Islamization in Pakistan

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Sharization or Islamization (Urdu: ‫ )اسالمی حکمرانی‬has a long history in Pakistan since its
foundation, but it became the primary policy,[1] or "centerpiece"[2] of the government
of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the ruler of Pakistan from 1977 until his death in
1988. Zia has also been called "the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a
global center for political Islam."[3]
The Pakistan movement had gained the country independence from the British
Empire as a Muslim-majority state.[4] At the time of its founding, the Dominion of
Pakistan had no official state religion prior to 1956, when the constitution had declared it
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Despite this, no religious laws had yet been adopted
for government and judicial protocols and civil governance, until the mid 1970s with the
coming of General Muhammed Zia Ul-Haq in a military coup also known as Operation
Fair Play which deposed the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Zia-ul-Haq committed himself to enforcing his interpretation of Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule
of the prophet" Muhammad), i.e. to establish an Islamic state and enforce sharia law.[5]
Zia established separate Shariat judicial courts[6] and court benches[7][8] to judge legal
cases using Islamic doctrine.[9] New criminal offenses (of adultery, fornication, and types
of blasphemy), and new punishments (of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death),
were added to Pakistani law. Interest payments for bank accounts were replaced by
 "profit and loss" payments. Zakat charitable donations became a 2.5% annual tax.
School textbooks and libraries were overhauled to remove un-Islamic
material.[10] Offices, schools, and factories were required to offer praying space.[11] Zia
bolstered the influence of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Islamic parties,[9] whilst
conservative scholars became fixtures on television.[11] 10,000s of activists from
the Jamaat-e-Islami party were appointed to government posts to ensure the
continuation of his agenda after his passing.[5][9][12][13] Conservative ulama (Islamic
scholars) were added to the Council of Islamic Ideology.[7]
In 1984 a referendum gave Zia and the Islamization program, 97.7% approval in official
results. However, there have been protests against the laws and their enforcement
during and after Zia's reign. Women's and human rights groups opposed incarceration
of rape victims under hadd punishments, new laws that valued women's testimony (Law
of Evidence) and blood money compensation (diyat) at half that of a man. Religious
minorities and human rights groups opposed the "vaguely worded" Blasphemy Law and
the "malicious abuse and arbitrary enforcement" of it.[14]
Possible motivations for the Islamisation programme included Zia's personal piety (most
accounts agree that he came from a religious family),[15] desire to gain political allies, to
"fulfill Pakistan's raison d'etre" as a Muslim state, and/or the political need to legitimise
what was seen by some Pakistanis as his "repressive, un-representative martial law
regime".[16]
How much success Zia had strengthening Pakistan's national cohesion with state-
sponsored Islamisation is disputed. Shia-Sunni religious riots broke out over differences
in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) – in particular, over how Zakat donations would be
distributed.[17][18] There were also differences among Sunni Muslims.[19]
The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a coalition of Islamist political parties in Pakistan,
calls for the increased Islamization of the government and society, specifically taking an
anti-Hindu stance. The MMA leads the opposition in the national assembly, held a
majority in the NWFP Provincial Assembly, and was part of the ruling coalition in
Balochistan. However, some members of the MMA made efforts to eliminate their
rhetoric against Hindus.[20]
Even more Islamization has happened by religious conversions in Pakistan.[citation needed]

Contents

 1Background and history

 2Hudood Ordinance
o 2.1Prohibition Order
o 2.2Adultery (Zina) Ordinance
 3Sharia courts and constitutional amendments
 4Blasphemy laws
o 4.1Religious offences and punishments
 5Economic islamization
o 5.1Zakat and Ushr Ordinance
 o 5.2Riba
o 5.3Land reforms
o 5.4Worker protests
 6Other Sharia laws
o 6.1Qisas and Diyat Ordinance 1990
 7Other policies
o 7.1Madrassa expansions
o 7.2Cultural policies
 8Causes, criticism and sectarian division
o 8.1Sectarian division
o 8.2Women's dissent
o 8.3Support
 9Legacy
 10Post-Zia ul-Haq Islamisation
o 10.1Court decisions
o 10.2Protection of Women Act
o 10.3Public support
 11See also
 12References
 13Bibliography

Background and history[edit]

President Ronald Reagan and President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, 1982.

