Introduction/Characteristics of Criminal Law

1. Liang vs. People, G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

a. FACTS
1. Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
with two counts of grave oral defamation. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
2. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process.
Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this
Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
1. Immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except when
the Bank waives the immunity."
3. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.
4. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
5. RTC issued an order setting aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the MeTC to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued
6. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under
the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.
b. ISSUES: WoN Petitioner is covered by immunity under agreement
c. Held: No, petitioner is not covered by the immunity
1. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. The mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
2. The immunity mentioned under Sec. 45 is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioner’s case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the
prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it
must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it
so desire
3. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in
the name of official duty.
1. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction
 4. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside
his official functions. The commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

2. US vs Look Chaw, G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

a. Facts
1. On August 15, Errol, a vessel of English nationality, came from Hongkong, bound
for Mexico, arrived at the port of Cebu. According to an internal-revenue agent, on
this same day, Look Chaw tried to sell the Opium for Php 16 a can.
2. On August 19, Officials from the department of the port of Cebu and internal-
revenue agent of Cebu went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo and found a sack under the defendant’s control and possession opium.
3. Defense moved for a dismissal of the case (illegal possession and sale of opium),
on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts
concerned therein did not constitute a crime.
4. CFI of Cebu sentenced defendant and ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of
Cebu.
b. Issue: WoN CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case
c. Held: Yes, CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction
1. GR: Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports does not constitute a crime triable by
the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality
2. Does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.

3. US vs Wong Cheng, G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

a. Facts
1. Changsa is a merchant vessel of English nationality, was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city. Wong Cheng, while aboard the
vessel, was accused of having illegally smoked opium.
b. Issue: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters
c. Held: Yes, Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case
1. French Rule vs. English Rule
1. French rule (flagship of the vessel): crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
 1. EXC: their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory
2. English rule: based on the territorial principle, crimes committed aboard a
foreign merchant vessels are in general triable in the courts of the country
within territory they were committed.
3. Of these rules, Philippines follow the English Rule
2. Smoking opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes
such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign
vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who
are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires
no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come
into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.
4. US vs Ah Sing, G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
a. Facts
1. Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun
Chang. The Shun Chang  is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu
after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had
them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
2. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making a
search found the eight cans of opium. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. Thus, defendant was
charged with Illegal importation of Opium
3. CFI finds the defendant guilty.
b. Issue: WoN Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case
c. Held: Yes, Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case
1. As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel
which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is
guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist
or the defense proves otherwise.
2. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused
was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for
the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive
that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal
use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the
defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands.
5. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent. G.R. No.
193707               December 10, 2014
a. Facts
1. Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
2. Their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
3. Respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son.
4. Respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu, and since then, have
been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
located at Cebu. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
5. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
6. Because of this, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for violation
of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner
7. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
8. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure
to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality.
9. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this case.
b. Issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
c. Held
1. No, a foreign national has no obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
Law
1. Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar
as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
 2. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
2. Yes, foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child
1. Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws
and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations."
2. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest

6. AAA*, Petitioner, v. BBB,* Respondent. G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

a. Facts:
1. AAA and BBB are married. BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status.
2. AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically.
There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their
son, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly
started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom
he allegedly has been living in Singapore. This prompted AAA to file a case
against BBB an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 committed through marital infidelity.
3. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
1. Acts complained of BBB had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case
is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it
having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court
2. Mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been
brought about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically have
occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the
offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory
one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws - territoriality.
b. Issue: WoN Philippine courts may exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting
psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital
infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country
 c. Held: Yes, Philippine courts may exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting
psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262
1. What R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity  per se  but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the
law seeks to outlaw. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an
essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense
2. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction
3. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As
correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the
element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
4. What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest
as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential
thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory,
while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.
5. It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct
or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife
and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
7. Dorado vs. People, G.R. No. 216671, October 3, 2016
a. Facts
1. On March 15, 2004, Dorado, 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, with 2 unidentified companions, threw stones and bottles at Ronald, 15
 years old at the time, and his group. Ronald's group scampered for shelter and hid
to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles.
2. When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came
out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for them. When they
finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group.
During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes.
Ronald fell unconscious while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was
brought to the hospital where, after the examination, revealed that he lost his left
eye while his right eye could only see some light
3. RTC found Dorado guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
b. Issue: WoN Dorado should be held Criminally liable
c. Held: No, Dorado should not be held criminally liable
1. The Information filed against him consistently stated his minority .For said reason,
he must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said law was enacted on April
28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado
pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda  (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are
given retroactive effect).
2. In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be
exempt from criminal liability:

1. Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime; and ,
2. Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who
acted without discernment.
3. Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be
exempted from criminal responsibility. When a minor above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or
she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically
prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime with
discernment.
1. Prosecution failed to establish discernment. There was no discussion at
all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the
crime imputed against him.
2. Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away
with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent.
4. Intent vs. Discernment
1. The word "intent" has been defined "(a) design; a determination to do a
certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge
as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination
with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intent, p. 1103.). It is this intent which
comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two.
 2. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in
Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil.
580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that constitutes an exception to
the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age
but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong ..." (italics
Ours) p. 583
3. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, intent
refers to the desire of one's act while discernment relate to the moral
significance that person ascribes to the said act
5. Evident Premeditation
1. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt:
1. (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
2. (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and
3. (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.
4. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is
indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched
or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out
2. Evident premeditation was not established
1. Prosecution evidence only referred to the matters that happened
during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by
Dorado beforehand to kill Ronald. There was no evidence on
record which would indicate how and when Dorado hatched his
plan to kill Ronald
Pprosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between
such determination and execution to allow Dorado to reflect upon
the circumstances of his act

8. LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

a. Facts:

1. Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City sometime in 1990.

2. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
petitioner approached him and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis
 3. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner
the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1)
men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.

4. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.

5. This prompted Tangcoy to file against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa

6. RTC found Lito Corpuz guilty and was affirmed by the CA.

7. Hence, this petition wherein Corpuz contends that the Information does not
contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and
that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by
private complainant.

b. Issue: WoN prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged

c. Held

1. An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory

designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.

2. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.

3. Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved.

4. private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two
(2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about
the same items with the latter promising to pay them.

5. No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand
need not even be formal; it may be verbal. 11 The specific word "demand" need not
even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged,
 since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.

6. demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate
court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b)

d. Facts

1. Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990.

2. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
petitioner approached him and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis

3. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner

the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1)
men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.

4. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.

5. This prompted Tangcoy to file against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa

6. RTC found Lito Corpuz guilty and was affirmed by the CA.

7. Hence, this petition.

e. Issue

1. Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of

particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough

(There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties

that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years
ago in 1932)

f. Held
1. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending
the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch
of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any
remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

2. ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever
a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

3. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense.18

4. The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of
a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable
act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is
tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by
law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the
situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding
penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first
paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the
Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the
Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper
penalty.

5. With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the
proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity.
There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless,
this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the
Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties
imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but
of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter,
consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or
 not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times.

6. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that
it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of
such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or
rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its
terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their
letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose.
Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial
legislation.

7. Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality
of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the present controversy
wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

9. Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 217874 Dec 5, 2017

a. Facts
1. Hernan is a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC. Her official functions include
receiving cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of
telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message fees.
2. When COA conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by Hernan,
they found that deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996
bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively slips did not
bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated
3. Upon confirmation, LBP reported that they did not recorded a remittance for the
₱11,300.00
4. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against
petitioner
5. RTC found Hernan guilty, affirmed by Sandiganbayan

1. 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months,

and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory
penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of
only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by
the accused.
b. Issues
c. Held
1. doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.52 None of the exceptions is present in this case.
2. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of
the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on
the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the
courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this
litigation.53
3. Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the not for
further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to
modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land
4. When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due
regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine
of immutability.
5. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act
Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is
Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the
Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as
Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged
herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance

6. On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and
such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions
of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the
facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases
where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft,
estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such
other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in
consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into
consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission.
For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find
application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the
 judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already
begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits
of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he
has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the
Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing
of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an
original petition filed for a similar purpose.

7. Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the
Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment,
the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed.

ARTICLE 1-13
10. US vs Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
a. Facts
1. Ah Chong and Pascual Gualberto were both employed at "Officers' quarters, No.
27. These two jointly occupy a small room toward the rear of the building, the door
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The
door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants,
as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one
small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
2. At about 10:00 pm, Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and
the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet
and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
3. At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is
probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested.
4. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight.
 5. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the
next house
6. There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these
repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
7. Pascual was rushed to hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on
the following day
8. Ah Chong was charged with crime of assassination. Trial court found him guilty of
simple homicide
1. Sentenced to six years and one day  presidio mayor (minimum penalty
prescribed by law)
2. At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed Pascual
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a
wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
b. Issue:
1. whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason
of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
c. Held
1. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
2. the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense
therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor,
where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
3. The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission
of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
4. The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the
milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable
excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful.”
5. A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
 from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property
under his charge.

