IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.
MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three pending criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City, namely: two
Grave Oral Defamation, and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez
and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit
the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him constitute
dishonesty
Whether or not he can use the appellation “Atty.”
Held:
Yes. The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable
by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused
or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him answerable under Rule
7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
No. His use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the
title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the
title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by
him in his private capacity. The Court declared that: persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law.
Penalty: the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court.
DUMLAO V. CAMACHO, AC NO. 10498 (2018)
Facts:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Branch
42 (RTC), where CV Case No. 2004-0181-D, entitled "Pathways Trading International, Inc. (Pathways)
versus Univet Agricultural Products, Inc., et al. (defendants)," was pending. Respondent is Pathways'
counsel.
Complainant alleged that while the case was pending, respondent attempted to fraternize with him.
Respondent casually mentioned his closeness to important personages, which included Justices of the
Supreme Court. He also tried to impress complainant with his influence by dropping names of notables
and his connection with the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, where he served as a
professor. Respondent told him that then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justice
Marvic Leonen were his colleagues and close friends.
Complainant averred that out of respect for the elderly and as a fellow U.P. graduate, he initially treated
respondent's fraternization as casual, trivial and harmless.
In the course of the proceedings, Pathways, through respondent, filed a motion for summary judgment.
In its Order2 dated January 30, 2014, the RTC found the said motion meritorious because there was no
genuine issue in the case.
Defendants, through their new counsel, Atty. Geraldine U. Baniqued (Atty. Baniqued), filed a notice of
appeal before the RTC.
Thereafter, respondent started to call complainant and even promised to share a portion of his
attorney's fees with complainant in exchange for the denial of the notice of appeal filed by defendants
and the issuance of the writ of execution. The promise was accompanied by a threat that if the offer is
refused, respondent would file a disbarment case against complainant and he insinuated that through
his connections, complainant would surely be disbarred. Respondent declared that the case of Pathways
was closely monitored by the named Supreme Court Justices and he insisted that a portion of the
judgment would be donated to the U.P. Law Center. He also stated that then President Benigno S.
Aquino III (President Aquino III) would supposedly appoint him as a Presidential Legal Consultant.
Complainant was shocked by the bribery offer and threat of respondent. He was appalled that these
statements came from a veteran lawyer and professor. Complainant, however, initially hesitated in
taking immediate and drastic measures against the inappropriate acts of respondent as he was cowed
by the latter's claim that he had power and influence.
In its order dated April 1, 2014, the RTC denied defendants' notice of appeal because it was filed by Atty.
Baniqued, who was not properly substituted as the counsel for defendants. It underscored that Atty.
Baniqued had no standing to represent defendants.
On April 28, 2014, the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality and a Writ of Execution. On the very same
morning that the writ of execution was issued, respondent went to the RTC together with the
representatives of Pathways. He demanded Court Sheriff Russel Blair Nabua (Sheriff Nabua) to go with
them and serve the writ of execution at the office of defendants in Mandaluyong City.
At that point, complainant was convinced of the abusive and scheming character of respondent to
influence the court. He resolved to avoid all means of communication with respondent. Complainant
then informed Sheriff Nabua to refrain from being influenced by respondent.
On May 22, 2014, at around 8:30 in the morning, respondent barged into complainant's chambers and
demanded that he order the court sheriff to sign the Garnishment Order, 4 which respondent himself
prepared. The said garnishment order sought the release of the supposed garnished check of one of the
defendants, addressed to Rizal Commercial Bank Corporation (RCBC) in the amount of
P18,690,000,643.00, in favor of Pathways. The prepared order also specifically stated that the RCBC
should release the said amount to respondent as the counsel for Pathways.
Complainant, who was preparing for his scheduled hearings for the day, peremptorily dismissed
respondent and told him to talk instead to Sheriff Nabua. Thereafter, respondent went out of
complainant's chambers and fiercely demanded Sheriff Nabua to sign the document.