Pakistan was founded on the basis of securing a sovereign homeland for the Muslims of
the subcontinent to live in self-determination.[21]
The idea of Pakistan had received overwhelming popular support among British Indian
Muslims, especially those in the Presidencies and provinces of British India where
Muslims were in a minority such as U.P.[22] The Muslim
League leadership, ulama (Islamic clergy) and Jinnah had articulated their vision of
Pakistan in terms of an Islamic state.[23] Muhammad Ali Jinnah had developed a close
association with the ulama.[24] When Jinnah died, Islamic scholar Maulana Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani described Jinnah as the greatest Muslim after the Mughal
Emperor Aurangzeb and also compared Jinnah's death to the Prophet's
passing.[24] Usmani asked Pakistanis to remember Jinnah's message of Unity, Faith and
Discipline and work to fulfil his dream:
to create a solid bloc of all Muslim states from Karachi to Ankara, from Pakistan to
Morocco. He [Jinnah] wanted to see the Muslims of the world united under the banner
of Islam as an effective check against the aggressive designs of their enemies.[24]
The first formal step taken to transform Pakistan into an ideological Islamic state was in
March 1949 when the country's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, introduced
the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly.[25] The Objectives
Resolution declared that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God
Almighty.[26] The president of the Muslim League, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, announced
that Pakistan would bring together all Muslim countries into Islamistan-a pan-Islamic
entity.[27] Khaliq believed that Pakistan was only a Muslim state and was not yet an
Islamic state, but that it could certainly become an Islamic state after bringing all
believers of Islam into a single political unit.[28] Keith Callard, one of the earliest scholars
on Pakistani politics, observed that Pakistanis believed in the essential unity of purpose
and outlook in the Muslim world:
Pakistan was founded to advance the cause of Muslims. Other Muslims might have
been expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But this assumed that other
Muslim states would take the same view of the relation between religion and
nationality.[27]
However, Pakistan's pan-Islamist sentiments were not shared by other Muslim
governments at the time. Nationalism in other parts of the Muslim world was based on
ethnicity, language and culture.[27] Although Muslim governments were unsympathetic
with Pakistan's pan-Islamic aspirations, Islamists from all over the world were drawn to
Pakistan. Figures such as the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, and
leaders of Islamist political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, became
frequent visitors to the country.[29] After General Zia-ul-Haq took power in a military
coup, Hizb ut-Tahrir (an Islamist group calling for the establishment of a Caliphate)
expanded its organisational network and activities in Pakistan. Its founder, Taqi al-Din
al-Nabhani, would maintain regular correspondence with Abul A’la Maududi, the founder
of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and he also urged Dr Israr Ahmed to continue his work in
Pakistan for the establishment of a global caliphate.[30]
Social scientist Nasim Ahmad Jawed conducted a survey in 1969 in pre-divided
Pakistan on the type of national identity that was used by educated professional people.
He found that over 60% of people in East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) professed
to have a secular national identity. However, in West Pakistan (current day Pakistan)
the same figure professed to have an Islamic and not a secular identity. Furthermore,
the same figure in East Pakistan defined their identity in terms of their ethnicity and not
Islam. But it was the opposite in West Pakistan where Islam was stated to be more
important than ethnicity.[31]
After Pakistan's first ever general elections the 1973 Constitution was created by an
elected Parliament.[32] The Constitution declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic
and Islam as the state religion. It also stated that all laws would have to be brought into
accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and that
no law repugnant to such injunctions could be enacted.[33] The 1973 Constitution also
created certain institutions such as the Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic
Ideology to channel the interpretation and application of Islam.[34]
On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq led a coup d'état.[35] In the year or two before Zia-ul-
Haq's coup, his predecessor, leftist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had faced
vigorous opposition which was united under the revivalist banner of Nizam-e-
Mustafa[36] ("Rule of the prophet"). According to supporters of the movement,
establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law would mean a return to the justice and
success of the early days of Islam when the Islamic prophet Muhammad ruled the
Muslims.[37] In an effort to stem the tide of street Islamisation, Bhutto had also called for it
and banned the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims, nightclubs and horse
racing.[37][38]
On coming to power, Zia went much further than Bhutto, committing himself to
enforcing Nizam-e-Mustafa,[5] i.e. sharia law. Most accounts confirm that Zia came from
a religious family and religion played an important part in molding his personality. His
father worked as a civilian official in army headquarters and was known as ''Maulvi''
Akbar Ali due to his religious devotion. Zia joined the army before partition and
occasionally offended his British superiors with his refusal to give up religious and
cultural traditions. Zia attributed his personal resistance to the lifestyle of the British
Indian cavalry to his faith in ''God and his teachings.''[39]
In his first televised speech to the country as head of state he declared that
Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks
to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential
prerequisite for the country.[40]
While in the past, "many a ruler did what they pleased in the name of Islam," he would
not.[8][41]
Unlike in Iran, Islamisation in Pakistan was politically conservative, working against, not
with leftist forces and ideas. Zia had little sympathy with Bhutto or
his populist, socialist philosophy—captured in the slogan, "Food, clothing, and
shelter".[42] General Zia explained in an interview in 1979 given to British journalist Ian
Stephens:
The basis of Pakistan was Islam. ... Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture.
It was on the Two-Nation Theory that this part was carved out of the Subcontinent as
Pakistan.... Mr. Bhutto's way of flourishing in this Society was by eroding its moral fiber.
... by pitching students against teachers, children against their parents, landlord against
tenants, workers against mill owners. [Pakistan has economic difficulties] because
Pakistanis have been made to believe that one can earn without working. ... We are
going back to Islam not by choice but by the force of circumstances. It is not I or my
government that is imposing Islam. It was what 99 percent of people wanted; the street
violence against Bhutto reflected the people's desire ...

— General Zia-ul-Haq, Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan:Between Mosque and

Military; §From Islamic Republic to Islamic State. United States: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (July 2005). p. 136. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
While Zia initiated the Islamisation programme, he came under attack from conservative
Sunni forces who considered his process too slow. He distanced himself from some of
the ulama in 1980,[43] and in 1983 religious opponents spread the rumour that Zia was
an Ahmadi. Zia was "forced to deny this allegation publicly and denounce the Ahmadis
as kafirs (infidels)".[44]
In 1984 a referendum was held on Zia, the Islamization program, and giving him a five-
year presidential term. Official results reported 97.7 in favor and voter participation of
60%. Independent observers questioned whether 30% of eligible voters had voted. [45]
Opposition to state-sponsored Islamisation or aspects of it came from several quarters.
Religious riots broke out in 1983 and 1984.[19] Sectarian divisions
between Sunnis and Shia worsened over the issue of the 1979 Zakat ordinance, but
differences in fiqh jurisprudence also arose in marriage and divorce, inheritance and
wills and imposition of hadd punishments.[17][18]
Among Sunni Muslims, there were disputes between Deobandis and Barelvis.[19] Zia
favored Deobandi doctrine and the Sufi pirs of Sindh (who were Barelvi) joined the anti-
Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.[19]

Hudood Ordinance[edit]
Fraz Wahlah as a Child in the mid 80s waving Pakistan Peoples' Party flag whilst leading a procession against
the Marshal Law and dictatorship of General Zia Ul-Haq in Pakistan.

Main article: Hudood Ordinance

One of the first and most controversial Islamisation measures was the replacement of
parts of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) with the 1979 "Hudood Ordinance."[46] (Hudood
meaning limits or restrictions, as in limits of acceptable behavior in Islamic law.) The
Ordinance added new criminal offenses of adultery and fornication to Pakistani
law,[47] and new punishments of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death.[48]
For theft or robbery, the PPC punishments of imprisonment or fine, or both, were
replaced by amputation of the right hand of the offender for theft, and amputation of the
right hand and left foot for robbery.[49] For Zina (extramarital sex) the provisions relating
to adultery were replaced by the Ordinance with punishments of flogged 100 lashes for
those unmarried offenders, and stoning to death for married offenders.[49]
All these Hudood punishments were the maximum punishments, dependent
on Hudd proof—four Muslim men of good repute testifying as witness to the crime—
being met. In practice, as of 2014, the Hudd requirement has not yet been met and no
offender has been stoned or had limbs amputated by the Pakistani judicial system. The
less strict tazir standards—where the punishment was some combination of
imprisonment, fines and/or flogging[50]—was applied and many offenders have been
publicly flogged.
More worrisome for human rights and women's rights advocates, some lawyers and
politicians, was the incarceration of thousands of rape victims on charges
of zina.[49] Mixing the Pakistan penal code with Islamic laws was difficult because of the
difference in the underlying logic of the two legal systems.[49]
Prohibition Order[edit]
"Drinking of wine" (and all other alcoholic drinks) was not a crime under the original
Pakistan Penal Code, but in 1977, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims was
banned in Pakistan, punishable by imprisonment of six months or a fine of Rs. 5000/-,
or both. Under Zia's Prohibition Order, this punishment was replaced by one of whipping
of eighty stripes, (citing an Ijma (consensus opinion) of
the Companions of Muhammad since the period of the Second Caliph Umar). Non-
Muslims were excepted if they obtained a license to drink and/or manufacture alcoholic
beverages from the Government.
Adultery (Zina) Ordinance[edit]
Further information: Hudood Ordinances § Controversy and revision, and Safia Bibi
rape case
The most controversial of the ordinances was the Zina Ordinance, by which the
Pakistan Penal Code provisions relating to adultery were replaced. Women and men
found guilty were to be flogged a hundred stripes apiece if unmarried, and stoned to
death if married. Uncorroborated testimony by women was inadmissible in hudood
crimes,[51] so in cases of rape, victims were sometimes charged with fornication and
jailed and their rapists were freed because the women could not comply with the Islamic
Hadd requirements of four reputable Muslim males testifying to the crime. Girls as
young as twelve were also sometimes jailed and prosecuted for having extra-marital
intercourse because the ordinance abolished Pakistan's statutory rape law. [52]
According to legal scholar Martin Lau,
While it was easy to file a case against a woman accusing her of adultery, the Zina
Ordinance made it very difficult for a woman to obtain bail pending trial. Worse, in actual
practice, the vast majority of accused women were found guilty by the trial court only to
be acquitted on appeal to the Federal Shariat Court. By then they had spent many years
in jail, were ostracized by their families, and had become social outcasts. [53]
In 1979, before the ordinances went into effect there were 70 women held in Pakistani
prisons. By 1988, there were 6000.[54] Critics complained that the law had become a way
for "vengeful husbands and parents" to punish their wives or daughters for
disobedience, but that "whenever even small changes" were proposed, religious groups
and political parties staged "large scale demonstrations" in opposition.[55]
Pakistani women's and human rights groups protested the law, and international media
gave it publicity. Supporters defended the Ordinances' punishments as ordained by God
and the law as the victim of "extremely unjust propaganda" in the media. [56]
The first conviction and sentence of stoning to death, in September 1981, [57] was
overturned under national and international pressure. A conviction for adultery of a 13-
year-old blind girl, (Safia Bibi), who alleged rape by her employer and his son, was
reversed and the conviction was set aside on appeal after bitter public criticism. Another
conviction for zina and sentence of stoning to death in early 1988[58] sparked more public
outrage and led to a retrial and acquittal by the Federal Sharia Court. [59]
Attention to the problematic nature of the Ordinance and suggestions for revising it were
given by a number of government appointed commissions and a televised several
weeks-long-televised debate on the subject.[60] In 2006, parts of the law were extensively
revised by the Women's Protection Bill.[61]

Sharia courts and constitutional amendments[edit]

In 1978 Zia established "Shariat Appellate Benches", "grafted" on to Pakistan's
four High Courts.[7][8][62] The benches were tasked with judging legal cases using the
teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah, and examining the country's laws to determine
whether they complied with sharia law, and bring them into alignment if they did
not.[9] A Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court was created to be the final
authority in Sharia cases.[63]
In announcing the establishment of Shariat Benches, Zia described their jurisdiction:
"Every citizen will have the right to present any law enforced by the government before
the 'Sharia Bench' and obtain its verdict whether the law is wholly or partly Islamic or
un-Islamic."
However, some very important laws were exempt from being struck down as un-Islamic.
The Ninth Amendment to the Pakistan Constitution, added by Zia's government, stated
that "the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah shall be the
supreme law and source of guidance for legislation", but qualified that in Article 203-B
by omitting from the rule: the constitution, "Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the
procedure of any Court or tribunal", and "until the expiration of ten years from the
commencement of this Chapter, any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and
collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure ..." Thus the
constitution and major parts of Pakistan's laws were exempt from Sharia jurisdiction.
Further, the Shariat Benches did not always follow Zia's policy, and early on
declared rajm, or stoning, to be un-Islamic. Zia-ul-Haq reconstituted the court, which
then ruled rajm Islamic.[64]
In 1980 the Shariat Appellate Benches were disbanded and replaced by a Federal
Shariat Court (FSC). Its establishment was less than clean and simple, as between
1980 and 1985, "provisions relating to the FSC's operation were modified 28 times,
through the mechanism of 12 separate presidential ordinances and were incorporated
into the Constitution in 14 subsections covering 11 pages of text." [65] It has eight judges
appointed by the president, "selected for the most part from judges of the high courts". [66]
The judges of the superior courts[67] appointed by General Zia tended to be "Islamic
moderates" rather than "Islamic activists" favoring a rapid advance of Islamisation.[68][69]:37–8
In the lower district courts, there is "considerable variation in the enforcement and
interpretation of the Hudood laws", with "much more enthusiasm" for implementation of
them in the Punjab and urban Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) than in other
regions.[69]:37

Blasphemy laws[edit]
Main article: Blasphemy law in Pakistan
To outlaw blasphemy, the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure
Code (CrPC) were amended through ordinances in 1980, 1982 and 1986.

 The 1980 law prohibited derogatory remarks against Islamic personages, and
carried a three-year prison sentence.[70]
 In 1982 the small Ahmadiyya religious minority were prohibited from saying or
implying they were Muslims.
 In 1986 declaring anything that implied disrespect to the Islamic
prophet Muhammad, Ahl al-Bayt (family members of
Muhammad), Sahabah (companions of Muhammad) or Sha'ar-i-Islam (Islamic
symbols), was made a cognisable offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine, or
both.[71]
Religious offences and punishments[edit]
PPC Description Penalty

Uttering of any word or making any sound or making any gesture or

1 years imprisonment, or
298 placing of any object in the sight with the deliberate intention of wounding
fine, or both
the religious feelings of any person.

3 years imprisonment, or
298A Use of derogatory remarks etc., in respect of holy personages. (1980)
with fine, or with both[72]

(Ahmadi blasphemy law) Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles etc.,

3 years imprisonment and
298B reserved for certain holy personages or places, by Ahmadis. (26 April
fine
1984[73])
 (Ahmadi blasphemy law) Aka Ordinance XX: An Ahmadi, calling himself
3 years imprisonment and
298C a Muslim, or preaching or propagating his faith, or outraging the religious
fine
feelings of Muslims, or posing himself as a Muslim. (26 April 1984[73])

Up to 2 years
Injuring or defiling places of worship, with intent to insult the religion of
295 imprisonment or with
any class
fine, or with both

Up to 10 years
Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any
295A imprisonment, or with
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. (1927)[74]
fine, or with both

295B Defiling, etc., of Quran. (1982)[75] Imprisonment for life[72]

Mandatory Death and

Use of derogatory remarks, spoken, written, directly or indirectly, etc. to fine[72][76]
295C
defile the name of Muhammad. (1986)
(Feb. 1990[77])

The legal language forbidding of blasphemy is quite complete, stating

Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person,
utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture
in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine, or with both.[78]
Prior to 1986, only 14 cases pertaining to blasphemy were reported in Pakistan.[79] From
1987 to 2014 over 1300 people have been accused of blasphemy, mostly non-Muslim
religious minorities. The vast majority of the accusations were lodged for desecration of
the Quran.[70]
The laws are controversial among the small liberal community in Pakistan and
international human rights organizations. According to one religious minority source, an
accusation of blasphemy commonly subjects the accused, police, lawyers, and judges
to harassment, threats, attacks and rioting.[80] Critics complain that Pakistan's blasphemy
law "is overwhelmingly being used to persecute religious minorities and settle personal
vendettas,"[81] but calls for change in the blasphemy laws have been strongly resisted by
Islamic parties. As of 2014 no one has been legally executed for blasphemy, but 17
people are on death row for the crime,[82] and a considerable number of accused of or
connected with the issue have been killed at the hands of mob or other vigilante
violence.
Over 50 people accused of blasphemy have been murdered before their respective
trials were over,[79][82] and prominent figures who opposed blasphemy laws (Salman
Taseer, the former governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Federal Minister for
Minorities) have been assassinated after urging reform of the law.[70] Altogether, since
1990, 62 people have been murdered as a result of blasphemy allegations.[83] There has
also been at least one case of an attack on a non-Muslim faith registered under the
blasphemy laws.[84][85]
The depth of passion and vigour of vigilantism against blasphemy was in evidence in a
21 April 1994 incident in Gujranwala where a doctor, Sajjad Farooq, was beaten,
stoned, doused with kerosene and set alight, and dragged through the streets tied to a
motorbike by a group of people after an announcement was made over the
loudspeakers of several local mosques that 'a Christian had burned a copy of the Koran'
and that people should come forward to stone him to death. It later transpired that
Farooq was not a Christian but a devout Muslim, but one with enemies with access to
local mosque public address systems. As of late 1994, a complaint had been lodged
against five people but no arrests appeared to have been made. [86][87]
Accusations of blasphemy in Pakistan have also often led to mob violence and forced
conversion to Islam in Pakistan. Attacks on Christian and Hindu minorities in Pakistan
could be part of a militant plan to send a message to the West or embarrass the civilian
governments of the country when they appear to be too friendly to the West. [88]

Economic islamization[edit]
Main article: Islamization of the economy in Pakistan
Zakat and Ushr Ordinance[edit]
In the short term, the fiscal dimension of the Islamization policy made a stronger impact.
Payment of the alms tax, Zakat, as well as its agricultural counterpart, Ushr, were
traditionally private obligations for Muslims in Pakistan. Together they generally
represented 2.5% of annual household savings and served as a sort of wealth tax to be
redistributed to the Muslim community's poor.[89] One of the provisions of the 1973
constitution already stipulated that these taxes should be collected by the government.
But Bhutto had made no move to implement it. In 1979, Zia decided to transform what
was considered a personal duty of solidarity into a legal obligation. The "Zakat and Ushr
Ordinance" was issued on 20 June 1980. Its urban component,zakat, took effect in
1981, whereas ushr did not come into effect until 1983. The system by which these
taxes were previously levied was replaced by a specific agency to rationalize the
collection & distribution of funds, a process that Malik describes as follows:
On the first day of the fasting month of Ramadan, the Zakat Deducting Agencies
(banks,post-offices etc.) by means of deduction at source withdraw 2.5% from all saving
accounts above a certain exemption limit (fixed at Rs. 1,000 in the first year of Zakat
deduction, 1980). They transfer the Zakat thus collected to the Central Zakat Fund
(CZF). This fund is fed also with proceeds from 'voluntary Zakat' and 'donations' and
from funds of other institutions. Following certain criteria, the Zakat is then distributed
among the Provincial Zakat Funds (PZFs) and the National Zakat Foundation (NZF).
Following prescribed quota, the PZFs turn over funds to the Local Zakat Funds (LZFs),
to other institutions, to the needy (mustaqhin) and to the National Zakat Foundation. [90]
While ushr is distributed in the locality where it was collected, the distribution process of
the zakat shows a whole bureaucratic pyramid in action. Here again, the Islamization
policy reinforced state control over religious institutions. Further evidence of this was the
Tehsil/Taluka/Subdivisional and Local Committees (Removal of Chairman and
Members) Rule (1981), which allowed the state to dismiss the president of a local Zakat
Committee, an institution that was previously independent of the state. In 1981, Al
Zakat, an influential national monthly publication boasted that 250,000 persons were
involved in the new system of collecting and distributing zakat funds. The fiscal
dimension of Zia's Islamization policy fostered a rise in sectarianism, a term that in
Pakistan denotes the conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims. As soon as Zia's plans
for zakat and ushr were made public, Shia leaders objected that according to their
jurisprudence of their sect, payment of these taxes was a purely individual choice, a
decision made according to one's conscience. In reaction to the promulgation of the law,
they orchestrated a massive demonstration in Islamabad which later led them to be
exempted from the mandatory tax.The taxes have not been found to have eliminated
rural and urban poverty or reduced the inequalities in wealth which had become a
traditional feature of Pakistani society.[91][92]
Riba[edit]
Zia publicly stated his desire to eliminate interest on loans and securities and create an
"Interest-free economy."[93] Zia declared that effective 1 July 1979 the affairs of the
National Investment Trust, the House Building Finance Corporation, and the Investment
Corporation of Pakistan were to be run on an interest-free basis through the adoption of
profit-loss sharing (PLS).[94] On 1 January 1980, approximately 7,000 interest-free
counters were opened at all the nationalized commercial banks.[93]
In 1981 interest payments were to be replaced by "profit and loss" accounts (though
profit was thought to be simply interest by another name).[10] The government introduced
and encouraged banks to adopt financing schemes based upon murabaha and
or musharaka[94]
Land reforms[edit]
Zia did not consider land reform or trade union activity to be part of Islamic economics.
In a statement addressed to the poor and working class he opined:
It is not for the employers to provide roti, kapda, aur makaan (bread, clothes and
homes) [a reference to a well-known slogan used by Bhutto's PPP]. It was for God
Almighty who is the provider of livelihood to his people. Trust in God and He will bestow
upon you an abundance of good things in life.[95]
His martial law government also made it clear that it "was not committed to redistributive
agrarian policies and described the land reforms as ordinary politics to reward
supporters and punish enemies".[96]
When, on 13 December 1980, the Federal Shariat Court declared the land reforms of
1972 and 1977 to be in consonance with Islamic injunctions,[97] Zia responded by
inducting three members of the Ulema (Islamic scholars) into the Federal Sharia Court
and two into the Sharia Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court (Ulema traditionally often
coming from, or at least supporting the interests of, the landowning class). The newly
constituted courts reversed the FSC judgment in 1990.[97]
After the imposition of martial law, thousands of tenants were forcibly evicted from the
land in various districts.[96]
Another source, scholar Charles H. Kennedy, states that from 1978 to 1992, the
"Islamic Courts" established by Islamisation (i.e. the Shariah Appellate
Bench and Federal Shariat Court) were much more important in land reform policy than
either the executive or legislature of Pakistan. Kennedy states they effectively
"suspended implementation" of the land reforms, "repealed the reforms, drafted new
legislation, and then interpreted the new laws' meanings".[98]
Worker protests[edit]
Trade union and grass roots demands for higher wages, better working conditions,
social security, old age benefits and compensation for accidents, were "no justification
for protests and strikes", and treated as disorder to be suppressed. Maximum
punishment to the offenders was three years rigorous imprisonment and/or whipping.
On 2 January 1986 police killed 19 striking workers of the Colony Textile Mill in Multan,
whose management had sought assistance from the authorities.[97]

Other Sharia laws[edit]

Attempts were made to enforce praying of salat five times a day.[9]
Separate electorates for Hindus and Christians were established in 1985—a policy
originally proposed by Islamist leader Abul A'la Maududi. Christian and Hindu leaders
complained that they felt excluded from county's political process, but the policy had
strong support from Islamists.[99]
Qisas and Diyat Ordinance 1990[edit]
In 1990 Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance on Qisas ("retaliation" or
revenge) and Diyat (financial compensation paid to the heirs of a victim), was
introduced after the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court declared that the
lack of Qisas and Diyat were repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down by the
Quran and Sunnah.[100] (These laws were introduced after Zia died, but by a court—
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court—that Zia had created.[101])
Under the law, the victim (or heirs of the victim) of a crime had the right to inflict injuries
on the offender identical to the ones sustained by the victim. (Although the ordinance
set the "blood money" compensation for a female victim at half that for a male. [14]) The
law also allows offenders to absolve themselves of the crime by paying compensation to
the victim or their heirs if, and only if, the family of the victim is willing to accept it.
Law of Evidence
A proposed Law of Evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat) would require two women to testify in
place of one man. After protest and demonstrations against the law, a 1984
compromise limited the rule to financial transactions.[14][102] According to Charles
Kennedy, it is unlikely that the law will affect any case brought to any superior court in
Pakistan because "in practice, virtually every financial transaction in Pakistan by custom
or rule requires the countersignature of several individuals."[103]
Unlike men, women entering into legal contracts were required to have their signature
witness by another person.[51]
Prayer timings
Instructions were issued for regular observance of prayers and arrangements were
made for performing noon prayer (Salat Al Zuhur) in government and quasi-government
offices and educational institutions, during office hours, and official functions, and at
airports, railway stations and bus stops.
Ramadan Ordinance
An Ehtram-e-Ramazan (reverence for fasting) Ordinance was issued banning eating,
smoking, and drinking in public places. According to a clause of this ordinance, those
places including restaurants, canteens, bridges, lanes, and even the confines of private
homes. While in theory the non-Muslim minority of Pakistan is exempt from the law,
minorities have been arrested for eating in public.[104]
Regulations for women
Under Zia, the order for women to cover their heads while in public was implemented in
public schools, colleges and state television. Women's participation in sports and the
performing arts was severely restricted.[51]
The Ansari commission, which from the 1980s onwards advised the President on un-
Islamic social conventions, recommended that women should be prohibited from leaving
the country without a male escort and that unmarried, unaccompanied women should
not be allowed to serve overseas in the diplomatic corps. An Islamic dress code was
imposed on women in the public eye such as newsreaders and air stewardesses. [105]

Other policies[edit]
Textbooks were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material, and un-Islamic books were
removed from libraries.[10] Offices, schools, and factories were required to offer praying
space; conservative scholars became fixtures on television.[11] The Government built
mosques in rural areas, giving the rural people greater access to mullahs. It also
appointed many mullahs to advisory groups.[106]
According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist opposed to fundamentalism,
under Zia the government organized international conferences and provided funding for
research on such topics as the temperature of hell and the chemical nature
of jinn (supernatural creatures made from fire).[107][108]
In prisons, religious instruction is mandatory.[109] Those who can demonstrate their ability
to recite the Quran from memory before an examination board are entitled to a
remission in their sentence of up to two years.[110]
Madrassa expansions[edit]
Main article: Madrassas in Pakistan
Educational reforms partly flowed from judicial reforms insofar as, for instance, a sharia
department was set up at Quaid-e-Azam University in 1979 to train Islamic legal
specialists. But Zia devoted personal attention to the reorganization of Quranic schools
(dini madaris, plural of madrasssa).Madrassass (traditional religious schools) in
Pakistan received state sponsorship for the first time.[111] Their number grew from 893 to
2,801 during the Zia years according to one source.[112] Another states that 12,000 were
opened from 1983-4.[113] Most were Deobandi in doctrinal orientation, while one quarter
of them were Barelvi.[112] They received funding from Zakat councils and provided free
religious training, room and board to impoverished Pakistanis.[114] The schools, which
banned televisions and radios, have been criticized by authors for stoking sectarian
hatred both between Muslim sects and against non-Muslims.[111][112][114]
Cultural policies[edit]
Main article: New wave of rock music in Pakistan (1980-1989)
In a 1979 address to the nation, Zia decried the influence of Western culture and music
in the country. Soon afterwards, PTV, the national television network, ceased playing
music videos or any music other than patriotic songs. Most of the cinemas in Lahore
were shut down.[115] (As of 2004, the "Lollywood" film industry of Pakistan produces
around 40 films a year, compared to India's thousand or so releases.[116])
This was despite warm relations between Zia and the President of the largest Western
country (US President Ronald Reagan), and strong support for Zia from that
country.[117] Also ironic was that under Zia's rule (according to leftist cultural
critic Nadeem F. Paracha), economic prosperity expanded the country's urban middle
and lower-middle-classes, and spread the popularity of Western 1980s fashion wear,
hairstyle and pop music.[118][119]
The common South Asian parting phrase "Khuda Hafiz" was discouraged in favour of
"Allah Hafiz", which was first used in 1985 in the state-run media as it was said to be
more Islamic than the former phrase that allowed for religious pluralism.[120]

Causes, criticism and sectarian division[edit]

Zia's motivation for the Islamisation programme has been described as including his
personal piety, desire "to fulfil Pakistan's raison d'etre" as a Muslim state, and the
political need to legitimise what was seen by many as Zia's "repressive, un-
representative martial law regime".[16] Zia had come to power overthrowing Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, whose opposition had been united around the slogan of Nizam-e-
Mustafa (Islamic rule), making supporters of Islamisation the enemy of Zia's enemy.[121]
Secular and leftist forces accused Zia of manipulating Islam for political ends. [8] Nusrat
Bhutto, former wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto claimed that Zia "used Islam" to ensure "the
survival of his own regime" following the "horrors of 1971 war" in East Bengal.[8]
One author points out that Zia was conspicuously silent on the dispute between the
heterodox Zikri sect and the `Ulama in Balochistan, where Islamist doctrine would call
for siding with the conservative Ulama, but where Zia had a political need for tranquility
among the Zikri.[122] Another notes Zia's use of Article 203-B to protect any part of the
constitution, any Personal Laws, and any financial laws from being struck down as in
violation of sharia law.[123]
Sectarian division[edit]
See also: Sectarian violence in Pakistan
How much success Zia had using state-sponsored Islamisation to strengthen national
cohesion is also disputed. The Shia Muslim minority differed with Sunnis over Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh). The Pakistani government leaned in favour of applying Sunni law to
all.[124]
In particular, dispute over how Zakat donations for the poor should be distributed fanned
sectarian tension[17][18] and religious riots broke out in 1983 and 1984.[19] Shia were exempt
from the Zakat tax on the grounds that they would contribute to their own Shi’i ulama for
charitable work. But this exemption "led more and more Pakistanis to declare
themselves as Shi’is" and this phenomenon "had the effect of hardening anti-Shi’i
attitudes among Sunni Islamic activists." [125]
Differences in fiqh jurisprudence also arose in marriage and divorce, inheritance and
wills and imposition of hadd punishments.[17][18]
Zia-ul-Haq pursued anti-Shia policies[126] and attacks on Shias also increased under Zia's
presidency,[127] with the first major sectarian riots in Pakistan breaking out in 1983
in Karachi and later spreading to Lahore and Balochistan.[128] Sectarian violence became
a recurring feature of the Muharram month every year, with sectarian violence
between Sunnis and Shias taking place in 1986 in Parachinar.[128] In one notorious
incident, the 1988 Gilgit Massacre, Osama bin Laden-led Sunni tribals assaulted,
massacred and raped Shia civilians in Gilgit after being inducted by the Pakistan
Army to quell a Shia uprising in Gilgit.[129][130][131][132][133]
Among Sunni Muslims, Deobandis and Barelvis also had disputes.[19] Zia favored
Deobandi doctrine and the Sufi pirs of Sindh (who were Barelvi) joined the anti-
Zia Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.[19]
A solid majority of Barelvis had supported the creation of
Pakistan,[134] and Barelvi ulama had also issued fatwas in support of the Pakistan
Movement during the 1946 elections,[135][136] but ironically Islamic state politics in Pakistan
was mostly in favour of Deobandi (and later Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi) institutions.[137] This was
despite the fact that the majority of Deobandi clerics strongly opposed the partition of
colonial India and only a few (although influential) Deobandi clerics had supported
the Pakistan Movement.[138][137] Zia-ul-Haq forged a strong alliance between
the military and Deobandi institutions.[137]
The Ahmadiyas, whose members include "many leading scientists and professionals",
complain that under Zia they have been "removed from jobs and charge that their
property and mosques have been seized".The Ahmadiyas, among whose members are
many leading scientists and professionals, differ from other Moslems in that they do not
regard Mohammad as the last prophet. They have been removed from jobs and charge
that their property and mosques have been seized under Mr. Zia's regime.[106]
Women's dissent[edit]
Main article: Women in Pakistan
Women's groups (All Pakistan Women's Association and Women’s Action Forum)
opposed the Diyat Ordinance (which set the "blood money" compensation for a female
victim at half that for a male),[14] and later the proposed Law of Evidence (which required
two women to testify in place of one man).[14] They challenged the law on an Islamic
basis, offering an alternative interpretation of the Quranic ayah (verse)[139] used as the
basis of the law, emphasising that in other ayat (verses), men and women are assumed
to be equal, and noting the importance of the importance of the testimony of two of
Muhammad's wives, (Khadija and Aisha) in early Muslim history.[14] (Despite their pious
rebuttal, the protesters were met with tear gas and lathi (baton) charges by police
outside the High Court building.[14] Ulama condemned the protest as an act of
apostasy.[14])
Internationally, Human Rights Watch complained that the exclusion of women's
testimony in rape cases (from Hudood Ordinances (1979), as well as the Law of
Evidence and proposed laws regarding Qisas and Diyat, relegated women to "inferior
legal status" to men.[140]
Support[edit]
Anis Ahmad of the International Islamic University credits controversy over the
"fundamentalism" of Islamisation to the failure of "Muslim elites" to understand "the very
nature of divinely revealed law."[141] He believes these elites have adopted the
"intellectual culture and political system" of the British colonizers due to which they have
used a "sociological approach" to understanding Sharia law,[141] and to assert that Islamic
punishments such as amputation, stoning and lashing are "bedouin", "tribal",
"premodern", "harsh", "outdated" and "barbaric."[141] He goes on to contend that unlike
Sharia, secularism calls for leniency towards the criminal, ignoring the suffering of the
victim of crime.[142] He believes that sexual indulgence is not a matter of personal
freedom but "rebellion against the established moral norms in a society", [142] that
application of Sharia to non-Muslims is simply a matter of trying to "persuade them to
act rationally"[143] and that criticism of the treatment of the Ahmadiyya community has
been made based on the Munir Report which has been "condemned by
the ulama [Islamic scholars] ... as a biased work."[144] Ahmad calls for development of
educational institutions to include adequate information on current issues so
that ijtihad can be exercised in social, political, economic and legal areas[145] and
believes that while Zia and other politicians may be criticized for "piecemeal and at
times frivolous" implementation, the "Islamic ideals" of Islamization have "the
commitment" of the Muslim people in Pakistan.[146]

Legacy[edit]
Islamization has been harshly criticized. Author Ian Talbot has accused it of appearing
"to have reduced a great faith tradition, rich in humanity, culture and a sense of social
justice, to a system of punishments and persecution of minority groups."[16] Author Zafar
Iqbal Kalanauri suggests that Zia's interpretation of Islam may have "contributed to the
rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and retrogression" in Pakistan.[55] Another
authority on the topic, Christophe Jaffrelot attributes the rise of Islamic movements
including the Lashkar-e-Taiba as an 'unintended consequence of the policy of
Islamisation and support for Jihad movements' undertaken by Pakistani authorities
since Zia. A blurb for a book of essays on The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-
2009 published by the Middle East Institute, sums up the 30 year impact of Islamisation
beginning with Zia as, "a country’s founding creed violated, much of its resources
misspent, and its social fabric rent".[147] Under Zia stricter Islamic rules did not appear to
lead to greater social tranquility. Crime, drinking, drug addiction are thought to have
increased.[106]
Others, at least writing in the 1980s and 1990, thought the impact of the process was
overstated. In 1986 New York Times journalist Steven Wiesman wrote that religious and
political leaders agreed that Islamisation changes were "largely marginal or
cosmetic."[106] Academic Charles H. Kennedy, wrote in the mid 1990s that while during
the Zia administration "hardly a day passed in which one or more of the issues of the
program were not the focus of political debate in Pakistan," the process had relatively
small impact, as policies were "already in place", "cosmetic", or were "left
unimplemented".[148] [149] Kennedy's explanation for why the rhetoric on Islamisation would
be so extravagant while the reality was so modest is that both proponents and
opponents had incentives to exaggerate its scope and impact—doing so would rally
their respective political bases of support. On the other hand, the "insiders" responsible
for a functioning state, who implemented Islamisation had (and have) an incentive to
preserve stability and order and make sure Islamisation took place in an "ordered and
prudent" (and cautious) manner.[150] Exaggeration by enemies of Islamisation in the
media and opposition (e.g. Benazir Bhutto) were not censored or even contested by the
government or government bureaucracy, as they "proved" to Islamic activists on the
other side of the issue that the "government was enthusiastically implementing Nizam-e-
Mustapha".[151] Lacking in depth and homegrown knowledge of Pakistan, the foreign
press accepted these reports.[151]
According to Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, the law under Zia is unstable. It has frequently
changed or threatened to change because of differences of opinion among the ruling
factions. There are inconsistencies

 Between legal norms and socially observed norms;

 Between statutory legal norms and the norms applied in practice in the courts (e.g.
Hadd is difficult to implement because confession, retraction of confession and strict
standards of proof make it difficult to execute);
 Between different formal legal norms (e.g. non-compliance with the Muslim Family
Laws Ordinance is tolerated by the courts but should be strictly punished under
the Zina Ordinance). Another example of this contradiction is that the constitution
assures women equal status on the one hand but, on the other hand, they are
greatly discriminated in criminal law.[55]

Post-Zia ul-Haq Islamisation[edit]

