A.M. No.
L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan,
and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death, but the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President. The
unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."
The widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint praying that respondent be
removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the
facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense
Held:
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed/suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court by reason of his conviction of a crime in solving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term
"moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to
his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on
disbarment aforecited.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his
term. It does not reach the offense itself. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but
require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
A.C. No. 9833, March 19, 2019
FORTUNE MEDICARE, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, DOROTHEA J.
SIBAL, AND ATTY. MELAN ESPELA, COMPLAINANTS, v. ATTY. RICHARD C. LEE, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Respondent obtained a favorable decision in the illegal dismissal case he filed against Fortune. In the execution proceedings,
Labor Arbiter Fatima Franco (LA Franco) computed the monetary award of respondent in the amount of P3,241,181.00. Both
parties disagreed with the amount and filed their respective Petitions for Extraordinary Remedy before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
While the petitions were pending before the NLRC, LA Franco issued writs of garnishment against several bank accounts of
Fortune. Fortune negotiated for an amicable settlement with respondent. Respondent agreed to settle the case for P2 Million
and the withdrawal of cases filed against him before the Ombudsman.
The parties agreed to meet in LA Franco's office for the signing of pertinent documents and payment of the agreed amount.
Days before the scheduled meeting, respondent insisted that he be paid in cash, to which Fortune acceded.
Fortune's counsel Atty. Espela and its Treasury Officer Rose Gahunia (Gahunia) met respondent in LA Franco's office. They
noticed that respondent had a companion holding a black bag. After exchanging pleasantries, Atty. Espela handed the
documents to be signed by respondent, who remarked that he would sign them after seeing the money. Gahunia gave a
bundle of stacked bills to respondent with the latter confirming that it amounted to P2 Million. Atty. Espela asked him to sign
the Compromise Agreement and the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, but the latter refused and retorted that he will take the
money as partial payment of his labor money claims.
Then, respondent signaled his two companions to enter LA Franco's office and to take the money. Atty. Espela tried to
prevent him from leaving with the money, but was unable to do so as one of the latter's companions blocked him from giving
chase. Atty. Espela failed to stop respondent and his companions from leaving the premises. As a result of this untoward
incident, criminal and administrative charges were filed against respondent before the City Prosecutor and the Department of
Justice respectively
Held:
Rule 1.01 of the CPR mandates that lawyers should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. To be
dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other hand, deceitful conduct is one tainted with fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage
of the latter.
Meanwhile, Canon 7, in conjunction with Rule 7.03, of the CPR requires that lawyers should conduct themselves in a manner
that upholds the integrity and dignity of the profession shunning actions that would adversely reflect on their fitness to practice
law. On the other hand, Canon 8 of the CPR mandates that lawyers should be guided with courteousness, fairness and
candor in their dealings with colleagues.
Based on the exchange of text communications and conversations24 between Atty. Espela and respondent, it is readily
apparent that the parties agreed that the P2 Million was for the full settlement of the judgment award. This is bolstered by the
fact that prior to the meeting in LA Franco's office, Atty. Espela had sent respondent the Compromise Agreement and
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss to be signed during the meeting. Thus, he should have been aware that it was the understanding
of Fortune and its representatives that the P2 Million served as the full payment of the judgment award.
If it were true that he did not agree with the terms of the compromise, he should have informed them about it. Instead, he
continued to communicate with Atty. Espela under the premise that he was amenable to the P2 Million as compensation for
the compromise.
Respondent cannot claim that there was no clear agreement that the P2 Million was in consideration of the full judgment
award because there was nothing categorical in his phone conversations and text messages with Atty. Espela. This is belied
by his admission that he was only forced to go along with Fortune's offer to settle the case so that at least his judgment award
could be partially settled.
Respondent was never straightforward and honest in his dealings with Fortune in arriving at a compromise. He was in
constant communication with Atty. Espela and he made him believe that there was progress in the negotiations for
compromise. He goaded Fortune into paying him P2 Million without any intention of accepting any settlement for the
judgment award. Respondent consciously and deliberately deceived Fortune because he knew from the start that the latter's
representative was there to meet him to consummate the agreed compromise.
