) the questionnaire in each
of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keystothe questionnaires, and (d) an
explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner's request on two grounds:first,that Section 36,
Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as
amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only
permitted access to the petitioner's answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that
reconsideration of her examinationresultwas only proper under the grounds stated therein:

Soc. 36 An examinee shall be allowedtohave access ortogo over his/her

test papers or answer sheets on a dale not later than thirty (30) days from the official
release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she
may file his/her requestforreoonsideratbn of ratings. Reoonsideratbn of rating shall
be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/hertestpapers or
answer sheets, or malfeasance.

Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than petitioner's answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution
No. 338, series of 1994, which provides:

Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprolessiionsil Acts - The

hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or
unprofessional conduct
A. Providhg, gating, receiving, holdrig, using or reproducing questions

xxxx

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for
the subject has on deposit at least two thousand (2,000) questions.

Undeterred, on January 12,1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages
against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The case was raffledtoBranch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its
members (the respondents)tofurnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also
pr^ed that final judgment be issued ordering respondentstofurnish petitioner with all documents aid
other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondentsfairlyadministered the
examinations and correctly graded petitioner's performance therein, and, if warranted,toissue to her a
oatiffcate ofregfetrafionas a CPA

On February 5, 1998,respondentsfiledtheir Opposition to the Application for a Writ of

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner vras> nc/L enffled to the relief
sought that the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination
 68

Papers, and that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequateremedyin Ine ordinary course of law,
namely,recourseto the PRC. Respondents alsofiledtheir Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the
main case, which asked that the PetitionforMandamus with Damages be dismissedforlack of merit on
thefollowinggrounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrativeremedies;(2) the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no ministerial duty toreleasethe information demanded; and (3) the
constitutional righttoinformation on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law,
including Section 20, Artiple IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.

On March 3,1998, petitioner tiled an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC),
where she included thefollowingallegation in the body of her petition:

The allegations in this amended petition are meant ontyto-ptea} a cause of

actionforaccess to the documentsrequested,notforre-correction which petitioner
shall assert in the properforumdepending on, among others, whether she finds
sufficient error in the documents to warrant such or any otherreliefNone of the
allegations in this amended petition,fodudmgthose in the following paragraphs, is
madetoassert a cause of actionforre-correction.

if onlytounderscore the fad that she was not asking for are-checkingof her exam, the following
prayer forreliefwas deleted from the Amended Petition: "and, if warranted,toissuetoher a certificate of
registration as a CPA"

On June 23,1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and MotiontoDismiss ApplicationforWrit

of Preiminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had takaa and. passed the May 1998
CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8,
1998. Subsequently, on October 29,1998,respondentsfiled their Answer with Counterclaimtothe
amended petition.Theyreiteratedtheir origir^ allegations andfartheraltegedft^
action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceasedtobe members of the
Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the petitioner.

Issues

The petitioner argues that she has a righttoobtain copies of the examination papers so she
can determineforherself why and how she failed andtoensure that the Board property performed its
duties. She agues that the Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees support ha-righttodemand accesstothe Examination. Pai^rs. Furthermore,
she clams that there was no needtoexhaust administrativeremedies,since norecoursetothe PRC
was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her
demandforaccesstodocuments was not rendered moot by her passing of 4te 7998 CPA Board
Exams.

Held:

At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Anv claim forre-correctionorrevisionof
her 1997 examination cannot be compelled bv mandamus. This much was mads evident bv our
ruling in AaustirhFamos v. Sandoval, where we stated:

After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the
proceedings at bar, the Court resolvedtoDENY said petitionforlack of merit The
 69

petitioners' mandamus actiontocompel the other respondents (Medical Board of

Examiners aid the Professional Regulation Commission) "to reconsider, reconnect
and/or rectify the boaid ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to
higher or passing marks." The function ofreviewingand reassessing the
petitioners' answerstothe examination questions, in the light of thefactsand
i arguments presented bv them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical
Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the
writ of mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment
by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appealtothe Professional Regulation
Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals.

We now turntothe question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioner's
having passed the 1998 CPA examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.

In this jurisdiction, anv cifaen mav challenge anv attempttoobstruct the exercise of his
or herriohttoinformation and mav seek its enforcement bv mandamus. AM sinos every citizen
possesses the inherent righttobe informed by the mere fact of citizenship, we find that petitioner's
belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in the
Examination Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the corrsfffcrtbrra/ question presented,
in view of the M i o o d that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants review.

The crux of this case is whether petitioner mav compel access to the Examination
Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7,
Article III provides:

Sec.7. The right of the people to ^formation on matters of public concern

shall berecognized.Access to officialrecords,and to documents, and papers
pertainingtoofficial acts, transactions, or decisions, as welltogovernment research
data used as basisforpolicy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such Irritations as may be provided by law.

Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full
disclosure and transparency in government, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the

State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, therightto information is not absolute. The people's right
to information is Emitedto"matters of public concern," and is further "subjecttosuch limitafions as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's pofcy of full disclosure is limitedto"transactions involving
public interest," and is "subjecttoreasonableconditions prescribed by law". The Court has always
grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern." As observed in begaspi
v. CM Service Commission:
 70

In determining whether x x x a particular information is of piMic concern there

is no rigidtestwhich can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is atermthat
eludes exact definition. Bothtermsembrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may wanttoknow, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it isforthe courtstodetermine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as itrelatestoor affect the public.

We have alsorecognizedthe needtopreserve a measure of conftteoliaBfy on some matters,

such as national security, trade secrete and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters.

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams
are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in ordertoensure
that only those qualified are admitted aito the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical,
these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment but also meanstofurther

On the other hand, we dorealizethat there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in ordertoproperty administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the
examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, aid checking of these multiple choice exams thatrequirethat the questions and answers
remain confidentialfora limited duration. However, the PRC is not a partytothese proceedings. They
have not been given an opportunitytoexplain the reasons behind theirregulationsor articulate the
justificationforkeeping the Examination Documents confidential. In viewof thefar-reachingimplications
of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that
aH relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it besttoremandthese casestothe RTCforfurther
proceedings.

Right to be informed of the nature and cause

of accusation; CM! liability imposed
despite acquittal oftheaccusedwhen it is
proper and when it is not

FELIXBERTO ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 174654, August 17,2011

Facts:

The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 13, of Estafa through
falsification of a public document but was convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ACQUITTED the accusedforhe was convicted of a
crime he was not charged of in violation of his constitutional rightto be informed of the nature end cause
of accusation against him. However, the Court of Appeals SUSTAINED the RTC Decision imposing civil
liab% on the petitioner despite his aoqiBttal.

Issue:
 71

The only issue therefore Is whether petitioner Felixberto A. AbeHana COI/KS s i be held civilly
liable notwithstanding his acquittal.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

It is an established mle in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failedtoprove the guilt of the accused or merely failedtoprove
his gul beyond reasonable doubt In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civfl liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely duetothe failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt the court should award tie cwii liability in favor
of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal action
does not cany with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgmentfoatfoefact from which the cMf fliabilifyj might arise did not
exist"

Here, the CA set aside the trial court's Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense
different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged
with estate through falsification of public document However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto
actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary publicforits
notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petifoner of falsification of public document. On appeal,
the CA held that petitioner's conviction cannot be sustained because it irritingad on his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however,foundno reversible
error on the dvi liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.

In Sana/ v. Tadeo, Jr., we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in
the wise:

While ai act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it givesriseto

<M liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability isreallythe obligation and moral duty of everyonetorepair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishabtetylaw. * x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damagetoanother. Hence, for petifonertobe oy/yfebletospcwses
Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damagetothe spouses.

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly wmmled by the petitioner did
not cause any damagetospouses Alonto.

First the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses
Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject
properties in hisfavor.However, after the presentation of the parties'respectiveevidence, the trial court
found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that
their signatures were genuine and not forged.
 72

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personality appear before the notary
publicforthe notarization of the Deed erf Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render
void ab iniio the parties' transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. To overcome the presumption,
there must be sufficient clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
thefalsityof the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld." And since the defective
notarization does not/pso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from
spouses Alontotopetitionerremainsvalid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Atonto's title and the issuance of new ones under his
name, aid thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damageresultedto the spouses Alonto.

Illegality of arrest is deemed waived if

accused enters a olea. Such could not be
raised for the firsttimeon Appeal: Non-
compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 entitles the
accused to acquittal based on
presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELLE SANTIAGO,

G.R. No. 191061, February 9,2011

ABAD, J.:

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas alias
fisay (Roselle) with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case 05-792. Roselle was also charged With violation of
Section 15 of the same law in Criminal Case 05-1101.

Initially, Roselle pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case 05-1101 (violation of Section 15) but
she later changed her plea to guilty and was so found by the court. The latter, however,
deferred her sentencing until theterminationof the case for violation of Section 5.

The parties stipulated at the pre-trial (1) that P03 Leo Gabang investigated the case; (2)
that, although the latter prepared the investigation report, he had no personal knowledge of
what happened; (3) that the police made a request, through P/Supt. Marietta Mendoza, for
laboratory examination; (4) that P/lnsp. Richard Allan Mangalip, a forensic chemist of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, examined the submitted specimen, not
knowing from whom the same was taken; (5) that the PNP Crime Laboratory Office issued
Physical Science Report D-090-05S; and (6) that theforensicchemist was qualified. With
these stipulations, the prosecution dispensed with Mangalip's testimony.