After the death of Zia ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto—the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the
Prime Minister he had overthrown and executed—was elected Prime Minister. Although
she was an outspoken opponent of Zia's Islamisation, she did not dismantle the Federal
Shariat Court, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, nor repeal the
Hudood and Ramazan Ordinances.[152] She did, however, release all women convict
prisoners in Pakistan not convicted of murder (most of whom were in prison because of
the Hudood Ordinances), as one of her first acts after assuming power,[153] and generally
practiced "bureaucratic neglect" of the Islamisation apparatus.[154]
In October 1990, the Qisas[155] and Diyat[156] Ordinance (QDO) was introduced by then
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.[157] In 1997 during the government of Nawaz Sharif, the
Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, now covering all offenses against human body, became an
Act of the Parliament. As a consequence, crimes affecting human body in Pakistan are
no longer considered offences "against the society or state", but "against an individual".
Thus, if the victim or its family so decide, offenders "can walk free even after
committing" murder.[157]
In 1996 the Abolition of Whipping Act (passed by Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's
Party), forbade sentences/punishments of whipping offenders except when imposed as
a hadd punishment.[158] This law has "greatly reduced" the instances of corporal
punishment.[159]
To lift the restrictions on jurisdiction of Shariat, an "Enforcement of Sharia Act" first
promulgated by Zia in 1988 but not passed by parliament (and so allowed to expire
under Benazir Bhutto), was voted into law by parliament under Nawaz Sharif's
government in 1991. The law gave jurisdiction to Sharia-related cases to the Federal
Shariat Court, rather than the less Islamically activist-inclined High Courts.[160] But
whether the law had more political impact than legal is debated because it kept in place
a limited standard of Supremacy of Sharia. The standard of interpretation for superior
courts allowed only rulings "consistent with Islamic principles of jurisprudence" when
"more than one interpretation" of the law "is possible."[161]
Court decisions[edit]
Further information: Islamic economics in Pakistan § Policies and difficulties
In the absence of strong political leadership or social consensus after Zia's passing,
Superior courts have been a major, some (Charles Kennedy) say the "real" determinant
of the "content and pace of Islamic reform", through their interpretation of their
jurisdiction to consider what laws and actions are "repugnant to Islam".[162] Another
scholar (Martin Lau) calls Islamisation process in Pakistan largely "judge-led".[163]
One roadblock in the way of striking down laws that activists felt were unIslamic was the
lack of supremacy of shariat in the constitution. Activists had tried to use the Objectives
Resolution with its principle that "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah," but the resolution was originally part of
the preamble of the constitution, rather than in the constitution itself, and as a result a
1973 ruling had declared it to "not have same status or authority" as the "normal written
constitution". In 1985, the constitution was amended and the Objectives Resolution
became article 2-A of the "restored constitution".[164] With this change, Dr. Tanzil-ur-
Rahman—a particularly "skillful" Islamic activist and judicial activist—argued that
ordering Muslims' lives "in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as
set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah," as specified in article 2A was a "supra-
Constitutional" grund norm of law in Pakistan.[162] Supporting Tanzil-ur-Rahman
interpretation were several decisions handed down in the late 1980s and early 1990s
declaring repugnant to Islam such things as the payment of court fees, interest on
loans, or investments with a fixed rate of return, the requirement that divorce decrees
needed to be recorded by family court to be valid.[165]
The Supreme Court addressed several important issues pertaining to Islamisation
around this time period (during Benazir's time in office), including decisions that found
unIslamic provisions in the Pakistan Penal Code pertaining to murder, manslaughter
and other forms of bodily hurt,[166] and in most of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's land reforms of
1972 and 1977[167] (ruling for example that Islam does not countenance compulsory
redistribution of wealth or land for the purpose of alleviating poverty, however laudable
the goal of poverty relief may be.[168][169][170])
However bank interest still had not been banned in Pakistan curse to Article 203-B of
the constitution (mentioned above) which exempted laws dealing with finance from
subordination to the sharia. To remedy this situation Islamic activists strove to convince
the public with numerous conferences and copious literature that an interest-free
economy as viable and religiously necessary, to pass a bill in parliament making shariat
"superordinate" to the constitution, and to encourage superior courts to expand their
definitions of jurisdiction of shariat.[171]
Faisal Case
In 1990, Tanzil-ur-Rehman was appointed to the Federal Sharia Court and about a year
later (November 1991) issued a "monumental decision" (Faisal vs. Secretary, Ministry of
Law) that appeared as though it might put an end to interest-bearing loans and
accounts in Pakistan.[172][173]
The Faisal decision forbade riba absolutely without exceptions, overturning 20 federal
and provincial financial laws as repugnant to Islam. It defined riba as "any addition,
however slight, over and above the principal", including any system of markup, any
indexing for inflation, payment by value rather than kind. It forbade riba in "production
loans" as well as "consumptive" loans. It specifically declared invalid two Islamic
Modernist interpretations that avoided strict prohibition: considering anti-riba Quranic
verses (2:275-8) allegorical, and use of ijtihad (independent reasoning) of the issue
based on ascertaining the public good (maslaha).[174]
After much stalling by the government and bureaucracy, the Faisal case was upheld in
1999 by the Shariah Appellate Bench in the "Aslam Khaki" decision, with detailed orders
to start the interest free economy.[175][176] Pleading that implementation of the judgment
would "create enormous problems" for Pakistan's economy by hurting the domestic
western-style banking industry and Pakistan's "financial dealings with the outside
world", the government was given an additional year by the court to Islamise by the
Bench.[177]
By this time, however, Pervez Musharraf had come to power in a coup and limited the
power of the courts. Two justices of the Shariah Appellate Bench resigned rather than
take a new oath of office, and a new appeal with new judges found many "errors" in the
Aslam Khaki case and overturned the ruling of a couple months earlier. [177][178]
Protection of Women Act[edit]
After 2001, attention to revise Hudood Ordinance was given by a number of government
appointed commissions, a televised several weeks-long-televised debate on the
subject[179] In 2006, then President Pervez Musharraf proposed reform of the
ordinance,[180] and in November/December the "Protection of Women (Criminal Laws
Amendment) Act" was passed and signed.[181] The bill retained only Adultery in the Zina
Ordinance, allowing rape to be prosecutable under civil law. It prevents unsuccessful
complaints of adultery or rape from being converted into charges of fornication, and
adds to the Pakistan Penal Code a new offense of false accusation of fornication.[182]
Public support[edit]
Islamisation has strong public support in Pakistan. According to Shajeel Zaidi, a million
people attended Zia ul Haq's funeral because he had given them what they wanted:
more religion.[183] A PEW opinion poll found that 84% of Pakistanis favoured making
Sharia the official law of the land.[184] According to the 2013 Pew Research Center report,
the majority of Pakistani Muslims also support the death penalty for those who leave
Islam (62%). In contrast, support for the death penalty for those who leave Islam was
only 36% in fellow South Asian Muslim country Bangladesh (which shared heritage with
Pakistan).[185]
A poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan during January 2011 of over 2,700 men and
women in rural and urban areas of all four provinces of the country, found 67% of
Pakistanis responding yes to the question In your opinion should government take steps
to ‘Islamise’ the society? 13% of those polled answered that Pakistan did not need
Islamisation and 20% gave no response.[186] In 2016 an opinion poll by PEW found that
78% of Pakistanis said that the country's laws should strictly follow the Quran and a
further 16% of Pakistanis said that the laws should follow the values and principles of
Islam, but not strictly follow. This was the highest figure amongst all Muslim populations
surveyed by PEW.[187]
A 2010 opinion poll by PEW Research Centre also found that 87% of Pakistanis
considered themselves 'Muslims first' rather than a member of their nationality. This was
the highest figure amongst all Muslim populations surveyed. In contrast only 67% in
Jordan, 59% in Egypt, 51% in Turkey, 36% in Indonesia and 71% in Nigeria considered
themselves as 'Muslim first' rather than a member of their own nationality.[188]