The Implementation of Anti- Terrorist Legislations in India

Subject:

Cr. L. Socio- Economic Offences (Hons. I)

Submitted to:

Dr. Parvesh Kumar Rajput

( Faculty of Law )

Submitted by:

Nishtha Shrivastava

(B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) 10th Semester, Section-C, Roll no. 108)

Date of submission:

June 20th, 2020

HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,

RAIPUR (C.G).

1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I feel highly elated to work on this topic “The implementation of Anti- Terrorist
Legislations in India”. I want to make it clear that I am not a master in the subject, but, I
have tried my level best to give a clear picture. This project, however, does not deal with the
topic exhaustively. Not to forget the deep sense of regard and gratitude to my adviser, Dr.
Parvesh Rajut who has played the role of a protagonist, who has always given me guidance
to go ahead with my topic. I also take up this opportunity to thank my colleagues for helping
me in completing this project.

2
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Miss Nishtha Shrivastava, Roll Number: 108, student of B.A.LL.B.
(Hons.), Semester: X, Hidayatullah National Law University, New Raipur (Chhattisgarh) in
the project work titled “The Implementation of Anti- Terrorist Legislations in India”, has
undergone original research which has not been copied from anywhere.

Dr. Parvesh Kumar Rajput

Date: 20.06.2020 (Faculty: Cr. L. Socio- Economic Offences Hons. I)

Hidayatullah National Law University

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. No. CHAPTERS Page

4
 INTRODUCTION

During the week of November 26, 2008, the focus of world attention centered on Mumbai,
the commercial capital of and largest city in India. For three days, the world watched in
horror as Islamic terrorist groups carried out a series of brazen attacks on some of the most
famous landmarks in the city, including the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower, the Hotel Oberoi,
and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Train Station. Over 170 people were killed, and over
300 injured in the attacks. In the ensuing weeks, calls for a new and aggressive anti-terrorism
regime intensified in the leading newspapers within India. In December 2008, the then
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance Central Government of Manmohan Singh enacted
stringent new anti-terror laws in response to the public outcry for tougher legislation. The
Indian Parliament enacted two laws—the Unlawful Activities (Prevention_ Amendment Act
of 2008 (“UAPA”), and the National Investigation Agency Act of 2008 (“NIA”). These laws
are part of a growing trend; governments across the globe enacted anti-terrorism and other
extraordinary laws that expanded police powers, surveillance, and the scope of preventive
detention for suspected terrorists.1
Many scholars have treated anti-terrorism law in India as increasing the power of the central
state. However, its implementation within the context of the Indian legal system and political
structures have empowered local elites within provincial governments to target political
opponents, including both subjugated classes and rival groups, as terrorists and to prosecute
them as such.2

1
Sabharwal, Y.K. 2006. Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism-Indian Model (EXPERIMENTS IN INDIA), available at
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_links/Terrorism%20paper.doc. ( as accessed on 11-06-2020)
2
Ibid.

5
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

1. To understand the History and implementation of extraordinary legislations like

2. To study the Judicial response to these extraordinary legislations.

3. To Study the current anti-terrorist legislations in India.

SOURCES OF DATA

This project is based on Doctrinal Research, which included collection of materials from e-
library. It includes secondary data sources. This also includes web search.

6
 HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGISLATIONS
LIKE POTA, TADA, PDA, MISA
POTA is one in a long line of extraordinary laws that reach back to colonial administration
and the framing of the Indian Constitution. The provisions of the statutes themselves display
remarkable continuities, while the political and historical context around extraordinary
legislation has shifted, resulting in differences between the administration of previous acts,
and of TADA and POTA from the 1990s onward.3
India, like many other post-colonial regimes, inherited the tradition of extraordinary
legislation from previous colonial administration. In particular, the Rowlatt Act of 1919,
promulgated by the British to stem anti-imperialist agitation, established the legislative
precedent for implementing preventative detention in peacetime. The Rowlatt Act
empowered colonial authorities to imprison without trial anyone suspected of terrorism
within British India.4
Nationalist leaders were extremely critical of the Rowlatt Act for its capacity for arbitrary
political punishment and launched peaceful protests against the legislation; the infamous
massacre at Amritsar, where troops under General Dyer opened fire at civilians organizing
peacefully, occurred at one of these rallies. Recent commentators have drawn a direct line
from the Rowlatt Acts to POTA. According to KG Kannabiram,
“Though more than fifty years have rolled by after the British left, we still continue the
Rowlatt Framework. The circumstances that led to the appointment of Justice Rowlatt and the
Report and the Rowlatt Bills that followed, and the situation at present as narrated by the Law
Commission and the POTA Bill co-authored by the Central Government and the Law
Commission are so strikingly similar.”5
So began a long and largely unbroken line of extraordinary law that makes permanent and
ubiquitous measures thought of as necessary only for states of emergency and exception.
The Rowlatt Act’s provisions on preventive detention survived independence: the Indian
Constitution, while guaranteeing habeas corpus under article 22, clauses 1 and 2, also allows
for preventive detention under clauses 4b and 5-7 of the same article, giving Parliament and
the courts a great deal of discretion in passing, reviewing and administering preventive

3
Swarup. A. 2007. “Terrorism and the Rule of Law”: A Case Comment on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,”
Social Science Research Network (2007), 4-5, available at http://works.bepress.com/adityaswarup/3. ( as
accessed on 11-06-2020)
4
Ibid.
5
Bakshi, P.M. Background Paper on Concurrent Powers of Legislation Under List III of the Constitution,
available at http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b3-3.htm. ( as accessed on 11-06-2020)

7
detention statutes. While the Supreme Court of India in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, the Court
upheld the Gandhi regime’s National Security Act which allowed for preventive detention of
a broad range of individuals.6
PDA was renewed several times before lapsing in the late 1960s. Gandhi’s victorious election
of 1971 gave her Congress government enough power to pass the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, or MISA. Gandhi imprisoned prominent political opponents under MISA
during the authoritarian Emergency rule regime (1975-1977).7 MISA was, however,
originally meant as emergency legislation to deal with the Naxalbari uprising, inspired by
hard-left Maoist- inspired insurgents known as ‘Naxalites’ that started in 1967 in the state of
West Bengal.8
Between 1972 and 1977, the then Congress central government, in concert with the hard-line,
‘law- and-order’ the then Congress Chief Minister S.S. Ray, enforced MISA in brutal fashion
against Naxalite revolutionaries and later, Communist parties. MISA was repealed during the
first by Janata government in 1977, but other extraordinary laws, including UAPA, remained
on the statute books. When Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the National Security Act was
enacted to replace MISA.9
The Khalistan insurgency in Punjab in the 1980s brought the next round of extraordinary
legislation; a Congress government at the center headed by Rajiv Gandhi enacted the
Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) in 1985 (re-enacted in 1987) following
Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. The administration of TADA began with a deeply
concentrated focus on Punjab; both the intensity of violence and the proximity to Delhi meant
that the Central government was very much in charge of its implementation. Between 1980
and 1992, Punjab’s assembly was ruled from the Center for seven years, under ‘President’s
Rule’ as provided for by article 356 of the Constitution, and a Congress state government
ruled for an additional two years. In 1986, Rajiv Gandhi directed the President to appoint S.S.
Ray, the Chief Minister of West Bengal during the Naxalite uprising, as Governor of Punjab
with independent charges to empower the state security forces against suspected terrorists in
the countryside. The administration of TADA was thus in the context of heavy-handed,
repressive and often brutal intervention by the central government against regional security
threats. While TADA, and securitization of the Punjab in general, threatened the civil
6
Ibid.
7
This list included former prime minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee, former Home Minister LK Advani, and former
Chief Minister and former Bihar Chief Minister and current Minister for Railways Laloo Prasad Yadav, who
named his daughter, born during the Emergency, ‘Misa’.
8
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2312035 ( as accessed on 12-06-2020)
9
Ibid.

8
liberties of millions of Punjabis, particularly Sikhs, these laws were instruments wielded by
the central government directly or indirectly, and subject to review and oversight of central
institutions.10
Following the rise of communal unrest and terrorism after the demolition of the Babri Masjid
in Ayodhya in 1992, TADA began to increasingly be used by state governments
independently of the authority of the Union government. Rajasthan, a state not known for any
insurgency, booked hundreds of individuals, most of them Muslims, under TADA on
spurious grounds. Similarly, the state of Gujarat was proactive in charging members of
minority communities under TADA. The changes in bail procedures under TADA and POTA
were tantamount to preventive or investigative detention, and the establishment of special
courts, with police-friendly procedures meant an empowerment of state security agencies,
often deployed by partisan state governments, without adequate safeguards or independent
oversight.11
In contrast to the implementation of previous preventive detention and anti-terrorism regimes,
there has been significant variation in the implementation of POTA by state. We analyze
variation in implementation by examining the number of criminal appeal cases decided by
State High Courts from prosecutions in lower-level special courts under POTA.12
Opposition to POTA was intense, from the parliamentary debates through the lifespan of the
legislation. POTA was originally adopted by ordinance in October 2001, and then was
extended by a second ordinance in the beginning of 2002 after the Indian parliament winter
session was disrupted by the December attacks. When the legislative debates finally
commenced in the beginning of the budget session in February 2002, opposition that had
been fermenting during the Ordinance period erupted; the Congress-led opposition coalition
bitterly opposed the bill’s passage. When it came to a vote, POTA passed in the Lok Sabha,
or lower house, but failed in the Rajya Sabha, the smaller upper house where opposition
parties was more powerful. In response, the NDA called for an extremely rare joint session,
where the bill passed.13
During the three-year lifespan of the law, human rights organizations and activists
continually criticized POTA for the scope and actual instances of abuse. Many civil liberties
organizations – including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the People’s

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/india/session_1_-
_april_2008/libinduprs12008liberationuprsubmission.pdf ( as accessed on 12-06-2020)
13
Ibid.

9
Union for Democratic Rights in India -- have issued reports on human rights abuse under
POTA. Respected senior advocate and human rights lawyer Rajeev Dhavan has criticized
POTA on constitutional and civil rights grounds. In 2004, the Delhi-based Human Rights
Law Network sponsored a ‘people’s tribunal’ against POTA, with victims from the different
states stepping forward and describing their experiences, and even since the repeal of POTA
in 2004.14

JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGISLATIONS

14
Ibid.

10
The Supreme Court has largely deferred to the regime in power and adopted a pragmatic
approach in upholding extraordinary laws that clearly impinge upon the Fundamental Rights.
The Court’s deferential mode in these decisions reflects a cautious approach to adjudicating
the constitutionality of state security laws, in which the Court has attempted to impose certain
procedural safeguards and requirements on the Government while upholding the
constitutionality of these laws.15
A. The National Security Act: A.K. Roy v. Union of India16
The Court’s decision reflects a highly deferential mode of decision-making. The Court
upheld the National Security Act enacted by the Gandhi Congress Government. The
petitioners’ challenged the law on the grounds that it clearly violated Article 22 of the
Constitution, which had been amended by the 44th Constitution Amendment Act in 1979.
Section 3 of the Act amended Article 22 to require that any law providing for preventive
detention of individuals in excess of two months must provide for Advisory Boards to review
whether there is sufficient cause for such detention, and provided that “an Advisory Board
shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two other members, and the Chairman shall be a
serving Judge of the appropriate High Court and the other members shall be serving or retired
Judges of any High Court”.17
The National Security Act, however, allowed for the creation of advisory boards in which
persons who were only qualified to be appointed as Judges of High Courts could serve on the
advisory boards,18which effectively removed the safeguard of quasi-judicial review. The
Government justified this move on technical grounds, based on the “notification” procedure
embedded in the law enacting the amendment to Article 22. The 44th Constitution
Amendment Act of 1978 stipulated that it shall come into force when notified, but the Gandhi
regime had notified all provisions save Section 3. The Gandhi regime thus argued that
because it had not brought the newly amended Article 22 into force, it did not apply to the
National Security Act. The majority upheld the government’s position, and ruled that the
Court not issue a mandamus to compel the President to bring the amendment into force.
B. TADA: Kartar Singh v. Union of India19 (1994)

A five judge bench of the Court upheld the constitutionality of all provisions of the
Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), except Section 22, which was struck

15
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1996) (Delhi pollution case).
16
(1982) 1 SCC 271.
17
A.K. Roy (1982) 1 SCC 271 at 341.
18
A.K. Roy (1982) 1 SCC 271 at 344.
19
(1994) 3 SCC 569

11
down by the Court unanimously.
The petitioners in challenged Parliament’s legislative competency to enact TADA on the
grounds that this issue domain fell under entry 1 of List II of the State List— “Public
Order,” and did not fall under either the Union List (List I) or Concurrent List (or List
III), when read in light of Article 246.20 The Court invoked the “pith and substance” test
—a doctrinal test that effectively requires judges to employ a structural approach to
constitutional interpretation in ascertaining the validity of a particular law. Under this
test, the Court is to examine the legal significance and object/goals of the law, the
relationship between the particular measures proposed and the object/goals. Applying this
test, the Court ultimately ruled that terrorism went far beyond disrupting the public order
within states.
Consequently, the Court went on to hold that because terrorism posed a grave and serious
threat to the sovereignty of the Indian Government that transcended state borders, that
TADA fell within the power of the Union Government pursuant to the “Defence of India”
clause contained in List I.21
The second major challenge to TADA argued that its provisions violated the fundamental
rights provisions of the Constitution. One of the main points of attack was on the validity
of Section 15, which provided that confessions made by suspects to police during
custodial interrogations were admissible in a court of law. The Court held that this
provision did not violate Article 20 (protecting against self-incrimination), ruling that the
mere possibility of abuse was not grounds for invalidating a law and that the rights of the
accused were protected by the rules of evidence under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Court also ruled that Section 15 did not violate either Article 14 (nonarbitrariness)
nor Article 21 (due process), ruling that because TADA was a special law that delineated

20
Article 246 of the Constitution provides as follows:
246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.—(1) Notwithstanding
anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List.”
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any
state also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh
Schedule (in this Constituiton referred to as the “Concurrent List”).
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such
State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in
this Constitution referred to as the “State List”).
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of Indian
ot included in a State notwithstanding that such manner is a matter enumerated in the State List.
21
The clause reads as follows: “1. Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence
and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination of effective
demobilization.” Schedule VII, List I, Entry I, Indian Constitution.

12
 a set of procedures for a distinct class of offences.22
The Court did attempt to apply certain limits on some provisions and to impose
procedural safeguards on the TADA regime, including Section 15. The Court thus held
that laid down a series of guidelines to “ensure that the confession obtained in the pre-
indictment interrogation by a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of
Police is not tainted with any vice but is in strict conformity with the well-recognised and
accepted aesthetic principles and fundamental fairness.”23
In addition, the Court also introduced an intent requirement for the offence of “abetment”
of a terrorist act in TADA, and also reformed the offence of “possession of specified arms
and ammunition.”24 Thus in order to save this latter provision from arbitrariness, the
Court held that it could only be invoked where possession was “connected with use
thereof.”25 Finally, to provide for some degree of quasi-judicial scrutiny and oversight of
TADA, the Court issued a directive ordering that the Central Government constitute
special “Review Committees” to review TADA cases initiated by the Central
Government.26
C. POTA: P.U.C.L. v. Union of India (2003)27
The Court’s wide deference to the government in the area of anti-terror policy was also
evident in the P.U.C.L. v. India (2003) decision, which involved a challenge to the
validity of POTA. The Act provided for an extra-ordinary enforcement regime that
allowed the Central Government to bypass procedural safeguards provided for under
normal criminal law, allowed confessions to a police officer and telephone interceptions
to be valid and admissible evidence. In addition, POTA allowed detenus to be denied bail
for at least one year, and bail could not be granted if the prosecution opposed it and
unless the Court found the detenu to be innocent.28
In the P.U.C.L. case, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties invoked a similar argument as
the petitioners in Kartar Singh, filing a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity
of POTA on federalism principles. The petition thus alleged that Parliament lacked

22
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=twlj ( as accessed on 12-06-
2020)
23
Ibid.
24
Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism-Indian Model (EXPERIMENTS IN INDIA), at
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_links/Terrorism%20paper.doc. ( as accessed on 11-06-2020)
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
(2004) 9 SCC 580.
28
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=twlj (as accessed on 12-06-
2020)

13
 legislative competence to enact the law because it fell under entry 1 of list II (Public
Order), which was within the domain of state, not central government powers. However,
the Court rejected the petitioner’s assertion that “terrorist activity is confined only to
states and therefore state(s) only have the competence to enact a legislation”. Instead, the
Court accepted the Government’s contentions that terrorism posed a threat to the
“sovereignty and integrity” of the nation, and that the extreme threat of terrorism required
granting the Government extraordinary powers.29
Terrorism is definitely a criminal act, but it is much more than mere criminality. Today
the Government is charged with the duty of protecting the unity, integrity, secularism and
sovereignty of India from terrorists, both from outside and within the borders. To face
terrorism we need new approaches, techniques, weapons, expertise and of course new
laws. In the above said circumstances Parliament felt that a new anti-terrorism law is
necessary for a better future. This parliamentary resolve is epitomised in POTA. The
Court proceeded to hold that terrorism fell under a “residuary power” that was not
defined in the constitution that conferred Parliament with broad powers, citing to its
earlier decision in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act of 1985.

CURRENT ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATIONS IN INDIA

29
Ibid.

14
Towards the end of the year 2008, two key anti terrorism legislation bills were passed within
the four days of their introduction by the Indian Parliament - The National Investigation
Agency (NIA) Bill, 2008 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2008.30

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008

The establishment of NIA is no doubt a positive step in fighting terrorism-related crimes, but
it is unlikely to be a panacea to prevent terrorist attacks. For, it will be an agency that
investigates and prosecutes only after terrorist attacks take place. Though the NIA no doubt
would contribute to a better understanding of how the attacks were planned and carried out,
the linkages between terrorist cells within the country as well as outside, the modus operandi
of terrorist cells and groups, etc., it is unlikely to prevent terrorist attacks.

One criticism against the Act is that it has so many features giving power to the Centre, and
that it undermines the federal character of our country and the supremacy given to the Centre
as per the Act will encroach upon the powers of the State Governments. 31 A counter argument
against this can be that terrorism is a menace that affects the whole country and not a single
state and therefore the Centre should be given more powers in the execution of such an anti-
terrorism legislation.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was conceived to put reasonable restrictions,
on the freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peacefully or unions for the
interests of the India's sovereignty and integrity. The Indian Parliament amended the Act in
2004 following the repeal of Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA).This changed the
entire character of the Act and made it more of an anti terrorism legislation. The Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008 made a number of procedural and substantive
changes to empower the NIA, Act effectively and decisively on terrorism.

These are some of the important changes that have been brought about in the amendment act.
Section 17 was replaced by a provision which makes such persons punishable who collects or
provides funds or attempts to do the same and has knowledge that such funds are likely to be
30
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_data_finder/A_Series/Number_of_District.htm, (as
accessed on 12-06-2020)
31
Shanti Som,”Combating terrorism with aid of new laws”,March 2009 available at file:///G:/SSRN-
id1667388.pdf (as accessed on 13-06-2020)

15
used for terrorist activities. Two additional provisions have been inserted after section 18 of
the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.Section 18A deals with the offence of
organizing or causing the organization of any camp or camps for imparting training in
terrorism and section 18B deals with the offence of recruiting or causing the recruitment of
any person for the purpose of committing a terrorist act. A new Section 43D has been
incorporated in the Amendment Act, which has increased the maximum period of custodial
interrogation (remand) to 180 days, an increase of over the 90 days allowed under Section
167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973. Section 43E introduces the principles of
presumption of guilt, which was also present in POTA. According to the section arms,
explosives or other substances specified in Section 15 of the Act, if recovered from the
possession of the accused and if there is reason to believe that substances of similar nature
will be used in the commission of the offence, the court shall presume that accused has
committed such offence. Critics have countered this section 43E stating that our criminal
justice system is based on the presumption of innocence until proved guilty. The onus of
proving the guilt of the accused is invariably and always on the prosecution whereas as per
Section 43E if a person is found with the weapon the onus would be upon him to prove that
he is not guilty. This provision hits at the root perception of Indian criminal jurisprudence
which is acquisitorial.32

This legislation again meets the objectives of speedy and efficient investigation, fair and
speedy trial, and deterrent punishment. However similar to the NIA act, it comes into play
only after the terrorist act has been committed. Howsoever deterrent our laws are, it is not
going to affect the spirit of a jehadi on a suicide mission.

CONCLUSION

India has been the victim of insurgencies and terrorism of various hues since it became
independent in 1947.Over the years the magnitude of attacks and the impact caused has only
32
Krishna Prasad, “Anti-terror Laws-or An Implementation Of Failure?”, December 2009 avvailable at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25663783?seq=1 ( as accessed on 13-06-2020)

16
increased. Under the circumstances there is an urgent need to include certain provisions to
deal effectively and strongly with this menace in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the other
major legislations namely the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 and the Indian Evidence
Act,1872. Incorporation of a separate chapter in the Indian Penal Code which defines
terrorism and other related offences can be a great step forward. It should also prescribe
stringent and deterrent punishments for such offences.33

In this regard the National Investigative Agency(NIA) Act,2008 and the Prevention of
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ammendment Act, 2008 are two effective legislations.
However it is very doubtful to what extend it will lead to prevention of terrorist acts. One
way of achieving this can be by reorganising the entire Indian intelligence set up along the
lines that the United States has done in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks.34

The Government on its part should ensure the effective implementation of our anti terror
legislations. Why a terrorist like Afzal Guru has not been executed when the Supreme Court
of India has ruled him to be a prime culprit in the Parliament attack case and sentenced him to
death? We don’t want another Indian Airlines plane to be hijacked to free dreaded terrorists
like him. Indian politicians should refrain from indulging in vote bank politics for the purpose
of protecting their vested interests and personal political careers. Mere slogans and promises
alone would not suffice, appropriate action is required to be taken.35

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles:

33
https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/ABCNY_India_Report_Executive_Summary.pdf ( as accessed on 13-06-2020)
34
http://hrsjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Human-RightsTerrorism-and-Security-Laws-in-India-2006.pdf
( as accessed on 14-06-2020)
35
Ibid.

17
 1. KRISHNA PRASAD, “ANTI-TERROR LAWS-OR AN IMPLEMENTATION OF FAILURE?”,
DECEMBER 2009.
2. SHANTI SOM,”COMBATING TERRORISM WITH AID OF NEW LAWS”, MARCH 2009.
3. CHIEF JUSTICE Y.K. SABHARWAL, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM-INDIAN
MODEL (EXPERIMENTS IN INDIA).
4. BAKSHI, P.M. BACKGROUND PAPER ON CONCURRENT POWERS OF LEGISLATION
UNDER LIST III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
5. SWARUP. A. 2007. “TERRORISM AND THE RULE OF LAW”: A CASE COMMENT ON

KARTAR SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB,” SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (2007).

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