CALO vs DEGAMO
Facts:
On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of
Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the
same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational
attainment, civil service eligibility and so forth. He failed to disclose the pendency of charges against him.
He was appointed as such Chief of Police on January 17, 1959, at a monthly salary of P95.00, and served
only until May 17, 1959. Subsequently, said respondent was elected Mayor of Carmen and served as such
from 1960 to 1964. Thereafter he was appointed and acted as Election Registrar during 1965.
On 2 March 1962, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed a verified letter-complaint with Supreme Court charging the
disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo for having committed false statement
under oath or perjury" in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.
Issue: Whether Atty. Degamo acted honesty when he denied under oath the existence against him of any
criminal or police record, including those that did not reach the court.
Ruling: A.C. No. 516 June 27, 1967
In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own
favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar and he has violated his oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical
standards applicable to a member of the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must
necessarily be one higher than that of the market place. The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's
insistence upon patent technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from his Court.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred.
Decision was amended on August 30, 1967
Since there is no evidence that he has not served honestly and efficiently in the various offices that he has
held, or that any complaint has been made against his official actuations, we are inclined to agree that the
original sanction of disbarment appears too harsh. A suspension of three years would seem adequate to
the merits of the case and as a warning to other members of the bar.