Respondent was intentionally dishonest when he dealt with Atty. Espela and Fortune. Instead of pursuing legal means of
protecting his rights, he opted to take the law into his own hands employing deceit to get what he felt he deserved. As a
member of the Bar, respondent is held to a higher standard compared to laypeople as he is duty-bound to promote the
respect and observance of the law and to be a beacon of justice, fairness, honesty and integrity.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 25 The Court
agrees that respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law. Serious dishonesty and professional misconduct
are causes for disbarment.
Here, he intentionally misled Fortune and Atty. Espela into believing that he had agreed to the Compromise Agreement. As a
lawyer, respondent should have been aware that there are legal remedies available to him in order to protect his rights and to
secure his judgment award from being a mere paper judgment. He, however, opted to employ deceit and chicanery to get
what he believed he deserved.
Further, it is noteworthy that respondent had been previously admonished by the Court for violating the CPR. 27 His deceitful
and dishonest conduct in dealing with Fortune, coupled with his past indiscretions, manifest an unfitness to continue as a
member of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Richard C. Lee is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon the finality
of this Decision.
A.C. No. 12702 November 10, 2020
Divine Grace P. Cristobal vs. Atty. Jonathan A. Cristobal
Facts:
This case involves a Complaintl for disbarment filed by Divine Grace P. Cristobal (Divine) against her husband, Atty. Jonathan
A. Cristobal (Atty. Cristobal; collectively, the spouses). Divine and Atty. Cristobal were married on May l, 1999 and were
blessed with four (4) children. They did not encounter any major marital problem during the early years. of their married life.
However, Atty. Cristobal's behavior changed when he became a lawyer. He became abusive and irresponsible towards his
family and subjected Divine to verbal, emotional, psychological, and physical abuse. Divine described six (6) particular
instances of such abuse:
(Pet. version)
1. The spouses had a heated argument over money - Atty. Cristobal choked and pushed Divine, punched her at the
back, and shouted "mayabang ka, akala mo ikaw ang gumgastos [sic] ng lahat!" Divine reported the incident at the
Ilagan Police Station and secured a Medical Certificate on the same day.
2. Atty. Cristobal threw a Red Horse beer bottle at Divine because she protested Atty. Cristobal's payment of his
family's utility bills. The argument started when Divine asked for money to buy food but was not given money by Atty.
Cristobal because he paid for the said utility bills.
3. Divine requested Atty. Cristobal to purchase milk for their son. Atty. Cristobal retorted, "eh di ikaw ang mag-utos,
leche ka!" He then pulled Divine's hair and punched her back, causing Divine to fall down the stairs.
4. Divine confronted Atty. Cristobal about her suspicions that he was having an affair with one of his students in St.
Ferdinand College. Atty. Cristobal responded, "lumayas ka na ayaw na kita!" He then pushed her, causing her to lose
her balance and hit her forehead on their house's gate.
5. During a car ride on July 17, 2009, the spouses were with Joyce and three of their children when Atty. Cristobal
ordered Divine to step out of the car. He pulled her hair, yelled, "umuwi ka na sa nanay mo! " "ayaw na kitang makita!
" and "papatayin. kita!" Atty. Cristobal then drew out his hand gun and threatened to shoot her.
6. Atty. Cristobal boxed Divine's right eye. According to Divine, she simply followed Atty. Cristobal to his law office to
chat but Atty. Cristobal was hostile and misinterpreted everything Divine said.
(Resp. version)
1. While he was sleeping, Divine suddenly woke him up by repeatedly kicking his legs and feet and angrily said, "hoy
gising!" Annoyed, Atty. Cristobal responded, "ang bastos mo naman. Hindi pa ginawa ngpapa ko sa akin yan!" Divine
then denied kicking him. Frustrated over Divine's denial, he lost his composure and pushed Divine back up to the
third floor. However, he did not choke or punch her back
2. Atty. Cristobal recalled that upon reaching the house after a tennis match with one of his clients, he asked Divine
what their breakfast would be. Out of the blue, Divine shouted, "magbigay ka ngpera mo! Akin na!" When Atty.