P01 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra) testified that on April 4, 2005, they received
information that Roselle was selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit Extension, Barangay
Rizal, Makati City. Esguerra conducted a test buy and received from her one heat-sealed
 73

transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When 'ne returnedtohis office,
Esguerra marked the sachet with 77sa/ then sent it to the laboratory for testing. Before
receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that Roselle was going to leave her
house, prompting Esguerra's teamtoconduct a buy-bust operation.

Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her
earlier that day. She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he jtold her that he
wanted to buy another packforP300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the
house. While waiting and looking in, Esguerra spotted two women inside using shabu with the
asset by their side, apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the
sachet, Esguerra signaled his team. They arrested Roselle and appraised tar of her rights.
Esguerra immediately marked the sachet with *RPS\

After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with Visa/ and "RPS"
markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochtoride
(shabu). A confirmatory test alsofoundRoselle positiveforthe use of shabu.

For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabutoEsguerra. She claims that the
case was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but
Roselle. She narrated how she wasforciblytaken from her house and into custody.

In its decision dated June 11, 2008, the RTCfoundRoselle guilty of violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to undergo rehabilitation tor not less than six
months at a government drug rehabilitation center subjecttothe provisions of R.A. 9165 for her
violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Roselle appealed from both judgments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC 03451 but the latter court affirmed the two convictions. She lookstorher acquittal from this
Court

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselle's case; and

(2) whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that the prosecution
evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

One. Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they
arrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of therightsof a person taken into
custody as the Constitution and R A 7438 provide. But Roselle raised this issue only during
appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have waived
any question as to the legality of her arrest.
 74

Two. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra tne acts constituting the
crime charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the
allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white substancefromRoselle

and marked the sachet with "RPS" right in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately
submitted the specimen to the police crime laboratory fpr examination. But the request for
laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory. It appears that Esguerra gave ittoa certain SP03 Puno who in turnforwardedit to
a certain P02 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the specimen among these other
persons. Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the chain of custody of the
seized item and its preservation from possible tampering.

Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and properly marked by
the officer who seized the same, it would have also been sufficient, despite intervening
changes in its custody and possession, if the prosecution had presented theforensicchemist to
attesttothe fact a) that the sachet of substance was handed to him for examination in the
same condition that Esguena last held it still heat-sealed, marked, and not tampered with; b)
that he (the chemist) opened the sachet and examined its content, c\ that he afterwards
reseated the sachet and what is left of its content and placed his own marking on the cover;
and d) that the specimen remained in the same condition when it is being presented in court.
In this way, the court would have been assured of the integrity of the specimen as presented
before it. If the finding of the chemist is challenged, there may be opportunityforthe court to
require a retest so long as sufficient remnants of the same are left.

What is more, the prosecution foiled to account for the whereabouts of the seized
specimen after the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain
of custody should be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and
eventually marked until the same is presented during trial.

Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to sustain the
conviction of Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the
charge must prevail.

Asforthe other offense, her violation of Section 15 (Use of Illegal Drugs), it is curious
that the CA still entertained her appealfromit despite the fact that she pleaded guilty to the
charge and did not ask the trial court to allow her to change her plea. At any rate, since she
had been under detention at the Correctional InstituteforWomen since 2005 and presumably
deprived of the use of illegal substance during her entire stay there, she should be deemed to
have served the mandatory rehabilitation period that the RTC imposed on her.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the alleged violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the Court REVERSES the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03451 dated October 30, 2009 and ACQUITS the
accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas of the charge against her for that crime.

The petitioners were deprived of their

right to due process when thev were
found guittv of direct contempt bv
 75

respondent iudae himself who is the

complainant against them.

ALLEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS.

JUDGE BIENVINIQO BLANCAFLOR, G.R. No. 190171,
March 14,2011

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court filed by Alen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and
Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan,
seeking to annul and set aside the October 13,2009 Decision of respondent Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor (Judge Blancaftor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Palawan (RTC).

In his October 13,2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and
Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court, in the
same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

findingrespondentsPROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN
ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty
of direct contempt andforviolation of their oath of office as member of the bar
and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence themtosuffer the penalty of
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of
P100,000.00.

Respondents aie further directed to issue a public apology to the

Courtforthe above grave offenses and should they fail to do so after the
finality of this Sentence, a warrantfortheir arrest will be issued, and they will
not bereleasedunless they comply with the order of this Court.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for

appropriate action.

The Facts

Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson
(arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an
alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor
under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez
 76

(Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Roily Ami (Ami), and Kne dismissal of the
arson case.

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the
arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case
to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation
a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his
superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.

On June 30,2009, Judge Blancaflorrenderedhis decision acquitting Ami of the crime

of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and
Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their
testimonies. On July 30,2009, he issued an older summoning Rodriguez to appear before him
for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in
Tulali's filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan,
among others.

On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of
Judge Blancaflor's continued inquiries considering that the decision in foe arson case had
already been promulgated.

In an order dated August 13,2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he
was proceeding against themfordirect contempt and violation of their oath of office on the
basis of Tulali's Ex-Parte Manifestation.

As earlierrecited,after the submission of petitioners' respective position papers, Judge

Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of
P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in
the assailed November 6,2009 Order.

Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special c M action before this Court
anchored on the following

GROUNDS

(A)

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS
WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

(B)
 77

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF TASCKETtON

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY
VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.

(C)

SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF

PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.

HELD:

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening
their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present
their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor's disregard of due process
constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of
simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon litem irr the "direct contempt"
proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve
order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However,
judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the
court, and notforretaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a
person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle;
and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor's onta psratag petitioners
for direct contempt on the basis of Tulali's Ex-Parte Manifestation.

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court astoobstruct

or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalitiestowardothers, or refusaltobe sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulall In filing the Ex-Parte
Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct
contempt It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali's voluntary withdrawal
from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between biro, and the accused. Its
filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in
any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held
accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malioe.
 78

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as tie "nad no "Knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed
by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.

Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the
petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the
RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both.

The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apotogytofreCtrurt under pain of
arrest is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.

Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in

conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged
and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and
opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.

In the same vein, the petitioners' alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge
Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt,
as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the
requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied,towit

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. -

After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportune gwsr? to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure
which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners.
Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only
learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30,2009 Order, requiring him
to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali,
on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his
compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against
Awayan.

In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed Vrafi. Vie no longer had the
cold impartiality expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested
in the questions propounded in his July 30,2009 Order, as follows:

a. Your [petitioner Rodriguez's] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-

parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulaii together with the attachment of
your lettertoGov. Joel T. Reyes dated May 8,2009 filed on June 29,2009
with the Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;
 79

b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joe'iT Reyes, if
you know, and if so what was the official action thereon;

c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30,2009 was he allowed

to answer the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator
and Ernesto Fernandez, calling him "extortionist."
Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for
your conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan
was a bag man and facilitator,

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Roily Ami from the
City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29,2009 at 2:00 O'clock in
the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Roily Ami interviewed?

d. Roily Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was
made to sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29,2009 at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, why?

e. Roily Ami was fetched upon his release by SP04 Efren Guinto, a close
associate of yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn
expensive jewelry (watch andring),why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION

CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10,2009.
Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court,
pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your
loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty
and obligation?

Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality
required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates
of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to
be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should
always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

Presumption of innocence; non-

compliance of the police of section 21 of
RA No. 9165 in drugs cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN,

G.R. No. 184595, June 29,2010

Accused was allegedly arrested in a buy-bus operation in Manila particularly in Abad

Santos Avenue along Bambang Street, a street with many people at that time, at around 7:50
 80

p.m. of June 25,2004. She allegedly sold shabu worth P500.00 for one ffl sachet containing
0.146 grams. No other sachet of shabu was confiscated on her person though she allegedly a
drug dealer.

HELD:
The chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not shown to have
been substantially complied with. ,

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could not prevail
over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-peddler to be

standing at a comer of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of ptymg tet tade secretly, and
with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00.of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of
which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wantstobuy.

Whether the COMELEC was correct in

denying Ana Ladlad as a party-list group
on moral wounds: freedom of expression
andrightto religion.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,

April 7,2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a Petitionfor(Mom under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an applicationfora writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction,filedby Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMQJEC) dated November 11,2009 (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assa'led Resolutions! The case has its roots in the COMELEC'srefusaltoaccredit Ana
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941. otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act

Ang Ladlad is an oiganization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuais, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
appliedforregistration with the COMELEC h 2006. The applicationforaccreditation was denied on the
around that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17.2009. Ana Ladlad
aoain filed a Petitionforregistrationwith the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized aid
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation aid
gender identify; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, aid violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrainedtohide their sexual orientation; and thai Ana Ladlad
complied withtire8-ooint guidelines enunciated bv this Court in Ana Baaona Bavan'hOFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ana Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
 81

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, tne tOWELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.

Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized aid under-represented sectof that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

xxx refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional

and sexual attractionto,and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender."

The definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offendsreligiousbefiefs.

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual

immorality as indicated in the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already
of age'. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for therecord:'In 2007, Men Having Sex with Mai or MSMs in the
Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract permit

license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemedpartofthe
requirementtobe complied withforaccreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code

which defines nuisance as 'Any act omission, establishment
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3)
shocks, defies: or disregards decency or morality xxx

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The

contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not
contrarytolaw, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that 'Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrarytolaw, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy" are inexistent aid void from the beginning.

