69. Sun v.
Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J.
WARBY, Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, Respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices,
for Petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for Private
Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. — Private respondent
claims that the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil
Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such
Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF THE
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. — It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT
CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. — The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS
CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. — Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been
paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its
nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared
in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially
against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of
litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which
prompted petitioners’ counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by
respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other
cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this
Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive
that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then
vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No.
85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that
in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of
court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise
required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177
was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue
a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners.
On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including
the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental
Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court’s letter-report
signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15,
1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount
sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance"
and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the
said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance
with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk
of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of
Court bases on private respondent’s claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
subsequently paid by private Respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion
thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the
basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on
April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of
non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may
be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as
herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in
the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should
be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising
therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioner cite the latest ruling
of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 4 as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed." cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot
apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in
court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers
that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this
Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee
paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount
of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible
entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan,
after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with
said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as
required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice
of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the
docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held
that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the
appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee v. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor
General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was
not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed
at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court
concluded that the filing of petitioner’s declaration of intention on October 23, 1953
produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In Malimit v. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied.
It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed
candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance,
within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10
However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the
real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica v. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must
be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that
said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same
decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may
have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same
court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the
payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriff’s fee, the complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and
void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00
from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, attorney’s fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action
and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of
the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action
was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its
assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial
court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,140.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic
as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages
earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as
the court may determine, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action.
The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition
notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court
reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed
and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
in the amount of P60.00 and that if he had to pay the additional fee it must be based
on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to
have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We
reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct
amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint;
that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the
docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also for damages, We upheld
the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the
amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the
damages alleged in the original complaint.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester
involves an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants’ announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants
that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after
hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annual defendants’ illegal forfeiture of
the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the
plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as
25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney’s fees. The plaintiff
also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of
plaintiff valid and sufficient for purpose of payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the
docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the
allegation of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for
damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed
the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed a amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the
said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985 the trial court
directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which
they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the
amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes they was no such original complaint duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and
void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment
of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts
and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the
prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund
of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be
awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the
body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent
was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately
P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee
of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on
August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional
docket fee on P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of this claim in
the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70,
petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern
and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in
the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case
was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud
committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been
admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
69. Sun v. Asuncion, February 13, 1989;
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered
his change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee
as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of
the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that
should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought
in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the
allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