11. People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
a. Facts
1. Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector received information on the the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, an escaped convict. According to the
information, Balagtas was with Iren, a bailarina
2. Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were instructed to arrest Balagtas
and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. When they arrived at Irene’s house,
Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and
asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further
inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
3. Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their caliber revolvers.
4. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and
looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at
him.
5. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour.
6. According to Galanta, upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you
are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and
as Tecson was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Galanta only fired at
Tecson when Oanis shouted "That is Balagtas."
7. However, according to Oanis, after he had opened the curtain covering the door
and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up”, Galanta at once fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the Tecson was still lying on bed, and
continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that
he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was
then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
8. The lower court declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
b. Issue
1. WoN Oanis and Galanta are not criminally liable for their acts in killing Balagtas for
reason being honest mistake of fact
c. Held: Yes, they are criminally liable
 1. There were no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action to arrest Balagtas. The person in the room being then asleep, Galanta and
Oanis had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed
2. Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
effected otherwise.
3. The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
(Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5
C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas
was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the
peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing
him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance
can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down,
although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
4. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance
5. a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
6. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in
the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in
their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty
by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees
than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed
7. appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
12. Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
a. Facts
1. Baby Aquino handed Jacinto, a collector of Mega Foam, a check representing her
payment for the purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. Somehow the check was
deposited in the LBP of Generoso Capitle (former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam), husband of Jacqueline Capitle (sister of Jacinto)
 2. Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in
the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to
know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing
the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline
Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela
Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.

3. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega

Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
regarding the bounced check. (Relaying of message is through Valencia since the
Capitles have no phone)
4. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four (Valencia, Jacinto,
Jacqueline Capitle and Ricablanca). Ricablanca reported the matter to the owner of
Megafoam.
5.
b. Issues: Whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
c. Held: No

1. The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to
Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property -
as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the
customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for
herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby
Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done
with intent to gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further
shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's
brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact
that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not
remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things – the check was
voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a
collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence –
petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

2. However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised

Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as
the intention of the accused is to gain  from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

3. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega
Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored.
4. requisites of an impossible crime are:
 1. (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property;
2. (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3. (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
1. the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because:
1. (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible
of accomplishment; or
2. (2) the means employed is either
1. (a) inadequate or
2. (b) ineffectual.
2. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime
3. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
5. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied,
as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check
bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega
Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
13. People vs. Balmores, G.R. No. L-1896, February 16, 1950
a. Facts
1. On September 22, Rafael tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion
of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true
and real unidentified number of same
2. substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or
number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a
prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29 1947
3. He presented the said ticket so falsified on said date, September 22, 1947, in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to one Bayani Miller , for the purpose of
exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number had won (1’359.55)
4. Bayani Miller discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was
falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and
arrested
5. He was charged guilty of attempted estafa through falsification
b. Issue: WoN the crime committed is an impossible crime
c. Case
1. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as
patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness
and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview
of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code.
 2. The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to
anyone and would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so
altered as a prize-winning number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant’s real offense
was the attempt commit estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but
technically and legally he has to suffer for the serious crime of falsification of a
government obligation.
14. Intod vs. CA, G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
a. Facts
1. Into, with five others, arrived at Palangpan’s house in Misamis Occidental, located
Palangpangan’s bedroom and fired said room (Reason bakit binaril: Because of a
land dispute between Intod and Palangpangan)
2. However, Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
3. RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder, affirmed by CA.
4. Intod appeals seeking a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan’s absence from her room on the
night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

b. Issue: WoN offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment
c. Held: Petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime
1. Under article of RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual.
2. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible
1. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting
from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a
person already dead falls in this category.
2. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime
1. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the
pocket empty
3. Intod’s case falls under factual impossibility
1. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense,
but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility"
that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction
between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.
15. Valenzuela vs People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007
a. Facts
1. Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club by Lago
(Security guard manning the parking area of the Supermarket)
 2. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known
"Tide" brand. Valenzuela unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes,
emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and ag
3. Valenzuel left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of
Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle.
4. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago
asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, Valenzuelaand Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot. Both of them were apprehended and the Tide were recovered ((4) cases
of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00).
5. RTC convicted them of consummated theft.
6. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to
freely dispose of the articles stolen.
7. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence this petition
b. Issue: Whether the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated
c. Held: there is no crime of frustrated theft

1. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies.

1. A felony is consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present."

2. It is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

3. Finally, it is attempted "when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance."

2. Subjective / Objective Phase

1. Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that
portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins
the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
2. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective
phase begins.
1. It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of
the offense, the crime is merely attempted.
2. On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of
frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is
complete."
3. Following Article 6, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed
by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce
[such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Two
determinative factors to consider:
 1. that the felony is not "produced," and
1. relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual
felonies in the Revised Penal Code52 as to when a particular felony is
"not produced," despite the commission of all the acts of execution
2. how exactly is the felony of theft "produced

1. theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal

property of another without the latter’s consent."

2. that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
1. This factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each
particular case
16. People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016
a. Facts
b. Issue
c. Held
17. Joel Yongco, G.R. No. 209373 People July 30, 2014
18.