Finallytosafeguard the morality of the Fifipino community, the Revised Penal

Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions aid indecent shows' as follows:
 82

Aft. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and

exhibitions, and indecent shows. — "The penalty of prisbn mayor or
a fine rangingfromsix thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both
such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly fxpound or proclaim dodriroas.

openly oontrarvtopublic morals:

When Ang Lad/ad sought reconsiderationtothe COMELEC EN BANC,tfrreecommissioners

votedtooverturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
SarmientQ, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad's Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Bias R. Yusoph). The
COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speakingforthe majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that

Laefed is applyingforaccreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.

Even assuming that it has property proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that badlads expressed sexual orientations per se
would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressionalrepresentativesis to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contributetothe
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole,tobecome membeis of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization torepresentUs constituencies, then allrepresentativeorganizations
would havefoundthemselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the
framers of the law. The party-list system is not atoolto advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a toolfortherealizationof aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nation's - only that their interests have rat been
brought to the attention of the nation because of their underrepresentation.Until the
time comes when Ladladis abletojustify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transoender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-fist system willremainiust that

Thus, even if society's understanding,tolerance,and acceptance of LGBTs

is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and thev willremaineither male or female protected bv the same Bill of
Rights that appliestoall dtizens alike.

The COMELEC likewise used the Holy Bibteand the Koran in denywgi iadUad's application.

On January 4,2010, Ang Ladladfiledthis Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELECtogrant Ang Ladlad's applicationfornxretftefon. Ang Ladlad
 83

also sought the Issuance ex parts of a preliminary mandatory injunction against Ine COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballotsforthe May 2010 elections by
January 25,2010.

HELD: ,

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the

Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's applicationforregistration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution arefRA 7941, rrar is it a s ^ ^
the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Sayanfsfendsforthe proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or relatedtosaid sectors (labor, peasant
fishertoBc urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, vouth.
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Validity of expulsion of Liberal

Party members without notice and
hearing: whether their right to due
process of law was violated.

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR.,

RODOLFO G.VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON
R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN
CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.MACUSI and ELEAZAR P.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC, MANUEL ROXAS II, FRANKLIN
DRILON and J.R. NEREUS ACOSTA , G.R. No. 188920,
February 16,2010

ABAD, J.:

On July 5,2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon, then the president of the Liberal Party
(LP), announced his party's withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr., LP Chairman, and a number of party
members denounced Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party.
 84

On March 2,2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss

local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party's electing bodies,
the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were
not property convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party
officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30,2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP's NECO and
NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that
occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent
Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP
Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not
been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and theoiterxtffaftis already ended on
July 24,2006

On October 13, 2006, (he COMELEC issued aresolution,part'rtliy granting respondent

Drilon's petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new
election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the
Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been
properlyratified,Drilon's term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP
president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute went to the Supreme Court to challenge the COMELEC •
rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilon's
petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the
COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dhQufer, ttvat the Salonga
Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence,respondentDrilon's term
as LP president was to end only on November 30,2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon's term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were
supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons
associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status andraisedissues
regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installedrespondentManuel
A. Roxas tl (Roxas) as the new LP president

On January 11,2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolto G. Valencia,

Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldwar-Pwii, Wafai Cast-Abayon,
Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O.
Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invaftdly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO
composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary
Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier
cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.
 85

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incunfoent party chairman,
was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were
given the status of "guests" during the meeting. Atienza's allies allegedly raised these issues
but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He
suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice
to Atienza's allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas' election as LP
president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party's
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the body's number and composition. Some NECO
members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the
government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in. tba May 2007 elections,
making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public
office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO
members upon respondent Drilon's nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the
amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it
changed due to supervening circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza,
Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on
March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO
subsequentlyratified.Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia,
and Suarez,forfeitedtheir party membership when they ran under other political parties during
the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of UP members..
i
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.'s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the
composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent
senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that
body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO
membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president
was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.'s expulsion as LP members, the

COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within
the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its
jurisdiction to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMElJrC .resdution, petitioners

Atienza, et al. filed this petitionforcertiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents Roxas. et

al. violated petitioners Atienza. et a/.'s
constitutionalrighttodue process bv
the letter's expulsion from the party.
 86

HELD:

Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsionfromthe party is not a simple issue of
party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protectedrightto
due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to
Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings
and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tlbay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ana Tibav www tnin administrative
bodies created bv the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions
are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority
to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state
function." The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the
state's powers thus, aoolv too, to administrative bodies

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state's powers are found in Article
III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the
taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on
the state's powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant
to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts
committed bv private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the, specific statutes that
provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment bv the state Into the fundamental rights of its citizens and
cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an

intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument The discipline of members by a political party does not involve therightto life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested
right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The
onlyrights,if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members,
correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their
charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whoserightsunder their
charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those
rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere
in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party, k pc/iftcafc party is free to
conduct its internal affairs, pursuanttoits constitutionally-protected right to free association. In
Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public
interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to
thefreechoice of the people.

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas'
election as LP president but refusedtorule on the validity of Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the
 87

party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC's performance
of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the
issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion isforthe moment an
issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.

No violation of therighttodue process

when a party was notified but failedtofile
commenttoa motion of the other party.

SUSIE CHAN-TAN vs. JESSE TAN, G.R. No. 167139,

February 25,2010

ISSUE:

Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the
17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court giving custody to their children have attained
finality despite the alleged denial of due process since she was not present during the
hearing.

HELD:

Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file
pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to amend the
partial judgment asregardsthe custody of the children and the properties in her
possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying
solely on thetestimonyofrespondent.Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her
counsel appeared in court at the hearings onrespondent'somnibus motion or on
petitioner's motion to dismiss.

We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon
the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of the tatter'srightto appeal is not a groundforsetting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.

Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may
have lost herrightto present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel,
she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to
believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be
gleaned from her counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004:

Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity

proceedings,respectfullyinforms the Honorable Court that she has
not heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner
have failed.
 88

Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable torespondin

an intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.

Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter
disinterest in the hearings onrespondent'somnibus motion seeking, among others,
custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed
with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by
respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.

Righttoassembly and doww of the Citv

Mayor to change Hie venue ofttierallv:
requisites.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANILA

MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241,
February 24,2010

CARPIO MORALES ,J.:

Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and
Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28,2006 Decision and the October 26,2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals thatfoundno grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Uto"
Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP.

On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz
(Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter applicationfora permit to rally
at thefootof Mendiola Bridge on June 22,2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated
in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19,2006.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21,2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22,2006 a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate court's inaction or refusal to resolve
the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26,2006, August 30,2006 and November 20,2006,
respectively, denied the petitionforbeing moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. and denied the
motionforreconsideration.

The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
 89

The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26,2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No.
061-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging arallyat a venue not
indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadizfileda Counter-Affidavit of August 3,2006.

In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first
assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.

Hence, the filing of the present petition forreviewon certiorari, to whichrespondentfiled

his Comment of November 18,2008 which merited petitioners' Reply of October 2,2009.

ISSUE:

The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic
Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right tofreedomof expression and public
assembly.

HELD:

The Court shall firstresolvethe preliminary issue of mootness.

Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21,2006 became moot
upon the passing of the date of therallyon June 22,2006.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised toformulatecontrolling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on
mootness. courts will decide a question otherwise moot If it is capable ofrepetition,vet
evading review.

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit torallywill
arise eachtimethetermsof an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it
evadesreview,owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest
allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility ofrecurrencecompels
the Court to definitivelyresolvethe issue at hand.

Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

Section 6. Actiontobe taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or
grant a perniit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
 assembly will create a clear and present danger to public orxJer, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

Ic) If the mavor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application
[sic] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mavor or anv official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision
in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
court withinforty-eight(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and
record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or
modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately
executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsedtothe executive judgefordisposition or, in his absence, to the next in
rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appealstobefollowedbyformalappeals are hereby allowed,

(underscoring supplied)

In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court

reiterated:

x x x Freedom of assembly connotes therightof the people to meet

peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect It is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of
 91

our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To

paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or
coincidence that therightsto freedom of speech and of the press were coupled
in a single guarantee with therightsof the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition the governmentforredress of grievances. All theserights,while not
identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of thisright,the judiciary is called upon to examine the
effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance
of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health,
or any other legitimate public interest, (emphasis supplied)

The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the
Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as
follows:

x x x (The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standardforthe decisionreached.If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recoursetothe proper judicial authority, (italics and underscoring supplied)

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of
his perceived Imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that mav warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit
since the applicant mav directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion
in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudencerequiresthat there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may pmbably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption
- especially so where the assembly is scheduledfora specific public place - Is that the permit
must beforthe assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on
 92

the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanationforhis

action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slatedfora specific public place. It is thus reversible errorforthe appellate
court not to havefoundsuch grave abuse of discretion.

The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in

modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from
Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.

Custodial investigation conducted bv

*Bantav Bavan" groups or Barangav
tanods: whether therightof the suspect
to be informed of his expanded Miranda
Rights is already applicable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO LAUGA,

G.R. No. 186228, March 15,2010

PEREZ, J.:

Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the
personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.

The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at

Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the
findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA
was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is
the daughter of the appellant On trial, three (3) witnesses testifiedforthe prosecution, namely:
victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayarf in the barangay.
Their testimonies revealed the following:
 93

The lone assignment of error in the appellant's brief is that, the trial court gravely erred
in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA
and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without
the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutionalright;and (3) AAA's accusation was
ill-motivated.

HELD

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay
bayarf and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession

before a "Bantay Bayan*

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay
bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer
and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine
providedforunder Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant
questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman
and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in

the particular instance, mav be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III. Section 12(1) and (31 of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in
the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore,
already under custodial Investigation and therightsguaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to
the 'interrogation' made by the latter - admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of herrightsunder the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag
are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal, x x x [T]he

constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x
x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza,
one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain
whether or not a "bantay bayarf may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 94

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the
nature of a "bantav bavan." that is. "a group of male residents living in fthel area
organizedforthe purpose of keeping peace In their communitvLwhich isl an accredited
auxiliary of the x x x PNP."

This Court is. therefore, convinced that barancrav-based volunteer organizations

In the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantav bavan." are recognized bv
the local government unittoperform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the baranaav level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a
"bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, anv inouirv
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutionalrightsprovided for under Article III. Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the
appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the
confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."

The iudae is correct in granting bailtoan

accused charged of Murder If altar the
prosecution presented Its evidence, only
the crime of Homicide was proven. There
is no need for the accused to tile a
petitionforbail or for the court to
conduct a separate hearing for the
PetitionforBailtiledbv the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BONCALON G.R. No.

176933, October 2,2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Raising only questions of law, the People's petition forreviewon certiorari assails the
January 31,2007 Decision] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12,2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the
case)fixingbailforthe temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent)
who was indicted for Murder.

The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge
Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer
to Evidence/The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order of March 14, 2002, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
a•
« f

95

The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of
homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because the Qualifying
circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated
in this case.

The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a
MotiontoFix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buyser's ruling that the
prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He
thus prayed that the bail bondforhis temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed
was the usual bondforHomicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.

In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond the prosecution contended, in
the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusbn
temporaltodeath; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a
motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the
accused had already waived hisrighttoapply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that
Judge Buyser's March 14,2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive
part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter
outside the Demurrer, and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence
of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.

During the hearing of the MotiontoFix Amount of Ball Bond, Senior State Prosecutor
Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buyser's impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit
himself andtoorder the case transferredtoBranch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond.

By Order of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge
Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by
reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied
bail. He accordingly granted respondent's Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration cum prayerforinhibition of Judge Tan was

deniedforlack of merit.

Respondent was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000 bond.

Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim's brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner,
assailed the trial court's orders via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Roberto faulted Judge Tanforgranting bail without an applicationforbail having been

filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not
the prosecution's evidence is strong.
, * 1 «
•* I

96

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Roberto's argument that the grant of
bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

By Decision of January 31,2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in
respondent's Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed
Roberto's petition and affirmed Judge Tan's orders.
In its present petition, the People contends that ,

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE

CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF
DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable bv reclusbn oemetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or bereleasedon recognizance as may be
provided by law."

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that
all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, recluston perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Stressing this point, this Court held:

. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or

otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine
the existence of strong evidence or lack of it. against the accused to enable
the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties. A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail." On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter info any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidenceforor against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself toreceivingsuch evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the tatter's statement that the evidence was
sufficient to convictrespondentof Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine
whetherrespondentwas entitledtobail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief
was already presented by the prosecution.
,» t «
"t !

97

The People's recourse to Section 5 ,1 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Proceduretosupport its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said
Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of
conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.

Landowner mav file for the reconveyance \

of his lot from the government if the same
was never used for the purpose for which
it was expropriated: what are the
obligations of the landowner to the
government to aet back his property?

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. BERNARDO
LOZADA, JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 176625, February 25,2010

NACHURA, Jr.

Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for
the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.

During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada,

Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
9045 was issued in Lozada's name.

On December 29,1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and
ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per
square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November
16,1947—the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received the amount
of P3.018.00 by way of payment.

The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office
(ATO),

The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was
not pursued.

Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr.,
requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that there
might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3 airport. It
reiterated, however, the assurance that "should this Office dispose and resell the properties
which may befoundto be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to
give priority to theformerowners subject to the approval of the President."
 98

ISSUE:

May the landowner ask for the repurchase of an expropriated property if the
government fails to use the sameforthe purpose for which it was expropriated? If so, how
much?

HELD: i

Yes, the landowner mayrepurchasehis land.

The Supreme Court held that "we now exoressiv hold that the taking of private property.
conseouent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is alwava
subjecttothe condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose far
which it was taken. Corollarilv. if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not
at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then thefannerowners. If thev so desire.
mav seek thereversionof the property, subject to the return of the amount of iust
compensationreceived.In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of therequiredfactualJustification

On the matter of therepurchaseprice, while petitioners are obliged toreconveyLot

No. 88 torespondents,the latter [1] mustreturnto theformerwhat they received as just
compensationforthe expropriation of the property, [2] plus legal interesttobe computed from
default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents. [3] Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they
may have incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, [4] as well as the monetary value of their services
in managing ittothe extent thatrespondentswere benefited thereby.
 umyeiuirror me oordhurhs
Baguio City
COLLEGE OF LAW

OUTLINE OF C A S E S AND OTHER

READING MATERIALS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW
(Political Law)
(August 17,2015)

Prepared by:

ATTY. L A R R Y D. G A C A Y A N
Professor
COLLEGE OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE C O R D I L L E R A S

PRE-BAR REVIEWER
(In Constitutional Law/Political Law)

C P R S PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Ozamis City, Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City,
Tacloban City, lligan City, lloilo City and Davao City)

EXCELLENT PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City, and Tacloban City)

P O W E R H A U S PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Manila, Baguio City, Santiago City, San Fernando City, La Union, Naga
City, Tacloban City, Tagbilaran City and Dipolog City)

COSMOPOLITAN B A R REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City)

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN B A R REVIEW CENTER

Dagupan City

HOLY TRINITY C O L L E G E B A R REVIEW CENTER

General Santos City
 2

DEFINITIONS AND C O N C E P T S

1. Define:
a. Political Law
b. Constitutional Law
c. Constitution
d. Administrative Law
e. Law of Public Officers
f. Law on Public Corporations
g. Election Law
h. Distinction between Political
Law and Constitutional Law

2. Read: MACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 S C R A 77

3. The Supremacy of the Constitution

Read: 1. MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 S C R A 228

2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 S C R A 408

PARTI

ARTICLE XVII-AMENDMENT OR REVISION

OF THE CONSTITUTION

Read: R.A. 6735

Requisites for a valid people's

initiative to amend the Constitution;
distinctions between amendment
and revision.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.

AUMENTADO , together with 6,327,952
registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153, October 25t
2006, 505 S C R A 160
Read also the S C Resolution on Lambino's
Motion for Reconsideration, November 20, 2006
which held by a vote of 10 justices that RA No.
6735 is complete and adequate for people's
initiative

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
& June 10,1997

3. Distinguish "Revision" from "amendment" of the Constitution.

4. Read: a) MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1

b) GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
c) TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702(Doctrine of proper
submission)
 3

d) SAN/DAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

e) ALMARIO vs. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69
f) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 ACRA

PART II
PREAMBLE

1. Purpose and Effect of a Preamble.

2. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

PART HI
ARTICLE I - THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

1. What is the most significant change in this Article, compared with those
of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions?

2. What is the archipelago theory or archipelagic doctrine?

3. Methods used in fixing the baseline from which the territorial belt is
measured:

a. The normal baseline method

b. The straight baseline method

1. Read:

a. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS);
b. The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Act of 2009, RA No.
9522
c. Republic Act No. 5446
d. Presidential Decree No. 1596 - June 11, 1978
e. Presidential Decree No. 1599 - June 11, 1978
f. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE
GOVERNEMNT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183591, October 14,2008
g. PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP
RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C ROQUE, THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS VS. HON
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ET AL, G.R No. 187167, August 16,2011

PART IV

ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

A N D STATE POLICIES

Section 1.

a. The basic principles underlying the 1935,1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

 4

b. Manifestations of a republican state.

c. Define "state"

COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23

d. Elements of a state. Define each:

1. people
2. territory
3. sovereignty
4. government

e. Different meanings of the word "people" as used in the

constitution:

1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. Ill( Sec. 2);

2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. Ill, Sec. 7);

3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4)

f. presidential & parliamentary forms of government

Read:

1. FREE TELEPHONE W O R K E R S UNION VS. OPLE, 108 S C R A

757

2. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 S C R A 418

g. Two-fold function of the government.

Read:

1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468

2) ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649

h. Parents Patriae

Read:
1) GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738
2) CABANAS VS. PILAPILt 58 SCRA 94

i. De jure govt.? De facto govt.?

Read: 1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 S C R A 275 (on the de jure

aspect)
2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 S C R A
160
3. Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra, Art. VII.

j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?

Read: C O KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113

 5

k. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation?

Read:

1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

30 SCRA 968
2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476
3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397

Section 2.

a. difference between aggressive & defensive war

b. Read:

1. MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70

2. KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171
3. SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 S C R A 121
4. A G U S T I N V S . E D U , 88 S C R A 19
I 5. R E Y E S VS. BAGATSING.125 S C R A 553 (

Section 3.