Consequently, Sheriff Nabua justifiably refused to sign the document prepared by respondent. He
explained that since defendants offered their personal property for satisfaction of the writ of execution,
the enforcement of the notice of garnishment must be held in abeyance pursuant to the prescribed
procedure under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, respondent said the following statements to Sheriff Nabua: "Kapag hindi mo pipirmahan ito,
papatanggal kita", "Alam ng nasa itaas ito.", "Alam ng dalawang Justices ito." As respondent was
making a scene, complainant went out of his chamber and tried to pacify him. He told respondent to just
leave the document he prepared and let Sheriff Nabua review the same. Respondent agreed to leave
the document and uttered , "Kung hindi niya pipirmahan ito, tutuluyan ko dismissal nito."
Meanwhile, complainant received several text messages from respondent:
Date Time Message
May 19, 2014 6:37 a.m. Judge call me you will be involve in the in some of
sheriff. He says its all your idea
May 22, 2014 10:24 a.m. Urgent please call after this
May 23, 2014 6:27 a.m. You are as guilty as your sheriff of antigraft. Call me I
explain
May 23, 2014 6:38 a.m. Ok don't blame me
May 23, 2014 7:05 am On Monday you will receive two pleading 1 for supreme
court [2] for antigraft.5
Thereafter, complainant made an Incident Report 6 stating the events that transpired on May 22, 2014
when respondent barged into his chambers and threatened Sheriff Nabua. The said report was
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
Hence, this complaint.
Issue:
WoN Atty. Manuel Camacho should be disbarred.
Held:
The Court is aware that respondent had been previously disbarred. In Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho,28 the
ultimate penalty of disbarment was imposed against respondent for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01
of the Code. In that case, respondent entered into a compromise agreement without the conformity of
his client and he failed to account for the money he received from his client in the amount of
P1,288,260.00.
The Court finds that respondent violated the Code and the Lawyer's Oath for influence peddling,
attempted bribery, threatening court officers and disrespecting court processes.
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her
client violates Canon 13 of the Code. 17 Canon 13 and Canon 13.01 state:
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
On the other hand, bribery is classified as a serious charge that constitutes malfeasance in office. 18 When
an attempted bribery is committed, the transaction is always done in secret and often only between the
two parties concerned.19 A lawyer who commits attempted bribery, or corruption of public officials,
against a judge or a court personnel, violates Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code, to wit:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Also, a lawyer must not disrespect the officers of the court. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is
disrespect to that branch of the government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has
instituted the judicial system.22 It is the duty of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers. 23 A lawyer who disrespects the court and its officers violates Canon
11 and Canon 11.03 of the Code, to wit:
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; and to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients.
Penalty: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, considering that he has
already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed. In the event that he should
apply for the lifting of his disbarment in Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, the penalty imposed in the present
case should be considered in the resolution of the same.
GUEVARRA V. EALA, AC NO. 7136 (2007)
Facts:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath."
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I
love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of
his wedding to Irene.
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11 th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten and that his relationship with Irene is low profile and not scandalous. The
respondent also denied having personal knowledge on Irene’s daughter’s Birth Cert whom he was
named as the father of the child.
Issue:
WoN the respondent violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct?
Held: DISBARRED
Yes. Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining
that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
For disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife.
It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
IN RE BARROZO, AC NO. 10207 (2015)
Facts:
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambasa
Blg. 222 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
According to Valeriano, respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for
₱20,000.00. hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the matter. The
Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who,
after being told of respondents’ demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the
operation conducted of February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents
receiving the amount of ₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.
After finding the existence of all the elements 4 of the crime (direct bribery), the Sandiganbayan, in a
Decision5 dated March 17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and
sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prison correctional maximum, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison
mayor medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. in addition, it imposed upon him the
penalty of special temporary disqualification.
In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter 14 dated in August 14, 2013 from
Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed
by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic helper
Anita G. Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said
person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if respondent is still a
lawyer qualified to practice law.
On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of
direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.
Issue:
WoN the conviction of the respondent is a ground for disbarment.
Held: (DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.)
Yes. To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been
"done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [it must involve] an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 20
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same question posed in this
case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a will disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to do so]. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a
promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
FLORES V. CHUA, AC NO. 4500 (1999)
Facts:
The complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Chua, a practicing lawyer and a notary
public, for various offenses amounting to malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his lawyer’s oath,
the CPR as well as the provisions of the laws of the Philippines, to wit: (a) Fraud through falsification and
forgery of public document; (b) foisting falsehood and fabricated public document to molest and harass
parties; and (c) libel, misrepresentation and unlawful advertisement.
Respondent Chua has not rebutted evidence presented on his role in notarizing a deed of sale where the
signatory did not appear before him as, in fact, the signature was a forgery. The "Acknowledgment" in
the deed of sale states that Chua Beng appeared and signed the deed personally before Respondent. In
his defense, respondent claims that there is a criminal case still pending against him for his participation
in the notarization and alleged falsification of the document so the administrative case cannot proceed
until the decision is rendered in the criminal case.
On the third charge that respondent was guilty of libel, misrepresentation and unlawful conduct by
causing the publication and advertisement of a portion of the SEC decision in a newspaper of general
and wide circulation in the province, evidence is not disputed that indeed an advertisement/notice and
news report came out in the Visayan Daily Star. In these publications, respondent was always in the
forefront, claiming to be the lawyer of the winning parties and paying for the advertisement/notice of
the SEC decision.
In his defense, the criminal case for libel as well as the administrative case was dismissed. Respondent
maintains that the complaint on the publication is, therefore, baseless.
On the charge that respondent was guilty of bribery, corruption and blackmail of the judiciary, as well as
harassment of the prosecution arm through the filing of administrative and criminal cases against them,
complainant presented evidence that respondent testified in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and
Administrative Matter No. RTJ No. 92-880, involving Judge Renato Abastillas and Judge Bethel
Moscardon, respectively, whereat respondent Chua allegedly admitted having bribed and/or conspired
to bribed then RTC judge Abastillas in order to obtain a favorable ruling for his clients in Crim. Case Nos.
10009 and 10010. Failing to get a favorable action, respondent Chua "squealed/fabricated
Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 against ex-Judge Abastillas" .
Respondent denies the accusation but admits that he has already been proceeded against and, in fact,
sternly warned for his misconduct in giving Judge Abastillas P20,000.00 for a case he was handling and
for which acts he has already expressed rancor (A.M. No. RTJ-92-863). He emphasizes that the charges
he acted irresponsibly by indiscriminately suing or harassing judges and others, white serious, are false
and untrue. His actions, in fact, resulted in the dismissal of judges.
On the charge that respondent admitted in the administrative cases as aforesaid that he and his clients
tapped private conversations and that said acts allegedly violated the Anti-Wiretapping Act, RA No.
4200, no evidence was adduced, independent of what has been stated in the administrative cases, had
been adduced by the complainant.chanrobles.com
Respondent is further charged of forum shopping for this role as counsel for certain parties in instituting
various actions in different judicial and quasi-judicial fora. These cases have the same or similar causes
of action and were allegedly instituted to defeat the ends of justice.
Issue:
WoN the respondent should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. In the instant case, respondent Enrique S. Chua also notarized a forged deed of sale. It must be
recalled that in Lee v. Abastillas and Abastillas v. Chua, 5 we held respondent Enrique Chua
"administratively liable . . . for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas" ; and, accordingly, we "STERNLY WARNED [him] that a repetition of
similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future [would] be dealt with more severely."
Respondent Chua should, on this score alone, deserve a similar deal with Cabanting. But, considering the
other items of his misconduct enumerated in the Report of the Investigating Commissioner, which in
their totality brought dishonor to the legal professions, for more reasons must we visit upon respondent
the most severe permissible penalty. What we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting bears repeating:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the legal profession.