Cristobal said he had no money because he paid for his family's electricity bills, she got angry and threatened to
leave the house if he didn't give her money. Atty. Cristobal denied having thrown a beer bottle at Divine as he was
not drinking at that time.
3. Atty. Cristobal denied physically hurting and shouting at Divine over such issue. He claimed that Divine's version of
what happened is too vague and failed to specify the exact date of the said incident.
4. Any argument the spouses had over Atty. Cristobal's alleged affairs were fabricated by Divine because of her
unjustified fits of jealousy. Atty. Cristobal claimed that Divine would be suspicious of almost anyone — his relatives,
clients, students, officemates at the RTC, employees in the law firm, and even a guest at their child's baptism.
5. Atty. Cristobal dropped Divine and their youngest child off at Isabela General Hospital and informed Divine that he
cannot pick them up because of a testimonial luncheon for new lawyers hosted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) — Isabela Chapter. However, Divine ordered him to bring them back to the hospital at 4:00 p.m. On
the ride to the hospital, Divine was picking fights with Atty. Cristobal and was nagging him about his drinking during
the luncheon. At wits' end, Atty. Cristobal stopped the car, took his things, told Divine to drive the car herself, and
rode a tricycle to his uncle's house to cool down. Contrary to Divine's allegations, he could not have pulled her hair
while they were in the car because Divine was seated in between Joyce and the spouses' daughter at the back seat.
He also denied carrying a gun in the car, as attested by Franklin and Rolly (part time drivers).
6. Upon entering the gate of their house, Divine was already waiting for him (nag-aabang) at the ground floor. She then
followed him to the third floor. Atty. Cristobal proceeded to take his glaucoma maintenance medicine and prepare for
bed. When he lied down on the bed, Divine sat beside him and asked about his whereabouts on previous days. She
told him that she saw a piece of scratch paper with scribbles of Atty. Cristobal's paramour in the pocket of Atty.
Cristobal's pants. Divine then reached into Atty. Cristobal's shorts, grabbed his crotch, pulled his penis, and said,
"pinalabas na ba nila ito ha? Pinalabas na ba nila?" Appalled by Divine's behavior, Atty. Cristobal brushed her hand
away. Still, Divine placed her right hand on top of Atty. Cristobal's shorts, shook his crotch, and asked the same
question. He requested her to stop nagging him. Divine proceeded to slap Atty. Cristobal and punch his chest. took
Atty. Cristobal's belt and hit him with it. She also scratched Atty. Cristobal's face. Feeling his blood pressure rising, he
closed his eyes, shielded his face, and defended himself by extending his arms to parry Divine's blows. When Divine
stopped hitting him, he opened his eyes and saw Divine standing by the wall with an injury on her eye. Atty. Cristobal
said, "ayan kasi eh, sinabi ko ng tama na, nasaktan ka tuloy," Divine vindictively uttered, "wala na talagang
mangyayari sa atin. Kaya hintayin mo ang bawi /co, tingnan mo magmakaawa ka din sa akin! Aalis na ako!" Atty.
Cristobal did not bother going to the hospital for his bruises as they were only minor injuries and were the result of a
normal quarrel between spouses.
Held:
A lawyer's duty to comport one's self in a professional and respectful manner is not only confined to professional
engagements but extends to one's personal life. This principle is also embodied in Rule 7.03 of the CPR where "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Corollary to this standard of conduct is
the proscription against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court lists deceit, malpractice, other gross misconduct in the office, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath as grounds for suspension or disbarment. Item no. 29 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics directs the reporting of corrupt and dishonest conduct and instructs lawyers to guard against morally
deficient candidates. It cannot be gainsaid that the burden imposed on lawyers is in keeping with the Court's objective of
obviating the Bar of odious members who tarnish the reputation of and reduce the confidence reposed on the legal profession
and the judicial system to which they belong.