See also:

Art. VII, Sec. 18

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2)
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)

Section 4.

Read:

1. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13

2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721
3. PD1706, August 8, 1980
4. Exec. Order No. 264

Section 5.

Section 6.

Read:
1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413

2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514

(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases)

3) Other provisions:
Other provisions on church & state:

1. ART. III. Sec. 5.

2. ART. VI. Sec. 28 f3V
3. ART. VI. Sec. 29 m
4. ART. IX, C, 2(5).
5. ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3).

Section 7.
 6

Section 8.

1. meaning of "nuclear-free" Philippines;

2. . Art. XVIII, Sees. 4 & 25

Section 9 fSecs. 19 and 20 also)

REP. G E R A R D Q ESPINA ET AL VS. EXEC. SEC. RONALDO

ZAMORA. G.R. No. 143855. September 21. 2010 (The Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000)

Section 10.

Section 11.

a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII

Section 12.

1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.

2. Read:
a) GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)
b) M E Y E R VS. NEBRASKA, 260 U S 260 (1922)
c) PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925)
d) PACU VS. S E C R E T A R Y OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806
e) CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 S C R A 94

Section 13.

Read:
1) PD 684
2) PD 935
3) PD 1102
4) PD 603; see the objectives of the law

Sections 14 to 17.
1) Read together with Article XIV
Read:
VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 S C R A 1
O P O S A VS. FACTORAN, July 30,1993

Section 18.

1) Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
3) Read:

a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59

SCRA 54

Section 19.

GAMBOA VS. S E C R E T A R Y OF FINANCE

 7

See Art. XII

Section 20.

a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it

the welfare state concept? Distinguish the two.

b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 S C R A 649 (Note: Read the

separate opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only)

Section 21.

a. Read together with Sees. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution

b. Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the M A R C O S

regime

c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE C O D E OF AGRARIAN

R E F O R M S OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this
matter)

d .Read the C O M P R E H E N S I V E AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7,1988.

e. Read:

Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, July 14,1989

Section 22.

To be discussed later with Art. X, Sees. 15- 21.

Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:

1. Art VI, Sec. 5(2)

2. Art. X, Sees. 15-21
3. Art. XII, Sec. 5
4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6
5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17
6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12

Sections 23

a. Define "autonomy"

b. See Art. X

Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its
provisions evidencing "autonomy" to local government units.

Sections 26

To be discussed under Article XI.

a. Please see RA3019. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as

amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195..
 8

b. PD 749, July 18,1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to

givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other
than graft cases against public officers.
c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to
have been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee.

Section 28.

Read:

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R No

174340, October 17, 2006, 504 S C R A 704

PARTV
ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT

Section 1.

a. Define legislative power

- Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:

1. It cannot pass irrepealable laws

2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers

- reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable

laws

- Separation of Powers

Read:

a. BELGICA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 208560,

November 19, 2013
a-1. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
e. Bondocvs. HRET, Sept. 26,1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 S C R A 106

b. Nature of legislative power

c What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the

legislature?

d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.

1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI

2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI.

- Other exceptions: traditional

 3)De!egation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government

is deemed to know better the needs of the people therein.

a. See Section 5 of Article X

b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660
bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56
c. Reason for the delegation
4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People

f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.

1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 S C R A 569

2 . TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)

3. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

_ 4- 770 VS- IDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151

SCRA 208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757
(Affecting National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989

g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative

bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to be
considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what conditions
must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION - a reviewer - Primer by FR. JOAQUIN
BERNAS, 1987 edition.

5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328

6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA

h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII and Section

i. Classify the membership of the legislative department.

j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108

Sections 2 to 4.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of
a senator or member of the House
of Representatives.

Read:
 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
Vsa. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 161658, November
3, 2008

Section 5.
Re-apportionment of a single
legislative district to makA it ty/n

Read:

ROGELIO BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 176970, December 8,2008

Formula in determining the party-list

representatives Is the 2Q% ceiling
mandatory? (Veterans vs
COMELEC Formula abandoned)

Read Republic Act No. 7941, the Party-List law

Read also:

BARANGAY A S S O C I A T I O N FOR NATIONAL

ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) - versus - C O M M I S S I O N ON
ELECTIONS , G.R. No. 179271, May
y
2009

POWER OF THE COMF1 Fr. T O

RESOLVE LEADERSHIP
DISPUTES OF PARTY-I IST

Read:

ATONG PAGLAUM VS. COMELEC, February 26,2013

DAYAO VS. COMELEC, G R NO. 193704,

January 29,2013

DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. S E N E R I S VS

COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC. GR Nn

190582. April fi, 9010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIAN AND

BROTHERHOOD, INC. V S HQMELEC. G R
No. 190529 April 29. 2010

VICTORINO ALDABA VS. COMELEC G R Mn

188078. January 25. 2010
 11

BENIGNO AQUINO III VS. C O M E L E C Q R No

189793. April 7 9010

The "natural-born" requirement.

Read:

ANTONIO BENGSON III VS.

H O U S E OF R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
T E O D O R O CRUZ, 357 S C R A 545

Section 6.

The "residence" requirement-

Read:

• TAGOLINO VS. HRET & LUCY TORRES-

GOMEZ, G R No. 202202, March 19, 2013
• OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ,
June 15,2004
• REP. DANILO FERNANDEZ VS. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
A S N D JESUS VICENTE, G.R. No. 187478,
December 21, 2009

Section 7.

Section 8.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of

Sectoral representatives to the Hose of Representatives.

Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS,
September 4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering

Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

Section 9.

Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337

2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy,

December 28, 1987

5. Section 10

Read:

1. Section 17, Article 18

 12

2. PH/LCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;

3. LIGOT VS. MATH AY, 56 SCRA 823

6.Section 11.

a. Privilege from arrest

Read: Martinez vs. Morfe,

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876

Section 12.
Section 13.
Read:
1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution

Section 14.

Read:
1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 S C R A 39
2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 S C R A 31

Sections 15.

Section 16.

NOTE:

1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN; and
2. REP. CEFERINO PAREDES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN,

Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the
motion for reconsideration dated March 14, 1949

2) Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

Par. 4. Journal

3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal

4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories;

which is conclusive over the other?

Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729
MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil 1
CASCO PHIL VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347
 13

MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131

ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714

5) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.

Section 17.

Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals viz-a-viz the COMELEC on

qualifications of candidates for Congress before and after proclamation.

• REGINA ONGSIAKO-REYES VS.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,
2013
• VINZONS-CHATO VS. COMELEC, 520
S C R A 166
• A G G A B A O VS. COMELEC, 449 S C R A
400
• G U E R R E R O VS. COMELEC, 391 Phil.
344
• DIMAPORO VS. COMELEC, 544 S C R A
381
• JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS.
COMELEC, G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 178831-
32, April 1, 2009 [1st District of Negros
Oriental vs. OLIVIA PARAS)
• GONZALES VS. COMELEC, March 8,2011

Read also:

• LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January

25, 1988
• FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, October27, 1988
• ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS.
COMELEC & RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS.
COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
• BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
• JOKER ARROYO VS. HRET
• DARYL G R A C E ABAYN VS. HRET and JOVITO
PALPARAN VS. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February
11,2010

Section 18.

Read:

1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December

21, 1989 [Cunanan vs. Tan]
2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October20, 1992

3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993

(Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
October 20, 1992 Decision)

To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

 14

Section 19.
Section 20.
Section 21.

Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

VIRGILLO GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OF

REEPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION ET AL, December 23
2008

3. MAY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS CONDUCT
INVESTIGATIONS IN AID OF
LEGISLATION FOR AN ALLEGED
ILLEGAL ACTS COMMITTED BY
POLICE GENERALS IN M O S C O W
RUSSIA WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE
PHILIPPINES?

S P O U S E S PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO DE LA

PAZ & MARIA FE DE LA PAZ VS. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R No
184849, February 13,2009

4. Power of Congress to conduct

investigation in aid of legislation;
distinguish said power with its power to
call department secretaries, etc., during
"question hour"

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R.
No. 16977, April 20, 2006

5. When the power of inquiry in aid of legislation is not allowed.

BENGZON. JR. V S S E N A T E BLUE RIRROM

COMMITTEE. N O V 20 1991

Investigation in aid of legislation: Executive Privilege

ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE
O N TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

7. Read the Two kinds of executive privilege.

 15

8. Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation

against PCGG officials: Right to Privacy: Public disclosure of
government transactions: rioht to information on matters of public
concern: accountability of public officers: and right against self-
incrimination:

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No.

174340, October 17, 2006, 504 S C R A 704

6- Investigation in aid of legislation by local government

units.

NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R.
No. 72492, Nov. 5,1987, 155 S C R A 421

Section 22.
Section 23

a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.

b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.

c. What is referred to by the phrase "next adjournment?"

d. Read:

1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369

- the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
- the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants
emergency powers to President Aquino.

Sections 24.

Read:

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (The E-VAT Law)

Section 25

Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208

Section 26.

Read:
1) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
2) LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172
6) CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
7) TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997 281
SCRA 330
 16

Section 27.

1. Read:
a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil 912
b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
d. BENGZON V S DRILON. April IS, 1QQ0

2) What is a"pocket veto?"

3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

7. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 S C R A 506

What is the so-called "executive impoundment"?

Section 28.
Section 29.

Read:

1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219

1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
2) PROVINCE OFABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER 71
Phil. 547
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil
331
3) AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201
4) MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

Section 30.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO
DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
1998)

Read also: MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24,

Section 31.

Sections 32.

Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA

PART VII
ARTICLE VII - THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT

Section 1.

1. a. Define executive power

b. May the President refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his
opinion it is unconstitutional?
 17

Read:
1) L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON, 43 Phil.38
2) GOVT. VS. SPRINGER, 50 Phil. 529, read also the separate
opinion.
3) What is the extent of the executive or administrative orders that
may be issued by the President as the Chief Executive, under the
Administrative Code of 1987?
Read:

BLAS O P L E VS. R U B E N T O R R E S , ET AL.

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
Sections 2-12... Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PFT)

MACALINTAL VS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL.

November20.2010... "

TECSON VS. FERNANDO POE. JR .2Q04

ATTY. PORMENTO VS. JOSEPH ESTRADA AND COMELEC.

August 31.2010..

a. Note the order of succession to the office of the President and

Vice President

Read:

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA V S

DESIERTO. G R Nos 146710-15 and 146738,
March 2, 2001

Section 13.

Read: 1. PUNZALAN VS. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

2. ADAZA VS. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
3. Opinion No. 155, Series of 1988 by the Secretary of Justice
4. Executive Order No. 284
5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec., February 22,1991

DENNIS FUNA V S FyF.CUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA GR Nln

184740. February 11, ?nin

Sections 14 and 1fi

Read:
1) AYTONA VS. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1
2) PAMANTASAN VS. IAC, 140 SCRA 22
3) IN RE JUDGE VALENZUELA & VALLARTA,298 SCRA 408 (1998)
4) ARTURO DE CASTRO VS. JBC. GR No. 191032 March 17. 2010
and April 20 2 o m on the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 16.

a. Read:
 IS

SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL. et a L vs EXFP.

S E C R E T A R Y E D U A R D O ERMITA. et al 479
S C R A 587

1. CALDERON VS CARALE. April 23. 11999

1a
') ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS. SALVADOR MISON. G.R Nn
79774. Den 17. 1987 156 SCRA 549
2. MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, April, 13,1989
2~A TERESITA DELES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON
Ann
APPOINTMENTS, September 4, 1989
3 RAFAEL VS. EMBROIDERY AND APPAREL CONTROL
BOARD, 21 SCRA 336
4 OLIVEROS-TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272,
5 • TARROSA VS. SINGSON. MaV>R 1QQA-
6 NIERE VS. CFI, 54 SCRA 165

b. Distinguish adjournment from recess.

c. Differentiate the status of an appointment made by the President

while Congress is in session compared to that when it is in recess.

Section 17

KILUSANG M A Y O UNO VS. EXECUTIVF

S E C R E T A R Y E D U A R D O ERMITA. ET AL April
19.2006 & June 20.2006

BAYAN M U N A VS. EXECUTIVE S E C R E T A R Y

E D U A R D O ERMITA. ET AL.. April 19 2006 ft
June 20. 2006

a. Distinguish the power of control over the power of supervision

M O N D A N O VS. SILVQSA. 97 Phil. 143

b. Read:
1. Santos vs. Exec. Sec., April 10, 1992
1-a. Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771
1-b. Echeche vs. CA, 198 SCRA 577
1-c. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271
1-e. Carpio vs. Exec. Sec., 206 S C R A 290
1-f. Malayan vs. CA, 213 S C R A 640
2. LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO. 21 S C R A 895
3) LACSON VS. ROQUE, 92 Phil. 456
4) VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710
5) VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, 67 Phil. 451
6) ALAJAR VS. ALBA, 100 Phil. 683
7) FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA
757
8) OLIVEROS TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272

c. What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? (see the

separate opinion of Former Chief Justice FERNANDO in the LACSON-
MAGALLANES VS. PANO CASE)

d. Powers which must be exercised personally by the President and

could and could not be delegated to any cabinet member?
 Read:

CONSTANTINO and the F R E E D O M F R O M

DEBT COALITION VS. CUISIA. et al 479
S C R A 505

Section 18.
Read:

1. ZALDY AMPATUAN VS. SEC

R O N A L D O P U N O . J u n e 7. 2011 .

2 . PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID*, LORENZO

TAfiADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, A S PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON.
AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE. GENERAL G E N E R O S O
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, A R M E D FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE,

NlflEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE

PUBLISHING CO.

G.R. No.
171396
May 3,2006
- versus -

HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO

ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO.

1) Read also:

2) The Habeas Corpus Cases

a. BARCELON VS. BAKER. 5 Phil. 87 f190S)

b. MONTENEGRO VS. CASTANEDA 91 Phil. 882 (1952)
c. LANSANG VS GARCIA. 42 SCRA 448
„ d GARCIA-PADILLA VS. PONCE ENRILE. 121 SCRA 472 April
e. MORALES VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 121 SCRA 472 April

f. OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION. G R. No. 54558

Mav 22. 1987

' Consolidated with six (6) other Petitions

 20

g. ROLANDO ABADILLA VS. GEN. RAMOS, 156 SCRA 97

h JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990
i. People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 120

2) The Martial Law cases

a. AQUINO VS. ENRILE, 59 SCRA 183
b. AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, 63 SCRA 546
c. GUMAUA VS. ESPINO, 96 SCRA 402
d. LEGASPI VS. MINISTER 115 SCRA 418 (on the possible
options available to the president in case of lawful violence)

Section 19.

a. Define: reprieve, commutation, pardon, amnesty

b
- See Article IX-C. Section fi 0 f the 1987 Constitution

c. Read:
1. ATTY. ALICIA VIDAL VS. C O M E L E C & JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
1-a) BARRIOQUINITO VS. FERNANDEZ. 82 Phil 643
1) VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152
2) CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR, 71 Phil. 34
3) PEOPLE VS. JOSE, 75 Phil. 612
4) 5) PELOBELOVS.PALATINO.72Phil.441
5) PEOPLE VS. PASILAN, 14 S C R A 694
6) LEGASPI VS. MINISTER, 115 S C R A 418
7) MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, February, 1989
9. Lllamas vs. Exec. Sec. Orbos, Oct. 15,1991 (
d. Is breach of the condition of pardon subject to judicial review?
Read: T O R R E S VS. GONZALES, 152 S C R A 272

e. Amnesty to rebels

Read:

Proclamation No. 80, February 28, 1987

Sections 20.

Section 21.

Read also Section 25 Art XVIII

Is the visitino forces agreement

between the Philippines and the
UNITED STATES vniri anH
unconstitutional? Is it a self-
executing treaty that can be
implemented without ratification by
the U S Senate though ratified hv
the Philippine Senate?

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, us

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary of Justice'
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
 21

Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his

capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government; S E R G I O APOSTOL, in his
capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and
L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, G.R. No. 175888,
February 11, 2009

Read: Distinctions between Treaty and executive agreements

1) GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 280
2) TAN SIN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD, 104 Phil. 868
3) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN, 3 SCRA 351
4. Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

Section 22.
Section 23

11. Under the present Constitution, is the president immune from suit in
relation to acts performed by him or by his subordinates by virtue of his
specific orders during his tenure considering that the immunity from suit
provision under the 1973 Constitution was already deleted?

Read:
1) Section 17, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution with the 1984
amendments.
2) HIDALGO VS. MARCOS, 80 SCRA 538
3) CARILLO VS. MARCOS, April 6, 1981
4. MAXIMO SOLIVEN VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, Nov. 15, 1988

PART VIII
A R T I C L E VIII - T H E J U D I C I A L D E P A R T M E N T

Section 1.

a. What is judicial power?

Read: Badua vs. CBA, February 14, 1991

b. Restrictions to the exercise of judicial power

Political question doctrine

Read:
1) JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30
2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294
3) ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69
1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 S C R A 333
2. Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 S C R A 30
3. Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 S C R A 774

c. Cases on judicial power in general

1) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 S C R A 756

2) SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 S C R A 188
3) RADIOWEALTH VS. AGRACADA, 86 Phil. 429
4) NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE, 23 S C R A 405
9

22

5) LINA VS. PURISIMA, 82 S C R A 244

6) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG.39 S C R A 106

Sections 2.

Section 3.

Section 4.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V S C O M F 1 F n

Read the [1] November 18, 2008 Decision; and

T21 December 21 2Q0Q
Read:

1) VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA, 80 Phil. 297

2) VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577
3. JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376
4. Maniago vs. CA, 253 S C R A

Section 5.

a. What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites?

DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON

DATUMANONG, 444 S C R A 203

- Distinguish judicial power from judicial review.

Read:
1-a Fernandez vs. Torres, 209 SCRA 677
1-b. Santos III vs. Northwest Airlines, 210 SCRA 256
1-c) ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil 139
2) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
3. NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 657
4. Allied Broadcasting Center vs. Rep., Oct. 18, 1991
5. Lagmay vs. CA, 199 S C R A 501

a-1. Functions of .li idicial Review

1) legitimizing function
2) checking function
3) symbolic or educational function

Read:
.f a - SAL0NGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438 (contact point
theory...Victor Bums Lovely)
bb. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

Moot and academic cases shall still be resolved

in the following cases:

Read the following cases:

1. there is a grave violation of the

Constitution (Province of Batangas
vs. Romulo, 429 S C R A 736);
 23

2. the exceptional character of the

situation and the paramount public
interest involved (Lacson vs. Perez,
357 S C R A 756);
3. when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the
bar and the public (Province of
Batangas vs. Romulo);
4. the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review (Acop vs
Guingona, Jr., 383 S C R A 577;
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary,
421 S C R A 656)

b. On personality to sue

Is there a difference as to the "personality" requirement if the law

being questioned involves disbursement of public funds and on the other
hand, if it does not.
ATTY. ALAN PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND H I L A R i n
DAVIDE. JR.. June 25. 20101

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. V S

SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 S C R A
673

Read also:
1) PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
2) SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
3) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC. 95 SCRA 392
3-3. Read again NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 57
4. Kilosbayan vs. Morato;1992
5. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5,1994
Read this very carefully because it changes the original concept of
personality to sue when public funds are involved or not.

2. TATAD VS. GARCIA, April 6,1995, 243 S C R A 436

3. BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS. LARON, 170 S C R A 240

c. May inferior courts also exercise the power of judicial review in the
light of the requirement of Section 4(2) of Article VIII?

Read: YNOT VS. IAC, March 20,1987

d Three v
|aw - 'ews on the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a

Read:
1) NORTON VS. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 US 425
2) SHEPPARD VS. BARREN, 194 US 553
3) DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB, 38 SCRA 429(Operative fact doctrine)
4) REPUBLIC VS. HEREDA, 119 SCRA 411
5) REPUBLIC VS. CFI, 120 SCRA 151

e. Transfer of venue in criminal cases

 24

Read:
1) PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172
2) PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393
3) PEOPLE VS. PILOTIN, 65 SCRA 635

f. Rule making power; note the limitations

Read:
1) BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, 81 Phil. 648
2) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433

g. On admission to the bar

Read: 1. IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534

2. ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite
suspension imposed on RAUL GONZALES)

g-1. May law students practice law before the courts? Requisites?

Read:

Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court on December

19, 1986

h. On the integration of the bar

Read: IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

Section 6.

Read:

C S C VS. ANDAL, G.R. No. 185749, December 16,2009

JUDGE MACEDA VS. OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ

Read: DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337

Sections 7.

Section 8.

CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, AUGUST 16, 2013

Section 9.

Section 10

a. See Sec. 17, Art. XVIII

b. Read: 1) NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER, 152 SCRA 284
2) PERFECTO VS. MEER, 85 Phil. 552
3) ENDENCIA VS. DAVID, 93 Phil. 696

Section 11.

JUDGE RUBEN C. A Y S O N VS. THE RTC JUDGES OF

BAGUIO CITY
 25

Read: 1) OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O G 147

2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294

Section 12.

Read:
1) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
2) MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION, 57 Phil 60
3) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756
4) IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988

Section 13.
Section 14.

Read:
1) AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
2) VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI, 47 SCRA 354
3) BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE, 102 SCRA 7
4) MANGCA VS. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273
5) VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG, 121 SCRA 205
6) NAPOLCOM VS. LOOD, 127 SCRA 757
8) NUNAL VS. CA, 169 SCRA 356
9) Mangelen vs. CA, 215 SCRA 230

Requirement that the decision shall

state clearly and distinctly state the
law and the facts on which it is
based.

BEDRUZ VS. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, 484 S C R A 452

G E R M A N MACHINERIES CORPORATION V S
ENDAYA, 444 S C R A 329

Section 15.

Read:
1) CORPUS VS. CA 98 SCRA 424
2) MALACORA VS. CA, 117 SCRA 435
3) MARCELINO VS. CRUZ, 121 SCRA 51
4) DE ROMA VS. CA, 152 SCRA 205

Section 16.

PART IX
A R T I C L E IX - C O N S T I T U T I O N A L
COMMISSIONS

1. A & B - Sections 1-8

Security of Tenure:

8 8 0 1 VS G R E G 0 R I
183337'Apri'l23 ^ o ^ ' ^ " ° MAGNAYE, G R No.
 26

Define:

Policy determining
Primarily confidential pnaitinn. f B E S A VS. PIMB, 33 S C R A 3301
Highly technical position-

Read:
1) NHC VS. JUCO, 134 SCRA 172
2) MWSS VS. HERNANDEZ, 143 SCRA 602
3) QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December2, 1986, 146 SCRA
4) PAL VS. CFI, January 8, 1987

b. Checking function of the C S C

Read:
1) DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289
2) MEDALLA VS. SAYO, 103 SCRA 587
3) MATURAN VS. MAGLARA, 113 SCRA 268
4) DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443
6) CENTRAL BANK VS. CSC, April 10, 1989
b-1. Security of Tenure

1. Alim vs. CSC, December 2, 1991

2. Marohombsarvs. Alonto, February 25, 1991

b-2. Power of the C S C to change appointee selected

by Head of Office

1. Panis vs. CSC, Feb. 2, 1994

1-b. Home Insurance vs. CSC, March 19, 1993
1-c. Medenilla vs. CSC, February 19, 1991
2. Simpao vs. CSC, November 15, 1990
3. Barrozo vs. CSC and Valentino Julian, June 25, 1991
4. Lapinid vs. CSC, May 14, 1991
5. Santiago vs. CSC, 178 SCRA 733
6. Orbos vs. CSC, Sept. 12, 1990
7. Teologo vs. CSC, Nov. 8, 1990
8. Gasparvs. CSC, Oct. 18, 1990

9. Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

c. Primarily confidential

Read:
1) CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, 142 SCRA 280

2) SAMSON VS. CA, 145 SCRA

d. Highly technical/policy determining

1) DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289

2) MEDALLA VS. SAYO, 103 SCRA 587
3) MATURAN VS. MAGLARA, 113 SCRA 268
4) DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443
e. 5)Dismissal
ANZALDOfor VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353
cause
 27

Read:
1) ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO, 9 SCRA 619
2) VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710
3) HERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGAS, 14 SCRA 544
4) BRIONES VS. OSMENA, 104 Phil. 588
5) CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO, 13 SCRA 175
6) CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR, 78 SCRA 175
7) INGLES VS. MUTUC, 26 SCRA 171
8) ALCOLALO VS. TANTUICO, 83 SCRA 789
9) ABROT VS. CA, 116 SCRA 468
10) GINSON VS. MUN. OF MURCIA, 158 SCRA 1
11) MARCEUNO VS. TANTUICO, July 7, 1986
12) CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, June 11, 1986

f- Mav gov't, employees form unions for purposes of collective

bargaining and to strike against the government?

Read:
1) ALLIANCE OF GOVT. WORKERS VS. MOLE, 124 SCRA 1
2) Executive Order No. 180, June 1, 1987 authorizing
govt, employees to form unions.
3) SANTOS VS. YATCO, 106 Phil. 745
4) PEOPLE l/S. DE VENECIA, 14 SCRA 864
5. S S S E A vs. Court of Appeals, 175 S C R A 686
6. NSC vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 123

9- Mav government employees be removed without cause as a

result of a government reorganization?

Read:

RA 6656, June 10, 1988 , An act to protect the security of tenure

of civil service officers and employees in the implementation of
government reorganization.

Read also 1) DARIO VS. MISON, August 8, 1989

2) FLOREZA VS. ONGPIN, February 26, 1990
3) MENDOZA VS. QUISUMBING, June 4, 1990
4. DOTCvs. CSC, October 3, 1991
5. Romualdez vs. CSC, August 12, 1993
6. Torio vs. CSC, 209 SCRA 677

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1
Section 2.

a. Term of COMELEC Commissioners

Read:
1. Brillantes vs. Yorac, Dec. 18, 1991
1-a) NP VS. DE VERA, 35 Phil. 126
2) REPUBLIC VS. IMPERIAL, 96 Phil 770
 28

b. Power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of

elections.
Read:
1) TICZON VS. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 671
2) SANCHEZ VS. BIUWANG, 114 SCRA 454
3) S A N C H E Z VS. BILIWANG, 114 S C R A 454

b-1. Powers of the COMELEC; Power to declare failure of elections.

1. PANGIUNAN VS. COMELEC, NOVEMBER 18, 1993

2. NPC VS. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
3. Labo vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297
- 4 - ABDUL GAFAR DIBARATUN VS. COMFLEC. G.R No
170365. February 2. 2010

c. Sole iudae of all election contests

Read:
1) GABATAN VS. COMELEC, 122 SCRA 1
2) GAD VS. COMELEC, May 26, 1987
3) UPP-KBL VS. COMELEC, June 4, 1987
4) DEFERIA VS. PARAS, 141 SCRA 518

Jurisdictions of the C O M E L E C Division and En Banc

SANDRA ERIGUEL VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

190526, February 26,2010

d. Distinguish referendum from plebiscite

e.
Read: SAN/DAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

e
- Cases to be decided bv the C O M E L E C EN BANC OR IN DIVISION
Read:

CUA VS. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582

f. Regulation and control of public utilities like TV stations during the

election period
Read: UNIDO VS. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17

g. Election inspectors
Read: KBL VS. COMELEC, December 11, 1986

h. Are decisions of the C O M E L E C appealable? If so, to what court?

On what ground or grounds?
Read:

1. Galido vs. Comelec, January 18, 1991

2. Garcia vs. De Jesus, March 4, 1992

3. Art. IX-D, Sees. 1-4

Powers of the COA

Read:

1. Caltex vs. COA, 208 SCRA 726

 29

2. Bustamante vs. COA, 216 SCRA 134

3. Orocio vs. COA, 213 SCRA 109

PARTX
ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. Sections 1 & 2. ..shall enjoy local/fiscal autonomy

Read:
Local Autonomy; automatic release
of funds of Local Government
Units, particularly the IRA. As a
result of the fiscal autonomy of
LGU's

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON.

ALBERTO ROMULO. ET AL.. Mav 27. 2004

2. Section 3
Read:
1) 1991 Local Government Code on Recall, requisites, grounds and
procedures) and other important aspects.
2. Exec. Order 249

Citizenship & Residence requirement for local government positions.

• MAQUILING VS. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, April 16,2013

• LABO VS. COMELEC, 211 S C R A 297
• M E R C A D O VS. MANZANAO, 367 Phil. 132
• TOPACIO VS. A R E D E S , 27 Phil. 238
• FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934
• QUIZON VS. COMELEC, 545 S C R A 635
• VELASCO VS. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 59
• JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9,
2012
• Fr. NARDO CAYAT VS. COMELEC, April, 2007
• SAY-ANG VS. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373
• T E S S DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADQ. ET A L . 475
S C R A 290

2-a. Recall

a. What are the requisites under the Local Government Code

of 1991?

b. Read:
1. Garcia vs. COMELEC, October 5, 1993
2. Sanchez vs. Comelec, January 24, 1991

2. Residence requirement for local government officials

. Mitra vs. COMELEC, July 2, 2010

Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, April 24, 2012
 30

Section 4. General supervision by the President of local elective officials

Read: LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS. SEC. ANGELO REYES April

13,2013
MONDANO VS. SILVOSA. 97 Phil 143

Section 5.
Section 6.

Read:
1. Basco vs. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52
1-a. Philippine Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality ofPililla, 198 SCRA 82
1-b) WILLIAM LINES VS. CITY OF OZAMIS, 56 SCRA 590
1-c. Estanislao vs. Hon. Costales, May 8, 1991
2) VELASCO VS. BLAS, 115 SCRA 540
3) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
4) MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE VS. ABELLERA, December 12
1986, 146 SCRA
5) PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS. LAC, December 17
1986, 146 SCRA
6. MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS VS. LIBANGAN SA
MALOLOS, 159 SCRA 525

Section 8.

Read:

• ABUNDO VS. COMELEC, January 8, 2013

• ADORMEO VS. COMELEC, February 4, 2002
• ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC, December 23
2009
• DIZON VS. COMELEC, January 30,2009
• LATASA VS. COMELEC, December 10,2003
• ONG VS. COMELEC, January 23, 2006
• RIVERA VS. COMELEC, May 9,2008
• SOCRATES VS. COMELEC, November 12,
2002
• BENJAMIN BORJA VS. COMELEC, and JOSE
T. CAPCO, JR., G.R. No. 133495, September
3,1998
• ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC, July 28
1999, 311 SCRA 602
• FEDERICO T. MONTEBON vs. COMELEC &
ELEANOR ONDOY, G.R. No. 180444 , April 8,
2008
• NICASIO BOLOS, JR. VS. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES
CINCONIEGUE, GR. No. 184082, March 17,
2009

Section 10.

1. RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. ERMITA. G.R Nn

180050. February 10.2010
2. RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. ERMITA fi R
No. 180050. April 11. 2011 Reversing the earlier
 31

Decision and granting the Motion for

Reconsideration

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMF1 FC

1. November 18. 2008:

2. December 21. 2009:
3. August 24. 2010:
4. February 1S. 2011

Read:
1) PAREDES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 128 SCRA 6
2) LOPEZ VS. METRO MANILA COMMISSION, 136 SCRA 633
3) TAN VS. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727
4) Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735

Sections 11-14
Read:
1) CENIZA VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
2) Differentiate a highly urbanized city from a component city (See BP
337, Sections 162-168)

Sections 15-21

Autonomous Regions:

a. Read: Exec. Order No. 220

b. Ordillo vs. Comelec, 192 SCRA 100

PART XI
ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS

1. Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust.

CAMILO L SABIO vs. GORDON G.R Nn

174340. October 17. 2006. 504 SCRA 704

2. Sections 12-18

a. Impeachment, officers of the government who are impeachable,

grounds, limitations for its exercise, procedure, etc...
| ROMULO, etalvs. YNIGUEZ, etal, 141 SCRA 263

Read:

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ VS. THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAfiO, EVELYN
PESTAftO, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER
MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON
OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS,
 SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY.
EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R.
GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT, G.R. No.
193459 , February 15, 2011

FRANCISCO VS. S P E A K E R JOSE DE

VENECIA, ET AL, 415 S C R A 44, November 10,
2003

What do vou mean bv the word *initiate" in impeachment cases?

a-1. Degree of loyalty, etc. of government employee.

Read:

Lim-Arce vs. Arce, 205 SCRA 21

a. The SANDIGANBAYAN A N D TANODBAYAN D E C R E E S

Read:
1) PD's 1486,1847,1606,1607 and 1630
2) Exec. Order 244
3) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433
4) MANGUBAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 147 SCRA 478
5) GABISON VS. DE LOS ANGELES, 151 SCRA 61
6) ZALDEVAR VS. RAUL GONZALES, April 27, 1988 and
the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 May 1988
6) BAGASO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 155 SCRA 154
7) DE JESUS VS. PEOPLE, 120 SCRA 760
8) QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December2,1986,146 SCRA
9) INTING VS. TANODBAYAN, 97 SCRA 494

b-1 Who prosecutes, files information and investigates public officials?

Read:

1. Corpuz vs. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281

c. Disqualification of public officer

Read:
1) MINOR VS. AGBU, April 10, 1987
2) MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING VS. TAGLE, 142 SCRA 553

d. Power of the Ombudsman to

suspend or dismiss public officials.
Not only to recommend but to
directly dismiss or suspend public
officials.

1. REMIA F. BONCALON vs. OMBUDSMAN. G.R. No

171812. December 24. 2008.
 33

2. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals 4fiS S C R A 437.

3. Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, 527 S C R A 798
4. Buenaseda vs. Flavier, September 21,1993

PART XI

ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE A N D HUMAN

RIGHTS

1. Sees. 1-19

2. Adjudicatory Power of the Commission on Human Rights

Read:

1. Carino vs. CHR, December 2, 1991

2. EPZA vs. CHR, April 14, 1992

Read also:

1) SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO, G.R. No. L-48685, Sept. 30, 1987

2) DIZON VS. GEN. EDUARDO, G.R. No. 59118, March 3,
1988

3) Exec. Order No. 163, May 5, 1987, Declaring the effectivity of the
creation of the Commission on Human Rights as provided for under the
1987 Constitution.

4) Memorandum Order No. 20, July 4,1986

PART XIII
ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION, SCIENCE, etc..

| 1. Sees. 1-19
a. Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act of 1988

Section 5 121 Academic freedom shall be entoved in all

institutions of higher learning.

b. What is academic freedom?

Read:

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE
AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and
ROBERTO VALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980,
December 19, 2007
 34

Read also:

1.THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, February 9, 1993

1-a. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON.

RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989

1-b. UP B O A R D OF R E G E N T S VS. CA. August 31. 1999

1-c) GARCIA VS. FACULTY A D M I S S I O N 68 S C R A 277 (The "four

(4) essential freedoms of a university".

2) MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION

3) VILLAR VS. TIP. April 17. 1985
4) MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO. 129 SCRA 359
5) BELENA VS. PMI
6) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA. Mav 2. 1988
6-a) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA. September 29, 198 (Resolutbn on the
Motion for Reconsideration) Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice
Sarmiento
7) TONGONAN VS. PANO, 137 SCRA 246
8) ATENEO VS. CA, 145 SCRA 100
9) GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706
10) ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26
11. Tan vs. CA, 199 SCRA 212
12. Colegio del Sto. Nino vs. NLRC> 197 SCRA 611
13. Dean Reyes vs. CA,
14. UP vs. CA, February 9, 1993
15. Ateneo vs. Judge Capu/ono. Mav 27. 1993

PART XIV
ARTICLE XVI - GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Sections 1-12

Exec. Order No. 264

a. Consent is either Express or Implied

b. Express
1. general law
aa. C.A. 327
bb. Act 3083, Sec. 1
cc. Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386)
dd. PD 1807, January 16,1981

2. Special law
Read: MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311

c. Implied

1. When the government institutes a suit;

 ff. BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 1
SCRA 340
hh. METRAN VS. PAREDES, 79 Phil. 819
ii. SANTOS VS. SANTOS, 92 Phil. 281
jj. MALAYAN INSURANCE VS. SMITH BELL, Nov.
17, 1980
kk. SYQUIA VS. ALMEDA LOPEZ, 84 Phil. 31
II. L/M VS. BROWNELL, JR., 107 Phil. 344
mm. CARABAO INC. VS. SPC, 35 SCRA 224
nn. U.S.A. vs. RUIZ, 136 SCRA 487
Distinguish "jure imperii" from
"jus gestiones"

oo) LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB

SHAUF vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON
E. DETWILER and ANTHONY, G.R. No. 90314
November 27,1990