Lawyers are always mandated to maintain the noble ideas and strictest standards of morality to remain worthy of the office
and the privileges which their license and the law confers upon them.
Whether domestic squabbles involving a lawyer and his/her spouse are proper subjects of a disbarment
proceeding.
We rule, pro hac vice, in the positive. Atty. Cristobal's actions fall short of the exacting moral standard required of the noble
profession of law.
Although acts amounting to gross immorality cannot be delineated, this Court has held that grossly immoral conduct is one
that is "willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community. Determining whether one's actions is grossly immoral depends on the attendant circumstances
and prevailing norms of conduct.
The instant administrative case is hinged on Atty. Cristobal's violent and abusive behavior towards his wife, Divine. The
dismissal of the criminal case filed by Divine against him does not exculpate him from administrative liability. While We
correct Divine's allegation that a preponderance of evidence is needed in administrative cases, this Court nevertheless finds
Atty. Cristobal guilty under Rule 1.01 for unlawful conduct based on substantial evidence — that which is more than a mere
scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Atty. Cristobal never denied hurting Divine. Although Atty. Cristobal denied choking and punching her, he admitted pushing
her after he "[lost] his composure." The affidavits of his mother, brother, and sister prove that they witnessed Atty. Cristobal
pushing Divine. Atty. Cristobal and his witnesses claimed that he merely did so because of Divine's provocation.
Furthermore, Atty. Cristobal merely attacks the probative value of Divine's police blotter and medical certificate, stating that
the blotter has no probative value and that the medical certificate is a sham for failure to indicate the name of the physician.
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are primafacie
evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence
of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
Let it be stressed that physical violence is never a normal occurrence when couples argue. Violence is violence. To justify
the same is egregious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society. Therefore, Atty. Cristobal's actions
display his unlawful and immoral conduct, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Atty. Cristobal's violence towards his
spouse shows his lack of respect for the sanctity of marriage. It is violative of his legal obligation to respect Divine.
However, disbarment is too harsh a penalty given the attenuating circumstances in this case.
Because disbarment proceedings are to be "exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle," the Court, in
its discretion, may impose a lower penalty. As in this case, there are mitigating circumstances that militate against the
imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment. We cannot turn a deaf ear on Atty. Cristobal's claim that Divine is abrasive,
boorish, insolent, and disrespectful towards Atty. Cristobal, Atty. Cristobal's relatives, the spouses' household help, their
children, the people tasked to renovate their house, and even their children's teachers.
Atty. Cristobal's mother, Araceli, attested that Divine was always disrespectful to her and never held back in speaking ill
of her.
Atty. Cristobal's sister, Joyce, described Divine as someone who (1) would insist on berating Atty. Cristobal even in the
presence of Atty. Cristobal's notarial clients rather than stepping away from an argument to cool off; (2) would bad mouth
Atty. Cristobal and constantly yelled at him, "letche ka!;" (3) did not care about her child's wellbeing when she was angry
with Atty. Cristobal; and (4) was proud that she once threatened Atty. Cristobal with a knife, which she hid under her pillow.
Ronald Pascual, one of the construction workers assigned to Araceli's house, revealed that Divine loved to curse and
humiliate them. He also recalled how Divine once destroyed plates in a fit of anger over a punchbowl.
Jocelyn M. Claravall (Jocelyn), St. Ferdinand College's elementary principal, narrated how Divine punched the face of her
son's Grade I adviser (Leticia) during a closed-door meeting between Divine, Leticia, and Jocelyn.
Moreover, this Court notes Atty. Cristobal's claim that he has solely provided for their four children's education, sustenance,
and support for the past decade. Of their four children, their first three children have been living with Atty. Cristobal from the
time Divine left the conjugal abode. Their youngest son, although within Divine's custody, is supported by Atty. Cristobal via
monthly financial support in accordance with the spouses' Compromise Agreement.
Given the aforementioned mitigating circumstance, this Court finds a suspension of three (3) months appropriate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Jonathan A. Cristobal is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months from the
practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
G.R. No. L-14277 April 30, 1960
MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Facts:
Held:
