Malaysian Politics:

The Second Generation

Gordon P. Means

SINGAPORE
O X F O R D UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD NEW YORK
1991
 Oxford University Press
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Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
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and associated com[panies in
Berlin Ibadan
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stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronics, mechanical, photocopying, recording and otherwise,
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ISBN 0 19 588983 5
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
means, Gordon P. (Gordon paul, 1927-
Malaysian politics the second generation-(South -East
Asian social science monographs).
1. Malaysia. Politics. History
i. Title ii. Series
320.9595

Library of Congress cataloging-in-Publication-D

means, Gordon
ISBN

Paul. Gordon p
019-588983-5

malaysian
p cm- politics:
(South-Eastthe second
Asian generation
social science monogra
Includes bibliographical references
ISBN 0-19-588983-5 and
(U.S.) index
1. Malaysia-Politics and
DS597 government.
2.M43 1991 i. Title. ii. S
320.9595-dc20
 To my mother, Nathalie Means,
and to the memory of my father, Paul B. Means,
who first brought me to Malaya and
who dedicated their lives to the well-being
of Malaysians, Singaporeans, and Indonesians
in all walks of life.
 Preface

THE focus of this book is on the pace and direction of political change in
Malaysia, concentrating on the tvs-o dccades of the 1970s and 1980s, T h e
earlier pcnod in .Malaysian politics has already been covered in con-
siderable detail by a number of authors, including myself, and from a
variety of analytical perspectives. For the purpose of this book, the
prcx'ious era of Malaysian politics will be referred to and will be used for
contrast and comparison. A longer perspective is useful, not only for
viewing the extent and rate of change, but also for asking the questions
about direction and pacc that allow us to contemplate and anticipate the
future. Apart from occasional references and an introductory summary of
the evolution of the Malaysian political system, the period before 1970
will not be covered. Rather than retell the saga of politics in colonial
Malaya, of the Japanese occupation, of Malayan independence, of the
formation of the Federation of Malaysia, of Singapore's exit from
Malaysia, and of the racial riots and crisis of 1969, this volume will
proceed on the assumption that the reader has some basic understanding
of these earlier events.
What is happening in contemporary Malaysia is not merely a set of
discrete and isolated political events Mithout direction and consequence.
Against the larger panorama, political change and process can be discerned
out of the apparently random and idiosyncratic events that are p a n of
contmuing political contests. T h e discrete events can be interesting and
important. T h e search for process and for explanation is, however, even
more significant.
Any account of politics in a m o d e m state must be selective and
simplify reality to reveal significant processes, changes, and interactions.
Various approaches have focused on class, on elites, on political economy,
on culture, on ideology, on ethnicity, on institutions, on constitutional-
legal structures, on political mobilization, on power, on political coercion,
and a variety of other criteria. Each has its adherents and its utility. Each
also, by focusing on some phenomena, of necessity, relegates other
phenomena to insignificance. For the analyst, the choice too often is
made between presenting and defending an elegant theory, or con-
fronting the messy and contradictory ambiguities of the real world. T h e r e
is no one model or theoretical approach that can be a touchstone for all
political and social analysis.
 PREFACE
viii

T h i s case study of two decades of Malaysian politics is no e x c e p t i o n . I

cannot pretend to m a k e c o n t m p o r a r y Malaysian politics neat a n d u n d e r -
standable in terms of any one fashionable political model or analytical
p a r a d i g m . Rather than select a single a p p r o a c h or analytical model as the
f r a m e w o r k for the present s t u d y , a n u m b e r of theoretical a p p r o a c h e s will
be utilized to highlight or illustrate aspects of the Malaysian scene.
H o p e f u l l y , alternative t h e o n e s of comparative politics will p r o v i d e s o m e
insights so that processes and trends can be identified a n d the m o r e
important transictions can be h i g h h g h t e d . I k n o w of no simple yardstick
for m a k i n g such selections, except for an intuitive sense of what may be
more important and what may be less so. O t h e r political o b s e r v e r s
w o u l d , no d o u b t , m a k e different selections and concentrate on a d i f f e r e n t
set of factors. Even so. I would hope that my account a n d assessments
will be congruent in most respects with those of most o t h e r i n f o r m e d
observers of the Malaysian political scene.
No work of this scope can be the product of a single u n a i d e d a u t h o r .
T h i s work relies heavily on the work a n d productivity of o t h e r scholars
engaged in research and writing on the Malaysian scene. F o r s o m e parts
of this w o r k , I could do little more than to assemble and interpret t h e
work of others—scholars, news r e p o n e r s . a n d active political activists.
For other p a n s of the w o r k , I was able to do m o r e p r i m a r y research or
rely on some of my previous research on Malaysia. My citations a n d
bibliography represent an e x t e n d e d set of a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s to t h e
accumulated scholarship of others. What is less a p p a r e n t f r o m these
sources is my indebtedness to those w h o have assisted me in o t h e r ways.
For one year. I was aniliated with the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies in Singapore and had a\'ailable the full resources of that s u p e r b
research centre. Special thanks are d u e to the D i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t e ,
Kernial Singh S a n d h u . a n d the Librarian, C h ' n g K i m Sec, w h o . along
with her very capable staff, went far beyond the call of their d u t i e s to find
m a t e n a l s and even to check sources for me after my r e t u r n to C a n a d a .
A m o n g the many Research Fellows working ai the I n s t i t u t e , Dr C h a n d r a n
J e s h u r u n . D r Stephen C h e e , D r T o h Kin W o o n , and D r S u b b i a h
G u n a s e k a r a n were particularly helpful with c o m m e n t s a n d suggestions on
p a n s of the preliminary manuscript as it e m e r g e d . The f r e q u e n t s e m i n a r s
at the Institute brought together m a n y i m p o n a n t guests f r o m Malaysia as
well as foreign visiting scholars working on Malaysian research topics.
T h e s e seminars and discussions between fellows a n d visitors all c o n i r i b -
uied to my understanding of d e v e l o p m e n t s in Malaysia.
D u r i n g the year I m a d e n u m e r o u s visits to Malaysia a n d received
especially generous assistance f r o m m a n y of the faculty a n d staff at the
University of Malaya and f r o m the staff at the Institute of A d v a n c e d
S t u d i e s . D e s e r \ i n g special mention are Lim T e c k G h e e . M u r u g e s u
P a i h m a n a i h a n . Susan A c k e n n a n . and R a v m o n d Lee. T w o f o r m e r
g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t s f r o m McMaster Universit\- w h o have g o n e o n t o
professional careers in M a l a r i a were also helpful a n d a s o u r c e of
s u b s t a n t i v e a n d interpretive m a t e n a l s on Malaysian politics. T h e y are
 PREFACE ix

Dr Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Frieda Koh. Finally, Robert Yew and his
family in Singapore made my siay in the area much easier to arrange by
extending hospitality to me and my family while we were in the process
of finding and getting settled into new living accommodation.
T h e year's work in Singapore and Malaysia was made possible by a
sabbatical leave from McMaster University and was facilitated by my
wife, Laurel Braswell-Means, who accommodated her own research and
writing agenda in such a way that she could work with medieval
documents from the Bodleian Library and other archival English
manuscript collections while we were both able to live together and work
at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Without her encouragement,
companionship, and editorial assistance, the manuscript would not have
been completed as quickly as it was, and it would have acquired a less
polished writing style,
Is it necessar\- lo add the obvious—thai I alone am responsible for
what appears in this volume? T h e sources relied upon, the interpretation
of events, the analysis of trends, the evaluation of interactive aspects of
politics, the depiction of events, the factual data presented, and any
errors of fact or interpretation must all rest entirely with me. T h a t there
arc some errors remaining in this volume, is quite probable, since I have
caught some myself, and, with the assistance of others, have been able to
correct errors that had h i t h e n o eluded me. I can only assure the reader
that I have made every effort to avoid factual errors, and have been
carcful not to let speculation become a substitute for what may be
difficult to know for cenain. That there may be many different inter-
pretations of the same facts and events should be obvious to any active
participant or observer of politics in any setting.

Department of Political Science, GORDON P. MEANS

McMaster University,
Hamilton,
Canada
July 1990
 Contents

Preface vii
Tables xiv
Figures xiv
Maps xiv
Abbrci'ianotis and Glossan xv

1 T h e Metamorphosis 1
Systemic Characteristics 2
The Election of 1969 4
The May Thirteenth Crisis 6
The Emergency 8
The Recovery Strategy 10

2 T h e Abdul Razak Administration 19

Tun Abdul Razak's Background and Leadership 19
The New Economic Policy 23
The Bansan Nasional Coalition 27
'The 1974 Election 32
Student Disturbances 35
The Bahsan Nasional Format in Sarawak 38
Tun Mustapha's Sabah 40
Economic Performance in the Razak Era 45
Foreign Affairs, 1970-1976 46
Tun Abdul Razak's Death 49

3 T h e Hussein Onn Administration 54

The Succession and Factional Politics 54
The Harun Case 56
Chinese Politics within the Barisan Nasional Format 57
The Kelantan Crisis 61
Sarawak and Sabah under Federal Tutelage 64
The Election of 1978 66
Economic Grounh and Social Malaise 69
Islamic Revival Movements 71
The Refugee Problem 74
Foreign Affain, 1976-1981 76
Hussein Onn's Retirement 78
xii CONTENTS

4 T h e Mahathir AdminlstraUon 82
T h e Changing of the G u a r d 82
T h e N e w Image 84
T h e Election of 1982 86
T h e Post-election G o v e r n m e n t 90
R e f u r b i s h i n g the N e w Economic Policy 91
T h e 'Look East' Policy 92
Industrialization 94
Privatization 97
Religious Policies 99

5 T h e N e w Political Idiom 110

System Characteristics 110
T h e Rulers' Powers Crisis 113
T h e Aftermath of Crisis 117
Bank B u m i p u t r a / B M F Scandals 120
T h e Islamic Constituency 123
T h e N o n - M a l a y Constituencies 131
Professionals. Intellectuals, and Strategic Elites 136
Control of the Media 137
H u m a n Rights 141
T h e Core S u p p o r t Base 145

6 T h e A m b i g u o u s Mandate 153
Political Skirmish in Sabah 153
Sarawak PoUtics. 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 165
T h e Economic Recession 172
U M N O Poliucs 174
M C A Politics 176
O t h e r Barisan Nasional Parties 179
T h e Opposition 180
T h e 1986 Election 182
Post-election Politics a n d Policies 187

7 Fracture at the Centre 193

Public Interest G r o u p s 194
T h e Battle for U M N O 199
T h e Rising Tensions of Politics 206
T h e Crisis and D e t e n t i o n s of 1987 211
T h e Judiciary Grasps the Political Nettle 215
T h e Decision o n U M N O 218

8 Picking Up the P i e c e s 223

T h e Re-registration Skirmish 223
' B o r a A g a i n ' UMNO vs the G h o s t of U M N O Past 227
T h e Malay O p p o s i t i o n — P u r g e o r U n i t y ? 230
Assault against the Judiciary 234
 CONTENTS Xiii

The By-election Contests 243

Rebalance of the Barisan Nasional 248
Economic Recovery and Salvage Management 250
Heart-felt Responses 257
Opposition Realignments 261
The New Economic Policy Reconsidered 265

9 T a k i n g Stock 275
Demography and Economic Changes 276
Changes in the Pany System 283
Public Attitudes and Political Culture 288
Political Socialization 291
Institutional Development and Change 293
Performance Criteria 306
Ethnicity: A Persistent Problem 310
Institutions and Congruent Development 315

Bibliography 323
Index 347
 Tables

1.1 Malava Malaysia: Parliamentary Elections, 1959. 1964. and

1969 6
1.2 Sarawak: State and Parliamentary Elections, 1970 12
2.1 Malaysia: Stale and Parliamentary Elections. 1974 34
3-1 Malaysia: Stale and Parliamentary Elections. 1978 68
4.1 Malaysia: Stale and Parliamentary. Elections. 1982 89
6.1 Sabah: State Assembly Elections. 1981-1986 164
6-2 Sarawak: Population by Ethnicity and Religion, 1980 165
6.3 Sarawak: Council Negri Elections. I974-1987 170
6.4 Malaysia: State and Parliamentary Elections. 1986 186

Figures

9.1 Malaya/Malaysia: Population Count and Projections 277

9.2 Malaya/Malaysia: Ethnic Disiribution 278
9.3 Peninsular Malaysia: Ethnic Projection I 280
9.4 Peninsular Malaysia; Ethnic Projection II 281
9.5 Malaya .Malaysia: Per Capita Income 282
9.6 Federal Voting Patterns 285
9.7 Malaysia: Status of Freedom 309

Maps

1 Peninsular Malaysia xx
xxi
2 Sabah and Sarawak
 Abbreviations and Glossary

ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth Move-

ment of Malaysia)
ACCCIM Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and In-
dustry of Malaysia
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations
Agong Sec: Yang di-Pertuan Agong
Aliran Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness
Movement)
APU Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Organization for the
Uplift of the Muslim Community)
ARE Asian Rare Earth (Corporation)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASN Amanah Saham Nasional (The National Trust Cor-
poration, the Bumiputra savings and trust society)
AWSJ Asian Wall Street Journal
BARJASA Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (Sarawak Native Asso-
ciation)
Benasa Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-Malaysia (Malaysian
Islamic Assembly Front)
Berjaya Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Sabah United People's
Party)
Bersatu United Group
Bisamah Parti Bisamah
BMF Bumiputra Malaysia Finance
BN Barisan Nasional (National From)
Bumiputra Indigenous people
CAP Consumers' Association of Penang
CCC Chinese Consultative COmmittee
Ceramah A talk or discussion in a small group, a political
meeting in a non-public place,
CKD completely Knocked Down kits (for the assembly of
automobiles)
CRC Catholic Research Centre
CUEPACS Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and
Ovil Service
xvi ABBREVIATIONS AND FIL.DSSARY

DAP Democratic Action Party

Dacing The traditional beam scale
Dakwah The Islamic revivalist movement
DTC Deposit Taking Co-operative (a co-operative savings
and loan society)
EGM Extraordinary General Meeting
EPF Employees Provident Fund
EPSM Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia
EPU Economic Planning Unit
ESCAR Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations,
1975
Fatwa An authoritative legal ruling given by an authorized
official interpreung Islamic law.
FELDA Federal Land Development Authority
FIM Freedom of Information Movement
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Gerakan Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Move-
ment)
GNP Gross National Product
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
Halal Legitimate, permissible, especially related to food
(according to Islamic law)
Hamim Hisbul Muslimin
HICOM Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia
Huguan Siou The Paramount Chief of the Kadazans
ICA Industrial Coordination Act
I mam An Islamic religious teacher
IMP Industrial Master Plan
INSAN Institute of Social Analysis
ISA Internal Security Act, 1960
Ijtihad Islamic tradition based on interpretation of historical,
legal, and theological texts.
Jihad Holy war
Kafir-mengkafir "Infidel-disbelief' dispute, a dispute over who is a
Muslim and who is apostate
KCA Kadazan Cultural Association
Khalwat The Islamic prohibition against 'suspicious proximity'
between the sexes among those of marriageable age
who are not related by blood ties
Kita Kesatuan Insaf Tanah Ayer
LUTH Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji (Islamic Pilgrims
Management and Fund Board)
Mahdi An Islamic prophet, saviour, or leader
MARA Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Council of Trust for the
Indigenous People)
MCA Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association
MCC Malaysian Council of Churches
MCP Malayan Communist Party
 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY xvii

Menteri Besar Chief Minister (of a state)

MIC Mttlayan/Malaysian Indian Congress
MLS Malay Language Society
MP Malayan Party
MPHB Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad
MTUC Malaysian Trades Union Congress
Mukim An Islamic parish or mosque district
Muktamar Meeting, assembly
Nasma Parti Nasionalis Malaysia
NCC National Consultative Council
NECC National Economic Consuliative Council
NEP N e w Economic Policy
NFPE Non-financial public enterprise
NIC N e w l y Industrializing Country
NOC National Operations Council
NUJ National Union of Journalists
NUMS National Union of Muslim Students
Orang pendatang Foreigners, immigrants
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAJAR Partai Anak Jati Sarawak
Panas Pani Negara Sarawak
Parang A machete or broad-bladed jungle knife
PARC Perak Anti-Radioactive Committee
PAS Partai Islam Se Malaysia (formerly Partai Aislam Sa-
Melayu or Pan-Malayan Islamic Party)
Pasok Penubuhan Kebangsaan Pasok Ragang Bersatu
PB Parti Bumiputera (Sarawak)
PBB Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (formerly Panai
Bumiputra Bersatu)
PBDS Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak (Sarawak Dayak People's
Party)
PBPR Party Bebas Progressif Rakyat (Independent People's
Progressive Party)
PBS Parti Bersatu Sabah (United Sabah Party)
Pekemas Parti Keadilan Masyarakat Malaysia (Social Justice
Party of Malaysia)
Pena Malay National Writers' Association
Perkim P e n u b u h a n Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Islamic
Welfare and Missionary Association of Aialaysia)
Permas Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak
Pemas Perbadanan Nasional Berhad ( T h e National Trading
Corporation)
Pesaka Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak
Petronas Petroliam Nasional Berhad ( T h e National P e u o l e u m
Corporation)
Pikul A unit of weight measure equal to 133 1/3 pounds
PMIP Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (see: PAS)
PNR Pasok N u n u k Ragang
 xviii ABBRKVIATJONS AND GLOSSARY

PNRS Partai Negara Rakyat Sarawak

Pondok Literally "hut', referring to a village school w h e r e
PPP s t u d e n t s live in huts near their t e a c h e r ' s house
Pribumi People's Progressive Party
I n d i g e n o u s (for Sabah)
Proton Perusahaan O t o m o b i l Nasional ( T h e National Auto-
PSG mobile I n d u s t r y )
PSRM Papan S u p p o r t G r o u p
Partai Socialis Rakyat Malaysia (Socialist W o r k e r s
Party of Malaysia)
Rakyat T h e ordinary Malays, citizens, the c o m m o n p e o p l e .
Riba subjects of the c o u n t r y
Ringgit Interest, u s u r y (which is prohibited in Islamic law)
The basic unit of Malaysian c u r r e n c y , the Malaysian
dollar
RISEAP Regional Islamic D a ' w a h Council of Southeast Asia
a n d the Pacific
Basic Principles of the State ( T h e National Ideology)
Sarawak Peoples' Organization
SCCP Sabah Chinese Consolidated Party
SDB Sabah D e v e l o p m e n t Bank
SDP Socialist D e m o c r a t i c Party
SEDC State Economic Development C o r p o r a t i o n
Semangat Semangat "46 ( T h e S p i n t of "46)
Semangat Soul
SERU Social and E c o n o m i c Research Unit
SGS Selangor G r a d u a t e s Society
SMP Second Malaysia Plan
SNAP Sarawak National Party
Sogo shosha A Japanese-style large c o n g l o m e r a t e b u s m e s s enter-
SUPP
prise s u p p o r t e d by a n d giNcn m o n o p o l y privileges
bv the g o v e r n m e n t
Sarawak United People's Party
S u r a t layang "Flymg letter', photocopied letters and political tracts,
often containing u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d allegations a n d
revelations
Surau An Islamic prayer hall
Towkay An old-style C h i n e s e business m a n
Tun An honorific title c o n f e m r d by the Yang d i - P e r t u a n
Agong a n d equivalent to 'Sir'
' 2 0 points" The "safeguards' a n d "guarantees" p r o m i s e d Sarawak
and Sabah m l963 as a c o n d i t i o n of e n t r y into
Malaysia
UCSCAM United Chinese School C o m m i t t e e s .\ssociaiion
UCSTAM United Chinese School T e a c h e r s Association
UDP United D e m o c r a t i c Party
UEM United Engineers ( M a l a y s i a )
 ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY XIX

Ulama M u s l i m scholars or theologians

UMAT Partai U m a t Sarawak
Ummah T h e Islamic c o m m u n i t y of believers
UMNO U n i t e d Malays National Organization
U M N O Baru N e w U n i t e d Malays National O r g a n i z a t i o n
Umrah A m i n o r pilgrimage to M e c c a
UMSU University o f Malaya S t u d e n t s ' U n i o n
USNO U n i t e d S a b a h National Organization
Yang di-Pertuan Literally ' H e w h o i s m a d e K i n g ' ; t h e K i n g , elected
Agong f r o m a m o n g the Malay R u l e r s
ZOPFAN Z o n e o f Peace, F r e e d o m a n d N e u t r a l i t y
Map 1 Peninsular Malaysia
Map 2 Sabah and Sarawak
 1
The Metamorphosis

As Malaysia entered the decade of the 1970s, it was in the early stages of
recovery from a crisis that had threatened the survival of its principal
political institutions and the maintenance of civil order within the society.
Only seven months earlier, the nation had been stunned by major and
devastating riots in the national capital. In the aftermath of those riots,
known as 'The May Thirteenth Crisis', parliamentary institutions were
suspended, emergency rule was decreed, and power shifted to new Elites
determined to avoid some of the 'errors' or 'misjudgements' made by the
political leaders who had earlier successfully negotiated Malayan inde-
pendence and the formation of the subsequent larger Malaysian Federa-
tion. To understand the proposed remedy, some attention must be given
to the perceived malady.
In the first decade after independence in 1957, the original Federation
of Malaya had been expanded to include Singapore and the Borneo states
of Sarawak and Sabah. This wider union came into existence despite the
protracted opposition of Indonesia. The larger Federation of Malaysia
came into being in September 1963 with approximately the same institu-
uonal structures as the earlier federation. In the first years of the
expanded federation, a political contest developed between the federal
authorities and the state government in Singapore; the dispute was finally
resolved in August 1965 by the forced exit of Singapore from the union.
In these early years, both external and iniemal crises had been severe,
but they had not fractured the institutional integrity of the country nor
the continuity of its ruling elites.
Malaysia's population was made up of a complex mixture of ethnic
communities being divided between Malays, constituting 45.9 per cent of
the population, Chinese with 35.9 per cent, Indians with 9.6 per cent,
non-Muslim natives with 6.6 per cent, and others with 2.2 per cent.' In
their attempt to gain a broad base of support, political leaders had
evolved a political system that operated with mechanisms of ethnic
accommodation which depended primarily on the capacity of key political
elites from each community to reach accommodative solutions to critical
public issues, As the public became politically mobilized by the national-
ist movement, parties formed primarily along communal lines and under
the leadership of recognized communal leaders, mostly from among
Western-educated elites within each community. In the political struggles
2 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

over i n d e p e n d e n c e , the nationalist movement had succeeded in forging

an alignment of the three major c o m m u n a l p a n i e s into an overarching
coalition called the Alliance, T h e original Alliance coalition comprised
the United Malays National Organization ( U M N O ) , the Malayan Chinese
Association ( M C \ ) , and the Malayan Indian Congress ( M I C ) , represent-
ing respectively, the Malays, the Chinese, a n d the Indians. It was within
t h e governing councils of the Alliance that the most difficult a n d conten-
tious issues of politics had been resolved by the representatives of each of
these three c o m m u n a l parties. By forging the basis for multi-ethnic co-
operation, the Alliance was able to build a base of consensus and public
s u p p o r t that enabled it to c a p t u r e public office t h r o u g h decisive election
victories.

S y s t e m i c Characteristics

In its most essential characteristics, Malaysia had evolved a political

system that comparative political analysts have called 'an elite accom-
m o d a t i o n system".• For purposes of comparison and analysis, it is possible
to construct an ideal model of such a system to identify its characteristics
a n d basic assumptions. In its ideal f o r m , the model p r e s u m e s : (1) that
each ethnic c o m m u n i t y is unified u n d e r a leadership which can author-
itatively bargain for the interests of that c o m m u n i t y ; (2) that the leaders
of each c o m m u n i t y have the capacity to secure compliance and 'legit-
i m a c y ' for the bargains thai arc reached by e1ite negotiations; (3) that
there is sufficient tru.st and e m p a t h y a m o n g elites to be sensitive to the
most vital concerns of other e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s ; (4) that p u b l i c mobil-
ization on 'ethnically sensitive issues' is kept lo a m i n i m u m to enable the
Elites to deal with these issues in a bargaining m o d e ; and (5) that
representative insiituiions accept their diminished role of merely 'rat-
ifying' the product of elite bargaining as appropriate for resolution of
these issues.

In Malaysia, the a s s u m p t i o n s of the model were never fully met.

M o r e o v e r , with the passage of time, the minimal r e q u i r e m e n t s to m a k e
such a system work were even f u r t h e r e r o d e d . Each c o m m u n a l g r o u p
w a s not unified into a single party representing its interests. T h e Alliance
c o m p r i s e d the leaders of only the three largest c o m m u n i t i e s . F u r t h e r -
m o r e , opposition p a n i e s , most of which also cultivated c o m m u n a l con-
stituencies, took root within the m a j o r e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e s e
c o m m u n a l l y based opposition p a n i c s (which included some that claimed
to be ' n o n - c o m m u n a l ' ) were ne\'er able to forge a stable a n d broad-based
coahtion a m o n g themselves that c o m m a n d e d sufficient s u p p o n to unseat
the Alliance coalition at the polls. T h e y were able, h o w e v e r , to heighten
e t h n i c d e m a n d s and inter-ethnic tensions to m a k e the elite accom-
m o d a t i o n ' bargaining process m u c h m o r e difficult for the ruling coalition.
F u r t h e r m o r e , with the rise of m o r e vocal opposition p a n i c s , e t h n i c elites
w i t h i n the ruling Alliance coalition lost m u c h of their capacity to secure
c o m p l i a n c e and s u p p o r t f r o m their ethnic constituencies for both past
a n d present 'bargains'. T h e opposition parties, by their tactics, were
 THE METAMORPHOSIS 3

continuously threatening to put all contentious issues back on the table

f o r review and revision. H a d this tactic succeeded, it w o u l d have over-
loaded the political system beyond its capacity to process and resolve
such issues. E v e n w i t h o u t the power to force renegotiation of earlier
political decisions, the tactics of the opposition created heightened anxiety
a n d potential paranoia within all ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s .
T h e s e systemic changes in the Malaysian political system w e r e also
a c c o m p a n i e d by changes in the character of political elites. D u r i n g the
early 1950s and 1960s, the Elites w h o engaged in working out b a r g a i n s on
policy issues within the r u l i n g Alliance coalition h a d m u c h in c o m m o n .
Most of the top elites had an English-medium education a n d were q u i t e
W e s t e r n i z e d in values and d e p o r t m e n t . Gradually, h o w e v e r , a n e w
generation of Elites began coming on to the political scene with m o r e of a
vernacular education and with a greater concern for some of the core
values of their ethnic cultural heritage a n d often with a heightened
awareness of the potential to mobilize mass s u p p o n for themselves by
appxfaling to the 'primordial sentiments'^ of their e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y ,
f r e q u e n t l y in the f o r m of religious revivalism. Because these y o u n g e r ,
aspiring d i t e s were not in key positions of p o w e r , they cultivated m o r e
abrasive a n d intransigent political styles, even w h e n they operated within
the s t r u c t u r e of the ruling "elite accommodation system' of the Alliance
coalition. T h u s , the political stance and the political styles that originated
with the opposition parties tended to spread to the y o u n g e r r a n k s of elites
in the d o m i n a n t coalition, w h i c h , at the top level, prided themselves on
being able to work out inter-ethnic bargains in an accommodative style.
Y e t , at the same time, their bargains were often being u n d e r m i n e d even
within their own party by y o u n g e r , aspiring Elites. As contests f o r p o w e r
w e r e generated within each constituent party, the natural c o n s e q u e n c e
t e n d e d to be that each faction m a d e more stridently e t h n i c appeals to
s e c u r e the s u p p o r t of Its c o m m u n i t y . T h e cumulative effect of these
d e v e l o p m e n t s revealed an axiom of politics in c o m m u n a l l y divided
societies: Strong leaders can be accommodative; weak leaders arc com-
pelled to be ethnically parochial.

D u r i n g the 1960s, m a n y contentious domestic issues h a d been partially

o v e r s h a d o w e d by external issues and threats. H o w e v e r , after S i n g a p o r e ' s
expulsion f r o m Malaysia in 1965, attention focused on s o m e very crucial
e t h n i c policies. O n e of the most contentious was the d e m a n d m a d e by
m a n y Malays that the National Language be enforced for all official
g o v e r n m e n t a l p u r p o s e s and as the sole m e d i u m of instruction f o r all
schools. Because Malay had been designated as the sole National
l a n g u a g e in the Constitution, moves to enforce its use w o u l d , quite
n a t u r a l l y , benefit the Malays. In reaction to these d e m a n d s , non-Malay
mass organizations mobilized to defend the use of the English, Chinese,
a n d I n d i a n languages for educational a n d other p u b l i c p u r p o s e s . Also at
issue was the question of the whole structure of Malay p r e f e r e n c e s and
'special rights' that had b e c o m e a p r o m i n e n t feature of p u b l i c policy
since the early days of British colonial rule. T h e Constitution a n d public
policies a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e had c o n t i n u e d and e x p a n d e d t h e system of
4 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

Malay preferences, 4 The disputes over these policies merely reflected the
e t h n i c animosities that were growing between the Malays, w h o claimed
the indigenous status of B u m i p u t r a , 5 and the non-Malays, w h o stressed
equal and u n i f o r m individual rights for all citizens and w h o also p r e f e n e d
pluralist cultural policies in matters of education, language, a n d volun-
tary associations. T h e s e contradictory sets of d e m a n d s were a feature of
politics for well over a decade but they bccame m o r e focused a n d intense
in the election campaign of 1969.

T h e Election of 1969

In the three previous elections, the Alliance had won 81.7 per cent of
the vote in 1955, 51.8 p e r c e n t in 1959, and 58.4 p e r c e n t in 1964, It had
contested against m a n y opposition parties, but their n u m b e r was gradually
r e d u c e d by attrition, t h u s increasing their potential at the polls. F o r some
time prior to the election of l969, the opposition p a r u e s had recognized
their collective s t r e n g t h , bui they also f o u n d that effective coalition-
building was virtually impossible.
T h e two most p r o m i n e n t opposition parties were Partai Islam (PAS),''
which was the d o m i n a n t Malay opposition party, a n d the D e m o c r a t i c
Action Party ( D A P ) , which was the d o m i n a n t non-Malay opposition
party. Along class lines, both these opposition p a n i c s recruited m o r e
affectively a m o n g ihc lower strata of society, but each within its p r i m a r y
e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y , l l i e s e main c o n t e n d e r s a m o n g the opposition re-
flected. exploited, and mobilized ethnic grievances, anxieties, a n d senti-
ments to challenge the s t r u c t u r e of decisions and policies that were the
p r o d u c t of the Alliance bargaining proccss.
On the non-Malay side of the political s p e c t r u m , the D A P had initially
been formed as an offshoot of the People's Action Party in Singapore, but
was forced to changc its n a m e and its affiliation w h e n Singapore was
expelled f r o m the u n i o n . T h e D A P grew rapidly after 1965, recruiting
t h e following of the earlier L a b o u r Party which had been a m e m b e r of
the Socialist Front with Party Ra'ayat. In its o n g i n a l c o n c e p t i o n , the
Socialist F r o n t professed to be a n o n - c o m m u n a l left-wing opposition to
the Alliance. H o w e v e r , its Malay-based p a r t n e r . Party Ra'ayat, was
u n a b l e to generate mass Malay s u p p o n . so the Socialist Front relied
mostly on the Chinese and Indian s u p p o n e r s of the L a b o u r Party. W h e n
the D A P appeared on the scene with a n i c u l a t e leadership a n d good
organization, the Chinese s u p p o n e r s of the L a b o u r Party t e n d e d to defect
to the D A P . leaving the Socialist F r o n t a d e f u n c t and derelict multi-
ethnic coalition. By contrast, the D A P built up its following by espousing
equalitarian policies a n d cultural pluralism that would e n s u r e equal
treatment for Malay, English, C h i n e s e , a n d T a m i l languages a n d educa-
tional systems. It stated as its first objective the creation of 'a f r e e ,
d e m o c r a t i c a n d socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of racial
equality and social and economic justice, f o u n d e d on the institutions of
parliamentary d e m o c r a c y ' , 7 It also stressed in its c a m p a i g n i n g the slogan
of creating a 'Malaysian Malaysia', which was a political c o d e w o r d
 THK METAMORPHOSIS 5

attacking the system of Malay 'special rights' that had been i n c o r p o r a t e d

in the i n s t i t u t i o n a n d had been justified as necessary to ' u p l i f t ' the
Malays by protective land laws and assured q u o u s in e d u c a t i o n , for
certain business licences, a n d for recruitment to the civil service. T h e
D A P argued that these Malay 'special rights' only created a 'rapacious'
M a l a y capitalist class and benefited feudal Malay elites, but d i d nothing
to aid Malay peasants or the u r b a n poor. Although the D A P did not
expect to displace the Alliance government at the polls, it did call u p o n
voters to d e n y the Alliance its two-thirds m a j o n t y in Parliament that h a d
e n a b l e d it to a m e n d the Constitution at will. T h e D A P argued that
constitutional a m e n d m e n t s should be based on consensus that took
account of the views of the opposition.
O p e r a t i n g at the other end of the pohtical spectrum was P A S , w h i c h
appealed for s u p p o r t on the basis of c o m m i t m e n t to Malay s u p r e m a c y
a n d Islamic principles. It called for p r o g r a m m e s to aid Malay peasants
a n d proposed new laws to strengthen Islam and for the expansion of
rights to be given to the B u m i p u t r a . 8 In effect, PAS was calling for the
e x p a n s i o n of Malay 'special rights' and for the a s s r a n c e that Islamic
p n n c i p l e s would not be c o m p r o m i s e d in any political a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h
the n o n - M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s .
A m o d e r a t e social r e f o r m p a n y k n o w n as Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
(Malaysian People's M o v e m e n t ) , or 'Gerakan' for s h o n , was f o u n d e d in
1968 by intellectuals in an effort to forge a n o n - c o m m u n a l multi-ethnic
p a r t y , dedicated to social justice, h u m a n rights, a n d an o p e n d e m o c r a t i c
.system. Although it was launched with m u c h fanfare, its appeal was
rather restricted to university-educated Elites a n d s o m e clusters of u r b a n
s u p p o n e r s i n P e n a n g a n d Kuala L u m p u r . T h e p r o g r a m m e advocated b y
Gerakan avoided c o m m u n a l issues, stressing instead social r e f o r m and
civil rights. W i t h the increasing polarization on ethnic issues, t h e Gerakan
p r o g r a m m e a n d campaign t h e m e s were d r o w n e d out b y the m o r e strident
c a m p a i g n rhetoric of the two major opposition parties that each cultivated
grievances within its e t h n i c constituencies.
O p e r a t i n g closer to the m i d d l e of the political s p e c t r u m , b u t with an
a c k n o w l e d g e d Malay bias, was the Alliance with its t h r e e - p a n y coalition
o f U M N O , the M C A , a n d the M I C . T h e Alliance w a s headed b y T u n k u
A b d u l R a h m a n , the President of U M N O and the head of the coalition
since its formation in 1952. T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n had great r e s p e a
a m o n g all coalition p a n n e r s , not only because he h a d successfully
negotiated the terms of Malaysian i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1957, b u t also because
t h e 'elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n system' which developed u n d e r the Alliance
d e p e n d e d on the goodwill and mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g of e t h n i c sensitivities
that had been assiduously cultivated by T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n d u r i n g his
m a n y years as P r i m e Minister. As the i n c u m b e n t party, the Alliance
c a m p a i g n e d on a platform praising past achievements, p r o m i s i n g a
' p r o s p e r o u s , stable, liberal and tolerant society', a n d claiming to be the
only party able to check 'the spreading contagion of racialist e m o t i o n s ' .
T h e Alliance d e f e n d e d the existing Malay 'special rights' that w e r e
g u a r a n t e e d in Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution, but it also
 6 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

promised that its policies would not 'deprive anyone of o p p o r t u n i t i e s for

advertisement'.9
The election campaign was sharply contested t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y ,
a n d It was not m u c h m o r e abrasive than earlier campaigns h a d been. A
few incidents occured which were later cited as contributing causes of
the crisis that developed in the wake of the election. T h e campaign d i d .
h o w e v e r , raiiie the pi>htical t e m p e r a t u r e a n d . in that respect, it was a
contributing factor in the explosion of emotion that took politics f r o m the
ballot to the streets.

T h e M a y Thirteenth Crisis

The polling began in Peninsular Malaysia on 10 May, with the Borneo

states schedule to vote two to four weeks later w h e n the votes in
Peninsular Malaysia were counted. it became apparent that the Alliance
had won less than half the votes and its s u p p o r t had d r o p p e d a b o u t
10 per cent below its previous showing. Even so. it had won 66 of the
104 parliamentary seats in Peninsular Malaysia and confident of
winning half the sets in Sabah a n d Sarawak to be decided in the next
stage of the election clear parliamentary majority was not in j e o p a r d y .
despite itd decline in public s u p p o r t T h e results d i d reveal a substantial
loss of support from the Chinese for the MCA, and theretore the results
created severe strains within the ruling Alliance. just at a time w h e n its
approach to communal issues was being challenged by the m o r e
chauvinist opposition parties.
The election results put greater strain on the Alliance system at the
state level, where the Alliance lost control of Kelantan Perak, and
Penang, with the control of Selangor being in d o u b t with the Alliance
THE METAMORPHOSIS 7

a n d the combined opposition being tied. T h e s e voting results s u r p r i s e d

both the public and most informed o b s e r v e n , heightening uncertainties
a n d anxieties. For most democratic systems, small shifts of voter s u p p o r t
are expected, a n d even w h e n no parliamentary majorities e m e r g e f r o m
t h e polls, the public does not become alarmed by the ambiguities
inherent in the formation of a new g o v e r n m e n t . In Malaysia, such an
o r d e r i y process of transformation was not to be.
Because the M C A had 20 oui of its 33 candidates go d o w n to d e f e a t , it
b c c a m e the target of caustic criticism f r o m the more chauvinist Malay
s p o k e s m e n in U M N O w h o blamed the M C A for the Alliance losses.
U n d e r attack from within the Alliance, the leader of the M C A , T a n Siew
S i n , a n n o u n c e d that with such a weak m a n d a t e , the M C A w o u l d not be
represented in the new Federal C a b m e t . " By implication, this m o v e
raised the spectre of no inter-ethnic bargaining m e c h a n i s m s being in
place in the new government. At the same time, the non-Malay opposition
p a r t i e s — G e r a k a n and D A P — w e r e jubilant that they had prevented the
Alliance f r o m w i n n m g a two-lhirds m a j o n t y in Parliament a n d h a d also
helped to lopple the Alliance at the state level in Perak a n d Penang- T h e
deadlock between the Alliance and the opposition in Selangor was viewed
as the e n d of a state government that had been led by a Menteri Besar
(Chief Minister) noted for his chauvinist Malay political style. To
celebraie these 'victories'. Gerakan and D A P s u p p o n e r s staged a p a r a d e
in Kuala L u m p u r , d u r i n g which racial epithets a n d threats were ex-
c h a n g e d with Malay bystanders. In response to these provocations, the
e m b a t t l e d M e n t e r i Besar of Selangor, Marun bin Haji Idris, s u m m o n e d
Malays for a mass pro-government demonstration and show of force.
R e s p o n d i n g to his call, Malays f r o m many areas of the state assembled on
the evening of 13 M a y ; m a n y were a r m e d with parangs and other
w e a p o n s . To the assembled c r o w d s , Malay politicians recounted the
"insults' a n d interpreted the earlier 'victory parade' as evidence that
M a l a y s u p r e m a c y in g o v e r n m e n t was being challenged by 'infidels'. T h e y
a r g u e d that c o u n t e r - d e m o n s t r a t i o n s were needed ' t o teach the Chinese a
lesson".

W h a t h a p p e n e d next was not the expression of o v e n economic griev-

ances or of class animosities. R a t h e r , in the a t m o s p h e r e of crisis and with
the irrational m e c h a n i s m s of crowd psychology, primal emotions surged
in u n c o n t r o l l a b l e w a v e s combining racial antipathies, a n g e r , fear, h a t r e d ,
a n d self-justifying rationalizations for barbarous behaviour. In the midst
of these events, there were also individual acts of sacrifice a n d valour,
with s o m e heroic d e e d s w h e r e threatened individuals were saved by those
uf o t h e r races unwilling to join in the violence. T h e r a m p a g e began with
a r m e d M a l a y s w h o looted and b u r n e d (Chinese shops a n d houses tn areas
w h e r e Chinese and Malays lived in close proximity. W h e n they w e r e
able, the C h i n e s e m o u n t e d s t u b b o r n resistance a n d s o m e launched
retaliatory counter-attacks. On both sides, participants were mostly f r o m
the lower classes.

T h e police called to the scenes of m o b violence a t t e m p t e d to control

the situation in an even-handed fashion b u t the n u m b e r s of rioters
8 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

o v e r w h e l m e d police ranks. As ihe rioting spread, the a r m y units were

called u p o n for assistance. W i t h no experience in responding to civil
violence, Malay units, acting on the basis of ethnic and political sym-
pathies, directed most of their p u n i u v e measures against the Chinese.
w h o were not viewed as victims deserving protection, but as 'trouble-
m a k e r s ' a n d as 'anti-national' elements. Despite curfews and the heavy
mtliiary presence, severe rioting, arson, and looting continued for t w o days.
S o m e 6,000 residents of Kuala l . u m p u r , about 90 per cent of w h o m
w e r e (Chinese, were m a d e refugees from b u r n t and destroyed homes. T h e
g o v e r n m e n t acknowledged 178 fatalities f r o m the riots, but journalists
and n o n - g u v e m m e n i sources claimed the death toll was m u c h higher. 1 2
A f t e r four days of violence, the authorities finally restored o r d e r to the
troubled areas of the capital Besides the destruction of life and p r o p e r t y ,
the h o i s had also provoked a crisis within the highest levels of the
g o v e r n m e n t over the distribution of power and blame for the rioting, as
well as over the a p p r o p r i a t e m e c h a n i s m s to restore o r d e r a n d to formulate
policies for reconstruction and reconciliation.

T h e Emergency

In response to the civil violence and the political crisis, the Yang
d i - P e r t u a n Agong (King), 1 3 acting at the request of the g o v e r n m e n t ,
declared a national emergency. Both the Consiitution and Parliament
were s u s p e n d e d and the elections scheduled for Sabah and Sarawak later
in the m o n t h were postponed indefinitely. T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n re-
mained as P r i m e Minister, but administrative p o w e r s d u r i n g the
e m e r g e n c y were transferred to a new body called the National O p e r a t i o n s
Council ( N O C ) , which was headed by D e p u i y P r i m e Minister Tun
A b d u l Razak bin Hussein, popularly known as T u n Razak. T h e National
O p e r a t i o n s Council consisted of the heads of the police, the a r m e d forces,
the public service, and the foreign service. plus three pohiical leaders.
A b d u l R a z a k , representing U M N O , T a n Siew Sin, representing the
M C A . and V . T . S a m b a n t h a n . representing the M I C . " W h i l e the C a b i n e t
c o n t i n u e d to meet u n d e r the leadership of Prime Minister T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n , its role had been affectively reduced to the supervision of
routine governmental administration and to a symbolic role that was a
tacit a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of c o n t i n u e d public s u p p o r t for established
political leaders, especially T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n w h o , despite severe
criticism from Malay students and intellectuals, continued to c o m m a n d
widespread respect and public confidence a m o n g large s e g m e n t s of all the
m a j o r ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s . In terms of real political p o w e r , h o w e v e r , the
e m e r g e n c y represented a termination of the i n i e r c o m m u n a l elite accom-
m o d a t i o n system" and it also may have effectively disguised a q u a s i - c o u p
w h e r e b y the political leadership of the Prime M i n i s t e r a n d C a b i n e t had
been partly supplanted by the D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r . A b d u l R a z a k .
backed by the combined powers of the a r m y , police, and b u r e a u c r a c y .
T h e N O C had an ethnic representation of seven Malays, one C h i n e s e ,
a n d one I n d i a n , whereas the Cabinet was composed of ten Malays to four
 THK METAMORPHOSIS 9

non-Malays. T h e s e changes were accomplished w i t h o u t any o p e n

symbolic or legal break in continuity with the previous constitutional
government system.
T h e rioting and the political changes d u r i n g the e m e r g e n c y e m b o l d e n e d
militant Malay chauvinists. Racial tensions had continued after the initial
rioting, in part because social contacts between Malays and n o n - M a l a y s
broke d o w n and m a n y non-Malays joined a near total boycott of Malay
s h o p s , Malay taxis, and o t h e r economic interchanges, At the s a m e t i m e ,
militant Malays were not satisfied with governmental changes a n d w e r e
d e m a n d i n g that parliamentary democracy be r e n o u n c e d in favour of one-
p a r t y rule b y U M N O . T h e leading spokesman for these d e m a n d s was
D r Mahathir bin .Mohamad, a n U M N O b a c k b e n c h e r w h o had just been
defeated in the Kota Star Selatan constituency in K e d a h by a P A S
c a n d i d a t e . Dr M a h a t h i r joined forces with Raja M u k t a r u d d i n D a i m , a
lecturer in Malay Studies at the University of Malaya, to mobilize Malays
in a campaign to force T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n to resign a n d accept
responsibility for the crisis which they viewed as being the result of his
too a c c o m m o d a t i v e and compromising policies towards non-Malay p o -
litical d e m a n d s . Dr M a h a t h i r wrote a private letter to T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n calling for his ' r e t i r e m e n t ' as P r i m e Minister and accusing h i m
of

giving the Chinese what they demand The Malays, whom you thought
will not revolt, have lost their minds and ran [sic] amok, sacrificing their lives and
killing those whom they hate, because you have given them [the Chinese] too
much face. The responsibility for the deaihs of these people, Muslims and
infidels. must be shouldered by a leader who was under a misconception."

Dr M a h a t h i r ' s letter was widely a n d openly circulated, fuelling t h e

c a m p a i g n against T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n . .Many Malay s t u d e n t s at the
University of Malaya, at the Islamic College, a n d at M A R A Institute of
T e c h n o l o g y became actively involved in mass d e m o n s t r a t i o n s d e m a n d i n g
t h e a s s e n i o n of "Malay sovereignty' and the o v e n h r o w of T u n k u A b d u l
Rahman.16
On 28 J u n e , a second wave of rioting broke o u t , this time directed
against I n d i a n s in the Sentul district of the capital, on its n o n h - e a s t e m
outskirts. D u r i n g these riots, 15 Indians were killed and m a n y h o u s e s
a n d shops were destroyed. 1 7 T h i s new violence a p p e a r e d to be a direct
c o n s e q u e n c e of the remobilization of militant Malay y o u t h by t h e n e w e r
generation of m o r e radical Malay elites w h o b e c a m e aggressive a n d
intimidating in their political rhetoric and w h o took ' n o n - n e g o t i a b l e '
s t a n d s on ethnic issues, openly proposing to terminate the processes of
elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n that had characterized the earlier e r a . Although the
c a m p a i g n was directed against the T u n k u , it was designed to p r e s s u r e the
N O C u n d e r T u n Razdk's control t o d e p o s e P r i m e Minister T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n a n d declare a ' o n e party, one-race' system of g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e mass d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d the renewed racial rioting in Sentul
forced the g o v e r n m e n t to deal with the political activities of those militant
Malay politicians w h o w e r e openly challenging g o v e r n m e n t authority.
10 MAI AYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

Instead of siding with the demonstrators a n d the Malay militants, T u n

Razak and the Minister of H o m e Affairs, Dr Ismail bin A b d u l R a h m a n ,
d e f e n d e d T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n . T o check the militants, D r M a h a t h i r
a n d M u s a H i t a m , f o r m e r Executive Secretary of U M N O , were both
expelled f r o m U M N O for breach of party discipline. In a n n o u n c i n g the
decision, Dr Ismail issued an explanation and warning:

These ultras beleive in the wild and fantastic theory of absolute dominion by one
race over the other communities, regardless of the Constitution.............
Polarization has taken place in Malaysian politics and the extreme racialists
among the ruling party are making a desperate bid to topple the present
leadership........
I must warn the extremists and others as well, that if he anti-Tengku
campaigns or activities are carried out in such a manner . . . as to cause undue
fear and alarm among members of any commumiy . . . I will not hesitate to
exercise my powers under the law against those responsible........................18

Following this disciplinary action by U M N O , the g o v e r n m e n t issued an

o r d e r establishing severe penalties for any public d e m a n d s for the
resignation o f T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n . " Although T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n
c o n t i n u e d as P r i m e M i n i s t e r , he devoted increasing attention to cere-
monial f u n c t i o n s a n d m a d e several diplomatic trips a b r o a d . Over time, it
b e c a m e obvious that the policies and initiatives for resolving ethnic
conflict and for the restoration of parliamentary democracy d e p e n d e d on
the actions of the National O p e r a t i o n s Council.

T h e R e c o v e r y Strategy

Shortly after it a s s u m e d effective p o w e r , the National O p e r a t i o n s Council

t u r n e d its attention to desising strategics for rcstormg order and dealing
with the climate of fear, a n g e r , a n d haired that had been generated by
boih the e t h n i c provocations and the violence. T h e high levels of paranoia
a n d c o m m u n a l animosity had created a crisis of confidence over the
capacity of the g o v e r n m e n t to keep o r d e r and to meet m i n i m a l d e m a n d s
of c o m p e t i n g politically mobilized constituencies. Essentially, the N O C
d e c i d e d to establish new m e c h a n i s m s for i n i e r c o m m u n a l dialogue and
reconciliation as well as to formulate new policies to reduce c o m m u n a l
conflicts a n d to resolve vexatious c o m m u n a l issues. To i m p l e m e n t these
strategies, it created a D e p a r t m e n t of National U n i t y , which was c h a r g e d
with creating a broad-based public consensus on c o m m u n a l issues. Some
t i m e later, a National Consuliative Council ( N C C ) w a s also f o r m e d so as
to provide a n o n - p u b l i c f o r u m for representatives of various interests to
discuss contentious issues a n d to advise the g o v e r n m e n t on strategics a n d
policies related to r a c i a l - < o m m u n a ! p r o b l e m s . In substance, the D e p a n -
m e n i of National Unity was charged with formulating broad strategies for
c o m m u n a l reconciliation, while the N C C , though havmg n o formal
p o w e r s , was to be used as a surrogate for Parliament to secure 'ratification
a n d consent' for those policies afier in camera discussions a m o n g
c o m m u n a l representatives w h o were t o b e a p p o i n t e d t o the N C C b y the
 THE METAMORPHOSIS 11

g o v e r n m e n t . 2 0 T h e ultimate power over policy and administration, h o w -

ever was retained by the N O C .
All m a j o r parties were invited to n o m i n a t e representatives to the N C C .
W h e n the D A P nominated its leader. Lim Kit Siang, w h o w a s then in
prison u n d e r a preventive detention o r d e r , the g o v e r n m e n t refused to
release h i m to permit his participation, w h e r e u p o n the D A P decided to
boycott the Council. O t h e r parties did participate, h o w e v e r , even t h o u g h
the g o v e r n m e n t parties had fifteen representatives to the c o m b i n e d
opposition representation of six. T h e total m e m b e r s h i p of the N C C was
65 with the remaining m e m b e r s sclccted to represent the federal
g o v e r n m e n t , state g o v e r n m e n t s , religious organizations, professional
associaiions, irade u n i o n s , the press, and 'minorities', About half the
m e m b e r s h i p were g o v e r n m e n t officials and the ethnic representation on
the N C C was 30 .Malays, 17 C h i n e s e . 7 Indians, and 11 'others'. 2 1 T h e
N C C firsi met in J a n u a r y 1970 lo discuss policy proposals a n d suggestions
for g o v e r n m e n t initiatives in ethnic matters, Over the next year a n d a
half, in secret meetings and without formal votes, the N C C discus-sed
c o m m u n a l l y sensitive issues and gave implicit approval to the m a j o r
policy mitiaiives designed by the government to deal with the a f t e r m a t h
of the May T h i r t e e n t h crisis.

After the issues of public security were resolved a n d militant activists

had been checked through disciplinary measures, the higher circles of the
g o v e r n m e n t c o n f r o n t e d the issue of if, h o w . and w h e n Parliament should
be reconsiitutcd. T h e most immediate issue was w h e t h e r the s u s p e n d e d
election in Sabah a n d Sarawak should be allowed to proceed. Representa-
tions were received f r o m m a n y party leaders in these states that there
were no security n s k s and thai 'Malay rights' would not be challenged.
Before the election could be sanctioned, however, there first needed to be
a d e a r decision ihai the parliamentary system was to c o n t i n u e . Some
mihiant Malays wanted the N O C to continue without Parliament to
as.sure Malay political s u p r e m a c y . O t h e r s argued that only with parlia-
m e n t a r y d e m o c r a c y could the g o v e r n m e n t be assured of p o p u l a r s u p p o r t .
T h e available evidence suggests that T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n a n d
Dr Ismail were in favour of rapid restoration of the parliamentary s y s t e m ,
while T u n Abdul Ruzak remained u n c u m m i t t e d , but finally was w o n
over, though on the condition that g o v e r n m e n t policies would be needed
to o v e r c o m e the inferior economic position of the M a l a y s . " As Director of
t h e N O C . A b d u l Razak explained; ' D e m o c r a c y cannot w o r k i n Malaysia
in terms of political equality alone. T'he democratic process m u s t be spelt
out also in terms of m o r e equitable distribution of wealth and o p p o r -
tunity.'23

After m u c h soul-searching and m a n y behind-the-scenes m a n o e u v r e s ,

the decision was finally m a d e to r e s u m e the s u s p e n d e d elections in
Sarawak a n d S a b a h . even though the Alliancc feared it might sustain a
f u r t h e r loss of seats. Yet. w h e n the short campaign was over a n d the
votes were c o u n t e d , the Alliance p a r t n e r s in S a b a h — t h e United Sabah
National Organization ( U S N O ) and the Sabah Chinese Association—had
swept all 16 parliamentary seats. In Sarawak, the Alliance p a r t n e r s won
12 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

10 of the 24 parliamentary seats and 24 of the 48 state seats. Despite

dismal predictions, these victories assured the Alliance of its two-thirds
majority in Parliament, if and w h e n it would be rcconstiiuied, 2 4 I n d e e d ,
the Alliance successes in the Sabah and Sarawak elections s t r e n g t h e n e d
the hand of those w h o argued for the restoration of Parliament as soon as
possible. T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s capacity to assure a m e n d m e n t s to the Consti-
tution wiihout hindrance f r o m the opposition, no d o u b t gave the govern-
m e m a free hand to formulate the next phase in an overall strategy of
recovery and reconciliation.
T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s next major policy initiative involved the formal
declaration of a national ideology called the R u k u n e g a r a . 2 5 It was designed
to be the basis for creating a basic consensus on c o m m u n a l issues by
establishing prmciples that could be involved to restrain the m o r e e x t r e m e
d e m a n d s o f ethnic chauvinists. T h e R u k u n e g a r a was proclaimed o n t h e
anniversary of Malayan i n d e p e n d e n c e , on 31 August 1970. by the Yang
d i - P e r t u a n A g o n g . A t the s a m e time, T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n a n n o u n c e d
that he w o u l d retire as P r i m e Minister in three w e e k s , to be succeeded by
T u n Razak. H e also a n n o u n c e d that p a r l i a m e n t a r y r u l e w o u l d b e restored
in F e b r u a r y 1971. but s u b j e a to certain l i m i u n g conditions. 2 6 T h e
R u k u n e g a r a declaration reads as follows:

Our nation.MA
MALAYSIA. being dedicated—
to achieving a greater unity' of all her peoples,
to maintaining a democratic way of life;
to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably
shared;
to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions
to building a progresive society- which shall be orwnted to modern science and
technology.
 THE METAMORPHOSIS 13

W E . her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these
pnnciples—
Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country
Upholding the Constitution
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality
T h e c o m m e n t a r y on these five principles explained their meaning in
m o r e detail:
1 Islam is the official religion of the Federaiion. Other religions and beliefs
may be praaised in peace and harmony and there shall be no discrimination
against any citizen on the ground of religion,
2. The lovalty that is expeaed of every citizen is ihat he must be faithful and
bear true allegiance to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong................
3. It is the duty of a citizen to respect and appreciate the letter, the spirit and
the historical background of the Constitution, This historical background led to
such provisions as those regarding the position o f . . . the Rulers, the position of
Islam as the otlicial religion, (he position of Malays and other Natives, the
leguimaie interests of the other communities, and the conferment of citizenship.
It is the sacred duty of a citizen to defend and uphold the Constitution.
4. Justice is founded upon the rule of law. Every citizen is equal before the law.
Fundamental libenties are guaranteed to all citizens. These include liberty of the
person, equal protection of the law, freedom of religion, rights of property and
protection against banishment.
The Constitution confers on a citizen the right of free speech, assembly and
association and this righi may be enjoyed freely subject only to limitations
imposed by law.
3. Individuals and groups shall conduct their affairs in such a manner as not to
violate any of the accepted canons of behaviour which is arrogant or offensive to
the sensitiviues of any other group. No citizen should question the loyally of
another citizen on the ground that he belongs to a particular community."
T h i s statement of a national ideology was designed to a s s e n that f u n d a -
m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s that had been the result of inter-elite ethnic bargaining
w e r e not to be challenged in the ongoing process of politics. Not only
w o u l d the R u k u n e g a r a be propagated in schools a n d t h r o u g h the media
for public acceptance, b u t it would also be used as a guide-line to
establish limits on the actions of politicians and the p u b l i c alike.
Challenges to the principles of the R u k u n e g a r a w e r e to be answered with
severe penalties. Although the previous elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n system' h a d
agreed on m a n y principles of policy and process, t h e r e is no evidence to
suggest that such agreements were viewed at the l i m e as being in
p e r p e t u i t y or beyond s u b s e q u e n t re-evaluation and renegotiation. N o w ,
h o w e v e r , the R u k u n e g a r a declaration w a s a statement that s o m e principles
of the political sy'stem are inviolable a n d outside the realm of political
d i s p u t a t i o n . In e f f e a . the R u k u n e g a r a was a formal declaration of a
' N a t i o n a l C o m p a c t ' , or what later came to be called T h e Racial B a r g a i n ' ,
w h i c h was n o w to be p r o m u l g a t e d as the f u n d a m e n t a l basis for political
a n d civil o r d e r in Malaysia, and its acceptance w a s to be a prerequisite
for p a n i c i p a t i o n in the political life of the c o u n t r y .
14 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

In preparation for the e n d i n g of emergency rule a n d ihe reconstitution

of Parliament, the government issued a White Paper that proposed a
series of constitutional a m e n d m e n t s that were formulated ,. to remove
sensitive issues from the realm of public discussions so as to allow the
smooth functioning of parliamcntary democracy; a n d to redress the racial
imbalance in certain sectors of the nation's life and thereby p r o m o t e
national unity'. 2 8 T h e first objective of the newly formulated recovery
strategy was thus to limit the topics for political discourse and for the
agenda of public policy. The second objective articulated a new d i m e n s i o n
of public policy agenda giving priority to the social and economic
inequalities that were believed lo be a more f u n d a m e n t a l root source of
e t h n i c hostilities and jealousies. T h e first objective was m a d e a precon-
dition for the reconstitution of Parliament, while the second objective was
to become a major priority for the new administration of T u n Razak as he
a s s u m e d the position of Prime Minister f r o m the retiring T u n k u A b d u l
Rahman.
Even before Parliament was r e c o n v e n e d , the povernment issued an
e m e r g e n c y decree a m e n d i n g the Sedition O r d i n a n c e , limiting f r e e d o m of
speech and of the pre.ss, m a k i n g it an otTence 'to question any m a t t e r ,
right, status, position. privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or
protected by the provisions of Part III of the Federal consstitution ot
Article 152, 153, or 181 of the Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n ' . T h e sections of
the Consiitution covered by these a m e n d m e n t s to the Sedition Ordinance-
included: rights of citizenship; Malay special rights, the status a n d
powers of the .Malay Rulers; the status, of Islam, and the status of Malay
as ihe sole National Language. I hc new a m e n d m e n t s also prohibited any
a c t . speech, or publication that had a 'tendency to p r o d u c e feelings of ill-
will and enmity between different races ..
T h e new constitutional a m e n d m e n t s proposed in the W h i t e P a p e r were
to prohibit any public questioning or criticism of the R u k u n e g a r a and
certain topics identified as 'sensitive issues', including: the powers and
status of the Malay R u l e r s ; citizenship rights uf n o n - M a l a y s : Malay
special rights and privileges; the status of Islam as the uflicial religion;
a n d the status of Malay as the sole National language, The proposed
a m e n d m e n t s would also ' e n t r e n c h ' these matters in the Ctmstiiution by
requiring the consent of the Conference uf Rulers for any f u r t h e r
a m e n d m e n t s to these ' e n t r e n c h e d ' sections of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . The
earlier resirictions ot the Sedition Act were to apply even to M e m b e r s
of Parliament by removing ihcir parliamentary Immunities w h e n
speaking on the identified "sensitive issues'. By giving the .Malay R u l e r s
the power to protect 'entrenched" constiiuiional provisions, they were
t h u s to be made the perpetual g u a r a n t o r s of ' T h e Racial B a r g a i n ' , which
had now been defined largely as a package of 'inalienable i n d i g e n o u s
rights'.

T h e second objective of the W h i t e P a p e r , that of addressing ethnic

social a n d economic mequalities, also entailed a c o n s u t u i i o n a l a m e n d m e n t
giving the Yang d i - P e r t u a n Agong the power to reserve academic places
in institutions of higher learning for Malays in courses of study w h e r e the
 THE METAMORPHOSIS 15

Malays were disproportionately few. T h i s a m e n d m e n t was only o n e

rather m i n o r constitutional provision extending existing Malay special
rights. 3 1 T h e White Paper left little d o u b t , however, that m a n y o t h e r
initiatives would follow in the f o r m of new legislation to a d d r e s s the
issues of e t h n i c , social, and educational inequalities.
W h e n Parliament was finally reconvened on 23 F e b r u a r y 1971, the
n e w P r i m e Minister, A b d u l Razak. introduced the package of constitu-
tional a m e n d m e n t s that were the contingent conditions for the r e s u m p t i o n
of p a r l i a m e n i a r y democracy. Explaining the limitations being placed on
t h e parliamentary system, he stated:

Shall we return simply to the wa\-s of the past when, in the name of democracy
and freedom uf specch, laesponsible elements were at libeny to foment and
exploit racial rmuiiuns until we were brought to the very brink of national
disintegration? Or shall we act now to deny them that freedom to foment and to
exploit and. in this way, safeguard for all of us the smooth functioning of
parliamentaryndemocracy?
I have no doubt in my own mind what we should do..............
Let us remember that the democratic system which we are working has to bear
the stresses and strains of a multi-racial soaety . . . we are determined to ensure
the working of the parliamentary>' system of govemmeni suited to our present
conditions. 32

Speaking on behalf of the g o v e r n m e n t , the leader of the M C A , T a n Siew

S i n . admitted that the a m e n d m e n t s did not fully meet all the ideals of
parliamentary d e m o c r a c y , but he reasoned 'it is better to have something
less than 100 per cent democracy than no democracy at a l l ' . " T h e
U M N O .Members of Parliament were m o r e enthusiastic, h o w e v e r , arguing
that ' b y taking these sensitive issues out of the b o d y politic, the first,
single effective step to eradicate c o m m u n a l politics will have taken
p l a c e ' . " T h e only opposition to the package of constitutional a m e n d -
m e n t s came from the D A P and the People's Progressive P a r t y ( P P P ) ,
w h i c h argued that the a m e n d m e n t s c u r b e d parliamentary d e m o c r a c y a n d
e r o d e d the powers of Parliament. T h e y reasoned that by b a n n i n g all
discussion on 'sensitive issues', these matters would be t u r n e d into
" u n d e r g r o u n d p r o b l e m s ' which would only become worse. After several
days of inconclusive debate. Parliament finally passed all the a m e n d -
m e n t s proposed in the W h i t e Paper by a vote of 125 to 1 7 . "
T h e passage of these a m e n d m e n t s marked the beginning of a n e w era
in Malaysian poliucs. Emergency rule had been e n d e d , b u t the new
g o v e r n m e n t had also acquired important new powers to direct govern-
ment policy and to m a n a g e and control political conflicts. T h e
R u k u n e g a r a ideology, the Sedition O r d i n a n c e , and the 'sensitive issues'
a m e n d m e n t s were all added to the previously existing arsenal of powers:
to issue e m e r g e n c y decrees; to suspend state constitutions; to allocate
federal revenues to states, all of which had b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t on federal
f u n d s because of i n a d e q u a t e state taxing p o w e r s ; to allocate extensive
p a t r o n a g e in r e t u r n for political s u p p o r t a n d d e f e r e n c e ; a n d finally, to
e.xercise the executive prerogative u n d e r the Internal Security Act ( I S A )
to detain any person w h o might create public unrest or w h o might
16 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

b e c o m e a "threat to internal securiiy'. Although Parliament was reinsti-

t u t e d , with the g o v e r n m e n t d e p e n d e n t on hs continuing s u p p o r t . Parlia-
ment had always played a passive role in matters of executive restraint
and oversight. T h e s e changes merely confirmed executive d o m i n a n c e .
T h e post-crisis government of Malaysia had greatly enhanced powers as a
result of the package of policies and institutional changes that h a d been
part of the recovery' strategy f r o m the May T h i r t e e n t h Crisis. Not only
did the government enjoy these new legal powers, it also had the
extensive resources of a large and elTective ci\'il service, a powerful a n d
well-disciphncd military, and a weakened, but still extensive, party system
that could mobilize sufficient public s u p p o r t to sustain a parliamentary
government.
W i t h the resources derived f r o m a fairly buoyant cconcimy, the govern-
ment had the capacity to forge m a j o r changes in Malaysian society, and
in the e c o n o m y . T h e s e powers also were sulficient to reshape the political
e n v i r o n m e n t so as to avoid some of the more intractable conflicts of the
first decade and a half of Malaysia's existence as an i n d e p e n d e n t state.
T h e resources and the opportunities were e n o r m o u s . T h e new a d m i n i s -
tration had not only formulated the policies appropriate for the r e t u r n to
parliamentar\' civil g o v e r n m e n t , but it also had the resources—political
a n d economic—that were required to rebuild its base of political s u p p o r t
w h i c h had become eroded d u r i n g the 1969 crisis.
THK METAMORPHOSIS 17
18 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION
 36
The Abdul Razak Administration

THE retirement of Tunku Abdul Rahman in September 1970 marked the

end of an era. Although there was no immediate break in leadership and
no succession crisis, the event marked a fairly rapid transition of power
from those elites who had fought the battles for independence and for the
formation of the Malaysian Federation lo newer elites who were more
interested in a new agenda of public policy and styles of leadership.
Although not immediately apparent at the time, the succession to power
of T u n Abdul Razak ushered in a new era of the 'second generation' of
Malaysian pohtical elites. This chapter will first explore some of the
personnel change? of the new regime and then proceed to examine those
policies and political strategies it employed to reconstruct a base of
political suppon that had been fractured by the crisis of 1969.

Tun Abdul Razak's Background and Leadership

The political style of Tun Abdul Razak was not that of a charismatic
leader. Instead, he was noted for being an efficient and hard-working
bureaucrat. He had the advanugc of Malay aristocratic origins, since his
father had been one of the four major chieftains of Pahang. As such, he
attended the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar and upon graduation joined
the Malay Administrative Service in 1939. After the war. he studied law
in England and became active in politics, serving first as Secretary and
later as President of the Malay Society in London. Upon his return to
Malaya, he was appointed State Secretary of Pahang in 1950; later, in
1951, he was appointed to the Federal Legislative Council. Being active
in U M N O , he was elected President of UMNO Youth in 1950. Following
his election to the Federal Legislative Council in 1955, he became
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. By 1959 he headed the
Ministry of National and Rural Development, where he attempted to
utilize some of the administrative techniques developed in the war against
the Communist guerrillas for the implementation of rural development
projects. Earlier, in 1955, he had been Chairman of the Special Committee
on Education which had produced the Razak Report, so his responsibil-
ities had focused on issues crucial to the Malays. His approach had been
to mobilize administrative resources to accomplish well-defined objectives
in issue areas that were deemed to be politically sensitive. T u n Razak's
20 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

reputation for administrative efficiency a n d low-key problem-solving was

one of the reasons that he emerged as Director of the National O p e r a t i o n s
Council afier the M a y T h i r t e e n t h riots. 1 As T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n ' s
political s u p p o r t and power eroded following the May 1969 crisis, it was
only a matter of time before T u n Razak became Prime Minister, an event
which occurred formally on 21 S e p t e m b e r 1970. 2
T u n Razak's reputation as an efficient a n d capable administrator was
matched by his dedication to the cause of improving the economic
condition of the Malays. His years f r o m 1959 to 1969 as Minister of
National a n d Rural D e v e l o p m e n t had been a period of building up the
udministrative infrastructure to implement new p r o g r a m m e s of assistance
to Malays, especially in the rural areas. His concern to weed out the
inefficient, lethargic, and corrupt had brought about a new sense of
p u r p o s e in that ministry. Similarly, as D e p u t y Prime Minister a n d while
he was Minister of Defence, he had also earned a reputation for being
tough and capable of action, especially w h e n civil o r d e r and national
security were threatened. T h i s reputation was merely strengthened after
he became Director of the National O p e r a t i o n s Council in the wake of
the M a y T h i r t e e n t h riots.
F o r a v a n e t y of reasons. T u n Razak was viewed as being m o r e
solicitous of Malay interests and concerns than those of the non-Malays.
A l t h o u g h he had been a loyal s u p p o r t e r of T u n k u . \ b d u l R a h m a n f r o m
the early days of U M N O , he had subtly distanced himself f r o m his
m e n t o r as the T u n k u ' s popularity waned among m a n y Malay intellectuals
a n d among the m o r e chauvinist rural Malays. M a n y non-Malays w e r e ,
therefore, suspicious, if not openly fearful, that the regime of A b d u l
Razak would m a k e an a b r u p t break with ihe past and put into motion a
scries of policy initiatives drastically upsetting the spirit of inter-ethnic
bargaining and a c c o m m o d a t i o n that had characterized the era of T u n k u
A b d u l R a h m a n . Similarly, there was fear a m o n g m a n y intellectuals that
liberal democratic institutions would be a b a n d o n e d in a m o v e tow-ard an
authoritarian regime. Even though T u n Razak was u n d e r great p r e s s u r e
f r o m Malay chauv-inists and f r o m those, such as Ghazali bin Shafie, w h o
openly attacked ' W e s t m i n s t e r D e m o c r a c y ' as being i n a p p r o p r i a t e for
Malaysia, he acted with caution to bring about changes that m a d e
incremental m o v e s in the direction of m o r e pro-Malay policies a n d m o r e
restrictions on the operaiion of liberal democratic processes. Yet, in
fairness, he m a d e the m o v e s in such a w-ay as to avoid m a j o r public
outcries f r o m the non-Malay constituencies.

In contrast to the previous e r a , T u n Razak's administration was based

on the assumption that U M N O w-as to provide the mass base of political
s u p p o r t for the g o v e r n m e n t . U M N O was t o b e , m u c h m o r e than before,
the foundation for the political system, while all o t h e r parties in coalition
to the g o v e r n m e n t were to provide peripheral s u p p o r t a n d also gain
peripheral advantage f r o m that s u p p o r t . T h e notion of balanced inter-
ethnic negotiations and distribution of benefits had been e r o d i n g for
years. W i t h T u n Razak at the h e l m , the pre-eminent position of U M N O
a n d of ihc .Malays it represented was no longer cloudcd by polite political
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 21

fictions. W h e n the National Operations Council was dissolved a n d

parliamentary rule was restored, the new Cabinet c o n t i n u e d the p a t t e r n
of Malay political h e g e m o n y that had been asserted so decisively u n d e r
the National O p e r a t i o n s Council, on which the c o m m u n a l representation
had been 7 Malays, 1 Chinese, a n d 1 Indian. W h e n the Razak C a b i n e t
w a s f o r m e d , all the key cabinet posts were held by Malays f r o m U M N O
except for the Minister of Finance, w h o was T a n Siew Sin, Presideni of
the Malaysian Chinese Association. T h e constituent non-Malay parties in
the ruling coalition were given a n u m b e r of deputy ministerial positions
m the new Cabinet, which merely tended to reinforce the principle of
Malay political h e g e m o n y .
Another distinctive feature of the Razak Administration was the
repudiation of m a n y of the 'Old G u a r d ' loyalists, w h o had been pillars of
s u p p o r t for T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n . T u n Razak was not only seeking to
infuse new blood into the administration, but also was careful to use
patronage to strengthen his control over the government and over
U M N O . T h e moves against the U A \ N O "Old G u a r d ' were m a d e gradually
a n d without open conflict so as to preserve the continuity with t h e
p r e v i o u s a d m i m s t r a t i o n . Senu Abdul R a h m a n , Minister of I n f o r m a t i o n
a n d B r o a d c a s t m g , had lost his seat in the 1969 e l e a i o n , w h e r e u p o n he
resigned as leader of U M N O Y o u t h . Although he later w o n a seat in
Parliament in the 1974 election, he never returned to a cabinet position.
Likewise, K h i r Johari, a n o t h e r T u n k u stalwart, lost his post as Vice-
President of U M N O in 1971, a n d was sent as Ambassador to the United
Slates, which effectively removed him from active political life. Similarly,
a n u m b e r of o t h e r p r o m i n e n t Malay politicians were gradually eased f r o m
key positions by stages^ so that new faces could be b r o u g h t into the inner
circles of g o v e r n m e n t .

T h e new people brought into the Cabinet provide some indication of

t h e policy objectives of T u n Razak. Initially, the three most p o w e r f u l
m e n w e r e T u n R a z a k , D r Ismail bin Abdul R a h m a n , a n d Ghazali Shafie.
T u n Razak held the posts of P r i m e Minister, .Minister of D e f e n c c , a n d
Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr Ismail bccame D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
Minister of H o m e Affairs, a n d Minister of T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y ; a n d
Ghazali Shafie was m a d e Minister with Special Functions a n d Minister of
I n f o r m a i i o n . W i t h i n U M N O , T u n Razak w a s elected President a n d
Dr Ismail was elected D e p u t y President. T h e elections alsoelevated militant
Malay c o m m u n a l s p o k e s m e n to important posts as Vice-Presidcnts a n d on
t h e C e n t r a l Executive Council. 4 Perhaps in response to these develop-
m e n t s within U M N O , T u n Razak m a d e moves t o bring into g o v e r n m e n t
a n u m b e r of Malay politicians w h o had earlier been noted for their
criticisms of government and their vigorous espousal of Malay interests,
' l l i e t h r e e most p r o m i n e n t of the rising new-style Malay politicians were
H u s s e i n O n n , D r M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d , and M u s a H i t a m — t h e latter two
having been expelled f r o m U M N O on the initiative of T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n in 1969 for violating party discipline.

As the son of D a i o O n n Ja'afar, the f o u n d e r of U M N O , Hussein O n n

had avoided close association with the Alliance government d u r i n g the
22 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

period when Tunku A b d u l R a h m a n was Prime Minister. Hussein O n n

was nominated as an U M N O candidate, h o w e v e r , and elected to Parlia-
ment in the 1969 election. In 1971 he won a seat on the U M N O S u p r e m e
Council, where u p o n T u n Razak apptiinted him to the sensitive cabinet
position of Minister of Education. D u r i n g his earlier years of affiliation
with Party N e g a r a , Hussein O n n had earned a reputation for being a
vigorous spokesman for .Malay interests. T h e congruent views and
political style of Hussein O n n and Abdul Razak provided the basis for
their close political affiliation, which was f u r t h e r strengthened by family
ties, since the t w o were brothers-in-law. W h e n Hussein O n n was given
responsibility for the portfolio of Hducation, his predecessor, .Abdul
R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b , had initiati-d the p r o g r a m m e to convert the entire
education system to the Malay m e d i u m of instruction. W i t h Hussein O n n
as ihe new Minister of Education, it soon became apparent that this
policy was to be i m p l e m e n t e d with a new sense of urgency.
In August 1973 the D e p u t y Prime M i m s t e r . Dr Ismail, died s u d d e n l y
of a heart attack. P r i m e .Mmister Abdul Razak appointed Hussein O n n as
D e p u t y P r i m e Minister, but Dr Ismail's double portfolios were divided
between Hussein O n n , w h o acquired H o m e Affairs, and Ghazali Shafie,
w h o became Minister of T r a d e a n d Industry. This m i d - t e r m cabinet
shufrtc t h u s confirmed Hussein O n n as the second most powerful person
in the government and the most logical successor to Abdul Razak.. 5
Both Dr M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d and M u s a H i t a m had been active in the
second echelon of U M N O leaders in the period of the 1960s. T h e y were
both k n o w n for taking niiher militant pro-Malay positions on c o m m u n a l
issues, and therefore were regarded by some as ' u h r a s ' . In 1969
Dr .Mahathir was an Alliancc back-bencher in Parliament, a n d M u s a
H i t a m was .Assistant .Mimster to the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak.
After the .May T h i n e e n t h riots. Dr .Mahathir h a d sent the highly critical
letter to T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n q u o t e d m C h a p t e r 1, accusing him of
always giving in to Chinese d e m a n d s and calling u p o n the T u n k u to
retire as Prime Minister and as President of U.MNO. T h e letter was also
leaked to the press, just at the time w h e n there were d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and
riots in Kuala L u m p u r in the aftermath of the m o r e serious May
T h i r t e e n t h disorders, Both Dr Mahathir and M u s a H i t a m w e r e accused
of ' d o u b t f u l loyalty' and violation of cabinet responsibility by T u n k u
Abdul R a h m a n : they were expelled from the g o v e r n m e n t a n d f r o m
U M N O . M u s a Hitam was given a one-year ' s t u d y leave' to go to
E n g l a n d , where he entered Sussex University a n d gained an MA d e g r e e
in International Relations. Dr .Mahathir r e t u r n e d to his medical practice
in K e d a h . but remained acuve in U M N O politics n o n e the less. He used
t h e time out of active politics lo write his controversial b o o k . The Malay
Dilemma. which was p r o m p t l y b a n n e d as contravening the 'sensitive
issues' provisions of the Sedition Act.

In 1970 Musa H i t a m r e t u r n e d from his political exile in England a n d

o n c e again entered active U M N O politics. W i t h i n a short time he had
been elected D e p u t y C h a i r m a n of U . M N O Y o u t h . By 1971 he was
a p p o i n t e d C h a i r m a n of the Federal Land D e v e l o p m e n t A u t h o r i t y
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 23

( F E L D A ) , a n d by J a n u a r y 1973 he was appointed D e p u t y Minister of

T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y . F r o m this position, he was later able to e n t e r t h e
irmer councils of the government in the latter days of the Razak regime. 6
By 1972 Dr Mahathir had also been m a k i n g a political come-back.
In that year he had been elected to the U M N O S u p r e m e C o u n c i l .
Followuig that election, T u n Razak named him Minister of Education at
the time that Hussein O n n was promoted to D e p u t y Prime Minister.
T u n Razak revealed by these a p p o i n t m e n t s that those w h o were commit-
ted to an activist role for the government acting for the betterment of the
Malays would be given p r i m e responsibility for important sectors of
g o v e r n m e n t administration. His a p p o i n t m e n t s also were interpreted as a
sign that T u n Razak gave high priority to winning the s u p p o n of Malay
intellectuals w h o had become increasingly disillusioned by both the
policies and the leadership style of T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n .

T h e N e w E c o n o m i c Policy

By the time that parliamentary g o v e m m e n t was restored in F e b r u a r y

1971. the corner-stone of social a n d economic policy for the post-crisis
period had already been laid. By t h e n , what remained was to c o m p l e t e
the edifice according to the blueprint that had been dratted by the
National O p e r a t i o n s Council and had been relincd after discussions in
the National Consultative Council. T h e basic policy objectives a n d
strategies were contained in a government White Paper entitled Towards
National H a r m o n y . 7 which o u t l m e d the condiuons for the end of the
e m e r g e n c y and for the restoration of Parliament.
W h e r e a s the earber r c p o n s on the May 1969 riots had stressed political
a n d psychological factors c o n t n b u t i n g to the conflict, ihis r e p o n and the
p u b l i c c o m m e n i s of government leaders emphasized economic causes:
they cued the failure of earlier economic policies to address the relative
deprivation of the Malays in c o m p a n s o n to non-Malays as being the
underlying root cause of the crisis. Such an explanation for pohtical
violence was then very popular a m o n g social scientists, so it seemed both
sophisticated and i n f o r m e d . Yet, in the Malaysian case, no new evidence
or research by i n d e p e n d e n t scholars was presented to confirm or r e f u t e
the revised explanations. Instead, t h e o n e s of violence attributed to
"relative depnvation" were used to justify a sci of policies that could just
as easily have been s u p p o r t e d without reference to the racial riots of
1969. A r m e d with this reassessment of the causes of the .May T h i r t e e n t h
Crisis, the g o v e r n m e n t formulated a set of economic strategies a n d policy-
goals w h i c h proposed to e n s u r e that .Malays gained an i m p r o v e d share of
t h e c o u n t r y ' s wealth as well as m o r e equitable access to jobs a n d positions
of influence in the m o r e m o d e m and dynamic sectors of the e c o n o m y .
Identified as the N e w Economic Policy ( N E P ) , it bccame even m o r e
i m p o r t a n t than the R u k u n e g a r a , since the N E P became the foundation of
a n d the yardstick for all economic a n d social policy as projected at least
u n u l 1990. T h e basic objectives a n d goals of the N E P w e r e set out in the
Second Malaysia P l a n , which was presented to Parliament on 11 July 1971:
24 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

ThE Plan incorporates a two-prongcd New Economic Policy for development.

The first prong is in reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raismg income
levels and increasing employmeni opponunitics for all Malaysians, irrespective of
race. The second prong aims ai accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian
society 10 correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate
the identification of race wiih economic function. This process involves the
modernisation of rural lives, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and
the creation of a Malay commercial and indusirial cu mm unity in all categories
and at all levels of operation, so that Malays and oiher indigenous people will
become full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation. The New
Economic Policy is based upon a rapidly expanding economy which offers
increasing opponunities for all Malaysians. as well as additional resources for
development. Thus in the iniplemcnution of ihe Policy, the Government will
ensure that no particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense of
deprivation.'

Identified as the first objective. the eradication of poverty was to be

p u r s u e d t h r o u g h policies of economic grownh and d e v e l o p m e n t that
w o u l d benefit all Malaysians regardless of race. T h e r e was no indication,
h o w e v e r , that "the p o o r ' , identified solely by e c o n o m i c criteria, were to
be targeted for special remedial p r o g r a m m e s , although concern for
p o v c n y alleviation was an important c o m p o n e n t of overall strategies of
economic g r o w t h . The second objective of the N E P . that of 'restructuring
Malaysian society", was to c o m m a n d the m a j o r effort of the g o v e r n m e n t ,
with the Malays and o t h e r indigenous peoples as the targeted benefi-
ciaries. Because Malaysian society tended to be c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d with
certain ethnic g r o u p s usually dominating various economic f u n c t i o n s a n d
professions, the sccond objecuve of the N E P was to formulate a new
system of quotas and M a b y special rights. These were to e n s u r e that
Malays gained privileged access to e d u c a t i o n , to better paying jobs, to the
professions, and to m a n a g e m e n t positions; they were also to secure a
stake in the e c o n o m y t h r o u g h investments in m o r e profitable commercial
and i n d u s t n a l c n t e r p n s c s . In theory, ethnic m o n o p o l i e s in f u n c t i o n a l -
e c o n o m i c c o m p a r t m e n t s would be e n d e d and replaced by ethnically
balanced and proportionately allocated advantages.

In presenting the N E P to the non-Malays, the P r i m e Minister explained

that these policies designed to "restructure Malaysian society' were
necessary to assure inter-ethnic peace as well as social justice. To those
w h o feared that it might involve e x p r o p n a t i o n of non-Malay wealth a n d
occupations, he promised that the expansion of Malay pnvilegcs a n d
q u o t a s would not involve the e.xpropriation of property or loss of jobs for
non-Malays. He e x p l a m e d : "What is envisioned by the G o v e r n m e n t is
that the newly created o p p o r t u n i t i e s will be distributed in a just a n d
equitable manner,"''
Besides the promise of a new range of policies to improve the e c o n o m i c
position of the Malays, the N E P also established specific goals to be
achieved over the next two decades. The government a r m o u n c e d its goal
of achieving 30 per cent Malay o w n e r s h i p a n d p a n i d p a t i o n in all
i n d u s i n a l a n d c o m m e r c i a l a c m i u e s b y 1990. T h e a r g u m e n t was m a d e
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 25

that these ' r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' objectives were necessary to create a 'just

society' so as to d a m p e n ethnic hostilities and create 'national h a r m o n y ' .
It should be noted that 'justice' and 'equality' were defined not in t e r m s
of overall p a t t e r n s of distribution of wealth or t h r o u g h fostering individual
equality of o p p o n u n i t y , but rather on the basis of the aggregate distri-
bution between e t h n i c communities of wealth, jobs, and economic p o w e r .
T h i s concept of the N E P was promoted with the slogan 'Masyarakat Adil'
(A J u s t Society),'" which was treated in government p r o n o u n c e m e n t s
with the same ideological mystique that had been accorded to the
Rukunegara.
U n d e r the N H P , the government formulated a series of five-year plans
that stressed both economic growih and the redistribution of economic
o p p o n u n i t i e s to Malays. T h e economic growih objectives were p u r s u e d
t h r o u g h p r o m o t i n g both domestic and foreign investment u n d e r close
supervision of the government and usually through joint-stock arrange-
m e n t s between foreign and local investors. T h e government also f o u n d e d
quasi-public corporations to provide the Malaysian c o m p o n e n t for m a n y
of such joint-stock a r r a n g e m e n t s with foreign corporate investors. By
vigorous and sophisticated pursuit of these economic growth strategies,
the Razak Administration and its successors were able to sustain the
Malaysian e c o n o m y with high levels of growth for most of the t w o
dccades after the inauguration of the N E P .
T h e ' r e s t r u c t u r i n g of society" objectives involved a n o t h e r set of pro-
g r a m m e s and institutions, which were viable only so long as the e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h rate was strong enough to sustain the costs and dislocations of
redistributive policies. Even in colonial times, government policy had
always h a d s o m e f o r m of 'special rights" for Malays. T h e s e h a d been in
the f o r m of Malay land rights, government support for Malay education,
favourable q u o t a s for recruitment to the civil service, and q u o t a s for
c e n a i n kinds of business licences. Such Malay 'special rights' had been
protected in the Constitution and had been gradually expanded in
g o v e r n m e n t policy since i n d e p e n d e n c e . " N o w , however, a new range of
p r o g r a m m e s w e r e to be devised to assure that Malays gained access to all
sectors of the c c o n o m y and acquired a more equitable share of the wealth
of the c o u n t r y .
The l a u n c h i n g of the N E P was accompanied by the release of im-
pressive statistics to reveal how far the Malays lagged b e h i n d non-Malays
in various sectors of the economy and m the ownership of share capital.
W i t h the target goals in m i n d , government policy-makers were hard
pressed to devise an ever-expanding set of p r o g r a m m e s to achieve the
ethnic r e s t r u c t u r i n g goals of the N E P . Most of the p r o g r a m m e s that w e r e
designed to i m p l e m e n t the N E P involved the extension of Malay or
Malay/Bumiputra quotas for government e m p l o y m e n t , for education,
a n d for application to the private sector of the economy. O v e r t i m e , the
regulations a n d q u o t a s became very elaborate and were s u b j e a to periodic
revision. T h e N E P also involved a great i n a e a s e in the formation of
quasi-public bodies and government agencies that were charged with
providing special assistance p r o g r a m m e s for Malays or that acted as
26 MALAYSIAN- POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

s u r r o g a t e msiitutions for the transfer of capital shares a n d o w n e r s h i p to

Malays. T h e m a i n areas of assistance for the economic transformation of
the Malays were in the public services. in e d u c a t i o n , a n d t h r o u g h
economic preferences applied lo private sector e m p l o y m e n t , corporate
m a n a g e m e n t , and o w n e r s h i p of share capital.
Prior to the N E P , the elite Malayan Civil Service recruited four .Malays
for each n o n - M a l a y . but no q u o t a s applied to the professional and
lechnical services or to lower-level civil servants. T h u s , after inde-
p e n d e n c e , Malays d o m i n a t e d the policy-making superscale posts a n d the
non-Malays tended to p r e d o n u n a t e in the professional services a n d at the
lower levels w h e r e q u o t a s were noi applied. After the N E P , the formal
Malay quota of 4 : 1 was c o n t i n u e d and applied to the new u n i h c d
Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service. In actual hiring, how-
ever. between 1969 and 1973, 98 per cent of all persons recruited for
governmeni service were Malays, if the a r m e d forces were also i n c l u d e d ,
the figure fur Malay rccruits would increase to 99 per cent. 12 T h e hiring
pattern lor public services had clearly far exceeded the formal 4 : 1
Malay q u o t a for the elite ranks of the civil service and for the military
In matters of e d u a i t i o n . conversion in Malay as the sole m e d i u m of
m s l r u c i i o n had aided ihc educational p e r f o r m a n c e of Malays a n d enabled
t h e m to gain greater acccss to higher education. In addition, they e n j o v c d
favourable quotas for admission a n d received generous g o v e r n m e n t
s t i p e n d s , also with favourable quoias. W i t h the N H P . investment in higher
e d u c a t i o n expanded from M $ 2 5 . 8 million in 1969 to M $ 3 5 0 . 8 million in
1980. the n u m b e r of universities was increased f r o m one to six, and
expenditure per student rose from M$3,700 to M $ 1 2 . 9 0 0 . " T w o of the
n e w universities were designed to eater almost exclusively to Malay or
Muslim s t u d e n t s , and all higher insuiutions utilized various admission
q u o t a s favouring .Malays. By 1980, .Malaysian universities h a d a Malay
s t u d e n t b o d y of between 65 per cent and 90 per cent. For example, the
n u m b e r of Malay s t u d e n t s at the University of Malaya rose f r o m 49.7 p e r
ceni to 66,4 p e r c e n t between 1970 and 1979.14 After 1970, the q u o t a s for
admission were extended to specific fields a n d courses of study in which
Malay represeniaiion was low. In a d d i t i o n , special training a n d remedial
course"; were established to assist Malavs in m a k i n g up tor deficiencies
and thus enable t h e m to acquire higher degrees in professional and
m a n a g e m e n t subiects. G o v e r n m e n t bursaries to finance higher education
w e r e m a d e available to all qualified Malays, while only a few bursaries
w e r e rescerved fur nun-Malays. In a d d i t i o n , large n u m b e r s of g o v e r n m e n t
scholarships were m a d e available for advanced study a b r o a d , with over
90 per cent of these foreign study scholarships being a w a r d e d to Malays.
By contrast, most non-Malays w h o s t u d i e d abroad had to do so on their
o w n resources. By 1982 there were 50,000 Malaysian s t u d e n t s p u r s u i n g
e d u c a t i o n a b r o a d , mostly in E n g l a n d . N o r t h America, or Australia.
with almost all the overseas .Malay s t u d e n t s fully f u n d e d by the govern-
m e n t . .All these p r o g r a m m e s of assistance to the Malays wore p l a n n e d as
p a n o f t h e overall N E P strategy.

P r i o r to 1969, the system of .Malay privileges a n d preferences had

 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 27

applied to land laws, government e m p l o y m e n t , a n d distribution of

government services. W i t h the 'restructuring" u r g c t s of the N E P , how-
ever, such preferences were extended to the private sector. C o m m e r c i a l
a n d industrial enterprises were required to establish plans for e m p l o y i n g ,
training, a n d p r o m o t i n g Malays at ail levels of operations. F o r foreign
firms, the terms were m a d e a condition for the licensing and the tax
concessions available lo 'infant' industries. Local businesses were also
covered u n d e r special regulations and by terms of g o v e r n m e n t contracts
a n d licences. T h e quotas were adjusted to suit local conditions a n d
m d u s t r y r e q u i r e m e n t s . F o r larger industries, the Malay e m p l o y m e n t
q u o t a s w e r e usually set at 40 per cent, b u t the figure was raised w h e n the
i n d u s t r y w a s sited near larger concentrations of Malay s e t t l e m e n t . " '
To facilitate a rapid increase of Malay ownership and control of the
e c o n o m y as promised by the N E P . the government formed public
c o r p o r a t i o n s , k n o w n as B u m i p u t r a trust agencies, to buy corporate
shares and to acquire control of industries and enterprises on behalf of
Malays. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n foreign corporations operated in Malaysia or
engaged in joint-stock agreements with local private or g o v e r n m e n t
c o r p o r a t i o n s , the agreements usually specified a quota of stock issues to
be reserved for sale to Malays or to Bumiputra trust agencies.'' T h e s e
piilicy m e c h a n i s m s were designed lo increase Malay share capital to the
target figure of 30 per cent by the year 1990 from its pitifully low level of
1.5 per cent in 1969.
T h e impact of the N E P extended to all aspects of economic planning
a n d to all d e p a r t m e n t s a n d agencies of government. M a n y new agcncies
a n d g o v e r n m e n t - f u n d e d quasi-public corporations were created specif-
ically to assist the economic advancement of the Malays and indigenous
peoples. All g o v e r n m e n t agencies and corporations were evaluated, m o n -
stored, and reviewed against the overall N E P strategy and target goals
p r o m i s e d for the year 1990.
As a guide-line for all government operations, the N E P continued to
have a p r o f o u n d effcct on all public policies for a period of two decades,
gradually t r a n s f o r m i n g the Malaysian social, economic, and political
landscape. In ihe longer t e r m , the N E P p r o d u c e d results that were
intended a n d predicted; as well, it generated some conscquences that
w e r e both unanticipated and u n i n t e n d e d . T h e s e long-term changes will
be examined in later chapters.

T h e Barisan Nasional Coalition

T h e renewed e m p h a s i s u p o n Malay rights and privileges a n d u p o n Malay

e c o n o m i c b e t t e r m e n t was matched by a renewed effort to build a w i d e r
a n d m o r e stable basis of political s u p p o n for the g o v e r n m e n t in the
pursuit of its goals. Political stability was viewed primarily in terms of the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b r o a d e r political coalition a n d the forging of a m o r e
effective ideological consensus to u n d e r p i n the g o v e r n m e n t ' s coalition.
In 1970 the Alliance g o v e r n m e n l enjoyed a c o m m a n d i n g majority of
93 scats in P a d i a m e n t to ihe combined opposition's 51 seats. At lower
28 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

levels of government, the opposition controlled only three states, P e n a n g ,

P e r a k , and K e l a n t a n , and two municipahties, Georgetown in P e n a n g a n d
Ipoh in P e r a k . Even so, T u n Razak viewed the opposition as a destabil-
izing element threatening the d e v e l o p m e n t plans of the Federal Govern-
m e n t . Potentially opposition s u p p o n could grow. B u t , even m o r e serious,
the opposition had the capacity for political mobilization over "sensitive
issues' a n d such 'politicking' was viewed as a threat to national unity a n d
to the e f f o n by ihe government to r e d u c e e t h n i c conflict a n d mobilize
national e f l o n s for the goals of the N E P . As a result, a m a j o r e f f o n w a s
n u d e to incorporate the more a c c o m m o d a t i n g of the opposition p a n i e s
i n t o a broader coalition. In this w a y , c n t i c i s m could be channelled and
contained within the structure of intra-coalition discussions and bargain-
ing, without involvement of public mobilization and acrimonious public
debate.
T h e pattern of federal involvement began with coalition-building at the
Slate level, but was rapidly extended to the federal level with a c o m b i n a -
tion of patronage and other inducements, To build a wider political
s u p p o n base and create a national political consensus became a m a j o r
p r e o c c u p a t i o n of the Razak Administration, T h e R u k u n e g a r a ideology
a n d the 'sensitive issues' a m e n d m e n t s to the Cxinsiitution had changed
s o m e of the g r o t m d rules of politics, while the e n h a n c e d p o w e r s of the
F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t m a d e it possible to apply both greater r e w a r d s for
co-tipcration and greater penalties for defiance. Ultimately, h o w e v e r , the
creation of a broader-based coalition d e p e n d e d on the political skills of
P r i m e Minister A b d u l Razak and his closest associates.
T h e first stages in the creation of a wider coalition can be identified
d u r i n g the rescheduled elections of J u n e 1970 in the two Borneo states of
Sabah and Sarawak. In S a b a h , all p a n i e s had either b e c o m e affiliated
with the Alliance or had dissolved u n d e r the combined p r e s s u r e of
federal authorities and an autocratic Chief M i n i s t e r , T u n .Mustapha
H a r u n . w h o headed the United Sabah National Organization. Because
the latter party had earlier absorbed the largest opposition p a n y , the
United Pasok M o m o g u n Kadazan Organization, in 1967, the only re-
maining task was to find a formula for the participation in the state
g o v e r n m e n t of the m u c h smaller Sabah C h i n e s e Association. W i t h only
one tate of candidates and no opposition, the Sabah Alliancc swept to
an easy victory in an election in which candidates were p r e v e n t e d from
m a k i n g public appeals a n d the foreign press w a s b a n n e d f r o m the state
d u r i n g the 'campaign'. 1 8

D u r i n g the same election in Sarawak, the p r o b l e m of building a

coalition acceptable to the federal authorities was m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d .
Five p a n i c s openly vied for public s u p p o r t , and even within the Alliance,
m e m b e r parties could not agree on the distribution of seats. T h e Iban-
based P a n y Pesaka Anak Sarawak, while nominally retaining its m c m -
b e n h i p in the Alliance, decided to contest on its o w n . t h u s leaving Party
B u m i p u t e r a and the Sarawak Chinese Association as the only parties
agreeing to a c o m m o n slate u n d e r the Alliance b a n n e r . 1 9 W i t h i n S a r a w a k ,
t h e opposition included the Iban-dominated Sarawak National Party
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 29

( S N A P ) a n d ihe Chinese-dominaied and 'leftist' Sarawak United People's

Party ( S U P P ) . W h e n the votes were c o u n t e d , the Sarawak Alliance had
w o n only 10 of the 24 parliamentary seats at stake a n d had failed to gain a
majority in the Legislative A s s e m b l y . " Anticipating possible instability
a n d t u r m o i l . Prime Minister Abdul Razak initiated negotiations to forge a
n e w federally backed coalition to be led by the designated Chief M i n i s t e r ,
A b d u l R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b , the leader of the Malay-dominated Party B u m i -
putera and the Minister of Education in the Federal Cabinet. First, the
I n d e p e n d e n t was persuaded to join Party Pesaka to give the Alliance a
majority in the State Assembly. W i t h the active intervention of federal
officials, a coalition agreement was worked out which included t h e
Chinese-based Sarawak United People's Party, but in a coalition built
a r o u n d the Malay-based Party B u m i p u t e r a . T h e weakest Iban p a n y .
Party Pesaka, was also included, but the m o r e militant Iban-based p a r t y ,
S N A P , was excluded f r o m any coaliuon even though it had w o n a
plurality of the votes. T h e latter was viewed as being too militant on s o m e
e t h n i c and stales' rights issues in conflict with federal authorities."'
After Parliament was r e s u m e d and the matter of a new m a n d a t e
b e c a m e crucial, the question of extending the political base of the g o v e m -
m e n i in Peninsular .Malaysia b e c a m e more urgent. As a first step, P r i m e
Minister A b d u l Razak held secret meetings with Dr Lim C h o n g E u , w h o
was the leader uf G e r a k a n — t h e party that controlled the P e n a n g state
g o v e r n m e n t . U n d e r terms of a coalition agreement, the Alliancc w o u l d
share in the P e n a n g state government a n d Gerakan w o u l d b e c o m e an
Alliance partner at the federal level. 22 Because of factional f e u d i n g within
G e r a k a n . partly as a result of the coalition a r r a n g e m e n t with the Alliance,
the party split. T h e anti-coalition faction resigned f r o m Gerakan and later
formed a rival party called P a n i Keadilan .Masyarakat Malaysia (Social
Justice Party), better k n o w n by the acronym ' P e k e m a s ' . T h i s new p a n y
w a s led in Parliament by Dr T a n C h e e K h o o n a n d was sponsored by
Professor Syed Hussein Alatas in a show of interracial co-operation.
P e k e m a s promised to act as a responsible opposition critic of the g o v e m -
m e n i , stressing social issues and a ' n o n - c o m m u n a l ' approach to p o l i t i c s . "
T w o m o n t h s after the coalition agreement was m a d e bringing G e r a k a n
into the Alliance fold, a similar agreement was negotiated with the
People's Progressive P a n y ( P P P ) , which controlled the town council of
I p o h a n d enjoyed substantial Chinese and Indian s u p p o n i n P e r a k . T h e
latter agreement b r o u g h t the P P P into the P e r a k stale Alliance s t r u c t u r e
in the first p h a s e , but was later extended to the federal level involving the
f o u r P P P M e m b e r s o f Parliament.-'''
T h e incorporation of Gerakan and the P P P into the Alliance coalition
involved a strengthening of s u p p o r t from non-Malay constituencies. To
e x p a n d the s u p p o n base of Malay voters required s o m e a c c o m m o d a t i o n
with the f o r m i d a b l e Malay-based Partai Islam, w h i c h controlled the
Kelantan state g o v e r n m e n t and had large representation in T r e n g g a n u
a n d K e d a h . Negotiations to bring P A S within the Alliance coalition
s t r u c t u r e c o n t i n u e d for several m o n t h s before P r i m e Minister A b d u l
Razak and P A S President M o h a m e d Asri H a j i M u d a agreed to terms of
30 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

coalition. W i t h i n P A S . the agrecmcni created strong divisions and w a s

o p p o s e d by a militant a n d u n c o m p r o m i s i n g faction. At the PAS a n n u a l
c o n f e r e n c e , the terms of affiliation with the Alliance were finally a p p r o v e d
by 3 vote of 190 in favour, 94 o p p o s e d , and 19 abstentions. 2 5
All these coalition agreements, both in Sabah and Sarawak and in
Peninsular Malaysia, were ad hoc a r r a n g e m e n t s of limited d u r a t i o n until
the next election and they primarily involved patronage, joint representa-
tion on various government bodies and councils in r e t u r n for m u t u a l
political s u p p o r t . and a restriction on public criticism of the g o v e r n m e n t .
T h i s widening of the s u p p o n base of the government left the former
Alliance s t r u c t u r e in an a m b i g u o u s limbo. T h e new p a n n e r s in the
g o v e r n m e n t coalition were not m a d e m e m b e r s of the Alliance, but were
p r o m i s e d limited access to political decision-making. At first T u n Razak
referred to a new National F r o n t . In Malay, he used the title 'Barisan
Nasional'. What that meant in practical terms was at first unclear. W h a t
gradually e m e r g e d was the idea of forging a grand coalition that would
jointly contest the next election as a unified political force in s u p p o n of
the g o v e r n m e n t . Q u i t e naturally, both the s t r u c t u r e a n d the w o r k i n g
a g r e e m e n t s to m a k e the Barisan Nasional a reality involved long and
a r d u o u s behind-the-scenes discussions a m o n g all the diverse p a r t n e r s in
the new Barisan Nasional.

T h e old Alliance s t r u c t u r e was d i s b a n d e d but some of the practices

a n d experience of the Alliance structure were transferred to the new
Barisan Nasional organization. T h e h e a d q u a n e r s of the Alliance in the
U M N O Building in Kuala L u m p u r b e c a m e the h e a d q u a r t e r s of Barisan
Nasional. The Alliance electoral symbol of a sail-boat was a b a n d o n e d for
the new Barisan Nasional symbol, the dacing, the traditional b e a m scale,
symbolizing justice a n d equity. All the m e m b e r p a n i e s were represented
with three m e m b e r s on a Bansan Nasional S u p r e m e Council, with all
decisions being taken by u n a n i m o u s vote, except for matters of inter-
pretation of the rules a n d discipline. T h e first political rallies in s u p p o r t
of Barisan Nasional ( B N ) preceded the formal registration of the organ-
ization on 1 J u n e 1974. T h e selection of BN candidates was m a d e on
28 July with T u n Razak acting as final arbiter in the selection of the BN
slate. W i t h all the preparations in place, national e l e a i o n s w e r e finally
called for 24 August 1974,26

Although public appearances gave the impression of a unified a n d

dissension-free coalition, there had a a u a l l y been s h a r p rivalry a n d conflict
b e h i n d the scenes a m o n g m e m b e r p a n i c s . In p a r u c u l a r . the Malaysian
Chinese Association exhibited extreme apprehensiveness a b o u t the new
coalition, since by implication the MCA was no longer acknowledged as
the sole representative of C h m e s c interests in the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e
admission of G e r a k a n and the People's Progressive Party from Peninsular
Malaysia, along with the inclusion of the Sabah Chinese Association. a n d
the Sarawak Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n a n d S U P P f r o m S a r a w a k , e f f e a i v e l y
diluted the MCA claim. .After its poor s h o w m g m the 1969 election, it
w a s difficult for the M C A to d e f e n d its d e m a n d s that it be allocated all its
traditional seats in the next election. F u r t h e r m o r e , in 1972 a n d 1973 the
THE ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 31

M C A had suffered f r o m internal divisions caused by an aggressive g r o u p

of 'young bloods', w h o argued that the p a n y should be m o r e assertive in
representing and defending Chinese interests. T h i s faction had strong
grass-roots s u p p o n a m o n g Chinese in P e r a k , w h o in 1972 had formed an
MCA Perak Task Force to recruit new m e m b e r s in the expectation that
t h e M C A could be m a d e m o r e forceful in negotiations within the Alliance.
T h e escalation of pohtical militancy among those w h o recently joined
the M C A , inspired by the activities of the Perak T a s k F o r c e , created a
mator division between the 'old g u a r d ' w h o held the top leadership of the
party at both the state and federal levels and the ' y o u n g bloods' w h o had
p o p u l a r s u p p o n at the grass-roots level. Eventually, the M C A leadership,
u n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m U M N O and T u n Razak, invoked party discipline,
a n d in N o v e m b e r 1972 the M C A ordered the Perak T a s k Force to
d i s b a n d . T h e continued agitation of the militants u n d e r the leadership of
Dr Lim Keng Yaik created severe dissension within the M C A . Dr L i m
held the federal cabinet post created to deal with the p r o b l e m s of the new
villages and he utilized this position to build a power base a m o n g the
rural Chinese. Eventually. Dr Lim was forced to resign his cabinet post
a n d by J u n e 1973 he was expelled f r o m the M C A . w h e r e u p o n he and
m a n y of his s u p p o r t e r s joined Gerakan. 2 7 T h e s e divisions within the
M C A had weakened the party just at the time w h e n the Barisan Nasional
w a s c o m i n g into operation. F u n h e r m o r e , the severe application of party
discipline against the miltiant 'young bloods' had created a wave of resig-
n a u o n s that swelled the ranks of G e r a k a n — t h e long-time rival of the
MCA a n d the p a n y that most openly had challenged the legitimacy of the
leadership claims m a d e by the established M C A office-holders.

When the BN was in the process of being f o r m e d , the M C A vacil-

lated between several options: to o p p o s e the BN concept, to w i t h d r a w
from the g o v e r n m e n t , to refuse to join ihe BN coalition s t r u c t u r e , or to
join the BN and resist the e n c r o a c h m e n t of the other partners. Part of the
uncertainty was d u e to the fact that T a n Siew Sin retired in April 1974 as
President of the M C A after a p e n o d of illness and a lung operation. T h e
new .MCA President, Lee San C h o o n , took a while to consolidate his
position, A f t e r s o m e unceriamty about the response of the M C A to the
B N , he eventually confirmed thai the M C A would remain within t h e n e w
BN coalition. Although the M C A claimcd the 33 seats it had contested in
1969, it was given only 23 seats on the BN ticket, This allocation w a s still
h i g h e r than critics thought it should be, considering that in 1969 it h a d
lost 20 of the seats it contested.
T h e Malaysian Indian Congress had been plagued by internal strife for
years, a l t h o u g h its s u p p o r t for and role in the newly f o r m e d BN w e r e not
in d i s p u t e . R a i h c r , the M I C had been torn by factional d i s p u t e s a m o n g
the top leaders a n d their s u p p o r t e r s . M u c h of the strife was resolved
w h e n the M I C Presidency changed f r o m V . T . S a m b a n t h a n t o
V. Manickavasagam in J u n e 1979. T h e key issue for the M l C w a s the
relationship of the Indian leaders to the d o m i n a n t Malay political elites.
T h i s relationship remained in m u c h the same pattern after the formation
of the Barisan Nasional as it had earlier within the Alliance.
32 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

Of all ihe p a n i c s in Malaysia, U M N O gained ihe most f r o m the

f o r m a t i o n of the Barisan Nasional, Its pre-emineni role in Malaysian
politics was reinforced and m a d e a corner-stone for ihe coalition agree-
m e n t s for all the parties joining the BN coalition. U M N O d o m i n a i e d all
the i m p o n a n t cabinet positions and its President was, of course, also the
P r i m e Minister. T h e u n a n i m i t y principle in the voting on the S u p r e m e
Council concealed the pobtical reality that, in fact, the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , as
leader of U M N O a n d of the G o v e r n m e n t , controlled the disbursal of
p a t r o n a g e and other political benefiis thai provided the p r i m a r y induce-
ment for the co-operation of all the o t h e r coalition p a n n e r s . As a
c o n s e q u e n c e , what was decided wiihin U M N O and a t the U M N O
General Assembly was a prelude to any important government policies
a n d an indication of which U M N O politicians were rising or falling in the
political stratosphere. Similarly, it was only within U M N O that a fairly
free and open discussion of public pohcy w o u l d take place, since all
i m p o n a n i political leaders owed their political power to the s u p p o r t base
p r o v i d e d by U M N O and its political constituency.

T h e 1974 Election

T u n A b d u l Razak began the election campaign on a wave of o p t i m i s m .

T h e Barisan Nasional had incorporated most of the m a j o r parties into the
g o v e r n m e n t coalition, a n d expected to gain some 80 per cent of the votes.
T u n Razak cautioned that the only way for non-Malays to be represented
in the g o v e r n m e n t was t h r o u g h the election of BN candidates. W i t h both
P A S a n d U M N O providing mass Malay s u p p o n , h e expected the o t h e r
m e m b e r s of the coalition to deliver non-Malay votes to assure the election
of BN candidates to represent all ethnic constituencies, What opposition
there was tended to be concentrated in fairly small regional pockcts that
had some capacity to influence the o u t c o m e in the state elections, b u t
w e r e not able lo prove decisive in the federal election. 2 8
Before the election was called, legislation was i n t r o d u c e d in Parliament
to m a k e Kuala L u m p u r a Federal T e r r i t o r y , modelled after the pattern of
the District of C o l u m b i a e m b r a c i n g the capital city of W a s h i n g t o n in the
United States. Although p a r l i a m e n t a r y constituencies remained in the
territory, the capital city was to be governed directly by the Federal
G o v e m m c m rather than u n d e r the administration of the state of Selangor.
T h e legislation for Federal T e r r i t o r y status w a s i n t r o d u c e d in April 1973
a n d went into effect on 1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 4 . " While the legislation w a s
designed to give full administrative control to the areas w h e r e central
federal agencies w e r e located, it also had the effect of isolating politically
t h e largest u r b a n area in the c o u n t r y , one which h a d . in fact, b e c o m e a
bastion of s u p p o r t for the primary' non-Malay opposition p a r t y — t h e
D e m o c r a t i c Action P a n y . In this sense, it, therefore, c h a n g e d the political
calculus to favour the Barisan Nasional g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e D e m o c r a t i c Action Party m o u n t e d a sustained c a m p a i g n against
t h e BN election m a c h i n e . It h o p e d to s u p p l a n t o t h e r opposition parties as
the p r i m a r y challenge lo ihe g o v e r n m e n t . As s u c h , it avoided a n y
 THE ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 33

elcction pacts a n d tried to pick up disgruntled s u p p o r t e r s of G e r a k a n .

especially in Penang. Likewise, it hoped to eclipse P e k e m a s by d e m o n -
strating that it could mobilize mass s u p p o n , especially a m o n g u r b a n n o n -
Malays. Although it campaigned on class issues, on behalf of landless
s q u a t t e r s and the u r b a n p o o r , its appeal, in effect, was to the d e p r i v e d
a n d alienated among the non-Malay communities. As the campaign t m -
folded, it appeared that the D A P believed that it had s o m e c h a n c e of
displacing the Gerakan g o v e m m e n t in Penang. M u c h of its c a m p a i g n
effort was devoted to that e n d . In addition, it hoped also to effect the
d e m i s e of the P P P in I p o h , which had suffered an erosion of s u p p o r t
after S. P. Seenivasagam had led his p a n y into the BN coalition.
A f t e r nomination d a y , it became apparent that Partai Sosialis Rakyat
Malaysia 3 0 was concentrating its resources in a bid to challenge the BN in
T r e n g g a n u . It hoped to capitalize on latent divisions between U M N O
a n d P A S , as well as the discontent of Malay peasants whose d e p r e s s e d
condition was in stark contrast with the wealth generated in the state by
the recent oil development b o o m . T h e party also sought the s u p p o n of
the m a n y T r e n g g a n u Malays w h o had been opposed to PAS joining the
BN.31
P e k e m a s merged with A h m a d Boestamam's P a n i M a r h a e n in July
b e f o r e the election. In its c a m p a i g n , it stressed the i m p o r t a n c e of a
'responsible opposition" t o make democracy w o r k . T h e p a n y p r e s i d e n t ,
Dr T a n Chee K h o o n , called on voters to d e n y the BN a two-thirds
majority in Parliament, presumably to prevent unilateral a m e n d m e n t s to
the Constitution that would circumvent democratic processes. 3 2
T h e election campaign operated i m d e r certain restrictions, the most
i m p o r t a n t being the prohibition on the raising of the 'sensitive issues'
defined b y the Rukunegara-inspired constitutional a m e n d m e n u , a n d the
Sedition O r d i n a n c e continued in force for the election c a m p a i g n . W i t h
these rules, m a n y issues could only be raised obliquely a n d a p r e m i u m
was placed o n p a n y organization t o c o n u a individual voters with
c a m p a i g n literature and a m o r e personal face-to-face system of c o m m u n -
ication. Naturally, this type of campaign gave a d v a n u g e to the l a t t e r a n d
better organized parties, of which the BN was both the largest a n d the
best organized-
T h e pre-election estimates indicated that the BN w o u l d c o m m a n d a
massive majority in Parliament. It had won 27 consecutive by-elections
since 1969, a n d the BN leaders even a n n o u n c e d a target goal of w i n n i n g
80 per cent of the votes, which w o u l d have practically eliminated the
opposition. W h e n the votes were tallied, the BN majority in Parliament
w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g , but it had accomplished that by w i n n i n g only 59 p e r
cent of the votes. Because it had also won 47 seats u n c o n t e s t e d , the BN
p o p u l a r s u p p o r t would have been somewhat h i g h e r , b u t n o w h e r e near
their 80 per cent target. At the federal level, the BN c a p t u r e d 104 scats in
P e n i n s u l a r Malaysia a n d 31 seats in Sabah and Sarawak. T h i s gave it a
w o r k i n g majority of 135 seats out of a total of IS4 seats in P a r l i a m e n t .
TTie opposition was r e d u c e d to a m e r e 19 m e m b e r s .
Of the 135 Barisan Nasional M P s , 71 were n e w c o m e r s , m a n y of w h o m
34
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 35

had been nominated because of their experience in economics, c o m m e r c e ,

ur industry-. In the new cabinet, the emphasis was u p o n youth a n d those
w h o had the image of being 'action-oriented'. T h e D e p u t y P r i m e
M i n i s t e r , Hussein O n n , was given responsibility for the M i n i s t i y of
F i n a n c e , a post that had traditionally been held by the leader of the
M C A . Dr M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d was n a m e d the new Minister of Education
a n d M u s a Hitam was promoted from a deputy minister to b e c o m e
Minister for P r i m a r y I n d u s t r i e s . " Overall, the new Cabinet reflected the
consolidation of U M N O d o m i n a n c e of all the key cabinet posts, as well as
ihe ascendancy- of younger Malay intellectuals, w h o had been impatient
critics of the poLcies and style of leadership in the era of T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n . Although no dramatic new policy initiatives were a n n o u n c e d ,
with the formation of the new government there was an air of expectancy
thai economic issues and the goals of the N E P would be p u r s u e d with
n e w vigour. In effect, the political mood stimulated rising expectaiions,
particularly a m o n g Malay s u p p o n e r s of the government.

Student Disturbances

T h e BN coalition had proved its capacity to check dissent and deliver a

decisive victory at the polls. T h e consensus created by ihe BN w a s ,
h o w e v e r , based on elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n , in m u c h the same pattern as h a d
evolved u n d e r the earlier Alliance system. F o r both structures, t h e
p r o b l e m r e m a m e d : how can elite accommodation agreements be legit-
imized for m o r e dissident non-ehtes w h o frequently feel that they- have
little or no stake in the political outcomes of elite bargaining? As a
c o n s e q u e n c e , the very success of the BN process masked pockets of
discontent a m o n g those with limited access to the political system.
A m o n g the most troublesome and alienated were a growing n u m b e r of
radical university s t u d e n t s , particularly at the Universiiy of Malaya in
Kuala L u m p u r . T h e n u m b e r of students attending university had risen
d r a m a t i c a l l y . W i t h the system of very high Malay admission q u o u s ,
m a n y .Malays f r o m poor rural origins were flooding into Malaysia's
universities a n d being subjected to the culture shock of u r b a n life and the
clash of n o r m s a n d values associated with advanced education based on a
W e s t e r n - o n e n t e d c u r r i c u l u m . At the same time, non-Malay s t u d e n t s
were alienated because of the limited access to university admission a n d
the system of d i s c n m i n a i i o n which they feared would impair their f u t u r e
e m p l o y m e n t o p p o n u n i t i e s . A l t h o u g h Malays and non-Malays f o u n d it
difficult to co-operate in political matters, a f o r m of c o m m o n opposition
t o Malaysia's political d i t e became p a n o f the c a m p u s ethos. C a m p u s
s t u d e n t associations became quite politicized and were q u i c k to voice
g n e v a n c e s a n d take up radical causes, especially w h e n they could focus
on the failure of government leaders to meet their political pledges. T h e
most obvious issue catching the imagination of the s t u d e n t aoivisis was
the N E P pledge ' t o eradicate p o v e n y ' . T h i s issue seemed to suggest that
the m a i n agenda of politics could be redefined along class lines, with the
36 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

a r g u m e n t being m a d e that class issues would displace ethnicity as a basis

for political conflict.
In this e n v i r o n m e n t , student radicalism did reach across e t h n i c differ-
e n c e s , even though only rather limited a n d selective issues were raised lo
f o c u s c a m p u s activism. At the forefront of the demonstrations were the
University of Malaya Students' Union ( U M S U ) , the N a u o n a l U n i o n of
M u s l i m S t u d e n t s , a n d the Malay Language Society. T h e r e was a n e t w o r k
of personal contacts that extended to m a n y c a m p u s s t u d e n t organizations
at o t h e r universities, even including the University of Singapore S t u d e n t s '
Union.
T h e first cause taken up by the s t u d e n t s ' organizations was that of the
rural squaiters on the outskirts of J o h o r e Bahru in an area selected for a
very large land d e v e l o p m e n t s c h e m e , eventually to house some 500,000
people. W h e n the time came for the o i c t i o n of squatters f r o m this area,
d i s o r d e r s a n d resistance resulted in 48 persons being charged with
various offences. A m o n g those arrested were seven s t u d e n t s , one of
w h o m was the Secretary of the U M S U , H i s h a m u d d i n Rais. 3 4 T h e arrest
of the s t u d e n t activists in J o h o r e p r o m p t e d s t u d e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s at the
University of Malaya, w h e r e u p o n , u n d e r pressure f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t ,
the University of Malaya Council s u s p e n d e d the U M S U . T h e new-
E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t e r , Dr M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d , took a hard line on both
s t u d e n t s a n d university staff becoming involved in politics, and w a r n e d
that political guide-lines would be required to c u r b c a m p u s political
a c t i v i t i e s . " He accused some Malaysian s t u d e n t s in Australia a n d N e w
Z e a l a n d of joining c o m m u n i s t front organizations a n d w a r n e d Malaysian
s t u d e n t s studying abroad that they should avoid political activities and
a n y criticism of Malaysia. 3 6 T h e s e g o v e n u n e n i responses to s t u d e n t
activism p r o m p t e d heated debates over academic f r e e d o m and the role of
internal security m e a s u r e s instituted at Malaysian universities. M u c h of
the political activity on u n i v e n i t y c a m p u s e s had involved a contest for
p o w e r a m o n g various s t u d e n t g r o u p s over a wide variety of issues, such
as language policy, implementation of the N E P , and Islamic o r t h o d o x y .
G o v e r n m e n t measures against student activism, h o w e v e r , t e n d e d lo
s u b m e r g e these differences and created an e n v i r o n m e n t leading to m o r e
open c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the g o v c m m e n i . An air of crisis pervaded the
University of Malaya, as g o v e r n m e n t a u t h o n i i e s acted on the a s s u m p t i o n
that s t u d e n t organizations were challenging the miegrity and legitimacy
of the g o v e r n m e n t .

T h e next episode in the contest with s t u d e n t organizations involved the

allegation that peasants in the Baling area of K e d a h were s t a r t i n g . T h e
price of r u b b e r had been d e p r e s s e d for some t i m e , causing h a r d s h i p
a m o n g r u b b e r smallholders in all of Malaysia. U l i e n c o m b i n e d with poor
subsistence crops, the effect could be especially hard on those villages
relying on the mixed e c o n o m y . T h e allegation was m a d e by some
s t u d e n t s that the g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies failed to benefit poor peasants a n d
that peasant starvation had b e g u n in Perak. Large s t u d e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
w e r e held at the University of Malaya, Universiti K e b a n g s a a n .Malaysia
( T h e National University of .Malaysia), and Universiti Sains Malaysia in
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 37

P e n a n g . T h e largest s t u d e n t demonstraiion occurred on the g r o u n d s of

t h e Selangor Q u b in the heart of Kuala L u m p u r on 3 D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 4 . "
T h e s e demonstrations were met by a massive show of force by the
F e d e r a l Reserve Unit of the Police, which m o v e d in force to o c c u p y the
c a m p u s e s at the University of Malaya, the Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, a n d at Universiti Sains Malaysia. Altogether over 1,100
s t u d e n t s , the majority of w h o m were Malay, were charged with unlawful
assembly. T h e leaders of the student demonstrations were arrested u n d e r
the Inierrud Security Act and pui in preventive detention. A m o n g those
arrested u n d e r the ISA w e r e Syed Husin Ali, L i m M a h H u i , Gurdial
Singh N i j a r , T u n k u Shamsul Bahrin, and Anwar I b r a h i m . T h e f i r s t t w o
w e r e university lecturers, while A n w a r I b r a h i m was the President a n d
f o u n d e r of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth M o v e m e n t
of Malaysia), which is better known by its a c r o n y m , A B I M . "
By April 1975. the government introduced a m e n d m e n t s to the Univer-
sities a n d University Colleges Act designed to c u r b political activities at
all institutions of higher learning. Students were b a n n e d f r o m holding
office in any political party or trade union and f r o m expressing s u p p o r t ,
s y m p a t h y , or opposition to any political p a n y or trade u n i o n . Political
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and meetings were also banned on the c a m p u s e s of
universities a n d colleges and university authorities were given extra-
o r d i n a r y p o w e r s to enforce the Act. 39
In the early stages of the student disturbances, g o v e m m e n t s p o k e s m e n
blamed foreign professors and agitators f r o m Partai Sosialis Rakyat
Malaysia for creating the disorders. Later, however, the g o v e m m e n t
issued a W h i t e P a p e r entitled Communist Party of Malaya Activities
within the University of Malaya Chinese Language Society, which
argued that infiltration by the C o m m u n i s t Party of Malaya of t h e Chinese
L a n g u a g e Society was the root cause for promoting student unrest 4 0
E v e n though most of the arrested demonstrators w e r e Malay s t u d e n t s ,
it b e c a m e convenient to attribute the conflicts to the conspiratorial
m a n i p u l a t i v e capabilities of the Malayan C o m m u n i s t s from their jungle
hide-outs in the T h a i - M a l a y s i a n border area. A m u c h more probable
explanation is that m a n y diverse student g r o u p s were frustrated by the
style of elite decision-making a n d by restrictions on their pohtical activ-
ities, and w e r e therefore d e t e r m i n e d to challenge the g o v e r n m e n t by
political mobilization a n d public demonstrations.

T h e arrests and the restrictive legisbtion failed lo s t o p the cycle of

s t u d e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . O n e year later, d u r i n g J a n u a r y 1976, the M A R A
I n s t i t u t e of T e c h n o l o g y was rocked by a series of d e m o n s t r a t i o n s cul-
minating in a inarch of some 5,000 s t u d e n t s protesting against the restric-
tions on s t u d e n t political aciivities. Since most of the d e m o n s t r a t o r s
w e r e Malay s t u d e n t s on g o v e r n m e n t scholarship. Education M i n i s t e r
Dr M a h a t h i r w a r n e d the students that their scholarships would be
revoked if they b e c a m e involved in f u n h e r political d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .
Particularly strong measures were promised against any instigators of
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . He r e m i n d e d the Malay s t u d e n t s that the schools and
universities w e r e helping to r e s t n i a u r e society and to eliminate poverty.
38 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

T h u s , he a r g u e d , their concern for the poor would be most appropriately

f u r t h e r e d by attending lo iheir studies and not paralysing the nation's
institutions of learning. 4 1
In dealing with student protestors, the government of Abdul Razak
was unwilling to tolerate public demonstrations or open political mobil-
ization. The recent events in Thailand, where student d e m o n s u a t i o n s
had toppled the government of Thanom Kitiikachorn, were a vivid
example both to s t u d e n t s a n d to authorities of what might h a p p e n in
Malaysia if student protests w e r e allowed to c o n t i n u e . In the e n d , the
confrontation was met with what seemed like draconian force, which the
authorities apparently a s s u m e d was needed to preserve the political style
of the B a n s a n Nasional. The legitimacy of that process was being
challenged by student activists and T u n Razak met the challenge with an
impressive display of some of the coercive i n s t r u m e n t s at his c o m m a n d .

T h e Barisan Nasional Format in Sarawak

In both Sarawak a n d S a b a h , the formation of pohtical coalitions had

alwav-s been complicated by a greater diversity of ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s
than was present in Peninsular Malaysia. Bccausc each e i h n i c c o n t m u n i t y
tended to be represented by one or m o r e p a n i c s , there were usually
possibilities of m a n y different w i n n m g coalition combinations. T h e r e f o r e .
the participants played politics m u c h like a g a m e of 'musical c h a i r s ' — t h e
object being to avoid being squeezed out and forced into the opposition.
The matter of coalition-building was f u r t h e r complicated by federal
c o n c e r n s over the character of the state coalition. As a result, there had
been substantial federal intervention to m o u l d state coalitions with
patronage, exercise of federal powers, and the promise of federal invest-
m e n t s a n d projects, all aiming to shape political alignments p r e s u m a b l y
c o n g r u e n t wiih federal objecuves. T h e strategics of state politicians in
both these stales uxik into account the 'federal factor' in their political
activities a n d their coalition a h g n m e n t s . Despite heavy federal involve-
ment in these two slates, the political coalitions h a d . none the less, been
r a t h e r fluid and sometimes unpredictably unstable.

D u r i n g the Razak y e a n , Sarawak enjoyed a degree of stability based in

p a n on a federally s u p p o r t e d BN coalition at the state level. T h e
coalition-making had developed over time with two Malay-based
parties—Parti Negara Sarawak (Panas) a n d Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak

( B A R J A S A ) — m e r g i n g in 1967 to f o r m P a n y B u m i p u t e r a , which then in

t u r n joined wiih one Iban-based p a r t y — P a r t y Pesaka Anak Sarawak
(Pesaka)—and the Sarawak Chinese .Association to f o r m the Sarawak
Alliance state government.''- In 1970, the state held elections, the results
of which necessitated a f u n h e r extension of the g o v e r n m e n t coalition to
include the Sarawak United People's Party, which was the party that
c o m m a n d e d the majority of (Chinese voters. Prior to the 1974 election,
the Iban party Pesaka, with some urging f r o m Kuala L u m p u r , was
p e r s u a d e d to disband and merge with Party B u m i p u t e r a to f o r m Partai
Pesaka B u m i p u t e r a Bersatu. At about the same t i m e , the Sarawak
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 39

C h i n e s e Association was dissolved, leaving S U P P to b e c o m e the p r i m e

s p o k e s m a n for Chinese interests.
W h i l e these moves appeared to build a government coalition bridging
all ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s , it had one inherent weakness—the most widely
s u p p o r t e d Iban party, S N A P , was forced into the opposition. F u r t h e r -
m o r e , the Malay bias of the state g o v e m m e n t u n d e r Chief Minister
A b d u l R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b and its insensitivity to Iban needs and concerns
m e a n t that Iban defections f r o m the vanishing Pesaka merely a d d e d to
the Iban s u p p o r t base of S N A P . In effect, S N A P was being m a d e to pay
political penance for its continued s u p p o r t for the states' rights issues of
the "20 points' a n d its role in the earlier 'Sarawak crisis' of 1965, w h e n
the Federal G o v e r n m e n t intervened with emergency powers to topple the
Sarawak G o v e r n m e n t of S N A P Chief Minister Stephen Kalong
Ningkan."
F o r the 1974 election, the Sarawak BN was composed of Partai Pesaka
B u m i p u t e r a Bersatu ( P B B ) , led by Chief Minister Abdul R a h m a n
Y a ' a k u b . and the S U P P . u n d e r the leadership of O n g K e e Hui. Confident
of its base of s u p p o r t . the Sarawak BN refused the pre-election o v e n u r e
f r o m S N A P for admission to the B N , so S N A P contested the 1974
election as an opposition p a n y . W h e n the vote was counted, the Sarawak
BN had won 15 parliamentary seats with S N A P winning 9 seats. In the
Sarawak Council Negri (Legislative Assembly), the BN had won a total
of seats to S N A P ' S 18, b u t S N A P had gained 43 per cent of the vote,
whereas the Chief M i n i s t e r ' s own PBB had gained only 34 per cent of the
vote for the Sarawak Council Negri. 4 5 At the federal level, the voting
results gave S N A P and the D A P an equal n u m b e r of seats in Parliament
to m a k e t h e m the t w o largest opposition panics. It also meant that S N A P
c o u l d not be ignored and isolated at the state level without long-term
p r o b l e m s of growing political alienation from Ibans and other non-
M u s l i m tribals.

T h e p r o b l e m of post-election extension of the Sarawak BN coalition to

m c l u d e the p a n y that had clearly won massive s u p p o r t f r o m interior
natives w a s complicated by the personal animo.sities between Chief
Minister A b d u l R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b a n d James W o n g , S N A P D e p u t y
C h a i r m a n and former S N A P leader of the opposition in the Malaysian
Parliament. D u r i n g previous election campaigns, James W o n g had con-
d u c t e d h a r d - h i t t i n g attacks on the Sarawak Government of A b d u l R a h m a n
Y a ' a k u b , revealing its pro-Malay patronage pattern and its failure to meet
t h e e c o n o m i c needs of rural people and Sarawak native peoples. Still
s m a r t i n g f r o m the poor showing of the BN in the 1974 election, the Chief
Minister a r r a n g e d with federal authorities for the arrest and indefinite
d e t e n t i o n of James W o n g on an accusation of sedition, b u t without trial,
u n d e r the Sedition Act. 46
A f t e r the d e t e n t i o n of J a m e s W o n g , S N A P elected a new Secretary-
G e n e r a l , L e o .Moggie, w h o was m u c h m o r e deferential to federal author-
ities and also m u c h m o r e eager for his p a n y to join the BN as an affiliate.
He e n t e r e d into e x t e n d e d negotiations with the Minister of H o m e Affairs,
Ghazali Shafie. on the detention of James W o n g and on possible con-
40 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

ditions for S N A P to join the B N . An agreement was finally a n n o u n c e d in

N o v e m b e r 1975, but S N A P ' S inclusion in the Sarawak G o v e r n m e n t was
delayed until M a r c h 1976. James W o n g w-as released f r o m d e t e n t i o n ,
D u n s t a n E n d a w i e was made a Depuiy Chief Minister in the Sarawak
G o v e r n m e n t , and Leo Moggie was given the portfolio for Welfare
Services. All the S N A P posts were m i n o r and subject to close BN
scrutiny a n d control, so that S N A P gained less access to policy-making
than its leaders had cxpected. T h e most important consequence w a s that
the agreement to include S N A P in the BN e n d e d some thirteen years of
p u b l i c disputes over states' rights, ethnic issues, and o t h e r matters of
c o n c e r n especially to the interior tribal peoples of Sarawak . 4 7
D u r i n g the firsi two years of S N A P participation in the Sarawak B N ,
friction arose between S N A P a n d S U P P over land policies a n d competition
for constituent s u p p o r t , since S U P P had earlier recruited s o m e L a n d
D a y a k s w h o were later wooed away by S N A P . Although politics was
confined to intra-Barisan competition, on the surface, at least, Sarawak
had achieved a high degree of political stability and a quiescent form of
political demobilization after 1976.

T u n Mustapha's Sabah

Between 1967 a n d the 1974 election, the state of Sabah appeared to be

firmly u n d e r the control of T u n M u s t a p h a H a r u n , w h o headed the
United Sabah National Organization; this party had established its d o m -
inance by absorbing the United Pasok M o m o g u n Organization led by
Donald Stephens. 4 8 By this move, the strongest native n o n - M u s l i m party
had b e c o m e incorporated into the p r i m a r y native M u s l i m party, so that
the B a n s a n formula Unked only two p a n i e s — t h e Sabah Chinese Asso-
ciation and U S N O . For this period after 1967, T u n M u s t a p h a had ruled
the state with unchallenged authority backed hy the formidable U S N O
organization. In 1967, Donald Stephens had been appointed by T u n k u
A b d u l R a h m a n as Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia, so that
T u n M u s t a p h a ' s p r i m a r y pohtical rival was no longer on the Sabah
scene. W i t h i n the state, the U S N O - l e d government of M u s t a p h a appeared
lo be i n v i n a b l e , having a free hand to define ihe f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t of
Sabah.

M u s t a p h a H a r u n was b o m in Sulu in the Philippines, but his family

m o v e d to N o r t h Borneo before the war. He was educated only up to
P r i m a r y O n e , but after serving as a houscboy to some British officers, he
was a p p o i n t e d by the colonial authorities to be a village h e a d m a n . Over
l i m e , he worked his way up the system of native administration to
b e c o m e a m e m b e r of the pre-war N o r t h B o r n e o Legislative council. By
the post-war period, he had become the acknowledged s p o k e s m a n for the
S u l u i s , w h o , like himself, viewed the island of Sulu as their anccstral
h o m e . As the Malaysian Federation proposals propelled N o r t h B o r n e o
inio the era of party politics, M u s t a p h a in 1961 f o r m e d U S N O to
represent the larger M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s — p r i m a r i l y the Suluts, the
Bajaus, a n d the Brunei .Malays. 49 T h i s same constituency r e m a i n e d the
 TUN ABDUI. RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 41

core s u p p o r t for U S N O in the 1970s, even though the n o n - M u s l i m native

people h a d , by i h e n , joined ihe U S N O coalition government.
On most matters, U S N O espoused congruent objectives with those of
the Federal G o v e m m e n t . M u s t a p h a developed close personal ties with
T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n and worked in close association with h i m to
secure federal s u p p o n for his policies and style of rule. U n d e r M u s t a p h a ' s
leadership, the state g o v e m m e n t adopted the view that Sabah's diverse
e t h n i c g r o u p s should be 'integrated' into the basic Malay culture that was
being p r o m o t e d by federal policy. T h i s involved public e m p h a s i s u p o n
s y m b o l s of Malay cultural identity, the rapid development of Bahasa
Malaysia as the national language, and the promotion of Islam as a m e a n s
to create cultural a n d religious conformity within the state. U n d e r the
direction of the United Sabah Islamic Association, which was s u p p o r t e d
by the U S N O g o v e m m e n t , a very aggressive p r o g r a m m e of Islamic
conversion was instituted with m u c h publicity given to mass conversions
of m a n y t h o u s a n d s of new Muslims. In 1973 Islam was m a d e the official
religion of the stale and Bahasa Malaysia was adopted as the state's sole
official language. Pressure for conversion to Islam was panicularly great
on those in politics, since U S N O viewed Islam as a prerequisite to e t h n i c
power-sharing in the Mustapha government. By 1973, within the Sabah
legisiative Assembly only live m e m b e r s still professed to be Christians,
even t h o u g h M u s l i m communities in Sabah constituted less than 40 per
cent of the population and most of the leaders of the n o n - M u s l i m
c o m m u n i u e s had earlier had nominal Christian affiliation. 5 0 By F e b r a a r y
1974. the United Sabah Islamic Association claimed to have achieved the
conversion to Islam of over 75.000 Sabah residents. 5 1 In the mailer of
language, the stale g o v e r n m e n t ' s adoption of Bahasa Malaysia as the sole
official language involved the termination of the use of all o t h e r Sabah
languages over the state radio, as well as rapid conversion to the national
language in e d u c a t i o n , m u c h to the displeasure of the Kadazans, Bajaus,
M u r u t s , and C h i n e s e . "

T h e political pressures on n o n - M u s l i m s for conversion to Islam in-

creased greatly after 1971 w h e n Donald Stephens decided to c o n v e n to
Islam a n d adopted the M u s l i m n a m e of T u n H a j i M o h a m e d F u a d
Stephens. Although he had remained the H u g u a n Siou—the traditional
"Paramount C h i e f of the K a d a z a n s — h e had been outside the c o u n t r y as
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r to Australia for several years, a n d wanted to r e t u m
to the political fray. W i t h i n Malaysia's informal patron-client system of
p o w e r , d e f e r e n c e to those at the apex of the structure is usually r e w a r d e d .
Fuad S t e p h e n s ' conversion to Islam involved a secret u n d e r s t a n d i n g that
he would t h e r e b y become eligible for high office in his h o m e s t a t e . ' '
W i t h i n two years, in S e p t e m b e r 1973, he was appointed Sabah's Yang di-
P e n u a N e g e r i ( H e a d of State), which e n d e d his six-year period in
political wilderness. 5 4
So long as Chief Minister M u s t a p h a p u r s u e d policies that were
a p p r o v e d by Kuala L u m p u r , he had a free hand to build his political
m a c h i n e at the state level. In the period after l 9 6 7 , Sabah enjoyed a
growing e c o n o m y based primarily on limber and m i n i n g exports. T h r o u g h
42 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

the licensing of timber and m i n i n g concessions, large s u m s uf m o n e y

c o u l d be m a d e by top political figures in the state. Patronage and the
' i r r e g u l a r ' rewards of public office were so great that the visible opposition
to M u s t a p h a ' s policies had been rcduced to insignificance. With his
unchallenged maiority in the Legislative Assembly, M u s t a p h a exercised
c o m p l e t e control over the state bureaucracy, as well as control over all
immigration and the entry of visitors to S a b a h . Following the 1969 riots
in Kuala L u m p u r , M u s t a p h a was also given the powers of preventive
detention within S a b a h , which he used ruthlessly against critics a n d
potenual political o p p o n e n t s . In 1966 the Sabah F o u n d a t i o n was estab-
lished with M u s t a p h a as C h a i r m a n . W h i l e the F o u n d a t i o n was designed
10 p u r s u e educational and social objectives, u n d e r M u s t a p h a ' s control it
was rapidly t r a n s f o r m e d to become a prime vehicle for a d m i n i s t e r i n g
stale exploiiation a n d development of limber resources, with the benefits
being distributed on a patronage basis to political s u p p o r t e r s . M u s t a p h a ' s
powers to allocate concessions for u m b e r to the F o u n d a t i o n and to others
w h o s u p p o r t e d his rule m a d e the rewards of politics extremely lucrative.
Because the F o u n d a t i o n was 'private" a n d not subject to g o v e r n m e n t
control, it became an important instrument of his political p o w e r . "

Tun M u s t a p h a not only developed an authoritarian a n d capricious

political style d e m a n d i n g defcrcnce a n d exaggerated p o m p , but he also
cultivated tastes for luxury and opulence. Although he personally amassed
incrcdible personal wealth, he also expected the stale to provide ex-
pensive benefits in the f o r m of a palatial official residence as well as a
Boeing 707 and two G r u m m a n executive jets, which were maintained at
state expense for his personal use. Gradually he spent m o r e a n d m o r e
time at his estate in E n g l a n d , or at his A $ l m i l l i o n villa in Q u e e n s l a n d
w h e r e he maintained an Australian salesgirl as an extra wile. Bccausc of
his extensive activities a b r o a d , he lived in Sabah for only t w o or three
m o n t h s each year. Despite his absence f r o m the scene, he ruled with an
iron hand t h r o u g h trusted assistants, such as Syed K e c h i k , an U M N O
m e m b e r from K e d a h w h o was m a d e Direcior of the Sabah F o u n d a t i o n
a n d exercised political control while M u s t a p h a was on his foreign
jaunts. 5 6

In anticipation of the election of 1974, M u s t a p h a a n n o u n c e d that all

a d u l t Sabah citizens would be given M $ 6 0 shares in the state's t i m b e r
wealth. 5 7 Within the state, the Sabah BN remained unified a n d s u p r e m e ,
even t h o u g h a symbolic opposition was m o u n t e d by the Peninsular
Malaysian party, P e k e m a s , that p a r a c h u t c d in to challenge the stale
g o v e r n m e n t . Surprisingly, Pekemas won 39.2 per cent of the vole in the
1974 Sabah elections, but even so, it failed to w e s t any of the 16
parliamentary seats f r o m the Sabah BN u n d e r the leadership of
Mustapha.58
T h e challenge to M u s t a p h a ' s power eventually c a m e f r o m the Federal
G o v e r n m e n t because of concern over his longer-term political objectives.
In the early 1970s, oil was discovered off ihe coasi of S a b a h . Mustapha
believed thai oil—like t i m b e r — s h o u l d be u n d e r the control of Sabah. He
w a s not satisfied with the federal statute transferring oil rights lo the
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 43

Federal G o v e r n m e n t ' s oil corporation, Peironas, which then operated

with a production-sharing formula that gave only 5 per cent of the oil
royalties to the littoral state governments.""
A f t e r the 1974 election, Prime Minister Abdul Razak had a t t e m p t e d to
move M u s t a p h a f r o m his entrenched political position in Sabah by
offering him the federal cabinet post of Minister of Defence. 6 1 M u s t a p h a
rejected the offer, however, preferring instead to remain in S a b a h , where
his power base was and where his style of politics reaped m a x i m u m
political and financial benefits. Despite his near dictatorial powers in the
stale, defection from his government became c o m m o n p l a c e , aided, in
p a r t , by e n c o u r a g e m e n t from federal authorities w h o were becoming
increasingly concerned with the level of corruption in the state, which
was being ruled as though t was a personal fiefdom of M u s t a p h a ' s .
As the d i s p u t e with federal authorities over finances and oil resources
escalated, Mustapha presented proposals in April 1975 to the U S N O
Central Executive Committee to explore the possibility of S a b a h ' s
seccession f r o m Malaysia. As a Sulut, Mustapha hud close ties with S u l u t s
a n d o t h e r .Muslim peoples living in the southern Philippines. It is also
alleged that the cultivated ties with the M o r o Liberation Front w h o were
themselves actively fighting for an independent Islamic republic to
c o m p r i s e the southern Philippines, and perhaps Sabah as well, w h e r e the
,Sulu Sultanate had historically claimed to exercise some authority. T h e
proposal to f o r m a new state of B o m e s i a . or some such concept, was also
discussed wiih the Yung di-Pertua Negeri. Fuad Stephens, w h o quietly
alerted federal a u t h o r i t i e s . " Prime Minister Abdul Razak acted i m m e -
diately to revoke Mustapha's detention powers and persuaded U S N O
Vice-President Harris Salleh and F u a d Stephens to co-operate to f o r m a
n e w party a n d force C-hief .Minister Mustapha to resign. T h e new party
w a s called Sabah United People's Party, or Bersaiu Rakyat Jelaia S a b a h ,
belter k n o w n as Berjaya. It was officially b u n c h e d on 15 J u l y , with
H a r r i s Salleh as President. 6 3 T w e l v e days later. F u a d Stephens resigned
as Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah. accusing M u s t a p h a of corruption and
revealing the 'plot' to lake Sabah out of .Malaysia.

After a periixl of intense political maniieuvring, Mustapha r e t u r n e d

f r o m an extended stay in England to defend his g o v e r n m e n t , reassert his
a u t h o r i t y , and recoup his political losses. Six Berjaya s u p p o r t e r s were
p e r s u a d e d to r e l u m to U S N O , so that only five Benaya m e m b e r s in the
S a b a h Assembly remained to vote against a confidence motion s u p p o r t e d
by U S N O . U n d e r M u s i a p h a ' s direction, the Assembly passed a non-
secession resolution to meei B e n a y a ' s criticisms, a n d m o u n t e d a counter-
iiitack in the f o r m of a motion c o n d e m n i n g the political activities of F u a d
S t e p h e n s while he was S a b a h ' s Yang di-Pertua Negeri. 6 4
Because of M u s i a p h a ' s s u p p o r t in the Sabah .Assembly, his govern-
ment was secure until the next election. Even so, political pressure on
h i m m o u n t e d f r o m Kuala L u m p u r w h e n U S N O was removed as a
m e m b e r nf the BN at the same time that Berjaya's application for
m e m b e r s h i p in the BN was a p p r o v e d . U n d e r threat of punitive measures
f r o m federal authorities, Mustapha finally a n n o u n c e d plans for his retire-
44 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

m e n t set for the end of O c t o b e r 1975. Apparently, M u s t a p h a h o p e d to

retain the substance of power as head of U S N O , a n d p e r h a p s , to rule
t h r o u g h a political ally or d e p u t y . In response to the retirement a n n o u n c e -
m e n t , the Sabah Assembly passed a bill which provided M u s t a p h a with a
lifetime pension and other b e n e f i t s . "
At first, the new Sabah government was headed by Said K e r u a k , the
former U S N O D e p u t y Chief Minister. I n N o v e m b e r 1975, U S N O won
t w o by-elections in M u s l i m - m a j o r i t y constituencies. T h i s appeared to
signal a reversal of the fortunes of U S N O againsi the onslaught of the
federal leaders and the fledgeling Berjaya coalition. W h e n P r i m e Minister
A b d u l Razak suddenly died on 14 January 1976, M u s t a p h a assumed that
the new Prime M i n i s t e r , Hussein O n n , would be m o r e sympathetic to
U S N O or at least remain neutral in Sabah's affairs. T h e call for a new
Sabah state election was issued a week following T u n Razak's d e a t h , with
the election set for April 1976. 66
H u s s e i n O n n tried initially to secure a pre-election agreement to
allocate seats between U S N O and Berjaya. Such an a r r a n g e m e n t was
rejected by the Berjaya leaders, w h o preferred to test their s u p p o r t in a
contested election. After a heated campaign with m a n y threats a n d some
defections, Berjaya emerged the v i a o r with 28 seats and 42.9 per cent of
the vote, while U S N O , still u n d e r M u s t a p h a ' s leadership, captured
20 seats."' T h e Sabah Chinese Association failed to win a single seal,
suggesting that the Chinese vote had gone to Berjaya. At the h e l m of
Berjaya was F u a d Stephens, w h o r e t u r n e d once again as S a b a h ' s Chief
Minisier. His first period as Chief Minister had been f r o m 1963 to 1965,
w h e n he had been unceremoniously removed because of his d e m a n d that
S a b a h ' s terms of association with Malaysia be renegotiated after
S i n g a p o r e ' s expulsion from M a l a y s i a . "
T h e d r a m a t i c t u r n a b o u t in Fuad Stephens' political fortunes w a s ,
h o w e v e r , very shortlived. On 6 J u n e 1976, a private plane in which he
was travelling, stalled and crashed as it was about to land at Kota
K i n a b a l u , apparently because it h a d been improperly loaded. F u a d
S t e p h e n s a n d his closest political associate, Peter M o j u n t i n , were both
killed instantly. 6 9
W i t h the death of Chief Minister F u a d Stephens. Bcnaya had to select
a new leader to f o r m the g o v e r n m e n t . Although there was considerable
s u p p o r t for James Ongkili, w h o . like S t e p h e n s , was a Kadazan and held
the s a m e political views as S t e p h e n s , pressure from within and from
outside the state for a M u s l i m as Chief Minister led to the selection of
H a r r i s Salleh. w h o came from L a b u a n and was of mixed Indian and
Singapore Malay origin. 7 0 Because he did not c o m e f r o m any of the
m a j o r Sabah c o m m u n i u e s . he could m a k e a multi-ethnic appeal, but he
also h a d no core base of s u p p o r t . Therefore, he was particularly vulner-
able and relied increasingly over time on federal s u p p o r t to sustain him ai
the Sabah h e l m . As a consequence, he b e c a m e an avid p r o p o n e n t of the
strong federalist position, p u r s u i n g policies that were designed to p r o m o t e
the integration of Sabah with the policies of Peninsular Malaysia.
W i t h the considerable powers that were available to him as Chief
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 45

Minister, Harris Salleh began to construct a political machine that was

almost as formidable as that of M u s t a p h a prior to his downfall. In
contrast to the previous regime, the constituency that was backing the
Berjaya g o v e m m e n t was not the Suluts and o t h e r M u s l i m natives of
M u s t a p h a ' s coalition; r a t h e r , the new government of Harris Salleh relied
on a coalition of support based primarily on the n o n - M u s l i m natives a n d
the Chinese, s u p p l e m e n t e d with some M u s l i m Malay s u p p o r t , especially
f r o m the state bureaucracy. Although Harris Salleh was himself a M u s l i m ,
the b u l k of the native M u s l i m g r o u p s , especially the Suluts, r e m a i n e d
loyal to U S N O , which was still being led by the 'retired' T u n M u s t a p h a .
T h e lines of political cleavage remained sufficiently b l u r r e d , however, to
facilitate overiapping p a n y competition within most ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s
in Sabah. W i t h no m a j o r shift in policies, but a substaniial redistribution
of patronage, the Berjaya government established a very effective political
m a c h i n e a n d u-as able to provide a long period of political stability a n d
rapid economic development for Sabah.

E c o n o m i c P e r f o m i a n c e in the Razak Era

T h e basic political strategy of T u n Razak was based on the a s s u m p t i o n

thai overall economic growth would remain at a sufficiently high level for
all sectors of society to benefit from economic growth, while at the same
t i m e , g o v e m m e n t redisiribution policies would rapidly redress the eco-
n o m i c imbalances that intensified ethnic antagonisms. T h u s , the first
prerequisite for stable politics was a healthy economy. T h e second was
the policy of affirmative action to meet the rising expectations of the
Malays for a greater share in the m o r e dynamic sectors of the e c o n o m y .
T h i s overall strategy was enunciated by the N e w Economic Policy w h i c h
was incorporated into the Second Malaysia Plan ( S M P ) covering the
years 1971-5. 7 1 T h e ideological foundations of the S M P were m o r e
clearly formulated than any of the earlier national plans. Likewise, it
involved a set of target goals which were in the f o r m of a political
p r o m i s e , primarily to the Malays, about economic objectives for the year
1990. W h a t was less clear were the economic strategies a n d i n s t r u m e n t s
to meet those goals.

T h e S M P involved a broad-sector integrated plan with clearly a n i c u -

lated priorities based on urban and rural sub-sector plans. T h e strategy
of the plan was based on promotion of regional 'growth poles' designed to
m i n i m i z e regional disparities. T h e first goal of the S M P remained that of
reducing racial disparities in economic function and benefits. Its second
goal was 'to eradicate p o v e r t y . H o w e v e r , an additional goal b e c a m e the
reduction of regional geographic disparities. F o r political reasons, the last
b e c a m e almost as i m p o n a n i as the first two goals in the f o r m u l a t i o n and
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of national economic p l a n n i n g . "
T h e ultimate success of the S M P and the political strategy u p o n which
it was b a s e d , rested on the assumption of continued a n d accelerated
e c o n o m i c g r o w i h . T h i s meant e x p a n d i n g the trade in Malaysia's p r i m a r y
c o m m o d i t i e s of r u b b e r and tin, while developing new sources of wealth
63 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

in industry and other commodities for a more diversified world m a r k e t .

In the period of the Second Malaysia P l a n . 1971-5. a real G D P growth
rate of 7.1 per cent per a n n u m was attained, thus exceeding the Plan's
target growth rate of 6.8 per cent per a n n u m . T h e transfer of share
capital to Malay o w n e r s h i p fell somewhat below target, but Malay
e m p l o y m e n t in industry and m o d e r n occupations was n s i n g at a rapid
rate. Similarly. Malay admissions to institutions of higher education were
rising by dramatic leaps. On the question of poverty eradication, 49.3 per
cent of all h o u s e h o l d s in Peninsular Malaysia were listed as u n d e r the
poverty line in 1970. By 1975 the figure had been reduccd to 4 3 . 9 per
ccni. While there was a slight reduction in the overall incidence of
poverty d u r i n g the S.MP period, there was also an increase in overall
i n c o m e i n e q u a h t y cau.scd by the wealthy becoming m u c h m o r e wealthy. 7 3
T h e buoyant .Malaysian economy d u r i n g the years from 1970 to 1974
m a d e the task of managing political d e m a n d s and ethnic rivalries m u c h
easier fur the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e economic e n v i r o n m e n t chanpcd in 1975
d u e to a world-wide recession 7 4 and the Malaysian economy e.xpenenced
a decline in G N P of 1.16 per cent for that year. H o w e v e r , the high
g r o w t h rales of eariier years and a surprisingly rapid recovery in 1976
m e a n t that few a d i u s t m e n t s had to be m a d e in the g o v e r n m e n t ' s overall
e c o n o m i c and political strategics.

Foreign Affaire, 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 6

Because T u n Razak had assumed leadership of the country in the wake

of the M a y 1969 riots, the priniary attention of his administration was on
the formulation a n d implementation of domestic policies that would
ameliorate the internal contiicis that afHictcd the countrv'. His period of
office was also a period of turmoil and change in international affairs.
T h e biggest p r o b l e m for regional securiiy in South-East Asia was ihe
prolonged involvement of the United States in the Vietnam conflict. T h e
disillusionment of the American public with the high costs of US
involvement a n d the apparently endless character of that conflict meant
thai p r e s s u r e was building for American withdrawal f r o m Vietnam. .As
thai impel us gamed m o m e n t u m , the p r o b l e m of potential instability lor
o t h e r states in South-East Asia became m o r e w o r r i s o m e . In addition to
regional security issues, Malaysia also faced areas of real or potential
conflict with i m m e d i a t e neighbours: with the Philippines, the claim to
Sabah remained an obstacle to h a r m o n i o u s relations: with T h a i l a n d , joint
o p e r a t i o n s against C o m m u n i s t guerrillas in b o r d e r areas and the Thai
treatment of Malay-Muslims in southern T h a i l a n d were sources of
c o n c e r n : with Indonesia, navigation rights in the Malacca Strait and
claims to o f f s h o r e oil resources were merely t w o of the m o r e pressing of
m a n y issues in bilateral affairs.

In matters of national security. Malaysia relied on a d e f e n c e pact with

Cireat Briiain which c o n t i n u e d in force all t h r o u g h the period of C o n -
frontation with Indonesia. By 1968 the British a n n o u n c e d plans for
military withdrawal "East of Suez' w h e n the Anglo,Malayan D e f e n c e
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 47

Agreement expired in 1971. To arrange for British w i t h d r a w a l , five-

p o w e r d e f e n c e talks were held in J u n e 1968 and J u n e 1969 involving
Malaysia. Singapore, Australia, N e w Zealand, a n d Great Britain. T h e s e
negotiations produced an u n d e r s t a n d i n g that Australia, N e w Z e a l a n d ,
a n d Great Britain continued to accept some responsibility for the joint
defence of Malaysia a n d Singapore, but the only significant military unit
to be stationed in Malaysia or Singapore was to be one s q u a d r o n of the
Australian Air F o r c e , at Butterworth, Penang. 7 5
In the a f t e r m a t h of the Confrontation dispute with Indonesia, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) was formed on 8 August
1967. In s o m e respects A S H A N had been founded in response to the
earlier failure of M A P H I L I N D O , a concept that had been proposed
at the 1963 .Manila conference of T u n k u .Abdul R a h m a n , President
S u k a r n o , and President Diosdado Macapagal. By 1967, the open conflict
between Malaysia and Indonesia had been replaced by co-operation. In
the m o r e cordial diplomatic a t m o s p h e r e . ASHAN was launched with its
f o u n d e r m e m b e r s including Malaysia. Indonesia, the Philippines,
S i n g a p o r e , and T h a i l a n d . At first A S H A N was largely symbolic and
lended to p r o m o t e primarily cultural and sporting exchanges. Yet, d u r i n g
the Razak era, Malaysian altitudes towards A S E A N bccame m o r e pws-
itive, while all m e m b e r states increasingly made it a venue for the
discussion of regional p r o b l e m s a n d even some bilateral issues. T h e
strong s u p p o r t of ASE.AN by T u n Razak was apparent t h r o u g h o u t his
t e r m as P r i m e Minister. T h r o u g h his initiative, a draft Treaty on Amity
a n d O w p c r a i i o n in Southeast Asia was formulated lo provide for peaceful
resolution of disputes bct\veen A S E A N m e m b e r states. T h i s T r e a t y was
finally signed by all m e m b e r s at the A S E A N summit conference in Bali
in F e b r u a r y , 1 9 7 7 . 7 6

An early foreign policy initiative of T u n A b d u l Razak was the an-

n o u n c e m e n t m a d e in S e p t e m b e r 1970 at the Conference of Non-aligned
Nations in Lusaka. Z a m b i a , that Malaysia proposed the neutralization of
South-East Asia to avoid Great Power conflicts in the area. Later, in
O c t o b e r 1971. the same proposal was placed before the General Assembly
of the United Nations. In N o v e m b e r of the same year, it w a s s u b m i t t e d
to A S E A N for e n d o r s e m e n t . Because T u n Razak had proposed a ' Z o n e
of Peace. F r e e d o m , and Neutrality, free f r o m any f o r m or m a n n e r of
interference f r o m outside powers', 7 7 the proposal was k n o w n by the
a c r o n y m " Z O P F A N " . Although the A S E A N s u t e s signed a declaration
s u p p o r t i n g Z O P F A N . it remained a statement of goals, raihcr than a
clear set of policy directives to m e m b e r states. T h e United States bases
remained in the Philippines and US support of Thailand c o n i i n u e d , even
after the defeat and withdrawal of the United States f r o m South Vietnam
m April 1975. If the goals of Z O P F A N were to be i m p l e m e n t e d , it
r e q u i r e d the s u p p o r t of the Major Powers—the United States, the Soviet
U n i o n , a n d China—all of w h o m p u r s u e d policies largely oblivious to the
declarations voiced by the A S H A N states.

Although Malaysia had historic ties with the C o m m o n w e a l t h a n d with

m a j o r Western powers, its concern to a s s e n its a u t o n o m y and promote
48 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

trade on a world-wide basis provided incentive for expansion of diplomatic

contacts with T h i r d World countries and with c o m m u n i s t Bloc countries.
Malaysia had attended various Afro-Asian conferences and the Con-
ferences of Non-aligned Nations d u r i n g the fu-st decade of its existence.
U n d e r the leadership of T u n R a z a k , new initiatives were m a d e to
establish new contacts with C o m m u n i s t states and also to stress a new
d i m e n s i o n of foreign policy: ihe growing recognition of a M u s l i m identity
in international relations.
In 1966 a Malaysian trade delegation visited Moscow to p r o m o t e Soviet
p u r c h a s e of Malaysian p r o d u c t s , principally r u b b e r . T h e rapid expansion
of trade with the Soviet Union was followed by the opening of a Soviet
embassy in Kuala L u m p u r in 1968, after it had become the biggest b u y e r
of Malaysian r u b b e r . D u n n g 1969 to 1970 a n u m b e r of moves w e r e taken
by Malaysia to p r o m o t e diplomatic and trade relations with the Eastern
E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i s t states. T h e issue of trade and possible d i p l o m a t i c
relations with China was a m u c h more sensitive issue, in p a n because of
the relationship of the People's Republic of China to the overseas Chinese
a n d cspccially its sponsorship of various c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t s in South-
East Asia, including the .Malayan C o m m u n i s t Party. As diplomatic
o v e n u r e s to China began lo be m a d e by the N i x o n Administration in the
United Slates and by m a n y European powers, the issue for .Malaysia of
relations with C h i n a a s s u m e d m o r e urgency. Reflecling the new inter-
national realities, the Malaysian Government a n n o u n c e d in May 1974
that it was establishing diplomatic relations with C h i n a , thus b e c o m i n g
the first A S E A N c o u n t r y to do so since Indonesia severed its ties with
C h i n a ui 1965. After the same m o n t h . T u n Razak visited C h i n a and had
discussions with CJiina's top leaders, including M a o T s e - i u n g . M a o is
r e p o n e d to have told T u n Razak that the overseas C-hinese should o w e
loyalty to the country of their adoption. Mao also agreed that the
guerrillas in Malaysia were an 'internal matter for Malaysia'. F o r its p a n .
Malaysia recognized the People"s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a as the legal govern-
m e n i of C h i n a , including Taiwan a.s a constituent province."'' Although
.Malaysia hoped that these agreements w o u l d terminate Chinese s u p p o r t
f o r the Malayan C o m m u n i s t Party, the a g r e e m e n t s remain a m b i g u o u s
since the Chinese m a d e the disiinction between formal international
g o v e r n m e n t relations a n d the relations between 'fraternal' c o m m u n i s t
parties. Even so, the agreement was viewed in Malaysia as an i m p o n a n t
psychological factor in the operations against the c o m m u n i s t g u e n i l l a s .
A m o n g other A S E A N states, there was general s u p p o r t a n d approval of
the m o v e to establish diplomatic relations with China. In p a n , this was
because China was viewed as having interests that c o u n t e r e d the growing
influence a n d power of the Soviet Union in the Indo-China stales a n d
beyond.

S h o n l y after the fall of Saigon to the N o n h Vietnamese forces,

Malaysia extended recognition to the new g o v e r n m e n t s in b o t h the
f o r m e r South Vietnam and in C a m b o d i a . A p p a r e n t l y , .Malaysia hoped to
act as a restraining influence by recognizing the new political situation in
the I n d o - C h i n a states. Also, there was some hope that the newly v i c t o r i -
 TUN ABDUL RAZAK ADMISISTRATION 49

ous g o v r r n m e n t s might be willing to endorse some aspect of the Z O P F A N

f o r m u l a for assuring peace and stability in South-East Asia. Although no
such agreement was forthcoming from Vietnam or C a m b o d i a , Malaysia,
by its moves to accord diplomatic recognition, did keep c h a n n e l s of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n open a n d avoided some of the vitriol directed by H a n o i
Radio to other states in A S E A N . "
D u r i n g 1974, Malaysia undertook another foreign pobcy initiative to
stress its ties with the loose grouping of Islamic states. In J u n e of that
year, it sponsored the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. At
the C o n f e r e n c e , Malaysia pleaded the ease of those Islamic countries that
suffered f r o m extremes of p o v e n y made worse by the rapid increase in oil
prices in the wake of the Oil Crisis of January 1974. By contrast, the
major oil-producing states of the Organization of Petroleum E x p o n i n g
C o u n t r i e s ( O P E C ) were enjoying windfall profits a n d a s u r p l u s of
r e v e n u e s thai needed to be invested. Malaysia called u p o n the oil-rich
Islamic countries to establish major development p r o g r a m m e s and invest-
m e n t policies to assist those Islamic countries that were m o r e needy a n d
destitute. W i t h i n the year following the Conference, T u n Razak loured
Saudi Arabia a n d seven Gulf States to promote his ideas. Malaysia, even
though it did not qualify as a d e s u t u t e country, did reap the benefit of
substantial Arabian mvesimenis in development projects a n d joint-stock
v e n t u r e s m the decade following thai Conference. 8 0 Perhaps even m o r e
i m p o r t a n t , the C o n f e r e n c e symbolized the importance of the g o v e n u n e n t ' s
c o m m i t m e n t to an Islamic grouping in international affairs, an issue
w h i c h was b e c o m i n g increasingly significant for the government's primary'
domestic constituency.

T u n Abdul Razak's D e a t h

T h r o u g h o u t his i n c u m b e n c y in the office of Prime M i n i s t e r , T u n Razak

gave the a p p e a r a n c e of being in a h u r r y to accomplish the goals he set for
the g o v e m m e n t . He sought to de-emphasize open political-conflict a n d
stress instead the mobilization of public and private resources for the
pursuit of well-defmed political goals. T h e urgency of the task at h a n d
w a s depicted in terms of national objectives. What was not k n o w n , even
to most of his close associates, was that T u n Razak suffered f r o m the
debilitating disease of leukaemia. W h e n his condition deteriorated in
D e c e m b e r 1975, he left for a 'holiday' in England. W i t h o u t benefit of
f o r e w a r n i n g , the .Malaysian public reacted with shock a n d dismay w h e n
the n e w s reported T u n ' R a z a k ' s death on 14 J a n u a r y 1976 at the age of
fifty-four."'
Because there had been no preparations m a d e for succession, there w a s
a sense of c n s i s , not only over the death of T u n R a z a k , but also because
of the u n c e n a i n t y about the political direction the c o u n t r y would take
u n d e r a n e w leader. T h e crisis, such as it was, was largely the p r o d u c t of
the secrecy s u r r o u n d i n g T u n Razak's health problem and the consequent
lack of preparation for a n o r m a l transition to a new administration.
50 MALAYSIAN POLITCS; THE SECOND GENERATlON
THE ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 51
52 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION
THE ABDUL RAZAK ADMINISTRATION 53
 3
The Hussein Onn Administration

T h e Succession and Factional Politics

HUSSEIN ONN assumed the office of Prime Minister from a fairly weak
political base and with a number of serious liabilities. As the son of the
venerable Malay politician, Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, Hussein Onn had left
U M N O at the time his father resigned to found the Independence of
Malaya Party in 1951. Hussein Onn returned to U M N O only in 1969 and
never had lime to build a solid base of delegate support within the party.
As a brother-in-law and close personal friend of T u n Abdul Razak, his
appointment as Deputy Prime Minisier was viewed as the Prime
Minister's prerogative rather than a matier of party selection. Although
Hussein Onn was held in high esteem, he was fully dependent on T u n
Razak for his position and for political backing. Because Hussein O n n
had also suffered a hean attack, his sudden accession to the post of Prime
Minister led many to speculate that he was only temporarily holding the
office until a suitable candidate could be selected. 1
T h e apparent weakness of Hussein Onn seemed to encourage factional
rivalries in U M N O to surface. All through the Razak era, there had been
an undercurrent of criticism and opposition to T u n Razak from within
U M N O , as well as within some of the panies in the BN coalition. Since
U M N O provided the core base of suppon for the government, the
problem of factional divisions in U M N O vvas far more serious for the
government. There arc several explanations for the increased factional
cleavages in U M N O . First, Tun Razak was believed to have wrested
power from T u n k u Abdul Rahman in the wake of the 1969 riots against
the wishes of the latter and the large core of his supponers within the
pany. Further, T u n Razak had moved against the 'Old Guard' when he
finally assumed full powers of Prime Minister. T h e n , in his relations with
U M N O , he had not remained above the factional alignments, but had
openly instructed delegates at the U M N O General Assembly to support
candidates he favoured for the high offices of the party. T h e strong and
interventionist leadership style of T u n Razak had left a legacy of biltemess
among a group of disappointed power-seekers who assumed that Hussein
O n n would be fairly easy to challenge and out-manoeuvre.

Perhaps as a means to distance himself from the factional alignments of

the Razak era, Hussein Onn chose as his new Deputy Prime Minister
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 55

D r M a h a l h i r M o h a m a d . A t the 1975 U M N O General A s s e m b l y ,

Dr M a h a t h i r had been elected as one of three U M N O Vice-Presidents,
b u t with the smallest vote, after Ghafar Baba and T e n g k u Razaleigh
Hamzah. 2 Dr M a h a t h i r had previously been Education Minister a n d w a s
seen to have acted decisively and firmly in ihe earUer s i u d e m d i s t u r b -
a n c e s . He was also vie\ved as an articulate spokesman for the new
generation of educated Malays that was assuming a m o r e i m p o r t a m role
in Malay politics. W i t h i n U M N O , he had avoided affiliation with the
factional divisions that had been mobilizing for a challenge to the
i n c u m b e n t leadership of the party and the government. At the l i m e ,
Dr .Mahathir's selection as D e p u t y Prime Minister was seen as bypassing
t w o very strong candidates w h o might mount a challenge to ihe leadership
of H u s s e i n O n n . At the same time, Dr .Mahathir projected a public image
of youth and d y n a m i s m that was considered to be an asset by the new
administration.
T h e potential factional alignment challenging Hussein O n n w a s a
g r o u p of f o r m i d a b l e political figures w h o were either opposed to the
Razak style of politics, or whose political advancement appeared to be
blocked by those w h o were promoted by T u n Razak and then by H u s s e i n
O n n . O n e of the key figures in the opposition faction was T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n , w h o had a degree of autonomy and immunity from reialiation
by virtue of being both retired and the Kather of Malaysian I n d e p e n d e n c e .
He used his considerable prestige to write critical evaluations of Malaysian
political affairs in a weekly column published in the n e w s p a p e r , The Star.
At one p o i n t . T u n Razak sought to impede this source of critical
c o m m e n t a r y by attempting to p u r c h a s e controlling shares in the p a p e r ,
b u t T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n went to his political ally. T u n M u s t a p h a of
S a b a h , w h o p r o m p t l y purchased sufficient shares in the paper to assure
that control w o u l d remain in the hands of those willing to publish mild
b u t open criticism of the government. 3

O n e of the charges laid against both T u n Razak and Hussein O n n w a s

that they w e r e subject to ' C o m m u n i s t ' influence. It is difficult to assess
precisely what was m e a n t by this charge. Rather vague accusations were
m a d e by s o m e U M N O leaders that they relied on some advisers and
c o n f i d a n t s w h o were believed to be secret agents of the .Malayan C o m -
munist P a r t y , or that some of their advisers espoused ' r a d i c a r or leftist
policies w h i c h w e r e similar to C o m m u n i s t doctrines and therefore lo be
o p p o s e d . Although it was difficult to attack the Prime Minister directly,
his advisers or confidants were not i m m u n e f r o m criticisms or charges of
misleading the P r i m e Minister. T u n Razak's critics accused him of being
u n d e r the influence of a small g r o u p of advisers composed of Ghafar
B a b a . A b d u l l a h A h m a d , Abdullah M a j i d , and Khalil Akasah. 4 W h e n
H u s s e i n O n n took over ihe leadership of the g o v e r n m e n t , s o m e of
Tun R a z a k ' s close advisers were not retained; among t h e m was Ghafar
Baba, w h o w a s disappointed that he had been passed over as t h e l o p
c a n d i d a t e for the post of D e p u t y Prime Minister. In r e a a i o n to this
a p p a r e n t slight. G h a f a r Baba refused to sen'c in ihe new Cabinet u n d e r
Hussein O n n .
56 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

D i s p u t e s over both policy issues a n d ptronage m a d e it necessary for

H u s s e i n O n n t o m o v e against t h e f t o i a a i n U M N O t h n w a s rather
o p e n l y challenging his s u c c e s s i o n t o p o w e r . I n r e a o w a t o t h e s e m o v e s ,
his d c t i a c t o i s began to spread n n n o u n ifatt U M N O h a d an Aidit or a
S u b a n d r i o i n its m i d s t , m e a n i n g t h a t t h e r e w e r e ' C o m m u n i s t s ' w h o h a d
gained influence and access to the t o p echelon of l e a d e r s h i p in the
c o u n t r y . T h e s e accusations w e r e g i v a s o m e c r e d e n c e i n 1976, just before
t h e U M N O General A s s e m b l y , w h e n t h e M i n i s t e r o f H o m e Affairs,
Ghazali Shafie, authorized t h e arrest u n d e r ifae l a t e r a l Security Act of
A b d u l S a m a d Ismail, the M a n a g i n g E d i t o r o f t h e N e w Straits T i m e s
G r o u p . In a bizarre series of r c v r l a t i a a s , a I k : g n i o n t w e r e m a d e in his
s u b s e q u e n t 'confession' to a series of alleged plots a n d political schemes
i n w h i c h Singapore a n d I n d n n r s a n p o i i i k a l f i g n r e s a n d s o m e exiled
Malaysians were invotved. L a t e r , A b d u l l a h A h m a d a n d several o t h e r s
w e r e also arrested a n d Abdullah A h m a d a d m i t t e d t o h a v i n g 'close
c o n t a c t ' with a foreign e m b a s s y , w h i c h was a p p a r e n t l y the Soviet E m b a s s y
that had r e c e n t l y been e s t a b l i s h e d i n K u a l a L u m p u r . 5 T h e validity o f
these confessions is subfect to d i s p u t e d interpretation. What w a s clear,
w a s that these d e v d o p m e n t s l e m s o m e c r e d e n c e t o t h e attacks o n
H u s s e i n O n n f o r being manipulated by associates whose m o t i v e s w e r e , at
t h e very least, suspect.

The Harun Case

O n e o f t h e most o u t s p o k e n critics o f H u s s e i n O o n w u l l a n m Idris, then

President o f U M N O Youth a n d a v e r y d y i a n a c personality w h o com-
m a n d e d tbe s u p p o n o f a large b c t i a o o f U M N O m o n b e r s . H e was
r e m e m b e r e d f o r his stroog d e f e n c e o f M a l a y r i g h t s a n d t h e willingness t o
sanction tbe use o f 'direct a c t i o n ' against d e m o n s t r a t o r s a a d those w h o
a p p e a r e d to be challenging tbe political p o w e r a n d the privileges of
t h e Malays at the t i m e the 1969 crisis. As a s p o n s o r of a large n e t w o r k
o f Malay martial-arts d u b s , b e c o m m a n d c d a n i m a g e o f t h e traditional
Malay h e r o w a r r i o r . T h i s image w a s f u r t h e r c o h i v z i e d w h e n H a r u n acted
as the principal organizer of a W o r i d H e a v y w e i g h t Boxing c h a m p i o n s h i p
fight in Kuala L u m p u r between M u h a m m a d Ali a n d Joe B u g n e r in 1975.
Because of the popularity of M u h a m m a d Ali in all of t h e M u s l i m w o r l d ,
t h e f i g h t a t t r s a e d m u c h a t t e n t i o n a n d publicity. Q u e s t i o n a b l e f i n a n c i a l
practices associated with that f i g h t , h o w e v e r , a n d H a n m ' s i n v o l v e m e n t
w i d i losses i n c u r r e d by Bank R a k y a t , led to an investigation w h i c h
revealed various c o r r u p t a n d iiregtilar activities. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , he
w a s r e m o v e d as M e n t e r i Besar Selangor a n d offered a post as a m b a s -
s a d o r to the United N a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , be was unwilling to exit grace-
fully a s had been a r r a n g e d u i t b s o m e o t b e r notable politicians w h e n
a c c u s e d o f shady o r irregular a c t i v i t i e s . T b e d e f i a n t p o s t u r e o f H a r u n o n
t h e s e matters p r o m p t e d the government to file corruption a n d criminal
b r e a c h o f trust charges against h i m . T h e f i r s t i n d i c t m e n t w a s f i l e d before
t h e d e a t h o f T u n R a z a k , 6 b u t u w a s H u s s e i n O n n w h o w a s left with the
p r o b l e m of facing the political c o o s e q u e o c e s of that action.
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 57

H a r u n m o i m i e d a twofold counter-attack. He answered the accusations

in c o u r t ; and he mobilized his s u p p o r t e r s to provide evidence of his
impressive political s u p p o r t i n U M N O . A t the U M N O General Assembly
in J u n e 1975, he was elected as one of the U M N O Vice-President even
a f t e r the c o r r u p t i o n charges had been l a i d . ' His s u p p o r t e r s also stepped
u p the accusations against T u n Razak and later Hussein O n n for being
influenced by 'Communists', intimating that these actions against H a n m
w e r e m o u v a t e d by fear of Harxm's 'anti-communist' stance.
W h e n H u s s e i n O n n a s s u m e d the office of Prime Minister, one of t h e
first m a j o r issues he had to face was what to do about H a r u n . T h e c o u n
case h a d p r o c e e d e d a n d H a r u n had been c o n v i a e d o f c o r r u p t i o n a n d
given a two-year prison sentence. H i s supporters pleaded for a p a r d o n or
remission of sentence. Instead, Hussein O n n moved to expel Harun f r o m
U M N O , even t h o u g h the sentence was suspended while H a n m appealed
his conviction to the Privy Council. At the 1977 U M N O General
A s s e m b l y , H a r u n ' s s u p p o r t e r s sought his rehabilitation by a strong s h o w
of s u p p o r t Politically, his case was aided by the strong support that he
received f r o m the faction known a s the ' U M N O Old G u a r d ' . ' W h e n
H a r t m ' s appeal to the Privy Council against conviction on c o r r u p t i o n
c h a r g e s was rejected in F e b r u a r y 1978, his supporters m a d e a s h o w of
force to d e f e n d h i m against serving a prison term. Eventually, h o w e v e r ,
he s u r r e n d e r e d to serve his jail sentence. An appeal for pardon w a s
s u b m i t t e d to the Yang d i - P e n u a n Agong, b u t this, too, was r e j e c t e d . '
D e s p i t e these set-backs, H a r u n retained widespread Malay s u p p o r t ,
w h i c h w a s revealed at the 1978 U M N O General Assembly sessions w h e n
h e w a s e l e a e d t o the U M N O S u p r e m e Council and his n e p h e w , H a j i
S u h a i m i D a t u k K a m a r u d d i n , was elected President o f U M N O Y o u t h . ' "
D e s p i t e his c o n t i n u e d political s u p p o n within U M N O , n o pardon was
a r r a n g e d a n d H a r u n Idris served his prison sentence until mid-1981.

Chinese Politics within the Barisan Nasional F o m a t

Just as factional divisions within U M N O exposed disaffection a n d division

within the M a l a y electorate, there were also signs of fractures a m o n g the
n o n - M a l a y political parties within the BN coalition. P e r h a p s the f u n d a -
m e n t a l cause of their malaise was the general feeling of being used for
political s u p p o n of the government while being largely ignored in policy
m a t t e r s d e e m e d to be of vital interest to the non-Malay c o m m u n i t i e s .
A l t h o u g h political patronage was used to reward compliant a n d co-
operative elites, such a distribution of benefits was increasingly viewed
by non-elites as inadequate, if not blatantly c o m i p u n g the role of their
political representatives. As a result, especially within the d o m a i n of
C h i n e s e politics, there emerged m o v e m e n t s of ' r e f o r m ' a n d opposition to
i n c u m b c n t leaders challenging their legitimacy a n d threatening to displace
t h e m for being i n e f f e a i v e or for becoming docile supplicants to the
d o m i n a n t Malay leadership at the federal level.

T h e i n h e r e n t instability in the politics of the Chinese c o m m u n i t y

b e c a m e manifest both d u r i n g the Razak Administration and in the early
58 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

years of H u s s e i n O n n ' s period in office. In the a f t e r m a t h of the 1969 riots

a n d the dismal p e r f o r m a n c e of the M C A in the 1969 election, t h e r e was
m u c h soul-searching wiihin the Chinese c o m m u n i t y concerning political
strategies and the most effective m e a n s to d e f e n d and p r o m o t e Chinese
interests. To m a n y , e n d e m i c political division within the Chinese com-
m u n i t y was to b l a m e for the tragedy of 1969 and the weakened political
voicc of the C h i n e s e . T h i s analysis p r o m p t e d the formation of what w a s
called the 'Chinese Unity M o v e m e n t ' . T h e objective of this m o v e m e n t
w a s to generate a new d y n a m i c leadership wiihin the M C A a n d to
b r o a d e n its base of s u p p o r t to encompass ail Chinese-based political
organizations a n d p a n i c s .
D u r i n g the early 1970s, the Chinese Unity M o v e m e n t gathered s o m e
m o m e n t u m t h r o u g h the energetic efforts of such people as Alex L e e ,
D r T a n Tiong H o n g , and D r Lim K e n g Yaik. I t mobilized considerable
s u p p o n , especially a m o n g Chinese alienated by the style of politics in the
prc-1969 era. Yet, it soon bccame apparent that the movement challenged
the existing political leadership of Chinese-based p a n i c s , p a n t c u l a r l y the
M C A a n d G c r a k a n . While it raised expectations and mobilized s u p p o r t
for Chinese defined causes, the m o v e m e n t did not create the u n i t y wiihin
t h e Chinese c o m m u n i t y that was its stated goal.
W i t h i n the M C A , a factional struggle developed beiween the established
leadership and a newer g r o u p identified with the (Chinese Unity Move-
ment seeking to define ' C h i n e s e rights', which w e r e espoused as a
parallel concept to that of B u m i p u t r a righis for Malays a n d i n d i g e n o u s
peoples. T h e very notion of separate special rights for Chinese was
sensitive a n d emotionally loaded, especially for the other ethnic c o m m u n -
ities. Eventually, in 1973, the .MCA, u n d e r pressure f r o m ihc B N , h a d
to p u r g e the m o r e militant s p o k e s m e n of ihc m o v e m e n t so as to p r e s e n e
p a n y discipline and keep within the rules of political behaviour i m p o s e d
by the B N . Despite the d e m i s e of the Chinese U n i t y M o v e m e n t , it d i d
have the effect of m a k i n g C h i n e s e poliiical leaders m o r e conscious of
their need to cultivate grass-roots s u p p o n a n d to espouse causes that
w o u l d bring visible benefits lo their c o n s t i t u e n t s . "
T h e constraints placed by the BN on p u b l i c mobilization for policy
d e m a n d s by constituent parties m a d e it especially difficult for n o n - M a l a y
politicians in the BN to c o m p c t e with the opposition parties for the
s u p p o r t of their consiituenis. Although criticism and mobilization of
p u b l i c s u p p o r t for public policy d e m a n d s w a s severely c o n s t r a i n e d , these
restrictions d i d not limit ihe 'self-help' activities that BN p a n i c s m i g h t
s p o n s o r to benefit their constituents. F o r this reason, u n d e r the leader-
s h i p of Lee San C h o o n , w h o became M C A President in 1974, the M C A
began to explore various projects w h i c h w o u l d benefit the Chinese
w i t h o u t raising m a j o r objections f r o m o t h e r constituent p a n i c s i n t h e B N
coalition. Of p a n i c u l a r c o n c e r n to p a n y leaders was the question of h o w
t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y could keep u p with the c h a n g i n g e c o n o m i c
c o n d i t i o n s and m o r e compeiitive business c m i r o n m e n i created b y the
N E P . G o v e r n m e n t assistance a n d g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d B u m i p u t r a
c o r p o r a t i o n s w e r e posing a serious challenge to n o n - M a l a y business a n d
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 59

c o m m e r c i a l v e n t u r e s . While government policy was vigorously p u r s u i n g

the 30 per cent N E P target goal for ihe Malays, t h e 40 p e r cent target
goal for the non-Malay-s in commercial enterprise was left to private
initiative if it w a s to be attained. M a n y Chinese feared that most Chinese
enterprises operated with traditional and archaic management practices
a n d with limited financial resources so that they were at risk in competi-
tion with well-fmanced g o v e m m e n t - a i d e d B u m i p u i r a corporations
e m p l o y i n g m o d e m management p r a a i c e s . T o meet this issue, the M C A
b e g a n a series of educational p r o g r a m m e s designed to u p g r a d e the skills
a n d business practices of Chinese in the typical small family-owned
business or m a n u f a c t u r i n g enterprise.
D u r i n g 1975 Parliament passed the Industrial Coordination Act ( I C A ) ,
w h i c h extended the N E P racial employment quota sv-stem to the private
sector. T h e objective of the Act was to ensure that industry and c o m m e r c e
w o u l d employ 30 per cent Malays and promote t h e m in a p p r o p r i a t e
s e q u e n c e to supervisory and management positions. These new require-
m e n i s were viewed as being especially difficult for Chinese business
o p e r a i i o n s , panicularly the more traditional family-based small business
e n t e r p n s e s . As a result, Chinese business interests, mobilized great
p r e s s u r e on Chinese political leaders in g o v e m m e n i , in both the M C A a n d
G e r a k a n , to seek a m e n d m e n t s to the Act and to secure favourable
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e rulings in its implementation. T h e p r i m a r y vehicle for this
mobilization of opposition to the ICA bccame the Associated Chinese
C h a m b e r s of C o m m e r c e and Industry of Malaysia ( A C C C I M ) , which
eventually achieved partial success in securing some m i n o r concessions
a n d p r o m i s e s that the Aa would not be administered 'overzealously'.
E v e n so, the g o v e r n m e n t remained unwavering in pursuing the p r i m a r y
objectives of the I C A , since the Act was considered a mainstay i n s t r u m e n t
in achieving ihe target goals promised the Malays for improved employ-
m e n t o p p o n u n i t i e s and economic betterment u n d e r the N e w E c o n o m i c
Policy.

As p a n of the strategy for revival of Chinese influence in public afl'airs,

the M C A d e c i d e d to p u r c h a s e controlling stock in ihe daily n e w s p a p e r ,
The Star. Earlier, U M N O had acquired control of the New Straits Times,
which s u p p o n e d a n d reflected the views of the c o u n t r y ' s U M N O leader-
ship. Although no m a j o r daily p a p e r was a critic of the g o v e r n m e n t , the
e m p h a s i s in the New Straits Times and The Star were different, with the
latter reporting in m o r e detail on political news of interest to non-Malay
readers. T h e r e f o r e , the political activities of M C A leaders a n d the M C A
perspective on politics was m o r e thoroughly and sympatheiically covered
in The Star.
Because the Chinese c o m m u n i t y as a whole feared the long-term
impact of t h e N E P a n d was anxious that its promised share of the
c c o n o m y w o u l d be eroded by the aggressive 'restructuring' policies of the
g o v e r n m e n t , m u c h attention was given by Chinese leaders to strategies
that would e n s u r e an equitable f u t u r e for the c o m m u n i t y . O n e of the
most i m p o n a n i strategies involved the promotion of Chinese participation
in the share-market e c o n o m y t h r o u g h the formation of co-operatives a n d
 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

c o r p o r a t e bodies that would channel the petty savings of ordinary Chinese

i n t o the growth sectors of the economy. W h e r e a s Malay-based corporate
b o d i e s were being formed by the g o v e r n m e n t to p r o m o t e the Malay stake
in the e c o n o m y , Chinese-based corporate structures were sponsored by
t h e M C A t o p r o m o t e the Chinese stake i n the e c o n o m y . T h e f i i r s t M C A -
s p o n s o r e d co-operative was s t a n e d about 1969, b u t their n u m b e r a n d
range of activities increased markedly after 1975. T h e largest a n d most
significant of such institutions was M u l t i - P u r p o s e H o l d i n g s Berhad
( M P H B ) , which bccame the p r i m a r y institutional vehicle for p r o m o t i n g
C h i n e s e investment in m o d e m sectors of ihe e c o n o m y . U n d e r the leader-
s h i p of T a n K o o n Swan, this c o m p a n y was f o r m e d in 1977 with an initial
i n v e s t m e n t of 26,000 shareholders a n d a paid-up capital of M $ 3 0 million.
By 1983 M P H B had assets of M $ 1 . 4 6 billion a n d it had g r o w n to b e c o m e
tbe centre of a large financial conglomcraie that had control or substantial
i n v e s t m e n t s in a b o u t 75 m a j o r multinational corporations in the fields of
s h i p p i n g , r u b b e r , palm-oil, m i n i n g , hotels, real e s u t e , m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,
c o n s t r u c t i o n , insurance, and banking. 1 3
T h e idea of self-help projects for the Chinese c o m m u n i t y began to be
a p p l i e d to a n o t h e r key area of Chinese c o n c e r n — e d u c a t i o n , arising f r o m
the desire to preserve Chinese education and the increasing difficulty
faced by qualified non-Malays in gaining admission to Malaysian univer-
sities with their B u m i p u t r a q u o t a sy-stem. By 1977 the n u m b e r of
a d m i s s i o n s to universities for non-Malays had been r c d u c e d to less than
25 p e r cent. 1 4 Reacting to this situation, Chinese leaders in the M C A .
G e r a k a n , a n d the D A P all s u p p o r t e d proposals for the formation of
privately financed higher educational institutions. Earlier, in 1975, the
M C A had sponsored the formation of a lechnical college called T u n k u
A b d u l R a h m a n College, which had an initial e n r o l m e n t of 1,020. By
1980 it h a d e x p a n d e d to over 4 , 0 0 0 students. T h i s college provided
technical a n d professional training designed to meet the needs of industry-
a n d c o m m e r c e . T h e success of that college led to a m o r e ambitious
p r o p o s a l — t o set up a privately f u n d e d university to be called ' M e r d e k a
University'. T h e s p o n s o n proposed that it would use Chinese as a
m e d i u m of instruction and it would provide advanced university- e d u c a t i o n
across all m a j o r academic fields. T h e proposal for incorporation w a s
s u p p o n e d by over 4.000 w h o signed a petition which was s u b m i t t e d to
t h e Yang d i - P e n u a n Agong in July 1978. T h e s u p p o r t e r s argued that the
M e r d e k a University would be a logical extension of the Chinese p r i m a r y
schools that were still being operated by the g o v e r n m e n t , as well as the
C h i n e s e secondary schools that were still being operated by private f u n d s
a n d m a n a g e m e n t committees. It also appeared to be a logical extension of
the principle that had been accepted earlier w h e n T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n
College had been incorporated,. 1 5

A l t h o u g h the proposals for M e r d e k a University received the endorse-

m e n t of the M C A , G e r a k a n , and the D A P , the response of the govern-
m e n t was delayed until after the 1978 election, p e r h a p s to avoid political
repercussions d u r i n g the campaign. H o w e v e r , once the m a n d a t e was
r e n e w e d , the M e r d e k a University proposals generated a torrent of criticism
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 61

f r o m p r o m l n e m Malay leaders. At the U M N O General Assembly in

S e p t e m b e r 1978, t h e issue of M e r d e k a University was raised a n d E d u c a -
tion M i n i s t e r M u s a H i t a m a n n o u n c e d that the petition vrauld be rejected
because it would set up a private u n i v e n i t y that w o u l d (each in the
C h i n e s e m e d i t m i a n d it would therefore be in coofiict with the obiectives
of a unified national system of education. Despite this a n n o u n c e m e n t ,
massive Chinese s u p p o n for ihe proposals c o n t i n u e d , putting p r e s s u r e on
C h i n e s e leaders i n the M C A , G e r a k a n , and the D A P t o p e r s u a d e t b e
g o v e m m e n t to reverse its a n n o u n c e d stand on the issue.
T h e interim council for M e r d e k a University u n d e r ihe c h a i r m a n s h i p of
L i m F o n g Seng decided to stage a mass meeting for 22 O c t o b e r to
consider the next m o v e . Plans were also laid to sponsor a c o u n challenge
of the decision as violating Malaysian constitutiotial guarantees p e r m i t t i n g
t h e use of o t h e r languages and as a violation of ihe United Nations
Declaration of H u m a n Rights. Before the mass meeting could be con-
v e n e d , h o w e v e r , it was b a n n e d by the g o v e m m e n t on the g r o u n d s that it
w o u l d likely spark c o m m u n a l violence. Although the M e r d e k a University
proposal w a s decisively rejected b y Prime Minisier Hussein O n n , " t h e
massive mobilization of s u p p o n for the proposal did have the e f f e a of
raising issues w h i c h required a review of some education policies that
w e r e a matter of high priority for the non-Malay communities. Shortly
t h e r e a f t e r , s o m e a d j u s t m e n t s were m a d e t o admission q u o u s t o Malaysian
universities providing for a gradual increase in the q u o t a s allotted to n o n -
M a l a y s so as gradually and eventually to adjust these admission q u o t a s to
r e f l e a the ethnic balance of the population as a w h o l e . "

T h e K e l a n t a n Crisis

So long as the BN coalition remained intact, political p o w e r at the federal

level w a s stable a n d unchallenged. Conflicts a n d o p p o s i u o n to the
leadership of Hussein O n n and the BN did e r u p t , h o w e v e r , in certain
states w h e r e o p p o s i u o n to the g o v e m m e n t was e n d e m i c a n d long-
s t a n d i n g . F o r the national leadership, the states of K e l a n t a n , P e r a k , a n d
Malacca all generated crises or r u m b l i n g s of discontent d u r i n g t h e t e n u r e
of H u s s e i n O n n as Prime Minister. In the cases of P e r a k a n d Malacca,
state Elites were willing to accept a 'federal f o r m u l a ' for the resolution of
political d i s p u t e s at the state level. In the case of K e l a n t a n , a crisis
e m e r g e d w h e n state elites r e j e a e d federal intervention to resolve an
escalating d i s p u t e that e r u p t e d a m o n g themselves.
In K e l a n t a n , a smouldering conflict had been brewing ever since t h e
1974 election. At issue was the role of PAS at the state level within the
BN coalition, Kelantan w a s acknowledged to be a stronghold of P A S
s u p p o r t , yet after PAS had joined the B N , the PAS-led government
o p e r a t e d within the limits imposed by their m e m b e r s h i p in the B N . S u c h
a coalition w a s viewed as m o r e advantageous to federally e l e a e d P A S
elites than it w a s to those P A S leaders w h o were e l e a e d at the state level.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , i n K e l a n t a n , despite the coalition, U M N O a n d P A S
rivalries c o n t i n u e d over m a t t e n of p o w e r a n d p u b l i c policy.
62 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T h e most contentious issues involved land policy, since land was a

state matter and the basis for a maior proportion of state revenues.
Moreover, land revenues were not subject to federal control a n d in the
pre-coalition period land revenues had been used to f u n d projects of
special interest to PAS. Over lime, certain politicians were alleged to
have profited f r o m arranging lucrative timber a n d mineral concessions
with various corporate interests outside the s u t e . In 1977 the ( P A S )
M e n t e r i Besar, M o h a m e d N a s i r , decided to freeze logging land con-
cessions, alleging c o r r u p t practices by the State E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t
C o r p o r a t i o n a n d the Agricultural Development Board. In r e a a i o n .
twenty PAS Kelantan assemblymen accused M o h a m e d Nasir of failing lo
protect party interests a n d called for his resignation as M e n t e r i Besar.
M o h a m e d Nasir refused to resign even though he lost the s u p p o r t of his
p a n y and was also requested lo resign by the President of P A S ,
M o h a m e d Asri M u d a . "
T h e struggle for political control in Kelantan quickly shifted to the
streets w h e n massive d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , some as large as 80,000-strong.
w e r e staged in s u p p o r t of .Mohamed N a s i r . w h o depicted himself as a
d e f e n d e r of honest a n d clean government battling against c o r r u p t a n d
self-serving politicians seeking profits f r o m the land concession system.
VITien M o h a m e d N a s i r ignored the d e m a n d s of his o p p o n e n t s , the
National Executive Council of PAS was convened and expelled him f r o m
the party. In the Kelantan State Assemblv, a 'no-confidence' motion was
tabled a n d e a r n e d by 20 P A S votes after 13 U M N O and one M C A
a s s e m b l y m e n had walked out in protest. A legal impasse e n s u e d with
M o h a m e d Nasir calling for the dissolution of the State Assembly, while
P A S called again for the Menteri Besar's resignation in accordance with
n o r m a l parliamentary practice following the passage of a 'no-confidence'
motion. M e a n w h i l e , the street d e m o n s t r a t i o n s had degenerated into
violence a n d looting by .Mohamed N a s i r ' s s u p p o r t e r s , which t h e n became
the justification for a federal declaration of an e m e r g e n c y a n d a c u r f e w
for the area.

As the crisis u n f o l d e d , federal leaders had tried to p e r s u a d e the

Kelantan PAS leaders to avoid provoking a c o n f r o n t a t i o n with its ' n o -
c o n f i d e n c e ' m o t i o n . Representing Hussein O n n . Dr Mahathir was sent to
K e l a n t a n to offer a pcace formula: sue PAS m e m b e r s of the Executive
Council a n d M o h a m e d Nasir would resign, a new M e n t e r i Besar w o u l d
be selected along with new P A S m e m b e r s for the Executive C o u n c i l . T h e
four PAS leaders w h o had precipitated the crisis w e r e to be excluded
f r o m the Executive Council. W h e n the PAS leaders rejected this federal
f o r m u l a , a second proposal was m a d e for the resignation of all Council
M e m b e r s , but again with no reappointment for the four PAS ringleaders.
A f t e r a similar rejection of the second proposal. H u s s e i n O n n m e t a P A S
delegation a n d issued an u l t i m a t u m : federal rule over K e l a n u n would be
i m p o s e d if P A S did not accept the terms offered by him for resolution of
t h e crisis in Kelantan.
Even before the 7 N o v e m b e r deadline set for a reply to the federal
u l t i m a t u m , a bill was rushed t h r o u g h Parliament providing for the
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 63

jmposiiion of federal rule u n d e r ihe conirol of a federal civil servant. T h e

bill w a s passed with 118 votes in s u p p o n and 18 o p p o s e d , including 12 of
t h e 14 P A S m e m b e r s a n d all 6 DAP m e m b e r s . O n e P A S m e m b e r w a s
a b s e n t , while the one PAS m e m b e r w h o voted with the BN on this biU
w a s p r o m p t l y expelled f r o m P A S for violating party discipline. M o h a m e d
Asri, along with four other PAS m e m b e r s w h o held office in the BN
g o v e r n m e n t , resigned their positions but also explained that P A S w o u l d
remain in the B N . " T h e wish of P A S leaders to remain in the BN was
q u i c k l y foreclosed w h e n the Barisan Nasional Council met to expel all
m e m b e r s w h o had voted against the Kelantan Emergency Bill.
T h e imposition by the Federal G o v e n u n e n t of 'emergency rule' over
Kelantan lasted only three m o n t h s — j u s t long e n o u g h to s u b i l i z e the
political situation—and then Hussein O n n called a surprise election for
the state before PAS could regain the political initiative a n d remobilize its
s u p p o r t e r s . T h e election date was sei for 11 March 1978. In the i n t e r i m ,
M o h a m e d N a s i r was appointed caretaker Menteri Besar, giving h i m an
advantage to campaign as the i n c u m b c n t . T h e restriction on large rallies
a n d the reliance on small g r o u p ceramah meetings gave U M N O , with its
larger financial and organizational resources, an advantage. T h e t w o
c o n t e n d i n g parties of U M N O and PAS were joined by a third party
f o r m e d by M o h a m e d Nasir, the former (PAS) .Menteri Besar and now
caretaker Menteri Besar u n d e r federal rule. His new party was called
Barisan J e m a a h Islamiah Se-Malaysia, which was better k n o w n by the
a c r o n y m 'Berjasa",
I n the s h o n e n e d month-long c a m p a i g n , U M N O promised economic
g r o w t h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t projects for the state; P A S played on its
traditional Islamic t h e m e s ; while Berjasa campaigned against the c o r r u p t
practices of P A S politicians in the previous state administration. In the
selection of seats to contest, it became obvious that the BN and Berjasa
had c o m e to an electoral agreement which was reflected in the election
results. Beriasa won 11 Assembly seats, all of which w e r e in straight
contests with P A S . BN won 23 seats. 13 of which were w o n as a r e s u h of
Berjasa's splitting votes away f r o m PAS. Although P A S had fielded
c a n d i d a t e s in 36 constituencies, it was able to c a p m r e only 2 seats. T h e
distribution of votes reveals the electoral s u p p o n of the c o n t e n d i n g
parties; B N , 3 6 . 7 p e r cent; P A S , 32.7 per c e n t ; and Beriasa, 27 p e r cent.
Because the results were such a c r u s h i n g defeat for P A S , the election w a s
widely interpreted as a h a r b i n g e r of an early federal election to capitalize
on the political m o m e n t u m of the B N . 2 0

A l t h o u g h the Kelantan crisis had originated at the s u t e level within the

r a n k s of P A S . what these events demonstrated was that federal leaders
w e r e unyielding in imposing a 'federal f o r m u l a ' for the resolution of
conflicts at the state level. When such agreement was not f o r t h c o m i n g
f r o m state leaders, federal p o w e r s were invoked to p u n i s h the recalcitrant
state leaders. F u n h e r m o r e , the crisis was used as a justification to tip t h e
political balance at the state level to U M N O state leaders w h o w e r e
viewed as the m o r e co-operative a n d reliable c o m e r - s t o n e of the BN
s t r u c t u r e . T h e political aspirations of the Kelantan C h a i r m a n of U M N O ,
64 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T e n g k u Razaleigh H a n u a h , m a y also have be«n a factor in the federal

decisions relating to the Kelantan crisis. Certainly, ihe imposition of
federal rule enhanced both ihe power of U M N O and the political p o w e r
of F i n a n c e Minister T e n g k u Razaleigh in his alleged aspiration for
e n h a n c e d p o w e r at the federal level.

Sarawak and Sabah under Federal T u t e l a g e

In Sarawak, the BN was based on the strong and skilful leadership of

A b d u l R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b , w h o headed the minority M a l a y - M u s l i m - b a s e d
Partai Pesaka B u m i p u t e r a Bersatu. As leader of the B N , he exploited
federal s u p p o r t and used his power as Chief Minister to build a n d retain
control of a wider M a l a y - n a t i v e - C h i n e s e coalition. Using c o n s u m m a t e
skills of balancing and playing off coalition partners against each other,
he gradually constructed a stable government, W i t h federal s u p p o n ,
R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b had become Chief Minister of Sarawak in 1970, w h e n
he headed the Malay-based Party B u m i p u t e r a , which held only a b o u t
o n e - f o u r t h of ihe seats in the Sarawak Council N e g r i . H i s a t t e m p t to
w i d e n his political base and create a Malay-native coalition in 1973 by a
merger with the Iban-based Party Pesaka was largely symbolic a n d
stillborn since the Pesaka leaders were unable to bring their Iban
s u p p o r t e r s into the new B u m i p u t r a - i n d i g e n o u s party known as Partai
Pesaka B u m i p u t e r a Bersatu. After the Sarawak state election in 1974,
R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b widened the Sarawak BN to include the largest p a r t y ,
Sarawak National Party ( S N A P ) , which c o m m a n d e d the s u p p o r t of most
of the interior native peoples. 2 1 W i t h i n the state g o v e r n m e n t , S N A P still
acted as a voice for the interests of non-.Muslim interior native peoples,
but the contest was shifted f r o m the media ond public d e b a t e to the i n n e r
councils of government and within administrative agencies.

As the 1978 election a p p r o a c h e d , Sarawak Chief Minister A b d u l

R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b was able to keep the BN coalition together despite t h e
strains between the m e m b e r parties along the native-Chinese cleavage as
well as the native-Malay/Muslim cleavage. T h e Sarawak BN was able to
field an agreed-upon state of candidates in 1978, although dissatisfaction
within the Chief Minister's own PBB ranks led to the breakaway faction
f o r m i n g a p a n y called Partai Anak Jati Sarawak, m o r e popularly k n o w n
as P A J A R . which m e a n s ' d a w n ' in Malay. Its leader was H a j i Alli K a w i ,
a f o r m e r state police chief of the Sarawak Special B r a n c h , w h o m o u n t e d a
c a m p a i g n challenging the leadership of R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b and accusing
his g o v e r n m e n t of engaging in corruption a n d nepotism, .More signific-
antly, P A J A R revealed the resurgence of the old conflicts within the
Malay c o m m u n i t y between u r b a n K u c h i n g Malays a r o u n d the capital
a n d the less privileged rural and more remote Malay c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e
lines of conflict could be traced back to the Brooke Sultanate and had
been perpetuated in ihe disputes over cession and the contests between
Parti Negara Sarawak (Panas) and Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak
( B A R J A S A ) in the 1 9 6 0 s . " T h r e e other m i n o r parties also contested
againsi ihe Sarawak BN state. T h e s e were Partai Umat Sarawak ( U M A T ) ,
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 65

Parti Negara Sarawak (Panas) a n d Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak

izaiion ( S A P O ) , each appealing to a different constituency—Malay,
native, a n d Chinese, in that o r d e r . Because of the weakening of his core
s u p p o r t , R a h m a n Y a ' a k u b chose not to submit his government to a state
election in 1978, at the same time thai the federal election w a s being
held. 2 3 Even so, the Sarawak B N , after m u c h internal bickering a n d wiih
federal involvement, did field an agreed c o m m o n slate of 24 candi-
dates for Ihe federal election. P A J A R was the most ambitious of the
opposition parties, fielding 12 candidates in Sarawak's 24 federal c o n -
stituencies. 2 4
In S a b a h , the new Berjaya government had been installed in April
1976 after nine years of iron-fisted rule by M u s t a p h a H a r u n . U n d e r
p r e s s u r e f r o m federal authorities, M u s t a p h a had 'resigned' as Chief
M i n i s t e r just before the 1976 s u t e election, but he remained politically
active as President of U S N O , which garnered 20 seats to Berjaya's
28 seats in the Sabah Assembly. So long as M u s t a p h a w a s plotting to
recover his power as Sabah Chief Minister, co-operaiion between Berjaya
a n d U S N O was not possible. T h e threat of civil violence loomed large
because M u s t a p h a had earlier permitted illegal immigration of p e r h a p s
150,000 Filipinos a n d s o m e 50,000 Indonesians to Sabah in a bid to tip
the d e m o g r a p h i c balance towards the M u s l i m - ' M a l a y ' political identity
being espoused b y U S N O . " Shortly after F u a d Stephens w a s installed a s
Chief Minisier of the Berjaya g o v e m m e n t in S a b a h , s o m e U S N O leaders
plotted to stage incidents that they h o p e d would lead to the declaration of
e m e r g e n c y rule a n d p r e s u m a b l y the r e t u m of M u s u p h a . B o m b s w e r e set
off in Kota K i n a b a l u , K u d a i , and S a n d a k a n , killing t w o people a n d
i n j u r i n g others. T h e police raided a house behind M u s t a p h a ' s villa a n d
f o u n d a large cache of a r m s , weapons, and explosives. Eventually, m o r e
than 4 , 0 0 0 people w e r e a r r e s t e d , m a n y of t h e m Filipino s u p p o r t e r s of
Mustapha.26

W h e n , along with a n u m b e r of his close political associates, F u a d

S t e p h e n s was killed in a plane crash on 6 J u n e 1976, after being in office
as Chief Minisier a biile m o r e than a m o n t h , the post of Chief Minister
a n d leader of the Berjaya g o v e r n m e n t devolved u p o n H a r r i s Salleh, w h o
h a d been the D e p u t y Chief Minister and was a f o u n d i n g leader of
Beriaya. H a r r i s Salleh quickly established control over the state govern-
ment a n d proceeded t o formulate development-oriented s u t e p r o -
g r a m m e s that contrasted with ihe waste and corruption of the M u s t a p h a
era. E v e n though his e f f o n s produced political s u b i l i t y within the state,
below the surface, ethnic tensions c o n i i n u e d , a n d , especially a m o n g
U S N O leaders, r e s e n t m e n t s s i m m e r e d over their loss of p o w e r . P r i o r to
t h e 1978 election, U S N O was admitted into the BN o n c e again at the
federal level, b u t not at the Sabah state level. W h e n t h e federal election
was called, an agreement was worked out w h e r e b y Beriaya contested
9 seats a n d U S N O contested 6 seats, with each party s u p p o r t i n g an
' I n d e p e n d e n t ' to contest one seat where a g r e e m e n t w a s not possible. It
was agreed thai the w i n n e r in that contest w o u l d be accepted into the BN
after the election. Because the Sabah g o v e m m e n t h a d only been in office
 66 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

for two years, there was no s u i e election in 1978, as was also the case
with Sarawak and K e l a n u n . 2 7

The Election of 1978

T h e BN election victory in Kelantan. c o m b i n e d with a fairly b u o y a n t

e c o n o m y , provided the basis for speculation that the government w o u l d
call a national election d u r i n g 1978, about one and a half years before the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s m a n d a t e expired. The primary difficulty faced by H u s s e i n
O n n was that he was still only Acting President of U M N O and t h e r e
remained within the party a substantial faction that was not pleased with
his leadership, largely because of the rigorous prosecution, conviction,
a n d i m p r i s o n m e n t of H a r u n I d r i s . as well as the bypassing of s o m e old
U M N O stalwarts for a new g r o u p of y o u n g e r , m o r e professional Malays,
s o m e of w h o m , such as .Musa H i t a m and Dr M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d , had
been d i s a p h n e d and exiled into the political wilderness by T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n . C o n s e q u e o t l y . it was by no m e a n s certain that Hussein O n n
could win election as U M N O President without a bruising a n d debilitating
f i g h t . T h e U M N O General Assembly was scheduled t o open o n 2 2 J u n e ,
a n d already, early in the year, candidates opposed to H u s s e i n O n n were
mobilizing their supporters. 2 8
R a t h e r than wait for a b a t d e to develop within U M N O , Hussein O n n
' p r e s e n t e d an 'election b u d g e t ' to P a r l i a m e n t , reshuffled his Cabinet a n d
m a d e preparations for the national election. 2 9 By .May, all parties expected
a n election. I n early J u n e , H u s s e m O n n p o s t t p o n e d the U M N O General
Assembly to S e p t e m b e r and called the election for 8 July, with nominal-
tion day set for 21 J u n e , leaving only sixteen days for c a m p a i g n i n g . In
a d d i t i o n , the g o v e r n m e n t issued a ban on all p u b h c rallies, thus forcing
parties to use door-to-door campaigning, tape-recorded speeches, a n d
c e r a m a h (small 'discussion g r o u p ' meetings) as the p r i m a r y t e c h n i q u e s for
contacting voters. 3 0
W i t h i n the B N , n u m e r o u s d i s p u t e s arose over the allocation of
seats to the constituient p a n i e s . Accorduig to the BN f o r m u l a , each
constituent party would defend the seats it had won in the previous
election. T h i s m e a n t that seats held by the opposition were the targets of
intense intra-BN competiiion. B e n a s a . the new party f o r m e d for the
K e l a n t a n state election, applied for admission to the B N . but only on the
c o n d i t i o n that it could field candidates m all former PAS constituencies
that were now vacant after the expulsion of P A S from the B N . It also
d e m a n d e d t h e same a p p o i n t e d positions in the govenrnteni that P A S had
h e l d . T h e inflexibility of Berjasa in these d e m a n d s led to its rejection by
the BN as a constituent party in the coalition. Sumlarly, competition
between the MCA and Gerakan f o r n o m i m t i o n to DAP-controIled
seats in P e n a n g , P e r a k , a n d Selangor led to severe controversy, w h i c h
was only resolved by Hussein O i m at the last possible m o m e n t b e f o r e
nominations were to be filed.
T h e m a j o r opposition t o the g o v e r n m e n t w a s m o u n t e d b y the D A P a n d
by P A S , t h e f o r m e r appealing to the n o n - M a l a y electorate a n d the latter
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 67

t h e Malay electorate. P A S , although still s m a n i n g f r o m its defeat in t h e

Kelantan state e l e a i o n , had e x p e c u t i o n s that it could regain the political
initiative by making m a j o r inroads in K e d a h while also recouping earlier
losses in Perlis and T r e n g g a n u . In K e d a h . the U M N O M e n t e r i Besar,
Syed A h m a d S h a h a b u d d i n , was believed to be an ineffective leader, and
w a s accused by PAS of neglecting peasant needs, especially d u r i n g a
d r o u g h t in the previous year. In earlier elections PAS had imseated
established n a m e s i n the U M N O firmament f r o m K e d a h , including
Dr M a h a t h i r M o h a m a d a n d Senu Abdul R a h m a n . Since P A S was now in
t h e opposition again, it was released from the obligation of restraint a n d
could launch a hard-hitting campaign on its familiar themes of protecting
I s l a m , i m p l e m e n t i n g Islamic Shariah law, establishing an Islamic state,
a n d preserving Malay.'lslamic h e g e m o n y in the political and economic
system. Although it had recently suffered a humiliating defeat in
K e l a n t a n , it hoped to be able to gain control of the state g o v e r n m e n t in
K e d a h w h e r e it had strong s u p p o r t and it could capitalize on growing
r e s e n t m e n t s against U M N O mis-rule at the state level. 32
T h e D A P was the best organized and most formidable of the opposi-
tion p a n i c s , appealing essentially to the non-Malay voters. Even before
the election, the small, ' n o n - c o m m u n a l ' but largely non-Malay P e k e m a s ,
w h i c h was led by the ailing Dr T a n Chee K h o o n , vinuaUy collapsed in a
wave of defections to the D A P . T h e D A P also picked up s u p p o r t e r s f r o m
defeated f a a i o n s of the MCA and f r o m Gerakan as a result of their
internecine d i s p u t e s over l e a d e n h i p and nominations on the BN ticket.
T h e failures of the non-.Malay BN partners to secure approval for
Merdeka University and to secure o t h e r concessions for Chinese education
w e r e skilfully exploited in the D A P campaign. 3 3 W i t h o u t directly attack-
ing the N e w Economic Policy and Malay special privileges, the D A P ' s
c a m p a i g n was explicit in calling for a shift in public policy priorities f r o m
e t h n i c distributive quotas to criteria based on economics and ' n e e d ' .
E v e n b e f o r e the e l e c u o n . the BN had won 9 federal seats and 17 state
seats that w e r e u n o p p o s e d . T h e BN campaigned on its record of e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h , on the equity of its e t h n i c accord, a n d on being able to provide
peace and stability. It accused the D A P a n d PAS of having a secret
election accord to maximize opposition seats. If there w a s such a secret
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it appeared to have almost no e f f e a . since w h e n the votes
w e r e c o u n t e d the BN had gained almost the s a m e n u m b e r of parliament-
ary seats it h a d held in the previous parliamentary session. T h e BN w o n
55.3 p e r cent of the vote, d o w n s o m e 2.7 per cent f r o m its p e r f o r m a n c e
in 1974. Even so, the extent of the v i a o r y was m u c h m o r e than m i g h t be
expected considering that PAS had been a m e m b e r of the BN in 1974 b u t
for the 1978 e l e a i o n had joined the opposition. W i t h this m a j o r shift in
coalition a l i g n m e n t , the BN did m u c h better than might have been
p r e d i a e d f r o m projecting t h e constituency s u p p o n of parties in previous
elections. In t e r m s of seats in Parliament, the biggest c h a n g e w a s the
large increase in representation of the D A P , which increased its n u m b e r
f r o m 9 to 16 in the new Parliament. F u n h e r m o r e , the D A P h a d secured
a foothold in the Bornean s u t e s with a win in S a b a h . W i t h P A S once
68
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 69

again in the opposition with 5 seats, P A S a n d t h e D A P together consti-

t u t e d almost all the opposition since the other credible opposition parties
h a d either joined the BN or suffered humiliating defeat. Clearly, H u s s e i n
O n n ' s leadership of the BN was reaffirmed, a n d the basic s t r u c t u r e of its
coalition remained intact.

E c o n o m i c Growth and Social Malaise

W i t h the n e w m a n d a t e , the Hussein O n n Administration t u r n e d its

emphasis to the pursuit of economic growth, which was viewed as the
corner-stone for all other g o v e m m e n t policies. A healthy e c o n o m y p r o -
vided the g o v e m m e n t with an adequate f u n d i n g base, b u t it also provided
the economic margin to faciliwte the 'ethnic restructuring' objectives of
the N E P . W i t h o u t a healthy e c o n o m y , e f f o r u to better the economic
position of the Malays w o u l d , of necessity, involve d i r e a transfers f r o m
the non-Malays. To avoid the 'zero-sum game' scenario in ethnic re-
lations, it w a s essentia] that economic growth be kept at a high level.
D u r i n g the T h i r d Malaysia Plan, 1 9 7 6 - 8 0 ( T M P ) , a n a n n u a l real G D P
growth rate of 8 . 6 per cent was achieved, which was above the 7.1 p e r
cent growih rate of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-5. 3 4 T h e increase in
p e r capita G N P had been 6.5 per cent between 1960 and 1970 a n d had
risen to 7 , 9 p e r cent between 1970 and 1978.
Malaysia's c o m p r e h e n s i v e economic development planning a n d ils
e n c o u r a g e m e n t of foreign investment had created a d y n a m i c , e x p a n d i n g ,
a n d m o r e diversified economy. T h e biggest boost to the e c o n o m y ,
h o w e v e r , c a m e in the f o r m of the rapid growth of the p e t r o l e u m
industry. Substantial production began in 1968, with a rapid increase in
p r o d u c t i o n after 1970. At first, production agreements were arranged
with foreign multinational firms, b u t after 1974, with the P e t r o l e u m
D e v e l o p m e n t Act which established the national oil c o m p a n y , Petronas,
all oil p r o d u c t i o n c a m e u n d e r government-approved joint-venture opera-
tions between Petronas and various mulunational oil c o m p a n i e s . T h e
fourfold increases in world oil prices imposed by O P E C in 1974 greatly
e x p a n d e d revenues just w h e n Malaysian oil production was already
rapidly increasing. By 1982 federal revenues derived d i r e a l y or indirectly
f r o m oil constituted approximately one-quarter of gross public revenues. 3 5
W i t h this f o r m of economic cushion, the g o v e m m e n t could p u r s u e
policies designed both to 'restructure the e c o n o m y ' related to ethnic
d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth, as well as p u r s u e policies related to the alleviation
of poverty.

A l t h o u g h the policies of the g o v e m m e n t remained essentially the s a m e

as h a d been f o r m u l a t e d d u r i n g the Razak e r a , there w e r e now m o r e
resources for the pursuit of those policies. T h e transfer of corporate
o w n e r s h i p to B u m i p u t r a s w a s accelerated, with heavy investments by
g o v e m m e n t - f u n d e d "Bumiputra trust agencies' and by p r o g r a m m e s
designed to increase B u m i p u t r a individual investments in the e c o n o m y .
B u m i p u t r a investment a n d control of the corporate sector, both individual
a n d t h r o u g h trust agency p a n i c i p a t i o n , increased f r o m 2.4 p e r cent in
 70 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

1970 to 12.4 per cent in 1980, with the target being 30 per cent by 1990.
T h e a n n u a l growth rate of B u m i p u t r a equity increased 23.5 p e r cent per
a n n u m for individual B u m i p u t r a o w n e r s h i p and by 39 per cent p e r
a n n u m for B u m i p u i r a irust agencies between 1971 a n d 1980. 36
D u r i n g ihe period of ihe Second and T h i r d Malaysia Plans, Malay
e m p l o y m e n t in industry rapidly increased, largely as a result of employ-
m e n t quotas imposed on industrial enterprises, especially w h e n new
industries were being established and new jobs were created in response
to overall economic growth. T h e Industrial ( O r d i n a t i o n Act of 1975
e x t e n d e d the principle of ethnic employment q u o i a s to the private sector,
t h u s opening u p new u r b a n e m p l o y m e n t opportunities for Malays.
On the issue of p o v c n y eradication, the N E P had set the target goal of
r e d u c t i o n of p o v c n y to 17 per cent by 1990. F r o m 1975 to 1980, the
incidence of poverty had been reduced f r o m 43.9 per cent to 2 9 . 2 per
c e n t , while poverty in u r b a n areas had been reduced in the same period
f r o m 19.0 p e r cent to 12.6 per cent. 3 7 Poverty reduction was m o r e
difficult to address in rural areas, panicularly among padi-growing
peasants, but even in this category the incidence of poverty was r e d u c e d
f r o m 77.0 p e r cent to 55.1 per cent between 1975 a n d 1980. 38 T h e s e
r e d u c t i o n s in the p o v e n y rate were accomplished in p a n t h r o u g h new
e m p l o y m e n t o p p o n u n i t i e s in an expanding economy a n d t h r o u g h the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s aggressive rural development p r o g r a m m e s designed t o
' o p e n up new agricultural land and to diversify and m o d e r n i z e the
agricultural sector. Although government policy gave increased attention
to the economic position of the Malays, the household income of all
c o m m u n i u e s rose dramatically. Between 1971 and 1979 the m e a n house-
hold i n c o m e of Malays increased 12.9 per cent per year, while the
Chinese gained 12.0 per cent and the Indians 11.0 per c e n t . "
In spite of the impressive economic gains being m a d e by nearly all
sectors of the economy a n d by all e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s , the latter years of
t h e Hussein O n n Administration witnessed growing evidence of social
unrest a n d anomie. W h i l e a n u m b e r of incidents of violence and social
d i s o r d e r o c c u n e d arising f r o m particular circumstanccs, in the aggregate,
they provide evidence of pockets of alienation, perhaps because some
g r o u p s felt that they were being left behind or were relatively m o r e
d e p r i v e d in an era w h e n others appeared to be benefiting f r o m new
prosperity. the ethnic and religious o v e n o n e s to these incidents m a d e
t h e m of p a n i c u l a r concern to Malaysia's political Elites.
O n e of the mosi d i s t u r b i n g incidents for inter-ethnic h a r m o n y involved
a s e n e s of desecrations of some twenty H i n d u shrines by white-robed
Islamic vigilantes w h o called themselves 'The A r m y of Allah,. W h e n one
g r o u p tried to break into the Kerling temple in Ulu Selangor, they were
met by a r m e d H i n d u g u a r d s w h o , in the ensuing f r a y , killed four of the
i n t r u d e r s . A m o n g those killed was a university lecturer. while a survivor
was a medical student enrolled ai an Australian university. Eventually,
eight H i n d u youths were charged in c o u n with homicide, in a case that
generated high emotions in all ethnic communities, 4 0
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 71

E v i d e n c e of widespread peasant discontent became visible in J a n u a r y

1980 w h e n there were large peasant d e m o n s t r a u o n s held at Alor Setar,
the capital of K e d a h , in the centre of one of the largest rice-growing areas
of Malaysia. T h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s obiected to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s rice subsidy
s c h e m e which provided a s u p p o r t price of between M $ 2 6 and MS30
p e r pikul, d e p e n d i n g on grade; the subsidy p a y m e n t s , t h o u g h , were m a d e
by c o u p o n s that could only be exchanged for credit against f u t u r e goods
a n d supplies. T h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s d e m a n d e d a subsidy of M $ 4 0 per pikul
a n d at least p a n of the subsidy payment in cash. W h e n the 10,000 d e m -
onstrators b e c a m e u n r u l y , police broke u p the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d
the K e d a h Menteri Besar declared a curfew, claiming that the organizers
planned to seize hostages, including the Menteri Besar himself, in o r d e r
to enforce their d e m a n d s . Federal authorities s u p p o r t e d the suppression
of the d e m o n s t r a t i o n , intimating that the protests were instigated by
i m n a m e d 'irresponsible g r o u p s ' , which w e r e later identified as being
m e m b e r s of PAS. 4 1 T u n k u Abdul R a h m a n suggested that the organizers
w e r e M u s l i m f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s w h o were inspired by the revolutionary
tactics of Ayatollah Khomeini. 4 2 In Parliament, the g o v e m m e n t c a m e
u n d e r severe criticism f r o m opposition parties for its agricultural policies
a n d for its response to protest demonstrations.

A m o r e serious breach of civil o r d e r occurred later in the year w h e n a

g r o u p of about 20 armed m e n a t u c k e d the Batu Pahat police station,
a m i d s t cries of 'Allahu Akhbar!' (God is Great!) Altogether, 23 m e n w e r e
i n j u r e d and 8 of the attackers were killed. As first r e p o r t e d , the attack
appeared u n p r o v o k e d . H o w e v e r , later it became apparent that t h e assault
w a s the culmination of escalating conflicts with local authorities. A p p a r -
ently, s o m e four C a m b o d i a n refugees, u p o n arriving in Malaysia, had
c o n v e n e d to Islam. T h e leader had adopted the M u s l i m n a m e of
M o h a m e d N a s i r Ismail, but later he claimed to be a Mahdi (saviour) a n d
was popularly k n o w n as I m a m M a h d i . He quickly attracted a growing
following w h o w e r e impressed by his charismatic powers and spirit
possession in trance, as well as his interpretation of Islamic mysticism.
T h e cult was w a m e d by authorities about 'false teachings' of Islam a n d
followers were warned that they had two weeks to r e n o u n c e 'false beliefs'
or face prosecution in t h e islamic K a d i ' s C o u n . It appears t h a t , rather
than s u b m i t to the d e m a n d s of the authoriiies enforcing Islamic law, the
leader organized the attack on the police station after conferring 'invul-
nerability' u p o n his followers, w h o r e p o n e d l y attacked after being placed
in a trance. 4 3

I s l a m i c Revival M o v e m e n t s
These isolated incidents were b u t one manifestation of a growing mobil-
ization a r o u n d the ideals of Islamic revival, f r e q u e n t l y referred to as
d a k w a h , which m e a n s 'call' and refers to the call to w o r s h i p issued to
Muslims. O v e r the years, an increasing n u m b e r of Islamic dakwah
g r o u p s w e r e being organized, to espouse Islamic ideals as well as to prop-
72 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

agate doctrines of a ' p u r e ' Islamic way of life. M a n y of these organ-

izations sought to p r o m o t e their objectives by political militancy a n d by
active participation in politics.
To the g o v e r n m e n t , the increasing mobilization of the M u s l i m c o m -
m u n i t y by these organizations posed both a threat a n d a challenge U n d e r
Malaysian law as well as Islamic doctrine, the s u i e is the protector of
I s l a m , a n d as s u c h , it has a responsibility to interpret a n d enforce
o r t h o d o x Islamic b w and d o a r m e s . T h e r e f o r e , any 'deviations' o r even
s e n o u s doctrinal controversies represent a challenge both to extablithed
Islamic authorities and to the g o v e r n m e n t . Because of the strong symbolic
a n d emotional a n a c h m e n t to Islam felt by most M u s l i m s , Malay leaders
were particularly concerned with any s e n o u s theological or doctrinal
d i s p u t e s thai threatened to split the Malay c o m m u n i t y w h i c h w a s viewed
as the 'keystone' constituency u n d e r p i i m m g the political base of tbe
g o v e r n m e n t . F o r both political and legal reasons, the government could
not afford to allow divergent or 'deviauonist' g r o u p s to e m e r g e a n d to
recruii a following. Yet, with social a n d political turmoil t h r o u g h o u t the
M u s l i m w o r k i , such groups tended to f o r m , sometimes with outside
financial s u p p o n , b u t m o r e f r e q u e n d y by example a n d by the spread of
literature propagating new, and sometimes radical, interpretations of
Islam.
As s u c h , the d a k a a h movement was merely stressing the f u n d a m e n t a l s
of Islam, w h i c h , for M u s l i m s , is a most noble cause. H o w e v e r , by
implication, it also suggested that the g o v e r n m e n t was not p u r s u i n g those
f u n d a m e n t a l s in an a p p r o p r i a t e or effective way. T h e r e f o r e , indirectly,
the g o v e r n m e n t was b o n g challenged to support the d a k w a h m o v e m e n t .
at the same time that it h a d also to oversee and check the spread of
'deviationist' teachings. In response to die rise of Islaimc revivalism, the
g o v e r n m e n t a d o p t e d two parallel policies: official s p o n s o r s h i p of 'correct'
dakwah organizations; and the careful oversight of o t h e r ' n o n - s p o n s o r e d '
dakwah organizations to d e t e r m i n e if they were to be tolerated or to be
legally proscribed as 'deviationist' a n d subversive to Islam,
W i t h this response to the challenge of the Islamic revival m o v e m e n t ,
d a k w a h organizations can be g r o u p e d into three categories: g o v e r n m e n t -
s p o n s o r e d Islamic bodies and associauons: ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' Islamic bodies
a n d associations; a n d , ' p r o s c r i b e d ' bodies a n d associauons that called
themselves 'Islamic' but were declared ' d e v i a u o m s t ' by t h e a u t h o n u e s .
T h e most i m p o n a n i o f the g o v e m m e n i - s p o n s o r e d bodies was P e r t u b u h a n
K e b a j i k a n Islam MaJaysia (Islamic Welfare a n d Missionary Association of
Malaysia), better k n o w n as Perkim. It was f o u n d e d in I960 with T u n k u
Abdul R a h m a n as its titular head. It became the sponsor of v a n o u s
p u b l i c celebrations of Islam, including the international K o r a n reading
c o m p e t i t i o n s , and missionary campaigns for the conversion of non-
M u s h m s to Islam. Between 1970 and 1973, Perkim clauned to have
s c c u r e d the c o n w r s i o n of s o m e 75,000 converts to Islam, with the largest
n u m b e r being f r o m Sabah u n d e r the active d i r e c u o n of Chief Minister
M u s t a p h a Harun. 4 4 In p u b l i c ceremonies a n d at official f u n c t i o n s , it was
P e r k i m that was usually r e p r e s m i e d to 'carry the dag of Islam' a n d to
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 73

d e m o n s t r a t e the g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o m m i t m e n t to dakwah.

A m o n g the ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' Islamic g r o u p s , the most important w e r e
A B I M , D a r u l A r q a m , Jemaat T a b l i g h , and Aliran. A B I M was f o r m e d i n
1972 primarily of Malay u r b a n middle-class y o u t h . It a d o p t e d a radical,
' m o d e r n i s t ' , anti-Western image that also challenged the legitimacy of the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies towards Islam as well as the leadership of the
established Islamic hierarchy in Malaysia. T h e President of A B I M was
A n w a r I b r a h i m , w h o played a leading role in the s t u d e n t disorders of
1975. Although A n w a r I b r a h i m was detained u n d e r the Internal Security
Act in D e c e m b e r 1974 a n d released only in 1976, A B I M w a s not m a d e a
p r o s c r i b e d organization. PoLtically, it w a s viewed as being closely allied
with PAS in its ideology and its strategies. It also provided t h e m a j o r
i m p e t u s for the growth of Islamic resurgence in u r b a n areas a n d a m o n g
M a l a y s attending universities both in Malaysia and abroad on govern-
m e n t scholarships. Its m e m b e r s h i p grew f r o m 11,000 in 1974 to 20,000
in 1977 a n d a b o u t 40,000 by 1986. A m o n g other issues, A B I M c a m -
p a i g n e d against the restrictions placed on political activides by the
provisions of the Internal Security Act, the Societies ( A m e n d m e n t ) A c t ,
a n d the Universities and University Colleges Act. It also campaigned
against c o r r u p t i o n a n d against lotteries, public consxunption of liquor,
a n d ' d e c a d e n t ' W e s t e r n culture. 4 5 Both because of its size a n d its
constituency a m o n g u r b a n , educated Malay y o u t h , A B I M was generally
c o n s i d e r e d to be the most powerful a n d potentially the most credible a n d
t h e r e f o r e the most dangerous of the political ' p r e s s u r e g r o u p s ' that
o p e r a t e d in a critic role in .Malaysian politics d u r i n g the late 1970s a n d
early 1980s.

D a n i l A r q a m was established in 1971 u n d e r the l e a d e n h i p of Ustaz

Ashaari M u h a m m e d as an organization attempting to create the ideal
Islamic c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t wailing for a n e s u b l i s h e d Islamic s u t e t o b e
f o r m e d . T h e f i r s t residential c o m m u n e was e s u b l i s h e d o n the outskirts o f
Kuala L u m p u r , w h i c h expanded to include a school, a hostel, a surau
(prayer h o u s e ) , a clinic, and o t h e r c o m m u n i t y amenities. T h e c o m m u n i t y
is modelled on the older village pondok schools, b u t goes f u n h e r by
a t t e m p t i n g to establish an a u t o n o m o u s c o m m u n i t y applying strict Islamic
principles. As the c o m m u n i u e s grew, they established their o w n
'factories' a n d economic enterprises, m u c h of it vvith volunteer l a b o u r , to
e n s u r e that the p r o d u c t s were strictly M u s l i m and halal ( p u r e a n d
undefiled by M u s l i m standards). Eschewing most ' W e s t e r n ' luxuries,
s u c h as f u r n i t u r e a n d television sets, they also a d o p t a fairly strict dress
c o d e based on a c o m b i n a u o n of Malay a n d traditional A r a b styles. W h i l e
Darul A r q a m d i d not become directly involved in politics, by its e x a m p l e
a n d its c o m m i t m e n t to Islamic ideals it provided a challenge to o t h e r
Muslims a n d , as a consequence, b c c a m e an important c o m p o n e n t of the
whole dakwah m o v e m e n t . 4 6

J e m a a t T a b l i g h was f o u n d e d in India in 1925 as a M u s l i m missionary

organization that a t t e m p t e d to provide spiritual revitalization to its
followers a n d i m p a n among t h e m a higher sense of social responsibility.
W i t h its n e t w o r k of missionaries, it first c a m e to Malaysia in the 19S0s.
74 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Cells are formed at mosques or prayer houses, and m e m b e r s canvass

d o o r 10 door for lectures, retreats, and meetings. W h i l e it is an exclusively
male organization, wives and other women are encouraged to organize
parallel prayer sessions in their h o m e s . W i t h an international network
c e n t r e d in D e l h i , it disseminates a certain Islamic theological line that
contains elements of Suh mysticism. Because of its I n d i a n - P a k i s t a n i
origins, it is m o r e successful a m o n g M u s l i m Indians and the offspring of
mixed M a l a y - M u s l i m Indian marriages. Its informal organization has
m o d e it very difficult to d e t e r m i n e the n u m b e r of a d h e r e n t s to the
movement.47
Besides these ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' Islamic organizations a n d m o v e m e n t s ,
t h e r e were also quite a n u m b e r of g r o u p s that the government labelled
'deviationist". In M a l a y , they are k n o w n as dakwah songsang, Uterally
meaning ' u p s i d e - d o w n revival', T h e g r o u p s in this category include the
A h m a d i y a h movement that is centred in Pakistan b u t has generated s o m e
a d h e r e n t s in Malaysia. T h e A h m a d i s claim to be Islamic, b u t they arc
declared by Malaysian authorities to be 'deviaiionist' since the f o u n d e r ,
Mirza G h u l a m A h m a d , claimed to be a p r o p h e t , t h u s , f r o m the o r t h o d o x
v i e w p o i n t , d e n y i n g by implication thai M u h a m m a d was the 'last p r o p h e t '
and that the Koran is the 'final' word of G o d . F o r this reason, A h m a d i s
arc d e e m e d to be apostate M u s l i m s a n d their doctrines a n d organizations
are f o r b i d d e n . 4 8 Similarly, some Sufi and mystical sects that practise
black magic a n d claim mystical powers were also b a n n e d ; a m o n g t h e m
w e r e the Qadiani Sect, Tarikat Mufaridiyah, a n d M u h a m m a d i y y a h
T a r i q a h . 4 9 In 1981 a g o v e r n m e n t survey of deviant dakwah g r o u p s
c o n c l u d e d that there were about forty such organizations with an estimated
following of 30,000. 5 0

D u r i n g the 1970s m a n y other dakwah organizations were also f o r m e d ,

f r e q u e n t l y a r o u n d village Islamic schools, usually u n d e r the leadership of
ulama ( M u s l i m scholars) w h o claimcd special knowledge of Islam a n d
p e r h a p s also s o m e genealogical ties to the A r a b w o r l d . T h e new Malay
iniellectual Elites that were the p r o d u c t of university education tended to
lead the m o v e m e n t , but there was an escalating competition vrithin the
M a l a y c o m m u n i t y to prove Islamic credentials a n d claim s u p e r i o r Islamic
moral rectitude in a campaign for the s u p p o n and leadership of the
Malay c o m m u n i t y . that is why existing Malay pobtical Elites, w h o were
f o r the most part quite secular and W e s t e r n in outlook a n d d e p o r t m e n t ,
a n d most of w h o m were educated in E n g l i s h - m e d i u m schools, either in
M a l a r i a or a b r o a d , were now forced to meet the challenge to the
legitimacy of their leadership posed by the intense mobilization of Malays
by diverse variants of the dakwah m o v e m e n t .

T h e Refugee Problem

Even before Hussein O n n a s s u m e d the reins of g o v e r n m e n t , one of the

m o r e serious p r o b l e m s afflicting the c o u n t r y was thai of refugees w h o
w e r e arriving f r o m troubled areas in South-East Asia, In the w a k e of the
withdrawal of the United States f r o m V i e t n a m , the South Vietnamese
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 75

government of President T h i e u collapscd u n d e r the onslaught of t h e

N o r t h Vietnamese invasion. Saigon surrendered on 30 April 1975, a n d
shortly thereafter, the first wave of "boat people' began appearing in
Malaysian waters to seek refugee status. T h e fwst wave of refugees were
primarily Vietnamese w h o were supporters of the previous regime, m a n y
of t h e m being Catholic. Somewhat later, the refugees were primarily
u r b a n Chinese, w h o were alleged to be 'bourgeoise' a n d viewed as an
'exploiting class' by the N o r t h Vietnamese regime. In Cambodia d u r i n g
April 1976, the K h m e r Rouge guerrillas defeated the American-backed
g o v e r n m e n t of Lon N o l . O n c e in power, the K h m e r R o u g e , u n d e r the
leadership of Pol P o t , proceeded to p u r s u e a 'de-urbanization' policy that
c u l m i n a t e d in the massacre or starvation of about one a n d a half million
C a m b o d i a n s . They also p u r s u e d a militant nationalist policy that resulted
in a series of provocations and border skirmishes with Vietnam. By
December 1978, the Vietnamese decided to o v e n h r o w the K h m e r R o u g e
g o v e r n m e n t of Pol Pot. T h e inv-asion of C a m b o d i a — b y then k n o w n as
K a m p u c h e a — b y the Vietnamese a r m y a n d the installation of the new
Vietnamese-backed H e n g Samrin g o v e m m e n t in P h n o m P e n h did n o t
e n d the conflict since Pol Pot fled to the jungles to f o r m a guerrilla force
that operated along the T h a i border areas, m a k i n g attacks on Vietnamese
forces. T h e fighting once again generated a new wave of C a m b o d i a n
refugees.

In response to these events, C h i n a , which had been a patron s u p p o n e r

of the d e p o s e d Pol Pot regime, decided ' t o teach Vietnam a lesson' by
w a g m g a s h o n but intense war wiih Vietnam d u r i n g P e b m a r y and M a r c h
1979. T h e refugees generated by this renewed conflict were mostly
C h i n e s e f r o m both n o n h e m and southern Vietnam w h o w e r e f l e e i n g
f r o m the wrath of the Vietnamese.
W h i l e not all the refugees sought haven in Malaysia, m a n y w h o could
escape by boat m a d e their way to Malaysian shores. T h e first of the boat
refugees came to Malaysia in 1975. T h e authorities tried to prevent t h e m
f r o m landing a n d , where possible, lowed t h e m back to sea. F o r those
w h o did l a n d , the government placed them in c a m p s and a t t e m p t e d lo
a r r a n g e with o t h e r countries for their resettlement in a c o u n t r y of
a s y l u m . T h e biggest n u m b e r of arrivals to .Malaysia appeared after the
Vietnamese intervention into K a m p u c h e a . In 1978, 64,328 refugees
l a n d e d , while in 1979, 166,709 landed. 5 1 Since those w h o c a m e f r o m
vietnam by then w e r e 70 to 80 per cent Chinese, the Malaysian authorities
w e r e distressed not only by the n u m b e r s b u t by the fear that the new-
refugees would ' u p s e t .Malaysia's racial balance'. T h e increasing difficuliy
in finding host countries for reselllcment created an air of d e s p e r a t i o n , if
not paranoia. T h e D e p u t y Prime M i n i s t e r , D r M a h a t h i r , a n n o u n c e d o n
15 J u n e 1979 that t h e r e a f t e r , refugees landing on Malaysian beaches
would be shot. 5 2 Although n o n e were shot, the public outery t h r o u g h o u t
the world in reaction to this statement did accclerate international e f f o n s
to And host countries for resettlement.

Malaysia's hard line on the refugees was reflected in the g o v e r n m e n t ' s

refusal to recognize t h e m as ' r e f u g e e s ' , preferring instead to call t h e m
76 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

'illegal i m m i g r a n t s ' , since, it was charged, they had left their o w n

country' illegally. O t h e r South-East Asian countries look almost as h a r d a
line, except for T h a i l a n d , which had no choice b u t to set up refugee
c a m p s along its eastern borders. Curiously, however, Malaysia d i d allow
s o m e M u s l i m refugees to immigrate, mostly f r o m the M u s l i m
K a m p u c h e a n c o m m u n i t y , which was reported to have been a b o u t 100,000
in 1970. O n l y a small n u m b e r of M u s l i m s f r o m I n d o - C h i n a came to
Malaysia, but those w h o d i d were more likely to be allowed to settle. Of
the Indo-Chinese refugees, about 83,000 had been resettled in countries
of asylum by N o v e m b e r 1980, while 13,180 still remained in Malaysia at
that date. By the next year, there were only 1,200 Indo-Chinese refugees
r e m a i n i n g in c a m p s , and they were being rapidly reduced t h r o u g h an
international effort by the United Nations a n d various host countries. 5 3
In contrast to the refugees f r o m I n d o - C h i n a , large n u m b e r s of refugees
f r o m the s o u t h e m Philippines were permitted to stay in S a b a h . F o r a
n u m b e r of years, the Philippine G o v e r n m e n t had a t t e m p t e d to quell the
irredentist insurrection of the M o r o National Liberation F r o n t that
sought to establish a M u s l i m s u i e in the southern islands of the
Philippines. Partly because of this c o n f i i a , and partly because of the
e c o n o m i c o p p o n u n i t i e s in Sabah, m a n y Filipinos a n d o t h e r s f r o m n e a r b y
areas c a m e to Sabah w t h o u i benefit of visa or the approval of authorities.
T h e n u m b e r s of these 'refugees' or 'illegal immigrants' by 1979 was
a b o u t 100,000 f r o m the Philippines and some 40,000 to 50,000 f r o m
Indonesia. Since the new arrivals were nearly all M u s l i m s a n d were
viewed as political allies by the M u s t a p h a g o v c m m e n i in S a b a h , a n d
since Sabah controlled immigration u n d e r the Malaysia A g r e e m e n t , they
w e r e not expelled, but were unofficially welcomed by authorities of the
state g o v e r n m e n t . Over lime, these 'refugees' acquired de facto status as
immigrants.

Foreign Affairs, 1976-1981

T h e political turmoil in Indo-China a n d the infiux of refugees f r o m there

focused the a n e n t i o n of Malaysia on the c h a n g m g power relations a n d the
potential threats to security that were a p r o d u a of the d r a m a t i c a n d
sometimes cataclysmic events in the Indo-Chinese states. In 1977,
Malaysian Foreign Minister T e n g k u A h m a d R i t h a u d e e n visited V i e t n a m
to see if he could secure acceptance of the neutralization principles earlier
a d o p t e d by A S E A N a n d k n o w n as Z O P F A N . A p p a r e n t l y , very little of
substance c a m e out of the visit except that Malaysia b e c a m e m o r e aware
of Vietnamese reliance on the Soviet Union in matters related to issues of
regional security. T h e Vietnamese alignment with the Soviet U n i o n w a s
formalized in N o v e m b e r 1978, with the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese
F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t y , just on ihe eve of the Vietnamese invasion and
occupation of K a m p u c h e a to install the K a m p u c h e a n G o v e r n m e n t headed
by Heng S a m r i n . "
R a t h e r than c o n t i n u e with what appeared to be fruitless negotiations
with V i e t n a m , Malaysia turned to contacts with m a j o r powers in the area
 THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 77

10 seek to stabilize the security situation that was an immediate threat to

T h a i l a n d a n d of great concern to Malaysia. C h i n a ' s Vice-Premier, D e n g
X i a o p i n g ( T e n g Hsiao Ping) visited Malaysia in N o v e m b e r 1978, a n d
H u s s e i n O n n visited Beijing in 1979, arriving the week following C h i n a ' s
punitive war against Vietnam. In the talks with C h i n a , Malaysia was
u n a b l e to get C h i n a to r e n o u n c e its symbolic a n d ideological s u p p o r t for
t h e Malayan C o m m u n i s t Party and its guerrilla forces that were surviving
in the jungles of the T h a i - M a l a y s i a n b o r d e r areas. H o w e v e r , s o m e t r a d e
issues were resolved and there was an apparent appreciation by both
parties of m u t u a l interests in checking Vietnamese expansionism a n d the
g r o w i n g Soviet military capabilities f r o m the bases in Vietnam provided
i m d e r the terms of the Soviet-Vietnamese F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t y . In
S e p t e m b e r 1979, Hussein O n n visited the Soviet Union and secured f r o m
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev 'a guarantee of non-aggression by
V i e t n a m ' , " but the f u n d a m e n t a l concerns of Malaysia a n d the o t h e r
A S E A N countries regarding events in Indo-China remained tmresolved.
Malaysia's concern over developments in the Indo-China area a n d iu
fear that Vietnam would use its massive military power to intimidate
n e i g h b o u r s and destabilize other areas of South-East Asia p r o m p t e d
Malaysia to take a lead within A S E A N to devise a c o m m o n strategy in
response to these threats. T o g e t h e r , the A S E A N states decided to re-
cognize the ousted g o v e m m e n t of Pol Pot as the legitimate regime in
K a m p u c h e a . T h e A S E A N s u t e s persuaded the U N General Assembly t o
seat the r e p r e s e n u i i v e of the Pol Pot regime as the 'legitimate' represent-
ative of K a m p u c h e a . T h e tainted r e p u u t i o n of Pol Pot for the domestic
massacres of 1976 and 1977 was side-stepped by efforts to create a w i d e r
coalition of exiled K a m p u c h e a n political iigtires w h o would legitimize the
claim of the exile g o v e m m e n t to represent K a m p u c h e a in the U n i t e d
N a t i o n s . Ultimately, P r i n c e N o r o d o m Sihanouk, w h o h a d b e e n i n e » I e
in C h i n a , r e t u m e d to active politics by becoming the symbolic head of
t h e exile regime, which was k n o w n as 'Democratic K a m p u c h e a ' in
contrast to the Vietnamese-backed 'Peoples R e p u b l i c of K a m p u c h e a '
u n d e r H e n g Samrin. 5 6 Co-operation with n e i g h t o u r i n g states was also
intensified. In M a r c h 1980, Prime Minister H u s s e i n O o n and President
S u h a r t o announced the ' K u a n t a n Principle', which called on b o t h China
and the Soviet U n i o n to refrain f r o m involvement in South-East Asia a n d
appealed for a negotiated political solution to the K a m p u c h e a n d i s p u t e .
T h i s declaration w a s followed by a proposal to f o r m a UN Peacekeeping
F o r c e for K a m p u c h e a . Because of V i e t n a m ' s firm c o m m i t m e n t to t h e
H e n g S a m r i n r e g i m e , these diplomatic initiatives of Malaysia proved to
be largely symbolic a n d designed to bolster t h e s u p p o n for the exile
K a m p u c h e a n s h a d o w g o v e n u n e n t a n d its factionalized anti-Vietnamese
guerrilla forces. T h e c o n c e m of T h a i l a n d that the Vietnamese w o u l d
m a k e military raids into T h a i l a n d to d e n y s a n a u a r y to the K a m p u c h e a n
guerrillas, p r o m p t e d H u s s e i n O n n to a n n o u n c e in O c t o b e r 1980 that
Malaysia w o u l d provide aid to T h a i l a n d if the latter w e r e a t u c k e d .

In reaction to these n e w power realities in South-East Asia, Malaysia

increased its e x p e n d i t u r e for iu a r m e d forces by 56 per cent in the 1980
78 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

parliamentary session, and also arranged for the purchase of 80 additional

Skyhawk planes and the long-range increase of its armed forces to
include a reserve force that would by 1990 be three times the size of the
standing army. At the same time. .Malaysia re-emphasized its mutual
security arrangements that were provided by the Five-Power Defence
Pact between Malaysia, Singapore. Britain, Australia, and N e w Zealand. 57

H u s s e i n Onn's Retirement

By the beginning of 1981, Hussein Onn had been Prime Minister for five
years. Considering his weak political base and his earlier health problems
from a hean altack, his period in office far exceeded the expectations of
most political observers. Eventually, it was not his weak political base,
but rather his health which forced him to vacate the leadership of the
country. In December 1980 he fell ill during a t n p to Britain. He
returned to Britain in February 1981 for a coronary bypass operation,
following which he decided to retire from public office. Although he first
suggested a .May retirement date, the transfer of power to the new regime
did not occur until 16 July 1981.''
THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 79
80 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION
THE HUSSEIN ONN ADMINISTRATION 81
 3
The Mahathir Administration

T h e Changing of the G u a r d
W m i the announcement of Hussein Onn's impending retirement, polit-
ical attention focused upon Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad. Twice before,
the Deputy Prime Minister had succeeded to the position of Prime
Minister, so there was a precedent that this would again be the pattern of
succession. The earlier controversy over Harun Idris and the disputes
over the implementation of education policy and the NKP were put aside
as politicians assessed the new political alignments likely to be formed by
Dr Mahathir. Although there was some speculation that opposition to
Dr Mahathir might develop at the 1981 U M N O General Assembly, none
materialized, instead, political anention focused on the position of Deputy
President of UMNO. By Malaysian political practice, the person who was
elected Deputy President of U M N O was automatically selected as Deputy
Prime Minister.
After some jockeying among potential contenders, two candidates
emerged for Deputy President of U.MNO; Finance Minister Tengku
Razaleigh Hamzah and Education Minister Musa Hitam. Each had
strong support within U M N O . Tengku Razaleigh, being a prince from
Kelantan and having been Minister of Finance for some years, was
viewed as being more conservative. He had also cultivated good relations
with the Chinese business community. Some Malays thought he had too
cosy a relationship with the Chinese business community, but it could
also be argued that he had developed the essential skills of iniercommunal
bargaining and accommodation. Musa Hitam was a commoner and had
strong support from his home state of Johore. His earlier reputation of
being an outspoken champion of Malay rights and his dynamic image
cultivated a somewhat different constituency within U M N O . He was
viewed as a spokesman for a new generation of well-educated and
cosmopolitan Malays who anticipated and expected new opportunities in
politics and in the economy.
Although Tengku Razaleigh was believed lo have slightly more s u p p o n
than Musa Hitam among U M N O delegates, a speech by Hussein Onn in
which he praised Musa Hitam may have swayed enough votes to assure
Musa's victory by a vote of 722 to 517. Because the Prime Minister elect,
Dr Mahathir, had remained judiciously neutral in the election, Musa
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 83

H i t a m w a s to b e c o m e the first D e p u t y Prime Minister in Malaysia not

p e n o n a l l y selected by the Prime Minister u n d e r w h o m he served. 1 A
m o n t h later, on 17 July 1981, the new administration of P r i m e Minister
Dr M a h a t h i r and D e p u t y Prime Minister Musa H i t a m a s s u m e d office.
H u s s e i n O n n retired from public life, even resigning his parliamentary
seat and a n n o u n c i n g that he was looking forward to retirement a n d a less
hectic pace of life.
D u r i n g the U M N O General Assembly and prior t o his becoming
P r i m e M i n i s t e r , Dr M a h a l h i r avoided any controversial issues a n d , in
answer to questions about policy issues, gave assurances that there would
be no m a j o r changes of policy. 2 After the installation of the new
Mahathir Administration, the press r e f e n e d to the new team as the '2-SV
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , implying that Dr Mahalhir and M u s a Hitam were very
close in political views and style, and were likely to work closely
together. At the time, this was a c o m m o n assumption since the political
records of the two m e n were so similar. D u r i n g the days of T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n , both m e n had been viewed as 'Young T u r k s ' and had been
accused of being 'ultras' by Lee K u a n Yew d u r i n g the contest over
S i n g a p o r e ' s role in Malaysia. Both had been exiled f r o m U M N O for their
criticisms of T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n in the wake of the 1969 riots. Even
their earlier careers had been somewhat similar.
Dr M a h a l h i r had studied medicine at the University of Malaya w h e n it
w a s located in Singapore, where he gained his medical degree in 1953.
He had been a student with Lee K u a n Yew, T a n C h e e K h o o n , and a
n u m b e r of others w h o later became prominent figures in the politics of
both Singapore a n d Malaysia. Although he applied, he did not obtain a
foreign scholarship for further education in E n g l a n d , as did m a n y of his
colleagues f r o m student days. Instead, after earning his medical d e g r e e ,
he entered government medical service in Kedah in 1954, a n d later
established his own private medical practice at Alor Setar in 1957.
A l t h o u g h politically active in these early years, he d i d nol nm for public
office until 1964, w h e n he was elected as U M N O M e m b e r of Parliament
f r o m K e d a h . As a b a c k - b e n c h e r , he objected to the cautious bargaining
style of the Alliance g o v e m m e n i . In 1969, Dr .Mahathir was defeated by
the P A S c a n d i d a t e . Haji Yusof Rawa; the defeat probably influenced h i m
to a s s u m e a m o r e militant stance on Malay ethnic issues. H i s defeat may
also have p r o m p t e d him to join M u s a Hitam in open criticism of the
leadership of T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n , which action led to their expulsion
f r o m U M N O for a breach of party discipline. After his expulsion,
Dr M a h a t h i r r e t u m e d to private medical practice, apparently rather
e m b i t t e r e d with politics, but he r e u i n e d his strong political c o n v i a i o n s . 3
W h i l e he was in the political wilderness, he wrote the controversial b o o k
The Malay Dilemma, which p u i s forth a rather b i z a n e mix of insightful
observations, racial stereotyping, theories of genetic ' i n b r e e d i n g ' a m o n g
Malays, a n d cultural-historical explanations for the inferior position of
the Malays in education a n d the economic life of the c o u n t r y . T h e book
a r g u e s f o r a radical political solution to the 'Malay d i l e m m a ' based on the
a s s u m p t i o n thai 'the Malays are the rightful o w n e r s of Malaya' and the
84 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

'definitive people' of the country w h o both need and have a right to

expanded p r o g r a m m e s to guarantee their 'special rights' and to assure
their ecomic control the country. In the b o o k , he argues that the
Malays alone, at the 'definitive people', have exclusive inalienable rights
to define the obligations of Citizenship, to control immigration, to define
a n d protect Malay at the note national language, a n d to define unilaterally
the content and form of national education. 4 Clearly, the book challenged
m a n y existing government policies a n d contravened tbe 'sensitive issues'
a m e n d m e n t s to the Constitution. Before its publication, the book was
b a n n e d by the Minister of H o m e Affairs as being prejudicial to p u b l i c
o r d e r , but it was published in Singapore tn 1970 so that it circulated
surreptitiously a m o n g politically active Malays.
M u s a Hitam had a similar political career development a n d a period in
the political wilderness. Born in 1934, he attended the University of
Malaya in the late 1950s where he was a o i v e in student politics. In tbe
1960s he was an Assistant D i s t n c t Officer and was also active in U M N O .
He rose quickly to the attention of U M N O l e a d e n and in 1968 he was
n o m i n a t e d as an U M N O candidate for the parliamentary by-election in
S e g a m a t , Johore. In his election campaigning a n d m ha activities within
U M N O , he became identified as an o u t s p o k e n advocate of policies to
uplift the Malays. H o w e v e r , after he openly criticized t h e leadership of
T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n following the May 1969 riots, he was expelled
f r o m U M N O . D u r i n g his period of political exile, he went to England ro
complete an MA degree in international affairs at Sussex University
in 1970. 5
Both Dr .Mahathir and Musa H i t a m w e r e encouraged to r e t u r n to
active political life by the intervention of H u s s e i n O n n , a n d u n d e r his
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , both were rapidly p r o m o t e d to key policy-making
positions. 6 Because of the parallel progression of their political careers,
the two men a p p e a r e d to have m u c h in c o m m o n a n d they gave every
indication that there would be close co-ordination a n d m u t u a l s u p p o r t for
a new d y n a m i c a p p r o a c h to g o v e r n m e n t .

T h e New Image

As soon as Dr M a h a t h i r a s s u m e d the h e l m of the government, a n u m b e r

of initiatives were taken to signal that the new a d m i n i s t r a u o n w o u l d be
'action o r i e n t e d ' a n d expected to reassess old pubcies that w e r e ineffective
or faltering. Dr M a h a t h i r indicated that m a n y civil servants w e r e not
pulling their weight a n d suggested thai m i s m a n a g e m e n t a n d corruption
w e r e u n d e r m i n i n g g o v e r n m e n t policies. To set the style of t b e oew
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , he instituted p u n c h - i n time clocks in m a n y d e p a r t m e n t s
a n d called for n a m e tags for all p u b h c employees, tbe implication being
that the p u b l i c could report on any civil servant w h o was derelict in d u t y .
To increase efficiency a n d productivity in g o v e r n m e n t , the top plan-
n i n g a n d administrative agencies a r o u n d the Prime Minister's D e p a r t m e n t
were s t r e n g t h e n e d . T h e Malaysian A d m i n i s t i a i w n athi H a n u i n g U m i
was instructed to m a k e surprise inspections to raise productivity and to
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 85

weed out 'dead wood' in the civil service. T h e National Bureau of

Investigations was given a new mandate to p u r s u e issues of c o r r u p t i o n in
g o v e r n m e n t with m o r e vigour. T h e Public Complaints Bureau was
r e a a i v a t e d to hear public complainis about inefficient or corrupt p u b l i c
servants. Civil servanis w e r e required to declare their assets, a n d t h e
A n t i - C o r r u p t i o n Agency was once again reactivated. 7
In matters of ethnic policy, Dr .Mahaihir appeared to s u p p o r t the BN
negotiation process while b o n g dedicated to pursuing t h e objectives
of the N E P . His implied c r i t i d a n was that its goals w e t v being u n d e r -
m m e d by ineffective a d m i n i s t n i u o n and tolerance of wasteful or c o r r u p t
practices. T h e implication was d e a r the N E P and t h e basic e c o n o m i c
a n d social p a l i a e s of the p r c n o u s administration would be c o n t i n u e d ,
but the adrmnistration would be improved to achieve the policy goals
with greater haste a n d with less waste.
Because Dr Mahathir had himself been a critic of the g o v e r n m e n t ,
t h e n was a general a n t i a p a t i o n a m o n g the public that be would p u r s u e
m o r e liberal policies t o w a r d s critics of the government and towards a
m o r e open political process on sensitive issues. On this issue t h e r e w e r e
mixed signals to t h e public. In .March 1981, Parliament passed the
controversial Societies Act ( A m e n d m e n t ) Bill 1981, which gave t h e
Registrar of S o a e t i e s t h e power to deregisier any group challenging
(1) t h e g o v e r n m e n t . (2) Islam or o t h e r religions. (3) the National
L a n g u a g e . (4) t h e s p e a a l position of t h e Bumiputras, or (5) t h e legitimate
iniertsis of the c o u n t r y ' s o t h e r c o m m u m i i e s . In addition, a m ' nrganization
that 'tries to influence in any m a n n e r the policies a n d acnvities of t h e
government could be dercgistered, or w o u l d have to register as a
'political society'. a n d w o u l d be prohibited f r o m having non-citizens as
m e m b e r s o r f r o m h a v i n g any t m e m a u o n a i affiliations without permission.
This legisiation, introduced while Dr .Mahathir was still P r i m e .Minister
designate, a p p e a r e d to be directed primarily against the increasingly
active p u b l i c interest reform societies that w e r e becoming m o r e vocal in
thetr c n t i o s m of g o v e r n m e n t policies a n d their mobilization of p u b l i c
s u p p o r t for s o m e policy positions. A m o n g the organizations which
a p p e a r e d to be the targets of this legtslation were t h e daktoah y o u t h
m o v e m e n t , A B I M , the m o d e r n i s t r e f o r m a n d c o n s u m e r m o v e m e n t ,
Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National C o n s a o u s n e s s Movement), a n d t h e
' C o n s u m e r s ' Assciation of P e n a n g ( C A P ) . which h a d taken t h e lead in
rsismg p u b l i c attention to environmental a n d ecology issues. A w a v e of
public o p p o s i u o n to t h e Societies Bill d e v e i o p e d with t h e campaign being
lumed b y m a n y professional a s s o o a u o n s , d e l u d i n g t h e M a l a y n a n B a r
C o u n c i l . Many o t h e r societies joined in a c o m m o n f r o m u n d e r t h e
leadership of A B l M ' s President. A n w a r I b r a h i m , to o p p o s e t h e Bill.
Dr .Mahathir d e t e o d e d the legislation, claiming that p r e s s u r e groups w e r e
one of t h e the worst aspects of democracy because they ' e n s u r e that a
m m o n t y will h a v e a greater say in the affairs of i h e country than their
n u m b e r s justify'. 8 Despite the o p p o s i t i o n , the legnislation w a s passed a n d
received royal assent in April 1981.

Against this background, the political commentators a n d the informed

86 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

public speculateed on the f u t u r e direction of government policy towards

critics and towards open public political discourse. On the one h a n d ,
Dr M a h a t h i r himself had been an outspoken critic of the g o v e r n m e n t . On
the other, he had been very f i r m in suppressing student protests a n d
disorders in 1975 a n d appeared to be a moving force within the govern-
ment in favour of the extremely restrictive Societies Bill that was passed
just on the eve of his new administration assuming officc.
O n c e in office. P r i m e Minister M a h a t h i r ' s first moves suggested that a
new era of tolerance and public discussion of politics alternatives w o u l d ,
i n d e e d , be p e r m i t t e d , if noi actively p r o m o t e d . A d m i t t e d l y , one of the
first actions taken involved lifting the ban on his own earlier controversial
b o o k , The Malay Dilemma. Promising to review the situation of the
persons detained u n d e r the Internal Security Act. within two weeks of
taking office Dr .Mahathir issued orders for the release of 21 p r o m i n e n t
detainees, but there remained 513 persons still u n d e r ISA detention. To
celebrate I n d e p e n d e n c e D a y on 31 .August 1981, an additional 47 ISA
detainees were released along with 239 convicted criminals. 9 A few
m o n t h s later, H a r u n Idris, w h o had been convicted and sentenced for
corruption three and a half years earlier, appealed to the R u l e r s Council
for full royal p a r d o n . While a full pardon was rejected, the Rulers
Council did r e d u c e H a r u n ' s sentence by seven m o n t h s , but u n d e r
c o n d i t i o n s which m a d e it difficult for him to return immediately to active
political lifc.'° By these actions, the new administration appeared to
favour liberalization of politics a n d the healing of old political w o u n d s .

T h e E l e c t i o n o f 1982

Shortly after a s s u m i n g office, it became apparent that Dr M a h a t h i r would

call for an early election. F o u r main considerations led to the decision for
an early election. First, the new g o v e r n m e n t needed a renewed m a n d a t e
to bolster its legitimacy in anticipation of new public policy initiatives.
Secondly, the BN hoped to better its p e r f o r m a n c e on the basis of the
positive image created in the first m o n t h s of the new .Mahathir Adminis-
tration. T h i r d l y , a world economic recession had already b e g u n a n d it
w a s feared that the longer the election was delayed, the m o r e the
g o v e r n m e n t would have to bear the b r u n t of public displeasure with a
sluggish e c o n o m y . Finally. Dr M a h a t h i r could use the e l e a i o n to reassign
positions of p o w e r in the g o v e r n m e n t and in U M N O to those selected
personally by h i m in o r d e r to a s s e n his authority over the main insti-
tutions of g o v e r n m e n t .
W i t h i n the B N , the m e m b e r parties were m o r e unified and had less
serious internal d i s p u t e s in 1982 than in most previous elections. W i t h i n
t h e M C A , the leadership of Lee San C h o o n was assured after the earlier
challenge in 1979 of Michael C h e n and R i c h a r d Ho h a d been t u r n e d
back so that Michael C h e n decided to join Gerakan along with some of
his closest s u p p o n e r s . U n d e r the leadership of Dr Lim C h o n g Bu a n d
s t r e n g t h e n e d by disaffected M C A m e m b e r s , Gerakan r e m a i n e d strong in
P e n a n g w h e r e it engaged in vigorous competition with the M C A ; how-
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 87

e v e r , with both parties restrained by their m e m b e r s h i p in the B N , these

conflicts were kept in check. Within the M I C , there had been acrimonious
conflict for years, but by 1981, the party c a m e u n d e r the control of S a m y
Vellu, w h o worked out a truce involving some sharing of power with the
defeated faction of S. S u b r a m a n i a m . "
T h e biggest changes i n the B N occurred within U M N O . T h e election
provided the occasion for a wholesale reallocation of office to new d i t e s
w h o w e r e either selected or approved by the new leadership. W i t h i n
U M N O , only 55 per cent of the exisiing Members of Parliament w e r e
r e n o m i n a t e d for the 1982 election, whereas the corresponding figures for
the M C A a n d the M I C were 85 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. In
the state assemblies, only 54 per cent of U M N O assemblymen w e r e
r e n o m i n a t e d . T h e r e had been for some lime a generational conflict within,
U M N O , usually c h a r a a e r i z e d a s 'Old Guards' versus ' Y o u n g T u r k s ' ,
In 1982, the shift was towards a new generation of Malay politicians w h o
w e r e assumed to have a great affinity for the ideas and political style of
the leadership of Dr M a h a t h i r and .Musa H i t a m . T h e new candidates
f r e q u e n t l y had better education a n d m a n y of t h e m came f r o m a pro-
fessional or business b a c k g r o u n d , with somewhat less emphasis on the
Malay teaching profession a n d the civil service. In a subtle b u t systematic
w a y . the new administration was trying both to build a stable base of
s u p p o n a n d to reflect i m p o n a n i changes that were already taking place
within the .Malay c o m m u n i t y .

O n e o t h e r d r a m a t i c political event o c c u n e d that affected the appeal of

the BN for the Malay vote. F o r some time, there had been an escalating
conflict between U M N O a n d PAS for Malay political s u p p o r t . At the
h e a n of ihe contest w e r e the alternative approaches towards Islam. While
P A S increasingly p u s h e d the goal of an Islamic state and a t t e m p t e d to
characterize the g o v e m m e n t as being 'un-Islamic' or even 'infidel', the
U M N O a p p r o a c h lended to take a secular-pragmatic and instrumentalist
a p p r o a c h to politics, avoiding the use of Islam as the primarv- basis for
legitimacy a n d political s u p p o r t . In this contest, what appeared to be the
'floating constituency' was the new generation of Malay youth w h o w e r e
g r a d u a t i n g in large n u m b e r s f r o m universities as a result of the accelerated
p r o g r a m m e s of Malay special rights that had been estabhshed u n d e r the
N E P . Many of the new Malay educated youth were greatly affected by
the Islamic revival movement and by the political c u n e n t s that were
c o m i n g to Malaysia f r o m the centres of political activism in t h e M i d d l e
East a n d elsewhere in the M u s l i m world. T h e political mobilization of
s t u d e n t s d e t e r m i n e d to change public policy resulted in a series of clashes
with g o v e m m e n t authority in ihe period from 1974 to 1976. T h e organ-
ization most closely associated with the political mobilization a n d radical-
ization of Malay s t u d e n i s was A B I M . led by A n w a r I b r a h i m . It is an
irony of the unfolding political scene that Dr Mahathir was ai that t i m e
Minister of Education and it was u n d e r his direction that the harsh
m e a s u r e s designed to control student radicalism were enacted a n d en-
f o r c e d , i n c l u d i n g the preventive detention of the leaders of the student
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , the most p r o m i n e n t of w h o m was A n w a r I b r a h i m .
88 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

H o w e v e r , seven years laier, Dr M a h a t h i r seemed to place a high priority

in recruiting this cohort of Malay educated youth w h o w e r e now entering
active politics a n d could easily tip the political balance between U M N O
a n d P A S . T h e heavy stress given by A B I M to the Islamic idiom in
politics a n d p u b l i c pohcy appeared to m a k e it a natural ally of P A S in any
f u t u r e poLidcal alignment or coalition-making. H o w e v e r , all these s p e c u -
lations were m a d e r e d u n d a n t w h e n , on ihe eve of the 1982 election,
D r M a h a t h i r axmounced that Anwar I b r a h i m was joining U M N O a n d
that he w o u l d be given a position of responsibility in the new
government.13
T h e election was called for 22 April 1982, with only fifteen days for
election c a m p a i g n i n g . To reduce the potential for election violence, the
g o v e r n m e n t b a n n e d all public election rallies but permitted the smaller
ceramah (discussion meetings) in private h o m e s or semi-public locations.
T h e ban on public rallies meant that p a n i e s had to rely on canvassing
a n d the e f f o n s of a large coterie of p a n y workers to get their message
across to the public. T h e door-to-door style of campaigning gave a
priority to p a n y organization, of w h i c h the BN party machinery far
outclassed all the opposition p a n i c s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the BN had a m p l e
f u n d s in its coffers, while the opposition p a n i c s f o u n d it difficult to
solicit donations.
T h e B N u n d e r the leadership o f D r M a h a t h i r a n d M u s a H i t a m
a d o p t e d the slogan 'Clean, Efficient, and T r u s t w o r t h y ' to epitomize ihe
image thai had been generated d u r i n g their first n i n e m o n t h s in office. 1 4
W h i l e the BN campaign avoided controversial issues, in one of his m a j o r
c a m p a i g n speeches, Dr M a h a t h i r talked a b o u t his ' d r e a m ' of a Malaysia
w i t h o u t a b w i u t e p o v e n y a n d with well-clothed, healthy c h i l d r e n . ' 1 5 T h e
m o r e ethnic aspects of the campaign were left to the constituent p a n i e s in
t h e B N . I n e f f e c t , the authorities wanted a n elecuon m a n d a t e w i t h o u t
m u c h political mobilization a n d without substantive p u b l i c debate.
D u r i n g the c a m p a i g n , the B N accused the two m a j o r opposition
p a r t i e s — P A S and the D A P — o f forging a secret election a g r e e m e n t to
maximize their voting p o w e r . M u s a H i t a m , in m a k i n g the accusation,
labelled the u n d e r s t a n d i n g as khalwat—the Islamic legal prohibition
against 'suspicious promixiiy' involving a M u s l i m w o m a n and any u n -
related adult male. 1 6 W h e t h e r , in fact, the D A P a n d P A S h a d a tacit
e l e a i o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g is difficult to prove. Even so, both parties d i d
h a v e m u t u a l interests to r e d u c e the p r e d o m i n a n t political p o w e r of the
B N . I n d e e d , the D A P m a d e o p e n appeals t o voters t o h e l p r e d u c e the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s representation in Parliament so as to d e n y it the power to
a m e n d the Constitution unilaterally. T h e D A P c h a r g e d that the B N h a d
a b u s e d the a m e n d i n g p o w e r in the past to assure unchallenged d o m i n a n c e
a n d the s u p p r e s s i o n of legitimate d o m e s t i c critics a n d regional interests.
T h e m a j o r o p p o s i d o n p a n i c s r e t u r n e d t o their familiar t h e m e s , w h i c h ,
in s o m e cases, had to be expressed in m u t e d f o r m because of the
restrictions of the Sedition Act w h i c h m a d e it an offence to raise 'sensitive
issues' o n penalty o f possible detention u n d e r the Internal Security A a .
Both P A S a n d the D A P had previously had a n u m b e r of their m o r e
89
90 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

outspoken leaders arrested under the ISA. so on what were defined as

'sensitive issues', candidates had to exercise caution and. at most, utilize
oblique reference to those topics.
When the votes were counted, the BN had won a higher proportion of
electoral support than in the previous election, but this increased support
did not result in significantly more parliamentary seats. Altogether
75.5 per cent of the registered voters cast'ballots, and the BN was able to
secure the support of 60.5 per cent of the voters. In Peninsular Malaysia,
the votes for the constituent partv candidates were distributed as follows;
the D A P 20.3 per cent; U M N O 35.9 per cent; M C A 18.4 per c e m ; PAS
16.4 per cent. 17 The collcctive strength of the BN clearly overwhelmed
the divided and fragmented support of the opposition parties, which had
been the usual puttern of Malaysian elections.
T h e election produced only slight changes in the distribution of power
over 1978. As expected, U M N O won 70 of the 73 seats it contested.
Moreover, the M C A had its best record ever, winning 24 of 28 scats
contested. It did so party at the expense of the D A P , which won
substantial voter suppon among urban Chinese but was unable to translate
its suppon into election victones. The most keenly contested constitu-
ency was in Seremban. where MCA President Lee San Choon was
challenged by the DAP President, Dr Chen Man Hin, with the former
winning by 23,258 to 2 2 , 4 1 3 . "
The parliamentary representation of the D A P fell from 16 to 9 even
though the party increased its percentage of the vote from 1978. The
lower success rate for the DAP was partly due to the defection of a
number of prominent Chinese educationists who gave their supptm
to Gerakan in this election. For PAS, its percentage of the vote
remained almost unchanged from the previous election and it retained
the same number of parliamentary seats—a mere 5 for us 14.5 per cent
electoral support. The only opposition in Parliament was reduced to
insignificant numbers and comprised two panics that were so ideologically
distant as to preclude any co-operation on substantive issues of public
policy.

T h e Post-election G o v e r n m e n t

The 1982 election provided an unequivocal mandate for the new govern-
ment. While there were few changes in the Cabinet, there had been
wholesale changes in the parliamcntan- and state U M N O representation
and many states were headed by new chief ministers. T h e key posts in
the Cabinet included Dr Mahathir as both Prime Minisier and Minister
of Defence, Musa Hitam assuming the powerful post of Home Affairs
Minister, Tengku Razaleigh as Minister of Finance, Ghazali Shafie
continuing as Foreign .Minister, while the new rising siar of the poliiical
scene, Anwar Ibrahim, was given charge of Islamic Affairs, which was
formed as a branch of the Prime Minister's Depanment. 1 9 The new
government exuded confidence and enthusiasm for its tasks and while
Dr Mahathir had been circumspect about elaborating any dramatic new
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 91

policy initiatives, there w a s a general assumption that the new team

w o u l d , i n d e e d , strike out in some bold new policy d i r e a i o n s . 2 0
W i t h Dr M a h a t h i r ' s active involvement in the selection of the BN slate
ot both federal a n d state levels, the new g o v e m m e n t c o m m a n d e d b r o a d -
based s u p p o r t enabling it to forge a new policy agenda. F r o m the
beginning of his administration, he had stressed the continuation of
earlier policies, and at no time did he elaborate a single a n d c o m p r e -
hensive set of new priorities for the government. Yet, in piecemeal
f a s h i o n , new policies emerged and old policies were redirected following
various p r o n o u n c e m e n t s b y the Prime Minister. T h e r e f o r e , i m p o n a n t
policy shifts were m a d e to adjust g o v e n u n e n t policy to Dr M a h a t h i r ' s
o w n rather fixed vision of goals a n d objectives for a f u t u r e A\alaysia.
R a t h e r than a t t e m p t a chronological account of the tacks a n d t u m s of
policy d u r i n g M a h a t h i r ' s first full term of office, we shall survey policy
d e v e l o p m e n t s and initiatives f r o m a topical perspective.

R e f u r b i s h i n g the N e w E c o n o m i c Policy
A l t h o u g h the world-wide recession had already begun prior to the 1982
election, creating a slow-down in the Malaysian e c o n o m y , the n e w
g o v e m m e n t was clearly dedicated to high priority for the racial restruc-
turing objectives of the N E P and the timetable of 1990 for achieving its
target goals. Dr M a h a t h i r had never criticized the o b j e a i v e s a n d goals of
the N E P , only its implementation and strategics. T h e r e f o r e , attention
naturally focused on the alterations in policy to intensify the ' e t h n i c
r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' p r o g r a m m e s of the N E P . 2 1 Nevertheless, after being in
office for o n e year, it bccame apparent that what Dr M a h a t h i r called
'changes in style' also involved important policy a d i u s t m e m s .

Of particular i m p o r t a n c e were questions of foreign investments a n d

foreign trade. As previous Minister of T r a d e , Dr Mahathir had becomc
involved with the depressed tin market as well as the role of British
c o r p o r a t i o n s operating in Malaysia. W i t h o u t any formal public a n n o u n c e -
m e n t , there appears to have been a decision to secure a c o n u o l l i n g
interest in a n u m b e r of key British corporations operating in Malaysia.
Large n u m b e r s of private Malaysian investors already held stock in
British-operated corporations, and when the g o v e m m e n t - f u n d e d B u m i -
p u t r a c o r p o r a t i o n s began operations, they too had invested in the share
m a r k e t s . H o w e v e r , the g o v e m m e n t now decided to co-ordinate efforts to
s e c u r e t h r o u g h stock-market purchases, effective g o v e m m e n t control of
s o m e of the most established British corporations operating in Malaysia.
T h e most d r a m a t i c event was the 'midnight raid' on the L o n d o n Stock
E x c h a n g e that effected the transfer of control of the Guthrie Corporation
to the Malaysian G o v e m m e n t . 2 2 .Malaysian ownership and control of
Sime D a r b y , D u n l o p , Harrisons & Crosfield, a n d a n u m b e r of o t h e r
f a m o u s n a m e s f r o m the colonial era were also brought a b o u t d u r i n g this
period. T h e object of these investments was to secure control of s o m e of
the p r i m a r y corporations operating in the major resource sectors of the
c c o n o m y a n d transfer o w n e r s h i p to the B u m i p u t r a t m s t agencies and the
92 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

invesimet p o n f o l i o s o f the m a j o r parties i n ihe B N , panicularly U M N O .

S h o n l y afier a s s u m i n g office, Dr Aiahathir rejected an i n v i u t i o n to
attend the C o m m o n w e a l t h H e a d s of G o v e r n m e n t s Meeting in Australia.
He accused ihe C o m m o n w e a l t h of being ineffective and he also c o m -
plained about Australian p u b l i c c o m m e n t s on Malaysian racial questions,
His a a i o n s were interpreted as a deliberate slight to Britain a n d
Australia. 2 3 At a b o u t the same time, the Malaysian Airlines System
( n o w Malaysian Airlines) became embroiled in a dispute with the British
G o v e r n m e n t over landing rights in L o n d o n . Before this issue w a s re-
solved, the British G o v e r n m e n t e n d e d preferential trade benefits for
Malaysia a n d also initiated a d r a m a t i c increase in student fees for all
foreign s t u d e n t s in Briiain. Because there were 15,500 Malaysians
s i u d y i n g in Briiain at the time, including Dr Mahathir's s o n , these
actions increased the tensions that were already escalating between Briiain
a n d Malaysia. T h e s e factors plus a n u m b e r of o t h e r s , including a possible
anti-British bias attributed to M a h a t h i r , 2 4 provide explanations for various
rctaliaiory actions considered by the Malaysian G o v e r n m e n t . Six m o n t h s
later, as the disputes with Britain intensified, Dr M a h a t h i r a n n o u n c e d a
Malaysian policy to 'Buy British Last'. By the e n d of 1981 there was a
v i n u a l Malaysian boycott of British goods, since any contracts between
g o v e r n m e n i or statutory bodies and British firms required the prior
approval of the Prime Minister's D e p a r t m e n t . 2 5

In an attempt to ease tensions a n d e n d the g o v e r n m e n t b o y c o t t . British

business firms pledged M$15 million for a f u n d to aid Malaysian s t u d e n t s
in Britain, but this m o v e p r o d u c e d no relaxation of the boycott. By
J a n u a r y 1982, the British G o v e r n m e n t , t h r o u g h diplomatic c h a n n e l s ,
a t t e m p t e d to bridge the differences with Malaysia. After talks bcnveen
British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Dr M a h a t h i r . no firm
c o m m i t m e n t s were a n n o u n c e d , b u t there did seem to be some a b a t e m e n t
of official 'anti-British' rhetoric f r o m Malaysian authorities, 2 6 Even so,
these diplomatic initiatives had very little immediate i m p a a on Malaysian
policies lowards British firms. 2 7 Finally, a year later, in M a r c h 1983, the
Malaysian Government a n n o u n c e d a formal end to the boycott following
various concessions m a d e by the British G o v e r n m e n t , a m o n g which were
the creation by Britain of a f u n d of M$161 million to aid Malaysians
studying in Britain and the transfer of Carcosa, the historically i m p o n a n t
residence of the Bntish H i g h Commissioner in Kuala L u m p u r , to the
Malaysian Government, as requested by Dr M a h a t h i r . 2 8

T h e ' L o o k E a s t ' Policy

Before the dispute with Britain was fully resolved, Dr M a h a t h i r an-
n o u n c e d in J a n u a r y 1982 a new policy initiative w h i c h he called the
' L o o k East' policy. 2 9 At first, it was unclear what was i n t e n d e d a n d
g o v c m m e n i s p o k e s m e n were kept busy issuing clarifications a n d explana-
tions. policy a p p e a r e d to some as a n o t h e r manifestation of anti-
British and anti-Western bias. It soon b e c a m e a p p a r e n t , h o w e v e r , thai
m o r e substantive issues were involved. Even before he had become
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 93

P r i m e M i n i s t e r , D r M a h a t h i r had praised the South Korean d e v e l o p m e n t

strategies and he had especially admired the ' w o r k ethic' of b o t h the
South Koreans a n d the Japanese. He had also expressed admiration for
the Korean success in industrialization and the close co-operation b e t w e e n
large Japanese corporations and the government in p r o m o t i n g foreign
sales, t h r o u g h agency or trading houses known as the sogo shosha
concept. 3 0 In his book The Malay Dilemma, Dr M a h a t h i r h a d identified
t h e lack of a 'work ethic" among the Malays as a m a j o r p r o b l e m h i n d e r i n g
national development. N o w , p r e s u m a b l y , the Japanese a n d K o r e a n s
would provide role models for the Malays, as well as being the s o u r c e of
business skills and technological transfers.
W h e n the new 'Look East' policy was first a n n o u n c e d , various com-
ponents of Malaysian economic and trade policies were justified or
w e r e adjusted to accommodate the 'Look East' slogan. Eventually, what
e m e r g e d was a combination of promoting trade and investment with
S o u t h Korea and Japan (but not with China or T a i w a n ) , a n d t h e
p r o m o t i o n of exchange agreements w h e r e b y Malaysian s t u d e n i s (mostly
Malays) were sent for technical training so that they could learn the ' w o r k
ethic' of these two rapidly developing industrial countries. In the
e u p h o r i a of the initial a n n o u n c e m e n t s , the p r o b l e m s of language a n d
cultural differences between Malaysia, J a p a n , and Korea were largely
ignored. Critics alleged that the 'Look East' policy also concealed a bias
against trade u n i o n s and for restrictions on the right to strike w h i c h were
characteristics of the labour legislation of both Japan a n d S o u t h K o r e a .
As a m i n o r product of the policy, there were moves to introduce Japanese
a n d Korean language courses at the universiiy level a n d efforts by
Malaysia to secure larger aid credits and 'technological t r a n s f e r ' f r o m
both countries. In addition, public officials exhorted Malaysian w o r k e r s ,
especially Malays, to work harder and called u p o n Malay businessmen to
learn Japanese management practices. In the matter of c o m r a a s ,
especially for the c o n s i r u a i o n of m a j o r projects, Korean a n d Japanese
firms appeared to have been given priority consideration.

O v e r the next several years, Japanese and Korean investments in

Malaysia soared as government agencies m a d e contracts with Japanese
a n d Korean firms for prestige projects a n d for the long-term delivery of
Malaysian p e t r o l e u m and liquefied natural gas to the Japanese a n d
Korean m a r k e t s . T h e Koreans were heavily c o m m i t t e d to m a j o r con-
struction projects, including ihe US$233 million contract for t h e b r i d g e
b e t w e e n P e n a n g and the mainland which was awarded to the H y u n d a i
Corporation over a lower bid by a F r e n c h firm. 3 1 T h e Japanese w e r e
given the contract for the construction of the U M N O H e a d q u a r t e r s a n d
t h e massive and expensive D a y a b u m i complcx in the heart of K u a l a
L u m p u r , and sometime later, the Mitsubishi C o r p o r a t i o n was invited to
engage in a joint project to p r o d u c e the 'first Malaysian automobile'.
Similarly, heavy Japanese investments in the electronics industry a n d in
the petroleum industry were capped by an agreement in late 1982 f o r a
massive supply of Malaysian liquefied natural gas to J a p a n until well into
t h e twenty-first century. 3 2 T h e s e increased trade a n d investment links
94 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

with Japan a n d K o r e a reflected the growing economic power of both

c o u n t r i e s , so thai they were deslined to play a m a j o r role in the
Malaysian economy in any event. Even so, it is clear that the process was
acceleralcd d u r i n g the M a h a t h i r Administration because of the official
prcfcrcnces of the Look East policy. 33

Industrialization

Since Malaysian i n d e p e n d e n c e , the pace of industrialization had been

steadily increasing, f r o m 8 per cent of G D P in I960 until it reached
19 p e r cent in 1985. 34 It was clear that the Malaysian e c o n o m y w a s be-
coming increasingly industrialized as its economy g r e w m o r e diversified,
with improved productivity and higher s t a n d a r d s of living. H o w e v e r .
Dr Mahathir was c o m m i t t e d to accelerate the pace of industrialization
even f u r t h e r because he viewed industrialization as a vital c o m p o n e n t of
g o v e r n m e n t policies designed to restructure Malaysian society. M a n y of
his ideas appeared to have been developed w h e n he had been Minister of
T r a d e and I n d u s t r y . O n l y after he became P r i m e Minister was he finally
in a position lo act decisively to i m p l e m e n t his vision of industrial
strategy. W i t h the expansion of i n d u s t r y , m o r e Malays would find jobs in
high-skill and d y n a m i c scctors of the economy and they would acquire the
m o d e r n attitudes a n d cultural traits that were essential in the m o d e m
w o r l d . In addition, .Malaysia would acquire high technology and iis
e c o n o m y w o u l d become less d e p e n d e n t on resource c o m m o d i t y exports
that were subject to extreme price fluctuations on world m a r k e t s . Because
Dr M a h a t h i r a n d some of his close advisers were dissatisfied with the
pace of industrialization thai was being fostered by the p n v a i e sector, it
w a s a r g u e d that a m a j o r initiative by government w a s needed to boost t h e
c o u n t r y ' s indusirial capacity and o u t p u t . In effect, Dr .Mahathir s u b -
scribed to the 'big p u s h ' iheorv' of indusirial economic growth that had
been p o p u l a r in the 1960s a m o n g developmental economists. A n d in
Malaysia, the ' p u s h ' would have t o c o m e f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t . "

U n d e r the direction of the P r i m e Minister's D e p a n m e n t , an Industrial

Master Plan was formulated with the objective of emulating the K o r e a n
pattern of industrial d e v e l o p m e n t that had been so d r a m a t i c over the
previous dccade. T h e p r i m a r y i n s t r u m e n t of government policy b c c a m e
ihe H c a w Industries Corporation o f Malaysia ( H I C O M ) , which i n t u r n
f o r m e d joint-stock companies with foreign investors to channel large
capital investments into industries that w e r e identified as suitable for
national d e v e l o p m e n t . In 1983, four major projects w e r e f u n d e d : a
c e m e n t i n d u s t r y with capital investments of M $ 4 3 0 million; a s p o n g e
iron and steel mill with M $ 8 0 0 million; a sponge iron plant with
M $ 4 5 0 million; and a national a u i o - m a n u f a c i u r i n g plant at M$560 million.
In a d d i t i o n , some M $ 3 . 6 billion was b u d g e t e d for i n f r a s t r u c t u r e invest-
m e n t s to i m p r o v e Malaysia's capacity to attract a n d sustain m o d e m ,
high-technology i n d u s t r i e s . " '
T h e plan ihal attracted the most public interest a n d the most coniro-
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 95

versy involved the p r o d u c t i o n of a Malaysian car. T h e Heavy Industries

C o r p o r a t i o n entered into an a g r e e m e n t with the M i t s u b i s h i C o m p a n y to
f o r m a joint-stock corporation called Pcrusahaan O t o m o b i l Nasional
( P r o t o n ) to p r o d u c e a .Nialaysian car. H I C O M held 70 p e r cent of P r o t o n
shares while Mitsubishi had 30 per ccnt of the stock. U n d e r the terms of
t h e a g r e e m e n t , Mitsubishi was to provide technical assistance a n d h e l p in
the construction of a 52-hectarc plant to be built at a 900-hectare H I C O M
industrial estate at S h a h Alam on the outskirts of Kuala L u m p u r . Most of
the c o m p o n e n t s of the car would be provided by M i t s u b i s h i , but over
t i m e , the Malaysian content was to Ix increased to the u r g e t level of
85 per cent to 90 per cent. According to the initial plans, the capacity of
the plant would be gradually increased f r o m 80,000 units p e r year in
1985 to 120,000 units p e r year by 1 9 8 8 . "
The unveiling of these industrial development plans generated a m u t e d
b u t steady c h o r u s of criticisms f r o m Malaysian economists both within
a n d outside of g o v e r n m e n t , all raising questions a b o u t the priorities of
t h e policy a n d the viability of the projects. Most of the criticism w a s
directed at the plans for the Malaysian car. Critics argued that a high-cost
i n d u s t r y with only a limited local market would be created a n d to m a k e it
viable, a u t o p r o d u c t i o n would need to be subsidized f r o m g o v e m m e n t
revenues a n d the protection of higher duties on c o m p e t i n g i m p o r t e d
vehicles. T h e costs of production would be high a n d w o u l d likely
increase as local c o n t e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s w e r e raised, while quality a n d
reliability would decline. T h e plans for auto production were also in
violation of the existing A S E A N c o m p l e m e n t a t i o n schemes designed to
integraie industrial d e v e l o p m e n t a m o n g m e m b e r countries b y e x p a n d i n g
integrated p r o d u c t i o n and providing access to the larger regional A S E A N
m a r k e t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , it was a r g u e d , rather than creating new i n d u s t r y
a n d jobs, this project merely displaced the existing car assembly plants
w h e r e eighteen different m a k e s of vehicles were already being assembled.
T h e m a j o r impact w o u l d be that Mitsubishi w a s provided with privileged
access to a market which in competition it had been able to win only an
8 per cent share in 1982. Although the plans called for technological
t r a n s f e r , critics d o u b t e d that the most advanced technology w o u l d be
transferred and suggested that Malaysia would instead be p r o d u c i n g an
o u t d a t e d model of a J a p a n e s e car with a slightly redesigned body. 3 8

A s the p u b l i c d e b a t e p r o c e e d e d . D r M a h a t h i r b e a m e the f o c u s o f the

criticism, not only for his fervent defence of the plans, b u t also bccause
of the way the industrial plans w e r e f o r m u l a t e d . Allegations were m a d e
thai he had not consulied his Cabinet and that he ignored the advice of
e c o n o m i s t s a n d planning experts within his o w n d e p a r t m e n t s w h o w e r e
responsible for industrial a n d economic policy p l a n n i n g . He was accused
of proceeding unilaterally on the advice of only a few close confidants. In
r e s p o n s e , Dr .Mahathir dismissed his c r i u c s as ivory-tower academics
w i t h o u t vision w h o failed to appreciate the m a n y social and e c o n o m i c
benefits f r o m developing m o d e r n , high-technology industrial capacity
t h r o u g h large i n p u t s of co-ordinated g o v e r n m e n t a n d private investment.
96 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

In e f f e c t , he was saying that the long-term economic impact a n d the

social a n d cultural benefiis of the a u t o p r o j e a outweighed questions of
s h o n - t e r m economic v i a b i l i t y . "
W i t h D r M a h a t h i r a s its most enthusiastic p a t r o n , the a u t o p r o j e a w a s
given the highest priority for the start of production as soon as possible.
T h e n a m e ' P r o t o n Saga' with a star and crescent logo was selected for the
car and the target date of July 1985 was a n n o u n c e d for the start of
p r o d u c t i o n . T w o years later, amid m u c h fanfare and publicity, the car
was unveiled to the public on 1 S e p t e m b e r 1985 with Dr M a h a t h i r at the
wheel of one of the first cars p r o d u c e d , driving over the newly c o m p l e t e d
M $ 8 5 0 million P e n a n g Bridge, t h u s d r a w i n g attention to t w o of his
prestige projects with one ceremonial show. 4 0
T h e Proton Saga was p r o d u c e d in 1300 cc and 1500 cc m o d e l s a n d
was sold for M $ I 7 , 4 6 5 a n d M $ 1 8 , 8 9 0 respectively, even t h o u g h the
initial costs of p r o d u c t i o n were about M $ 4 5 , 0 0 0 per unit. T h e i m p o r t
d u t y on c o m p o n e n t s for locally assembled vehicles m a d e f r o m completely
k n o c k e d d o w n kits ( C K D ) was raised f r o m 15 per cent to 40 p e r cent. At
the same time, the i m p o n e d c o m p o n e n t s for the Proton were e x e m p t e d
f r o m the 40 per cent d u t y applied to C K D c o m p o n e n t s of o t h e r a u t o
i m p o r t s . W i t h increased v o l u m e , the production costs of the Proton were
reduced slightly, but the rising value of the Japanese yen m u d e the
i m p o r t e d Proton c o m p o n e n t s m o r e expensive. F u r t h e r m o r e , with the
e c o n o m i c recession, by 1986 the car market had s h r u n k by 20 p e r cent so
the Proton plant operated at about 75 per cent capacity. 4 1 To stimulate
d e m a n d , all government car loans to civil servants w e r e m a d e applicable
o n l y for the purchase of the Proton Saga. M o r e o v e r , the vehicle con-
t i n u e d to be sold to the public at a price far below production costs. W i t h
these m e a s u r e s a n d favourable protective tariffs, the Proton Saga was able
to c a p t u r e 56 per cent of the .Malaysian market for new c a n in the u n d e r
1 6 0 0 cc category' 4 2 and 47 per cent of the total passenger car sales by
mid-1986. D u e to the recession, h o w e v e r , the total market for cars
d r o p p e d by almost 50 per cent. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , the Proton sold only
22,000 units and p r o d u c t i o n operated at only 18 per cent of capacity ui
the first year. To overcome t h e p r o b l e m of low production levels, the
g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d plans t o market the car i n B a n g l a d e s h . B n u e i ,
M a l t a , N e w Z e a l a n d , and even in the United States, w h e r e it was
expected to sell for less than US$5,000. Since this price w a s US$3,500
less than the subsidized Malaysian price, the proposals g e n e r a t e d m u c h
controversy in Parliament a n d in the press. Up to 31 M a r c h 1985, t h e
Proton had resulted in losses of MSI 1.6 million. A year later, it had
p r o d u c e d f u r t h e r losses of M $ 4 2 . 5 million. Because of the obstacles
involved in exports to the United States, these plans w e r e shelved for
a while, b u t efforts w e r e m a d e to expand exports to o t h e r countries,
mostly i n the T h i r d W o r l d . T h e P r o t o n Saga was sold t o N e w Z e a l a n d ,
B a n g l a d e s h , Brunei, M a l t a , a n d Sri L a n k a , b u t by July 1987 the total
foreign sales c a m e to 4 8 0 cars only. After Dr .Niahathir's t r i p to Britain in
J u l y 1987, plans were a n n o u n c e d to sell 48,000 cars in Britain after
a d a p u t i o n s were m a d e to the car to comply with British s t a n d a r d s . W h e n
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 97

that w o u l d be accomplished remained unclear. In s u c h a highly compet-

itive m a r k e t , few e x p e a e d the car to p r o d u c e profits for m a n y years, if
ever. 4 3
Malaysians w h o bought the car f o u n d it reasonably priced a n d s u i u b l e
for local conditions. Public reactions to the P r o t o n w e r e m i x e d b e t w e e n
those w h o found national p r i d e in its production in Malaysia a n d those
w h o expressed concern a b o u t the e x p e n d i t u r e o f p u b l i c resources o n t h e
s u b s i d y to sustain p r o d u c t i o n . A t t e m p t s to depict it as an Islamic car
caused m o r e of the critics to be a m o n g the non-Malay c o m m u n i t y . E v e n
s o , the displacement of labour in the o t h e r a u t o assembly plants, closed
because of the market shift created by the Proton Saga, also a f f e a e d
m a n y Malays w h o h a d been employed a t the rival production lines. T h e
' w i n n e r s ' a n d 'losers' f r o m the Proton Saga project w e r e t h u s d i s t r i b u t e d
a m o n g all e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s .

Privatization

At the very t i m e that the g o v e r n m e n t launched ambitious plans for a 'big

leap f o r w a r d ' in industrialization of the key industries of c e m e n t , iron
a n d steel, a n d a u t o m o b i l e p r o d u c t i o n , the e c o n o m y was suffering f r o m
the effects of a w o r l d depression. Prices of Malaysia's e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s
of r u b b e r , tin, palm-oil, a n d t i m b e r p r o d u a s h a d all fallen. At the s a m e
l i m e , g o v e r n m e n t investments in B u m i p u t r a corporations a n d t r u s t
agencies had risen dramatically as part of t h e N E P goals to ' r e s t r u a u r e
t h e e c o n o m y ' b y p r o m o t i n g Malay o w n e r s h i p a n d participation i n t h e
private s e a o r . By 1983 g o v e r n m e n t investments, most of t h e m designed
to p r o m o t e B u m i p u t r a p a n i c i p a t i o n in the e c o n o m y , h a d been channelled
t h r o u g h 57 institutions, 115 stamtory b o a r d s , a n d corporations that in
t u r n controlled or had ioint-venture shares in 500 subsidiary companies. 4 4
In 1982 the government b u d g e t deficit rose to M$10 billion as t h e trade
balance for the year registered a d e f i a t of M $ 2 . 5 billion after a
M$5 billion s u r p l u s only t w o years before. 4 5 Q e a r l y , s o m e action w a s
called for to meet these effects of the s l u m p in the world e c o n o m y .

Besides m a j o r e f l o n s at budget-cutting a n d austerity, Dr M a h a t h i r

a n n o u n c e d in A u g u s t 1982 that the g o v e m m e n t plaimed to stimulate the
private s e a o r . especially m the construction i n d u s t r y , a n d that it would
p r o m o t e exports of Malaysian c o m m o d i d e s t h r o u g h Japanese-style t r a d i n g
b o u s e s — t h e so-called sogo shosha concept 4 6 that he had praised before he
b e c a m e P r i m e M i n i s t e r . A f u r t h e r ingredient to the g o v e m m e n t response
w a s a d d e d m J a n u a r y 1983 w h e n Dr .Mahathir e s p o u s e d the policy of
t r a n s f e m n g s o m e g o v e m m e n t enterprises t o the private s e a o r . T o g e t h e r ,
these policies were s u m m e d up with t w o slogans: 'Malaysia I n c o r p o r a t e d '
a n d 'Privatisation'.
Dr .Mahathir gave t h e following explanation for both slogans:

The Malaysia Incorporated concept means that .Malaysia should be viewed as a

compuiy where the government and the privaie s e a o r are both ownen and
worken together in this c o m p u y . In a company, all owners/workers are expected
to cooperate to ensure die company's success. Only through the success of the
 98 MALAYSIAS POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

company, will the owners' and workers' well-being be safeguarded and

improved......
Privatisation means the opposite of naiionalisaiion. the objective of national-
isation is for government to take over the ownership of private enterprises, while
privatisation means the transfer of government services and enterprises to the
private scctor.
Normally, companies and services owned and managed by the government
have been less successful or have run at a loss because the government's
management methods differ greatly from those of the private sector. On the other
hand, private businesses and enterprises are usually profitable.........
In view of this possibility, there is a need lo transfer several public services and
government-owned businesses to the private scctor, This transfer is callcd privat-
isation. Thc privatisation process can be carried out in stages following detailed
siudy. 42

O v e r the next several years, a series of conferences and s e m i n a r s

discussed and evaluated both these slogans as policy options. T h e
'Malaysia I n c o r p o r a t e d ' , which called for b u s i n e s s - g o v e r n m e n t co-
o p e r a t i o n , was i m p l e m e n t e d primarily t h r o u g h trade p r o m o t i o n schemes
a n d t h r o u g h e f f o n s at c o m m o d i t y price stabilization. The earlier efforts
of the g o v e r n m e n t to create international p r o d u c e r cartels to defend
m i n i m u m prices for tin, r u b b e r , palm-oil, and textiles had failed to slop a
precipitous decline in prices. T h e Malaysian G o v e r n m e n t ' s ploy of secretly
b u y i n g tin on the L o n d o n Metal Exchange to bolster tin prices m a d e a
s h o n - t e r m impact but proved disastrous in the long r u n w h e n p n c e s
c o n t i n u e d to decline a n d the government was left holding large stocks of
devalued tin, 48 Similar e f f o n s to s u p p o r t r u b b e r prices t h r o u g h the
International N a t u r a l R u b b e r Organization and a r u b b e r b u f f e r stock
s u p p o r t system were equally ineffective. A year later, h o w e v e r , s o m e
progress was m a d e in stabilizing r u b b e r prices w h e n a g r e e m e n t s w e r e
w o r k e d out for production q u o t a s to check the price slide f r o m M $ 2 . 9 4 / k g
in I 9 8 0 - I to M S L J O I c g d u r i n g 1982. As the price fell below p r o d u c t i o n
costs, all r u b b e r producers bccame more anxious about survival than
a b o u t profits. 4 9 In such circumstances, private p r o d u c e r s a n d c o m m e r c i a l
interests worked in close co-opcration with the g o v e r n m e n t .

W i t h the g o v e r n m e n t already o w n i n g or having m a j o r investments in

m a n y large corporations a n d trading houses, especially those f o r m e r
British corporations that had been acquired by B u m i p u t r a agencies
t h r o u g h stock purchases, the sogo shosha concept was interpreted by s o m e
o b s e r v e r s to be already in effect in some sectors of the c c o n o m y . "
Despite Dr .Mahathir's e n t h u s i a s m for the sogo shosha concept, no efforts
w e r e m a d e to p r o m o t e umbrella organizations for trade p r o m o t i o n a n d
retail sales a b r o a d . I n d e e d , this theme appeared to be in contradiction to
t h e 'privatisation' theme which was also being p r o m o t e d with m u c h
f a n f a r e . Ultimately, e f f o n s at Malaysian trade p r o m o t i o n were largely
confined to informal channels of c o m m u n i c a t i o n beiween the private
sector a n d g o v e r n m e n t as well as t h r o u g h joint trade p r o m o t i o n fairs a n d
conferences.
T h e privatization policy received ihc most lasting attention a n d the
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 99

d o s e s t scrutiny of academics a n d potential investors. After the first

a n n o u n c e m e n t s , hints f r o m g o v e m m e n t officials fed press speculation
that u r b a n mass transit, television, telecommunications, electric p o w e r ,
railways, s h i p p i n g , h a r b o u r m a n a g e m e n t , hospitals, and schools, plus t h e
large g o v e r n m e n t holdings in the corporate sector, w e r e all candidates for
privatization. W h e t h e r o w n e r s h i p a n d m a n a g e m e n t control would b e
t r a n s f e r r e d , o r w h e t h e r public shares for p a n i a l o w n e r s h i p would b e
issued for private investors, was left u n a n s w e r e d .
T h e first specific action by the g o v e m m e n t involved the issuing of a
licence to a private c o m p a n y to build a n d operate the television c h a n n e l
TV3 on a commercial basis. T h e recipient of the licence was a new-
corporation called Fleet, headed b y D a i m Z a i n u d d i n with U M N O a s the
maior stockholder a n d with other Malay a n d Q ) i n e s e investors. 5 1 In this
transaction, no g o v e m m e n t facilities or functions were transferred to the
private sector. I n d e e d , the heavy U M N O investment m a d e the govern-
m e n t indirectly a party to the new v e n t u r e .
T w o years later, in 1985. the government finally a n n o u n c e d that
the Malaysian Airlines System would b e c o m e privatized to raise
M $ 6 5 0 million that was needed for new capital investments. 5 2 P u b l i c
s h a r e s w e r e issued and sold, b u t b u y e r s were unenihusiastic since
g o v e r n m e n t majority o w n e r s h i p , control, and management c o n t i n u e d as
before. Unlike privatization policies initiated in Britain, the United
Slates, a n d C a n a d a , w h e r e whole industries were sold to private investors,
Malaysia appeared to be p u r s u i n g instead a policy of seeking private
investment in p u b l i c enterprises. T h e issues of f u t u r e policy c o n t i n u e d to
be discussed and d e b a t e d with m u c h interest, but with a growing sense of
scepticism and cynicism within the financial and academic c o m m u n i t i e s
a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t policy obiectives.

Religious Policies

Prior to taking office, Dr M a h a t h i r expressed the view that for the

.Malays, Islam was a p o w e r f u l source of identity w h i c h he likened to
nationalism, 5 3 b u t he gave no indication that he had a n y agenda for
r e f o r m or policy changes concerning religious issues or the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of Islamic affairs. I n d e e d , at the U M N O General Assembly in J u n e 1981,
he avoided a n y m e n t i o n of Islamic reforms even t h o u g h the Assembly
passed a resolution requesting that both federal a n d state Islamic C o u n c i l s
take action to enforce ' t h e purity of Islam'. 5 4 N i n e m o n t h s later, t h e
issues of Islamic r e f o r m became m o r e salient after A n w a r I b r a h i m w a s
p e r s u a d e d to join U M N O and b e c o m e a leading m e m b e r of the g o v e m -
m e n t . As a f o r m e r leader a n d f o u n d e r of A B I M , A n w a r h a d become t h e
charismatic leader of the m o v e m e n t which had a m e m b e r s h i p of 40,000,
mostly Malay university s t u d e n t s and young educated M u s l i m s .
A B I M w a s o n e of the m o r e m o d e r a t e dakwah organizations, w h i c h
stressed active involvement in politics and the i m p o n a n c e of Islamic
principles in g o v e r n m e n t , politics, the e c o n o m y , and in the lives of all
'Muslims. A n w a r accepted D r M a h a t h i r ' s i n v i u t i o n o n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g
 100 MALAYSIA POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

that he would play a m a j o r role in the f o r m u l a i w o of a new Islamization

policy. Although ABLM h a d been consistently anti-government a n d b a d
ideological ties with P A S as an avowedly M u s l i m party seeking 10
establish an 'Islamic R e p u b l i c ' in Malaysia, A n w a r decaded to join the
g o v e r n m e n t a n d explained that his acceptance at public office would
e n a b l e h i m to work f r o m within the system to f u r t h e r the Islamic
reformist ideals he espoused. 5 5 M a n y of Anwar's dakwah followers
considered his acceptance of a g o v e r n m e n t post to be a betrayal of the
Islamic cause a n d ABLM as a potiucal force lost b o t h support and
direction after A n w a r ' s exit. H o w e v e r , A n w a r gained a d d e d national
prestige a n d substantial political p o w e r by being given a position as
Deputy Minister m the P r u n e M i n i s t e r ' s Deportmenx a n d m a d e r e s p o n s -
ible for Islamic Affairs. Within a short p e r i o d . tbe government began to
f o r m u l a t e new Islamic policies that p u t it into a competition wrth P A S
a n d the d a k w a h m o v e m e n t for tbe s o p p c n o f tbe Malay e l e c t o r a t e o n tbe
basis of an intensified e m p h a s i s on Islamic s y m b o l s , ideals, a n d p o l i c e s .
At the UMNO General Assembly in S e p t e m b e r 1982. Anwar Ibrahim
challenged the leadership of Suhaimi K a m a r u d d m who was seeking re-
election as President of U M N O Y o u t h . Although A n w a r had been an
active m e m b e r of U M N O for only five months, with the implcit b a c k i n g
of Dr .Mahathir, he won the election over Suhaimi by 183 to 173 votes. 5 6
. T h i s n a r r o w victory a d d e d to Anwar's prestige a n d p o w e r a n d gave him
a d d e d authority withuot U M N O t o press f i o r i n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s o n
Islamic policies. T h e c h a n g e n e m p h a s i s by the gsovernment was revealed
i n D r M a h a t h i r ' s speech t o t h e U M N O General Assembly. d u r i n g w h i c h
he called u p o n U M N O to e n h a n c e Islamic pracatices a n d to e n s u r e that
t h e Malay community truly adheres to islamic teachings' He also
p r o m i s e d that the g o v e r n m e n t would create an Islamic university a n d an
Islamic b a n k i n g system, a n d the introduction of courses on Islamic
civilization so that all Malaysians c o u l d become familiar with Islam and
Its value system. 5 7
U n d e r Anwar's leadership, U M N O Y o u t h p e r f e c t e d its earlier r o l e a s a
'ginger g r o u p ' within U M N O , making demands to accelerate the pace of
Islamization and d e m a n d i n g a m o r e pro-Malay—islamic thrust to govern-
ment policies as well as o b j e c t m g in s t u d e n t rhetoric to the political
d e m a n d s of the non-Malay parties in the BN
Following t h e 1982 U M N O General A s s e m b l y c h a n g e s i n r e l i g i o u s
policy c a m e on an ad hoc basis in response to various factors and e v e m s .
w i t h i n t h e B N . especially f r o m U M N O Y o u t h , d e m a n d s f o r Islamic
reforms became a regular part of the political litany. Within t h e adminis-
tration, s o m e politicians and civil servants w o u l d make decisions or
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s t h a t w o u l d f o r c e a n issue o n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a g e n d a . T h e
intensified competition between U M N O a n d P A S for the supportt of the
Malay electorate meant that the government and all U M N O l e a d e r s
continually had to prove their Islamic credentials against the current at
P A S accusation t h a t the g o v e r n m e n t was failing in us duty ou Islam or
h a d even become 'infidel' a n d . from Its perspective. illegitimate. Finally,
t h e responsibility of the guvernment for Islamic affairs a n d for the
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 101

p r o t e c t i o n o f I s l a m meant that every deviant s e a a n d every p u b l i c

d i s p u t e over the interpretation of Islamic law, d o c t r i n e , or practice
r c q m r e d fcnrentiaeiu intervention to define o r t h o d o x y a n d to p r o t e c t t h e
tranquillity a n d well-being of the ummah (Islamic c o m m u n i t y ) . In this
emvironmentt, dakwah militants could set the agenda of political d i s c o u r s e ,
w h i c h forced t h e hand of the g o v e r n m e n t to r e s p o n d by concessions or
r e j e c t i o n s - - - - - - s o m e t i m e s f a r c e f u l — t o those w h o d e m a n d e d n e w policies t o
i m p l e m e n t I s l a m i c p e o p l e s i n p u b l i c policy a n d i n the s y m b o l i s m a n d
rhetoric of public life.. T h i s interaction between g o v e r n m e n t leaders a n d
those mobilized by the s y m b o l s and ideology of Islamic revivalism
accounts for the piecemeal character of policy changes related to as
w e l l a s p o l i c i e s t o w a r d s o t h e r rehgions. 5 8
At the end of 1982, on Dr Mahathir's promise, the gov-
ernment founded Bank Islam Malaysia with paid-up capital of
M $ 1 0 0 million based on federal and state government investments as well
a deposits by the Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji ( L U T H , the Islamic
Pilgrims Management and Fund Board) and other g o v e m m e n t bodies
and Bumiputra agencies. T h e Bank was established to operate with strict
Islamic principles based on the study made by a committee that sub-
mined a confidential report to Dr Mahathir. T h e Islamic prohibition
against riba (asury or interest) for both leader and borrower was avoided
through merchanism of profit-sharing and dividends, rather fixed
guaranteed interest payments, or through mutually agreed profit m a r g i n s
on goods sold at a price. so that both borrower and lender earn the
102 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

d e p e n d e d on stale administration. T h e r e had already been m o r e vigorous

e n f o r c e m e n t of Islamic laws and the application of greater penalties for
Islamic violations in most of the states. Such matters included: enforce-
ment of fasting rules d u r i n g the m o n t h of R a m a d a n for M u s l i m s and for
a n y o n e w h o served food to Muslims d u r i n g daylight h o u r s ; stricter
e n f o r c e m e n t of the khalwat law prohibiting 'suspicious proximity' between
the sexes among those of marriageable age w h o are not blood relations;
stricter enforcement of m o s q u e attendance for Friday prayers; and stricter
e n f o r c e m e n t of the collection of z a k a t and fitrah 'alms' taxes w h i c h are
considered 'obligatory' in Islamic law, 61
T h e s e t r e n d s towards stricter Islamic administration at the state level
were m a t c h e d by new regulations at the federal level. N e w laws were
passed prohibiting Muslims from entering any gambling e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,
the most important being at Genting Highlands where a casino operated
u n d e r g o v e r n m e n t licence. T h e corporation was very profitable, attract-
ing substantial investments by some p r o m i n e n t Malays, including
royalty. Alcohol c o n s u m p t i o n was banned at all government f u n c t i o n s
a n d in g o v e r n m e n t establishments, such as at univershies or in
g o v e r n m e n t - o p e r a t e d rest houses. T h e import of all fresh pork to Malavsia
w a s p r o h i b i t e d , and later, only halal fresh meat was allowed to be
i m p o r t e d . T h i s meant that all fresh meat had to c o n f o r m to Islamic
r e q u i r e m e n t s and be b u t c h e r e d in the correct M u s l i m way u n d e r the
supervision of an I m a m , so as to be suitable for c o n s u m p t i o n by
M u s l i m s . Hotels that catcred to government servants on oflicial business
or that hosted oflicial government functions were prohibited f r o m serving
a n y pork or non-halal food. D u r i n g the Islamic fasting m o n t h of
R a m a d a n , g o v e r n m e n t schools s u s p e n d e d school meals for all s t u d e n t s ,
w h e t h e r .Muslim or n o t , so as to encourage M u s l i m students to abide by
the fasting r e q u i r e m e n t s of Islam, On television, the time allotted to
Islamic p r o g r a m m e s , to Koran reading, and to prayers was greatly
increased. M o r e f u n d s were allocated for the construction of m o s q u e s and
surau (prayer houses) so that nearly every Malay village a n d settlement
was provided with an a p p r o p r i a t e m o s q u e — m a n y q u i t e new a n d
imposing. At the national level, the annually sponsored international
K o r a n reading contests bccamc more grandiose with large prizes, at-
tracting contestants f r o m mosi Islamic countries. In 1982, the g o v e r n m e n t
s p o n s o r e d the formation of the Regional Islamic D a ' w a h Council of
Southeast Asia and the I'acihc ( R I S E A P ) which attracted delegates f r o m
most countries in South-East Asia. East Asia, a n d the Pacific region. T h e
firsi R I S E A P general assembly w a s held in Kuala L u m p u r d u r i n g
11-14 J u n e 1982. In additiun, n u m e r o u s inicrnaiional confercnccs were
held on such issues as Islam and technology. Islamic b a n k i n g . Islamic co-
o p e r a t i o n , the role of M u s l i m w o m e n in d e v e l o p m e n t , and various social
a n d political issues confronting the M u s l i m world, 6 2

Islamic law provides for ihe M u s l i m ruler to be the protector of Islam

a n d the head of the religious institutions of Islam. U n d e r the colonial
p o v e m m e n t . the authority of the Malay Sultans over Islamic affairs was
e n s h r i n e d in treaty a n d law. Malaysia's constitution p e r p e t u a t e d this
 THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 103

practice by vesting authority over Islamic affairs with the Sultan of each
M a l a y state, each of w h o m was aided by a Council of Islainic Affairs that
provided advice to the ruler. T h i s decentralized system m e a n t that the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Islam differed f r o m state to state. In 1968, a National
Council for Islamic Affairs was established by the Federal G o v e r n m e n t to
co-ordinate Islamic affairs t h r o u g h consultation a n d co-operation. As
Islam b c c a m e m o r e of a concern to federal authoriiies, particularly
d u r i n g the M a h a t h i r Administration, e f f o n s were m a d e t o enlarge the
scope of federal supervision of Islamic affairs. Federal authorities, u n d e r
p r e s s u r e to enforce Islamic o r t h o d o x y and bring about unity within the
ummah, became c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the different interpretations of Islamic
law a n d different responses of the state authorities to the p r o b l e m of
' d e v i a n t ' seats or ' i m p r o p e r ' religious practices. T h i s issue of the degree
of diversity to be permitted in the administration of Islam became a
m a t t e r of public concern over the issue of how the end of the fasting
m o n t h of R a m a d a n would be d e t e r m i n e d . Since the e n d of R a m a d a n
m a r k s Hari Raya Aidilfitri, the most i m p o n a n t day of celebration
in the Islamic c a l e n d a r , it was an issue that w a s of utmost i m p o n a n c e to
M u s l i m s . W h e r e a s Dr Mahathir a n n o u n c e d that the day w o u l d be fixed
by astronomical calculation, the Sultan of Johore established the day by
t h e o l d e r practice of 'sighting the n e w m o o n ' , which p u t the J o h o r e
celebrations on a different day. 6 3 On o t h e r less d r a m a t i c issues as well,
federal authorities clashed with s u i e religious authorities. At stake w a s
the question of w h o would exercise leadership and have ultimate p o w e r
over Islamic institutions and w h o could claim legitimacy based on Islamic
principles. Such differences may have been a contributing factor in the
constitutional crisis of 1983 between Dr M a h a t h i r a n d the Malay R u l e r s ,
which is covered in C h a p t e r 5.

T h e Federal G o v e m m e n t a s s u m e d a m u c h m o r e activist role in Islamic

alfairs by a t t e m p t i n g to infuse Islamic principles to m a n y existing pro-
g r a m m e s a n d policies. Federal decisions a n d i n t e r p r e u t i o n s of Islam
b e c a m c crucial, largely o v e r s h a d o w i n g state actions. It was the federal
authorities thai had the power to ban books as being c o u n t e r to Islam,
a n d to declare certain practices or s e c u as being in contravention of
Islamic doctrine. Federal powers over publications, i m p o n controls,
police, a n d i n i e m a l security m a d e t h e Federal G o v e m m e n i t h e effective
final power on m a n y issues that h a d previously been dealt with at the
state level or had been largely ignored, t h u s tolerating considerable
diversity within Islam. T h e Islamization of public policy t h e r e f o r e n o w
m e a n t that Islam was to be unified u n d e r the leadership of federal
authorities headed b y D r M a h a t h i r .
The d e m a n d s to Islamize the g o v e m m e n t a n d reassess policies in light
of Islamic r e q u i r e m e n t s were usually c o u c h e d in t e r m s that a s s u m e d thai
Islamic policy and Islamic law would not affect the n o n - M u s l i m com-
m u n i t i e s . Y e t , in s o m e matters it was difficult to enforce Islamic law
w i t h o u t some attention to the behaviour of n o n - M u s l i m s . Efforts to
e x t e n d Islamic principles to n o n - M u s l i m s b e c a m e an issue that agitated
the non-.Niuslim c o m m u n i t i e s . F r o m colonial limes, n o n - M u s l i m s were
104 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATIONS

prohibited from proselytizing Muslims and they could be punished if

Muslims were invited or encouraged to attend any non-Muslim
ceremonies. With the attempt to apply more strictly the Muslims social
codes of behaviour, the issue arose whaether those codes should also apply
to M u s l i m - o o o - M u s i i m social contact. More particularly, should the
khalwat laws governing premarital social relations between the semes be
applied to non-Muslims when one partner was a Muslim's Many dakwah
Muslim groups insisted that they should.
A n o t h e r issue e m e r g e d , initially more by unilateral action of some
individuals than by central policy inititives. A Christian book store
o r d e r e d some Bibles p r i n t e d in Malaya from Indonesia. The shipment was
i m p o u n d e d by a customs official. a n d after long delays tthe explanation
was given that it contained ' M u s l i m ' words and was thust not permitted in
Malaysia to be used by Christians. In subsequent discussion between
Christian c h u r c h leaders a n d government authorities, the doctrine of
exclusive 'Islamic c o p y r i g h t ' to certain w o r d s was emunciated. Initially
the list of exclusive 'Islamic w o r d s ' was only five.Over time, however
THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 105
106 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION
T H E MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 107
108 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION 109
 5
The New Political Idiom

BY 1983 the Mahathir Aministration had entered into a second stage,

T h e initial 'honeymoon' period of the new administration was over and
by then Dr Mahathir had placed his dominant imprint on government
policy and had esublished a style of leadership distinctively his own. At
that lime, the Malaysian political system gave every indication of being
both stable and effective. Government was infused with a new energy and
sense of purpose that to a large extent was transmitted from the top. Yet
below the surface was hidden the faull lines of basic conflict, and many of
the policies of governmeni widely praised by some also had sown ihe
seeds of discontent among others. Many ambitious government pro-
grammes were achieving many of their targets and were gradually
changing the political and social landscape. Some of the most i m p o n a n t
changes involved the processes of decision-making and the generation of
support and legitimacy for tbe government. The key issues of pohtics in
this period had an impact on a rapidly changing society; in turn, these
policies and political disputes were gradually redefining political align-
ments and generating a new political agenda for the last half of the next
decade.
Before reviewing the major issues and events in the second phase of the
Mahathir Administration, this chapter will provide an evaluation of the
systemic changes that affected the interplay of politics. A brief review of
these systemic changes will focus attention on ihe evolution of Malaysian
politics, before considering the major events and issues leading up to the
1986 election.

System Characteristics
After the 1969 crisis, parliamentary government had been restored and
two respected and effective prime ministers had sci in motion policies
that were designed to address the major problems afllicting the country.
While neither T u n Abdul Razak nor T u n Hussein Onn could be said to
have generated a charismatic image, they none the less built a sufficiently
solid base of political suppon through effective negotiations among
diverse elements in society to forge a broad-based coalition that could
command decisive public support at election time. Although the BN
structure was based on complex elite bargaining, the process was quite
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 111

d i n e r e n t f r o m the elite bargaining processes of ihe Alliance d u r i n g t h e

1950s a n d 1960s. Boih ihe venue a n d ihe agenda of the bargaining h a d
altered substantially. A new political idiom had evolved, based on
institutional changes, on a changing political a g e n d a , on changes in the
elite s t r u c t u r e in Malaysian society, and on differences in style of
leadership.
T h e R u k u n e g a r a , the 'sensitive issues' constitutional a m e n d m e n t s a n d
s t a t u t e s , a n d the N B P had s u b s u n t i a l l y altered the institutions a n d the
'rules of the game' of Malaysian politics. Because the earlier process of
elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n had not created a stable consensus supporting the
p r o d u c t of those negotiations, the new rules were designed to create, by
g o v e r n m e n t iniiiaiive, ' f u n d a m e n t a l principles' that w e r e to be propagated
to the public a n d were also to be used lo limit access to the real decision-
m a k i n g processes of g o v e r n m e n t . O n l y those political dlites w h o accepted
the tenets a n d limiting conditions of the ideology a n d the new 'rules of
t h e g a m e ' would be permitted to share in g o v e m m c n i office a n d parti-
cipate in policy-making activities. T h u s , the R u k u n e g a r a was d r a f t e d to
forge a national consensus w h e r e agreement had broken d o w n , a n d also
to stake o u t a ' m i d d l e g r o u n d ' defining the limits of acceptable political
aciivities. T h e political extremes were defined as 'off limits' because, it
w a s a r g u e d , the political system could not accommodate extreme d e m a n d s
a n d high levels of political mobilization, especially over ethnic issues.

T h e net effect of these changes was to reduce pohtical mobilization a n d

to restrict access to the crucial decision-making processes in the political
system to those elites w h o were ' m o d e r a t e ' , willing to avoid raising
'sensitive issues', a n d willing to defend the p r o d u c t of n o n - p u b l i c inter-
c o m m u n a l bargaining. T h i s also involved the creation of an excluded
s e m i - p e r m a n e n t opposition subject to various f o r m s of harassment a n d
penalties if its poliucal acti\ities b c c a m e too strident. F o r the most p a r t ,
the p e r m a n e n t opposition c o m p r i s e d the non-Malay parties that expected
the Malaysian political system to operate with the s a m e k i n d of o p e n
c o m p e t i t i v e rules idealized by the British parliamentary system. W h a t the
m o r e m o d e r a t e p a n i e s were promised w a s access to a n d representation
within the central arena of the political system and a share of effective
political p o w e r . At the same time, the agenda of politics w a s b t i n g
restricted. Previous issues a n d ' c o m m u n a l bargains' h a d already been
d e c i d e d , a n d should not be renegotiated. Some of the most f u n d a m e n t a l
c o m p o n e n t s of the public agenda were e n s h r i n e d in the N E P . T h e policy
a g e n d a , t h e r e f o r e , shifted to administrative m a t t e r s a n d issues of delivery
of services a n d material benefits to constituents. T h u s , the policy agenda
tended to m o v e f r o m broad f u n d a m e n t a l policy issues to questions of
p a t r o n a g e a n d allocative decisions affecting specific g r o u p s a n d the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of tangible material benefits to key political constituents.

T h e elite s t r u c t u r e of Malaysian society was also c h a n g i n g , w h i c h h a d

the effect of u n d e r m i n i n g the a s s u m p t i o n s of the elite bargaining s t r u c -
t u r e s . Elites were b e c o m i n g m o r e functionally diversified; those at the
a p e x of c o m m u n a l parties f o u n d it m o r e difficult to represent this
diversity a n d also to c o m m a n d s u p p o r t for the o u t c o m e of i n t e r c o m m u n a l
112 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

' b a r g a i n s ' agreed u p o n as the 'best possible' final c o m p r o m i s e . W i t h

political Elites in the ruling coalition having a 'weak h a n d ' and b e c o m i n g
involved with a fairly low-priority a g e n d a , the roles of political i l i t e s
q u i t e naturally were d i m i n i s h e d .
T h e hierarchical s t r u c t u r e of each c o m m u n a l segment of society had
never been complete. It was m o r e characieristic of Malay society than of
C h i n e s e , I n d i a n , or other minority societies. Yet, in the post-war p e r i o d ,
even M a l a y society was u n d e r g o i n g t r e m e n d o u s c h a n g e to m a k e it m o r e
pluralized a n d egalitarian. In all c o m m u n i t i e s , the top poliucal ilites w e r e
n o t the traditional ascriptive Elites of the colonial era. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e
political elites were operating in a political milieu w h e r e professional a n d
'strategic Elites' also c o m m a n d e d important resources, both e c o n o m i c a n d
political. H o w the decision-making processes related to a n d incorporated
these strategic Elites was becoming increasingly i m p o r t a n t for the stability
a n d viability of the d e m o c r a t i c process. S u c h elite g r o u p s as the M a l a y
R u l e r s , the Islamic ulama, the legal profession, the academics, the press,
those representing business a n d commercial interests, and the military
b e c a m e m o r e important in the equation of politics. T h e s e strategic Elites
could be i g n o r e d , b y p a s s e d , or penalized only with h i g h , long-term costs.
W i t h i n this gradually changing pohtical landscape, D r M a h a t h i r
M o h a m a d initiated a n e w political style. It w a s based on his view that
Malaysia n e e d e d strong a n d d y n a m i c leadership, p e r h a p s modelled a f t e r
a romanticized image of the presidential style of J o h n K e n n e d y . C o m i n g
into office as a ' r e f o r m e r ' and one w h o had articulated a plan of action to
deal with 'the Malay d i l e m m a ' , he vvas not very i n c h n e d to act as a
c o m p r o m i s e r nor to listen sympathetically to 'second o p i n i o n s ' . He
o p e n l y expressed his disapproval of multilateral negotiations in the
i n i e m a t i o n a l a r e n a , preferring instead bilateral n e g o d a i i o n s . ' A m p l e
e v i d e n c e f r o m insiders and f r o m former m e m b e r s of his g o v e r n m e n t
reveal that these s a m e attitudes applied to his leadership role in d o m e s t i c
policy processes. A r m e d with the e n h a n c e d powers that were given to the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r in the w a k e of the 1969 crisis, Dr Mahathir c o u l d deal
with political c o n s u l u t i o n t h r o u g h non-institutionalized bilateral agree-
m e n t s with key individuals or g r o u p s . By these m o v e s , i m p o r t a n t policy
q u e s t i o n s need n e v e r be reviewed in any f o r u m in which multilateral
discussion a n d negotiations assessed and revised policy.

T h e net effect of all these systemic changes p r o d u c e d a m o r e centralized

decision-making system focused on the powers a n d prerogatives of the
office of the Prime Minister. T h e earlier practice of multilateral elite
consultation in policy matters w a s largely eclipsed and replaced with a
system that d e p e n d e d primarily on the good j u d g e m e n t a n d sense of
e q u i t y a n d balance being excrcised b y o n e individual. F u r t h e r m o r e , even
w h e n good j u d g e m e n t , e q u i t y , and balance w e r e m a i n t a i n e d , t h e r e
r e m a i n e d the p r o b l e m of legitimacy a n d s u p p o r t for such a system of
leadership that bypassed the roles of second-level political elites, as well
as m a n y of the influential strategic Elites. W h e n g o v e r n m e n t processes
b e c a m e cloaked in obsessive secrecy-, the erosion of legitimacy increased,
the anxiety a n d rivalries of second-level elites intensified, a n d ' i n f o r m e d
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 113

r u m o u r s ' filled the informaiion gap. T h e diverse, disaggregated, a n d

non-insiituiionally processed d e m a n d s generated by second-level ililes
b e c a m e increasingly difficult to satisfy and manage t h r o u g h the distri-
bution of patronage a n d the techniques of bilateral face-to-face a g r e e m e n t s
a n d unilateral policy decisions that w e r e c h a r a n e r i s t i c of Dr M a h a t h i r ' s
l e a d e r s h i p style.
A n u m b e r of the significant political events between 1983 a n d 1986
reveal increasing tensions, segmented alienation, a n d structural i n c o n g r u -
ities between c o m p o n e n t s of the Malaysian political system. O u r attention
will n o w shift to s o m e of t h e events a n d disputes leading up to ihe 1986
election c a m p a i g n .

T h e Rulers' Powers Crisis

T h e p r i m a r y political strategy of Dr M a h a t h i r was based on the a s s u m p -

tion that the Malays should remain united so as to preserve Malay
political s u p r e m a c y a n d thereby assure that g o v e r n m e n t policy w o u l d
give the highest priority to the economic betterment of t h e Malay c o m -
m u n i t y . In his view, he had inherited the leadership of the Malay
c o m m u n i t y , a n d it followed that ' u n i t y ' required strong and d y n a m i c
leadership on his part. While this assumption w a s never directly
c h a l l e n g e d , the Malay R u l e r s assumed that they, too, were d e f e n d e r s of
Malay rights a n d interests, a n d certamly deserved to be included in the
processes of policy formulation. 'The Constitution gave to the Malay
R u l e r s specific rights to protect certain Malay rights by r e q u i r i n g their
' c o n s e n t ' to any proposed a m e n d m e n t s to the ' e n t r e n c h e d ' parts of t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n . It also provided for the 'assent' of each state R u l e r for state
legislation a n d for the 'assent' of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong ( K i n g ) f o r
federal legislation. In the case of the declaration of an e m e r g e n c y , the
Agong was to be satisfied that 'a grave emergency exists'. 2 T h e precise
p o w e r s of the R u l e r s remained a m b i g u o u s in the Constitution, since
t h e r e was no clear statement of w h e n a R u l e r was b o u n d to follow the
advice of his ministers, and w h e n he might exercise his o w n i n d e p e n d e n t
j u d g e m e n t w h e n his advice, consent, and assent w e r e r e q u i r e d . T h e
British legal p r e c e d e n t s suggested that the M o n a r c h was constitutionally
b o u n d to follow the advice uf his ministers, while the Malay traditional
p r e c e d e n t s and the special responsibilities given to the R u l e n suggested
that a large area of a u t o n o m o u s prerogative remained by w h i c h they
m i g h t play an active role in g o v e m m e n t a n d political leadership at both
t h e s u t e a n d federal levels.

The R u l e r s w e r e also s y m b o b c d e f e n d e r s of states' rights in ihe federal

s y s t e m ; each R u l e r had traditionally exercised substantive p o w e r s a n d an
active leadership role in his o w n slate, especially within the Malay
c o m m u n i t y . To challenge the role of the R u l e r s could easily be inter-
p r e t e d as an attack on the federal system. T h e issue of the role of t h e
R u l e r s w a s complicated by the d e m a n d of s o m e in the Islamic r e s u r g e n c e
m o v e m e n t that an 'Islamic state' be established, w h i c h , for the m o r e
radical, m e a n t the abolition of the Sultans a n d ihe replacement of ' f e u d a l
114 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

s t r u c t u r e s ' by an Islamic r e p u b l i c modelled after the post-revolution

g o v e r n m e n t of I r a n . Because the role a n d status of t h e Malay R u l e r s was
m a d e a 'sensitive issue' by ihe R u k u n e g a r a and the Sedition A c t , a n y
conflict over the role of the Rulers was b o u n d to generate a s t o r m of
controversy with u n p r e d i c t a b l e political a n d legal consequences.
T h e conflict between the Federal G o v e r n m e n t and the R u l e r s b e g a n
over some relatively m i n o r issues. Several R u l e r s had played an active
role in the formation of state cabinets and over t h e award of or the
s t r i p p i n g of royal titles a n d h o n o u r s to individuals. W h e n federal a u t h o r -
ities a t t e m p t e d to d e t e r m i n e w h o should b e c o m e Menteri Besar in a state,
s o m e R u l e r s refused to co-operate. In 1978 the Sultan of P a h a n g o b j e a e d
to the candidate for Menteri Besar selected by Hussein O n n . In 1981 the
Sultan of J o h o r e forced the resignation of a M e n t e n Besar w h o had
served for 14 years. T h e opposition of the Sultan of Perak w a s a key
factor c o n t r i b u t i n g to the resignation of two Menteri Besar w h o h a d lost
t h e R u l e r ' s confidence. 3 T h e e x t r e m e wealth of m a n y of the R u l e r s , their
f r e q u e n t l y flamboyant life-styles, a n d , in some cases, their brazen dis-
regard for the restraint of the law a d d e d to the criticisms directed againsi
b o t h their political and personal behaviour. All these issues were inter-
twined with the very strong emotional affective b o n d s of s u p p o r t that the
R u l e r s had with large segments of both Malay and n o n - M a l a y society,
particularly at the state level.

F o r the Federal Government. the issue that triggered a response

involved the d i s p u t e over the determination of the date for H a r i Raya
Aidilfitri, which m a r k s the e n d of the fastmg m o n t h of R a m a d a n . T h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n gave authority over Islamic affairs to each Malay R u l e r , b u t
to co-ordinate Islamic policy, the Federal G o v e r n m e n t in l968 had
f o r m e d the National Islamic Religious Affairs Council. T h e Sulians of
J o h o r e a n d Perak h a d w i t h d r a w n f r o m the Council to preserve their
a u t o n o m y . W h e n the Council, u n d e r federal direction, picked o n e of t w o
a u t h o r i z e d m e t h o d s to d e t e r m i n e the correct d a t e , J o h o r e a n d P e r a k
p r o c e e d e d to pick the o t h e r m e t h o d ; this p r o d u c e d a different d a t e and
created confusion a n d distress within the Malay c o m m u n i t y with regard
to their most i m p o r t a n t religious holiday.

Because t w o of the most assertive and defiant R u l e r s — t h o s e of Perak

a n d J o h o r e — w e r e in line to succeed to the position of Yang d i - P e r t u a n
Agong w h e n the term of the then c u r r e n t Agong e x p i r e d . Dr M a h a t h i r
d e c i d e d in A u g u s t 1983 to meet this challenge by using t h e constitutional
a m e n d m e n t process to clarify the role of the Rulers. W i t h o u t prior
consultation with the judiciary or the Bar Coimcil, twenty-two constitu-
tional a m e n d m e n t s w e r e s u b m i t t e d to Parliament providing that parlia-
m e n t a r y bills that failed to secure royal assent after 15 d a y s w e r e to be
gazetted w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g royal assent. F u r t h e r , the power to declare an
e m e r g e n c y was to be transferred f r o m the Agong to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
ttithoui any reference to the Cabinet or to Parliament. Q u e s t i o n s by
Parliament a b o u t a declared e m e r g e n c y a n d any reference to judicial
processes were p r o h i b i t e d . T h e r e was also to be no time limit to the
d u r a t i o n o f any e m e r g e n c y . T h e s e a m e n d m e n t s t h u s transferred b o t h
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 115

s y m b o l i c a n d actual powers of the Agong to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , a n d ,

within the states, of t h e R u l e r s to the Menteri Besar. 4
Because of the sensitivity of the issue, the proposed constitutional
a m e n d m e n t s were to be m a d e with restricted press coverage a n d limited
d e b a t e . Before Parliament met to pass the a m e n d m e n t s , Dr M a h a t h i r m e t
with the press to w a r n against reporting in detail on the a m e n d m e n t s or
on any critical speeches in Parliament. T h e r e f o r e , no account appeared in
t h e press of t h e critical speech by L i m Kit Siang of the D A P . analysing
t h e legal c o n s e q u e n c e of the a m e n d m e n t s and pointing out the unre-
s t r a i n e d powers being given to the P r i m e Minister w h i c h posed a threat
to parliamentary g o v e r n m e n t m o r e serious than the exercise of royal
a u t o n o m y . He argued that the a m e n d m e n t s were both an unnecessary
a n d ill-advised r e m e d y for Rulers unwilling to take the advice of their
ministers. 5
W i t h its large majority in Parliament, the BN passed the a m e n d m e n t s
q u i c k l y a n d w i t h o u t critical evaluation, even though m a n y in the ruling
coalition were critical of a n d distressed by the content of the a m e n d m e n t s
a n d the confrontational style of Dr M a h a t h i r towards the Malay Rulers.
W i t h the local press subiect to a n n u a l licence renewals and fearful of
r e p o r t m g a 'sensitive issue' in contravention of Dr M a h a t h i r ' s w a r n i n g ,
for over t w o m o n t h s the domesiic press reported nothing about ihe
d i s p u t e or the controversial issues. Gradually, however, the public became
a w a r e of t h e crisis f r o m press reports in foreign journals and t h r o u g h t h e
u b i q u i t o u s r u m o u r s thai spread rapidly, partly in response to official
denials that a n y crisis existed.
W h e n the a m e n d m e n t s were s u b m i t t e d for royal assent, the Agong
d e l a y e d a n y r e s p o n s e a n d consulted the other R u l e r s , since they w e r e
affected by the provisions applicable to state constitutions. T h e R u l e r s
u n a n i m o u s l y o p p o s e d the a m e n d m e n t s and secured attorneys to advise
t h e m , W a s assent required w h e n the a m e n d m e n t s coniravened the
Sedition Act? W a s Parliament unconstitutionally authorizing u n b r i d l e d
a b s o l u t e p o w e r s by the P r i m e Minisier? What royal powers are protected
in the C o n s t i t u t i o n ? T h e s e were some of the questions examined w h e n
the C o n f e r e n c e of R u l e r s met in Kota Kinabalu on 12 O c t o b e r 1983 lo
f o r m u l a t e a c o m b i n e d response by the Rulers to the p e n d i n g a m e n d -
m e n t s . A t the C o n f e r e n c e , D r M a h a t h i r met with the R u l e r s , b u t n o
a g r e e m e n t w a s f o r t h c o m i n g . Instead, ihe R u l e n remained u n a n i m o u s l y
o p p o s e d to the a m e n d m e n t s . Because the Agong had suffered a heart
attack on 27 S e p t e m b e r , the fact that no p e n d i n g g o v e m m e n t legislation
w a s assented to and no diplomatic credentials were a p p r o v e d was b l a m e d
on the A g o n g ' s 'indisposed condition'. Yet, the D e p u t y Agong also
r e f u s e d to c o n d u c t g o v e m m e n t business so long as the issue r e m a i n e d
unresolved. Both t h e Supply Bill for 1984 a n d the Constituency D e l i n -
eation Bill w e r e a m o n g the pieces of crucial legislation that r e m a i n e d
stalled by the crisis over the a m e n d m e n t s .

D e c i d i n g t o m a k e the issue p u b l i c , Senu A b d u l R a h m a n , w h o h a d

been in T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n ' s Cabinet as Minister of I n f o r m a t i o n , held
a press c o n f e r e n c e highly critical of the g o v e m m e n l ' s actions a n d pre-
116 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

dicting a ' s t o r m y f u t u r e ' . His views went u n r e p o r t e d in the Malaysian

press b u t attracted s o m e foreign coverage. 6 Senu A b d u l R a h m a n followed
his statements to t h e press with a widely circulated open letter that
attacked the a m e n d m e n t s a n d D r M a h a i h i r ' s a r b i t r a r y a n d confrontational
b e h a v i o u r . Finally, breaking the press b l a c k o u t , The Star p u b l i s h e d a
c o l u m n written b y T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n r e f u t i n g D r M a h a i h i r ' s ' n o
crisis' s t a t e m e n t s , reporting on the issues a n d events, a n d suggesting a
c o m p r o m i s e way out of the political d e a d l o c k . ' T h i s appeal by Malaysia's
f o u n d i n g P r i m e M i n i s t e r m e t with no official response, since b o t h sides
f o u n d it difficult to retreat gracefully after having taken e n t r e n c h e d
positions on the issues at stake.
A f t e r the issue b e c a m e p u b l i c , both t h e R u l e r s a n d the g o v e r n m e n t
initiated campaigns to solicit a n d d e m o n s t r a t e mass public s u p p o r t .
L a r g e rallies w e r e staged in K e l a n t a n a n d T r e n g g a n u in s u p p o r t of the
Rulers. T h e press speculated that these rallies m a y have been discreetly
o r g a n i z e d by T e n g k u Razaleigh H a m z a h , whose royalist s y m p a t h i e s were
well k n o w n . In a c o u n t e r - s h o w of public s u p p o r t , U M N O organized a
p r o - M a h a t h i r mass rally in Alor Setar in K e d a h , Dr M a h a t h i r ' s h o m e
state. O t h e r rallies were organized in S e r e m b a n , J o h o r e B a h r u , and
K u c h i n g . T h e New Straiis Times, being o w n e d by U M N O , gave
p r o m i n e n c e t o the rallies s u p p o r t i n g D r M a h a t h i r , b u t almost n o coverage
of the p r o - R u l e r rallies. Technically, all the rallies were 'illegal' since
they w e r e held w i t h o u t police permission a n d in contravention of the ban
on large political rallies. Estimates of those a t t e n d i n g the rallies indicate
they attracted f r o m 15,000 to 100.000, but for each rally, widely d i f f e r e n t
estimates w e r e m a d e . T h e d o m e s l i c press t e n d e d to give t h e larger figures
f o r the p r o - g o v c m m c n i rallies, with ihe foreign press r e p o r t i n g m o r e
nearly equal levels of s u p p o r t a m o n g Malays for both factions. T h e issues
w e r e not directly d e b a t e d at the rallies, b u t with the increased public
mobilization a n d threatening p o s t u r e s , the d i s p u t e was rapidly ap-
p r o a c h i n g crisis proportions.

A s tension m o u n t e d . D r M a h a t h i r convened his C a b i n e t a n d polled

each m e m b e r for his unequivocal s u p p o r t . While all gave their s u p p o r t ,
a p p a r e n t l y s o m e were less enihusiasiic than others. A f t e r w a r d s , a spokes-
m a n for the g o v e r n m e n t revealed a list of cabinct m e m b e r s w h o w e r e
'loyal', the implication being that those noi on the list were 'disloyal'.
H e a d i n g the 'loyal' list were: A d i b A d a m , A n w a r I b r a h i m , Rais Y a t i m ,
Rafidah Aziz, Sanusi J u n i d , and Abdullah A h m a d Badawi. A m o n g t h e
m o r e p r o m i n e n t cabinet m e m b e r s not on the 'loyal' list w e r e T e n g k u
Razaleigh, G h a z a l i Shafie, Aishah G h a n i , A b d u l M a n a n O t h m a n , a n d
T e n g k u A h m a d R i t h a u d e e n . " T h e list left a m b i g u o u s the status o f D e p u t y
P r i m e Minister Musa H i t a m , w h o led a very active public campaign to
generate public s u p p o r t for the a m e n d m e n t s s p o n s o r e d b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t .

A s the crisis b e c a m e m o r e p u b l i c a n d visible, p r e s s u r e m o t m t e d within

t h e g o v e r n m e n t for decisive action. At an Executive Council M e e t i n g of
U M N O Y o u t h u n d e r the leadership o f A n w a r I b r a h i m , a resolution w a s
passed calling on the g o v e r n m e n t to gazette the delayed bills a n d a m e n d -
m e n t s w i t h o u t royal assent and t h e n let t h e R u l e r s challenge t h e g o v e r n -
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 117

m e n t in c o u r t , if they wished. Dr M a h a t h i r did not accept this tactic, b u t

he d i d indicate that it was u n d e r consideration, implying that this action
o u g h t be t a k e n as a last r t s o n if the Rulere remained i n t r a n s i g e n t . '
Behind the scenes, m a n y influential 61ites cautioned against confronta-
tion a n d called for s o m e compromise. Finally, on 15 D e c e m b e r 1983,
after secret discussions with ihe Rulers, a c o m p r o m i s e f o r m u l a was
accepted b y D r M a h a t h i r a n d m o s t , but not all, o f the Rulers. T h e
D e p u t y A g o n g signed the p e n d i n g bills, and the g o v e m m e n t promised to
i n t r o d u c e a new Constitution ( A m e n d m e n t ) Bill in Parliament w h i c h
w o u l d p r o v i d e that m o n e y bills presented for royal assent would become
law after 30 days regardless w h e t h e r assented to or not by the Agong. F o r
non-monetary bills, the Agong would have 30 days to assent to a bill or to
r e t u r n it to Parliament stating his objections. If the bill was reconsidered
a n d then a p p r o v e d by Parliament, it would become law automatically
after 30 m o r e d a y s even if royal assent were not given. T h e provisions
m a k i n g changes in state constimtions and transferring absolute p o w e r
over t h e declaration of an emergency to the Prime Minister were with-
d r a w n i n t h e c o m p r o m i s e a m e n d m e n t formula. 1 0

It should be noted that, with this new a m e n d i n g f o r m u l a , the Agong

had e m e r g e d with a m o r e defined a n d enhanced role, one which included
delaying p o w e r s , the right to exercise a u t o n o m o u s judgement, a n d the
right of f o r m a l i n p u t into the legislative process. Although parliamentary
s u p r e m a c y h a d been asserted, the P r i m e Minister had also not obtained
unilateral p o w e r s of declaring an emergency. T h e crisis had d e m o n s t r a t e d
t h a i , w i t h o u t substantial elite s u p p o r t , a p r i m e minister would be in
serious i r o u b l e if he sought to r u l e by emergency decree even if the
formalities of securing royal assent were followed. W h e n Parliament
convened on 9 J a n u a r y 1984, these c o m p r o m i s e a m e n d m e n t s were passed
by a vote of 141 to 10 after a s h o n debate in the D e w a n Rakyat. T h e
D A P w e r e the only opposition, and the sole P A S M P walked out without
indicating s u p p o r t or opposition to the new a m e n d m e n t formula. 1 1

T h e Aftermath of Crisis
A l t h o u g h the g o v e m m e n t had ' w o n ' , it had d o n e so at considerable cost.
T h e M a l a y R u l e r s a n d their most loyal s u p p o n e r s were shocked a n d
d i s a p p o i n t e d in the actions of the g o v e r n m e n t , and they were also
distressed at t h e way in which government-controlled media had depicted
t h e m . T h e disrespectful a n d disparaging c o m m e n i s of some t o p officials
a b o u t the actions a n d life-style of specific R u l e r s p r o d u c e d extremely
hard feelings b e t w e e n s o m e Malay royalty and certain individuals in ihe
C a b i n e t . T h e R u l e r s w e r e also d i s t u r b e d w h e n Dr M a h a t h i r staged a
victory rally in Malacca s h o n l y after the agreement bad been m a d e on t h e
c o m p r o m i s e a m e n d m e n t f o r m u l a , a n d a t m o u n c e d that 'the feudal system
w a s over'. 1 2 T h e R u l e r s viewed t h d r role as preserving constitutional
g o v e n u n e n t a n d o b j e a e d t o the implication that they might 'sieze p o w e r '
by s o m e unilateral declaration of emergency in defiance of Parliament
a n d the government. In the campaign for public s u p p o r t , they were at
118 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

the mercy of press, radio, a n d television media d o m i n a t e d by or u n d e r

d i r e c t instructions f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t . Despite the one-sided r e p o r t i n g
a n d the distortions, Malay society' was split aboui half a n d half, while
U M N O w a s divided a b o u t 60 ; 40 in favour of the government side. T h i s
division extended f r o m the Cabinet at the highest level, t h r o u g h the
p u b l i c services, into the military forces, a n d even a m o n g some coalition
p a r t n e r s in the B N . T h e crisis opened d e e p w o u n d s in Mialay society that
w e r e to have long-term ramifications for Malaysian politics.
T h e new Agong was s c h e d u l e d to be elected on 31 J a n u a r y 1984, f o r a
five-year t e r m . T h e R u l e r with the most seniority 1 3 by the criteria
applied was the Sultan of Perak. T e n days prior to the election, h o w e v e r ,
he died of a heart attack, t h e r e b y m a k i n g the J o h o r e R u l e r , Sultan
M a h m o o d Iskandar Shah, the R u l e r with the most seniority.
The Sultan of J o h o r e was known for being head-strong and i m p e t u o u s
in his y o u t h , and in fact, for various m i s d e m e a n o u r s , he h a d been denied
inheritance to ihe t h r o n e by his father in 1961, In 1977 he was convictcd
of a charge of culpable h o m i c i d e , w h e n , on his o w n initiative, he
personally c o n f r o n t e d and killed a m a n involved in smuggling activities,
b u t was p a r d o n e d by his father after his conviction a n d sentence to six
m o n t h s in jail. 14 In 1981, the Sultan on his d e a t h b e d revoked his earlier
selection of his sccond son as heir a n d t h u s restored the royal line to
T u n k u Mahmood I s k a n d a r . " In his s u b s e q u e n t years as R u l e r of J o h o r e ,
the new Sultan bccame noted as a d y n a m i c and strong-willed ruler w h o
loved fast cars, lived an extravagant life-style, a n d p a n i c u l a r l y enjoyed
t h e personal c o m m a n d of a u n i q u e state a r m y , the J o h o r e State Militia.
His earlier irresponsible boast that as Agong he might unilaterally declare
a state of emergency 1 6 m i g h t indeed have been the s p a r k that triggered
t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s ill-advised scheme to a m e n d the Constitution. W i t h this
history of controversy, t h e n , it was by no m e a n s c e n a i n that the Sultan of
j o h o r e would be clected by his fellow Rulers as the n e w Agong.

When the C o n f e r e n c e of Rulers convened on 9 F e b r u a r y 1984 to elect

the new A g o n g , the R u l e r of J o h o r e w a s indeed selected as Agong and
the new R u l e r of P e r a k , R a j a Azlan S h a h , former Lord P r e s i d e n t , was
elected D e p u t y Agong. Because of the strict code of secrecy s u r r o u n d i n g
the election of an A g o n g , no vote was a n n o u n c e d . Speculation circulated
that the election reflected the desire of the Rulers to have a s u o n g - w i l l e d
representative of their n u m b e r elected to protect their role a n d prerog-
atives. On the o t h e r h a n d , the election could also have been seen as
c o n f i r m a t i o n of the 'near automatic' seniority principle protecting the
equal right.s of all R u l e r s t h r o u g h rotation.
T h e new Yang d i - P e r t u a n A g o n g , Sultan .Mahmood Iskandar S h a h ,
acccpted his constitutional role, promising in an interview to ' d o whatever
the P r i m e M i n i s t c r a d v i s c s m c t o . . . ' , b u t he also claimed loyalty to the eight
Rulers. 1 7 A l t h o u g h there was some friction over the desire of the n e w
A g o n g to wear his military u n i f o r m for official fimctions, there w e r e no
o p e n incidents of defiance of the g o v e r n m e n t . I n d e e d , m a n y speculated
that the Agong and Dr M a h a t h i r respected each o t h e r a n d h a d c o m e to
s o m e tacit u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n c c m i n g their r c s p c a i v e roles a n d s p h e r e s of
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 119

o p e r a t i o n . T h e Agong d i d , h o w e v e r , create a n incident with s o m e

political implications. D u r i n g the crisis, he had taken t u n b r a g e at s o m e
r e m a r k s o f D e p u t y P r i m e Minister M u s a l i i t a m , w h o was f r o m J o h o r e
a n d w h o m he considered one of his s u b j e c t . At the H a r i Raya prayers in
the National M o s q u e , the Agong asked M u s a H i t a m to stand and m a k e a
p u b l i c apology, w h e r e u p o n M u s a Hitam apologized a n d kissed the
A g o n g ' s h a n d . Television coverage of the incident was broken off, b u t
not radio coverage. T h e gracious behaviour of M u s a H i t a m a n d the
forgiving gesture of the Agong w e r e met by applause at the m o s q u e a n d
a p p e a r e d to be welcomed by most M a l a s s , even though it seemed to go
b e y o n d n o r m a l protocol. 1 8
F o r the g o v e r n m e n t of Dr .Mahathir, the post-crisis period was o n e of
m e n d i n g political fences and strengthening those lines of authority
strained or f r a c t u r e d d u r i n g the dispute. By mid-year, nearly every
cabinet minister w h o had not appeared on the 'loyal' list had lost his post
a n d been replaced by individuals w h o had been m o r e visible in their
s u p p o r t for the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e U M N O S u p r e m e Council was also
reconstituted to exclude those whose loyalty had been questioned d u r i n g
the crisis, including such p r o m i n e n t U M N O politicians as Ghazali Shafie
a n d Aishah Ghani. 1 9
Even t h o u g h T e n g k u Razaleigh was r u m o u r e d to have played a p a n in
organizing the mass demonstrations for the Rulers d u r i n g the crisis and
was identified as a 'royalist' (being himself a prince of Kelantan), he was
not p u r g e d f r o m the C a b i n e t . Because he had the s u p p o n of some 35 per
ccnt to 40 per cent of U M N O delegates, it was clearly inexpedient for
Dr M a h a t h i r to expel h i m f r o m the inner councils of the g o v e m m e n t .
In-stead, Dr M a h a t h i r w a r n e d T e n g k u Razaleigh not to contest the post of
D e p u t y President o f U M N O against the i n c u m b e n t , M u s a H i t a m , a t the
1984 p a n y election. T l u s w a r n i n g w a s ignored by T e n g k u Razaleigh,
w h o w a n t e d to test a n d to d e m o n s t r a t e his s u p p o r t at the U M N O General
A s s e m b l y in M a y 1984. In view of Dr Alahathir's s t a n d , T e n g k u
Razaleigh's candidacy was seen to be as m u c h of a challenge to
Dr .Mahathir's leadership of the p a n y as it w a s a matter of a personal
contest between M u s a H i t a m and himself. In the highly publicized
c a m p a i g n for U M N O delegate s u p p o r t , .Musa H i t a m e m e r g e d t h e victor,
b u t the vote reflected only a slight shift of alignment f r o m their earlier
contest in 1981. T h e vote in 1984 was M u s a H i t a m , 774; T e n g k u
Razaleigh, 501; a n d H a r u n Idris, 3 4 . " T h e factional a l i g n m e n t s within
U M N O w e r e such that D r M a h a t h i r c o m m a n d e d a m a j o t i t y i n U M N O ,
b u t it was a r a t h e r fragile majority, in view of the serious divisions
o p e n e d by the constitutional crisis over the role of the Rulers.

Besides the reallocation of political office to the strong d e f e n d e r s of the

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , there w a s also a curious s h a k e - u p in the military. D u r i n g
the crisis, the Chief of the A r m y , General M o h d . Zain H a s h i m , w a s
k n o w n to be d o s e to the Agong a n d had apparently been critical of
Dr M a h a t h i r ' s confrontational tactics to redefine the role of the Malay
R u l e r s . Five days after the a g r e e m e n t o n t h e c o m p r o m i s e f o r m u l a was
m a d e , the g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d that General M o h d . Zain H a s h i m b a d
120 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

decided on early retirement in o r d e r to go into business. T h i s w-as

followed by a b o u t 500 o t h e r dismissals a n d 'early r e t i r e m e n t s ' f r o m the
a r m y . 2 1 A l t h o u g h no reasons were given for this reorganization of
c o m m a n d responsibilities in the a r m y , its t i m i n g a n d its extent suggest
that there were p r o b a b l y concerns about the political reliability a n d the
c o m m i t m e n t of the a r m y to the objectives a n d policies of the M a h a t h i r
Administration.

Bank Bumiputra/BMF S c a n d a l s

At the same time the g o v e r n m e n t was faced with t h e crisis over the
R u l e r s ' p o w e r s , it also c o n f r o n t e d a continuing scandal of m i s m a n a g e -
m e n t a n d c o r r u p t i o n that became p a n of continuing revelations in t h e
daily papers. S u c h revelations w e r e noi the p r o d u c t of investigative
r e p o r t i n g by journalists, but rather the c u m u l a t i v e impact of ordinary
n e w s that could not be i g n o r e d .
U n d e r Malaysia's N E P , a large n u m b e r of p u b l i c bodies and corpora-
d o n s w e r e set up to p r o m o t e B u m i p u t r a participation in the e c o n o m y . At
the state level. State E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n s w e r e set up in
most states, w h i c h in t u r n f o u n d e d subsidiary c o r p o r a t i o n s with public
m o n e y to participate in various economic v e n t u r e s so as to assist B u m i -
p u t r a to attain the share of the commercial a n d indusirial activity
p r o m i s e d i n the N E P . A t the federal level, a n e v n larger a n d m o r e
impressive array of B u m i p u i r a corporations and bodies w e r e f o u n d e d to
c h a n n e l federal f u n d s into e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and to p r o m o t e the
e c o n o m i c b e t t e r m e n t of the B u m i p u t r a s . At the apex of this s t r u c t u r e of
parastatal B u m i p u t r a c o r p o r a t i o n s was Bank B u m i p u i r a . W i t h a very
large financial base, it loaned m o n e y to both individuals a n d c o r p o r a t i o n s ,
p r e s u m a b l y giving special consideration to those with B u m i p u t r a status
a n d for projects that w e r e f a c i l i u t i n g the objectives o f the N E P .
Because of the higher rates of default on loans to Malays and to
B u m i p u t r a enterprises, there was always some conflict of objectives
b e t w e e n hard calculations of business profits and risks a n d the o b j e a i v e s
of ' e t h n i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g ' lo assist the B u m i p u t r a s . W h e n losses or poor
r e t u r n s were m a d e in some v e n t u r e s , it w a s assumed that these could be
offset by high r e t u r n s elsewhere in a large portfolio of investments. Most
of the officers of these B u m i p u t r a bodies w e r e y o u n g Malay g r a d u a t e s ,
often with degrees in Malay Studies, Islamic Studies, or A r t s s u b j e a s .
A l m o s t n o n e of these officials had any previous experience of financial
m a n a g e m e n t of f u n d s involving their o w n business or personal assets.
I n s t e a d , they were m a d e financial m a n a g e r s of large s u m s of institutional
m o n e y p r o v i d e d f r o m public r e v e n u e s , a n d w e r e instructed t o meet
c e n a i n policy objectives while also m a x i m i z i n g profits. F o r the b a n k i n g
a n d savings institutions, large s u m s of m o n e y also came f r o m private
savings a n d i n v e s t m e n t s , often involving the m e a g r e private savings of
M a l a y peasants t h r o u g h the savings society, A m a n a h S a h a m N a s i o n a l ,
that invested its f t m d s t h r o u g h Bank B u m i p u t r a . In any case, t h e total
m o n e y transactions for these agencies were e n o r m o u s a n d the m a n a g e -
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 121

m e n t style of those responsible appeared to throw caution to t h e w i n d s

a n d proceed with an air of unreality in their search for high-profit
v e n t u r e s a n d their lack of c o n c e m for potential risks or the p r o s p e a of
default on loans a n d investments.
D u r i n g the late 1970s, the H o n g K o n g property a n d share markets
w e r e b o o m i n g d u e to rapid industrial expansion and a s h o r u g e of land
a n d building space. T h e escalating property values meant that large
profits could be m a d e even with short-term investments. A subsidiary
c o m p a n y o f B a n k B u m i p u t r a , B u m i p u i r a Malaysia F i n a n c e ( B M F ) ,
began investing heavily in the H o n g Kong property market t h r o u g h
several i n v e s t m e n t a n d property firms, the largest being the Carrian
G r o u p u n d e r the leadership o f George T a n . T h e r e were m a n y a n d
c o m p l e x transactions involving large 'consultancy fees', a n d concealed
p a y m e n t s to s h a d o w companies that probably involved bribes a n d diver-
sion of m o n e y for o t h e r p u r p o s e s . W h e n the British began negotiations
with C h i n a in 1982 for the return of H o n g Kong to China by 1997, the
H o n g K o n g stock-market p l u n g e d , property prices collapsed, a n d the
value o f the H o n g K o n g dollar fell. T h e Carrian G r o u p h a d borrowed
e n o r m o u s s u m s of m o n e y f r o m B M F without proper collateral, and with
the collapsing m a r k e t prices, it teetered on the b r i n k of b a n k r u p t c y .
B a n k B u m i p u i r a b e c a m e c o n c e m e d a n d began internal investigations of
the H o n g K o n g operations of B M F at the same time that court action w a s
b e i n g taken to liquidate the holdings of the Carrian G r o u p . T h e first
p u b l i c revelations of the large B M F loans to the Carrian G r o u p were
m a d e in a n e w s p a p e r report in N o v e m b e r 1982. 22 T h e B M F C h a i r m a n ,
Dr N a w a w i M a t A w i n , denied allegations of h u g e losses a n d financial
irregularities, b u t t h e financial scandal coniinued to unravel. U n d e r
p r e s s u r e f r o m the p u b l i c revelations, Bank B u m i p u i r a a p p o i n t e d a senior
b a n k officer, Jalil I b r a h i m , as Assistant General Manager of B M F in
H o n g K o n g a n d gave him the responsibility of auditing and invesugating
the B M F H o n g K o n g operations. I n July 1983, Jalil I b r a h i m w a s f o u n d
murdered.23

M e a n w h i l e , in the H o n g K o n g courts, the b a n k r u p t c y cases of the

C a r r i a n G r o u p w e r e p r o c e e d i n g , followed by criminal proceedings against
m a n y of t h e principal actors in a w e b of c o r r u p t financial dealings that
implicated s o m e officials of Bank B u m i p u t r a and B u m i p u t r a Malaysia
F i n a n c e . By O a o b e r , the c o u r t actions revealed that Carrian Investments
owed H K $ 4 . 6 billion ( M $ 1 7 billion) to B M F and that very little of t h e
s u m could b e recovered. I n a d d i t i o n , B M F loans h a d been m a d e t o
K e v i n H s u a n d E d a H o l d i n g s , both linked t o the Carrian e m p i r e a n d
financially insolvent. T h e total s u m of m o n e y lost t h r o u g h speculation in
t h e H o n g K o n g p r o p e r t y m a r k e t a n d through fraud a n d nefarious f i n a n -
cial transactions exceeded M $ 2 billion a n d was estimated by s o m e to be
a b o u t M $ 2 . 5 billion. 2 4 T h e s e losses had exceeded the capital a n d reserves
o f the B M F p a r e n t organization, Bank B u m i p u t r a , which h a d been
established at M $ 1 . 2 billion. As the revelations about the massive finan-
cial losses of B M F b e c a m e p u b l i c , t h e r e was a scurry of activity widiin
the g o v e m m e n t to disclaim responsibility a n d to restrict public i n f o r m a -
122 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION

lion about the scandal. Various government officials began m a k i n g

accusaitons a n d disclaiming personal responsibility. In February- 1983,
T e n g k u Razaleigh, w h o was Minister of Finance, a n n o u n c e d that Bank
B u m i p u t r a a n d B u m i p u t r a Malaysia Finance were not u n d e r the control
of Bank N e g a r a ( t h e national b a n k ) , and therefore p r e s u m a b l y not within
the purview of his minisiry. 2 5 D e s p i t e the statement, T e n g k u Razaleigh
r e m a i n e d in the limelight a n d his ministry was blamed by m a n y for
failing 10 exercise a d e q u a t e fiscal controls over Bank B u m i p u i r a a n d its
subsidiaries, M e m b e r s of the Board of Bank B u m i p u t r a claimed they
w e r e unaware of the extent of B M F loans to the Carrian G r o u p , and the
f o r m e r Bank C h a i r m a n . R a m a n i l Ariffin. revealed thai it w a s against
b a n k policy for loans to be given overseas, 2 6 t h u s raising f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s
a b o u t the lines of responsibihty for B M F decisions.
Al the height of the controversy over the B M F scandal a n d w h e n the
constitutional crisis wiih the Malay R u l e r s was also intense, the govern-
ment introduced in Parliament a new Official Secrets Act, w h i c h m a d e it
an offence for a n y o n e to seek official i n f o r m a t i o n about g o v e r n m e n t
acuvities or operations w i t h o u t r e p o n m g immediately to the Police or to
the d e p a r t m e n t head. A n y b o d y 'possessing' such 'official i n f o r m a t i o n '
f r o m whatever source w o u l d be also liable for prosecution. T h e penalties
w e r e 5 years in jail a n d a M $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 fine. F r o m the liming a n d the
severity of the p u m s h m e n t s , it seemed a p p a r e n t that the g o v e r n m e n t was
trying to s t o p press reporting on behind-the-scenes revelations about the
B M F scandal a n d on the consiimtional crisis over the R u l e r s ' powers. 2 7
U n d e r p r e s s u r e in Parliament a n d elsewhere for a full accounting of
the B M F operations, Dr Mahathir a d m i t t e d that a ' h e i n o u s c r i m e ' had
been c o m m i t t e d , b u t a d d e d , "what they did was morally w r o n g a l t h o u g h ,
legally it w a s within ihe law. we cannot take t h e m to court'. 2 8 T h e next
d a y , the f o r m e r C h a i r m a n of Bank B u m i p u t r a was q u o t e d as saying that
ties between the g o v e r n m e n t and Bank B u m i p u t r a were such that ' n o
i m p o r t a n t decisions are taken w i t h o u t the a g r e e m e n t or knowledge of the
g o v e r n m e n t or of the central b a n k . . Although the lines of c o m m a n d
a n d responsibility a p p a r e n t l y involved the highest level of g o v e r n m e n t ,
the P r i m e Minister a n d even-one else at cabinet level disclaimed k n o w -
ledge or involvement with the B M F operations. T h e opposition in
P a r l i a m e n t , as well as m a n y public interest g r o u p s , called f o r an inde-
p e n d e n t Royal C o m m i s s i o n to investigate the scandal. I n s t e a d , the
g o v e r n m e n t finally agreed to f o r m a m o r e limited and restricted C o m -
m i t t e e of Enquiry chaired by A h m a d N o o r d i n Zakaria. this Committee
p r o d u c e d a W h i l e P a p e r in N o v e m b e r 1984. which r e p o r t e d on the
financial losses, but assigned no blame for the m i s m a n a g e m e n t or fur the
c o r r u p t practices. In P a r l i a m e n i , Lim Kit Siang chided the g o v e r n m e n t :
' W h a t Malaysians find unacceptable is that although Dr M a h a t h i r
describes the B M F loans scandal as a " h e i n o u s c r i m e " , there appears to
be no criminals.' 3 0

To cover the h u g e losses a n d rescue Bank B u m i p u t r a f r o m insolvency

P e t r o n a s . the Malaysian national oil c o r p o r a t i o n , p u r c h a s e d 90 p e r cent
of the share capital of Bank B u m i p u t r a for M$933 million a n d ' p u r c h a s e d '
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 123

the p r o b l e m loans of B M F for M$1,255 billion. In this w a y , Malaysia's

large oil r e v e n u e s were used to cover the financial losses that were
estimated by the final C o m m i t t e e of E n q u i r y to be a b o u t M $ 2 . 5 billion
( U S $ 1 . 2 billion). 3 1 Even after the C:ommittcc submitted its r e p o r t , the
g o v e r n m e n t refused to release it to the public. T h e issue was debated in
Parliament, but the report was not m a d e public until the Auditor-General
acted to force its release in January 1986, 32 almost four years after the
first n e w s of t h e BMF scandal had appeared in the news.
T h e original slogan that the M a h a t h i r Administration adopted for the
1982 election had p r o m i s e d a ' C l e a n , Efficient a n d T r u s t w o n h y ' g o v e m -
m e n t . T h e revelations of the B M F affair clearly t a m i s h e d that image.
M a n y p r o m i n e n t political leaders had been implicated d i r e a l y or
indirectly, b u t the most that was revealed to the public were c o m b i n a -
tions of bad j u d g e m e n t , i m p r o p e r suspension of regular b a n k i n g
practices, a n d i n a d e q u a t e lines of control and financial supervision.
A m o n g t h e political figures w h o were t a m i s h e d by these events were:
D r M a h a t h i r , T e n g k u Razaleigh, Musa H i t a m , D r N a w a w i Mat A w i n ,
H a s h i m S h a m s u d d i n , K a m a r u l Arilfin, and D r Rais Saniman. 3 3 T h e lack
of forthright action a n d the l i m i u i i o n on information gave the impression
thai t h e r e was m u c h m o r e that might be concealed. W i t h large a m o u n t s
of ' M a l a y ' i n v e s t m e n t s being lost t h r o u g h shady operations with Chinese
firms o p e r a t i n g in the highly volatile H o n g K o n g property m a r k e t , the
g o v e m m e n t was at risk of losing the confidence of s o m e of its core
c o n s t i t u e n c y . Because the losses a n d corruption involved Malay invest-
m e n t s that were being p r o m o t e d by the N E P , some of the strongest
criticisms of the g o v e m m e n i came f r o m old and established Malay
politicians w h o were distressed over ihe i n i e r p b y between political power
a n d the control over large s u m s of public money that was being m a n i p -
ulated for pohtical a n d personal gain. In this case, there w e r e no
Malaysian w i n n e r s , b u t the p r i m a r y losers were ordinary Malays. T h e
political c o n s e q u e n c e s of such aciivities were quite naturally to increase
political d i s p u t e s within Malay society over political p o w e r , patronage,
a n d the e x t r a o r d i n a r y privileges of office.

T h e Islamic Constituency
T h e categories ' M a l a y ' , ' B u m i p u t r a ' , a n d ' M u s l i m ' are not q u i t e con-
t i g u o u s , b u t do overlap to a very large extent. Malays constitute slightly
less than 50 p e r cent of the population of Malaysia, 3 4 the M u s l i m s
constitute just over 50 p e r c e n t , while the B u m i p u t r a s constitute about 54
or 55 p e r cent. W h i c h of these three categories is stressed for political
mobilization is a m a t t e r of shifting strategies a n d alliances. Each category
is energized by a different set of emotive symbols of identity as well as by
d i f f e r e n t issues of public policy that highlight a n d m a k e salient that
c o n s t i t u e n c y . Just as the categories overlap, the idioms of politics also
overlap. T h u s there is a c o n t i n u o u s interplay between the t h e m e s of
ethnicity a n d c u l t u r e , of ' i n d i g e n o u s n e s s ' , and of religion in the discourse
of politics.
124 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

D u r i n g the M a h a t h i r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the t h e m e s of Islam were given

increased e m p h a s i s a n d p r o m i n e n c e . Some of the practical aspects of
religious policies were s u r v i v e d in C h a p t e r 4. It is of some import-
a n c e , n o w , to consider how the Islamic constituency r e s p o n d e d to these
political overtures a n d evaluate the extent of s u p p o r t a n d opposition that
w a s generated within the Islamic cortununity as Islam b e c a m e m o r e
politically salient.
N e a r l y all M u s l i m s agree there is only o n e Islam, even w h e n they
disagree a m o n g themselves over the particulars of their religion. T h u s ,
Islam c o n u i n s within it a very pervasive ideal of the unity of the ummah,
w h i c h is in stark contrast to the political realities of the M u s l i m world
since the time of the P r o p h e t M u h a n m i a d . In m a n y respects, Islam has
been united by c o m m o n ritual a n d c e r e m o n y , but divided by diverse
d o g m a , d o c t r i n e s , a n d politics. Over the centuries, this has led to
n u m e r o u s seats, a n d schools of theology a n d of j u r i s p r u d e n c e , b u t
usually w i t h o u t creating a direct challenge to the ultimate ideal of the
' o n e n e s s of Islam'.
T h i s ideal of h a r m o n y a n d unity within the ummah is particularly
attractive to politicians to invoke in their effort to mobilize mass s u p p o r t .
To do so, h o w e v e r , requires the assertion of u n d i s p u t e d leadership over
the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . T h o s e in p o w e r have a certain advantage d e r i v e d
f r o m their control over the central institutions of Islam s u p p o n e d by the
state. But they m u s t also c o n t e n d with the decentralized character of
a u t h o r i t y wiihin Islam a n d the tendency of local M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s to
c o n g r e g a t e a r o u n d a u t o n o m o u s leaders w h o seem t o e m e r g e spontaneously
f r o m the local setting. Being of Arabic descent a n d having instruction in
Islamic religious schools is an advantage b u t not a prerequisite for
religious leadership at the village level.
A n o t h e r source of leadership within the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y has been
wcll-educaied, u r b a n - b a s e d intellectuals w h o study writings on Islam and
w h o are usually inspired by the intellectual, political, and theological
ideas e m a n a t i n g f r o m other parts of the M u s l i m w o r l d . T h e s e u r b a n i t e
M u s l i m intellectuals are m o r e conscious of pan-Islamic m o v e m e n t s a n d
m o r e likely to espouse what is called 'Islamic universalism', w h i c h
stresses the universal principles of Islam and the ideals of pan-Islamic
b r o t h e r h o o d a n d unity. Because of the dakwah revivalist m o v e m e n t ,
m a n y of the ideas of Islamic universalism are being p r o p a g a t e d at the
local a n d village level, and infused into the thinking and rhetoric of
local religious leaders. T h e intellectual and ideological f e r m e n t within
Islam a n d the vigorous competition for leadership within the M u s l i m
c o m m u n i t y have m a d e h difficult for the g o v e r n m e n t - s u p p o r t e d institu-
tions of Islam to establish unqualified s u p r e m a c y a n d unchallenged
leadership of the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y .

W i t h i n Malaysia, the administration of Islamic affairs falls within state

jurisdiction. T h e r e f o r e , each Malay R u l e r , aided by a religious council of
ulama, is al the apex of the formal s t r u c t u r e of authority of Islam. T h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Islamic affairs a n d institutions is the responsibility of a
D e p a r t m e n t of Religious Affairs in each state. Because Islam is also the
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 125

religion of the F e d e r a t i o n , at the federal level the Yang di-Pertuan Agong

acts as the symbolic leader of Islam, aided since 1968 by a National
C o u n c i l for Islamic Affairs and a rudimentary administration of Islamic
affairs u n d e r the supervision of the Keeper of the R u l e r ' s Seal. W h e n
A n w a r I b r a h i m was recruited into U M N O b y D r M a h a t h i r i n 1982, h e
w a s given responsibility for Islamic Affairs and m a d e a D e p u t y Minister
within the P r i m e Minister's D e p a r t m e n t . In effect, this involved an
administrative reallocation of responsibilities for administration of Islamic
m a t t e r s f r o m the institution of the M o n a r c h y to the P r i m e Minister a n d
t h e C a b i n e t . In its early years, the National Council for Islamic Affairs
w a s primarily consultative a n d d e p e n d e d on persuasion and collaboration
with state authorities. D u r i n g the M a h a t h i r Admiiustration, efforts were
m a d e towards m o r e direct leadership over Islamic matters a n d m a k i n g
t h e Council m o r e a u t h o r i u t i v e for the Federation as a whole. In 1983,
the g o v e m m e n t passed a m e n d m e n t s to the penal code a n d the criminal
p r o c e d u r e code which gave the federal g o v e m m e n t the absolute right to
interpret Islamic precepts, tenets, and Shariah law. It also provided
p u n i s h m e n t for creating ' . . . d i s h a r m o n y , disunity, o r feelings o f e n m i t y ,
hatred or ill-will' among M u s l i m s with up to five years in jail. Accusations
that s o m e b o d y else is an infidel was m a d e a c r i m i i u l offence p u n i s h a b l e
by a jail term of up to three years. 3 5

As seen earlier, the expansion of federal authority over Islamic aH'airs

was o n e of the issues that precipitated the constitutional crisis over the
role of ihe Malay R u l e r s . After the crisis, the issue of the ultimate p o w e r
of the National Council for Islamic Affairs remained somewhat
a m b i g u o u s . Legally, it still exercised only consultative a n d advisory
p o w e r s , b u t politically, it was also apparent that federal p o w e r s over
Islam were incorporated into the criminal c o d e a n d that the federal
authoriiies could cxercise m o r e initiative in establishing c o m m o n prin-
ciples a n d policies for Islam than had been characteristic of the earlier
era.
A p a r t f r o m the increased e m p h a s i s o n Islamic-based p o l i d e s w h i c h
w e r e briefly surveyed in the previous chapter, the federal authorities
w e r e increasingly c o n c e r n e d over challenges to its leadership of the
M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y posed by opposition parties a n d by the e m e r g e n c e of
what w e r e d e e m e d to be 'unorthodox' or 'deviant' seats. At the same
time, federal authorities w e r e also c o n c e m e d about the increasing dis-
putation a m o n g u r b a n - b a s e d M u s l i m intellectuals over M u s l i m law,
d o c t r i n e , a n d theology, In both instances, the ideal of a unified Islam
i m d e r a single s t r u c t u r e of authority p r o m p t e d federal authorities to act
m o r e decisively to define o n h o d o x y a n d to e s u b l i s h limits to t h e p u b l i c
expressions of political or religious differences within the ummah.
Because o f the c o m p e t i t i o n between U M N O a n d P A S for the leader-
s h i p of M a l a y v o t e r s , m a n y rural Malay c o m m u n i t i e s b e c a m e internally
split between U M N O s u p p o r t e r s a n d P A S s u p p o n e r s . W h e r e the split
was intense, it affected the leadership of a c o m m u n i t y , with each faction
d e m e a n i n g a n d q u e s t i o n i n g the leadership credentials o f the o t h e r . W i i h
Islam b e c o m i n g a m o r e i m p o n a n t touchstone of leadership, the divisions
126 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

w e r e ofien articulated by reference to Islamic symbols of l e g i l i m a y .

U n d e r the government p r o g r a m m e of constructing new m o s q u e s , most
M a l a y villages had new-style c e m e n i - s t r u c t u r e m o s q u e s w h i c h w e r e
operated by a state-supported imam and o t h e r m o s q u e officials, usually
h a v i n g political ties with the U M N O - l e d state administration. As a
c o n s e q u e n c e , ihe villagers would f r e q u e n t l y identify ihe n e w m o s q u e as
a n ' U M N O mosque". PAS s u p p o r t e r s might then congregate a r o u n d the
leadership of a rival 'imam' w h o followed a m o r e fundamentalist line on
Islamic d o c t r i n e a n d ritual, a n d on symbolic issues and d e p a r t m e n t
w o u l d a p p e a r m o r e d e v o u t . If the old m o s q u e or prayer house w a s not
d e m o l i s h e d , the rival 'imam' with his s u p p o r t e r s would often a s s u m e
control of the old s t r u c t u r e , which w a s usually m o r e revered. The
villagers would argue that the old m o s q u e was infused with semangat
(soul) because of the accumulation of m e m o r i e s and religious experiences
of the c o m m u n i t y a n d because the c o m m u n i t y graveyard w a s usually p a n
of the c o m p o u n d of the old m o s q u e . Although each mukim (Islamic
p a r i s h ) is s u p p o s e d to have only one m o s q u e , symbolizing the unity of
I s l a m , the rapid construction of new m o s q u e s by the g o v e r n m e n t facil-
itated the d e v e l o p m e n t of the p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n as ' t h e iwo-imam
c o n t r o v e r s y ' , which is considered a violation of the principle of ' t h e
o n e n e s s of I s l a m ' . W i t h t w o m o s q u e s , or t w o imam, in the s a m e religious
p a r i s h , t h e c o m m u n i t y would b e r e n d e r e d into t w o c o m p e t i n g f a a i o n s
for rituals, social interaction, a n d i m p o n a n t integrative ceremonies such
as w e d d i n g s a n d funerals. In states w h e r e PAS had strong s u p p o r t , such
as T r e n g g a n u , K e l a n t a n , K e d a h , a n d Perlis, m a n y Malay villages were
torn by such religiously defined factional conflicts. T h e intensity of the
d i s p u t e s could tear a c o m m u n i t y apart and lead to inier-factional ostra-
c i s m , open conflicts, a n d even violence. T h e s e disputes w e r e p a n i c u l a r i y
d i s t u r b i n g to Malays, most of w h o m retain the ideals of h a r m o n y , social
solidarity, a n d elaborate f o r m s of interpersonal politeness in social inter-
a c t i o n , but were c o n f r o n t e d instead by the extreme opposiie in their local
c o m m u n i t y a n d their daily personal life. In villages with Islamic religious
pondok schools or where a teacher or religious leader attracted a personal
following into a c o m m u n i t y of the d e v o u t , the school or the religious
c o m m u n i t y would often then b e c o m c the c e n t r e of a challenge to the
s t r u c t u r e of state-sanctioned religious authority in the c o m m u n i t y , W h e r e
such schools or religious c o m m u n i t i e s were f o r m e d , there was f r e q u e n t l y
an intense level of local conflict, often involving d i s p u t e s over the
i n t e r p r e u t i o n of Islamic law a n d d o c t r i n e , a n d t h u s also over the legit-
imacy of rival claimants to leadership in the c o m m u n i t y .

A f r e q u e n t pattern in the village-level conflict over Islam w o u l d be the

e r u p t i o n of a ' k a f i r - m c n g k a f i r ' (irifidel-disbelief) d i s p u t e . O f t e n the imam
identified with the PAS faction would accuse the g o v e m m c n t - b a c k c d
leaders a n d imam of being kafir, either because of failure to u p h o l d ' t r u e '
I s l a m , or because of affiliation with a government having a coalition with
n o n - M u s l i m s a n d therefore d e e m e d not to be based on the Islamic
principles established b y the P r o p h e t M u h a m m a d for the f i r s t M u s l i m
c o m m u n i t y . T h e g o v e r n m e n t - s a n c t i o n e d leaders w o u l d usually r e s p o n d
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 127

ID t h i s c h a r g e in k i n d , pointing to un-lslamic practices of PAS leaders

a n d asking what PAS had accomplished in practical a n d substantive
benefits for the c o m m u n i t y , especially w h e n compared to the material
benefits derived f r o m various government programmes.
T h e political a n d religious doctrines of PAS were spread by P A S
speakers at ceramah or by the circulation of thousands of audio-tape
cassettes of their m o r e charismatic speakers, such as P A S Vice-President
Ustaz A b d u l H a d i A w a n g . In the intense campaign, PAS speakers called
for the e s t a b b s h m e n t of an 'Islamic republic', while some accused all
U M N O m e m b e r s of being kafir, and claimed that those M u s l i m s w h o
o p p o s e d U M N O w o u l d be rewarded at deaih as martyrs. T h e message
also was conveyed that ' t r u e believers' should not co-operate with the
g o v e m m e n t n o r pay g o v e m m e n i taxes, and the dead should not be
buried in ' g o v e r n m e n t ' graveyards. Quite naturally, this extreme d o c t r i n e
of religious exclusivity escalated local-level conflicts in Malay villages
d i v i d e d by political-religious factionalism.
To c o u n t e r the persistent and pervasive campaign being waged at the
grass-roots level by P A S , Dr .Mahathir at the .Merdeka Day celebrations
in 1984 attacked P A S , accusing it of fomenting hatred of non-Malays, of
seeking to substitute a g o v e n u n e n t of mullahs for democratic institutions,
a n d of p r o m o t i n g religious ' e x t r e m i s m ' to u n d e r m i n e e s u b l i s h e d o r d e r
a n d good g o v e m m e n t . He also accused PAS of splitting the ummah a n d
of o b s t r u c t i n g the economic and social betterment of the Malays. 3 6
S h o n l y after this s p e e c h . Dr M a h a t h i r challenged P A S to a two-hour
d e b a t e on national television on the 'kafir-mengkafir' issue; the challenge
was accepted by the PAS leadership.
After the a r r a n g e m e n t s for the TV debate were fmalized, m a n y leaders
q u e s t i o n e d the w i s d o m of holding such a public d e b a t e that would not
resolve the issues, b u t w o u l d , instead, open more severe w o u n d s within
the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y a n d could also inflame intercommunal antag-
o n i s m s . T h e critics o f D r M a h a t h i r ' s 'anti-extremism' campaign a r g u e d
that it w o u l d merely give P A S a f o r u m to propagate their views, a n d that
the g o v e r n m e n t should not become so alarmed at a party that held only
five scats in P a r l i a m e n t . Dr .Mahathir countered that it was better to go
on the offensive than to wait until there were m a j o r incidents of conflict
a n d direct challenges to orderly g o v e m m e n t . 3 7 Five days before the
s c h e d u l e d d e b a t e , T u n k u A b d u l f U h m a n , writing his c o l u m n in The
Star, a r g u e d that t h e d e b a t e would cause 'untold h a r m a m o n g M u s l i m s
a n d o t h e r s ' . " T w o days later, the A g o n g , after consulting the other
R u l e r s , o r d e r e d the d e b a t e cancelled. 3 9 N o t only d i d this allow t h e
g o v e r n m e n t to w i t h d r a w f r o m a situation which w o u l d have pitted
U M N O leaders against P A S spokesmen w h o had m o r e religious training
a n d were a d e p t at Islamic rcbgious a r g u m e n t , but the decision also, in an
i n d i r e a w a y , reasserted the ultimate authority of the Agong a n d the
M a l a y R u l e r s over Islamic religious affairs. In the contest for the leader-
s h i p of the ummat, the most authoritative word ultimately came f r o m the
collective stand of the Malay R u l e r s , a n d significantly, this w a s accepted
tacitly even by the P A S leadership.
128 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T h e d a y after the proposed a n d cancelled T V d e b a t e , the g o v e r n m e n t

tabled in Parliament a W h i t e P a p e r entitled The Threat to Muslim Unity
and National Security. 4 0 In this d o c u m e n t , the substance of the govern-
m e n t accusations against P A S a n d Islamic 'extremist g r o u p s ' w a s
p r e s e n t e d . Six extremist g r o u p s were listed, a n d s o m e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s
presented on the activities of some P A S w o r k e r s w h o h a d earlier been
d e t a i n e d u n d e r the ISA. T h e W h i t e P a p e r revealed that the g o v e r n m e n t
w a s fearful of s o d a l d i s o r d e r resulting f r o m the activides of s o m e political
activists w h o w e r e calling u p o n their followers to d e m o n s t r a t e the intensity
of their c o m m i t m e n t to Islam by violent acts against g o v e n u n e n t a u t h o r -
ity. It also accused the Malayan C o m m u n i s t Party of exploiting divisions
w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y .
Since the early years of the M a h a t h i r Administration, there h a d b e e n
periodic actions against 'deviant' Islamic g r o u p s . F o r e x a m p l e , in 1981
Dr M a h a t h i r h a d w a r n e d a b o u t a g r o u p called ' C r y p t o ' with a leader w h o
claimed to be a Mahdi a n d w h o had f o r m e d g r o u p s in P e n a n g , Sungai
P e t a n i , a n d Selangor. He accused this 'deviant sect' of i n c i u n g revolt a n d
of deriving its principles f r o m ' Z i o n i s m ' , but he d i d not give m o r e
details of its practices or alleged beliefs. T h e leader a n d a n u m b e r of
m e m b e r s w e r e detained u n d e r tbe ISA. 4 1 Several m o n t h s before the
release of t h e W h i t e P a p e r on M u s l i m u n i t y in 1984, ISA d e t e n t i o n
o r d e r s w e r e issued for the arrest of a n u m b e r of the leaders associated
with t h e six Islamic 'extremist g r o u p s ' identified in that d o c u m e n t .
O n e of the m o r e i m p o r t a n t of the g r o u p s u n d e r g o v e r n m e n t surveillance
was a religious c o m m u n i t y that had formed a r o u n d an Islamic school
f o t m d e d in the early 1980s by a charismatic teacher n a m e d I b r a h i m
M a h m u d . He h a d been a m e m b e r of A B I M a n d , in his s t u d e n t day's, w a s
a close associate of A n w a r I b r a h i m . I b r a h i m M a h m u d h a d helped to
o r g a n i z e the ABLM-sponsored Baling d e m o n s t r a t i o n s against Malay
p o v e r t y a n d alleged peasant h u n g e r a n d starv-ation in 1974. Later he w e n t
t o E g y p t , w h e r e h e g r a d u a t e d f r o m Al-Azhar University, a n d then w e n t
t o Libya for f u r t h e r e d u c a t i o n . O n his r e t u r n , h e w o r k e d i n the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r ' s D e p a r t m e n t d u r i n g tbe administration of A b d u l R a z a k , a n d at
the g o v e r n m e n t - s u p p o r t e d Islamic C e n t r e . Eventually he r e t u r n e d to his
h o m e area in K e d a h , w h e r e he f o u n d e d a pondok school in the village of
M e m a l i , not far f r o m Baling. T h e r e he began attracting a d e v o t e d a n d
militant following, including a n u m b e r of o t h e r Islamic religious teachers.
Because of his m o r e radical ideas a n d his e d u c a t i o n a b r o a d , he w a s
k n o w n as ' I b r a h i m L i b y a ' . After his r e t u r n , he ran for election in K e d a h
as a P A S candidate b u t w a s defeated. In S e p i e m b e r 1984, a w a r r a n t for
his arrest a n d the arrest of five associates w a s issued u n d e r the I S A .
Police detained the five associates, b u t ' I b r a h i m L i b y a ' refused to sur-
r e n d e r . H e c o n t i n u e d living i n M e m a l i , a n d w a s d e f e n d e d b y t h e
c o n c e n e d actions of m e m b e r s of his c o m m u n i t y . Several efforts by t h e
local police to arrest ' I b r a h i m L i b y a ' w e r e unsuccessful because his
followers utilized obstnictionist u c t i c s w h e n e v e r police a r r i v e d . F o r over
a year he successfully resisted arrest.

W h e n m e m b e r s o f the M e m a l i c o m m u n i t y began a i m i n g themselves

 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 129

a n d crealing local d i s t u r b a n c e s , a 200-man unit of the Federal Police

Reserve, e q u i p p e d with a r m o u r e d cars a n d heavy w e a p o n s , was
s u m m o n e d to arrest ' I b r a h i m Libya' a n d disarm about 4 0 0 of his
s u p p o r t e r s . T h e area w a s d e f e n d e d b y s u p p o r t e r s , including w o m e n a n d
c h i l d r e n , a r m e d with parangs and primitive weapons. W h e n t h e Police
Field F o r c e a r r i v e d , the villagers are r e p o n e d to have a t u c k e d , shouting
'Allahu akbar!' (God is great!) A five-hour battle e n s u e d , resulting in t h e
d e a t h of 14 civilians a n d 4 police. ' I b r a h i m Libya' w a s a m o n g the dead.
Altogether, 160 w e r e arrested a n d d e t a i n e d , 37 of w h o m the g o v e m m e n t
r e p o r t e d to be ' w a n t e d m e n ' . A m o n g those arrested w e r e some as young
as 11 years of age. 4 2
W h e n q u e s t i o n e d in Parliament a b o u t excessive use of force in the
M e m a l i o p e r a t i o n s , the g o v e m m e n t displayed on national television a
short edited version of police video-tapes of the operation. T h e opposition
asked w h e t h e r o t h e r tactics could have been used to arrest the wanted
m e n , a n d w h e t h e r it w a s necessary to use such force against villagers,
including w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . T h e g o v e m m e n t criticized P A S for
covert s u p p o r t of the m o v e m e n t . After the police operations at M e m a l i ,
PAS Vice-President Ustaz A b d u l H a d i A w a n g , in defiance of the g o v e m -
m e n t , issued a fatwa (Islamic edict) stating that to oppose the g o v e m m e n t
is to c o n d u c t jihad (holy w a r ) a n d to die for the cause is mad syahid
( m a r t y r ' s d e a t h ) . H i s action was d i e d b y the g o v e m m e n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e
the complicity of P A S with the Memali m o v e m e n t . All b u t one of the
M e m a l i c o n u n u n i t y dead were taken to a PAS-stronghold village some
d i s t a n c e away w h e r e they were buried following Islamic burial services
normally reserved for Malay warrior-heroes. 4 3 O u t of the 160 arrested
M e m a l i m e m b e r s , 127 w e r e released within two m o n t h s a n d 36 were
released in J u l y , leaving a b o u t 10 in detention in late 1986. 44

A somewhat d i f f e r e n t challenge to Islamic policy d e v d o p e d within ihe

M u s l i m intellectual c o m m u n i t y because of the publication of a contro-
versial b o o k . T h e a u t h o r , Kassim A h m a d , was the f o n n e r C h a i r m a n o f
Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia ( P S R M , Socialist W o r k e r s Party of
Malaysia) a n d he h a d been detained f r o m 1976 lo 1981 u n d e r the ISA.
After his release, h e was recruited into U M N O and w a s w i d d y respected
in i n i e l l e a u a l circles for his scholarship. In this new b o o k , entitled
Hadith—A R e - m a i u a t i m , 4 5 he argued that the H a d i t h (reports on the
P r o p h e t ' s sayings a n d rulings) w e r e created by the ulama a century or
t w o a f t e r M u h a m m a d ' s d e a t h as a device to maintain their power.
T h e r e f o r e , h e c o n c l u d e d , the H a d i t h are n o t 'revealed' a n d are n o t , b y
themselves, a valid source for M u s l i m law. His a r g u m e n t w a s not entirely
original, b u t the e v i d e n c e w a s assembled in a scholarly m a n n e r with
extensive d u t i o n s f r o m w e l l - e s u b l i s h e d works o o Islamic history and
j u r i s p r u d e n c e . H i s objective w a s to open the way for social r e f o r m
t h r o u g h ijtihad (Islamic i n t e r p r e u t i o n s ) . By his o w n admission, he was
appealing to those 30 p e r cent of M u s l i m s w h o were m o d e m , liberal, a n d
p r a g m a t i c i n outlook a n d w h o w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o social r e f o n n . H e
argued that the ulama a n d M u s l i m traditionalists were too rigid a n d
reactionary in their thinking a n d w e r e the cause of m u c h of the back-
 MALAYSIAS POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

wardress of the M u s l i m w o r l d . T h e evidence and the historical data w e r e

less i m p o r t a n t than his conclusions, which were a direct challenge to the
d o c t r i n e s of the Islamic establishment.
K a s s i m A h m a d ' s book generated m u c h reaction a m o n g M u s l i m s and
led t o s o m e p u b h c discussions a n d debaie. A t f i r s t , m a n y p r o m i n e n t
M a l a y s argued for open discussion a m o n g M u s l i m s of the evidence a n d
t h e theological issues raised. Since the whole s t r u c t u r e of M u s l i m juris-
p r u d e n c e w a s being challenged, the book stirred up a s t o r m of d e b a t e
a n d criticism. T h e g o v e r n m e n t promised to p u b l i s h a b o o k to reveal
flaws in his a r g u m e n t a n d scholarship. A B I M invited h i m to discuss his
b o o k , which he did in a closed five-hour confrontation with ulama.
d u r i n g w h i c h he refused to recant, but instead d e f e n d e d his thesis.
U M N O Y o u t h s u t e d that the book was contrary t o Islam, b u t they w e r e
o p p o s e d to it being b a n n e d , while P e r k i m called for a b a n on all
controversial books on Islam. 4 7 T h e book was bitterly attacked by P A S
bccausc it challenged the role and legitimacy of the ulama, w h o w e r e to
b e c o m e the basis for g o v e r n m e n t authority in the f u t u r e i s l a m i c state'
thai was envisioned by the party.

T h e first official actions against the book took place ai the state level.
T h e state religious councils i n Perlis, P e r a k , a n d P a h a n g b a n n e d t h e
book a n d prohibited Kassim A h m a d f r o m talking on Islam. 4 8 Finally, the
H o m e Ministry' ( h e a d e d by Dr M a h a t h i r ) acted on a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
f r o m the Religious Affairs Division (headed by Dr Yusof N o r ) that w a s
within the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s D e p a r t m e n t ( u n d e r D r M a h a t h i r ) . T h e book
w a s b a n n e d f r o m sale a n d possession of the book w a s m a d e an offence. 4 9
All p u b l i c d e b a i e on the issues raised by the book was effectively
s t o p p e d . Kassim A h m a d never r e n o u n c e d his views, yet he also retained
his m e m b e r s h i p in U M N O and w a s not r e q u i r e d to admit his e r r o r s or
apostasy. It appeared that individuals could subscribe to unorthodox
theories of Islam so long as they did not c o m m u n i c a t e t h e m in p r i n t or
in p u b l i c a n d no public controversies e r u p t e d .

T h e s e events d e m o n s t r a t e the diversity of political, social, and religious

views wiihin the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . While the g o v e r n m e n t gained
s u p p o n for its e m p h a s i s on Islamic policies, it also had to exercise
exiensive disciplinary m e a s u r e s to restrict the o u t w a r d manifestations of
this diversity. To d e f e n d Islam with secular p o w e r is to acquire the
m a n t l e of righteousness for secular a u t h o r i t y , but only in the eyes of
those w h o agree with the State's definition of Islam. F o r m a n y , theolo-
gical issues b e c a m e central to politics. W i t h the increasing social a n d
e c o n o m i c diversity within the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , it was b e c o m i n g m o r e
difficult to create political unity a n d a stable s u p p o r t base for ihe
g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h the appeal to Islamic symbols a n d by the exercise of
t h e p o w e r s t o define a n d d e f e n d Islam. T h e r e w e r e always s o m e M u s l i m s
w h o w o u l d push at the b o u n d a r i e s of o r t h o d o x y a n d there w e r e o t h e r s
w h o w o u l d invoke Islam to criticize or oppose the g o v e r n m e n t . Religion
gave to politics an intensity that challenged t h e ingenuity of leaders, and
p r o v i d e d the basis for both loyal s u p p o r t a n d a militant o p p o s i t i o n , while
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 131

it also u n d e r m i n e d the viability and legitimacy of e s u b l i s h e d institutional

processes of policy-making a n d resolution of conflicts.

The Non-Malay Constituencies

All of Malaysia's diverse non-Malay constituencies—Chinese, I n d i a n ,

S i k h , E u r a s i a n , B o r n e o tribal g r o u p s , a n d m a n y others—faced the same
basic e q u a t i o n of politics: Malay political supremacy expressed t h r o u g h
t h e d o m i n a n t p o w e r of U M N O . As a consequence, m e m b e r s of these
c o m m u n i t i e s h a d to face the issue of w h e t h e r their interests would be
b e t t e r protected a n d f u r t h e r e d t h r o u g h alliance a n d incorporation into
t h e d o m i n a n t r u l i n g coalition—the Barisan Nasional—or t h r o u g h s u p p o a
for t h e opposition. T h i s was not a matter of choosing and defending
political ideals, b u t rather of selecting u c t i c s to avoid the "worst option'
scenarios a n d choosing between two or three distasteful options, N o t only
w a s each of these c o m m u n i t i e s usually split between cultural, economic,
a n d social s u b - g r o u p i n g s , but they were also often split over strategies
a n d tactics for participation in politics. M u c h of their political activity
reflected the frustrations a n d despair of relative political weakness and
marginalization. C o m p e t i n g Elites could sound convincing, b u t , in the
political e n v i r o n m e n t of Malaysian politics, those seeking the s u p p o n of
non-.Malay constituencies could seldom deliver m u c h that was u n g i b l e to
their grass-root s u p p o r t e r s .

No firm a n s w e r s can be given to the 'might-have-beens' of history.

N o n - M a l a y leaders c a n , even with the benefit of hindsight, look at the
past and still disagree over what strategies and tactics might have been
m o r e or less successful. O v e r time, it became m o r e apparent that it was
not the strategies of the weak that c o u n t e d , b u t of those with power.
D u r i n g the pre-1969 e r a , the non-Malay communities had become
mobilized by e t h n i c parties. T h e most important of these participated in
the Alliance, with concessions m a d e to the constituent p a n i e s t h r o u g h
the 'elite a c c o m m o d a t i o n system' operating u n d e r the guidance of
T u n k u A b d u l R a h m a n . W h i l e .Malay interests were p a r a m o u n t , con-
cessions to n o n - M a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s were significant and tangible. T h e
process d e p e n d e d on the personal trust a n d goodwill built up a m o n g
the Elites w h o represented the various e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s . Even after the
collapse of the i l i t e a c c o m m o d a t i o n system in 1969, there were still the
b o n d s of trust a n d e m p a t h y that facilitated substantial concessions to
those p a n i c s that had all along r e m a i n e d faithful to the Alliancc system of
inter-elite negotiations. F o r e x a m p l e , the personal ties of trust and
s u p p o r t b e t w e e n T a n Siew Sin a n d T u n A b d u l Razak are reported to
have altered s o m e of t h e abrasiveness of g o v e m m e n t policies towards the
Chinese, w h e n the thrust of g o v e m m e n t policy was to give highest
priority t o t h e n e e d s a n d d e m a n d s o f the Malay c o n u n u n i t y .

Before the M a h a t h i r Administration assumed office, the non-Malays

had s e c u r e d f r o m t h e Cabinet in 1980 an agreement that p r i m a r y
e d u c a t i o n w o u l d c o n t i n u e in three languages—Malay, Chinese, and
132 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T a m i l . A l t h o u g h the government disallowed the formation of the p r o p o s e d

M e r d e k a University, there had been an earlier concession allowing the
f o r m a t i o n of the diploma-course institution for C h i n e s e , the T u n k u
A b d u l R a h m a n College. Likewise, there had been s o m e a d j u s t m e n t s t o
t h e university admission q u o t a system reserving the p r e p o n d e r a n t n u m b e r
of places for Malays. Concessions had also been m a d e to ease visa
r e q u i r e m e n t s for foreign wives of citizens w h o w e r e n o n - B u m i p u t r a .
W h e n Dr M a h a t h i r c a m e to power in 1981, m a n y of the n o n - M a l a y
leaders w e r e cautious but h o p e f u l of a m o r e regularized access to decision-
m a k i n g processes. While he had fen- political associates w h o were n o n -
M a l a y , a n d had e a r h e r espoused a very militant pro-Malay line on m a n y
issues, he also gave the impression of being o p e n to a r g u m e n i a n d
persuasion and of acknowledging the validity a n d legitimacy of criticism
a n d pluralized politics. S o m e of the leaders of the n o n - M a l a y c o m m u -
n i u e s a s s u m e d that the realities of Malaysia's political landscape w o u l d
define a logic of political d e v e l o p m e n t leading to s o m e n e w system of ilite
a c c o m m o d a t i o n for any leader operating within a d e m o c r a t i c system.
Dr M a h a t h i r exploited these hopes a n d aspirations in his direct appeals to
n o n - M a l a y voters in the 1982 election. In r e s p o n s e , increasing n u m b e r s
of n o n - M a l a y voters a b a n d o n e d the opposition parties a n d s u p p o r t e d
their ethnic leaders w h o had access to the councils of g o v e r n m e n t
t h r o u g h m e m b e r s h i p i n the B N . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , the M C A w a s able
to score an u n p r e c e d e n t e d 24 victories out of 28 contested p a r l i a m e n t a r y
seats, even though the government had recently rejected the mass
d e m a n d s by Chinese for M e r d e k a University, seen by m a n y C h i n e s e as
essential to meet their needs for higher e d u c a t i o n . T h e political s u p p o r t
for the M C A was based on the a s s u m p t i o n that access a n d 'quiet politics'
at the elite level would achieve m o r e than c o n f r o n u t i o n a n d polemics.

D u r i n g the M a h a t h i r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , neither the S u p r e m e Council of

t h e Barisan Nasional n o r the Cabinet was m a d e into an o r g a n of intra-
elite bargaining. T h e a s s u m p t i o n seemed to be that the outlines of e t h n i c
policy h a d already been set. U n d e r p r e s s u r e to prove his credentials with
U M N O , a n d c o n c e r n e d a b o u t his c o m p e t i t i o n with P A S for the Islamic
constituency, Dr M a h a t h i r a n d his associates were in no m o o d for
substantial concessions to ihe non-Malay constituencies. T h i s does not
m e a n that no concessions w e r e made, .Matters of adminisurative detail a n d
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w e r e m o r e readily discussed than substantive policy
issues. If s o m e administrative p r o b l e m s arose, they mighi be discussed in
t h e C a b i n e t . Ultimately, the resolution d e p e n d e d on the decision of the
P r i m e Minister. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , those w h o wished to raise a sensitive
issue w o u l d usually a p p r o a c h the P r i m e Minister for bilateral negotiations
to see if s o m e concessions could be s e c u r e d . If concessions were m a d e ,
e i t h e r t h r o u g h the C a b i n e t o r the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , the n o r m a l c o n d i t i o n
w o u l d be that the agreement was not publicized so as not to antagonize
o t h e r c o n t e n d i n g factions. T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t left c o m m u n a l leaders in an
exposed position in relations with their p r i m a r y constituents. An u n n a m e d
M C A leader i s q u o t e d a s saying, ' W e can't publicise w h a t w e achieve i n
t h e cabinet, because we are sworn to secrecy as cabinet m e m b e r s .
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 133

T h e r e f o r e , people d o n ' t k n o w e x a a l y what w e work for b e h i n d the

scenes. 5 0
T h e rules o f political c o n d u n within the B N proceeded o n the a s s u m p -
tion that issues w o u l d be resolved quietly without public mobilization or
p u b l i c ventilation of grievances and d e m a n d s . Yet, without s o m e mobil-
ization, concessions, especially to the non-Malay constituencies, were
unlikely. T h u s , there was always a symbiotic relationship between Barisan
Elites a n d the opposition ilites f r o m the same ethnic constituency, since
the latter could organize p u b l i c opposition and demonstrations, while the
Barisan d i t e s could argue 'quietly' for appropriate concessions. In this
m a n n e r , a n u m b e r of contentious issues affecting the non-Malay consti-
t u e n d e s w e r e t h r u s t u p o n the public agenda, even w h e n the M a h a t h i r
Administration m i g h t have preferred inaction or benign indiflerence.
In early 1982, the government introduced a new education c u r r i c u l u m
stressing t h e basic skills of writing, reading, a n d mathematics. Called the
3R policy, it was designed to deal with performance d e f i d e n d e s a m o n g
Malaysian s t u d e n i s . U n d e r the guide-lines, 77 per cent of the time w a s to
be devoted to the 3R subjects. Very shortly, public protests were s u g e d ,
led by the D A P a n d s p o k e s m e n f r o m Chinese schools a n d Chinese
t e a c h e r s , w h o c h a r g e d that the policy downgraded Chinese language
instruction and ' s m u g g l e d ' Malay as the m e d i u m of instruction for the
3R subjects. T h i s was viewed as a violation of the 1980 Cabinet agree-
m e n t on e d u c a t i o n that provided for the preservation of Chinese- and
T a m i l - m e d i u m schools. T h e protestors feared that the c u r r i c u l u m
changes w e r e a p r e l u d e to the conversion of Chinese schools to national
schools with Malay as the sole m e d i u m of instruction. 5 1

In 1982, the M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e , u n d e r the l e a d e n h i p of A d i b A d a m ,

f o r m u l a t e d a National Cultural Policy designed to p r o m o t e Malaysian
c u l t u r e a r o u n d the t h e m e of one culture, one language, and one d t i z e n r y .
R a t h e r than defining Malaysian culture as an amalgam of m a n y cultural
s t r e a m s , M a l a y c u l t u r e a n d language were taken as being appropriate for
all d t i z e n s , on the a s s u m p t i o n thai those of non-Malay cultural h e r i u g e
s h o u l d either willingly accept Malay culture or perhaps be foreed into
assimilation t h r o u g h active g o v e m m e n t p r o g r a m m e s of cultural con-
version, F o r the Chinese, the threatening and c o e r d v e a s p e a of the
cultural policy was symbolized by the government ban on ihe perfor-
mance of t h e C h i n e s e lion d a n c e in public. In protest over these a n d
o t h e r p o l i d e s , fifteen Chinese associations met a n d d r a f t e d a protest that
w a s sent to the M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e . T h e issues were also taken to t h e
voters by t h e D A P , which d u r i n g the period f r o m 1982 to 1984 w o n
three by-elections in a row against M C A leaders w h o were clearly losing
s u p p o n f r o m iheir p r i m a r y constituency. 5 2

M a n y actions of g o v e m m e n i administration appeared to proceed on

the a s s u m p t i o n that the n o n - M a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s did not exist, or at least,
that they d i d n o t w a r r a n t p r o p o r t i o n a t e consideration in the delivery of
goverrunent services or in d e v e l o p m e n t plarming. W h e n the new roaster
plan for the l o n g - t e r m u r b a n developmeni of Kuala L u m p u r a n d its
satellite u r b a n areas w a s unveiled, there were plans for mosques a n d
134 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

M a l a y ccmeierics, but practically no provisions for t e m p l e s , c h u r c h e s ,

a n d o t h e r n o n - M u s l i m places of w o r s h i p , and no provision for n o n -
M u s l i m cemeteries. 5 3 It w a s as if the planners expected all Malaysians to
b e c o m e M u s h m o r . for planning p u r p o s e s , t o vanish f r o m the h u m a n
g e o g r a p h y of the c o u n t r y . Later, in 1984, the state g o v e r n m e n t of
Malacca d e c i d e d to develop for commercial p u r p o s e s one of the oldest
C h i n e s e cemeteries i n the c o u n t r y — B u k i t C h i n a . T h e Chinese c o n t e n d
that the area had been given to the Chinese c o m m u n i t y as a burial
g r o u n d by the i n d e p e n d e n t Malay sultan of Malacca over f o u r centuries
a g o , before the c o m i n g of the P o r t u g u e s e to South-East Asia. T h e
historic t e m p l e of C h e n g H o o n T e n g and a well supposedly constructed
in a b o u t 1404 by the Chinese a d m i r a l , C h e n g H o , were also on the site.
Because of its location in the heart of Malacca t o w n , the land had b c c o m e
e x t r e m e l y valuable, which was the primary reason for the interest in
developing the site. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t proposals w e r e opposed by prac-
tically all Chinese organizations, including the M C A a n d the D A P . T h e
intensity of the opposition within the C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y eventually
p r o m p t e d the state g o v e n u n e n t lo revise its plans so as to preserve the
historic Bukit C h i n a cemetcry and the Cheng H o o n T e n g T e m p l e . 5 4

O n e o t h e r administrative decision irritated the Chinese c o m m u n i t y .

T h r o u g h import licensing, the government gave a v i n u a l m o n o p o l y for
t h e i m p o r t of m a n d a r i n oranges to the B u m i p u t r a firm, Satria Utara S d n .
B h d . , w h i c h u-as a subsidiary of P e m a s , the national trading c o r p o r a t i o n .
T h i s action c a m e s h o n l y before the Chinese N e w Year w h e n , b y c u s t o m ,
the Chinese p u r c h a s e tons of m a n d a r i n oranges for celebration and gifts.
H o w e v e r , because the usual Chinese importers and distribuiors w e r e
excluded f r o m the trade, the C h i n e s e c o m m u n i t y staged a s p o n t a n e o u s
boycott of m a n d a r i n oranges imported f r o m C h i n a , a n d instead p u r c h a s e d
local oranges or those i m p o r t e d f r o m o t h e r countries t h r o u g h Chinese
t r a d e r s . T h i s boycott resulted in large stocks of unsold i m p o r t e d m a n d a r i n
o r a n g e s held by the B u m i p u t r a trading corporation. 5 5 S u c h actions of the
n o n - M a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s in the market-place often spoke louder a n d m o r e
effectively than protest t h r o u g h official channels,

As in the case of so m a n y issues of administration a n d policy, the

g o v e r n m e n t ' s calculation appeared to be that the interests of the non-
M a l a y c o m m u n i t i e s , while not to be ignored, were to be d i s c o u n i e d . T h e
B u m i p u t r a s y n d r o m e appeared to apply not just to raising the economic
position of the i n d i g e n o u s c o m m t m i t i e s b u t also to penalizing a n d
r e d u c i n g services to those without the ascriptive claim to ' B u m i p u t r a -
i s m ' . At least, this was the perception of a majority of n o n - M a l a y s , a n d
the government did lilde by its a a i o n s to dispel this p e r c e p t i o n , despite
occasional p r o n o u n c e m e n t s f r o m high officials to the contrary.
M a n y g o v e r n m e n t pobcics gave e v i d e n c e of being f o r m u l a t e d to
d i m i m s h the political impact of the non-Malays. Ai the height of the
d e b a t e over the viability of the Malaysian car p r o j e c t , w h e n critics a r g u e d
that the Malaysian market was not big e n o u g h to sustain a car m a n u f a c -
t u r i n g facihty, Dr M a h a t h i r in N o v e m b e r 1982 suggested a population
policy to p r o m o t e Malaysian population growth f r o m 15.5 million to
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 135

70 million, p r e s u m a b l y by the t u r n of the century. T h e original, rather

o f f h a n d r e m a r k was followed in April 1984 by a m o r e formal statement of
objectives w h e n Dr M a h a t h i r presented the M i d - T e r m Review of the
F o u r t h Malaysia P l a n , covering the years 1981-5. He e x p l a i n e d . 'A small
p o p u l a t i o n could give rise to m a n y problems. A m o n g others, the domestic
m a r k e t would be [too] small to s u p p o n mass c o n s u m p t i o n industries. 5 6
He went on to propose a target objective of 70 million by 2100. E v e n
with the target date p o s t p o n e d by a c e n t u r y , it meant that population
g r o w t h rates w o u l d need to be greatly accelerated. In 1985 the W o r i d
B a n k estimated that Malaysia's population would be 20.7 million by t h e
year 2000. In 1970 the Malaysian population grownh rate had been
2 . 9 per cent p e r a n n u m b u t it had fallen to 2.3 per cent by 1985. To
achieve the target d a t e a n n o u n c e d by Dr M a h a t h i r , the rate would need
to be increased to 3.2 per cent, w h i c h w o u l d give Malaysia the highest
g r o w t h rate in Asia a n d one of the highest in the world. W i t h steady
g r o w t h at the then existing rate of 2 . 3 per cent, the population would be
39.12 million by the year 2025. 5 7 Because Malay birth rates and growth
rates w e r e higher than n o n - M a l a y s ' , this policy was interpreted by most
c o m m e n t a t o r s as a m e c h a n i s m to assure that B u m i p u t r a s would 'win the
c e n s u s ' , a n d p r e s u m a b l y therefore exercise the ability to keep political
c o n t r o l with m i n i m a l concessions to non-Malays. 5 8

Similar attitudes a n d political calculations were revealed in public

s t a t e m e n t s by D e p u t y P r i m e Minister Musa H i t a m on the patterns of
n o n - M a l a y emigration. F o r some time, there had been a steady a n d
g r o w i n g emigration of Chinese, Indians, a n d Eurasians primarily to
C a n a d a , the United S u t e s , Australia, a n d Britain. M a n y were also
b u y i n g p r o p e r t y a b r o a d in a 'lifeboat s y n d r o m e ' to faciliute a f u t u r e
option of emigration as a hedge against discriminatory economic policies
a n d potential political repression in Malaysia. T h e governments of most
c o u n t n e s w o u l d b e c o m e c o n c e m e d about the 'brain drain' of highly
e d u c a t e d professionals a n d the loss of investments being t r a n s f e n e d
a b r o a d . I n s t e a d , M u s a H i t a m , after revealing that 16,864 Malaysians
(mostly C h i n e s e ) had d e p a n e d a n d acquired foreign citizenship, stated
that they h a d been ' t h o r n s in the flesh w h e n they were still in this

country...........Their d e p a r t u r e is no loss to Malaysia. 5 9

T h e e t h n i c calculations o f the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e m o r e blatantly a p p a r e n t
w h e n t h e new constituency d e l i m i u t i o n s were m a d e d u r i n g 1984 in
preparation for the f o n h c o m i n g election. Malaysia's original Constitution
h a d established the principle of weightage for rural areas, b u t had set a
limit on rural over-representation of 15 p e r cent. In 1962 that limit w a s
r e m o v e d a n d the disproportion between the largest a n d smallest constitu-
encies increased. After each constituency delimitation, the n u m b e r of
Malay majority constituencies increased. In 1969 Malays constituted a
m a j o r i t y in 60 p e r cent of federal constituencies, b u t by 1984 they had
b e c o m e a m a j o r i t y in 74 p e r cent of federal constituencies. To achieve
this result, s o m e of the n o n - M a l a y majority constituencies had m o r e than
t h r e e times the population of the smallest Malay majority constituency. 6 0
W h i l e this g e r r y m a n d e r i n g to amplify Malay political p o w e r was of
136 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

c o n c e r n to all non-Malay p a n i c s , the rules of the BN p r e v e n t e d affiliated

p a n i e s f r o m voicing public criticism of the g o v e r n m e n t on this, as on all
o t h e r issues. T h i s inhibition left the opposition D A P a s the only p a n y
able to give p u b l i c articulation to the serious perception of grievance by
n o n - M a l a y s that t h e political system v,-as gready biased against their
poliucal participation a n d the full exercise of their rights as citizens of
Malaysia.

Professionals, Intellectuals, and Strategic Elites

W h i l e the e t h n i c equation clearly defined the mass c o n s u t u e n c i e s , as

Malaysia's society became m o r e complex a n d functionally specialized, an
increasing n u m b e r of educated a n d professional people b e c a m e identified
in politics as m u c h by their functional roles as by their ascribed e i h n i c
affiliation. T h i s does not m e a n that e t h n i c affihauons w e r e irrelevant, b u t
a m o n g professionals and inielleciuals they w e r e m u t e d by professional
n o r m s , a m o r e cosmopolitan outlook, i m p r o v e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s across
ethnic barriers, a n d a greater capacity to e m p a t h i z e with those of different
ethnic a n d cultural b a c k g r o u n d s . T h e s e elites were less able to be
m a n i p u l a t e d by national political leaders a n d , as they became aware of
their own role in society, were m o r e likely to d e f e n d professional a n d
civic n o r m s a n d to n e w politics as a pluralized process of representation
a n d incremental acconmiodaiion. C r u d e efforts by leaders to invoke
t h e m e s of ' u n i t y ' to mask arbitrary decisions a n d d e f e n d monolilhic
authority structures were m o r e likely to generate opposition or attitudes
of e m b a r r a s s m e n t or even derision for the political m a c h i n a t i o n s of m a n y
active politicians. Of m o r e i m p o r t a n c e to these Elites were such issues as
access to i n d e p e n d e n t sources of valid information a b o u t public alTairs,
t h e exercise of free speech a n d other personal f r e e d o m s , and the proiec-
lions of the law against arbitrary action of government t h r o u g h processes
that are the n o r m in most W e s t e r n societies. T h e s e professional a n d
intellectual Elites had become exposed to W e s t e r n education a n d c u l t u r e ,
a n d they w e r e , therefore, m o r e likely to evaluate Malaysian politics a n d
p u b l i c policies againsi the n o r m s a n d s t a n d a r d s of W e s t e r n constitutional
n o r m s and the political ideals of a participant civic c u l t u r e .

A l t h o u g h it w a s difficult for professionals a n d intellectuals to mobilize

f o r effective action, as educated Elites, their c o n c e r n s and views could not
easily be dismissed or ignored. Most academics w e r e employed directly
by the government in g o v e r n m e n t - o p e r a t e d i n s u t u t i o n s of higher learning
or research, while most professionals w e r e d e p e n d e n t in s o m e way on
government contracts or in employment by firms d e p e n d e n t on m a i n -
taining good relations with g o v e r n m e n t authorities. E v e n t h o u g h most
professionals a n d academics were economically vulnerable to p r e s s u r e ,
m a n y also enjoyed the prestige that enabled t h e m to take stands on p u b l i c
m a t t e r s against the c c n u a l i z i n g a n d authoritarian predilections of those in
p o w e r . In this r e g a r d , two sets of issues b e c a m e m a t t e r s of c o n c e r n :
g o v e r n m e n t control of the m e d i a , a n d issues of h u m a n rights. Policy in
t h e s e two areas will be briefly surveyed before c o n s i d e r i n g the reactions
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 137

of Other e1ite groups to the policies a n d leadership styles of the

government.

Control of the Media

C e n t r a l to the c o n c e m of m a n y intelleauals a n d cosmopolitan elites was

t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d credibility of public media and the protection of
the rights of free c o m m u n i c a t i o n necessary to make democracy m o r e than
a m e r e exercise in media manipulation a n d public relations. A small b u t
i m p o r t a n t professional g r o u p at the centre of c o n c e m on these issues
c o m p r i s e d journalists and those f r o m the press a n d news m e d i a . A m o n g
the r e a d i n g a n d viewing public were professionals a n d i n t e l l e a u a l s w h o
b e c a m e increasingly c o n c e m e d that the media remain a u t o n o m o u s a n d
i n d e p e n d e n t so that it retained credibility and did not become totally
subservient to g o v e m m e n t control a n d censorship.
Malaysia acquired at i n d e p e n d e n c e a pro-government b u t cautiously
a u t o n o m o u s press. As the staff became Malaysianized, so too d i d the
o w n e r s h i p . In 1974, legislation required Malaysian majority o w n e r s h i p
f o r all n e w s p a p e r s , w h i c h facilitated investments by dominant political
p a r t i e s , leading to their control of most major newspapers. In 1972,
P e m a s , the g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d national trading c o m p a n y , acquired
80 p e r cent control of the Straiis Times (which changed its n a m e to the
New Straiis Times in 1974), Later, a majority of shares were transferred
to Fleet Holdings, an investment a r m of U M N O u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p
of Dr M a h a t h i r ' s close political associate, D a i m Z a i n u d d i n . By the early
1980s U M N O h a d direct or indirect ownership of the New Straits Times,
Berita M i n g g u , The Malay Mail, Utusan Melayu, a n d Utusan Malaysia.
By 1985, Fleet H o l d i n g s had acquired 40 per cent of the private television
c h a n n e l , T V 3 . T h e g o v e m m e n t already operated T V I a n d T V 2 , s o all
television stations w e r e u n d e r direct or indirect control of the government.
U M N O also a c q u i r e d control of Nanyang Siang Pau, the largest Chinese-
language n e w s p a p e r , while P e m a s acquired control of the second largest
C h i n e s e p a p e r , Sin Chew Jit Poh, as well as the P e n a n g p a p e r , Sing P i n .
T h e English-language n e w s p a p e r The Star was formed in 1975 w h e n t h e
P e n a n g n e w s p a p e r , Straits Echo, was moved to Kuala L u m p u r . Initially,
o w n e r s h i p was shared between Utusan Melayu (owned b y U M N O ) a n d
t h e M C A , with the C h a i r m a n o f Star Publications being T u n k u A b d u l
R a h m a n . A m a j o r shareholder of The Star w a s T u n M u s t a p h a H a r u n of
S a b a h . L a t e r , majority o w n e r s h i p shifted to G o h C h e n g T e i k a n d
T a n K o o n Swan of the M C A , w h o also acquired controlling interest in
Shin Afin Daily News. By 1982, the M C A , t h r o u g h its investment a r m ,
H u a r e n H o l d i n g s , u n d e r ihe c h a i r m a n s h i p o f M C A Senator H ' n g H u n g
Y o n g , h a d a c q u i r e d 75 per cent o w n e r s h i p of The Star. O n e of the t w o
largest T a m i l daily p a p e r s , Tamil Malar, w a s owned by a p r o m i n e n t
politician i n the M I C . T h e M I C h a d some l i n k s with the other T a m i l
p a p e r s as well. Similarly, the d o m i n a n t government parties in Sabah a n d
Sarawak also gained effective o w n e r s h i p a n d control of all the principal
daily n e w s p a p e r s in those t w o states. The few daily p a p e r s In Malaysia
138 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

not o w n e d by political parties had small circulation a n d n o n e w a s openly

idenuiied with any of the opposition parties. 6 1
T h e a n n u a l licence reqtiiremenis, dating f r o m 1948, coupled with t h e
ever-present threat of closure u n d e r the Sedition Act of 1948, gave
journalists a cautious, t i m i d , and f r e q u e n t l y servile role in reporting
a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g the news. U n d e r the P r i m i n g Presses O r d i n a n c e of
1958, the powers to grant or w i t h d r a w a printing licence w e r e given to
t h e M i n i s t e r o f H o m e Affairs, w h o could d o s o without cause, a n d the
only appeal was directly to the A g o n g , w h o was subject to the advice of
his m i n i s i e n . T h e Control o f I m p o r t e d Publications A a also gave the
H o m e Minister powers t o ban o r censor any i m p o r t e d publication
d e e m e d prejudicial to public o r d e r , national interest, m o r a l i t y , or
security. The 1971 a m e n d m e n t s to the Sedition O r d i n a n c e p r o h i b i t e d
m a s s media f r o m any discussion of Malay special r i g h t s , t h e privileges of
Sultans and royalty, citizenship of non-Malays, a n d language policy. 6 2
M u c h of this legislation was based on the a s s u m p t i o n thai the m a s s media
m u s t be organized a n d utilized as an i n s t r u m e n t of leadership to achieve
national d e v e l o p m e n t goals a n d the ideals of the R u k u n e g a r a while
avoiding a n y divisive public controversies o r inflaming c o m m u n a l
passions over the 'sensitive issues'. T h e g o v e r n m e n t d i d not exercise
direct p r i o r censorship. By a w i d e array of legal penalties a n d t h r o u g h
p a r t y o w n e r s h i p of m u c h of the m e d i a , h o w e v e r , the a s s u m p t i o n w a s
q u i t e clear that all public media w o u l d be r e q u i r e d to exercise restraint
a n d self-censorship. Critical or investigadve journalism was an activity
f r a u g h t with legal penalties and financial risks.

After he took officc, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that Dr .Mahathir d i d not see a

f r e e press as essential for d e m o c r a c y . In a July 1981 essay w r i t t e n for t h e
New Straits Times, he expressed the view that press f r e e d o m w a s a m y t h
that w a s unsuitable for Malaysia, claiming that 'journalists' righteousness
is usually a g i m m i c k ' . 6 3 He accused the press of distorting ihe news to
sell p a p e r s r a t h e r than using press f r e e d o m s t o d e f e n d d e m o c r a c y . H e
w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t e m p t u o u s o f foreign c o r r e s p o n d e n t s , w h o , h e
claimed, distorted a n d monopolized n e w s about Malaysia. His philosophy
of the press stessed 'social responsibility' and self-censorship based on the
u n s t a t e d a s s u m p t i o n s that the g o v e r n m e n t epitomized national ideals
w h i l e journalists o f t e n 'distorted' the news a n d abused f r e e d o m s for self-
serving a n d nefarious o b j e a i v e s . In a 1985 speech to A S E A N journalists,
Dr M a h a t h i r provided f u r t h e r elaboration of his views a b o u t the need for
a 'responsible p r e s s ' . He explained:

. . . if it is assumed that power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to

corrupt absolutely, by what magical formula is the media itself, with all Us
awesome power, exempt from this inexorable tendeitcy? Is power the only cause
of corruption? Freedom loo can corrupt and absolute freedom can corrupt
absolutely.
. . . so long as the press is conscious of Itself being a potential threat to democracy
and conscientiously limits the exerdse of its rights, it should be allowed to
function without government interference.
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 139

But when the press obviously abuses its rights, then democratic government
have a duty to put it right. 64

In 1984 the g o v e n u n e n t introduced a n d passed the Printing Presses

a n d Publications A c t , which extended controls to the foreign press that
r e q u i r e d large d e p o s i t s by foreign papers and journals which would be
forfeited if the p u b l i s h e r s did not appear in c o u n to face charges w h e n
'biassed articles' or materials 'prejudicial to the national interest' a p p e a r e d
in the publications. Officials were given powers to censor or ban the
o f f e n d i n g publications. T h e penalties were raised to M$20,000 or three
y e a r s ' i m p r i s o n m e n t . T h e new legislation also provided penalties for
a n y o n e in Malaysia 'having publications without g o v e m m e n i p e r m i t ' .
T h e D e p u t y H o m e Affairs M i n i s t e r , Kassim A h m a d , was the only
s p o k e s m a n for the government d u r i n g the parliamentary debate on the
legislation. He explained the g o v e m m e n l ' s objectives: 'People will k n o w
right away what they can read and what they cannot. T h e people must be
vigilant a n d discard publications which do not accord with the govern-
m e n t ' s vision. 6 5 T h i s legislation was severely criticized by both the D A P
a n d P A S , while all BN M e m b e r s of Parliament, except for the Deputy
H o m e Affairs M i n i s t e r , remained uncharacteristically silent.

T h e s e n e w controls over the press were buttressed by an even m o r e

far-reaching l a w — T h e Official Secrcis A a o f 1984, w h i c h a m e n d e d a n
earlier act of 1972. This Act defined as a secret any information entrusted
to a public official in confidence by a n o t h e r official. T h e definition
effectively covered all government activities. Officials were required to
report immediately to the police a n y o n e seeking official 'classified' in-
f o r m a t i o n . No official informaiion was allowed to be c o m m u n i c a t e d
w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n , a n d official informaiion could nol be ' u s e d ' or
' r e t a i n e d ' by a n y u n a u t h o r i z e d persons. T h e Act provided for a penalty
of five years' jail for government servants w h o failed to report to the
police w h e n they received f r o m the public any requests for official
i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e penalty for use or possession of 'official information' by
u n a u t h o r i z e d persons w a s seven years' jail a n d a fine of up to M $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . "
Because of the b r o a d definition of "official secrets', it became very
h a z a r d o u s f o r a n y o n e to seek even the most innocent information a b o u t
g o v e r n m e n t activities. Foreign a n d d o m e s t i c journalists could no longer
rely on ' o f f - t h e - r e c o r d ' i n f o n n a t i o n f r o m their sources in government,
a n d they w e r e put in jeopardy if they had in their possession any
u n a u t h o r i z e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t activities or plans, or p u b -
lished in their j o u m a l s any information that w e n t beyond the bland
official press releases a n d media h a n d o u t s distributed by the D e p a r t m e n t
of I n f o r m a t i o n or the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s Department. T h i s legislation w e n t
into effect just at the lime of the constitutional crisis over the role of the
R u l e r s , a n d for a time it effectively kept the news of that crisis from the
domestic press. Later, this legislation w a s used to bring the foreign press
r e p o n i n g on Malaysian affairs u n d e r the c o n t i n u o u s threat of punitive
action by the g o v e r n m e n t against resident joumalists for the foreign press
a n d electronic m e d i a .
140 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T h e legislation to c o n t r o l the press m o r t t h a n just cauntionary. A

senior j o u n u l i s t o f t h e M a l a y s i a n p a p e r , W a t a n . w a s d e t a i n e d u n d e r t h e
ISA for publishing what was alleged to have been Malayan Communist
Party a n d Soviet E m b a s s y materials. NAdi Insan, Watan, and Mingguan
B u m i a l l lost their publishing p e r m i t s . T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e F a r
E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w James C l a d . w a s c h a r g e d u n d e r t h e O f f i c i a l
Secrets Act for an article on Malaysia's relations with China, following a
police search of his h o m e where they f o u n d an 'official document' He
pleaded guilty and was fined the maximum s u m of M $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . Sabry
Sharif of the New Straits Tmes also was charged a n d peaded guilty to
having an Air F o r c e d o c u m e n t used in a s t o y . for which he paid a fine of
M$7,000.67
Over the years. Dr Mahathir has been particularly critical of the
foreign press for failing to understand the circumstances in Malaysia that
make Western-style institutions and excessive preoccupation with human
rights inappropriate. Government antipathy towards the foreign press
creased greatly after the Asian Wall Street Journal published a series of
articles on questionable financial activities of high officials, concentrating
especially on the financial transactions involving the sale United
Malayan Banking Corporation shares owned by Finance Minister Daim
Zainuddin to Pernas. In response, the govemment banned the Asian
Wall Street Journal and its two correspondents, John Berthetsen and
Raphael Pura, had their workk permits cancelled. Dr Mahathir made a
broad accusation against the foreign press, charging: Many famous
international publications are controlled by Jews are new citizens of
many Western countries. 6 8 Shortly afterwards, the New Straits Times

published a feature article the Zionist control of the Western press,

The timing and content of the article, with its exaggerated account of
Zionist conspiracies in the world media raised doubts among many
Malaysian intellecttuals about whether the article had been written spon-
taneously or upon order from government authorities. 69 Eventually, the
Malaysian Supreme Court overtuned the cancellation of John
Berthelsen's work permit on procedural grounds because he had not been
given the opportunity answer the charges against him. As a result of
142 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

valid even if inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution." As a

consequcnce, during an emergency, most constilutional rights can be
effectively suspended through executive decrees without recourse to
judicial or constitutional remedies, Malaysia's first emergency- predated
independence and involved the Communist insurgency which lasted from
1948 lo 1960. Four emergencies have been declared since: in 1964 in
response to the conflict with Indonesia; in 1966 for Sarawak; in 1969
after the May Thirteenth riots for the whole federation; and in 1977 for
Kelantan. N o n e of the emergencies declared after independence was
revoked, so the emergency powers remained in readiness to be involved at
any time. 74
During an emergency, Parliament has the power to revoke any state of
emergency or ordinances issued by emergency decree. Yet, because of
strict party discipline within the ruling coalition, Pariiament has never
exercised ihis righi. Indeed, it has provided no effective check on
executive powers and prerogatives. Instead, because the government has
always enjoyed a iwo-thirds majority in Parliameni neccssary to pass
constitutional amendments, the government has had the capacity to
amend at will any constitutional provision that impeded its immediate
political objectives. Over the years. Parliament established a pattern of
sanctioning ihe abrogation of individual rights whenever requested to do
so by the Prime Minister. Since independence, over 1,000 amendments
have been made to the Malaysian Constitution. 75 The ease of making
changes in the Constitution would suggest ihat the Constitution is valued
for its capacity to provide the rituals of legitimacy, but that constitutional
limitations on government provide little more than a temporary check on
the exercise of power so long as the g o v e m m c m enjoys a two-thirds
majority in Parliament.

T h e legislation which has been most often criticized as infringing on

individual rights includes the following;
(1) T h e Internal Security Act, I960 (ISA), as revised and amended in
1972 and 1975, gives the Minister of H o m e Affairs powers to impose
preventive detention for up to two years, and without trial, for anyone
'acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia". Police are
given wide powers to arrest without warrant and detain almost anyone for
a maximum of 60 days. T h e offences under the ISA are non-bailable,
When an order for preventive detention is issued by the H o m e Affairs
Minister, a person may be detained for up to two years, but the detainee
has a right to appeal to an Advisory Board, which makes non-binding
recommendations to the Minister. Minister's orders can also, for the
same reasons, impose restricuve residence, prohibition from any political
activities or from holding office, conditions of curfew, and/or prohibition
on travelling abroad. Any document or pubhcation 'prejudicial to the
nauonal interest or to pubhc order' may be banned by order of the
Minister.

(2) The Sedition Act, 1948, made it an offence to engage in any

seditious activities, by word, printing, or the impjort of publications, or
by any other acts 'which would, if done, have a seditious tendency'.
 THE S£V POLITICAL IDIOM 143

Liability upon conviction is a maximum fine of M$5,000 and/or three

years in prison.
(3) The Prevention of Crime Ordinance, 1959, permits the arrest of
suspects without a show of cause, their detention for investigation up to
28 days, and after enquiry, their registration subjecting them to police
supervision for a period of up to five years.
(4) T h e Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance, 1958, empowers the
police to proclaim certain areas restricted, to regulate processions or
meetings of more than five persons, to search and arrest without warrant
any suspected persons, and to control firearms and lethal weapons.
Violations of restricted area orders are subject to imprisonment of up to
ten years and whipping.
(5) Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations, 1975
( E S C A R ) , suspended much of the regular judicial procedures for security
cases. Trial by jury or by assessors was eliminated and trial was by judge
alone. T h e burden of proof of innocence was shifted to the accused, while
rights of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses were restriaed and
all types of evidence, including hearsay evidence, was made admissible.
For a number of offences, including drug trafficking and the possession
of unauthorized firearms and ammunition, the death penalty was made
mandatory upon conviction for anyone over ten years of age. W h e n
E S C A R was invalidated on appeal to the Privy Council of England in
1978, a constitutional amendment was hurriedly passed by Parliament
abolishing all criminal and constitutional appeals to the Privy Council,
thus nullifying the decision of the Privy Council and preventing any
further court challenges seeking to overturn ESCAR or any other parlia-
mentary statutes or emergency regulations. 76

In all these acts and regulations dealing with security and emergency
matters, the courts have played a very passive role. For every emergency
declaration under Article 150, there is an 'ouster clause' which states that
any declaration is not challengeable or questionable in a court of law. In
Malaysia, the judiciary has operated with a very restrictive view of their
role, deliberately limiting judiciable matters that seek to challenge the
validity of laws or of govemment actions related to public order and
security. Although the Malaysian courts have the power to declare laws
void, they can only do so on very limited grounds of the laws being
beyond the powers of the legislative body, primarily in regard to the
federal distribution of powers. 7 7 Yet, on most issues, the courts have
been unwilling to substitute their judgment for that of either the executive
or Parliament. In a spcech to the Law Association for Asia and the
Western Pacific, after his installation as the new Lord President,
T u n M o h a m e d Salleh Abas explained his understanding of the proper role
of the Malaysian judiciary. He argued that the Court's role is not to
dispense social justice, but only to apply the law as it is w r i t t e n . To
administer law according to some abstraa ideas of justice would, in his
view, lead to confusion and arbitrariness and would involve the Court
usurping the powers of Parliament and of the govemment. 7 8

In response to international criticism, Malaysia permitted a visit by a

144 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

delegation from Amnesty' International during 1978. In its published

r e p o n , the Amnesty International mission was highly critical of Malaysia's
laws and of the conditions of detention, which included the use of
torture." In rejecting the report, the Malaysian Government also banned
it. Three years later, convinced of its more liberal record, the Mahathir
Administration permitted a visit of five human rights lawyers from the
U S , Japan, France, and Britain to make a report on Malay-sia's security
laws and human righis records. T h e delegation was led by Sydney
Wolinsky, w h o had taught law at the University of Malaya on an
exchange during 1981. T h e lawyers interviewed top government leaders,
including Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam, and talked with 200 others,
including some w h o were in detention. The lawyers reported that in their
meeting with Dr Mahathir, he had argued that 'the security of Malaysia
was one of the "human rights" of its people and consequently the rights
of the victims of the security situation were more important than those of
the "assassins" convicted by the Court or detained without trial'. 80 T h e
activities of the lawyers prompted a protest demonstration by U M N O
Youth led by Suhaimi Kamaruddin, in support of the ISA laws and
demanding that the human rights lawyers leave Malaysia. W h e n inter-
viewed in Malaysia, the lawyers seemed circumspect about Malaysia's
judicial system, but when their report was published, it criticized pre-
ventive detenuon and the ISA. and reponed on allegations of torture and
bad conditions for detainees. It also revealed that 87 per cent of the
detainees were Chinese, and that 52 of them were under sentence of
death. 81 In their r e p o n , the lawyers concluded that 'the breadth
of emergency powers presently authorised seems unnecessary and out of
proportion to the actual security threat . . . ' . T h e repon recommended
the repeal of the ESCAR laws, the release of all deiainecs held under the
ISA, the repeal of all mandatory death sentence laws, and the restoration
of the Supreme C o u n as a guardian of fundamental rights. 8 2 Unfor-
tunately, there were one or two minor e n o r s in the repon, and they were
seized upon by the government to dismiss the validity of the entire
r e p o n . With this experience in mind, the government rejected f u n h e r
visits to Malaysia by all international legal or human rights organizations
intent on investigating human rights conditions in the country.

T h e issues of human rights and prerogative justice continued to be

raised by a small but dedicated number of Malaysians w h o objected not
o n l y to the draconian charaaer of the security laws, bui also to the way
they were administered. Most Malaysians, including intellectuals and
academics, accepted the principle of some extraordinary measures to deal
with threats to security. Even so, those concerned with human righis
were fearful that the s e o u i t y laws were being used to stifle dissent, to
intimidate the legitimate opposition, and to inhibit the activities of
various interest groups pressing for changes in public policy. Over the
next several years, there were a number of conferences and seminars
devoted to human rights issues and to the legal rights of those charged
under the security laws. Periodic representations were made to the
government on these mailers, but these elicited very little response, if
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 145

any. T h e Malaysian Bar Council held several seminars and made rep-
resentations to the govemmeni regarding the ESCAR taws, especially
w h e n the lawyers w h o were preparing to defend John Berthelsen of the
Asian Wall Street Journal were arrested under the ISA for violating the
Official Secrets Act, because they had documents prepared for his case
that were deemed 'Official Secrets'." The Consumen' Association of
Penang, the National Union of Joumalists, Aliran, the Catholic Research
Centre, and the D A P were all active on behalf of human rights issues.
Each organization gave a somewhat different emphasis, but the overall
thrust of their c o n c e m s remained focused primarily on ESCAR, the ISA,
and the Official Secrets Act.
Under the auspices of the D A P and under the chairmanship of T u n k u
Abdul Rahman, a Convention on Human Rights in Malaysia was con-
vened on 2 - 3 November 1985. The participants were mostly lawyers,
human rights activists, and public inierest groups. While a number of
academics attended the sessions, few were active participants, thus illus-
trating the limitations imposed by being in govemment employment.
Even so, the issues of human rights were fully aired, and the main papers
presented at the sessions were published by the D A P in a volume. 8 4

T h e Core Support Base

The Mahathir Administration had entered office on a wave of public

support and goodwill, generated in pan by expectations that it would
resolve Malaysia's political conflicts in a more open and civil political
style and that many of the abrasive i s s u e of the past could be displaced
by emphasis on growth and development objectives beneficial to all
sectors of the public. A candid, forthright, and open style, so it was
believed, would revitalize democratic processes and lead to a more civil
and humane style of g o v e m m e n t . Perhaps these were unrealistic expecta-
tions. A n d perhaps the govemment fell victim to its own image-making,
raising expectaiions beyond its capacity to satisfy all sectors of the public.
In any event, it is d e a r that by mid-decade, many sectors of sodety bad
becomc alienated or cynical about the prospects for an 'open civil polity'.
Even so, many w h o were critical remained supponers of the regime,
primarily from lack of a viable, more credible alternative. Despite the
rising murmurs of discontent, it must be remembered that the govern-
ment still commanded the strong s u p p o n of a core constimency of the
public and the loyally of the primary institutional organizations of the
state.

Over the years, Malays in government service remained an imponant

component, especially as the public services were expanded. T h e 1980
Census reports that 321,026 Malays were employed in 'public administra-
tion and defence while 104,666 Malays were employed in 'education
services'. 85 H o w many of these could be counted as active U M N O
supporters can only be imagined. Even so, it would be safe to assume
that only a minute minority would openly admit any other political
affiliation than to U M N O .
146 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

In Malaysia, the military and ihc pwlice have remained non-political in

the sense that they have not intervened directly in government affairs,
unlike the military in most other South-East Asian states. A number of
factors have contributed to the non-intervention of the military in politics.
T h e strong British tradition of civilian supremacy was effectively trans-
mitted to the Malaysian military and police, and this pattern was rein-
forced for a number of years after independence by the presence of token
British and Commonwealth forces under the terras of the Anglo-Malayan
D e f e n c e Agreement of 1957 and later by the Five Power Defence
Arrangements of 1971. 86 The effectiveness of civilian government in
Malaysia also meant that there was no temptation presented to military
officers to step into a 'power vacuum'.
Despite the uadition of civilian political leadership, the military has
always been a political force—either latently or by becoming an imponant
component of public pohcy implementation. In addition, the top military
command has formal links with policy-making processes through rep-
resentation on the National Security Council, headed by the Prime
Minister, and on state security councils. During the period of the 1969
emergency, the military and police were represented on the National
Operations Council. The heavy reliancc on the policc and military for
domestic security against threats to civil order has given these branches a
high priority in funding. Each year between 1970 and 1985, the military
was allocated a s u m ranging from 9 per cent to over 16 per cent of total
government expenditures. 8 7 The army i n a c a s e d in size from aboui
33,000 in 1963 to 50,000 in 1971 and 100,000 by 1983, The navy and air
forcc were also greatly expanded and provided with m o d e m equipment
during the 1970s and 1980s. 88

The non-political traditions of the mihiary and police have meant that
there has been no o v e n panicipation by policc or military officers in
p a n y affairs of the component parties in the B N . Instead, the political
links tend to be from the P n m e Minister to the highest military com-
manders, usually through the appointment of relatives and trusted asso-
ciates to the most senior posts in the military command structure. For
example, T u n k u Abdul Rahman appointed his nephew. Gen. T u n k u
Osman Jewa, as the first Malayan Chief of Siaff; Prime Minister .Abdul
Razak appointed his wife's cousin. Gen. Ghazali Scth, General Officer
Commanding Peninsular Malaysia; and Prime Aiinister Hussein Onn
appointed his cousin and brother-in-law. Gen. Ghazali Seth, Chief of
Defence Forces and his brother, Li.-Gen. Ja'afar O n n , D e p u t y Chief of
Army. Following this precedent, Dr Mahathir, when he became Prime
Minisier, appointed his brother-in-law, Maj.-Gen. Hashim Mohamed
Ali, General Officer Commanding Peninsular Malaysia. With Malays
constituting 75 per cent of military officers and 80 per c e m of other
ranks, 89 the political loyally of the military to the U M N O political
leadership and to the pro-Malay policies of government has never been in
doubt. Only when internal disputes arose among Malay d i t c s has the
matter of political alignments of the mihtary become less certain. The
shake-up in the top military high command at the close of the contest
 THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 147

between the Mahalhir Adminisiration and the Malay Rulers was indicative
of the government's c o n c e m over potentially divided loyalties of some
senior military officers during that crisis. The political orientation of the
military would no doubt become much more imponant if a new national
emergency were to be declared and the institutions of representative
governmenl were to be replaced by some form of martial law or rule by
executive decree. T h e very existence of a strong and reliable military
gives it a persistent and latent political impact that far exceeds the visible
presence of the military in the inner councils of govemment.
When U M N O was founded in 1946, the power structure of Malay
society from the Malay Rulers down to the village headmen was effectively
incorporated into the party. .Most Malay civil servants became members
of the p a n y and a large proportion of the Malay population in the rural
areas became pro forma members of the pany. The active core of U M N O
tended to come from the state and federal civil services and from Malay
schoolteachers, w h o were more pohtically mobilized. In this way, the
p a n y developed a rural Malay peasant base but with the active leadership
derived from traditional Malay aristocratic Elites as well as those in the
public service and Malay schoolteachers.
The core constituency of U M N O began to change after 1969 and the
introduction of the NHP. Large numbers of Malays had benefited sub-
stantially from the polides of the N E P and its many programmes
designed to raise the economic position and power of the Bumiputras. The
system of Malay 'spedal privileges' and the quota systems to promote
Malay/Bumiputra access to power and wealth meant that many Malays
had been able to experience a rapid improvement in their economic and
political status. A new business and commercial class of Malays emerged,
some having petty trading experience, but others, often with some lies lo
the royal Malay houses, were able to enter business by securing conces-
sions and contraas through their connections with political leaders. In
addition to these early business and commerdal entrepreneurs, there was
also a rapidly expanding group of newly educated Malays w h o gained
university degrees in the country or after study abroad. These educated
Malay youth were not quite the Malaysian version of the Young
Upwardly-mobile Professionals (Yuppies) of the West, but they were a
new breed of what might be called Young Upwardly-mobile Muslim
Professionals (Yumpies) that was unique to the Malaysian scene. These
were the people w h o had benefited most from the ethnic preference
policies of the N E P and had moved easily and rapidly into well-paying
and imponant jobs in government, in the parasiatal Bumiputra corpora-
tions, or in private business. These younger Malay professionals had a
strong sense of their religious and ethnic identity and they were well
represented in U M N O Youth; they also constituted a growing proportion
of the regular delegates in U M N O . Their active panicipation within
U M N O made them among the most vocal of the supporters of the
regime, even while they were also making demands for more vigorous
pursuit of B u m i p u u a policies. W h e n Anwar Ibrahim was recruited from
ABIM into U M N O in 1982, it vras the Yumpie element in Malaysian
148 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

society that was being given access and priority in the Malaysian political
system. A n d , for the mosi pan, these became among the most outspoken
defenders of the political style and policies of the Mahathir Administra-
tion, even as they demanded a greater panicipadon in the councils of
government.
WTtile the older corc constituency of U M N O — t h e lesser government
servants and Malay schoolteachers—remained faithful to the party, their
influence within U M N O gradually declined over the years. By contrast,
the contingent of older Malay businessmen and entrepreneurs became
more i m p o n a n i in the 1960s, only to be challenged by the newer
professionals w h o were beneficiaries of the N E P of the post-1969 era.
With each new cohort of party activists, the levels of education and
political sophistication also rose. Similarly, wiihin the party, tensions
increased between the rank and file as the new c o h o n , with high
aspiradons and higher levels of education, attempted to leap-frog over
older leaders wiih more experience in politics but also with poorer
education and often with less sophisticated styles of leadership. These
trends created serious generational conflicts wiihin the political structure
of U M N O , which had become the foundation for the political edifice of
the BN structure. The U M N O General Assembly had always been a key
f o m m where the performance of the governmeni was subjected to critical
public serutiny. With the ritualizaiion of Parliament and the limitations
placed on its capacity to s u p e n i s e and oversee government in any
effective way, the U M N O General Assembly assumed even more signi-
ficance. T h e power of this party assembly was most vividly demonstrated
in 1981 when there was an open contest for the position of Deputy-
President of U M N O , and by c o m m o n understanding and precedent, also
for the selection of the D e p u i y Prime Minister. As an acuve forum for
elecuon, the U M N O General Assembly developed faaional (or quasi-
party) alignments in support of the alternative candidates. More
important, the General Assembly had established the principle that the
most important leaders of the country would be responsible to the
General Assembly, bodi for public policy and for the selection of
the most imponant positions of power in the government. Within U M N O ,
there was a sense of political panidpation and pobucal freedom to
challenge government and hold it accountable—a developmeni that was
paiendy lacking in the formal representauve institutions of g o v c m m e n i
and within die g o v c m i n g institutions of all other parties.

T h e combination of political mobilizauon wiihin U M N O and the sense

of access to real power that was apparent among U M N O ehtes, gave the
party a vitality and impaned competitiveness to the proceedings of the
p a n y . It was only a matter of time when the ideals of competitive and
representative democracy would come into conflict with the more tradi-
tional view that leaders should command loyal followers and crcate by
careful pohtical management a unified and non-contentious body politic.
WhiIe the Mahathir Administration enjoyed the massive support of its
core constituency, these alternative perspectives on the roles of leadership
and of political participation were yet to be resolved.
THE NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 149
150 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: T H E SECOND GENERATION
T H E NEW POLITICAL IDIOM 151
152 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
 5
The Ambiguous Mandate

THE pattern of politics in Malaysia, as in many other countries, is shaped

by the electoral cycle. Upon renewal of the mandate, open political
campaigning for public support gives way to a cycle of political deference
to the new regime, which becomes preoccupied with translating election
promises into policy and with the distribution of patronage and the
rewards of office. Over time, the accumulation of new issues and griev-
ances culminates in a flurry of renewed pany activity designed to
reconstruct political coalitions and to mobilize public support for the
anticipated election campaign.
During 1985 Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad had entered his
fifth year in office, and it had been over three years since he had won a
decisive mandate for his leadership of the govemment. While the Malay-
sian COnstitution provides for elections at least every five years, most
govemments have not waited until the final year to call an election. For
this reason, the third year of a term of office is usually when 'election
fever' tends to rise and all parties undergo preparations for their parti-
cipation in elections. Although the Prime Minister has a wide range of
discretion in calling an election, frequently events beyond his control
shape the options and create the conditions for likely elections. In such a
case, most politicians can anticipate an election, even when the date is
carefully concealed by the Prime Minister until the last possible moment.
During 1984, political instability in Sabah set off a chain of events which
were not direaly related to national politics, but which had imponant
conscquences for political alignments and campaign strategies at the
national level. These events were also signals in the wind concerning
trends and issues for the forthcoming election.

Political Skirmish in Sabah

At the periphery of the political system, Sabah has always been a

problem for both state and local politicians. This has been primarily
because the cultural configurations in the s u t e and the basis of the state's
economy make it very difficult to replicate national public policies and
political alignments at the s u t e level.
After federal intervention in 1976 to oust T u n Mustapha Harun for
pursuing secessionist activities, the state government in Sabah remained
154 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

firmly under the control of Harris Salleh, who constructed a multi-ethnic

coalition under the banner of the Berjaya party. 1 It gained fairly wide
popular support through emphasis on ending the excessive waste and
corrupiion of the Mustapha era and by stressing widespread economic
development projects in co-operation with the Federal Government, In
its first term of office, Berjaya was very effective in projecting a positive
image of an efficient government dedicated to economic development and
improved social services. The government provided all villages with
television sets, some solar-powered, so that government accomplishments,
projects, and ministerial pronouncements would reach the widest
possible audience.
In the Sabah state election of March 1981, both Berjaya and U S N O
were members of the B N , the latier having been readmitied in 1978.
There had been some moves by U S N O to recoup its losses by merging
with U M N O , but such a merger never materialized due to political
differences between the two. Because Berjaya and U S N O were compet-
itors at the state level, yet within the BN at the federal level, federal
authorities announced their 'neutrality' for the 1981 state election. Under
Mustapha's leadership, U S N O attempted to create an opposition front to
challenge Berjaya's control of the state government. Linked in opposition
by a limited election agreement were three opposition parties: U S N O ,
claiming to represent Muslim and Malay/Bajau interests: Pasok N u n u k
Ragang, claiming to represent Kadazans: and the Sabah Chinese Con-
solidated Party (SCCP), claiming to represent Chinese. T h e D A P from
Peninsular Malaysia also fielded three candidates in predominantly
Chinese constituencies. With a carefully balanced list of candidates,
Berjaya successfully defended its mulli-eihnic image, assisted by a judi-
cious disiribuiion of projects and other benefits just prior to the election.
Over 60 per cent of the vole went to Berjaya, which won 53 seats, with
U S N O gaining 3 and the SCCP only one. All other parties failed to gain
any seat. 2

Over the next several years, the Berjaya government of Harris Salleh
perfected its techniques of retaining power through emphasis on develop-
ment projects, which tended to be distributed by political patriarchs and
through patronage systems linked to those in government. Tremendous
sums of money were invested in industrial sites, particularly at Labuan
but also at Kota Kinabalu and a few other sites. A m o n g the more
controversial was a shipyard designed to build submarines, but that
project collapscd when no submarine buyers could be found, .More
successful were the large investments in timber-processing industries, in
massive gas and oil facilities, and in the joint venture with a Japanese
firm operating the copper mine at Mamut. l.ess successful were large
housing and property development projects. Through the government's
Bumipuira Participation Unit of the Sabah Developmeni Bank, large
s u m s of money were loaned to Sabahans, as Bumiputras, for a wide
variety of development proposals and schemes. Many of the larger loans
were issued by the Sabah Development Bank lo government ministers or
to Benaya party officials under very lax financial conditions. By 1985 the
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 155

recession had hit the Sabah economy, creating losses from poorly planned
developmeni projects. The default rate of the Bumiputra loans rose, with
over half of the loans being delinquent. Although the public was not
informed, by 1985 the Sabah Govemment had amassed a foreign debt of
M $ 2 . 7 billion. 3
Despite these problems, the issue which exposed the weakness of the
Ifarris Salleh government was noi economic mismanagement but rather
cultural-ethnic policies. The Beriaya govenunent pursued very strong
'integrationist policies in line with federal objectives, seeking to emphas-
ize Malay as the National Language and Malay-Muslim culture as the
core basis for national integration. As such, indigenous Sabah cultures
and languages were de-emphasized in an e f f o n to follow the lead of Kuala
Lumpur. Over television and radio, less and less time was given to native
languages, and the symbols of indigenous Sabah cultural identities wxre
being submerged in programmes to 'make Sabahans into Malaysians'.
For the 1980 Census, a political decision was made to abolish all
indigenous tribal identifications; these were replaced by the category
'Pribumi', 4 so as to blur Sabah cultural and tribal identities. Even illegal
immigrants from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei were classified
with the indigenous Sabahans as 'Pribumi'. Perhaps the most abrasive
aspect of policy involved the aggressive programme sponsored by the
state government to c o n v e n non-Muslim natives to Islam. In the pre-
war era, large n u m b e n of Kadazans had become Catholics through the
e f f o r u of Catholic missionaries, w h o established excellent schools in
Kadazan areas. As a result, the Catholic Church became an important
component of Kadazan social structure and identity. When the state
government expelled missionaries and sponsored aggressive Islamic
proselytizing, it created resentment among Kadazans, which was a con-
tributing factor to the loss of public support for the Mustapha regime in
1976. Yet these same programmes of Islamic conversion were continued
and intensified under the Harris regime. During the years 1 9 7 0 - 5 , the
Mustapha g o v e m m e n t claimed to have c o n v e n e d 24,000 to Islam. In the
period 1 9 7 6 - 8 5 , the Berjaya g o v e m m e n t under Harris Salleh claimed to
have c o n v e n e d an additional 32,112 to Islam. T h i s policy was pursued
despite the earlier guarantees incorporated in the '20 points' and the
terms of Sabah's affiliation with the Federaiion of Malaysia that Islam
would not become the official religion in Sabah. 5 This condition bad
been revoked in 1973 w h e n , under pressure from the Federal G o v e m -
ment, the s u t e adopted Islam as Sabah's 'official religion'. T h e Islamic
conversion campaign was ostensibly an i m p l e m e n a t i o n of that decision,
even though other s u t e s in Malaysia, where Islam was the official
religion, avoided suie-sponsored mass conversions of non-.Muslims.

Within Sabah, the grievances over cultural aod religious policies were
most felt by the Kadazans, the largest ethnic community in the state,
constituting some 30 per cent of the indigenous population. Although
Donald Stephens had mobilized Kadazans for political action in the t w o
decades after the war, his conciliatory political tactics, merging his
Kadazan-based party into the Muslim-oriented U S N O in 1967 and his
156 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

subsequent conversion to Islam and name change to T u n Mohamed

Fuad Stephens in 1974, were both disappointing and perplexing to his
supponers. When Beriaya was formed to dislodge M u s u p h a , Fuad
Stephens played a lead role and was picked as Chief Minister. H i s
sudden death in 1976 and the accession to power of Harris Salleh,
supported by a multi-ethnic coalition, raised Kadazan hopes of more
tolerant and pluralist cultural policies. When these hopes were dashed,
the issue of pohtical tactics once again was debated by Kadazans. Within
this environment, new political leadership of the Kadazan community
began to emerge. As much by acddent as by design, Joseph Pairin
Kitingan became the spokesman for, and leader o f , a resurgent Kadazan
political movement. Born in 1940, the son of a police sergeant, he
attended a Catholic school and after a s h o n period as a clerk in the
Education Department, he obtained a Colombo Plan scholarship to study
law at Adelaide U n i v e n i t y in the late 1960s. Upon his return, he joined
Berjaya as it was being formed, and a year later, was selected as a party
vice-president. In the state election of 1976, he was elected to the Sabah
Legislative Assembly to represent Tambunan in the hean of the Kadazan
area. By 1980 he had joined the Cabinet, first as Minister for Local
Government and Housing, and then in two other ministries. 6 Within the
Berjaya government, Pairin was persistent in raising issues of concern to
the Kadazans: the survival of the Kadazan language and culture; the
aggressive tactics of 'unqualified' Muslim missionaries; the uncontrolled
illegal immigrants to Sabah from the Philippines and Indonesia; and
discrimination against Kadazans in the distribution of government benefits
and services. The Harris Salleh government was more sensiuve to a
militant Islamic faction within Berjaya that had been recruited from
U S N O and was espousing various 'Islamic' causes. Because of this and
persistent pressure from Kuala Lumpur, including Or Mahathir, seeking
to increase the pace of Islamization in Sabah,' these questions raised by
Pairin were not met by argument, but by hostility. In June 1982, Harris
asked for Pairin's resignation from the Cabinet, He remained in Benaya
but became an ordinary' member of the Legisbtive Assembly. Shortly
afterwards, during a Beriaya Congress, Pairin raised the question from
the floor of unqualified Muslim missionaries and asked whether Christian
missionaries could receive state aid as was being provided to Muslim
missionaries. In a fit of anger, Harris ordered Pairin out of the meeting
and later took action to expel him from Beriaya, 8 In response, Pairin
decided to 'cross the floor' as an Independent, but was blocked when
Harris submitted Pairin's undated letter of resignation to the Speaker of
the Sabah Assembly. Similar letters of resignaiion had been required of
all candidates w h o were nomiruted to the Berjaya tickcet. With no other
choice, Pairin had to face a by-election in his home constituency of
Tambunan.

Meanwhile, the Kadazan community were showing their appreciation

of Pairin's e f l o n s lo speak to their concerns. Pairin had earlier been
elected Prcsideni of the Kadazan Cultural Association, which had
100,000 members. 9 Shortly after being dropped from the Cabinet, he was
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 157

selected as the Huguan Siou (Paramount Chief of the Kadazans. T h i s

was a position last held by Peter Mojuntin, but vacant since his death in
the air crash along with Fuad Stephens, the Huguan Siou before
Mojuntin. Although exercising no legal powers, the position commanded
the respect and support of most Kadazans. Later, the title also proved a
liability in making it difficult for Pairin to claim also to represent other
communities in the Sabah political environment. But, for the s h o n term,
these positions of leadership of Kadazan organizations gave him a boost
in political fortunes just as he was being subject to discipline by the
ruling powers of the Berjaya government.
In the by-election in Tambunan, Berjaya nominated as its standard-
bearer Roger Ongkili, the brother of Berjaya Vice-President James
Ongkili. Both Pairin and Ongkili were Kadazan and had deep roots in
the community. Indeed, the two were related, Pairin being the uncle of
Roger Ongkili. T h e primary difference between the two candidates w a s
that Roger Ongkili was affiliated with the Berjaya g o v e m m e n t and with
the political strategy of conciliation and quiet bargaining for political
concessions, while Pairin had demonstrated his willingness to speak
openly and publicly on matters of central concern to the Kadazan
community. T h e by-election was delayed for several months in a legal
dispute over the undated letter of resignauon used to force the election.
W h e n the c o u n accepted the validity of the resignation letter, the by-
election was held oo 29 December 1984, with Pairin emerging the v i a o r
by the overwhelming vote of 3,685 to 637. 1 0

Obviously angered by the resulu of the by-election, Chief Minister

Harris Salleh, through a government spokesman, announced that all
development in Tambunan would be frozen and that its district status
was being revoked. Harris firmly defended the principle that T a m b u n a n
should be punished for its failure to s u p p o n the government. For t w o
w e e k s this issue dominated press coverage from Sabah, finally prompting
Dr Mahathir to intervene and reverse the punitive meastures against
Tambunan. During this controversy, Mark Koding, a Kadazan leader,
resigned from Berjaya in protest and joined a small but growing number
of public figures determined to form a new political party to challenge the
often arbitrary and manipulative tactics of the Berjaya g o v e m m e n t under
Harris Salleh. 11
Within a few weeks of the by-election victory, a n e w party w a s being
f o n n e d . Called Parti Bersatu Sabah ( P B S , United Sabah Party), it
pledged to s u p p o n the Rukunegara, the N E P , and parliamentary demo-
cracy. Nevertheless, ihe a n e m p i to register the party met with considerable
delay. Sensing that this new party woukl capitalize on grievances held by
non-Muslim native peoples, Harris Salleh decided to bold a snap election
before the new party could become effectively organized. T h i s decision
was approved by Dr Mahathir, even though he had earlier maintained
that the election in Sabah should be synchronized with tiune of Peninsular
Malaysia. W h e n the snap election was announced and the Legislative
A s s e m b l y dissolved on 15 March, PBS had still not been registered as a
legal party. Fearing that they might not secure official registration in time
158 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

to contest the election, the PBS leaders made an agreement with a small
Kadazan-based parry, Pasok (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Pasok Ragang
Bersatu), whereby PBS candidates could stand under the Pasok label.
Perhaps because of this move, PBS was finally registered just before the
nomination date for the state elecuon set for 20 and 21 April 1985.
Immediately following the party registration, the PBS leaders and their
followers resigned from Pasok, and the new party began functioning as a
legal and independent organization for its first electoral test.
For the 1985 Sabah state election, the main contenders were Berjaya,
representing the government in power and holding 44 of the 48 seats in
the Sabah Legislative Assembly; U S N O , representing the militantly
Muslim party still led by Mustapha Harun, who had been Chief Minister
for nine turbulent and controversial years, but holding only 3 seats in the
preceding assembly; and PBS, the Kadazan-based party that had been
legally formed for less than a month. A m o n g the minor parties were
Bersepadu, attracting Brunei Malays; Pasok, a narrowly Kadazan-based
party; the SCCP, claiming to represent Chinese interests; Bersih, a minor
regional party; and the D A P , a major opposition party in Peninsular
Malaysia, but finding it difficult to establish a base of support in Sabah.
Although the Berjaya government had claimed to be a multiracial
coalition, it had always retained the elements of a pro-federal and pro-
Islamic slant. Because of the success of PBS in making an appeal to the
n o n - M u s h m nauve voters, Harris Salleh made an even more open appeal
to Muslims for support as the protector of MusUm supremacy. This
tendency was accelerated as the PBS was able to extend its appeal beyond
the Kadazan community to Muruts, other natives, to Chinese, and to
many others w h o , for various reasons, were dissausfied with the Berjaya
regime. T w o 'silent issues' permeated the campaign. The first involved
Labuan, and the second, immigrants.
At a BN meeting in 1983, Dr Mahathir had suggested that Labuan be
made a Federal Territory. After only a moment's consultation with an
aide, Harris Salleh impulsively agreed, and only later brought the matter
up with the Sabah Cabinct for approval. U S N O objected vehemently to
the move, and, as a result, that party was expelled from the BN for the
second time, the first having been over Mustapha's alleged secessionist
moves. W h e n the decision to make Labuan a Federal Territory was
announced, the argument was made that any secessionist activities in the
area would be pre-empted by the federal presence. Furthermore, Sabah
would save some $30 million to $40 million per year in development
expenditures. T h e public explanations avoided some imponant aspects of
the transfer. T h e Federal Government gained full control of a strategic
island that was being used to projea Malaysian claims to some of the
uninhabited reefs known as the Spratly Islands. Sabah lost a small
territory but it was the location of the largest state investments in
development projects with many new industries and excellent p o n facil-
iues. Because of its location in the midst of rich oil-producing fields, the
state also lost a share of the 5 percent of oil revenues paid to littoral states.
W h e n Selangor s u a e n d e r e d territory for the national capital, it received
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 159

financial compensation. Yet Sabah surrendered Labuan with no such

compensation. Whether the cession of Labuan was beneficial to Sabah
became a matter of concern to Sabah voters. For many Sabahans, the
transfer of Labuan to federal control on 16 April 1984 merely confirmed
the view that the Berjaya government was so dependent on federal
support that it was unable to withstand any pressure from Kuala Lumpur,
thus confirming the accusation that it had lost even a minimal capacity to
defend state i n t e r e s t s . T h i s issue became the topic of many of the 'off-
the-record' ceramah staged by opposition parties during the election
campaign, particularly by U S N O and PBS.
M a n y in Sabah were also becoming increasingly c o n c e m e d about the
large influx of 'refugees' and immigrants w h o were coming to the state
primarily from the Philippines and Indonesia. During the Mustapha era,
this wave of immigration was encouraged in a bid to increase political
support for U S N O , perhaps in anticipation of secessionist moves. During
the Berjaya government, large numbers of immigrants were attracted by
a booming economy. Immigration was bolh tolerated and covertly en-
couraged, on the assumption that the immigrants would bring Muslims
into a majority in the state. Police registration of aliens in 1985 revealed
that they numbered 280,000, but because of additional illegal unregistered
aliens, the figure was obviously much higher. About 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 of the
registered aliens were Filipino and about 70,000 were Indonesian. With a
total Sabah population of just over one million, the existence of some
3 0 0 , 0 0 0 or more immigrants was a matter of grave c o n c e m and import-
ance to most Sabahans. T h e political calculation of Harris Salleh is
revealed in his speech after his pany's by-election loss ai Tambunan. He
stated: 'In 1967 Muslim voters formed 37 per cent of the total eleaorate.
T o d a y they comprise over 52 per ccnt. Therefore the scales will tilt in
favour of the Muslim communities if anyone plays the politics of race and
religion. 13 Later he stated, 'Inevitsbly the Muslims will eventually
dominate all other races in Sabah politically because ihey will have the
n u m b e r when many more Filipino immigrants are given IC cards and
register to vote. T h e n the Muslims will not forget.' 14 Harris seemed
oblivious to the possibility that many Sabah Muslims also might not like
the immigrants, w h o competed with them for jobs and w h o were often
lawless. Many Filipino immigrants had links with the Moro Liberation
From and retained their firearms while in Sabah. Even though possession
of unregistered firearms is an offencc carrying a mandatory death sentence
under the E S C A R , police authorities looked the other way and did not
charge Filipino immigrants w h o might have been charged with violation of
those regulations. T h e political and social issues created by the large
immigrant communities were of greater c o n c e m to non-Muslims, but
because these immigrant communities also generated m u c h friction with
other locals, many Sabah Muslims had mixed feelings about the encroach-
ments of these new settlers.

During the campaign, Berjaya relied heavily on the federal image and
on the s u p p o n of federal leaders. The Beriaya symbol was abandoned in
favour of the BN symbol—the dacing or beam scale. Federal ministers
160 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

flew over to address the large rallies staged by Beriaya. At a rally of

20,000 in Kota Kinabalu, Dr Mahathir pledged that the Federal Govern-
ment would 'sink or swim with Beriaya'. He went on to warn, 'Berjaya
should continue to rule Sabah. If any other party rules there will be no
support from the Barisan Nasional government. 1 5 Similar messages were
conveyed by other federal ministers, including Musa Hitam and T e n g k u
Razaleigh Hamzah. Much of the campaign effort was devoted to mobil-
izing Islamic support as a counter to the U S N O claim that only it could
protect the interests of the Muslim community. In making that point, the
Berjaya campaign stressed its Islamic credentials and also confirmed the
criticisms of PBS that Berjaya had become too committed to programmes
of Islamic conversion and Islamic preference, but was not willing to
defend legitimate rights and interests of other communities representing
the rich cultural diversity within Sabah.
T h e PBS campaign was mostly c o n d u a e d by means of small ceramah
meetings, because police permission was not given for larger rallies. By
this method, the campaign was conducted largely beyond close police
supervision. T h e Catholic Church bccame a centre for party aaivities in
Christian areas. Great effort were made to extend pany support beyond
the Kadazan community. The party gained a strong following among
Muruts and Chinese w h o were increasingly fearful of the rising fervour of
Islamic extremism.
On the eve of the election, Harris Salleh was confident of victory, but
anucipating a smaller majority' than the 43 seats Berjaya had won in 1981.
T h e Police Special Branch p r e d i a e d that Berjaya would win between 32
and 36 seats, 16 but it is doubtful that they provided any details of their
polLng methods. When the votes were counted, to the surprise of most
observers, Benaya suffered a stunning defeat. Harris Salleh and all the
cabinet ministers lost their seats and Benaya was able to hold on to only
6 seats. U S N O won 16 seats, 13 more than in 1981, but P B S emerged the
majoriiy winner with 25 seats. Pasok had also gained one seat, with its
elected member immediately joining PBS to swell its number to 26. 1 7
At the height of the agony of defeat, Harris SaUeh conccived of a
scheme to deny his arch-rival and critic, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, of the
fruits of victory. Under the Sabah Constitution, as a relic from the
colonial era, the Chief Minister had the power to appoint six non-elected
assemblymen, Berjaya, with its 6 elected members, would support
T u n Mustapha for Chief Minister, w h o with U S N O ' s 16 elected members,
and the 6 appointed members would consutute a majority of 28 in the 48-
member Assembly. By this move, Benaya would also have the power to
force a new election at any favourable moment so as to recoup its losses.
Because Dr Mahathir was on a state visit to Norway, Harris phoned
Musa Hitam at 2 . 0 0 a.m. on election night to explain his scheme, but
Musa rejeaed h. N o n e the less, the plan proceeded, this lime with
Mustapha as the primary actor. After receiving Harris's offer of coahtion
support, Mustapha led a group of his supponers into the grounds of the
residence of the Governor, Adnan Roberts, at about 3.00 a.m. on election
night. Mustapha's spokesman argued that Mustapha deserved to be
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 161

installed as Chief Minister because he headed a coalition supported by

over half of the voters and having the blessing of Kuala Lumpur, which
wanted a Muslim as Chief Minister. T h e Governor was warned that he
would be removed if Mustapha was not immediately sworn in as Chief
Minister. Ignoring his o w n legal advisers w h o recommended against
appointing Mustapha, Adnan R o b e n s , early in the mortiing, and without
a judge as witness, administered the oath of office to M u s u p h a as the
new Chief Minisier and provided him with a letter of appointment.
W h e n the PBS leaders found out what had happened, they were furious
and contacted various federal leaders for redress. Musa Hitam bad
already teamed of the dawn coup attempt by Mustapha and was aheady
taking action to rectify the misjudgement of Adnan Roberts. T h e
deception in the arguments and the coercive threau of Mustapha's
supporters were made the basis for revoking M u s u p h a ' s appointment. At
8.15 p . m . the next evening, Joseph Pairin Kitingan was installed Chief
Minister in a ceremony properly wimessed and duty announced. 1 8

T h e new PBS state administration began with high hopes bul serious
liabilities. Mustapha immediately filed a suit in court, claiming to be the
Chief Minister since the Governor has no constitutional power to revoke
an appointment once given. This suit challenged the legal validity of all
government actions and remained an impediment over decisive g o v e m -
ment action for almost a year, until the court finally rejected Mustapha's
claim on the basis that the original appointment was invalid primarily
because of fraudulent deception and duress. 19 T h e other major impedi-
ment confronting Pairin's government was the strained relations with
Kuala Lumpur that persisted despite the e f f o n s by PBS to be admitted
into the BN and to secure from Kuala Lumpur s o m e recognition of
validity for the new s u t e g o v e m m e n t . Even with the six new P B S
nominees that Pairin had the power to appoint, the govemment remained
under siege from its critics, both in Sabah and in Peninsular Malaysia.

Dr Mahathir, w h e n he returned from abroad, backed the decisions of

Musa Hitam which had permitted Pairin to be installed as Chief Minister.
Yet he also made it plain that he was disturbed about the results of the
eleciion. On learning of the PBS victory, he is reponed to have said, 'I
tore out my hair . . . I was disappointed.' 2 0 He was especially concerned
that the new government was not 'multi-racial', as Berjaya had claimed to
be. While the votes had s h o w n that PBS had w o n with the core support
of the non-Muslim Sabah nauves, they also revealed massive support by
the Chinese and even substantial Muslim support in s o m e constituencies.
The principal theme of the P B S campaign had been 'to keep Sabah's
'30 ethnic groups from being deprived at the expense of others'. T h i s had
struck a responsive note that extended far beyond the Kadazan c o m -
munity, In support of its court case, U S N O walked out of the first
meeting of the Sabah Assembly and claimed that the g o v e m m e n t was a
'Catholic government' and that Muslims were being discriminated against.
T h e same charges were made by Harris Salleh and were echoed by
Anwar Ibrahim, speaking for U M N O Youth. These complaints were
discussed by the BN in July, and they were used to support the position
162 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

that the PBS application to join the BN should be held in abeyance until
the new government had proven that it would be 'fair to Malays'. The
argument was made that 'we cannot allow Muslims to be ruled by non-
Muslims'. 2 1 Pairin did appoint Muslims, both to the Assembly and to
other imponant positions, but his appoiniees were accused of not being
'true leaders' or of being heretical Muslims. When he persuaded some
Muslims w h o had been in the Berjaya government to join the PBS
government, he was then accused of 'raiding' the other parties.
T h e first test of public support of the PBS government came in
October 1985 when Harris Salleh decided to resign as President of
Beriaya to make way for his chosen successor, Mohamed Noor Mansoor,
He also resigned his parliamentary seat, thus forcing a by-election, which
was promptly won by the PBS candidate, Kadoh Agundong, a Murut
w h o had earher defeated Harris in the 1985 state election. When Pairin
persuaded three of ihe six Berjaya assemblymen to join his government,
by-elections were forced through the use of undated letters of resignation.
U S N O also surrendered one seat to allow the new Beriaya President,
Mohamed N o o r Mansor, lo secure a seat in the Assembly. As a con-
sequence of these moves, there were four state by-elections in January
1986, with three of the constituencies being predominantly Muslim and
the fourth being predominantly Chinese. T w o of the seats were won by
P B S , while U S N O took the other two, thus proving that PBS had the
capacity to win in Muslim areas. 22

It required no great political acumen for ihc opponents of the PBS

government to realize that it would take some time before it could be
defeated at the polls. Consequently, a new strategy was devised, designed
to induce the declaration of emergency rule by the Federal Government,
or at the very least, the imposition of more effective sanctions by Kuala
Lumpur to end the one-party PBS regime of the Sabah Government.
Toward this objective, various politicians from U S N O and Berjaya,
including Harris Salleh, joined together to organize demonstrations and
incidents to challenge the authority of the Pairin government. At the
same time, efforts were made to undermine the political support of the
PBS government by inducing defections. Although the number of clected
assemblymen supporting the g o v e m m e n i had risen to 30 with the earlier
defections from Berjaya, the by-elections of January- 1986 had reduced
the number to 28. Under continuous pressure from the federal authorities,
some six additional PBS members were induced to defect in mid-
February, perhaps with the promise of money or favourable appoint-
menis. U p o n hearing of the potential erosion of his support in the
assembly, Pairin decided to dissolve the Sabah Assembly, and the pro-
clamation was signed by the Governor, Adnan Roberts, on 24 February-.
He also withdrew the PBS application for admission to the B N . Rather
than wail for the gradual dismemberment of his party by the tactics of the
opposition, he decided to seek a new- mandate. This action surprised his
critics and made irrelevant the attempts by the opposition to buy over
members of his government. U S N O and Mustapha sought an injunction
against the dissolution pending the outcome of the case claiming that
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 163

Mustapha had all along been the legal Chief Minister since the disputed
appointment in April 198S. With the testimony and arguments in that
case nearing an end, it was clear that a momentous court judgment would
shortly be made. To call a new election, would pre-empt that judgment.
T h e Federal G o v e m m e n t , too, was upset by the surprise calling of a fresh
election, just when federal pressure was appearing to have the effect of
bringing the PBS g o v e m m e n t to its knees. Behind the scenes, the federal
authorities were active in trying to form a Sabah coalition that could
challenge PBS.
In view of these developments, some opposition politicians decided to
create disturbances that would justify the declaration of an emergency by
the Federal G o v e m m e n t , as had happened in the case of Kelantan in
1978. Both the tactics and the principal a a o r s were not too different from
what had been staged in Kota Kinabalu in 1976; only this t i m e , key
U S N O politicians were joined by some disgroniled Benaya politicians,
including Harris Salleh, w h o resigned his membership in Berjaya to join
U S N O . Riots and bombings were s u g e d in Kota Kinabalu as some 2 , 0 0 0
to 3,000 demonstrators camped at the state mosque, hoping to use it as a
sanctuary. When the police arrived, most of those detained were un-
employed Filipinos w h o , it was later leamed, were being paid M$10 per
day to s u g c demonstrations. Foreign correspondents reported the rumour
thai Harris Salleh was one of the mysterious figures helping to finance
the campaign. 2 3 Some of those associated with the campaign pleaded for
the declaration of an emergency, but this was difficult for Dr Mahathir to
d o , since a Malaysian election was on the horizon, and it would prove a
liability if he were to react rashly to what most Malaysians viewed as an
engineered emergency situation. Chief Minister Pairin Kitingan remained
calm, and Dr Mahathir promised that there would be no declaration of
an emergency. Instead, Dr Mahathir put forth his plan to solve the

After a series of talks, first between Anwar Ibrahim and Pairin and
then between Dr Mahathir and Pairin, Dr Mahathir drafted what he
called the 'Sabah Plan'. It provided for the cancellation of the s u t e
election and the formation of a coalition govemment in Sabah, with
Pairin Kitingan remaining as Chief Minisier, but the positions of power
in the government distributed according to an agreement. There would
be three Deputy Ministers, two from PBS and one from U S N O ; a
Berjaya member would be appointed a federal Deputy Minister; both
U S N O and P B S would be admitted lo the BN and the Sabah BN would
be chaired by Dr Mahathir; at the next general election, the three parties
would all contest under the BN symbol and would not contest against
each other, but have seals allocated as follows: P B S 28, U S N O 16,
Beriaya 4. In discussions on this 'plan', PBS leaders o b j e a e d to non-
competitive managed elections and argued thai the distribution of seats
would prevent their party from widening its base and force it, instead, to
represent only one ethnic community. 2 4 T h e y offered a counter proposal,
but the new D e p u t y Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba, called to w a m P B S
leaders that if ihe 'Sabah Plan' was not accepted as formulated, the full
164 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

weight of the BN would be turned against the P B S government. T h e

implication was that emergency rule would likely be declared. T h i s
ultimatimt by Ghafar Baba was reportedly the decisive factor which
convinced the PBS leaders to reject funher negotiations over the 'Sabah
Plan'. 25
By this t i m e , the c o u n had ruled on the applications for an injunction
to block the pending Sabah election. The High Court ruled that the
dissolution of the Sabah Assembly was valid. It seems that a legislauve
assembly is like Humpty D u m p t y — o n c e it has 'fallen', 'all the King's
horses and all the King's men cannot put H u m p t y D u m p t y together
again'. Without other opuons, all parties to the unfolding contest had to
await the decisions of the electorate with the polling set by the Election
Commission for 5 and 6 May 1986, just slightly over a year since the
previous s u t e election.
For its second state-wide campaign, PBS was belter organized. It had
confidence in its base of support and it used its incumbency to good
advantage. It also could capitalize on the unfair harassments of its critics.
At the ceramah, the party displayed video shots of Berjaya and U S N O
leaders at the head of crowds that later turned to violence and arson. T h e
PBS claim to be a multiracial party was stressed and extra efforts were
made to bring Muslims into the party in a visible way. These e f f o n s
appear to have had some effect, since after the vote was cast, PBS had
been returned with an even greater margin of majority, winning 34 seats,
to 12 for U S N O and only 1 for Berjaya. With 6 appointed seats, this gave
the PBS a majority of 40 out of 54 seats in the Sabah Legislative
A s s e m b l y lo begin its second lerm of office. It had also w o n over 53 per
cent of the voies and had captured a number of Muslim majority
constituencies.
Immediately after the election, Pairin stated, 'I hope that P B S will no
longer be accused of representing only one community or race.' W h e n
asked about the possibility of a coaliuon government, he replied, ' W h y
should we have a coaliuon of panics? We are a coalition of races.' 26

T A B L E 6.1
Sabah: State Assembly Elections, 1981-1986
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 165

Within a very short time, PBS was admitted without fanfare into the B N ,
with both the PBS leaders and the leaders of the BN showing each other
the mutual respect that refleaed political realities and a recognition of
their limited capacities to project political power into the other's home
territory and legal jurisdiction.

Sarawak Politics, 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7
Sarawak, like Sabah, began its cycle of political activity before Peninsular
Malaysia. Sarawak had held a state election in 1979, but because of
insubility in the ruling coalition, a new election was put off to the last
moment possible at the very end of 1983. Nevertheless, before this state
election, there were a number of important political developments that
set the stage for a protraaed political struggle which remained largely
tmresolved until 1987.

T h e political environment in Sarawak was similar in many r e s p e a s to

that of Sabah. Yet political alignments and the constellation of parties had
evolved quite differently. T h e economy of Sarawak, like Sabah, w a s
dominated by the extractive industries of oil, gas, and timber. Most of
the wealth had accumulated in the coastal towns, but much of the
depiction of timber resources adversely a f f e a e d the interior areas.
Lucrative timber licences which were issued by the s u t e government
became an i m p o n a n t instrument of political power jealously controUed
by the Chief Minister. Since the licences were worth many millions of
ringgit, they could be distributed to reward political supporters and be
used to build a s u b l e coalition at the state level, often including those
politicians w h o claimed to represent the interests of interior native
peoples. Sintilarly, the large hydroelearic projects that were built or
being planned involved the flooding of large tracts of upland forest and
the relocadon of people from ihe interior areas where the native non-
M u s l i m peoples were conccntrated. T h u s , basic economic conflicts arose
over land policies, over the distribution of new jobs and wealth from

T A B L E 6.2
Sarawak: Population by Ethnicity and Religion, 1980
166 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

development projects, and over the provision of government services

between coastal areas, with their urban centres, and the highland interior
areas of the state. These geo-political tensions were intensified by ethnic
and religious differences.
As the grievances of the interior natives gradually accumulated, some
of their leaders began to explore political strategies that would translate
their plurality as an ethnic community inio more substantial power. T h e
indigenous native peoples had proven to be very difficult to mobilize for
political action because of tribal divisions, geographic isolation, and old
factional rivalries. After years of ineffective political action, a new genera-
tion of interior native leaders sought to forge a wider sense of community
extending beyond the individual tribes to embrace all interior natives.
T h e older and more general term 'Dayak' was revived to denote all non-
Malay indigenous tribal communities. Together, the Dayak grouping
constituted the largest ethnic community. Even so, they had not been
able to translate their near majority of numbers into dominant political
power because of the character of the party system and the judicious use
of federal power and patronage to assure the dominant position within
the state of the Malay/Melanau community. Occasionally, there had been
rumblings uf 'Dayak power', which created tensions and instability
within Sarawak as well as an.xieiy in Kuala Lumpur among those w h o
believed that state governments should replicate, so far as possible,
national political alignmenis. 2 7

T h e character of the Sarawak parly system, while reflecting ethmc

differences, none the less muted ethnic mobilization. While all parties
had a communal core of supporters, none was ethnically exclusive, All
major panies attempted to create some form of multi-ethnic coaliuon
bridging at least two ethnic commumties. In this configuraiion, the
Dayaks became the common recruited group for all major parties. As a
con sequence, Dayaks were given limited access and token representation
in most panics, but they never acquired positions of dominance and real
authority, T h u s , for example, Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB)
represented ihe .Muslim Malay-Melanau community, but also displayed
token representation of Bidayuhs and some other Dayaks, Similarly, the
primary Chinese party, Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), recruited
substantial Bidayuh and some Iban following. The Sarawak National
P a n y ( S N A P ) claimed to be the primary' spokesman for Iban interests.
Yet, some of its top leaders and most of its financial supporters were
Chinese w h o were successful in forging a Chinese-Dayak coalition as the
basis for the party. With this s o n of party system, there was continuous
competition between pardes for shifting and transient supporters as well
as endemic internal factional struggles for power within all major parties.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, from the perspective of federal
authorities, the 'bad boy' of Sarawak politics had been S N A P which, in
its early days, espoused state autonomy. In 1965, under S N A P Chief
Minisier Stephen Kalong Ningkan, federal-state differences had provoked
the Federal Government into proclaiming a state of emergency to depose
the SNAP-led Sarawak ruling coalition. The f o n u n e s of S N A P revived in
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 167

1974 when the p a n y won 43 per cent of the vote and 18 Legislauve
Assembly seats. Even though S N A P President James Wong was detained
without trial for 17 months under the ISA, 2 8 this action did not prevent
S N A P from later joining the BN in 1976 at both state and federal
levels. 2 9 After S N A P joined the B N , the ruling coalition consisted of
three parties, with the balance remaining remarkably stable from election
to election.
W h e n elections were held, scats on the BN ucket were divided
according to past performances. Unlike Peninsular Malaysia, the BN
panics also contested against each other, either openly or through
surrogate 'independents' w h o , if they w o n , could expand a party's claim
to a constituency. A few minor parties and, after 1974, the presence of
the D A P from Peninsular Malaysia added to the competition bul did not
upset the basic balance of power so deftly maintained by Chief Minister
Abdul Rahman Ya'akub of the PBB.
Leading up to the state election in 1979, there had been periodic
rumblings of discontent with the distribution of power, particularly
among natives w h o believed that they were being shon-changed in the
political process. T h e first moves to challenge the balance look place as
intra-party disputes within S N A P , the p a n y ,that claimed to be the
primary political vehicle for native peoples. At The S N A P party congress
in 1981, Leo Moggie (an Iban) unsuccessfully challenged the incumbent,
James W o n g (a Chinese), for the presidency of S N A P . 3 0 T w o years later,
in a bitter battle, he tried again, arguing that Dayaks should be the
leaders of a Dayak party. James W o n g defended the multiracial character
of S N A P , and retained his position as leader of the party. At the party
congress, a prominent S N A P politician, Daniel Tajem, was expelled
from the party for campaigning against BN candidates in the 1982
parliamentary election. In protest against this action, Leo Moggie resigned
from S N A P . By September 1983, the two fonner S N A P leaders launched
a new p a n y called Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak ( P B D S , Dayak Ethnic
P a n y of Sarawak), which appealed for support on the basis of exclusive
Dayak identity. Attracted by the new p a n y , many Dayaks in S N A P w h o
had been elected or appointed to both federal and state positions trans-
ferred their membership to P B D S . 3 1 Because of the ethnic appeal of
P B D S for Dayak political mobilization, other parties that had recruited
peripheral Dayak s u p p o n were also a f f e a e d . As a consequence, the
P B D S represented a challenge to the existing political calculus of the
entire Sarawak party system.

With the formation of P B D S , the question remained whether there

would be a realignment in Sarawak politics. T h e real lest came in the
state election of 1983. W h e n the votes were counted, it was apparent that
P B D S had not upset the political base of either PBB or of S U P P , but it
had rather split the support base that had been previously cultivated by
S N A P . Where S N A P had w o n 16 seats in 1979, it now took only 8,
whereas P B D S won 6, which, together, represented a net loss of 2 seats.
Their competition against each other had been detrimental to both and it
had not enhanced the political position of the indigenous Sarawak tribal
168 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

peoples. The number of Dayak voters was on the increase, however, and
if some political accommodations were made between the leaders of
S N A P and P B D S , it was apparent that they could have a greater impact
on the distribution of power at the state level and also on public policy
issues of concern to the interior natives.
During the internal crisis within S N A P , the Sarawak BN leaders from
other parties avoided becoming involved in the dispute. Indeed, conflicts
among the Dayaks could only enhance the power of the other parties.
When Daniel Tajem was expelled from S N A P , he retained his position in
the Cabinet in what was called the 'BN Plus' arrangement. Similarly,
after the 1983 election, the new P B D S party was quickly welcomed as a
new member of both the state and the federal BN and the P B D S leaders
retained approximately the same positions in government that they had
held before their exit from S N A P . As a resuh, the primary compeution
between S N A P and P B D S was over the issue of which party could be
more effective in representing the interests of the Dayak communities.
These shifting alignments were also reflected in the internal politics of
P B B , the Malay/Melanau party that headed the BN in Sarawak. Since
1970, the leader of die PBB had been Abdul Rahman Ya'akub, w h o was
also the Chief Minister of the BN government in Sarawak. In 1981 he
was elevated to the post of Governor, with the new Chief Minister being
Abdul Taib Mahmud, his nephew but his junior by only a few years.
Being the senior and the surrogate guardian of Taib after the death of
Taib's father, Rahman Ya'akub expected both deference and substanual
political power as leader of the P B B , which he had led for over a decade.
Nevertheless, Taib tried to establish his o w n leadership of the party. As
Chief Minisier, Taib made policy decisions and distributed patronage
and government benefits as he deemed appropriate, often going against
the 'advice' freely offered by his uncle, the Governor. Within a short
period, an intense personal and factional rivalry' developed between the
two. At stake was not only the control of P B B , the keystone party in the
B N , but also control of the state government with its tremendous powers
of patronage. The struggle involved public accusations, coup plots and
counter-plots in a w e b of intrigues and under-cover machinations that
s o m e claim to be all too characteristic of the Sarawak Malay/Melanau
communiues. Despite the factional rivahies within P B B , the party did
not fracture and Abdul-Taib Mahmud survived as Chief Minister and
leader of the Sarawak B N , largely because of strong and substantive
support for his government from the authorities in Kuala Lumpur.

Under Taib Mahmud's leadership, the PBB moved away from its
earlier stance of being the assertive defender of Malay ethnic interests and
its emphasis on a militant Islamic political idiom, The party's defence of
Malay/Melanau identity was not abandoned, but policy was muted in an
e f f o n to extend its appeal, especially to Bidayuhs (formerly called Land
Dayaks), some of whom had become Muslims. Partly in response to the
rising Dayak political consciousness, Taib stressed that the PBB was a
multi-ethnic party which included nauve peoples. To retain even the
semblance of a multi-ethnic appeal required a de-emphasis on some of
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 169

the symbolic aspects of both Malay ethnicity and Islam. For a while in
1985, it appeared that the PBB might split with the possible formation of
a Bidayuh party by dissident P B B native members. 3 2 T h e policy shifts
initiated by Taib may have been a deciding f a a o r which dissuaded
dissidents within the party from breaking away to form a new party to
espouse more exclusive Bidayuh interests.
During 1984 and 1985 there were rumblings of discontent within the
Sarawak BN over the decisions and leadership style of Chief Minister
Taib Mahmud, Many issues were involved, but the most contentious was
the way timber liccnces were being distributed as well as being revoked.
T h e previous Chief Minister, Rahman Ya'akub, had awarded concessions
to friends, relatives, and political allies. This practice continued when
Abdul Taib became Chief Minister. The total value of these concessions
was never revealed but may have approached M $ 3 0 billion. Part of the
disconient with the 'leadership style' of Taib undoubtedly involved
disagreemenis over the distribution of benefits from this vast resource. In
addition, policy decisions tended to be made unilaterally by Taib, and
when Dayaks asked for beneficial policies or programmes to uplift their
community, he would state that 'we cannot afford to entertain those
championing a particular community', claiming, instead, to pursue
'multi-racialism and the politics of development'. 3 3 For the Dayak leaders,
this was not an adequate response. T h e y expected some form of 'affirm-
ative action' to raise the economic and social posiuon of the interior
natives, along some of the same lines that were used by the N E P to
benefit the Malays of Peninsular Malaysia. Furthermore, many state
policies, especially regarding the distribution of timber licences, were
viewed by Dayaks as interfering with native land rights. Because there
was no effective consultative forum within the Sarawak BN to air these
issues and because of the often arbitrary and apparently hostile attitude of
Taib to representations from Dayak leaders, there developed a chasm of
suspicion and distrust between the Chief Minister and especially those
w h o were elected under the P B D S banner. In addiuon, he had succeeded
in alienating some legislative assemblymen from among all the parties in
the BN coalition. T h e distribution of patronage can make allies, but it
also can make enemies among those w h o feel slighted,

T h e s e undercurrents of c o n f l i a and factionalism were c o m p o u n d e d by

the bitter rivalry that had earlier developed between Taib and his uncle,
Rahman Ya'akub. T h e feud coniinued through most of the laiter's tenure
as Governor of Sarawak. At one point in the dispute, Rahman Ya'akub
even sent a letter to Taib asking him to step down 'honourably', but Taib
retained the s u p p o n of federal leaders. 34 Although Rahman Ya'akub
wanted a second term as Governor, he was forced to retire when his term
expired in April 1985; the new appointee was Ahmad Zaidi Adruce, a
less commanding political figure and much more willing to play a non-
political role as Governor.
In retirement, Rahman Ya'akub attempted a political come-back by
exploiting the undercurrent of opposition to the leadership style of Taib.
T h e Sarawak BN had contested the federal election in 1986 with no
170
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 171

major disputes and succeeded in winning 21 of the 24 federal seats

allocated to Sarawak. Yet, the underlying factionalism within all parties
in the BN broke into the open in March, when 28 S u t e Council Negri
members convened at the Ming Court Hotel in Kuala Lumpur
and issued a call for Taib either to resign or to face a 'no confidence
motion' in the S u t e Assembly. Calling themselves 'Bersatu' (United
Group), they included all 8 P B D S members, 8 from P B B , 5 from S N A P ,
4 from S U P P , and 3 independents. 3 5 Later, allegations were n u d e that
Rahman Ya'akub had invited the dissidents to Kuala Lumpur and
perhaps had paid for the air tickets and hotel accommodation, and
offered to be the alternative candidate to replace Taib as Chief Minister.
T h e next day, Taib revoked twenty-five timber concessions held by those
involved with the Bersatu faction.
T h e s e concessions were estimated to be worth M $ 2 2 . 5 billion and
involved about 3 million acres of forest land. 36 In addition, he ordered
state statutory bodies to withdraw a t o u l of M$1S0 million from Sarawak
Bank Utama, of which Rahman Ya'akub was the majority shareholder.
Taib explained that these a a i o n s were to stop money from flowing to
those supporting the opposition. In the following days, bolh parties
revealed the seamier sides of the timber licence award sysiem, and it
became clear that practically all s u t e assemblymen were in some way
beneficiaries, although not all to the same extent.
While the Bersatu faction c o m n u n d e d a nominal majority of the
Assembly, they could not convene a meeting of the Sarawak Council
Negri. Taib immediately dissolved the assembly and called for a new
election, two years earlier than required. T h e issue then became one of
w h o would contest what seats and under what party label. With federal
support, Taib insisted that the rebels not be nominated under the BN
ticket. Each BN member party was told by Dr Mahathir that they would
o n l y contcst the seats held at dissolution and all would use the symbol of
the B N — t h e dacing. With these conditions, the P B D S decided to opt out
of the BN and the faction in PBB supporting Rahman Ya'akub decided
to form a new party called Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak (Permas).
S o m e of the dissidents from other panies shifted p a n i e s , but In the
election, the primary line-up was the B N , consisting of the sulwarts from
P B B , S U P P , and S N A P , versus the newly defined opposition: P B D S and
the fledgeling Permas, n o w led by the venerable and wily Sarawak-Malay
politician, Rahman Ya'akub. During the campaign, Dr Mahathir came to
Sarawak to lend the full s u p p o n of the Federal G o v e m m e n t to the
Sarawak BN administration of Abdul Taib. 3 7

Even before the vote was counted, there was anguish among some
Dayak politicians, w h o realized that no matter how things t u m e d out,
they would most likely be denied a proponiotute share of power and a
say in the formation of s u t e policies. Even so, they hoped that some
realignment would take place as a result of a new sense of political
purpose among the Dayaks. After a s h o n , intense, and often bitter
campaign, the voters went to the polls on I5 and 16 April. W h e n the
votes were counted, the BN was retumed, but with a reduced majority of
172 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

28 out of 48 seats. In the opposition was P B D S with 15 seats, and Permas

with 5 seats. Among ihc defeated candidates was Abdul Rahman Ya'akub
as well as Daniel Tajem, Deputy Prcsideni of P B D S . Although the
Day-aks remained on the periphery of the political system, the election
also revealed their potential power ai the polls. It was apparent that Chief
Minister Taib had retained power but with a weakened mandate and the
prospect dial the ethnic factional alignments might easily turn against his
g o v c m m e n i . 3 8 Many of the Dayaks were inspired by the rise to power of
the PBS in Sabah, but they did not have sophisticated leaders w h o were
adept ai building stable alliances and a base of support that extended
beyond their o w n beleaguered community. No doubt, in time this would
occur.

T h e Economic Recession
For the federal authorities, political set-backs or surprises in the two
states of Sabah and Sarawak were minor concerns compared to the
problems posed by a downturn in the world's economy. For three
decades Malaysia had experienced a dramatic growth of its economy,
with an average increase in per capita G N P of 6.5 per cent between 1960
and 1970 and 7,9 per cent between 1970 and 1978. This economic vitality
was led by petroleum and liquefied natural gas, which together accounted
for 29.6 per cent of exports in 1985 and provided approximately 26 per
cent of all government revenues.

Over the previous decade, palm-oil had expanded to account for

10.4 per cent of e x p o n s , to surpass Malaysia's tradidonal export com-
m o d i u e s of rubber (which had fallen to 7.5 per cent) and lin (which had
collapsed to a mere 4.2 per cent) as the mainstay of the Malaysian
economy. Malaysia's N E P had been largely funded by the revenues
derived from foreign oil sales. The expanding economy provided the
resources to cushion the ethnic conflicts and grievances that had plagued
the country since its independence. These favourable circumstances
changed in 1984 as Malaysia began to feel the impact of the world
economic recession. Oil prices dropped from US$34 per barrel in 1982 to
U S $ 1 5 per barrel in 1986. T h e un market had also collapsed in 1984 with
the failure of the Iniemauonal Tin Agreement ( I T A ) to sustain m i n i m u m
prices. The prices fell from M$30.15/kg in O a o b e r 1983 to a low of
M$14.03/kg in October 1986. The drop in price resulted in the closure of
314 of die 488 tin mines in Malaysia within the period of one year. T h e
government had contributed to the collapse of die tin price through its
secret effort to establish a (in canel through a company called
MA.MINCO, which invested in un to support a floor price. W h e n this
effort failed, the company lost M$600 million in funds that ultimately
came from the federal treasury. T h e resulting oversupply caused the
collapse of the price of tin on worid markets to record lows. Similarly,
rubber prices fell from M$2.60/kg in 1984 lo below M$1.80/kg in 1986, a
nine-year low. T h e depressed rubber prices occurred in spite of the
actions of the signatories to the International Rubber Agreement to
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 190 173

protect a m i n i m u m price for that commodity. A similar fate befell palm-

oil, which had a price of M$l,600/tonne in April 1984 but fell to less
than M$650/tonne by November 1985. 39 The govemment had leamed
the hard way thai commodity cartels provided little protection in the
event of depressed world markets.
T h e drastic losses in foreign exchange resulted in a decline in real
economic growth of 8.1 per cent for 1986 and a drop in per capita G N P
from M $ 4 , 9 3 7 in 1984 to M $ 4 , 3 2 7 in 1986. T h e lower eamings led to a
rapid rise in external debt to over M$5O billion, and severe problems of
debt-servicing payments. In 1985 the public debt increased to M $ 6 2 . 4
billion or about 86 per cent of the nation's G N P . 4 0 In these circumstances,
the g o v e m m e n t had to devise polides to cut govemment expenditures, to
attract greater foreign investment, and to manage at the same time
escalating ethnic demands with fewer resources and benefits to distribute.
As foreign investments dwindled, the govemment responded to the
criticism of investors and United Nations consultants concerning the
economic costs of the N E P . While on a visit to Australia to promote
investment in Malaysia, Dr Mahathir stated that the N E P 'will be held in
abeyance, more or less, except in areas where there is growth'. 4 1 T h i s
policy shift was very limited and temporary and appeared to apply mainly
to the provisions of the Industrial Coordination Act which provided for
Bumiputra participation in foreign commerdal ventures in Malaysia.
Certainly there was no hint that the entire edifice of Malay privileges and
quotas was to be abandoned or gradually dismantled. The only changes
were those minimal conditions deemed necessary to attract foreign invest-
ment and to allow 'market forces' to operate. To promote foreign
investment, some categories of investors were exempted from the 70 per
cent local equity requirement of the N E P . Some companies manufacturing
products not produced locally were allowed 100 per cent foreign owner;
ship and permanently exempted from the requirement to restructure
their equity to local or Bumiputra investors. 42

In other areas, the g o v e m m e n i initiated a policy of constraint as it

attempted to meet the problem of falling revenues, the rising defidt in
balance of payments, the decline in export eamings, increased unemploy-
ment, and the decline in domestic savings. Govemment operating
expenditure was scaled d o w n by 6 per cent and development expenditure
was cut by 25 per cent for the 1986 budget. T h e military budget
allocations were slashed by 37 per cent. Efforts were made to stimulate
exports with tax incentives and an Industrial Master Plan was rdeased
which was expected to promote the expansion of the manufacturing
sector of the economy, including mining and petroleum. 4 3 Because the
recession was imposed on Malaysia by the world economy, there were
limited options for policy-makers. Political leaders called on the public
for sacrifice, restraint, and understanding, while bdl-tighiening measures
were employed to cut back on g o v e m m e n i expenditures. Confident of its
abiliity to balance economic and political demands, the g o v e m m e n t
e x p e a e d to weather the economic d o w n t u m with minimal loss of public
confidence and public support. As the time for new elections approached.
174 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

political issues once again assumed primacy over questions of economic

strategies and fiscal management.

U M N O Politics

Being the dominant party within the ruling BN coalition, thc United
Malay? National Organization had become the most important represent-
ative f o n m t for the interaction between the top leadership and the
primary support base for the government. Some of the most imponant
pre-election m a n o e u v e s took place at the U M N O General Assembly in
May 1984. Tengku Razaleigh once again decided to contest for Deputy
President, as he had done in 1981. At that time he had lost to Musa
Hitam by a vote of 722 to 517, but he obviously thought his chances had
improved in the intervening years. Although the campaign remained
civil, it did involve a major effort and considerable expenditure of money
by both candidates. This u m e , Dr Mahathir left no doubt that he
favoured the incumbent. Again Musa emerged the victor by 744 to 501, a
vote that was remarkably similar to the earlier 1981 contest.
In the Cabinet reshuffle following the U M N O election, T e n g k u
Razaleigh was moved from Finance to Trade and Industry. A long-time
businessman ally of Dr Mahathir from his home state of Kedah, Daim
Zainuddin, was made Finance Mimster even though he was a vinual
novice to politics and relatively imknown. Anwar Ibrahim was moved
from Culture, Youth and S p o n s to Agriculture, and Abdullah Badawi
became Minister of Education. Musa Hitam condnued in H o m e Affairs,
and Dr Mahathir retained two ponfolios, Prime Minister and Defence.
T h e net result of these changes was that Tengku Razaleigh had been
moved laterally to a less important post while the other key posts were
filled by m e n closcly affiliated with Dr Mahathir. Musa Hitam's position
had not changed, but he was now surrounded by those elevated by prime
ministerial appointment. 44
T h e next year at the U M N O General Assembly in September 1985,
there was no major e l e a i o n , but there was the usual opportunity for
interchange between U M N O leaders and delegates. Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad in his speech to the delegates stressed the main
theme of U M N O unity and a dedication to 'the Malay struggle', following
which he received the complete s u p p o n of the delegates for his leader-
ship. Indirea warnings about involvement in politics by the Malay
Rulers gave hints diai the 1983 constitutional crisis over the role of the
Monarchy might still be simmering behind the scenes. Rumours of a rift
between Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam were denied by both men. 4 5 Yet,
five months later, on 27 February 1986, Musa suddenly submitted his
resignation as Deputy Prime Minister. Having been originally elected by
a free vote of U M N O , Musa was viewed as having some independence
from Dr Mahadiir. It was common knowledge that Dr Mahathir and
Musa had disagreed over a number of policies, including the "Look East'
Policy, some of the high-cost investments in prestige p r o j e a s , some
aspects of Islamizauon, and, more recendy, the way Musa had handled
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 175

the Memali incident and the Sabah crisis during Dr Mahathir's absence.
Despite these differences, the deciding factor may have been Musa
Hitam's indiscretion in making some confidential criticisms of
Dr Mahathir; the comments could easily have been distorted and reported
back through the rumour circuit to Dr Mahathir. Copies of Musa's
confidential resignation letter were first circulated privately to members
of the U M N O Supreme Council and then as a 'flying letter'—a technique
often used in Malaysia to circumvent a cautious and controlled press. In
the letter, Musa explained that Dr Mahathir during a Cabinet meeting
had referred to those 'who could not wait to step into his shoes' and w h o
'had slandered him as corrupt, a dictator, and among the richest m e n in
the world'. 46 When Musa asked w h o m he had in mind, Dr Mahathir
named Musa. In his defence, Musa said that he had always considered
Dr Mahathir as a brother but under the circumstances, he had little
choice but to resign. He also explained that he was tired of 'money
politics' and the abuse of power in U M N O . This appeared to be an
oblique reference to the growing influence of 'money brokers' and the
w e b of political patronage centralized in the hands of Prime Minister
Mahathir. Musa also objected to the centralization of policy around a
small 'kitchen cabinet' composed of Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin,
Agriculture Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and Minister of National and Rural
Development Sanusi Junid.

Because of the widespread s u p p o n for Musa Hitam within U M N O , his

resignation came as a shock and prompted a number of prominent
U M N O politicians to explore some form of reconciliation strategy. After
announcing his resignation decision, Musa left almost immediately for
Jeddah on an umrah 4 7 pilgrimage, after which he continued on to
England. Following an emergency meeting of the U M N O Supreme
Council on 28 February, a delegation of four chief ministers flew to
London for discussions with Musa, during which they persuaded him to
retain his post as D e p u t y President of U M N O and his seat in Parliament.
By keeping his parliamentary seat and his party post, he retained the
leadership of a bloc of supporters of U M N O . He thus remained active in
U M N O politics but in a passive political stance, which would enable him
to make some decisive moves later when the political scene had subilized
and w h e n he could assess his political options. From the discussions, it
was clear that he retained a substantial following, not only al the grass-
roots level from his home state of Johore, but also among a number of
prominent U M N O political leaders. Those w h o were closely allied to
.Musa Hitam during this crisis over his tenure as D e p u t y Prime Minister
included such Elites as Federal Territories Minister Shahrir Abdul Samad,
Deputy Trade and Indusiry Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, Johore Menteri
Besar Abdul Ajib A h m a d , Regional Development Minister Adib A d a m ,
and Education Minister Abdullah Badawi. 48 Few believed that Musa
Hitam would fade away, regardless of his differences with Dr Mahalhir.
Rather, the speculation was on questions of whether Musa had over-
played his political hand and what his next moves would be to recoup his
political losses.
176 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

Although press rcpons speculated that Musa Hitam might make a ixtld
move to challenge Dr Mahaihir's leadership, for the time being he kept a
low political profile. Prime Mnister Mahathir appointed U M N O Vice-
President Ghafar Baba as the new Deputy Prime Minister and moved his
frequently promoted protege, Anwar Ibrahim, from Agriculture to
Education. 49 By these appointments, Dr Mahathir further consolidated
power in the hands of those w h o were immediately dependent upon him
for political support.

MCA Politics

Within the B N , a recurring problem had been the political instability

within the Malaysian Chinese Association. P a n of the conflict was
derived from the fact that the top Elites were drawn from the English-
educated, often with radier poor abilities to communicate with the rank
and file in Chinese. As well, ihe higher leaders enjoyed the benefits of
holding government positions, which meant also that they had to defend
government policies largely unmindful of Chinese interests. Because the
M C A leaders were relatively powerless in shaping policy, they were often
subject to competition from aspiring middle-level leaders who could
easily generate a following at the grass-roots level by aniculating some of
the accumulated grievances of the Chinese community. In such an
environment, the top leaders of the M C A had acquired more and more
arbitrary powers within the party to suppress dissident movements,
including the application of party discipline and the summary powers of
expulsion.
W h e n Tan Siew Sin retired in 1974, his place was filled by Lee San
Choon, who was elected the following year as President. In 1979, Lee
San Choon was challenged by Michacl Chen, who failed in his bid to oust
the incumbent by a vote of 901 to 686. Following this contest, sixty-one
of Michacl Chen's principal supporters were expelled from the party; he
himself lost his cabinet post and left the M C A to join Gerakan. After
the depanure of Michael Chen from the p a n y , the dominant faction
supporting Lee San Choon spht into two factions, one headed by N e o
Yee Pan and the other by Tan Koon Swan. 50
T h e competidon betxveen these two factions may have contributed to
the decision of Lee San Choon to retire in March 1983. 51 Ruling out an
election as too divisive, Lee San Choon appointed N e o Yee Pan as Acting
D e p u t y President of the M C A , even though most observers noted dial
T a n Koon Swan probably had more support from MCA delegates. What
followed was a bitter and sometimes vicious two-year contest between the
two facuons for conuol of the party. The controversy involved not only
political representation in the Cabinet and the BN councils, but also
control of a large portfolio of investments managed by the M C A .
N e o Yee Pan represented the archetype of a party bureaucrat. He
acquired a doctorate at the University of Saskatchewan and upon his
return became a physics lecturer at the University of Malaya. In 1968
he joined the MCA, just before its disastrous performance in 1969. As
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 177

the party gradually recovered, he worked his way up the hierarchy,

winning the Muar parliamentary seat in 1974, which he successfully
defended in 1978. By 1977 he had bccome an M C A Vice-President
and in 1979 he was made Minister of Housing and Local Govemment
and later Dcputv Finance Minister. In September 1982, with the
support of Lee San Choon, he was appointed Acting Deputy President
by a decision of the M C A Central Committee. His rise in the party was
largely due to the fact that he was sponsored from above and promoted
through the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection. He argued that the
p a n y needed professional politicians w h o could work quietly behind the
scenes to protect the interests of the Chinese, rather than flamboyant
politicians w h o combined business interests with politics and perpetuated
the image that the .SVCA was a towkay party.
In contrast. T a n Koon Swan was a self-made millionaire businessman
w h o was recruited to the p a n y about 1977 by Lee San Choon and made
managing director of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad ( M P H B ) , the
primary investment and business management arm of the MCA. Although
T a n Koon Swan won the Raub parliamentary seat in 1978 and later
defeated the venerable D A P leader, V. David, in the Damansara parlia-
mentary constituency in 1982, Tan's primary appeal derived from his
dramatic successes in building M P H B into a major financial and com-
mercial empire with over 250,000 Chinese investors, mostly M C A
members. Multi-Purpose Holdings had been formed to channel the
savings of M C A members into growth sectors of the economy as a
strategy to increase the Chinese political-economic leverage in public
affairs. Under T a n Koon Swan's leadership the M P H B portfolio rapidly
expanded in value, becoming the primary owner of major corporations
operating in Malaysia and abroad. This holding company facilitated
Chinese participation in nearly all sectors of the Malaysian economy. 5 2

For the ordinary M C A member. Tan Koon Swan had the practical
Chinese response to the N E P that, while aiding the Malays, was also
viewed as threatening the economic position of the Chinese. In addition.
T a n Koon Swan exhibited an aura of confidence and quiet charisma that
appealed to rank-and-file members. T h e prolonged dispute between these
two factions involved both personality, political style, and substantive
issues. The fact that N e o Yee Pan had never been e l e a e d to the position
of M C A Presideni was probably the initial reason for a challenge to his
leadership. As the dispute between the two facuons began to escalate,
N e o used the power of the presidency to expel T a n Koon Swan and
thinecn of his primary supponers from the party. T h e T a n faction
responded with a petition for an Extraordinary General Meeting ( E G M )
of the M C A supported over one-third of the Central Committee
m e m b e r s , as required by the M C A Constitution. N e o argued that the
petition required the approval of the party Secretary-General, which was
denied. The Tan faction claimed lo have discovered massive padding of
membership by illegal registration of 'phantom' members based on the
identity card numbers of non-Chinese. After extensive investigations, the
T a n faction alleged that there were as many as 120,000 'phantom'
178 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION

members being used to support the N e o faction, because for each 100
members, a division was enutled to one delegate at the M C A Assembly.
W h e n any members of the M C A indicated their s u p p o n for an EGM, or
openly supported the Tan faction, expulsion orders were promptly issued
by the N e o faction. By mid-1984, evidence presented in court revealed
that 189 branches, 42 divisions, and 99,000 members of die M C A had
been suspended with disciplinary o r d e r s . " T h e real contest, however,
was for public support, especially wiihin Chinese constituencies. From
newspaper polls and from many other indications, the Tan faction was
much more successful in creating a positive pubhc image.
After several unsuccessful e f f o n s at mediation between the factions,
the Tan faction organized their own Extraordinary General Meeting on
6 May 1984, legitimized by a pedtion signed by 1,640 out of the 2 , 5 2 6 del-
egates to the previous M C A General Assembly. Because the E G M was
not recognized as legal by ihe incumbent N e o faction, the issue of which
faction was 'legal' then went before the C o u n s , which became embroiled
in an extremely complicaied series of suits and injunctions, followed by
counter-suits and injunctions. 54
During the later stages of the protracted struggle, the M C A was
threatened by U M N O leaders with expulsion from the B N . Both Musa
Hitam and Dr Mahathir made unsuccessful attempts to resolve the
dispute. To put pressure on the contestants, N e o Yee Pan was temporarily
dropped from the Federal Cabinet pending a resolution of the conflict.
Eventually, through die intervention of Ghafar Baba, the two factions
agreed to have an independent auditor examine the 'phantom' member-
ship issue, and to restore the membership of all suspended members.
Finally, at the regular M C A General Assembly in November 1985, all
outstanding issues were placed before the delegates. Tan Koon Swan and
his faction emerged the victor, wresting control of the M C A from
Dr Neo's faction by die vote of 2,715 to 809. 5 5
T h e decisive victory of T a n Koon Swan at the M C A General Assembly
appeared to stabilize the MCA as a viable panner in the BN coalition. It
was not long, however, before another controversy erupted over T a n
Koon Swan's activides as Managing Director of Mulli-Purpose Holdings,
which in turn controlled a network of allied companies in most sectors of
the cconomy. R u m o u n circulated about his involvement in shady and
speculative stock-market manoeuvres. With large numbers of Chinese in
the M C A holding M P H B shares, any mismanagement or major losses
would reflect on Tan Koon Swan's political leadership. Within a week of
his election as M C A President, the Pan-Electric Company collapsed,
unable to repay S$75 million in credit, with Tan Koon Swan holding a
conuolling stake. Pan-Electric's stock was suspended and both the
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchanges were closed for four days
to prevent a domino effect of bankruptcies and lo enable the Government
of Singapore to intervene to organize a rescue package.

Apparently, too many investors had engaged in rather reckless

'forward dealings'. These had been successful so long as the stock-market
had remained buoyant, but with the recession, and the over-extension of
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 179

credit, a large network of interlocking companies w a s on the brink of

receivership. While in Singapore to deal with the Pan-Electric collapse,
Tan Koon Swan was arrested and charged with criminal breach of trust.
T h e Monetary Authority of Singapore was reported to have discovered
that there were o u t s u n d i n g about S$600 million of forward c o n t r a a s ,
with around S$350 million at risk of default. Tan Koon S w w posted bail
of S$40 million (US$18.7 million), and returned for a trial that was
interrupted by legal manoeuvres and attempts to untangle the w e b of his
complex financial dealings. Losses of S$150 million were sustained in his
stock manoeuvres, while M P H B reported M$200 million in losses for
1985. Eventually, Tan Koon Swan pleaded guilty; he was sentenced to
t w o years' imprisonment and a fine of S$500,000. As a resuh of his
sentence he resigned from the MCA, and the office of MCA President
was assumed by Deputy President Ling Liong Sik, w h o was by then
Minister of Transpon in the post-1986 election BN government. 5 6 T h e
storm surrounding Tan Koon Swan's business dealings most certainly
weakened the party during the 1986 election campaign.

Other Barisan Nasional Parties

Holding five seats in Parliament and a member of the BN coalition,

Oerakan Rakyat Malaysia claimed to be a non-communal party, but also
contested the claim of the M C A to be the primary spokesman for Chinese
interests in the B N . While both Gerakan and the M C A were members of
the B N . they also were bitter rivals for the same large Chinese constitu-
e n c y in Penang as well as in other centres of Chinese concentration,
such as Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, and Malacca. In 1985 Gerakan and the
M C A had held talks which explored the possibility of merger between
the two BN partners, but the extended leadership crisis in the M C A and
old rivalries proved to be insurmountable obstacles. W h e n dissidents
were disciplined in either party, they often emerged again in the other
party as activists or even leaders. While the M C A was in the throes of its
factional crisis, Gerakan President Dr Lim Keng Yaik proposed that it
take over the M C A role within the B N . Paradoxically, it also had
experienced a less damaging leadership struggle with a faction led by
Michael Chen, w h o had previously left the M C A and was disappointed
not to have been made a Vice-President of Gerakan. 57 T h e factional
disputes of both panies were interlinked, which also precluded a merger
or even close co-operation to maximize the political representation of the
Chinese and the non-Malay constituencies. As the 1986 election
approached, each party agreed to defend its traditional constituencies,
despite the turmoil which had characterized internal politics in both
parties.

Representing the Indian ethnic component of Malaysia's population in

the B N , the Malaysian Indian Congress had, for some l i m e , chafed at
being such a junior partner as to be almost ignored. On a pattern similar
to that of the M C A ' s Multi-Purpose Holdings, the MIC formed Maika
Holdings to promote Indian investment and to strengthen the economic
180 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

power of the Indian community. 5 8 MIC President Samy Vellu, on behalf

of Maika Holdings, approached the Indian Governmeni to purchase the
Indian shares of the United Asian Bank, which had been incorporated in
Malaysia. These moves to increase the economic power of the M I C
generated strong criticism from some U M N O activists, who viewed such
moves as evidence of the split loyalty of Malaysian Indians.
For leaders of the M I C , their primary obiective was to secure better
treatment for Indians, suffering from poverty and lack of opportunity,
cspccially in comparison to the Malays. The leaders determined, there-
fore, to becomc more vocal in espousing Indian causes and drawing
aiteniion to the grievances of a largely forgotten minority. 59 At the MIC
Annual Congress, President Samy Vellu criticized government policy and
the N E P for discriminating againsi Indians and not giving the Indians
their fair share, thus violating the unwritten rule of the BN that member
parties not make public criticism of the government.
In response, Dr Mahathir stated. 'Unfortunately. I can say yes. but
nothing will happen.' This was interpreied by the press as both a rebuke
and a conundrum. Thereafter, Samy Vellu promised to 'present the case
in a more acceptable forum', meaning through cabinct channels. 6 0

T h e Opposition

Partai Islam Se Malaysia was viewed by the government as its most

dangerous opposition, primarily bccausc both PAS and U M N O competed
for the Malay vote with both resorting to similar religious and ethnic
appeals. PAS had a dedicated following in areas where Malay majorities
were overwhelming, panicularly Ln the eastern and northern Malay states
of Kelantan, Trengganu. Kedah. and Perlis. After years of P A S - U M N O
contesls for power in these states, PAS was finally admitted as a member
of the BN coalition in die years between 1972 and 1977; later, it
withdrew from the BN when the earlier PAS leader, Datuk Mohamed
Asri bin Haji Muda, was ousted by a more militant faction led by Haji
Yusof Rawa, w h o espoused a more uncompromising position on Islamic
issues.
In the 1982 election, PAS had won 5 parliamentary seats and garnered
about 16 per cent of the vote. PAS had accused the government of not
upholding Islamic principles and, at the village level, challenged the
authority of government-appointed imam with their o w n orthodox and
ostentatiously devout P A S imam. As a consequence, many Malay villages
were torn by the contest for power and legitimacy between PAS and
U M N O . T h e Memali incident, described earlier, was the most violent
example of the grass-roots conflicts within Malay society between those
w h o supported U M N O and those who were attracted to the 'extremist'
doctrines of some PAS activists. 61
Both because of its doctrines and its political appeal, PAS was subject
to the restricdons of the ISA laws as' well as other regulations, thereby
severely limiting its political activities. In 1984 its legal adviser, Haji
Suhaimi Said, was arrested under the ISA for distributing subversive
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 181

documents concerning a violent incident at Lubok Merbau. After the

Memali crisis, many of those involved were also detained under the ISA.
Followtng its depanure from the Barisan Nasional, PAS re-established
its political base in Trengganu. In order to expand ils appeal to other
stales. PAS leaders realized that the party needed to build some coalitions
beyond its narrow rural-Malay base of support. Accordingly, some
negotiations were opened, initially wiih Muslim Chinese, stressing the
'universalism of Islam'. At the 1985 PAS Muktamar (annual meeting).
President Haji Yusof Rawa assened thai ethno-cenirism, communalism,
and nationalism were 'Western secular' ideas inconsistent with Islam,
There was even a hint that Malay special privileges would be reconsidered
if P A S came to power, provided that they were replaced by genuine
Shariah law. 62 T h e government responded to these PAS ovenures to
other communities for a re-evaluation of the political agenda as being
bolh subversive and seditious. By raising the issue of Malay special
rights, as some PAS activists had earlier raised the issue of the role of
monarchs in an Islamic stale, PAS was accused of contravention of the
laws banning public discussion of constitutionally defined 'sensitive issues'.

In spile of these government threats and the restrictions on the political

activities of PAS, U M N O and PAS remained locked in an ideological and
propaganda war for Malay political support. U M N O relied on the public
media, while PAS relied on video and sound-tape cassettes and the
persuasive power of its activists in small face-to-face meetings conducted
in Malay villages largely beyond the purview of the local police. Utilizing
these tactics, PAS leaders were confident that the party could improve its
performance in the next federal election.''
T h e Democratic Action Party was the largest opposition party, having
gamed 9 parliamentary seats, 6 from Peninsular Malaysia and 3 from the
Borneo states, in the 1982 election. Just as PAS was the core of the Malay
opposition to the g o v e m m e n t , the D A P was the opposition spokesman
for non-Malay interests. Over the years, D A P politicians have s k i n e d
close to the limits placed by the govemment on raising in public
'sensitive issues' which are deemed to be likely to lead to ethnic hostilities.
As a result, the D A P has tended to concentrate on holding the g o v e m -
menl's performances up against its s u i e d promises and goals. In the
1970s, one of its p a n y officials and two Members of Parliament had been
detained under the ISA, A more cauuous attitude prevailed on both sides
in the 1980s. On several occasions, the D A P utilized the c o u n s lo
challenge the g o v e m m e n t , but was not panicularly successful in this
tactic. From the government's perception, the D A P was an 'irresponsible'
opposition. The threat from the D A P came nol only from its tireless
effort to expose discrimination against non-Malays, but also from its
tenacious pursuit of government mismanagement and its revelations of
official corruption. As some govemment-funded public corporations failed
to meet their targets or lost large sums of money under highly dubious
circumstances, the DAP was persistent and strident in iu criticisms.
Although the D A P could not encroach upon the core support of the
g o v e m m e n t , which was based on a Malay electorate, it had mobilized
182 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

substantial non-Malay support to become the largest opposition party. By

1982 it was also successful in expanding its operations to Sarawak and
Sabah, being the only Peninsular Malaysian party to do so, From this
perspective, the D A P was viewed as a formidable opponent of the B N ,
partcularly for its Chinese-based parties—the M C A and Gerakan.
In anticipation of forthcoming elections, two new parties appeared on
the Malaysian political scene. The Socialist Democratic Party ( S D P ) was
founded by the former leader of the D A P in Penang, Yeap Ghim Guan,
following an intra-party factional dispute. T h e S D P claimed to follow a
multiracial perspective but appealed primarily to Chinese constituents,
When the former Assistant Secretary-General of the D A P , Fan Yew
T e n g , returned to Malaysia from a period of self-imposed exile in
England, he joined the S D P and by 1986 became its President. He had
been a D A P Member of Parliament and was noted for being an out-
spoken human righis activist. In 1985 he organized a protest outside
Pudu Prison over the mandatory death penalties imposed on firearms
offenders. These protests resulted in his arrest along with those of eight
others. Later, in June 1986, Fan Yew Teng was again charged, this time
under the ISA. for publishing an inflammatory anicle entitled "Trojan
D o n k e y s in Malaysia'. While he remained in detention, the party prepared
to challenge the government at the fonhcoming polls. After the N e o Yee
Pan faction of the MCA was defeated by Tan Koon Swan, a substantial
number of disaffected M C A members transferred their membership to
the S D P , including one M C A Member of Parliament. Despite much
fanfare and ambitious plans, the S D P remained largely confined to
pockets of supporters in Penang, Perak, and Selangor, even though it
had atiracted a significant number of dissidents from among the older
established parties. 64

T h e other new party was Parti Nasionalis Malaysia (Nasma), which

was founded with the objective of providing a non-communal party that
would bring together middle-class liberal Elites with the backing of
labour unions. The party was given an initial boost when Ahmad N o r ,
the former President of C U E P A C S (Congress of Unions of Employees in
the Public and Civil Service), the union representing government civil
servants, joined Nasma. T h e party anticipated that Malaysia's labour
unions might generate support for the party. Following a rather pathetic
Start, Ahmad Nor decided to transfer his membership to the new S D P
and there was no significant grass-roots support generated for Nasma, By
the time of the 1986 election, it was led by Raja Nasron Raja Ishak, a
former U M N O official w h o had been chairman of the Malay Chamber of
Commerce. His leadership belied the party's initial image of becoming a
vehicle for trade union political activities. 65

T h e 1986 E l e c t i o n

Despite major problems with a faltering economy, the government was

taking decisive remedial actions and it remained confident that its base of
public support remained intact. Besides the sluggish economy, other
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 183

issues had emerged on the public agenda. T h e series of scandals and

massive loss of public funds associated with the investments and opera-
tions of Bumiputra financial institutions had tarnished the goverrunent's
self-proclaimed image as being 'dean, efficient and trustworthy'. Of
greater concern were ethnic tensions, which had intensified over the
future direction of policy after the 1990 target date for achieving the
ethnic restructuring goals of the N E P . Although the N E P target of
securing 30 per cent of share capital and jobs in the m o d e m sector of the
economy for Malays was within reach in many sectors, the issue of the
continuation or expansion of Malay ethnic privileges bad become
extremely contentious. In anticipation of a major review of N E P policies,
the political demands of ethnically mobilized constituencies were be-
coming intensified. Many assumed that there would be a crisis in ethnic
relations when these N E P policies were to be reviewed and new policies
devised for the post-1990 period. T h i s fundamental issue was further
complicated by the impact of the economic slow-down after 1983, which
gave the government fewer resources for allocation to the economic
restructuring objectives of the N E P .

As critics of g o v e m m e n t policy become more vocal, the Mahathir

regime resorted lo the use of more coercive measures to stifle dissent and
intimidate opponents. Increasingly, the processes of public policy-making
and evaluation had been centralized and cloaked in secrecy, while many,
even within Dr Mahathir's o w n party, were becoming critical of his
leadership style as well as some of the policies that appeared to emerge
largely from his o w n inspiration, rather than from a process of extensive
consultations with elites and power brokers in the ruling coalition.
Many of these issues would remain, regardless when an election would
be called. On the more important matter of the economy, there was no
assurance that there would be substantial improvement if an election
were to be postponed until 1987. T h e very contentious issue of what
would replace the N E P after 1990 could more easily be side-stepped with
an earlier election. Given these considerations, Dr Mahathir decided to
renew the g o v e m m e n t mandate in 1986, one year before his government's
term of office expired in April 1987. Sensing that an election was on the
horizon, all Malaysian political parues began preparations to face the
electorate. In addition, the problems of deciding upon candidates and
making coalition agreements between parties, both for the government
coalition and the opposition parties, intensified political activity and
heightened conflicts within most parties and political groupings.

T h e Barisan Nasional had the usual intemal conflicts over the

allocation of seats among member parties. As a by-product of the
Kelantan crisis of 1978, a number of moderates led by Mohamed Asri
Haji Muda, the former President of PAS, left that party to form a party
called H a m i m (Hisbul Muslimin). Just before the 1986 d e c t i o n , H a m i m
was admitted into the BN as an imponant symbolic counter to PAS.
Berjasa, the other Kelantan party that had earlier been sponsored by the
B N , bitterly opposed Hamim's admission to the BN and in protest
withdrew from the Barisan coalition,
184 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Based in Ipoh, the People's Progressive Party had suffered a decline in

its fonunes over the years. Even though it was given no parliamentary
seats to contest, it had to swallow its pride and decided to stay in the BN
with a minimal representation and role.
Because the number of seats in Parliament had been increased by 17,
all the major BN pardes were given more seats to contest than in the
previous election. Even so, many intra-BN disputes erupted over the
nomination of candidates and the allocation of constituencies. In the end,
all decisions on seat allocation were left to Dr Mahathir for final res-
olution.

Tbe 1986 Election Campaign

Parliament was dissolved on 18 July, and nomination day was set for
24 July, with voting set for 2 and 3 August 1986. While the campaign
period was only nine days, mosi parties had begun canvassing earlier in
anticipation of the election. The short period for campaigning and the
resinctions on large public meetings meant that the B N . with its extensive
organization, its control of the media, and its massive funding, could
bring its message to the voters more effectively than any of the opposition
parties.
T h e biggest problem facing the opposition was whether it would be
possible to form a tmited front to maximize their potential in Malaysia's
single-member-constituency system. PAS decided to make the establish-
ment of an Islamic state its primary plank, claiming that nationalism and
cthnic divisions were contrary to Islam's 'universalism'. It also attempted
to widen its appeal by forming a Chinese Consultative Committee (CCC),
T h i s Committee was promised diat PAS would abolish Malay special
rights, and, to prove its sincerity in appealing for non-Malay support,
s o m e Chinese and Indian Muslims were selected as PAS candidates.
With this shift in strategy, PAS hoped both to expand its appeal and to
forge an Opposition Front with non-Malay parties. Any agreement
among opposition panies to form such a front, however, would first need
to confront major policy differences and contradictory political objectives.
Eventually, a minimal 'front' was forged with three minor, ostensibly
'multi-ethnic' opposition parues—the S D P , P S R M , and Nasma. T h e
agreement avoided policy matters but divided constituencies to avoid
opposition parties contesting against one another. T h e D A P refused to
join in any opposition from unless PAS first abandoned its goal of an
Islamic state, which, of course, PAS refused to do. 66
Campaigning as the primary opposition party and without obvious
coalition alignments, the D A P attacked the division made in public
policy between Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra. It called for the termina-
u o n of the N E P in 1990 and its system of Bumiputra quotas. In the area
of educadon, it promised to fight for the repeal of Section 21(2) of the
Educstioo Aa which provided for conversion of vernacular Chinese and
Tamil schools to Malay as the medium of instruction. In other areas, it
called for mulu-culturalism that would reflect the cultural diversity of the
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 185

country and asked for more universities and university admissions for
non-Malays. In addition, it demanded deportation of illegal immigrants
and parliamentary redelincation to eliminate gross disparities in constitu-
encies on the basis of ethnicity. As such, the party was making a direct
challenge to the system of Malay preferences and privileges by invoking
the ideals of equality, democracy, and human rights. 6 7
The BN depicted the Opposition Front as an unholy alliance of
extremists seeking contradictory objectives. In particular, the BN at-
tempted to draw out the meaning and implication of an i s l a m i c state'.
Various PAS candidates and party leaders were pressed for explanation.
Eventually some PAS leaders acknowledged that in an Islamic s u t e ,
neither non-Muslims nor w o m e n would be allowed to vote. Embarrassed
by the PAS stand, state branches of the S D P disavowed the opposition
pact and defections occurred from the CCC. 6 8 Clearly, PAS had lost its
rather naive expectation of winning significant non-Malay support while
it also had made itself vulnerable to the criticism that it had abandoned
'the Malay struggle'.
Claiming to provide 'unity, prosperity and harmony', the BN stated
that it needed a two-thirds majority in Parliament to ensure Slability in
Malaysia's multi-ethnic setting. The argument was made that the Consti-
tution might need to be amended in any emergency without the threat of
partisan veto. The BN manifesto emphasized moderation, intercommunal
consultation, and benefits for all communities. It condemned 'extremists'
but there were only general statements about policy issues. Instead, the
emphasis was upon peace, stability, national unity, and 'balanced eco-
nomic development'. The very generality of the manifesto allowed com-
ponent BN parties to give their o w n emphasis and interpretation to the
BN election platform. Indeed, the M C A went one step further, issuing its
o w n supplement to the manifesto, providing a list of the concessions it
had achieved while a member of the government and declaring that the
BN had tentatively agreed to amend the controversial Section 21(2) of the
Education Act of 1961 to assure the continuation of vernacular Chinese-
and Tamil-medium education classes. 69 This M C A announcement was
designed to demonstrate to its Chinese constituents that the M C A could
produce results, while the D A P could only formulate grandiose demands
and pompous pronouncements.

On nearly all other issues, the voters were asked by the BN leaders to
s u p p o n past policies and the incumbent government team, rather than
asking for a mandate for clearly defined future policy options. Indeed,
informed voters were well aware of fundamental differences within the
ruling coalition over the direction of future policies, particularly after
the 1990 target date for the N E P , Paradoxically, in order to participate
effectively in the process of future policy formulation, each ethnic com-
munity was being asked to remain 'unified' in its electoral support for the
BN so as to strengthen the hand of their respective communal represent-
atives in those future intra-BN negotiations. In effect, the BN was
presenting to the voters a choice, not of policy, but of personnel and of
process.
186
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 187

W h e n the voles were finally counted on 3 August, the BN had w o n its

two-thirds majority and much more, although its proportion of the
popular vote had dropped from 6 0 . 4 per cent in 1982 to 55.8 per cent in
1986. Even so, it had captured 83 per cent of the parliamentary seats. But
this v i a o r y was somewhat tamished by the D A P , which gained the
biggest proportionate increase in seats. With its appeal targeted at non-
Malay constituencies, it had increased its parliamentary representation
from 9 to 24, of which 5 were w o n in the Borneo states. In Peninsular
Malaysia, D A P gains were largely at the expense of BN seats contested
by M C A candidates. The disarray of the M C A in the aftermath of its
protracted factional struggle may have contributed to the improved
showing of the D A P , alihough Gerakan seats had also proved vulnerable
to the D A P assault. With an increase in the total number of voters of
13.7 per cent, all major parties, except the M C A , increased the number
of votes cast for their candidates. T h e percentage increase for U M N O
was 10.18, for the D A P it was 22.7, and for PAS it was 16.91, but the
M C A defied the trend, experiencing a decrease of 13.11 per cent. 70 T h e
most dramatic and surprising results involved PAS, which captured only
one parliamentary seat, even though its percenuge of the total vote
dropped by only 0.8 per cent from its 1982 showing. Many of the PAS
losses were by n a n o w margins, which made its dismal performance all
the more disappointing to its militant supporters.

For the B N , the results were celebrated as a decisive victory and a

renewal of its mandate for five more years. T h e policy content of that
mandate had not been defined or endorsed by the election. Indeed, major
faaional divisions had appeared in all major consutuent BN parties and
the policy outlines for the next decade had not yet appeared on the public
agenda. As such, the government's mandate was both impressive and
ambiguous.

P o s t - e l e c t i o n Politics and P o l i c i e s

A post-election crisis emerged in Perung, which had a party distribution

of: U M N O 12, Gerakan 9, M C A 2, and D A P 10. Having the largest bloc
of seats in the State Assembly, U M N O demanded that it control the
Chief Minister's post, even though the s u t e is overwhelmingly Chinese.
In response, the Gerakan leader and former Chief Minister, Dr Lim
Chong Hu, threatened to join the opposition D A P to control the state.
After much give and take, Dr Lim Chong Eu becamc Chief Minister and
Penang remained the only state in Malaysia with a Chinese Chief
Minister. Any other arrangement would have created a racially explosive
atmosphere. 7 1
Within the B N , U M N O (with Hamim) had w o n all but one of the
84 scats it contested. T h e M I C w o n all 6 o f its contested seats, but the M C A
won only 17 of the 32 seats assigned to it, while Gerakan w o n 5 of the
9 seats it d e f e n d e d . T h u s , the net e f f e a of the election was to reduce the
credibility of the Chinese component in the BN just at a time when some
Malays were discussing the merits of assening Malay dominance by
188 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

unilateral actions and by forming a completely Malay-controlled g o v e m -

meni. In the Parliament of 177 members, U M N O (with its ally, Hamim)
comntanded 83 seats. Adding to this the Malay-based component parties
from Sabah and Sarawak, the Malay component was sufficient to com-
mand a bare working majority.
T h e idea of Malay dominance was forcefully espoused by Abdullah
A h m a d in a speech in Singapore. It created a storm of protest among
non-Malays for its forthright espousal of permanent supremacy for Malays
and the relegation of non-Malays to an inferior status. 73 Although prac-
tical political considerations of public support and Icgiumacy ruled out
such a rash move by any responsible politicians, these election results
emboldened some Malay radicals and militant chauvinists to intensiiy
their demands and to take a harder line in the internal politics of the
Barisan Nasional. From this perspective, the election results made the
task of the M C A and Gerakan leaders that much more difficult, just at a
time when the non-Malay public was becoming more vocal in its criu-
cisms of government policies and performance and was also doubting the
capacity of the non-Malay BN leaders to protect the vital interests of the
communities that they claimed to represent. The key issues on the public
agenda, which had not been addressed during the election, would now
have to be worked out within a party that had become much less
representative of the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country. With a
government divided internally and facing more strident criticisms from
the opposition, political anxieties were increasing as potential combatants
manoeuvred for political advantage.

F e w changes were made in the Cabinet following the election. There

were no changes in the four key cabinet posts of Finance, Trade and
Industry', Education, and Defence, while Dr Mahathir condnued to hold
the portfolio of H o m e Affairs in addition to being Prime Minister. The
close alhes of Musa Hitam were eased into less imponant posts, while
Dr Mahathir's supporters and trusted lieutenants were rewarded by
being placed in most critical policy-making positions. 74 The government
appeared to assume thai its election victory had confirmed public accept-
ance of all existing policies, so few changes were required. Yet, there was
a general awareness that a serious challenge to the government might be
mounted, not ai national polls, but within the political structure of a
more self-confident and independent U M N O which was becoming more
factionalized and more difficult lo lead. For the moment, Dr Mahathir
stressed die themes of party unity, Malay unity, and Islamic unity,
thereby confirming his claim to be the sole legitimate leader and spokes-
man for all three emotive-symbolic communities.

Because the election confirmed the dominant power of U M N O , some

party officials openly warned non-Malays that the Malaysian political
system is founded on Malay dominance, and that those w h o challenge the
special righis of the Malays and Malay privileges are 'playing with fire'. 75
Dr Mahathir both played to and acknowledged these sentiments in a
speech to the U M N O General Assembly in October 1986 when he stated:
'We do not wish to rob other people of their righis. But let no one try to
 THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 189

rob us of our rights. 76 W h e n Parliament convened, the King's speech

from the throne voiced the usual pious warning against radal sentiments
in the discussion of issues. Yet, it was not long after the Parliamentary
sessions got underway that the D A P raised its objections to the division
of Malaysians into 'first class and second class ciuzens'. As the debate
intensified between those defending and those opposing Malay special
rights, some U M N O members began referring to non-Malays as orang
pendatang (immigrants or foreigners). When the D A P began asking
parliamentary questions on the current status of ethnic target goals of the
N H P , the Standing Orders of Parliament were amended to disallow
questions seeking information on racial distribuuon in any economic or
employment categories. 77 Apparently, even the issue of whether the N E P
had or had not reached its 1990 target goals was deemed to be a matter of
secrecy and 'national security'. Malay politicians seemed more determined
than ever to have an extension of Malay rights and privileges under the
N E P , while the D A P and many non-Malays argued tfut most of the N E P
targets had been met, and thai the N E P should be considered a remedial
'affirmative action' programme, subject to revision and gradual conversion
to more equalitarian policies. Many observers believed that political
differences over this fundamental issue was likely to reach crisis propor-
tions sometime before the 1990 N E P target date.
190 MALAYSIAN POLITICS T H E SECOND GENERATION
THE AMBIGUOUS MANDATE 191
192 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
 7
Fracture at the Centre

THE general election in 1986 was held at the period when the recession
was most severe. That this was so could not have been known by the
govemment when Dr Mahathir decided to call an election. Some of the
bad economic news was delayed until after the election, when Finance
Minister Daim Zainuddin presented the 1987 budget estimates to Parlia-
meni in Octobcr 1986. At that time, he revealed that per capita income
had declined by 15.7 per cent in 1986 and that the country was in the
midst of a severe economic crisis with falling revenues and a rising debt
burden. 1 In most countries, an economic downturn will produce a
dramatic loss of electoral support for the govertmtent in power. That this
did not happen in 1986 is a testimony to the salience of other issues and
to the fact that the critics of the govenunent were found both in the
opposition and within the government's own coalition.
Because much of the election was fought on the issue of access to
forthcoming decision-making, many key issues had been postponed,
heightening anticipation of what might follow from unspecified future
policy-making processes. The critics and dissidents remained scattered
through the political spectrum, based on various and diverse grievances
and without unified leadership. The most vocal critics were those asso-
ciated with organizations that had very small membership but a high
public profile by their focus on broader issues of social equity, public
benefits, and other 'public interest' issues. Perhaps because the election
in 1986 had been relatively 'issueless', in the inmiediate wake of the
election, these public interest groups became more vocal, reflecting some
of the rising sense of frustration and alienation that could be discemed
within imponant sectors of the public.
For the government, the activities of these interest groups proved
distressing because they brought to public attention many of the more
sensidve issues that were assumed lo be appropriate only for resolution
through 'off-the-record' intra-Barisan negotiation. Furthermore, these
interest groups, by their highly visible attention-getting tactics, were
seeking to reshape a public agenda that the govemment wished to
manage and define according to iis own priorities and timetable. For
various reasons, political attention immediately after the election shifted
to the activities and demands of a few highly visible and articulate public
interest groups.
194 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Public Interest G r o u p s

Perhaps because of the govemment's decisive win at the polls,

Dr Mahathir Mohamad decided in late 1986 to mount an attack on
interest groups that were deemed lo be 'negative' and only finding faull
with the policies of the government. To that end. Federal Territory
Minister Abu Hassan Omar announced that five non-governmental
organizations and two political parties were 'thorns in the flesh' of the
country. He specifically named as 'enemies' of the state: Aliran, the
Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP), the Environmental Protection
Society of Malaysia ( E P S M ) , the Selangor Graduates Society, and the
Malaysian Bar Council, along with the two main opposition parties, the
D A P and PAS. He challenged the named interest groups to register as
poliucal parues and face ihe voters, 2 with the implicauon being that their
criticisms were illegitimate unless they could demonstrate popular support
at the polls. Altogether, there were about twenty registered interest
groups, but it was these five named organizations which drew the most
scathing comments. A few days later, at a political rally, Dr Mahathir
himself joined the attack, hitting out at 'intellectual Allies' w h o had
become 'tools of foreign powers' and w h o used their organizations to
subvert democracy by using tactics which he concluded could generate 'a
terrorist g r o u p — To me ihey arc saboteurs. 3 By implicauon.
Dr Mahathir equated his government's mandate with 'democracy'', while
base, self-serving, and anti-national motives were aitributed to his critics.
He did not, however, address the substance of their criticisms. It was
apparent that he was most disturbed over the recent involvement of
public interest groups in the campaign to oppose the newly proposed
Official Secrets Act and other measures designed to stifle dissent and
impose controls over the foreign news media. His antipathy towards
these inieresi groups apparendy also derived from their earlier involve-
ment in protests and criticisms of the g o v e m m e n i over the huge losses in
the B M F and other bank scandals, over allegations of corruption and
impropriety in the awarding of government contracts, over government
e f f o n s to chcck the independence of the judiciary, and over resource
development and environmental issues, A brief review of some of these
issues will provide some indicauon why they emerged on Dr Mahathir's
'enemies list'.

T h e one issue which united all the public interest groups was the
Societies Act of 1966 and its subsequent amendments, first in 1981 and
then its more draconian amendments in 1983, Following thai dispute, all
public interest socieites kept a constant watch on what they took to be
m o v e s to stifle pubhc criticism and dissent and to impose censorship or
press controls, eidier directly or through the 'self-censorship' mechanism
imposed by BN parties buying control of all major daily papers. A m o n g
the persistent critics of government policy on these issues was Aliran,
under the leadership of the political scientist and former academic,
Chandra Muzaffar, w h o edited the monthly magazine, Aliran Monthly.
Wiihin this journal, critical comments were published on most public
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 195

issues, concentrating on issues of corruption, human rights, democracy,

freedom of speech, and the role of an independent judiciary. Aliran
published a number of reporu and books on public policy issues, 5 which,
in both volume and quality, were impressive, considering its small staff
and budget. Its trenchant comments and critical reports were read
primarily by Western-educated middle-class urban elites, so that its
influence far exceeded its meagre readership, which must also have
included Dr Mahathir, since it elicited from him such scathing responses
to its criticisms.
Prior to 1983, environmental issues were of c o n c e m to only a few score
of Malaysians, who first noticed the degradation of rivers and water
supplies, largely from tin mining, rubber, and palm-oil processing
effluents and untreated sewage. The Consumers' Association of Penang
had sponsored several conferences and seminare on environmenul issues
beginning as early as 1978, 6 but it was not until the factory operated by
Asian Rare Earth ( A R E ) began functioning that environmental issues
attracted wide public attention. Owned jointly by Mitsubishi Chemicals
and Malaysian investors, including the Islamic Pilgrims Management and
Fund Board as a major Bumiputra shareholder, A R E began operations in
1982 processing rare elements from tin tailings to produce thorium
hydroxide, in the course of which radioactive waste products are gener-
ated, Initial plans called for the radioactive waste to be dumped near
Parit, a Malay village, but the site was moved near Papan, a Chinese
settlement, by the time production started. The waste products were
deposited in a rapidly cracking cement-lined trench noi far from a river
tributary. When this was discovered, sbcieen organizauons joined to form
the Papan Support Group, and the Perak Anti-Radioactive Committee
( P A R C ) , which together sponsored radiation measurements, a nation-
wide petition, and eventually public demonstrations against the unsafe
d u m p site. In response, the d u m p site was moved to a new location near
Bukit Merah, another Chinese village. In October 1985, a c o u n injunction
was secured suspending production pending proper safety measures. As a
consequence, A R E reported losses of M$7 million in 1986. W h e n the
Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Board Issued a new licence to A R E
in February 1987, demonstrations by 10,000 nearby residents ensued.
T h e D A P and the EPSM were both involved in the protests, while the
M C A was placed in an awkward position between its support for the
government and its need to defend the interests of its Chinese constitu-
ents. With a half-life of 10 million years, the finished product, thorium
hydroxide, was exported to Japan, the United States, and Canada.
Because it had a potential as nuclear fuel, some proposed long-term
storage of p a n of the output in Malaysia. What remained uncertain was
whether the d u m p site, which was re-opened, would become a temporary
storage facility or a permanent disposal site. T h e protest leaders pursued
further c o u n action seeking injunctions against the operations of A R E
but the issues remained unresolved and entangled with complicated c o u n
manoeuvres well into 1988. T h e Malaysian Cabinet approved the con-
tinued production of A R E but also promised to monitor the safety and
196 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

environmental issues posed by us operations.

By mid-1987, environment issues combined with concern over native
land righis to focus public aiienuon on logging and development issues,
particularly in Sarawak. T h e system of timber concessions awarded on a
patronage basis by the Sarawak state government had produced large
profits and millionaire status for a number of well-connected state busi-
ness men and politicians. T h e umber policies had also resulted in the
logging of about 30 per cent of the state's forest in the period 1 9 6 2 - 8 5 ,
and. while creating local employment, also generated substantial opposi-
don from many upland natives. Added to the threat to the tradidonal
system of swidden agriculture of upland natives was the federal-sponsored
Bakun Project which proposed to construa a 200-foot-high dam on the
upper Rejang River. The dam would flood 69 0 0 0 hectares of land and
force the relocauon of over 5,000 tribal nadves. The dam would produce
2 4 0 0 MW of power which was to be transmitted to Peninsular Malaysia
via an undersea power cable based on untested technology. T h e total
project was expected to cost about M$10 billion. Besides Bakun, some 51
other possible power generation sites were to be investigated for future
power generation. 8

T h e problems of the upland Sarawak natives were taken up by several

of the public interest groups, including Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends
of the Earth Malaysia) and Aliran.' At about the same time, a Swiss
amateur ethnologist and photographer, Bruno Manser, was hving among
the Penans of Sarawak and writing articles for European journals,
depicting the life and the problems faced by dicsc semi-nomadic people.
W h e n Penans and Ibans began proicsting logging operations in their area
and direatening to barricade logging roads, the government blamed him
for inciting the natives. Widt the help of his Penan hosts, he eluded
police sent to arresi him. Eventually, after several years of eluding the
police, he musi have left the country undetected. In June 1987 a
delegation of native representatives and chiefs from Sarawak appeared in
Kuala Lumpur to plead their case for protecting their native land rights
against the logging concessions. At first, these quesdons were treated
merely as a police matter, but later the delegation was received by top
political leaders, including Dr Mahathir. While the Sarawak native
delegation received a sympathetic hearing at public meetings in Kuala
Lumpur and Penang, they were criticized by a number of prominent
Sarawak politicians w h o were known to be the holders of vast state
logging concessions. Eventually, Dr Mahathir stated that the Penans
were diemselves responsible for destroying the rain forest because of their
shifting cultivauon pracdces. 11

For several years, the government had assumed a hostile stance towards
the operations of the foreign press in Malaysia. T h e government pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the foreign press should r e s p e a the
Malaysian 'national interest' as defined by the government and therefore
news reports should noi be biased against the government and not
contain any 'unauthorized' information concerning government activities
or policies. When the foreign press refused to accede to these unwritten
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 197

assumptions about their role, a series of restrictions and harassments

were placed on their activities. From 1 May 1984, the Malaysian news
agency, Bernama, was made the sole domesiic distributor from all foreign
news agencies and the sole wire transmitter of news from reporters in
Malaysia to their foreign news desks. When the Far Eastern Economic
Review gave full coverage to the B M F scandals, the copies of the Review
sent to Malaysia for local distribution were delayed in the post by about a
month. W h e n the Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) e x p o s a l some
aspects of the B M F scandal and later published a repon on the personal
financial transactions of Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin suggesting
that there was a conflict of interest involving awards of government
contracts and sales of shares, 12 the government viewed the reports as
malicious and irresponsible. In September, new government rules were
issued, requiring govemment ministers to make limited divestment of
their business interests. Pursuing its earlier allegations, the AWSJ pub-
lished another in a series of articles on government financial transactions,
revealing that Daim Zainuddin would profit from the forthcoming sale of
his shares in United Malayan Banking Corporation to the state trading
corporation, Pernas. 13 T h e government responded by immediately
banning the AWSJ and revoking the work permits of its two correspond-
ents, John Benhelsen and Raphael Pura. Dr Mahathir reacted angrily to
these allegations and responded by making his counter-allegations about
the Western 'Zionist press'. 14 The AWSJ sought redress in the Malaysian
court, which, in a judgment issued on 3 November, voided on procedural
grounds the g o v e m m e n l ' s decision revoking work permits for the AWSJ
c o n e s p o n d e n t s because no opponunities were given to the accused to be
heard. Just before the decision, the government arrested two lawyers
representing the AWSJ, charging them with having documents protected
by the Official Secrets A c t . " T h e combination of these events generated
great c o n c e m among the Bar Council, the National Union of Journalists,
and most of the public interest groups concemed with democratic prin-
ciples and a free press.

In response to the c o u n order, the government fiiully rescinded its

ban on the AWSJ and permitted iu two corespondent to return with
authorized work permits. Perhaps in reaction to this set-back in the
c o u n s , the government proposed new amendments to the Official Secrets
Act which extended protective 'secret' status to most government docu-
ments not officially released to the public and provided for mandatory
m i n i m u m imprisonment for one year for anyone found to be in possession
of information covered by the Official Secrets A a . W h e n these amend-
ments were presented to Parliament, 2,000 joumalists s u g e d a protest
demonstration, the National Union of Joumalists presented a petition of
protest with 36,000 signatures, and various public interest organizations
joined to sponsor a Freedom of Information Movement led by the former
Auditor-General, Ahmad Noordin Zakaria. T h e latter organization
Sponsored a public protest rally against the Official Secrets A a , while the
Malaysian Bar Council President, Param Cumaraswamy, voiced dismay
over the extent of the Act's coverage and its removal of judicial discretion
198 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

to examine whether a document qualified for ihe 'secret' label. Both

T u n k u Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn joined the protestors, openly
expressing their objections to the new amendments lo the Official Secrets
Act. These protests were to no avail, since the government proceeded
with its proposed Official Secrets Act amendments which, on 5 December
1986, were passed by Parliament by a vote of 131 to 21. 16
On the issues of human rights and democratic constitutional govern-
ment, the public interest groups were a consunt source of criticism and
annoyance to the government. On such issues, there was close co-
ordination and usually joint sponsorship of events, frequendy involving
Aliran, the Consumers' Association of Penang. Sahabat Alam Malaysia,
the Malaysian Bar Council, and various Christian religious organizadons,
such as the Malaysian Council of Churches and the Catholic Research
Centre, The fact that the D A P usually played a highly visible role in the
various seminars and conferences considering such issues only served to
identify these interest groups with what the government considered to be
implacable hard-line critics of the regime. The major s e m i n a n on human
rights and dcmocradc consiimtionalism included die 1981 Seminar on
'Rural Developmeni and Human Rights in South Easi Asia' 17 held in
Penang, the ' i n f e r e n c e on Human Rights in .Malaysia' held in Kuala
Lumpur in November 1985, 18 and the August 1987 conference sponsored
by Ahran in Kuala Lumpur enutled 'Reflections on the Malaysian
Constitution: 30 Years after Independence'. This last conference attracted
scathing criticism from Dr Mahathir, w h o depleted the participants as
frustrated intellectuals atiempting to seize power and presuming 'to make
policies for the government'. Echoing Dr Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim
called those w h o organized the conference 'arrogant intellectuals' wanting
to 'force their views down the government's throat'. 19

Earlier, on 21 July, Dr Mahathir had delivered a speech at Chatham

H o u s e in London during which he explained his views on democracy and
individual rights. In that speech, and in response to questions (hat
followed, he stated: ' . . . democracy has a distressing tendency to get out
of c o n t r o l — Democracy has come to mean individual rights. T h i s is
not what democracy is. Democracy is the will of the majoriyy.....
Democracy must mean the will of ihe majority, and it is expressed
through the vote,' He went on to explain that once the choice has been
made, it ill b e l o v e s some to presume to lell their leaders what to do and
how to run the country, especially when such pressure all too often arises
from the narrowest sectarian interests in complete disregard of the greater
good of the nation as a whole. He continued, 'The individual hasn't the
right to do what he likes if it hurts the majority.
T h i s concept of the 'blank cheque' mandate for executive prerogative
presumably deriving from popular elections and residing exclusively with
the Office of the Prime Minister was one of the issues discussed and
vigorously opposed by most interest groups and participants at the
various conferences on human rights and constitutional reform. In re-
acdon to the confcrcnces, the government seemed most disturbed by the
acuve participation of T u n k u Abdul Rahman in both the conference on
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 199

human rights in 1985 and again in the conference on the Constitution in

1987. T h e substantive criticisms of the papers presented could be ignored,
but the criticisms of Malaysia's founder were more difficult to dismiss.
By 1987, the political situation had changed such that Dr Mahathir was
much more uncertain of the s u p p o n base for his g o v e m m e n i . Refiecung
his insecurity, he reacted even more testily than before to public criti-
cisms, especially those emanating from T u n k u Abdul Rahman, w h o
remained highly revered among large segments of the public.

T h e Battle for U M N O

Not all the critics of Dr Mahathir and his government were members of
public interest groups or members of opposition parties. T h e rules of
Malaysian politics prevented members of the BN from voicing criticisms
or making demands upon the government in any public forum. Yet, such
rules did not apply to the intemal politics of the panies that comprised
the B N . Over the years, all the major component parties within the BN
had experienced rather severe internal factional disputes, many of which
erupted into public view through the media. For the most part, U M N O
had remained free of extreme factionalism, partly because of the strong
leadership exercised by successive Prime Ministers and partly because of
the extensive patronage available to placate the recurring factionalism
which surfaced periodically. Because U M N O had become the centre of
substantive power supporting the government the factional divisions also
reflected imponant policy implications which required more than mere
distribution of patronage benefits to resolve. T h e open and fairly demo-
cratic procedures of U M N O had gradually transformed it into the
country's most powerful political forum, and also one that was m u c h
more difficult to manipulate and manage by its incumbent leaders.

With the accession lo power of Dr Mahathir, the role of U M N O had

been enhanced, panicularly by the free vote at the U M N O General
Assembly for the election of the D e p u t y President to serve with
Dr Mahathir in 1981. T h e spirited contesi between Musa Hitam and
T e n g k u Razaleigh Hamzah in that contest was repeated in 1984 with
Musa Hitam emerging the victor both times by a very small margin. T h e
political mobilization for those c o n t e s u had revealed some of the factional
alignments within U M N O — a l i g n m e n t s that were to become more
defined and better organized as the party struggled with more subsuntive
issues of policy, patronage, and the polidcal fortunes of those principal
leaders w h o commanded a substantial and stable coterie of party sup-
porters.

W h e n Musa H i u m was accused of disloyalty by Dr Mahathir, precip-

itating Musa's resignation as D e p u t y Prime Minister in February 1986, it
was clear that there would be some long-term repcrcussions within
U M N O . Musa enjoyed the support of a large segment of U M N O
delegates and he retained his post as D e p u t y President of U M N O . H i s
expulsion from the Cabinet and the selection of Ghafar Baba as his
replacement as Deputy Prime Minister had been the product of
200 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Dr Mahathir's autonomous decision, not that of the U M N O Supreme

Council or of the party General Assembly. Wiih a party that was
becoming more assertive in matters of policy and the s e l e a i o n of key
government leaders, the relative role of the Prime Minister and the party
was somewhat ambiguous and required ihe skill and tact of a Malay-style
negotiated agreement. Instead, Dr Mahathir was seen as acting bluntly
and somewhat arbitrarily, in violation of Malay political norms, with his
open and semi-public confrontation againsi a dynamic and popular
leader. Over time, perceived personal shghts and resentments only
served to harden factional ahgnments and encourage crides within the
party to mount an open contest against incumbent leaders of the
government.
A similar pattern had contributed to the formation of a facdon of
discontent around the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh, In 1981, Tengku
Razaleigh had been the most senior U M N O Vice-President, but his
seniority had not been sufficient to secure his elevation to the position of
Deputy President of U M N O becausc Hussein O n n had instead indicated
his support for Musa Hitam. Although Tengku Razaleigh was brought
into the Cabinet as Finance Minister in the early years of the Mahaihir
Administration, he was replaced by Daim Zainuddin in 1984 and moved
to the less imponant Ministry of Trade and Industry. Tcngku Razaleigh's
autonomy and willingness to contest against those U M N O leaders,
'selected' by co-optation from above, meant that Dr Mahathir treated him
with a mixture of suspicion and as the object of not-ioo-subtle strategies
of confinement. Party rules had been changed to prohibit nadonal leaders
from retaining leadership of iheir state U M N O organization. As a result,
T e n g k u Razaleigh had been forced to abandon his post as leader of
Kelantan U M N O , although he retained his position as chairman of his
home division in Gua Musang. After failing in his earher effort to become
D e p u t y President of U M N O , he held no high party office to use as a base
for his appeal for party support. Even so, Tengku Razaleigh commanded
widespread popular support within U M N O , not only in his home state of
Kelantan but also in Trengganu, Perak, Penang, and even Johore. 21

T h e U M N O General Assembly of April 1987 was acknowledged to be

the crucial lesung ground for both incumbents and challengers for the
leadership of the Malay community. At stake were all the top offices of
U M N O , including the 25 seats on the Supreme Council. Well before the
annual meeting, there was much speculation concerning w h o would
contest for which positions and whether there would be some factional
coalitions to enhance chances of victory. Most of the speculadon focused
on the activities of Musa Hitam and Tengku Razaleigh, but the actions
and statements of Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba were also carefully
scrutinized to discover clues as to their poliucal intentions and strategies.
T h e firsi o v e n moves came in early December 1986, when aides to Musa
Hitam met representadves of Tengku Razaleigh in order to reach an
unwritten understanding for an alliancc or coalition. It was agreed that
Tengku Razaleigh would contest for the U M N O Presidency against
Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam would contest for the Deputy Presidency
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 201

against the presumed candidacy of Ghafar Baba. T h e tacit agreement was

publicly symbolized by reciprocal invitations to each other's home con-
stituency—first Musa visited Gua Musang in Kelantan to receive a
'hero's welcome' as Tengku Razaleigh's guest, and then T e n g k u Razaleigh
appeared as the humble but honoured hero-guest at Segamat in Johore.
No formal pact was signed, partly because it violated U M N O rules
against election agreements, but also because such a formality was viewed
as counter to the Malay political culture of honouring verbal under-
standings between men of power and prestige. Besides, without a formal
agreement, co-operation could be cloaked in the Malay norms of recipro-
city and freely offered mutual assisunce.
Well before candidates declared their intention to contest specific
party positions, both the challengers and the incumbents had begun well-
coordinated and costly campaigns to align s u p p o n from among the
approximately 1,500 delegates to be selected for the U M N O General
Assembly. Because the delegates were also to be chosen, the campaign
concentrated on the support of ordinary U M N O members w h o were to
choose the delegates and w h o could instruct them prior to their parti-
cipation in the crucial elections scheduled for 24 April at the U M N O
General Assembly. Although iniually avoiding an appearance of concern
or active participation in the fray, Dr Mahathir revealed his mounting
anxiety by the extraordinary efforts made to induce his supporters from
among holders of high government officc to publicly declare their support
for him. In an unprecedented move, he was able to secure the public
pledge of support from all Malay state Chief Ministers w h o were especially
dependent on him for federal patronage, for favourable state budget
allocations, and for tacit federal confirmation of their positions as Chief
Ministers. Clearly, battle preparations had begun for both factions, even
though the U M N O General Assembly was not due to be convened for
more than a month.

At the start of the formal campaign, Tengku Razaleigh and Musa

Hitam jointly announced their candidacy: Tengku Razaleigh contesting
for U M N O President; and Musa Hitam seeking re-election as D e p u t y
President. Some speculated that Musa might have a better chance of
defeating Ghafar Baba than Tengku Razaleigh would have of defeating
Dr .Mahathir for the top leadership of U M N O — a n d , by implication, also
for the office of Prime Minister. Interpolating from past contests, Musa
was assumed to have slightly more grass-roots s u p p o n within U M N O
than T e n g k u Razaleigh, and Ghafar Baba, while popular, was seen as a
rather 'old-style' Malay leader w h o was also vulnerable because of large
personal debts arising from his involvement in a number of bad business
ventures. It remained unclear what the coaliuon might do to their
individual support and what resources and t a a i c s Dr Mahathir and
Ghafar Baba might be able to mobilize to ward off the challenge being
mounted by the Razaleigh-Musa team.

As the contest intensified within the Malay community, the press

dubbed the two factions 'Team A' and 'Team B', suggesting that there
was not much difference between the factions concerning ideology or
202 MALAYSIAN POLITICS:. THE SECOND GENERATION

public policy issues. Bven so, the two factions did stress different issues
and made rather personal charges and countercharges. Team B was on
the attack, while Team defended its achievements and promised more
benefits to the Malay community. Team B charged that only some
.Malays benefited from the N E P , claiming that the most favoured were
those who were close to the Prime Mimster. Team B stressed the growth
of corruption ai high levels, concentrating much attention on the activities
of Finance Minisier Daim Zainuddin, who vras alleged to have benefited
from g o v e m m e n i decisions favouring corporations in which he held large
blocks of shares. For a while, the revelations about Daim Zainuddin were
so intense and persistent that the press speculated he might be sacrificed
to Dr Mahaihir's critics. Yet Dr Mahathir remamed a staunch supporter
of his long-dme friend and confidant and made no concessions to his
cridcs in this regard. A m o n g the most often repeated themes of Team B
was its criticism of Dr Mahathir's 'personal style of leadership'. This
rather ambiguous charge referred to his failure to consult widely enough
among U M N O and BN leaders and his reliance on a small coterie of
confidants w h o were increasingly influential. Dr Mahathir was also
accused of dictatorial and unilateral actions and of failure to lake action
against corruption and fraud within his government. In addition, his
critics alleged that Dr Mahathir often acted without proper expert advice,
especially in formulating complex economic plans, and in promoting
plans for costly prestige projects. In defence of Dr Mahathir, his sup-
porters argued that great economic progress had been made under
Dr Mahathir's leadership and that the N E P had been mostly successful in
achieving its target objectives. He had, it was argued, been forced to take
some difficull decisions that were not popular among the non-Malays,
and that he suffered loss of popularity as a result. Furthermore, the
economic problems of ihc country were largely due to the world economic
recession beyond his control.

In effect, both Team A and Team B were promising the Malay

community that they would receive more benefits by giving support to
one faction or the other. T h e non-Malay conununitics viewed the spectacle
of factional conflict within die Malay community widi a mixture of
trepidation and hope. On the one hand, the factional split within U M N O
opened new opportunities for new forms of cross-ethnic political alliances.
On the other hand, the competition between the two U M N O factions had
stimulated a campaign of Malay ethnic outbidding that many non-Malays
feared could only result in more repressive or discriminatory policies
directed against non-Malays. The political norms of detachment and non-
interference in die poliucal affairs of other communities meant that the
non-Malay public watchcd the unfolding campaign beiween Team A and
T e a m B with a mixture of avid fascination and mute anxieiy. 23

As die campaign intensified, Dr Mahathir abandoned his aloof strategy

and entered the political fray with a vigorous personal campaign, con-
tacimg delegates and presenung himself directly to the Malay constitu-
ency through mass rallies. At the forefront of ihe campaign was Anwar
Ibrahim, who decided to abandon his party post as U M N O Youth
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 203

President to contest for one of the U M N O Vice-President positions.

Against his accusers, Dr Mahathir denied any wrongdoing or impro-
priety. He suggested that those w h o were challenging his leadership w e r e
breaking party tradition, fracturing Malay unity, and being mouvated by
personal power and greed that was detrimental to the interests of the
Malay community. Anwar Ibrahim assumed a somewhat more aggressive
role in the campaign, first attempting to arrange s o m e rapprocement
between U M N O and PAS leaders, to smother the challenge within
U M N O . W h e n political coalition talks promoted by Anwar failed to
produce a new alignment, Anwar, in his campaign, stressed his Islamic
credentials and promised 'to support Islamic resurgence and to oppose
those w h o oppose it'.24 Dr Mahathir also stressed the promotion of
i s l a m i c values' and the intensification of the government's efforts to
approximate the Islamic model of g o v e m m e n t , presumably within the
constraints imposed by Malaysia's multi-ethnic society. Because T e n g k u
Razaleigh and Musa Hitam did not n u t c h this stress on Islamic symbolic
issues, many observers concluded that Team B would move more
cautiously in responding to Islamic fundamentalist demands, especially
w h e n demands cloaked in an Islamic idiom were viewed by non-Malays
as threatening those basic rights guaranteed in the Constitution or else
were policy proposals violating intenuttionally accepted norms of demo-
cratic and human rights. For this reason, both Malays and non-Malays
viewed Team B as being somewhat more amenable to intercommunal co-
operation and accommodation. In contrast, the T e a m A strategy appeared
to be exploiting Malay religious and communal exclusivity to create an
upsurge of Malay support for the incumbent leaders of U M N O .

In addition to the mass rallies and eloquent speeches of the candidates,

a subterranean campaign was waged based on surat layang (flying letters)
passed from hand to hand, which included leaked government docu-
m e n t , allegations of corruption, favouritism and impropriety. Many
irregular publications, books, and u p e recordings were sponsored by
both f a n i o n s in an e f f o n to sway Malay voters and uncommitted U M N O
members. T h e underground campaign was often intensely partisan,
vitriolic, and personal, creating bittemess among candidates, thus intens-
ifying the factional divisions within U M N O . As part of this under-
ground campaign, some of the 'dirty linen' of earlier behind-the-scenes
politics was unofficially but effectively distributed and displayed for
public scrutiny and evaluation.
As the campaign reached its final stages, the m o m e n t u m appeared to
be with the T e a m B faction. A number of i m p o n a n t g o v e m m e n t ministers
had become tacitly affiliated with T e a m B, including Foreign Minister
Rais Yatim, Welfare Services Minister Shahrir Abdul Samad, Deputy
Primary Industries Minister Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, D e p u t y Energy,
Telecommunication and Posts Minisier Zainal Abidin Zin, and a number
of former ministers and chief ministers w h o had h d d office in previous
administrations. 2 5 Al all levels of the p a n y , the factional split was evident
and the turnout at rallies suggested that the contest would be close, but
that a victory for the challengers seemed imminent. It was apparent that
204 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

the support for a change of leadership was extremely strong, yet the
incumbents were also well entrenched and extremely bitter over the
challenge to the established power structure of U M N O . T h e intensity of
feelings meant that very few Malay politicians could remain neutral in
their alignment with either Team A or Team B.
When the delegates assembled in Kuala Lumpur for the U M N O General
Assembly, there was much excitement in anticipation of momenious
events climaxed by the vote scheduled for 24 April. A rally the previous
night by Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam at the Regent Hotel had
attracted a crowd of 10,000 obviously enihusiastic supporters. When the
U M N O Assembly began, after initial formalities Dr Mahathir gave his
presidential address with the delegates expected to vote shortly after in
the period before lunch. Dr Mahathir's speech received enthusiastic
response from his supporters, but the momentum still appeared to be
with Team B. Because the keys to the ballot boxes had been jumbled, the
voting was delayed and could not be completed before lunch. Only about
60 per cent of the delegates had voted before the lunch break, but straw
exit polls had placed Tengku Razaleigh slightly ahead. Those w h o had
not voted were transported by bus to the Putra World Trade Centre
where they were actively lobbied by Team A campaign managers.
Subsequently, those committed to Team B alleged that enormous sums of
m o n e y were promised to delegates at lunch for their votes in support of
T e a m A. These allegadons were never substantiated with firm evidence
or presented in court, but they remain part of frequently repeated oral
accounts by some w h o were acuve participants in the drama. After the
delegates returned to the Assembly, voting was resumed and was com-
pleted by 4.30 p.m. T h e first counting of the ballots was completed at
about 10.00 p . m . , but a recount was ordered. Word spread that the
unofficial witmer was Tengku Razaleigh. Less than an hour later, the
official result was armounced: Dr Mahathir had won 761 to 718 over
T e n g k u Razaleigh, with a 43-vote margin, and Ghafar Baba had defeated
Musa Hitam with a vote of 739 to 699 and a 40-vote margin. T w o of the
three elected vice-presidents were members of Team A: Wan Mokhtar
Ahmad and Anwar Ibrahim. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, identified with
T e a m B, collected the second largest number of votes cast for vice-
president. Sixteen of the 25 Supreme Council seats went to T e a m A,
while Team B secured 9 seats. 26

T h e announcement of the official results came as a shock to those

associated with Team B, some of w h o m after the last Tengku Razaleigh
rally had p r e d i a e d a victory margin of 6 5 - 3 5 for their faction. In their
disappointment, many of the avid T e a m B supporters suspected some
form of skulduggery had robbed them of their victory.
Although many of the U M N O delegates urged some form of recon-
ciliation between the two factions after the vote, Dr Mahathir in closing
the Assembly two days later rejected such advice, slating in his speech,
'We must be aware that if we win, we get something and that if we lose,
we will not get it.' 27 In his speech, Dr Mahathir implied that those
associated with Team B had violated their oaths of cabinet secrecy and
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 222

support to the govemment and the Constitution; he further hinted that

there would be repercussions. Tengku Razaleigh and Foreign Minister
Rais Yatim submitted their resignations from the government, but many
other Team B supporters in the govemment waited to sec whether they
would get a letter from Dr Mahathir asking for their resignation. In 1985
Dr Mahathir had w a m e d the M C A in their factional dispute that 'winners
should not take all, while those defeated should not lose all. After all,
even losers have their supporters and they have the right to their views.'
T e n g k u Razaleigh pledged his s u p p o n to the elected leadership of
Dr Mahathir provided that there was no 'witch hunt'. Before submitting
his o w n resignation, Tengku Razaleigh had w a m e d , 'if there is a witch
hunt, members will not forget and forgive. T h i s will destroy the party. 2 8
Despite his o w n previous advice to others and the cautions given by
many p a n y leaders, Dr Mahathir was in no mood for reconciliation or
compromise. Very promptly the Cabinet was purged of all Team B
supporters, and shonly afterwards, the purges continued within the party
and at the lower levels of both state and federal govemments. T h e purges
from the Cabinet were announced hours before Dr Mahathir left for an
extended personal visit to the United States, where he attended his son's
graduation from the University of Tulsa, and later continued on to Japan
to visit his daughter and grandchild. Most of the purged positions were
not filled for some time, giving the impression that the purges were made
with undue haste and with considerable malice. Welfare Minister Shahrir
Abdul Samad, w h o was one of the expelled ministers, explained
Dr Mahathir's behaviour as a question of e g o and professional training.
'He will not think of negotiating his way out of a problem the way his
predecessors, with their legal backgrounds, would have done. T h e
medical solution is to cut out the cancer.' 2 9

In the cabinet reshuffle following the U M N O General Assembly,

Dr Mahathir's most loyal and uncritical supporters were rewarded. His
o w n powers were also increased, since he appointed as Foreign Minister,
A b u Hassan Omar, w h o was relatively unknown, and abolished the
Federal Territory Ministry. T h i s was interpreted as evidence of his
determination to exercise more control over foreign affairs and to assume
direct responsibility for the increasingly controversial demand for the
return of Labuan to the state of Sabah. In addition to the H o m e Affairs
Ministry, which he headed, he also assumed the portfolio of the Justice
Ministry, just at a time when legal issues were assuming more poliucal
importance for the fumre of his government. 3 0 T h e cumulative effect of
Dr Mahathir's actions immediately after his narrow victory only added
fuel to the charges made by his critics that his leadership style centralized
power, avoided consultation and consent, and did not promote public
confidence in the g o v e m m e n t .

T h e ill will created by the U M N O e l e a i o n campaign, the closeness of

the contest, the questionable validity of the election results, and the sub-
sequent purges from g o v e m m e n t and higher party positions of T e a m B
supporters, all contributed to a determination of some in the defeated
faction to challenge the outcome of the election. Collecting evidence of
206 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

fraud and the participation of delegates from unregistered branches,

12 U M N O members filed suit in the High Court on 25 June 1987 seeking to
obtain a court order voiding the results of the U M N O election. In the
suit, the plaintiffs alleged that 78 of the 1,479 U M N O delegates were
illegal and that other illegalities were committed in the conduct of the
vodng, following which the documents were ' u m p e r e d with'. Since a
change of only 22 votes would have produced a different result, they
sought an order calling for a new election. 31 Although Tengku Razaleigh
was not one of the plaintiffs, it was widely beheved that the suit was
brought on behalf of Team B. It was supposed that Tengku Razaleigh
was funding the costs of the suit and that the legal manoeuvres of the
plaintiffs were co-ordinated and directed by him and his close political
associates. Whether Musa Hitam was also u d t l y associated with the suit
was a matier of much speculation, but there was also considerable
uncertainty in the daily rumours that circulated among elite circles
during the course of the extended c o u n deliberations and legal
manoeuvres.

Because the stakes were so high, the court case by these U M N O

members against the incumbent officers of U M N O created a mood of
intensified anxiety and uncertainty, even though on the surface there was
litde public reference to the possible consequences of any likely c o u n
decision on the case. In the early stages of the case, the c o u n attempted
to secure some negotiated setdement of tbe dispute. All e f f o n s by the
judge to promote an out-of-coun settlement failed, because the incumbent
U M N O leaders (as the defendants) were unwilling to make any con-
cessions regarding the validity of the e l e a i o n , and the plaintiffs were
unwilling to abandon their suit without some guarantee that supporters
of Team B would not be purged from the party and from lesser
government posiuons by the incumbents. As the months rolled by in the
presentation of evidence to ihe c o u n and the elaborate legal moves made
by both sides, it became apparent that the c o u n would ultimately be
faced with no opdon but to make an authoriiauve legal pronouncement
on all the issues raised by the suit. When that final judgment would come
was recognized by both sides as a time of potential political crisis.

T b e Rising T e n s i o n s of Politics
While the T e a m B court case slowly made its way through the legal
maze, political and ethnic tensions gradually increased. Some important
issues had not been resolved prior to the general election, and the
divisions within U M N O heightened competition among both U M N O
factions, promoting more belligerent expressions of Malay exclusivity in
matters of public policy. Furthermore, promises and hints of concessions
to non-Malays made prior to the general election had apparently been
forgonen or revoked, thus generating substantial political mobilization
among s o m e non-Malays to secure what they viewed as either being
promised or what was i m p l i d d y rightfully theirs by virtue of earlier
commitments or from basic principles of equity and fair play.
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 207

Early in 1987, a complicated issue arose which had the effect of pitting
the M C A against U M N O in Cabinet deliberations. As part of the M C A
strategy to increase Chinese investment in the economy, the party had
promoted the formation of Deposit Taking Co-operatives ( D T C s ) where
Chinese could place their savings. T h e money so c o l l e a e d could then be
invested in the many business ventures and money-making schemes that
were being promoted through the party's corporate empire being managed
by Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd. Unfortunately, in 1986, with the down-
t u m in the e c o n o m y , many banks suffered losses, and two major banks.
United Asian Bank and Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia, were forced into
insolvency and were rescued by the central bank, Bank Negara. 32 With
the massive financial losses and fraud associated with Tan Koon Swan's
buccaneering style of business and financial management, M P H B had lo
be reorganized, with depositors receiving only about M $ 0 . 4 l for every
ringgit invested. 3 3 To make matters worse, the Deposit Taking Co-
operatives sponsored by the M C A had also lost massive s u m s of money.
One week after the 1986 election, 23 D T C s were suspended for insolv-
e n c y , and bv early 1987, 35 D T C s had their deposits frozen. Altogether
about M $ 3 . 6 billion had been lost by D T C s by April 1987 through a
combinauon of bad investment decisions, the unanticipated downturn in
the world economy, criminal fraud, and outright theft by some D T C
officials. 34

Bccause of the involvement of the M C A with the D T C s and the f a a

that the depositore were rank-and-file Malaysian Chinese, most of them of
meagre means, the party was insistent that the g o v e m m e n t provide some
bail-out to save the petty investments made by many thousands of its
supporters. T h e M C A leaders argued that the government had rescued
Bank Bumiputra and Bumiputra Malaysia Finance when they lost over
M $ 2 . 5 billion in the Hong Kong property market. Similarly, in 1987,
Perwira Habib Bank, a Bumiputra firm, had also been rescued by
g o v e m m e n t intervention and some ten years earlier, Bank Rakyat had
been saved when M $ 1 5 0 million was lost in fraud and scandal. T h e same
provisions of government guarantee to depositors, they argued, should
apply 10 the Chinese financial institutions as had been provided for the
Bumiputra institutions which had suffered financial difficulties.

In M a y , the M C A proposed to the Cabinet a ringgil-for-ringgit rescue

scheme which would involve M $ 1 . 4 billion in govenunent loans to the
co-operatives to secure the funds of the 588,000 depositors, almost all of
w h o m were M C A members. Implied in the proposal was the under-
standing that the M C A would then be in a position lo deliver Chinese
votes 10 the B N . T h e M C A proposal generated opposition, especially
from U M N O Youth, some of w h o m openly invited the M C A to leave the
B N . 3 5 Within the C a b i n a , Anwar Ibrahim took a hard line against the
M C A plan, while M C A President Ling Liong Sik remained adamant that
something had to be done to rescue the D T C s or the M C A would be
forced to reassess its role in the B N . Agreement was first reached on the
broad outlines of a rescue package which provided for depositors to be
guaranteed some refunds by 1990 but without a massive injection of
208 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

government funds. T h e existing assets were to be refinanced in such a

way that ftmds would be recovered gradually as the stock assets being
held by the D T C s also recovered their value. At the heart of the
refinancing scheme was the recendy reorganized M P H B , which remained
the mainstay in the M C A corporate structure. T h e government calculated
that depositors would eventually receive a return of M $ 0 . 6 2 on the
ringgit, with the possibility that recovering assets would permit an
eventual return of M $ 0 . 9 2 . The government extended concessionary soft
loans and tax credits and arranged reorganizadon of the 13 D T C s with
the biggest deficits so as to permit a payout of 50 per cent of deposits but
with incentives offered to d e p o s i t o n to keep their investments with the
D T C s in expectadon of greater returns later.36 Although the D T C rescue
package was finally approved by the Cabinet only in February 1988, in
u m e for the first payments before the Chinese N e w Year, the abrasive
rhetoric and the militant stand taken by the principals on each side had
greatly intensified political tensions both within the ruling coalition and
among the general public.
During July and August of 1987 another contenuous issue was added
to the agenda of the government. This involved the implementation of
the pre-election promise made by the BN to the MCA concerning the
status of Chinese-medium primary schools. During the 1986 election, the
government had promised to repeal Section 21(2) of the Education Act
of 1961 which gave the Minister of Education the power to c o n v e n
vernacular Chinese and Tamil schools inio the Malay medium of in-
struction by prerogative decree. Not only was this promise not imple-
mented, but from the public pronouncements of Education Minister
Anwar Ibrahim, it was apparent that he firmly opposed any repeal of his
prerogative powers over the perpetuadon of Chinese and Tamil verna-
cular schools. This issue remained unresolved, when another related
dispute arose.

Allegedly bccause of a shoruge of Mandarin-trained teachers, the

Department of Education promoted more than 100 Chinese teachers w h o
had no Mandarin training to be headmasters and administrators in
Chinese schools. Many (Chinese viewed this move as a violation of the
1986 election manifesto pledge and as die first move in a ploy to
undermine or possibly eliminate Chinese-medium primary schools. At
die M C A Annual Assembly in July 1987, party president Ling Liong Sik
had promised that the M C A would lake a strong stand 'to ensure the
proiection of minority rights'. He indicated that there would be a more
vigorous defence of Chinese right by the M C A and went on to criticize
the actions of some leaders of the B N . With Dr Mahathir present on the
platform at his side, he stated:

In a multi-racial country, all must always remember that democracy is not just
majority rule. Democracy also ensures protection of minority rights and tn-
terests...... The creeping arrogance of power and the never-ending quest for
power has made some of our political leaders and civil servanu strive to be racial
heroes in their own communities....... It is to easy to play to the gallery.37
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 209

At the conference, Deputy President Lee K i m S i i announced that the

M C A would not support government policies any longer if it had not
been consulted during their formulation. He also suggested that policy
decisions were made by a small group in the government and that the
number involved was getting smaller. T h i s stance by the M C A provoked
an angry reaction from the leader of U M N O Youth, Najib Razak, w h o
declared that U M N O would not compromise its principles on issues
affecting the dominance of Malays in poliucs and economics, bccause
otherwise 'the survival of the Malays will be at stake'. 38 Despite the
intensity of such reactions, the M C A leaders proclaimed their determina-
tion to pursue a more assertive role within the B N . When the issue of the
future of Chinese education appeared to be on the line, they could not
easily alter their public stance and attempt a low-key strategy to resolve
the issues. Earlier experience had shown that such a strategy rarely
produced accepuble results which could be defended to their consutuents.
As the dispute over the promotion of Chinese teachers intensified,
M C A President Ling Liong Sik announced that the conuoversial promo-
tions were counter to the 'solemn promise' made in the 1986 election
manifesio of the B N . An M C A delegation asked to discuss the issues with
Education Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Before the meeting took place,
Anwar Ibrahim added insult to injury by announcing to the Malacca
U M N O convention that he would not alter his decision. W h e n the
discussions with the M C A did occur, the M C A submitted a m e m o
protesting his earlier pre-emptive announcement, while at the same time
U M N O Youth issued a warning to the M C A not to pursue the issue of
Chinese education any funher. 3 9 Rather than dialogue and negotiation,
there was instead an exchange of warnings and ominous threats.
After failing to secure any redress on the issue, the M C A , Gerakan,
and D A P , as well as some other organizatons, formed the National joint
Action C o m m i t e e on Chinese Schools and issued a statement of objectives
regarding the issue of non-Chinese-educated school administrators, and
calling for a public rally to highlight the demands. 4 0 Representing the
M C A , Labour Minister Lee K i m Sai joined in the public rally along with
representatives from Gerakan, S D P , P S R M , D A P , and some IS Chinese
education and teachers' associations. T h e rally attracted about 2,000 parti-
cipants, w h o heard speeches demanding the withdrawal of the pro-
motions of non-Mandarin trained teachers. Other education p o l i d e s
were also criticized, including g o v e m m e n t restrictions on non-Muslim
students at universities, and proposals made by some Malay politicians to
terminate government support for the predominantly Chinese T u n k u
Abdul Rahman College. At the rally, Lee promised that the M C A 'would
not sell off Chinese rights'. Because of Lee K i m Sai's public association
with the opposition and his vigorous defence of Chinese demands,
U M N O militants, for the third time in a year, demanded his resignation
from the government. T h e M C A viewed such demands as abrasively
inappropriate interference in their internal affairs. 41 T h e rally had inten-
sified political rhetoric and h i g h t e n e d the sense of impending crisis.
210 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

T h e court case between Team A and Team B was not the only case
pending which had political significance. After a period of extensive
negotiations, the government awarded a contract with construction costs
of M $ 3 . 4 billion and overall costs estimated at M$4.7 billion for building
and operating a north-south toll highway to run from Johore Bahru to
the Kedah-Thai border. The contract was awarded to United Engineers
(Malaysia) ( U E M ) as part of the government's privatization policy. T h e
government was to provide M $ I 5 0 million per year as a support loan,
while the remainder of the construction costs were to be acquired from
borrowings on the open market. U E M was to operate the highway and
collect the tolls for a concession period of 25 y e a n . As a consequence,
recovery of the investment and profits depended on future traffic volume
and the rate of the tolls to be charged. Alternative projections of traffic
volume combined with government guarantees of minimum financial
retums made the project an easy target of criticism for being too
generous to U E M , both because projected profits appeared to be
enormous, and because the government was underwriting too much of
the costs and the risks. 42

Political controversy over this project greatly escalated when critics of

the government charged that the contract was awarded in an improper
maimer, involving conflict of mterest and outright corruption. T h e
controlling stockholder of U E M was a Malaysian company called
Hatibudi, which was owned by U M N O and considered to be the primary
investment arm of U M N O Youth, and was alleged to be under the
control of Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin. During the contest for the
leadership of U M N O , Musa Hitam had accused Dr Mahathir and Daim
of corruption in the award of the contract. Critics alleged that those w h o
awarded the North-South Highway contract were also shareholders and
officers in the company which vras awarded the government's largest-ever
contract. Opposition M P s questioned the government about the terms of
the contract, raising issues of impropriety and questioning the long-term
costs and benefits to the public. Because many people would be affected
by the proposed road tolls, there was a mounting chorus of protests over
the plans for the North-South Highway. In response to criticism, the
first sigiung of the contract was postponed in April, just prior to the
U M N O Assembly. Yel, after Dr Mahathir's narrow victory over his
T e a m B challengers, a revised contraa was finallv signed with U E M in
May 1987. 43

T h e controversy became more complicated in July 1987 when Lim Kit

Siang, leader of the D A P , filed suit in court seeking to block the
implementation of the contract on the grounds of conflict of interest in
the award of the contract and corruption on the part of those associated
with the project. T h e government was furious with this legal move. T h e
p r o j e a had been given high priority, but it could not proceed so long as
the case was pending before the courts. 44 T h e critics of the project were
given added support when T u n k u Abdul Rahman opposed the way the
N o r t h - S o u t h Highway contract was awarded. In his weekly column in
The Star, he stated; 'As one of die f o u n d e n of U M N O , I consider it
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 228 211

improper and irregular for a leading political party to tnake usc of its
power to amass wealth at the expense of other business venttues.' 4 5
Although there was no public evidence of Dr Mahathir's anger with Lim
Kit Siang's legal moves against the g o v e m m e n i and T u n k u Abdul
Rahman's accusations of abuse of power and impropriety, it is not
difficult to imagine his probable reactions.

T h e Crisis and D e t e n t i o n s of 1987

Against the backdrop of these escalating political disputes, the next

sequence of dramatic events unfolded. In response to the public rally by
Chinese associations to protest the promotion of non-Mandarin trained
headmasters and administrators, U M N O Youth, very likely encouraged
by Anwar Ibrahim, determined to s u g e a massive rally in Kuala Lumpur.
T h e rally on Chinese education rights had a n r a a e d a crowd of 2,000 at
the Thean H o u Temple. T h e rally being organized by U M N O Youth was
scheduled for the Jalan Raja Muda Stadium in Kuala Ltunpur and was to
be a massive rally of many thousands of Malays to demand the expulsion
of Lee K i m Sai from the Cabinet and the M C A from the BN for
supporting the Chinese education lobby. T h e organizer of the rally' was
the acting leader of U M N O Youth, Najib Razak, w h o apparently was
seeking to demonstrate mibtancy in his newly acquired office. T h e
organizers had sought police permission to have a long-bladed sword
handed to Najib Razak at the rally and for effigies of Lee K i m Sai and the
M C A to be burned. 4 6 T h e U M N O Youth rally was designed to forcefully
assert Malay political supremacy and intimidate those w h o had joined in
the recent protests over Chinese education, the deposit-taking co-
operatives, the N o r t h - S o u t h Highway, and allegations of corruption and
lack of c o n c e m for minority and democratic rights. T h e U M N O Youth
rally took place at the Jalan Raja Muda Stadium on 17 October, with
15,000 Malays packing the stadium, voicing threats and militant action
against the political demands of non-Malays. Although Anwar Ibrahim
did not play a visible role in the U M N O Youth rally, the day before he
had made the ominous statement: 'People want to test us and see if
U M N O is still strong. Make no mistake about it—we are strong. And do
not demonstrate because others can demonstrate as well.' 4 7

The boisterous enthusiasm of the U M N O Youth rally generated plans

for an even bigger rally to follow on 1 N o v e m b e r , this time to be
sponsored by U M N O as a 'unity' rally to mark the fortieth anniversary of
the party and to make an even stronger assertion of Malay political
dominance. T h e anticipated numbers for the latter rally were expected to
approach 500,000. T h e organizers apparently expected that a massive
physical display of Malay political power would put pressure on
Dr Mahathir not to make any concessions to those mobilizing to defend
non-Malay interests. At the same time, some U M N O members were
planning to make it into an anti-Mahathir rally. Banners critical of
Dr Mahathir were being prepared and reports circulated that some Malays
were resoning to silat magic to make themselves invincible in combat. 4 8
212 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Rather than act decisively to check the excesses of his rambunctious

supporters and some of the more rabble-rousing aspiring politicians in
his party, Dr Mahathir decided, instead, to invoke his emergency powers
so as to penalize and check the political activity of many of the more
activc critics of his government. Because of the serious conflict widun
U M N O over his leadership, Dr Mahathir's hold on office had become
somcwhat precarious. Perhaps that is why he was unwilling lo aa against
the militant mobilizauon of those in his own party, without, at the same
time, imposing far greater penalties on the opposition and critics of his
government. 4 9
On 27 October 1987, Malaysian police arrested 63 people under the
ISA. Dr Mahathir appeared on television to explain that T h e govern-
ment cannot wait until riot flares up before taking action. 50 T h e mass
U M N O rally scheduled for 1 November was banned, as were all other
raUies and meetings of a pohdcal nature. Within a week, the number
detained under the ISA had risen to 93, and after two weeks, the number
had increased to 106. At first, no names of the detainees were released,
but the press and Amnesty Iniemational assembled a list of those known
to have been arrested under the ISA. A m o n g the detained were 16 leaders
from the D A P , 9 from P A S , 8 from the M C A . 5 from Gerakan, 3 from
U M N O , and 1 from PSRM. Topping the list of political leaders
were Lim Kit Siang, leader of the D A P , and his son, also an M P , L i m
Guan Eng. T h e three U M N O members dewined were on the Executive
Council of U M N O Youth and were also associated with the 'Team B'
faction of U M N O : Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, Fahmi Ibrahim, and Ibrahim
All. T h e controversial .MCA leader. Lee K i m Sai, was not among
the arrested, but he left for Australia on 'indefinite leave' the night of the
arrests, while .MCA President Ling Liong Sik also left for a trip abroad a
few days later.51 Altogether, 18 Members of Parliament, Senators, or
s u i e assemblymen were arrested, including 10 D A P M P s and 4 D A P
s u i c assembly members. 5 2

In addition to the arrest of active politicians, a number of prominent

leaders or activists from interest groups were also detained, including at
least 12 from public interest groups. 5 from Christian organizations, 3
from Chinese education societies, and 2 representing Muslim teachers.
Among the most promineni in this category was Chandra Muzaffar,
President of the public interest group Aliran; Teresa Lim, Co-ordinator
of the Research Unit of the Malaysian Council of Churches, Brother
Anthony R o g e n of thee Catholic Church, and Cecilia N g , a proponent of
feminist rights with die Institute of Social Analysis ( I N S A N ) , were ortiy
three from a long list of academics and activists in public interest groups,
trade unions, religious bodies, and professional associations. 53
T h e initial ISA detention orders were for 60 days, during which time
police investigation and inteirogation determined whether the detained
were to be served widi new orders or released with or without conditions.
T h o s e detained under new orders were subject to sentences, which in
s o m e cases extended for two more years, without benefit of trial in open
court nor subject to judicial review. By 26 December, of the original 106
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 213

ISA detainees, 68 had been released, while ihose deemed to be 'hardcore'

offenders were given extended detention sentences. Dr Mahathir accused
the latter of being people w h o had incited racial and religious tmrest.
Idendfied by the authorities as 'hardcore' were eight D A P Members of
Parliament, including Lim Kit Siang, leader of the D A P and the plaintiff
in the pending suit against Dr Mahathir over the M $ 3 . 4 b i l l o n N o r t h -
South Highway p r o j e a . T e n people representing Christian organizations,
public interest groups, and t r a d e unions were also deemed to be
'hardcore'. Altogether 38 detainees were given extended sentences under
orders signed by Dr Mahathir in his capacity as Minister of H o m e
Affairs. Some three months later, on 23 March 1988, a White Paper
explaining the arrests but giving very little additional information was
finally presented to Parliament. 54
T h e day after the firsi ISA arrests, the government also banned three
newspapers—the popular English-language daily. The Star, the Chinese-
language daily. Sin Chew Jit Poh, and the Malay-language bi-weekly,
Watan. T h e reasons for the ban were not given, but each was noted for a
degree of independence in reporting. Furthermore, The Star had pro-
vided the venue for three columnists w h o were widely read and noted for
their fearless criticisms of the government—Tunku Abdul Rahman,
Malaysia's first prime minister; Dr T a n Chee Khoon, former leader of
the opposition in ParUament; and Mohamed Sopiee Sheikh Ibrahim, a
former U M N O Member of Parliament. Watan was a Malay tabloid paper
owned by former Education Minister Mohamed Khir Johari, whose
political views were similar to those of T u n k u Abdul Rahman, reflecting
a Team B perspective. That the paper also gave PAS some prominence in
its coverage may have contributed to its being included among the
p a p e n which received orders revoking their publication licences. After
28 October, the only newspapers continuing to publish in English and
Malay were those owned or controlled by U M N O . 5 5 T h e printing licence
for The Star was reissued only after its editorial management had been
resiruaured. T u n k u Abdul Rahman had to resign as Chairman of the
Board and the paper promised to stop printing his weekly column. T h e
new 'sanitized' version of The Star reappeared for the first time on
26 March 1 9 8 8 . "

O n e month after the ISA detentions and the banning of the three
papers, Dr Mahathir gave his interpretation of the reasons for the crisis.
In an interview with S. Jayasankaran, he explained:

Well, part of the reason was our—my liberal attitude over the past few years. One
of the results was people saying things that u-ere racialist in character. That is not
damaging so long as the audience is small. But—pardon my saying so—the
newspapers play up these things. Certain newspapers concentraie almost ex-
clusively on racial issues. When you write and publish such things you are bound
to cause tension. Action invites reaction and it goes all the way through. The
thing escalates. In the past, other papers had been careful to avoid such
journalism. But thinking they were missing out they joined in the fray and got
racialist as well. So it mounted. 57
214 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Although there had been the cycle of escalation described by Dr Mahathir,

it is not the case that the government could do nothing to defuse the
situadon. Emergency n d e and invoking the ISA was one way to do
so. But decisive acdon could have been taken much earlier to bring
the disputes into an 'ihte accommodauon mode'. Perhaps Dr Mahathir
felt vuhierable regarding support from the Malay constituency, and it was
difficult for him to exercise restraining acdon on his Malay constituency
when his critics and the non-Malay activists were 'going public'. Yet,
there were also other calculations. By his surprising and decisive use of
the ISA, Dr Mahathir had significantly shifted the balance of political
dispute and made himself the decisive arbiter of most of the major
pending issues of politics. Not only had he pre-empted those wiihin
U M N O w h o were attempting to mobilize Malay opinion against him, but
he also succeeded in emasculating both the major opposition parties—the
D A P by removing a large contingent of its Members of Parliament, and
P A S by banning at political meetings through which it made c o n u a
widi and cultivated its committed followers. Although widely criticized
for his use of draconian powers of arbitrary detention without trial, there
was also some sense of relief expressed by those citizens w h o feared that
the plaimed massive U M N O rally might lead to political violence in die
streets. T h e ingredients for such a scenario were present and depended,
as is usually the case, on what political leaders might do to trigger or to
mute the passions of their followers. The decisive action was taken by
Dr Mahathir, but in such a way as to enhance his political position and
powers, and at the expense of many w h o were only peripherally involved.
Many of the detainees had become unwitting targets of the ire and
epithets generated by others w h o constituted die primary 'clear and
present danger' to civil order.

When Indira Gandhi lost the court case which declared her election
void and thereby faced a challenge to the survival of her government, she
declared an emergency, suspending Parliament and putting many of her
critics in 'preventive' detention. At the time, journalists and political
analy-sts asked, 'Is it India's Emergency? Or is it Indira's Emergency?' in
Malaysia in 1987, a similar question was asked. 'Is it Malaysia's Emer-
gency? Or is it Mahathir's Emergency?' Perhaps it was a bit of both.
There was a climate of escalating political conflict that could have
reached violent levels. There was also the brewing contest over leadership
of U M N O that had not been finally resolved. T h e big difference in
Mahathir's actions, as compared to those of Indira Gandhi, was that he
acted decisively before the c o u n had passed judgment on the pending
case which had the potentialitiy of dislodging him from office. H i s anxiety
over die outcome of that decision must have been looming large when he
decided to invoke the ISA detention orders. It appears thai it also may
have coloured his vievre on the proper role of the Courts in matters that
have important political implications.
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 215

T h e J u d i c i a r y G r a s p s t h e Political N e t t l e

T h e case of the ' U M N O 12' representing the T e a m B faction w a s

followed avidly in political circles via the active r u m o u r circuit, supple-
m e n t e d on occasion by s n i p p e u of news that appeared in the local press.
In t h e early stages, there were a r g u m e n t s over the d o c u m e n t a r y evidence
deposited with the c o u r t . L a t e r , o n e of the 12 plaintiffs was p e n u a d e d to
w i t h d r a w , b u t the r e m a i n i n g 11 pressed on with t h e suit. A l t h o u g h
D r M a h a t h i r naade o m i n o u s w a r n i n g s a b o u t those trying t o ' w r e c k '
U M N O a n d the need t o b e careful i n admitting n e w m e m b e r s , b e also
suggested that T e n g k u Razaleigh could c o m e t o see h i m , b u t a d d e d , ' I will
w e l c o m e a n y o n e w h o does not s u p p o n the action of the 12 or those w h o
finance t h e m . ' 5 8 A l t h o u g h both sides in the court case welcomed talks
o v e r the issues, negouations stalled over formaliues, such as w h o c o u l d
s p e a k f o r U M N O a n d the allegations of illegalities a n d voce f r a u d
p r e s e n t e d i n the suit. O n 3 0 S e p t e m b e r , the H i g h C o u r t gave b o t h
parties t w o w e e k s to c o m e to some negotiated s e t t k m e m . 5 9 D u r i n g this
p e r i o d , D r M a h a t h i r m a d e a n official visit t o Kelantan. W h i l e h e w a s
t h e r e , D r M a h a t h i r a n d T e n g k u Razaleigh m e t , b u t n o substantive
discussions took place. Instead, the d e m e a n o u r of b o t h m e n retoibrced
t h e p u b l i c image of suspicion and thinly concealed hostility b e t w e e n t h e
two. 6 0 Finally, a n U M N O negotiating ' U n i t y P a n e l ' w a s f o r m e d t o
e x p l o r e s o m e a c c e p u b l e f o r m u l a for an o u t - o f - c o u n settlement of the
case. At t h e head of t h e panel was Abdullah A h m a d B a d a w i , t h e most
p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r o f the U M N O S u p r e m e Council w h o h a d previously
been identified with T e a m B . After the April U M N O election, b e b a d
played a ' g o - b e t w e e n ' role in attempting to bring t h e t w o factions
t o g e t h e r in a reunified p a r t y .

S o o n after the negotiations b e g a n , i t w a s a p p a r e n t that U M N O w a s

unwilling t o m a k e s u f f i c i e n t concessions t o placate the plaintiffs. T h e s u i t
c l a i m e d that 7 8 delegates t o the 2 4 April U M N O e l e c t i o n s h a d b e e p
involved with voting illegalities a n d that 5 3 U M N O b r a n c h e s w e r e
u n r e g i s t e r e d , therefore r e n d e r i n g illegal all the delegates f r o m those
b r a n c h e s . T h e plaintiffs sought t o h a v e the court nullify t h e l a s t U M N O
election and o r d e r a new election u n d e r t h e authority ot t h e officials who
w e r e in office p r i o r to that election. T h e plaintiffs w e r e challenging the
validity o f a l l U M N O officials w h o h a d a s s u m e d office b y v i r t u e o f t h e
2 4 April election. B y c o n t r a s t , the U M N O ' U n i t y P a n e l ' s o u g h t t o g e t
t h e plaintiffs t o w i t h d r a w their suit, a b a n d o n a n y c h a l l l e n g e f o p a r t y ( a n d
g o v e r n m e n t ) i n c u m b e n t s , a n d accept some face-saving formula for
' m o d e r a t e ' T e a m B m e m b e r s to be a s s u r e d continued membership in the
p a r t y . T h e r u l e c h a n g e s i n U M N O m a d e a f t e r t h e April e f l e c t i o n , w h i c h
increased t h e p o w e r s o f t h e U M N O President a n d m a d e i t m u c h m o r e
difficult 10 m o u n t a challenge to incumbent l e a d e r s , w a s an added
complication i n a t t e m p t i n g t o f o r m u l a t e s o m e o u t - o f - c o u r t s e t t l e m e n t .

A f t e r several negotiating sessionss, it became c l e a r that T e a m A was

unwilling to a d m i t a n y t h i n g that w o u l d q u e s t i o n t h e legitimacy its
election ' v i c t o r y ' , a n d T e a m B w a s c o n v i n c e d that the election b a d been
216 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

'stolen' and only a new election would provide an appropriate way to

resolve ihe issues in dispute. By 19 October, the T e a m B plainitiff's
announced that their suit would continue for a final court judgment. 6 1
Challenging die very legitimacy of U M N O and of the government, the
case headed for final court determination, while attention turned to the
role of the Courts and the possible or likely outcome of a court decision.
For over a year, the judiciary had been subject to sharp and p e r i s t e n t
criticism by Prime Minister Mahathir. His first o v e n public attack on the
role of the judiciary occurred shortly after the Supreme Court nullified,
on procedural grounds, the government's order revoking work permits of
John Berthelsen and Raphael Pura, resident joumahsts for the Asian
Wall Street Journal. T h e court invoked Common Law principles to
d e f e n d the right of the defendants to be given an opportunity to answer
charges made against them. After the disputed U M N O election of April
1987, the attacks by Dr Mahathir on the judiciary were made with
increasing intensity and vehemence. This was also a period when die
government was being challenged through the courts on a number of
vital issues. These included the suit against Dr Mahathir by Lim Kit
Siang for 'contempt of court regarding the statement made to Time
quoted below; the suit against the government claiming fraud and
conflict of inieresi in the award of the contract for the N o r t h - S o u t h
Highway; a suit challenging amendments lo the Criminal Procedure
Code; a suit by Karpal Singh, w h o challenged his immediate re-arrest
after the C o u n had released him from detention because of errors of fact
in the original detention order; and finally, the suh of ihe U M N O 11
challenging the validity of the party election in April 1987.

Even before diese cases had been decided, Dr Mahathir's criticisms of

the judiciary became more frequent, more strident and more intense. He
accused some judges w h o 'wanted to be fiercely independent' of
'exceeding their powers', of undermining ihe g o v e m m e m ' s right to
govern, of encroaching on the powers of Parhameni and the executive,
and of failing to remain neutral, especially on political matters. At the
same u m e , Dr Mahathir also attacked the Bar Council, which had
became a strong defender of the independence of the judiciary as well as
of the legal profession.
At times, Dr Mahathir lectured or admonished the judiciary. At other
times, his words could be interpreted as warnings or even veiled threats
to the judiciary'. In his pronouncements, he espoused the view that since
'we', meaning his g o v e m m e n t , made the law, there was some defect in
the role of the judiciary if the judges did not accept the government's
interpretation of that law in cases brought before the courts. This theory-
of judicial deference to the prerogadves of the executive and Parliament
was expressed by Dr Mahathir in an interview with Time magazine:

The judiciary s a y s [to us], 'Although you passed a law with a cenain thing in
mind, we think that your mind is wrong, and we want to give our interpretation'.
If we disagree, the Courts will say, 'We will interpret your disagreement'. If we
go along, we are going lo lose our power of legislation. We know exactly what we
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 217

want to do, but once we do it, it is interpreted in a different way. If we find out
that a Court always throws us out on its interpreution, if it interprets contrary to
why we made the law, then we will hive to find a way of producing a law that
will have to be interpreted according to our with."

Later, in other speeches and interviews, Dr Mahathir anacked what he

called 'black sheep' judges 'who want to be . . . fiercely independent'. He
accused some judges of playing to public opinion and forgetting about
the duty to be fair. These judges, he argued, pursued other motives:
'You have to stretch things a bit, you have to prove you can hammer the
government, for example. You want lo ingratiate yourself, y o u want to be
well thought of by the public. A good judge should stick to dispensing
jusuce. That's all, nol to show that he is independent. 6 3 In Dr Mahaihir's
v i e w , the courts should act merely as the compliant agent for the
expression of the 'will' of the g o v e m m e n t as represented by the Prime
Minister, and his Ministers, w h o together commanded the support of a
Parliament which represented the supreme and unchallenged 'sovereignty'
of the people. T h e principles of Common Law were criticized as if they
were not part of the Malaysian judicial tradition, and b e a u s e they were
not specifically authorized by parliamentary s u t u t e . By adopting this
simplified Austinian theory of law, he assumed not only the right to
criticize the judiciary but also the power to set things right when they
erred. Whenever the g o v e m m e n t did not win its cases, especially when
interpretation of the law or the Constitution was involved, he was quick
to express his displeasure. 64

For a number of years, the g o v e m m e n t had passed legislation that

reduced the scope of the judiciary in the application of statutes to specific
cases, This had been most obvious in criminal statutes with an increasing
use of 'compulsory' punishments for cenain crimes and rigid statutory
provisions limiting judicial discretion. The most notorious legislation
involved the provisions for 'compulsory death sentence' upon conviction
for trafficking in drugs and for illegal possession of firearms or ammu-
nition. T h e c o u n s could no longer lake into account mitigating facts or
extenuating circumstances of each particular case and were compelled,
instead, to sentence all accused w h o were convicted under such statutes
to a mandatory death penalty. In many other areas, legislation was
drafted to restrict the scope of the judiciary, making it ever more difficult
for judges to invoke general legal principles, especially those derived
from the C o m m o n Law and from precedents of previous judicial
decisions.

Immediately following Dr Mahathir's attack on 'black sheep' judges,

the g o v e m m c n i initialed a wholesale reallocation of judicial assignments
for the High Court. Altogether some nine judges were transferred,
including Justice Harun Hashim, w h o was viewed by s o m e as being
'independent' and w h o was then presiding over the case of the U M N O 11.
Justice Harun was moved from appellate and special powers cases to
commercial crimes. 6 5 Because the U M N O 11 case was already in pro-
gress, his reassignment could not take place until after that case had been
218 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

adjudicated. Even so, the government's powers to reassign judges was

exercised in such a way as to remind all judges that their decisions in
particular cases could affect their future judicial career assignments. T h e
day after the judicial reassignment was announced, the Attorney-General,
Abu Talib Othman, also warned justices that they must not express 'their
sentiments or personal opinions'. 6 6

The Decision on U M N O
Although it cannot be proven, it seemed obvious to many observers that
the pronouncements on the role of the judiciary and the criticisms and
accusations by the govemment concerning the c o u r u were related to the
case of the U M N O 11, nearing final adjudication. It was in this atmosphere
of political tension and thinly disguised w a m i n g s and hints of dire
conscquences if certain kinds of decisions were made by the courts that
the case of the U M N O 11 came before Justice Harun Hashim. Most of
the facts in the case were uncontested, but the defence argued that the
plaintiffs had not exhausted the remedies available under the U M N O
Constitution and through existing party institutions. The plaintiffs
argued that the evidence revealed at least 30 unregistered U M N O
branches plus other irregularities in the voting, and that the Court should
therefore declare the April 1987 U M N O General Assembly null and
void, and order a fresh election to a new General Assembly under
conditions that were in force at the time of the disputed election. 67
T h e decision of Justice Harun Hashim was a masterpiece in the literal
apphcadon of the law and made in such a way as to give the decision to
the defendants (the govemment). Yet, at the same time, it did not accede
to the tendentious argument of the defence that the case be dismissed
because all avenues of redress through U M N O had not been exhausted.
In effect, his decision confirmed that the disputed U M N O election had
been tainted by illegahties and, by implication, electoral fraud, although
the decision never stated that conclusion precisely and directly.
T h e S o d e d e s Act of 1966 as amended in 1983 provided very suingent
conditions on all s o d e d e s , and subjected them to control and scrutiny
dirough the Regisuar of S o d e d e s w h o operated under die Ministry of
H o m e Affairs. Under Article 41 of the original Act, any s o d e t y bccomes
an 'unlawful society' if a branch diercof is not duly registered with the
Registrar of Sodeties. 6 8 Because the facts in the case revealed the
existence of some 30 unregistered branches. Justice Harun concluded:

Very sadly, 1 have to make a finding in law that, at the material time, UMNO
was an unlawful society.... UMNO itself had been deemed by law to be an
unlawful society. Going by this—I don't diink I can grant the remedies sought.
Once deemed to be an unlawful sodety. it remains unlawful. There can be no
elections at the general assembly.
If the old law was in existence . . . [one could] apply the common law principle,
but here it seems the Parliament, to ensure strict campliance with the law, has
made tlis provision look harsh.
Parliament wanted the Societies Act to be complied with by everyone. It is a
 FRACTURE AT THE CENTRE 219

mo-nonsense provision. The law is strict; it says so in d e a r terms. T h e society is

deemed to be unlawful.
. . . What happened in 1987 is a nullity. Therefore, the d a i m by the plaintiffs is
dismissed. 69

Arising from this reasoning, Justice H a n m dismissed the suit of the

U M N O II and awarded the judgment to the defendants. The U M N O
incumbents bad w o n their legal battle against the T e a m B challengers,
but in the process the party had been declared illegal. Furthermore, the
decision confirmed that the disputed election had indeed been illegal and
therefore prestunably fraudulent. T h e decision also drew anention to the
lack of options available to the C o u n to pursue less stark options had
over-strict legislation not foredosed the application of tong-esublished
C o m m o n Law prindples. Indirectly, Justice Harun was laying the blame
for the harsh outcome on those very features of legislation that had by
design shackled the role of the Court and prevented it from looking for
and applying derivative prindples of justice and equity. There were no
winners—only losers.
220 MALAYSIAN POLITICS; THE SECOND GENERATION
FRACTURE AT T H E CENTRE 221
222 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
 8
Picking Up the Pieces

THE High Court decision that the United Malays National Organization
was an illegal body under the provisioiu of the Societies Aa of 1966
caught nearly everyone by surprise. It also precipitated a furious political
scramble to revive UMNO so as to claim its mantle of political legitimacy
among the Malays as well as to assume control of its massive ponfolio of
properties, corporate holdings, and financial assets. If justice Harun
Hashim assumed that his decision would lead to new UMNO elections
conducted with due consideration for the right of an opposition within
the pany, he was out of touch with reality, simplistically misguided, and
native about the consequences of the decision in the rough-and-tumble
world of real politics. Although the decision followed the letter of the law
and appeared, at first glance, to be even-handed, nearly all tbe resources
to effect a political and legal recovery remained with the incumbents.
They could use thdr powers of office to change the rules of the game and
remedy the effects of the decision through administrative prerogatives
and parliamentary action. By its act of declaring the enure struaure ttf
U M N O illegal, the High Coun had created a legal void containing
enormous political, legal, and financial resources, that these would be
fought over was ineviuble. What was less obvious, in the inunediate
aftermath of the decision, was that nearly all the trump cards for the
ensuing battle of inheritance had already been dealt to the government.

T h e Re-registration Skirmish
Immediately following the court decision dedaring UMNO an illegal
organization, Dr Mahathir Mohamad claimed that the decision was based
on rather minor 'technicalities' which could easily be corrected to restore
the legality of the pany. He was quick to assert that, since his authority
and that of the government derived from Parliament, the decision had oo
effect on the powers and authority of his government. He reminded bis
critics that it would take a parliamentary vote of no confidence to remove
him and his government from power.' The Court's dedsion involved the
inherent implication that the UMNO election had been rigged by means
of 'illegal delegates' and was therefore fraudulent. This matter was
conveniendy ignored by government spokesmen. It was also ignored in
224 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

all commentary in the mass media, which by then was almost exclusively
owned or effectively controlled by the government. Because the court
decision had made no judgment on w h o might be the culprits in
sanctioning or sponsoring 'illegal delegates' at the U M N O General
Assembly, that issue could also be allowed to the a natural deadi through
silence and seif-hghteous postures of innocence by all the principals to
the dispute. Many of the seamier aspects of the disputed election were
thus able to be laid to rest among the ashes of the defunct party.
T h e decision of Justice Harun Hashim in the suit by the eleven
U M N O plaintiffs provoked an immediate response by T u n k u Abdul
Rahman, w h o called upon Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to resign.
In addition, the Tunku quickly formed an U M N O pro-iem committee to
reconstitute what he considered to be 'his' party. T h e inaugural session of
the committee took place during the Tunku's binhday celebrations on
8 February in Penang. The arrangements for the new U M N O committee
proceeded so fast and apparently in such an informal atmosphere that
Hussein O n n , who was chosen as Deputy President, was at first unaware
of his selection lo ihe post. Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was not a member
of the new committee, but most observers assumed that he was informed
and supported the moves by those associated with T u n k u Abdul Rahman
and the Team B faction of U M N O . Very quickly, this self-selected
committee approached the Registrar of Societies to register the new party
10 be called U M N O Malaysia, which was to be, in their calculation, the
heir and successor of the now moribund U M N O . 2 T h e Registrar of
Societies, Zakiah Hashim, was under the authority of the H o m e Ministry,
with the minisier in charge being none other than Dr Mahathir himself.
T w o day-s after ihe application for ihe formation of U M N O Malaysia
was received, it was rejected by the Registrar with no explanation
for the denial being provided to the applicants. 3

Meanwhile, Dr Mahathir and his cohort of incumbent former leaders

from the old U M N O devised their o w n strategy to reconstitute the party.
T h e y intended to assure that they would inherit the leadership and the
resources of the old U M N O and that the party would remain in the
control of established 'loyal' Malays, w h o would not fracture Malay unity
or create political instability by challenging incumbent office-holders, At
first there was speculation that Parliameni might be utilized to restore the
legality of U M N O through some retroactive legislative enactments,
Alternatively, the extraordinary p o w e n vested in the H o m e Minister
under the Socieues Act to exempt any party from various provisions of
the Act was proposed as a way out of the legal void created by the court
decision. When it became clear, however, that the g o v e m m e n t could
control and block the registration of any proposed parues being promoted
by opponents of the regime, it was realized that the formation of a new
party would, in fact, facilitate what were seen to be 'needed' party
consutuiional changes as well as provide an opportunity lo overhaul the
p a n y and purge it of dissidents. T h e selected course of action involved
carefully planned and orchestrated moves to form a new U M N O party
that would replace 'their' U M N O , so summarily terminated by the action
 PlCKING UP THE PIECES 225

of the High C o u n , with something more suited to their political

objectives.
T h e week following the rejection of the application for registration by
U M N O Malaysia, Dr Mahathir announced that a new party, Penubuhan
Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (Baru), had been duty registered. T h e old
name, but in Malay, was used for the title, but now it was refened to by
the previous initials, ' U M N O ' , and the word 'Baru', meaning 'new',
hence the popular utle ' N e w U M N O ' or ' U M N O Baru'. Only after its
registration was it revealed that the previous application from T u n k u
Abdul Rahman had been rejected because the original U M N O had not
yet been 'deregistered' when he had submitted his application for U M N O
Malaysia. 4 Although T i m k u Abdul Rahman had invited Dr Mahathir
to be a member of the pro-tem committee for U M N O Malaysia, the
founding committee for U M N O Baru, that was evenmally registered,
was more exclusive, containing only loyalists supporting Dr Mahathir.
From its very inception, nearly every party pronouncement and political
decision of U M N O Baru provided overwhelming evidence that the new
party would be shaped to buttress the position and power of Dr Mahathir.
Supporters of the previous Team B faction of U M N O were excluded
from the party, except for a few individuals w h o had played a peripheral
role in the T e a m B faction or had openly d e f e a e d . Those w h o had been
tainted by association with the Team B f a a i o n were required to make
s o m e form of political obeisance for their past 'misbehaviour' and affirm
their loyalty to Dr Mahathir and the incumbent U M N O Baru leadership
as the price for their admission to the party. T h e Prime Minister's rivals
were depicted as traitors to the party and the nation. 5

Beyond the boundaries of party politics, a process of purge also was

persistently pursued. Ever since the disputed election of April 1987, the
supporters of the Team B faction had gradually lost govemment posts
and other benefits, even including appointments as village headmen,
imam, and lesser positions in both federal and state services. T h e impact
had severe repcrcussions within Malay society, creating animosiues and
divisions that were to be far more serious than the question of the
distribution of office to a few Malay leaders at the national level. Over
l i m e , the extent of the purge merely strengthened the bond of support
between the former Team B leaders and their constituents.
O n c e U M N O Baru was registered, a host of new appointments could
be made to reward supporters. The Registrar of Societies issued a ruling
allowing all former office-holders in the deregistered old U M N O to hold
posts in U M N O Baru, thus overriding the provisions of the Societies Act
which prohibited anyone from a deregistered society from holding office
in any other society. 6 U M N O Baru division heads were appointed, with
24 of the old U M N O division heads being dropped, apparently for being
suspect in their loyally to Dr Mahathir's leadership. 7 Registration forms
were distributed to trusted lieutenants chosen to reconstitute the branches
of U M N O Baru. Party spokesmen announced that all applications for
membership would be screened by the U M N O Baru Supreme Council.
Dr Mahathir s u t e d that those 'involved with the suit' against the party,
226 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

or those w h o could 'jeopardize actions to revive ihe party', would be

excluded. Later, he clarified his statement by declaring that T e n g k u
Razaleigh would not be permitted to join U M N O Baru, if he ever were to
apply. He explained, 'new U M N O will not suffer ihe fate of U M N O ' , 8
thus by implication seeking to put alt the blame for the deregistradon of
the old U M N O and the political factionalism within the party on the
activities of his electoral challengers,
To retrieve the assets of the old U M N O , an Official Assignee was
appointed and various legal moves were made to effect a transfer of those
assets to U M N O Baru. For half a year or more, the top echelon of
U M N O Baru devoted much of their energies to the reconstruction of the
party and to efforts designed to retrieve the assets and claim the legitimacy
of the now defunct old U M N O . To facilitate such a transfer to U M N O
Baru, legislation was passed through Parliament providing for the full
transfer of assets once half of the members of the old U M N O had become
members of U M N O Baru, This provision placed a premium on the
recruitment of members from the old party, both to enhance its claims to
legitimacy and, just as imponant, to give it the resources to reward its
supporters and deny those resources to its opponents. 9
At the time of registration, a new constitution was drafted and approved
by the Registrar of Societies. T h e constitution provided for gready
increased powers of the party President. He acquired new powers to
appoint the heads of U M N O Youth and Wanita U M N O (the w o m e n ' s
division), positions which had been directly elected before and held by
rather independent-minded and ambitious younger politicians. N o w ,
rather than cultivating their constituency, they would need to pay
primary heed to the political views and sensitivities of the party President
if they expected to continue in office. The new constitution also provided
for changes in the methods of counting votes in elections for leaders. For
each nomination received for President or Deputy President, 10 votes
would be awarded to that candidate prior to the counting of the votes by
delegates to the party General Assembly. It had been c o m m o n practice in
U M N O for party branches to make scores of ritual public nominations
for incumbent party leaders prior to a General Assembly, though the
nominations did not necessarily reflect subsequent votes which were cast
in secret. This change in the voting rules would obviously give the
President and the Deputy President an enormous cushion of votes againsi
any potential challengers. In defending these changes, Dr Mahathir
explained that they were made 'to uphold the majority consensus of
grassroots members'. 1 0 Later, Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba, w h e n
unveiling the new party constitution for public scrutiny, justified the
changes as being necessary because of the need for 'political stability that
will benefit the people'. 11 W h e n these provisions were approved by the
first U M N O Baru General Assembly, Ghafar Baba denied that the
automatic 10-vote system for each nomination was to ensure that
Dr .Mahathir would remain unchallenged in power. He explained that the
m a x i m u m number of nominations from divisions was 133, which would
only translate into 1,330 votes, whereas there were 1,500 votes cast by
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 227

regular delegates. 12 H i s arguments supported the conclusion that grass-

roots democracy prevailed and that delegates held the ultimate power in
the party. That he, as Deputy President, was one of two principal
beneficiaries of the new system was left for bis more astute, but judidousiy
m u t e , listeners lo figure out for themselves.
All the delegates to the first General Assembly of U M N O Baru had
been selected on an interim basis from above by the p a n y since the party
organs had not yet been fully organized at the district and branch levels.
T h e new U M N O Baru constitution was approved with vinually no
dissent and few public policy issues were raised. Without having to face
competitive elecuons, the delegates exhibited uninhibited enthusiasm for
their leaders and, responding to cues, vilified the Malay opposition,
which was attacked for not joining U M N O Baru as well as threatened by
a proposal made by some delegates that the H o m e Minister use the ISA
to 'detain those trying to undermine Malay unity'. 13 A General Assembly
chosen without elections provided an ideal forum to display support for
leaders and the power of a unified party.

Born Again' U M N O vs the G h o s t of U M N O Past

T h e success of registration by U M N O Baru and the rapidity with which

Dr Mahathir was creating a party to his own design only intensified the
efforts of his critics and challengers to find some way to check his
'steamroller' tactics. T h e y could easily evaluate these as being designed to
accomplish their banishment to the political wilderness. With nothing to
lose, the remnants of the T e a m B faction continued their efforts to seek
redress through the courts.
As a first step, the plaintiffs in the U M N O 11 case filed an appeal
against the High Court decision of Justice Harun Hashim declaring
U M N O illegal. Instead, they sought an order restoring the legality of the
old U M N O and securing a new court order calling once again for fresh
U M N O elections and a reconstitution of the U M N O General Assembly
to replace the disputed assembly of April 1987. Eventually, this appeal
was rejected by the Supreme Court. 14
While this primary court action was pending, a series of other legal
m o v e s were also pursued. Some of those associated with Team B sought
High C o u n injunctions to block tbc registration of U M N O Baru and to
prevent the transfer of assets from U M N O to U M N O Baru. Although it
was widely believed that Tengku Razaleigh directed the strategy for most
legal actions and also paid for legal fees and c o u n costs, he avoided the
spotlight, preferring to aa through intermediaries and lieutenants. Later
in the year, suits were lodged against the New Strait Times and Utusan
Melayu for using the term ' U M N O ' in their reponing, as though U M N O
Baru was equivalent to the old U M N O . After the U M N O 11 plaintiffs
had their appeal rejeaed by the Supreme C o u n in the original case, they
proceeded to sue the New Strait Times, The Star, and Utusan Melayu for
defamatory statements which had allegedly refened to them as 'hypo-
crites, traitors, criminals, liars, villains and infidels'. 15 In all these c o u n
228 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

actions, the Team B members seeking redress dirough the courts were
uhimately unsuccessful. Yet, their aggressive legal strategy did succeed in
delaying and complicating the process of reconsiituung U M N O Baru.
Their legal manoeuvres also brought the courts into a posture of having
to explore ihe legahiy of some sensitive and raiher irregular g o v e m m e n t
actions just at a time when the relations between the judiciary and the
executive were already being strained. T h u s , while the rulings of the
courts ultimately went in favour of the g o v e m m e n t , the courts were
indirectly being drawn into the political and factional contest that had
created such deep cleavages within Malay society.
T h e political contest between U M N O Baru and the Team B faction
continued unabated, even though the latter had not succeeded in forming
a duly registered party as a vehicle for their poUtical activities. Instead,
T u n k u Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn openly campaigned to revive
the old U M N O and the 'spirit of 1946', harking back to the time when
nearly all Malays were unified within a single Malay nationalist move-
ment. Although Tunku Abdul Rahman had lost his access to the public
through his column in The Star, he appeared frequently at public
functions sponsored by Team B supporters to express his views and lend
his political prestige to their efforts. Considering his age of 85 years, he
travelled extensively; yet many of his activities were ignored by a press
cowed by g o v e m m e n t ownership and control. Even so, the T u n k u
attracted some aitention by his presence and his outspoken public
comments. At one such occasion, he was invited by the Sultan of
Kelantan to open the magnificent new Balai Islam (Islamic Hall) in Kota
Bharu. This event was used by the Sultan to demonstrate political
support for Tengku Razaleigh and to campaign for the revival of the old
U M N O and die 'spirit of 1946'. 16

In addition to these few public events, the Malay opposition to the

g o v e m m e n t relied on the free distribution to Malays of many thousands
of audio and video-tapes was impossible for the government to control,
Abdul Rahman, Musa Hitam, and others w h o at various times were
openly critical of Dr Mahathir or w h o were luminaries in the T e a m B
faction, Denied access to television and tbe press, and refused permission
by the police to address public ralles, they utilized the underground
media of electronic u p e d materials that was popularly known as T V 4 , in
contrast to die UMNO-controlled broadcast station T V 3 . T h e circulation
of audio and video-iapes was impossible for the government to control,
even though the Censor Board was given new powers in March 1988 and
a mandate to check 'negative elements' being broadcast via unauthorized
video-tapes. 1 7

Although they had failed to secure registration for their party, the
Malay opposition that was congregating around Tengku Razaleigh's
leadership proceeded to hold an U M N O Malaysia General Assembly in
Kuala Lumpur in June 1988. At this assembly, T e n g k u Razaleigh was
confirmed as President, and Rais Yatim vras elected as the pro-tem
Secretary-General for the still 'uturegistered' party. T h e main theme
s u e s s e d was incorporated into the slogan 'Hidup U M N O '46', meaning
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 229

'Long Live the U M N O of 1946'. 18 While the party had not acquired
'official' status as a political body, its supporters could not be prevented
from meeting to discuss c o m m o n cause, and its selected candidates could
not be prevented from contesting elections as 'independents'. Although it
was still a 'ghost' party, it had the capacity to luck up a storm of real
political dust.
Secure in their assured legal status and gradually gaining the real
estate, the infrastructure, and the material assets of the old U M N O , the
leaders of U M N O Baru still faced a problem of restoring the confidence
and support of the Malay constituencies. T h e challenge posed by U M N O
Malaysia was far greater than they were prepared to admit, especially in
public. T h e accusations of two former Prime Ministers and one Deputy
Prime Minister had been too consistent and credible to be dismissed as
the mutterings of 'losers'. Furthermore, revelations of improprieties and
corruption in high places had been sufficiently supponed by leaked
documents in the form of surat layang, making it too plausible to be
shrugged off as a matter of no consequence.
To address the problem of public support and credibiliiy, the g o v e m -
ment first solicited public statements of support and loyalty from all the
leaders of the Barisan Nasional member parties. State Chief Ministers
and BN state party leaders were then persuaded to make oaths of loyalty
and support for Dr Mahathir. T h e most public display of such 'loyalty'
pledging came in the period just prior to the selection of the new officers
for U M N O Baru, as well as when the delegates to the first U M N O Baru
General Assembly were being appointed. Finally, Dr Mahathir himself
initiated a whirlwind campaign of public rallies staged throughout Ihe
country; it was called the Semarak Movement, an acronym for a longer
slogan which was officially translated as 'Loyalty with the People Move-
ment'. Both state and federal government funds were used to pay for the
costs of numerous Semarak rallies, which were staged over a period of
almost one year in all the s u t e s of Malaysia. In addition, civil servants
were used to help organize the rallies and make local arrangements to
assure a mass attendance. To generate public support for the movement,
M $ l . 5 million in federal funds was allocated for the construction of a
250-foot Menara Semarak monument as 'a permanent reminder of the
bond between the people and the leaders'. 19

Al these Semarak Movement mass rallies, political speeches were

combined with entertainment in a carnival atmosphere, to assure large
crowds and m a x i m u m impact from media coverage. T h e Prime Minisier
would appear as the main attraction and usually participate in some
staged media event designed to depict him as a c o m m o n man c o n c e m e d
and personally involved with the activities of ordinary Malays. The
theme of 'Malay unity' being needed to preserve Malay political power
was continuously reiterated. In his speeches, Dr Mahathir appealed for
massive displays of public support for the government so as to restore
Malay unity and establish stable and enlightened g o v e m m e n t for the
country. H i s critics were seldom mentioned by name but were more
often r e f e n e d to by oblique references or derogatory euphemisms such as
230 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

'selfish people', 'certain quarters', 'power hungry people', 'negative

elements', 'a splinter group', 'a certain narrow thinking group', 'traitors
to the Malay cause', or two enemies'. As a political campaign, the
Semarak Movement was high on theaue and symbolism, but rather
devoid of substance, especially considering that it was d i r e a e d against
critics who were denied the right to appear at the rallies and were
prohibited from organizing their own rallies to answer their accusers and
promoie their o w n political views. In the circumstances, the Semarak
campaign resembled a silat display of martial arts against a shadow foe or
a monologue of the deaf, rather than an open and public debate on the
political issues facing the party or the country.
T h e Semarak Movement reached a pirmacle of intensiiy and 'show-biz'
glitz during the National Day celebrations of 31 August. In 1988 the
National Ehy celebrations were held for the first time in the politiically
pivotal city of Johore Bahru. Parades, graphic displays, theatrical events,
and speeches played upon the themes of nationalism and Bersatu (unity).
At simultaneous celebrations in Kuala Lumpur, a gargantuan Malaysian
flag measuring 100 metres by 70 metres was raised, completely engulfying
one of the larger buildings in the city. The flag, along with the other
nationalist symbolism, was equaled with the ideal of unity between the
people and their leaders being propagated by Dr Mahathir and his 'born
again' U M N O Baru.
All mass rallies of the Semarak Movement were closely co-ordinated
with highly organized U M N O Baru recruitment drives designed to
generate mass Malay membership for the party. In comparison lo the
1.4 million members claimcd by U M N O at the lime of dcregisiration,
U M N O Baru claimed that applications for membership had reached
931,361 by Augusi 1988. In December it reported approved membership
of 732,722, and by January 1989 ihe number had reached 1 , 0 5 2 , 3 0 8 . "
To justify the claim that nearly all former U M N O members had joined
U M N O Baru, party leaders asserted thai the membership of the old
U M N O had been highly exaggerated, presumably due to administrative
laxity or fraud. Under changes in the Societies Act passed after the court
decision deregistering die old U M N O , the successor party had lo recruit
al least 50 per cent of the old U M N O members to be eligible to claim
the assets of old U M N O . Naturally, U M N O Baru wanted to lower the
membership threshold needed finally to secure full control of the enormous
assets of the old party. Finally, in order to capitalize on the strong
emotional attachment of Malays to U M N O , the party officially decided
that the term 'Baru' was unnecessary and superfluous. T h e party could
thereafter be referred to simply as U M N O . 2 1 The political transmigration
of soul from the deceased to the newborn entity had finally been
confirmed.

T h e Malay Opposition—Purge or Unity?

With the formation of U M N O Baru and the continuation of the factional

split among the leadership of the old U M N O , the principal issue of
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 231

Malay politics remained: how and on what terms would 'Malay unity' be
restored? During its gestation period, the strategy of the leaders of
U M N O Baru was to refuse membership to the top and middle-ranking
Elites from the previous Team B faction but to actively solicit their rank-
and-file supporters. T h e y also experimented with tactics designed to split
the factional alignment of the Mailay opposition. T h e object was to depict
the others as having created 'disunity', while offering the hand of
friendship and reconciliation. But this was done in such a way that
reconciliation would be on terms esublishing the political supremacy of
the one oppearing to be 'so generous'. To disarm one's opponents by
polite manners and guile, while being prepared for mortal combat, is part
of the traditional Malay political style; thus, threatening actiotis, feints,
displays of power, moves by lesser retainers, smiles, inviutions, and
formal etiquette were all assessed for their ultimate political impact. With
a number of principal actors on the scene, the moves of all parties
remained sufficiently ambiguous and unprediaable to make each one
cautious and make moves designed to keep political alternatives open.
Behind the confusion of discrete events there was a clarity of purpose: the
struggle for political power and political survival.
T h e original Team B alignment had been composed of a political
alliance between Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam, each with his
coterie of loyalists and clients. The old rivalries between the two m e n
were such that close co-ordination and mutual support were not forth-
coming, even when both were under assault from the incumbents and
experiencing a waning in political fonunes. When Dr Mahathir fint
announced the formation of U M N O Baru, Musa studiously avoided
affiliation with either the effons to form UMNO Malaysia or U M N O
Baru, and instead called for 'reconciliation' and 'unity'. When that did
not produce any results, he appeared to follow a 'wait and see' strategy.
This ended abruptly when U M N O Baru engaged in a thorough purge of
his supporters and allies, forcing him to take a more critical view of the
incumbents and their new party.
For some lime, the strategy of Musa Hitam involved joining in the
chorus of criticism of Dr Mahathir but avoiding any substantive political
commitment to the Tengku Razaleigh camp. Many informal hints were
dropped that could be interpreted as meaning that, if the conditions were
right, Musa Hitam might either be willing to join U M N O Baru or be
prepared to aa as the 'peace-maker' to arrange for a reconciliation
between Dr Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh. At the same t i m e , Musa
had his o w n Johore constituency to cultivate and defend, so many of his
actions refleaed the decisions and fonunes of some of his principal
supporters and allies. One of these was Shahrir Abdul Samad, an MP
w h o resigned his seat in Johore Bahru and stood again to defend it as an
Independent in an act of protest againsi the actions of Dr Mahathir. T h i s
election is covered later in this chapter. We may only note here, in
evaluating the strategy of Musa Hitam, thai he produced a hard-hitting
video-taped speech during which he accused Dr Mahathir of becoming a
'dictator' and of failing to consult with or secure the consensus of his
232 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Cabinet. The video-tape was used extensively with great effect in Shahrir's
election campaign, and ihe questions it raised became the primary issues
of the campaign. But Musa himself left for Europe during the campaign,
thus giving mixed signals both to his supporters and his opponents.
While U M N O Baru was in its formative stage, Dr Mahathir pursued
an aggressive and unyielding strategy towards his critics. No one w h o
supported or who was allied with the 'trouble-makers' would be allowed
inio the new p a n y , least of all Tengku Razaleigh. Various proposals for
reconciliation talks were rebuffed or side-stepped, while the organizers of
U M N O Baru proceeded, unmindful of criticism, to implement their
blueprint for their new party. Persistent critics of the regime would not
be tolerated within the new party, Members of Parliament who had been
elected as candidates of the old U M N O were forced to declare their
loyalty and affiliation with the new party or face expulsion from both the
government and the Barisan Nasional. For a time, it was even suggested
that failure to do so might also entail forfeit of the seat in Parliament. Yet
under the Constitution, that was not possible to enforce. In September
1988, while the climate of recrimination and vindictiveness remained
particularly intense, 13 .Members of Parliament who had been members
of the old U M N O refused to join U M N O Baru and asked to be seated
across the floor among the opposition benches. Thereafter they acquired
the status of Independents. 22 T h e y were later joined by two others as well
as Musa Hitam, who concealed his intentions for longer than any others.
After nearly tvvo years of fratricidal conflict within the Malay com-
munity over the leadership claims of rival factions, many prominent
leaders in the Malay community were joining a mounting chorus calhng
for some form of reconcilation to restore 'Malay u n i t y . Frequently, such
moves were made by diose allied to or sympathetic to one side or the
other in the protracted facdonal struggle. Because of this growing send-
ment, leaders of all factions had to protect their political flanks while also
appearing to remain supportive of 'genuine moves to restore that elusive
'unity' which every Malay politician claimed to espouse.
Cognizant of these semiments, Dr Mahathir, in his closing spcech to
the first U M N O Baru General Assembly, dramatically appeared lo
reverse his earlier uncompromising hardline stance towards his
opponents. As he put it, 'to mend the rift among the Malays and U M N O
members', he offered Cabinet posts without ponfolio to Tengku Razaleigh
and Musa Hitam, ostensibly without time limit or pre-conditions. His
explanations to the delegates only hint at his calculations. 'As we have
seen, U M N O is strong and the support for it firm.' 23 Once he had
created a party according to his design and had demonstrated firm
control of il, he correctly calculated that his two most outspoken Malay
critics could be effectively hemmed in and contained within the party. All
the rule changes had given the party President ample powers to deal with
any potential breaches of 'party discipline'. Outside the party, his critics
could also be restrained, but it would be much more difficult to do so,
and it depended much more upon tactics to penalize their supporters,
such as selective use of federal funds and denial of patronage, as well as
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 233

the use of coercive instruments that might also alienate additional

segments of Malay society. The pro-government press reported that
delegates 'wept unashamedly at the magnanimity of his invitation', 24 but
the two to whom the invitation was directed were astute enough to
identify the trap which had been laid. To refuse invited the charge that
they were the source of Malay 'disunity'. To accept meant capitulation
and humble deference to Dr Mahathir's leadership of a highly centralized
p a n y that had been tailor-made to his specificauons and designed to
ensure that his position would not be challenged again from within the
party. No positions of responsibility were being offered but that elusive
entity 'Malay unity' was being promised as the ultimate reward.
Musa Hitam immediately rejected the offer of Dr Mahathir, and
Tengku Razaleigh d e f e n e d comment for a few weeks but later com-
mented that the offer was tak mmis or tainted, and subsequently referred
to it as being rasuah politik (political bribery). Instead, Tengku Razaleigh
decided to attend a O n g r e s s on Malay Unity that was being sponsored
by the Malay National Writers' Association (Pena), and scheduled to be
held al the Sultan Sulaiman Q u b in Kuala Lumpur, the site of the
original founding of U M N O in 1946. Because the President of Pena,
Yahaya Ismail, had written a critical book about Dr Mahathir, this
Congress was identified as being an opportunity for the anti-Mahathir
faction to organize and to mobilize public opinion against the incumbents
m U M N O Baru. With obvious political calculation, the police refused to
give a permit for the proposed Malay Unity Congress, alleging 'security'
considerations. 25 Shortly after the cancellation of the proposed Congress
on Malay Unity, Tengku Razaleigh turned to another tactic to publicize
his criticisms of U M N O Baru and its claim to be the successor to
U M N O . In Parliament, he introduced a resolution calling for the revival
of the old U M N O and the re-admission of all former U M N O members
into the revived party. Dr Mahathir responded by saying that was legally
impossible and not politically appropriate. After a rather bitter exchange
of accusations, the resolution was rejeaed by the vote of 108 to 35,
reflecting the relative strength between the opposition and the Barisan
Nasional in Parliament. 26

Because of widespread dissatisfaction within the Malay community

over the debilitating political battle between the U M N O Baru leadership
and the remnants of Team B, a number of prominent Malay politicians
were disturbed over the spectacle of such bitter divisions within the
Malay community. T h e y were convinced that renewed e f f o n s should be
made to facilitate some form of reconciliation between U M N O Baru and
the former U M N O leaders who were being thrust into the political
wilderness. With the active participation of former Prime Minister
Hussein O n n , a Johore Malay Unity Forum was held in December, It
was attended by many prominent Malay political figures, particularly
those aligned with Musa Hitam. Avoiding any criticisms of Dr Mahathir
or impugning the legitimacy of U M N O Baru, the Forum passed a series
of resolutions calling for the adoption of the old U M N O constitution and
for the admission of all former members of U M N O into the new party.
234 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

These "Unity Resolutions" of the Forum were then forwarded to the

U M N O Baru Council for iu consideration and response. The next day,
Dr Mahathir, in comments to the press, expressed cautious support for
the e f f o n s of Hussein Onn and hinted that some favourable response
might be forthcoming later.27
In mid-January the proposals of the Forum were formally "accepted"
by the U M N O Baru Council, but were subject to certain condiuons. All
members of the old U M N O from Johore were to be admitted to the party
provided that they accepted 'the U M N O leadership elected during the
party general assembly on April 24, 1987'. The Council further stipulated
that the 'Unity Resolutions' were accepted but 'they must comply with
the existing provisions in the c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . steps were to be taken to
adapt the constitution of the deregistered U M N O according to the
provisions of the present party's rules'. 28 By this move, the leaders of
U M N O Baru had opened the door to ihe Musa faction in Johore for their
return lo ihe party, but under terms that meant that the leadership of the
incumbents would remain unchallenged. Because these conditions were
not applied to Malaysia as a whole, the exclusionary pohcies against other
supporters of Team B remained in force. In terms of political strategy,
this move by the U M N O Baru Council strengthened the claims of the
new U M N O to the mantle of the old party, while at the same time
inviting the Musa Hitam faction to abandon their rather strained panner-
ship widi the Tengku Razaleigh faction. While almost nothing was
promised, much political capital was gained for those in control of the
new U M N O .

Assault against the Judiciary

As the political powers of the govenunent became more extensive and

assertive, more of the critics of the regime resoned to the courts to check
what they viewed as violations of constitutional rights, abuses of power,
and malfeasance of office. The expansion of executive prerogative by
parliamentary statute tended to increase the incidence of such cases in
regard to human rights and public interest issues. T h e disputed U M N O
election and the factional split within U M N O merely increased the
number of court cases, but now primarily over issues of political legit-
imacy and the legal authority of those in office. T h u s , the courts were
drawn into disputes crucial in the allocation of power and to the most
conicntious issues of politics and public policy. What had been matters of
import for civil law and for a few individuals now became a matter
affecting the legitimacy, power, and survival of the incumbents holding
the highest offices in the land. In such an environment, the courts could
either play an independent role, judging the legality of acts of government
and its agents, or they could defer to incumbent political authority and
refuse to step into the breach to resolve issues which challenged the
powers and legitimacy of the highest executive organs of g o v e m m e n t . In
e f f e a , the judiciary was forced by events and by paiiems of litigation to
take a stand on its autonomy vis-a-vis the executive branch and the
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 235

massive arsenal of powers available to incumbent office-holders. In the

circumsunces, any fonhrighi defence of judicial autonomy would require
political courage.
In Malaysia, the judiciary inherited the British Common Law traditions
of an independent judiciary operating within the principle of parlia-
mentary supremacy. Yet, unlike Britain, Malaysia has a written constitu-
tion which was assumed to be supreme over ordinary parliamentary
statutory law. By implication, this system of a hierarchy of laws capped
by a written constitution meani an even more important and autonomous
role for the courts than had been evolved by the British legal tradition. If
the Constitution were to be taken as supreme law, judges would be
required to examine both statutes and acts of government for their
compliance with its provisions.
Having no training in the law or jurisprudence, Dr Mahathir was
unimpressed by legal arguments about judicial autonomy and the role of
the judiciary to check arbitrary and unconstitutional government actions.
Instead, he held to the view that all sovereignty ultimately rested with
Parliament. So long as the govemment held a noajoriiy, particularly a
two-thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution, its decisions and
'will' should not be impeded or distoned in any way by the actions of any
'fiercely independent' judges w h o , in his view, might be tempted to
substitute 'personal opinions' for legislative intentions or to encroach on
g o v e m m e n i powers derived from the only legitimate and the ultimate
source of legal power—the confirming actions of a continuing parlia-
mentary majority. In particular, he objected to the application of un-
written law—by which he meant the principles derived from Common
Law—arguing that judges, like all other humans, were biased, and that
any application of judicial review interfered with politics and frustrated
the intentions of Parliament. 29 With such a philosophy of law being
espoused by the govemment of the day, it was only a matter of time
before there would be a major confrontation involving the courts and the
g o v e m m e n t over the pattern of court decisions concerning crucial political
issues.
Dr Mahathir opened his attack against judges who were 'fiercely
independent' in his November 1986 interview with Time magazine just
after the court decision which overtumed the government's order revoking
the work permit of the two correspondents for the Asian Wall Street
Journal. This incident was recounted earlier in Chapter 7. In oblique
response to Dr Mahathir's views, the former Lord President, Mohamed
Suffian Hashim, made an important speech on the role of the judiciary
and the obligation of all citizens to preserve its independence in decisions
on all judicial issues. 30 The following year, he also played a prominent
part in the 1987 conference on 'The Malaysian Constitution after
30 Years', at which T u n k u Abdul Rahman and another former Lord
President, the Sultan of Perak, Sultan Azlan Muhibuddin Shah, also
were active and outspoken participants. T h e y , along with many others
attending the conference, stressed the essential principle of judicial
independence, just at the time when the c o u n s were facing a dramatic
236 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

increase in politically sensitive eases. In apparent response to the issues

raised at this conference, Dr Mahathir, on several occasions, lectured
judges on their rotes in deciding cases and warned them about encroaching
on executive powers. 31 Later, in a 1988 N e w Year's Day interview,
Dr Mahathir reneu-ed his criticism of the judiciary, stating: 'When you
want to be fiercely independent, you're implying that you'd forget your
duty to be just and fair.'32 Shortly thereafter, the Attorney--General, Abu
Talib Othman, issued a public warning lo the judiciary- about expressing
'sentiments and personal opinions' in their decisions on cases. His
statement included the following admonition:

. . . the independence of the judiciajy does not give judges freedom to express
their sentimenis or personal opinions.......While the independence—always pro-
tected by the judiciary—gives judges ihe freedom to dispense justice without fear
or favour, they should refrain from expressing sentimenis which may cause
conflicts to arise.33

This warning by the Attorney-General was issued just a few days after the
government initialed a major reassignment of judges to the High Court
and just prior to the time when the High Court was scheduled to hear the
case of ihe eleven U M N O plaintiffs who were challenging the validity of
the U M N O election of April 1987. In Malaysia, all judges are appointed
by the Yang di-Penuan Agong on the advice of the Prime Minister, and
while they cannot be removed without cause prior to retirement age, they
can be assigned to different couns. Therefore, at the very time that the
courts were having lo decide on a number of very difficull and politically
sensitive cases, there were very few judges w h o could noi feel the
mounting pressure of public criticism combined with undisguised threats
of remedial or punitive actions emanaiing from the Prime Minister's
Office.
Many of the politically sensitive cases decided by the courts had been
generated because of recent legislation greatly increasing ihe arbitrary
and prerogative powers of the government. The amendments to the
Official Secrets Act, the Iniemal Security Act, and the Criminal Procedure
Code had reduced the rights of defendants to challenge the actions of
govemment invoking such Acts. The disputed U M N O eleciion and
public concern over corruption and malfeasance of office had generated a
raft of cases involving litigants seeking redress in the c o u n s arising from
allegations of various govemment abuses and excessive exercise of arbit-
rary authority. Among the more important cases was the contempt of
c o u n case against Dr Mahathir brought by Lim Kit Siang arising from
Dr Mahathir's comments about the c o u n s appearing in Time magazine.
This case was dismissed by the High Court and the decision was upheld
by the Supreme C o u n . Another was the appeal by John Benhelsen of ihe
Asian Wall Street Journal against the Minisier of H o m e Affairs
( D r Mahathir) seeking to nullify the order revoking his work permit
without being given the opportunity to answer allegations and charges
made in the order. In this case, the c o u n nullified the Minister's order
and restored Benhelsen's work permit. In yet another case, the Supreme
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 237

Court exercised judicial review nullifying amendments to the Criminal

Procedure Code which gave the Attorney-General powers to initiate
criminal proceedings in the High Court without preliminary inquiry in a
Magistrate's Court. This decision against the government's position was
made by a 3 to 2 majority. When the privatization c o n u a a was issued to
United Engineers (Malaysia) for the construction of the North-South
Highway, Lim Kit Siang brought suit in court alleging corruption and
criminal fraud. In this case, the Supreme Court, by a 2 to 3 decision,
ruled that Lim had no locus standi and therefore could not pursue the case
in court. After the mass arrests during October and November 1987
under the ISA, there were a number of court cases involving applications
by detainees for habeas corpus and other orders challenging the validity of
the ISA detention orders. These included cases initiated by Lim Kit
Siang and Karpal Singh. Because of errors of f a n in the ISA detention
order issued for Karpal Singh, the High Court granted his application,
but upon his release, he was immediately rearrested. This action by the
authorities provoked a second application for habeas corpus by Karpal
Singh as well as an appeal against the earlier High Court order by the
Attorney-General. 34 The Karpal Singh case merely added to the mounting
sense of conflict and crisis between the courts and the government over
the role of the judiciary.
To limit the power of the courts, the government submitted a consti-
tutional amendment in Parliament the week following the decision freeing
Karpal Singh from ISA detention. When the new constitutional amend-
ments were submitted to Parliament for approval, Dr Mahathir explained
w h y they were needed:

. . . the courts have decided that in enforcing the law they are bound by their
interpretations and noi by the reasons for which Parliament formulated these
l a w s . . . . lately the Judidaiy had seen fit to touch on matters w h k h were
previously regarded as solely within the Executive's jurisdiction.
When a judge feels he has first to prove his indepeodence, then justice takes a
back seat. That is why we see some judges, when delivering judgements, making
unfounded statements as if they want to vent their frustrations . . . lately, we find
incidents where some members of the Judiciary are involved in politics . . . to
display that their independence is really 'fierce' they often bend Over backwards
10 award decisions in favour of those challenging the Government. 35

The new amendments to the Constitution transferred judicial powers

from the Courts (by constitutional conferment) to ordinary legislative
enactments of Parliament. In addition, the Attorney-General was given
powers to determine the venue for criminal proceedings, while existing
powers of the courts were redefined more narrowly and placed in two co-
equal High Courts, one for Malaya and one for Borneo. As a result, no
court had final ultimate jurisdiction for the Federation as a whole, and
thus the question of where ultimate judicial authority rested was made
ambiguous, apparently deliberately, by the new amendments to
Articles 121 and 145 of the Federal Constitution. 36 With divided author-
ity, judicial review would be much more difficult to stistain, but at the
238 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

same lime, the mechanism for authoritative resolution of complex and

contenuous legal issues had been severely impaired.
Because the criticisms of the judiciary by the Prime Minister had
evolved from general criticisms to more restrictive legislation and then to
constitutional amendments, the judiciary was placed in a quandary over
how it should respond. Public defence of its role was criticized as
inierfering in politics. Silence gave the impression of acquiescence to the
charges levelled against the judiciary and implied that judges themselves
accepted the view that their role was to be merely subservient lo the
immediate short-term policy directives of the govemment. At stake was
public confidence in the judiciary as a venue of justice, rather than
merely as an agency of government administration cloaked in counterfeit
mystical rituals of autonomy and impartial dispensation of justice. In
January 1988, Lord President Salleh Abas launched a book of proceed-
ings of two international conferences, one of Appellate Judges and the
other of Chief Judges, attended a year earher by ninety-seven judges
from around the world. He used the occasion to defend the autonomy of
the judiciary from those questioning the neuuality and threatening ihe
independence of the judiciary. While his speech on the role of law was
clearly designed to be an answer to the attacks being mounted by
Dr Mahaihir, the Prime Minister was not mentioned by name and the
principles defended by the Lord President were those that are commonly
assumed to apply to all democratic govemmenis operating under prin-
ciples of constitutionalism. 37 This spcech by the Lord President appeared
to have no effect on the government. In Parliament, Dr Mahathir
launched funher criticisms of the judiciary and submitted to Parliament
the constitutional amendment, mentioned above, which weakened the
judiciary through divided jurisdiction and the effective emasculation of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate authority over the judicial system.

Under pressure from some of the judges for a unified response by the
judiciary, the Lord President, Salleh Abas, convened a meeting of all
20 judges in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur. Rather than make a public reply
to the criticisms of the Prime Minisier, they decided instead to address a
confidential letter to the Agong and all the Malay Rulers expressing their
concerns and views on the issues involved. The letter was approved by all
20 judges present, although one judge, Hashim Yeop Sani, expressed
some reservations. After customary salutations, the letter began as
follows:

I as Lord President on behalf of myself and all the Judges of the country beg to
express our feelings regarding the development in ihe relationship between the
Executive and the Judiciary.
All of us are disappointed with the various comments and accusations made by
the Honourable Prime Minister against the Judiciary, not only outside but within
the Parliament.

The letter ended with the expression of 'hope that all those unfounded
accusations will be stopped'. 38 No specific action by the Agong or the
Malay Rulers was called for or suggested in the letter. In an ironic twist
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 239

of fate, eleven years earlier, Salleh Abas had been the Public Prosecutor
in the case when the heir apparent to the throne of Johore was c o n v i a e d
of homicide and sentenced to six months in jail.39 N o w the defendant in
that case had become the Agong and was being asked to use his power
and influence to protect the Lord President and the couru from what
were alleged to be unjustified attacks on the judidary.
Although seant and highly speculative information is available on what
happened when the Agong received this letter, it appeared that the
Agong informed Dr Mahathir about the letier, and then the two agreed lo
take disciplinary action against the Lord President. Because the Lord
President had left for a trip abroad shonly after the letter was sent, upon
his retum he was summoned to see the Prime Minister. At the meeting,
according to the account of Salleh Abas, Dr Mahathir accused him of
being biased in the U M N O cases that were pending. Prime Minisier
Mahathir then informed him that both the Agong and he wanted his
resignation as Lord President. Stunned by the request, Salleh Abas at
first agreed. Later the same day, when he received a letter from the
Prime Minister announcing his suspension as Lord President with the
suspension being backdated so as to nullify some of his earlier legal a a s
setting hearing dates for the U M N O case and the Karpal Singh appeal,
he thereupon decided to withdraw his resignation. The government
countered by initiating impeachment proceedings againsi Salleh Abas. 40
T h e Malaysian Constitution provides for impeachment of judges by
means of a specially constituted Tribunal composed of judges but the
appointment of the members of such a Tribunal was left to the govem-
m c n i , just as in the case of all judicial appointments. While this mechanism
was designed to assure the independence of the judiciary, the drafters
seemed oblivious to the fact that those w h o could choose the members of
the Tribunal could also shape the v e r d i a . Accordingly, the government
appointed a panel of six judges, four from Malaysia and one each from
Singapore and Sri Lanka. The Chairman of the Tribunal was Abdul
Hamid Omar, w h o had just been appointed Acting Lord President to fill
the post vacated by the suspension of Salleh Abas. T h e charges against
Salleh Abas were drafted and argued by the Attorney-General, alleging
misbehaviour, by participating in politics, criticizing the government,
and by committing perjury, because 'he wrote a letter to the Agong
without approval of all judges in the country' yet the letier had claimed
that it was written on behalf of all judges. 41 T h e charges also induded the
allegation that he 'displayed bias and prejudice' against the government
in his speeches and 'sought to undermine public confidence in the
govemment's administration' by imputing that the govemment had no
respect for the law and interfered with the independence of the judiciary.
One of the charges look issue with a decision he had made in a case
involving a minor's choice of religion. The last of the five charges related
10 siatemenis he made to the media after his suspension, which the
g o v e m m e n t alleged 'were calculated to politicise the issues and to further
discredit the govemment'. 4 2 Assisted by his legal counsel, Mr Anthony
Lester, QC, Salleh Abas objected to the composition of the Tribunal and
240 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND CENEKATION

demanded that the Chairman disqualify himself since he had been newly
promoted to be Lord President—the very position being contested—and
therefore he had a vested interest in the outcome of the case. Further-
more, Salleh Abas argued that the Tribunal had been impropserly consu-
tuted because the govemmeni had appointed a Tribunal composed of
relatively junior judges plus two foreign justices from countries not noted
for judicial independence. Instead, he demanded a trial by peers of equal
rank and standing, to include, if needed, retired Lord Presidents and
other senior retired justices. He also demanded that the Tribunal hold
full public hearings. When his objections were overruled by the Tribunal,
Salleh Abas withdrew from further participation in ils deliberations.
In closed door sessions, the Tribunal proceeded to hear the charges
presented by the Attorney-General, with only four govemment witnesses
being called to present evidence againsi Salleh Abas and no witnesses
called for the defence. Meanwhile, Salleh Abas approached the Supreme
Court for a stay of proceedings, alleging that the Tribimal had been
improperly established and that the Agong had been 'wrongfully advised'.
T h e Supreme Court, meeting in emergency session because 'the future of
the judiciary was at stake', by unanimous decision ordered the Salleh
Abas impeachment Tribunal to stay proceedings and not to submit its
recommendations to the Agong. 4 3
Four days after the Supreme Court issued its 'stay of proceedings'
order to the Tribunal, the Agong. on the advice of the Prime Minister,
suspended the five judges of the Supreme Court w h o had issued the
order and announced that the government was initiating impeachment
proceedings againsi the five Supreme Court justices on charges of 'gross
misbehaviour' because the 'judges conspired to make the order'. T h e
attitudes of Prime Minister Mahathir had been revealed three days
earlier, just after the Supreme Court's order, when, upon news of the
c o u n decision, he vehemendy and publicly accused the judidary of
usurping power:

There is now an attempt by a cenain institution to grab power from the people.
They use the legal system to try and deny the taityat of that rightful power.
Such institutions have been set up with respective roles to play in accordance
with tbe laws and regulation. But they should never be allowed to deny the
rakyat of their power to elect people of their choice.44

With the suspension of five Supreme Court justices and the pending
impeachment process against the suspended Lord President Salleh Abas,
the judicial system was in a s u t e of chaos and ambiguity. Only four
Supreme Court justices remained still sitting and two of them were
appointed to the Salleh Abas impeachment Tribunal. W h o might delib-
erate on any appeals remained in doubt, as the remaining legal avenues
for redress of grievances were being suspended in a mounting crisis of
judicial authority. The Acting Lord President was an interested party in
the Salleh Abas case and a defendant in the 'stay of proceedings' order
issued by the Supreme Court. The five suspended Supreme Court judges
were now defendants in an impeachment process being initiated by the
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 241

g o v e r n m e n t . The five vacant seats on the Supreme Court could be filled

by acting appointees by the government, but they too would be benefi-
ciaries to any impeachment decisions. The sequence of events surrounding
the suspension and impeachment proceedings of the six justices had
effectively emasculated the judiciary by removing those who subscribed
to or acted upon the doctrine of judicial autonomy. At die same time, it
appeared to many that confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary had
been effectively destroyed by the actions of a government which was
more concemed about its political power than any abstract principles of
justice, or judicial impartiality.
After new appointments to the Supreme Court were made by the
government, further appeals by Salleh Abas to the Court to block
the pending decision of the Tribunal were all rejected. In short order, the
Tribunal submitted ils recommendations to the Agong, finding Salleh
Abas guilty as accused, whereupon he was removed as Lord President.
T h e fact that Salleh Abas rejeaed the findings and the dedsion as 'bad
law and bad procedure' was of no consequence for the ultimate decision, 4 5
although his arguments were of some political importance for those w h o
became concerned over the issues involved and were mobilizing to
oppose the government's moves. Three days after the decision on the
impeachment of Salleh Abas, the reconsutuied Supreme Court rejected
the appeal of the ' U M N O 11' seeking to overturn the decision that had
made tbc old U M N O an 'illegal entity'. 46 T h e new Court seemed to be
more attuned to realities of power and to the core c o n c e m s of the
govemment.
Meanwhile, a second impeachment Tribunal was b d n g formed to
consider the case of the five suspended Supreme Court judges. The new
government-appointed Tribunal consisted of the two remaining available
Supreme C o u n judges, three more junior High Court judges, and two
foreign judges. Together they considered the charges brought by the
Attorney-General against the five accused judges. T h e y were accused of
'improper motives' and of convening a session of the Supreme Court
without permission of the Chief Justice, Abdul Hamid Omar, w h o had
recently been appointed Acting Lord President in addition to being
appointed Chairman of the Salleh Abas impeachment Tribunal. Some of
the judges were also accused of failing to appear at scheduled judicial
proceedings because of their attendance at the emergency sessions of the
Supreme Court convened to consider Salleh Abas's appeal for the re-
straining order against the Tribunal. In defence, the five accused judges
claimed that the Lord President had not been informed because he, as
Chairman of the Salleh Abas Tribunal, was a principal defendant in the
action brought by Salleh Abas. Again, the suspended judges o b j e a e d to
the composition of their Tribunal, but these objections were overruled.
Ultimately, this second Tribunal gave a judgment that did not l o u l l y
accept the government's charges, as had been the case with the earlier
Tribunal considering the impeachment charges against Salleh Abas. This
time, only two of the accused judges were c o n v i a e d and removed from
office, white three were acquitted, had their suspensions removed, and
242 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

consequently retained their positions as Supreme Court judges. 47

When the Lord President was suspended and subjected to impeach-
ment proceedings, the case generated much controversy and attracted the
attention of the world press. Their interest in the case escalated even
more when the five Supreme Court judges were subjected to the same
procedures. Within the country, a coalition of groups mobilized to
defend the judiciary from the punitive measures meted out to justices
w h o incurred the displeasure of ihe government. At the forefront of the
domestic criticism was the Malaysian Bar Council, but the critics also
included most public interest groups as well as many of the political
figures aligned with the Team B faction of U M N O . Immediately following
the publication of the Salleh Abas Tribunal report, the Malaysian Bar
Council convened an emergency meeting at which were 1,002 Malaysian
lawyers constituting 43 per cent of the Bar Council's total membership.
At the meeting, the Bar Council voted 'no confidence' in the newly
appointed Acting Lord President, Abdul Hamid Omar, and called upon
him to resign or be removed from office. The Council agreed to initiate
contempt of court proceedings against him for interference in the
administration of justice and they were highly cridcal of the decision and
the legal arguments put forward in die repon of the Salleh Abas Tribunal.
In panicular, they called for the resignation of the Chairman of the
second Tribunal, Hashim Yeop Sani. Eventually, Hashim Yeop Sani,
under pressure of criticism, did resign as Chairman, but he remained on
the second Tribunal as a regular member. In support of the Bar Council's
actions, the Law Association of Asia announced that it was conducting a
'watching brief of all the legal issues and manoeuvres associated with the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the six Malaysian judges. T h e
sharp criticisms of the Malaysian Bar Council and from the international
media of the entire proceedings by the government against the offending
'fiercely independent' justices were answered by political actions rather
than legal reasoning and argument. At the hearing before the reconstituted
Supreme Court following the suspension of the five Supreme Court
judges, U M N O Youth staged a demonstration against the Bar Council.
Waving banners and placards denouncing 'Traitor Lawyers' and the
'Traitor Bar' for their actions condemning the newly appointed A a i n g
Lord President, the demonsirators defended the new appointments to the
Court replacing the suspended and accused judges. 48

By its forceful actions, the government eventually gained the upper

hand against the judicial'- Critics of the government claimed that the
judiciary had been fully cowed into submission by the government's
actions. Yet, the batde had not resulted in a clear-cut victory for the
government, since three of the six accused judges were restored to their
positions, and the government's reputation of upholding the principles of
law and constitutionalism had been severely tarnished both abroad and
widun the country. T h e case widi which the government could remove
judges as well as appoint and reassign them to judicial posts suggested
that few judges would be unmindful of the impact of their decisions on
their future careers. Even so, judges must also have been c o n c e m e d
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 243

about their public reputations of judicial impartiality and continued to

pride themselves in exercising a degree of judicial autonomy, however
slight it might have become through restriaive legislation and the exer-
cise of enlarged executive prerogatives. Ultimately, the real battle for the
credibility and viability of the government was not waged in court battles
or dependent on the actions of the judiciary, but was instead to be waged
through political contests and depended upon the responses of the
Malaysian electorate.

T h e By-election C o n t e s t

While the disputes over the reconsutution of U M N O were unfolding and

the legal contests in the courts and over the suspension of the judges were
also attracting headlines, there were periodic by-elections which provided
some barometer of public response to the government's muld-front
campaign against its critics and opponents.
T h e first by-election after the disputed U M N O election came in March
1988 and was for a state assembly seat in Johore. It arose because of the
death of an U M N O Assemblyman representing the constituency of
Tanjung Puteri in the vicinity of Johore Bahm. Coming as it did just
after the High Court had ruled the old U M N O an illegal body, the
election occurred in the immediate aftermath of the formation of U M N O
Baru and the launching of the Semarak campaign. The constituency was
primarily urban and lower- to middle-class with Malay voters constituting
51.1 per cent, Chinese 42.5 percent, and Indians 6.2 percent. No Team B
candidate contested against the U M N O Baru candidate, Mohamed Yunos
Sulaiman, and the election developed into a three-comered contest with
the primary challenger being a local lawyer, Abdul Razak Ahmad,
representing the PSRM. Although it was only a s u t e by-election,
Dr Mahathir treated it as a test of support for his administration and
made a personal appearance to spearhead the BN election campaign. T h e
voter turnout was unusually low, suggesting disaffection among Malay
voters. After three recounts, the U M N O Baru candidate, Mohamed
Yunos Sulaiman, was declared the winner with 10,181 votes to 10,150 for
the PSRM challenger—a razor-thin margin of 31 votes. 49
T h i s election result, combined with the disputes over the admission of
new members to U M N O Baru, must have increased the confidence and
the resolve of the Team B faction to challenge Dr Mahathir in what they
saw as his ruthless campaign against critics and challengers. As one of
many ironies of politics, the Barisan Nasional campaign manager in the
Tanjung Puteri by-elecuon had been Shahrir Abdul Samad, a Member of
Parliament, former Welfare Minister, a close ally of Musa Hitam, and a
person who had earlier been associated with the Team B faction. When
the new U M N O Baru recruitment campaign began ils policy of screening
out former U M N O members of 'doubtful' loyalty, Shahrir Abdul Samad
was one of the victims. Following the Tanjung Puteri by-election,
Shahrir was removed as head of the Johore Bahm Division of U M N O
B a m , whereupon he joined forces with his former mentor, Musa Hitam,
244 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

w h o , in 1973, had introduced him to politics as his political secretary.

Shahrir and Musa were among 16 other former U M N O M P s who
declared themselves 'Independents' and were then seated in Parliament
with ihe opposition. By early 1988 the remnants of the Team B faction
were regrouping and now calling themselves 'Semangat '46' (Spirit of
1946), T h e y attempted to present an alternative leadenhip for the Malays
to that provided by Dr Mahathir and his team. As a member of the
Semangai '46 faction, Shahrir was eager to demonstrate his political
support and probably wished to avenge the punitive measures directed
against him from die top leaders of U M N O Baru. No doubt, with the
lessons of the Tanjung Puteri by-election in mind, Shahrir then decided,
in co-operation with the Semangat '46 group, to force a by-election by
resigning his parliamentary seal and to re-contest ii in a campaign
designed to challenge the policies of Dr Mahathir and his claim to
leadership of U M N O and the Barisan Nasional,
Shahrir's decision to become an Independent was announced in late
April 1988 in response to the controversy over the screening of member-
ship applications for U M N O Baru. He resigned his seal in Parliament
when the big issue was the attempt by Semangat '46 to re-register the old
U M N O through parliamentary action. By the time of the by-election for
his vacated seal, on 25 August, the main political news centred on the
government's impeachment moves against the Lord President and the
five Supreme Court justices. Thus, for reasons of political strategy and of
timing the Johore Bahru by-election provided the Semangat '46 coalition
with an opportunity to focus on the decisions of the U M N O Baru
leaders, with parucular aiiendon to the deeds and pronouncements of
Dr Mahathir. Not only did Shahrir have popular support in Johore, but
the state was also a stronghold of support for Musa Hitam, w h o endorsed
the strategy of making the by-election into a referendum on Dr Mahathir's
leadership of the govemment and the party. Many Malay Johore p o l i -
d a n s had suffered political losses and denial of patronage due to their
association with Musa, so there was a regional accumulation of disaffection
which could be cultivated by the opposition in the Johore Bahru by-
election.
T h e Johore Bahru constituency was primarily urban and approximated
the national ethiuc distribution, having 48.4 per ccnt Malays, 40.1 per
ceni Chinese, 8.5 per cent Indians, and 3 per cent others. The D A P
decided not to contest the seat, thus by inference indicating its support of
Shahrir. A straight fight widi the BN was not possible, however, since
the P S R M , buoyed by its excellent showing in the Tanjung Puieri by-
d e c t i o n , was tmwilling to defer to Shahrir as the sole candidate repres-
enting a combined opposition. Once again Abdul Razak Ahmad was
nominated by the PSRM, while the BN nominated as its candidate
Mas'ud Abdul Rahman, a former teacher, an official of the local U M N O
Baru. and a first-time candidate. Shahrir Abdul Samad was nonunated as
an Independent, but was supponed by the combined efforts of the yet
unregistered Semangai '46 grouping.
For several weeks in August, the Johore Bahru by-election dominated
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 245

national attention and was ueaied by all parties as a virtual referendum

on the many controversial actions of the government since the last general
election in 1986. Backed by the massive resources of the BN and with the
active panicipation of the Prime Minister and other top leaders, Mas'ud
Abdul Rahman was all but forgotten in the actual campaigning. The BN
campaign stressed the economic recovery which by then was in full swing
and was creating many new jobs. In addition, Ghafar Baba announced
plans for a M$230 million project to build a new causeway to Singapore,
as well as a M$27 million increase in other grants to Johore Bahru,
presumably contingent upon the voters making the right choice in the
fonhcoming by-election. T h e BN campaign stressed the need for Malay
unity and attempted to exploit the tacit alignment of the D A P with
Shahrir's campaign, raising tbe spectre of "Chinese power' as a device to
generate Malay support. Yet, when Dr Mahathir made his campaign
appearance in Johore Bahru, he claimed that the BN was the only party
able to guarantee a fair representation to all communities and predicted
that the voters would give it an easy victory.
In the poster campaign, Shahrir was overwhelmed by at least 2 0 - 1
with tons of BN posters festooned all over the city. In the media, Shahrir
was all but squeezed out of news coverage in papers and denied access to
television. Even so, his door-tondoor campaign was waged by enthusiastic
supporters, including a number of prominent Malays w h o lent their
efforts to his campaign. Tunku Abdul Rahman appeared twice, announc-
ing that the e l e a i o n was a choice between 'dictatorship and democracy'.
Tengku Razaleigh and Rais Yatim campaigned actively while Musa
Hitam left a video-tape, which was widely circulated, of a speech in
which he made a scathing attack on Dr Mahathir, accusing him of being
anogant, domineering, and authoritarian in Cabinet meetings and un-
willing to listen to diverse opinions. Adopting the symbol of three keys,
representing multi-ethnic co-operation, Shahrir solicited support from all
communities and effectively utilized his Chinese wife in tbe campaign.
By focusing primarily on corruption, abuse of power, and Dr Mahathir's
'style of leadership', his campaign sought to articulate grievances in all
communities, but did not attempt to formulate a full range of public
policy options for a future alternative government. Much attention was
given to the destruction of 'old U M N O ' and the refusal of the govem-
ment to hold discussions on Malay unity. While he did not repudiate the
ISA, he criticized its 'abuse' and opposed the recent ISA amendments
prohibiting any court challenges by detainees. He also called for tbe
release all political detainees 50 and supported the cause of suspended
Lord President Salleh Abas and the five Supreme Court justices, citing
Mahathir's actions in those cases as prime examples of the escalating
trend toward authoritarian govemment. 5 1

Contrary to the predictions of die local press that the election would be
close, the vote represented a major r e p u t a t i o n of the B N . Shahrir Abdul
Samad won by 63.57 per cent to the 29.56 per cent garnered by the BN
candidate, Mas'ud Abdul Rahman. Shahrir had recaptured his seat by
increasing his margin of victory from 2,235 in 1986 to 12,595. Inde-
246 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

pendent analysis of the results reveals that he gained a majority of

Chinese votes and from 70 per cem to 74 per cent of Malay votes. 52
Although only a by-election which involved no change in the parlia-
mentary distribution of seats, the results represented a devastating
psychological and symbolic defeat for the government and greatly buoyed
the hopes of the opposition grouped under the banner of Semangat '46.
For a time, the Malay opposition considered the tactic of forcing
further by-elections by resignations of sitting legislators. T h i s tactic was
eventually discarded as counter-productive since a win did not change the
political balance. Yet, additional by-elections were soon to occur in any
event. One week after the Johore Bahru by-election, the Johore State
Assembly Speaker died, leaving vacant the state constituency of Parit
Raja, a predominantly rural area not far from Batu Pahat where voters
were 80 per cent Malay. This reladvely minor State Assembly seat
attracted much attendon as a barometer of rural Malay opinion. Once
again, U M N O Baru and the Semangat '46 group locked horns in a
contest to demonstrate their popular support, especially among die
Malays. Represendng U M N O Baru was Mohamed Yasin Kamari, while
the Semangat '46 banner was carried by Hamdan Yahya, who contested
as an Independent. Five other Independents also entered the race, some
apparendy secredy supported by U M N O Baru to confuse voters
sympadiizing widi the Malay opposidon and also to claim the "Three
Keys' election symbol used so successfully by Shahrir in the carrier by-
election. By law, when two candidates claim the same symbol, it is
awarded to neither thus the tactic forced the Independeni supported by
Semangat "46 lo adopt another symbol—for this election, the much less
appealing symbol of a fish was selected for the Semangat '46 candidate.
Again, in the campaign, Dr Mahathir"s leadership became the main
issue. This t i m e , just before the election Dr Mahathir made his proposal
for Malay unity talks, thus undercutdng some of the earlier accusations
made by the opposition about U M N O Baru 'splitting the M a l a y s . Under
more favourable condiuons than the previous by-election, the BN w o n by
7,262 to 6,849—an extremely narrow 413-vote margin of v i c t o r y . "

T h e most important by-election in the series took place on 28 January

1989 in the parliamentary consumency of Ampang Jaya on the outskirts
of Kuala Lumpur where the registered voters were 67 per cent Malay,
27 per cent Chinese, and 5 per cent Indian. The by-election was required
to fill the seat vacated when Dr Lim Ann Koon of the MCA resigned his
scat in Parliament. Although he claimcd "exhaustion" as the reason for his
retirement from politics, it appeared to many that the political importence
of the M C A in the BN may have been the primary factor influencing his
decision. At the u m e there were public accusations, denied by him, that
his resignation had been instigated by the Semangat '46 faction.
Because the vacated seat had been held by the M C A , the BN left its
defence to the MCA. After various representations within the B N , the
candidate agreed upon was Ong Tee Kiat, w h o had been political
secretary to M C A Deputy President Lee Kim Sai. Even before the BN
announced its candidate, the Semangat '46 faction decided to sponsor the
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 247

candidacy of H a m n idris, the venerable and controversial Malay poliu-

cian w h o had been Menteri Besar of Selangor in 1969 and for many years
had been a close friend and politicial ally of Tunku Abdul Rahman.
In the earlier by-elections, Dr Mahathir and his 'style of leadership'
had been the primary issue. In the Ampang Jaya election, the often
stormy past of Harun Idris became as much of an issue as Dr Mahaihir's
leadership traits. H a m n ' s role in the 1969 May Thirteendi Crisis and his
subsequent conviction and prison sentence on corruption charges were
inaticrs that voters could hardly ignore. Although he undoubtedly still
had a small core of loyal Malay supponers from the 1960s, when he built
U M N O Youth into a formidable political force, most of his following had
abandoned him over the years. He was now faced wiih an entirely new
task of forging a broad base of Malay s u p p o n while also appealing
for a substantial following among non-Malays. The legacy of Harun's
past somewhat overshadowed the earlier positive image created by
Semangat '46 in the Johore by-election waged by Shahrir Abdul Samad.
That campaign had stressed idealism, inter-ethnic coalition, and youth
mobilized against c o m i p t i o n , patronage, and entrenched power brokers.
With Harun Idris as the standard-bearer, it was extremely difficult
to avoid a credibility problem when any of these earlier themes was
raised.
By January 1989, U M N O Baru and the BN mobilized dieir massive
resources to s u p p o n the little-known MCA candidate, Ong T e e Kiat.
Instead of concentrating on defending Dr Mahathir, the BN campaign
attacked the credibility of the entire Semangat '46 faction, which by then
was showing signs of iniental dissension. After Shahrir's by-election
victory, he had refused to take the oath of office required before assuming
his seat in Parliament. His action was in protest against the Speaker
administering the oath, w h o had been a member of the Tribunal which
had recommended the impeachment of Lord President Salleh Abas by
the Agong. 5 4 In both the Parit Raja and the Ampang Jaya by-elections,
the BN exploited this, and other obstructionist u a i c s , of tbe opposition,
to make the argument that a vote for any member of the dissident Malay
f a a i o n was a wasted vote and merely prolonged Malay disunity and petty
factionalism. The argument for Malay unity was made more compelling
by the concessions offered by U M N O Baru in its public statement
accepting the 'unity' resolutions drafted by the Johore Malay Unity
Fonim.55
T h e Ampang Jaya by-election results provided conclusive evidence
that the BN had turned the tide against the 'Old U M N O ' dissidents. T h e
M C A candidate, even while contesting in a Malay-majority constituency,
had gained 23,719 votes and 54 per cent of the t o u l to the 19,469 and
44 per cent gained by Harun Idris. 56 T h e results reveal that Harun had
failed to attract majority support among Malays and had been even less
successful among non-Malays. Although the BN margin of victory had
been substantially reduced from that of 1986, the party had reconstruct-
ed a winning coalition and the fortunes of the rather amorphous
Semangat '46 grouping had been dealt an u n e x p e a e d l y crushing defeat,
248 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

the results of which would force its leaders to reconsider their options
and tactics.

Rebalance of the Barisan Nasional

The political struggle between U M N O Baru and the Malay dissident

faction had affected not only the courts and the institution of the
monarchy but also the iniemal politics of die Barisan Nasional. While
Dr Mahaihir's role wiihin the BN had been enhanced by the changes
initiated by the formation of U M N O B a m , he was forced to pay heed to
the possibiUty of political realignments that might jeopardize the basic
coalition formula of the B N . While the compeiidon widi Team B or its
successor Semangat '46 was being waged with intensiiy, neither side
could afford to appear to be making concessions to non-Malays, Yet,
when the series of by-elecdons began as a challenge to the government's
mandate, it was die vote of both the Malays and the non-Malays which
determined the outcome. Consequently, over time there was a subtle shift
in political ahgnments within the BN as the political struggle within the
Malay community unfolded.
When the political crisis developed in October and November 1987
over rising demands by Chinese groups for changes in education policy
and other issues, the government responded with a hard line, arresting
some 106 persons under the ISA. TTie MCA did not openly condemn the
arrests, but both its President and Deputy President left the country on
'indefinite leave'. 57 Upon their return, the MCA engaged in a series of
soul-searching exercises attempting to formulate both political position
papers on issues and to draft contingent political strategies designed to
promoie more effectively Chinese interests in the context of the changing
political environment, A small group of advisers and consultants from the
professions and the academic community were recruited as a 'Think
Tank' to consider long-term political issues, evaluate priorities, and draft
position papers for the M C A leadership. Major attention was given to the
issue of what policy positions the MCA should take regarding the
replacement of the N E P after it expired in 1990. This process produced
not only confidential strategy and position papers, but also a public
document resulting from a 'political seminar' of consultants. Eventually,
the process of policy review generated a series of position papers that
were published as a book entitled The Future of Malaysian Chinese. 58
Essenually, these documents proposed that the party move away from
old-style patronage politics and shon-term political calculations in favour
of strategies to preserve the longer-term interests of die Chinese com-
munity, which was predicted to decrease in both numbers and relative
political power over the coming decades. Rational, pragmatic, and non-
confrontational approaches to politics were believed to be more successful,
while the proposed policy positions tended to favour an emphasis on
legiumate minonly rights and policies to assure that the Chinese secured
a fair share of public benefiis through the extension to the Chinese
community of the system of quotas for allocation of public goods and
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 249

services in proportion to its size within the country as a whole. In effect,

Malay rights and privileges were to be balanced by some public recogni-
tion of Chinese rights and privileges, at least in the views of some of the
members of the M C A 'Think Tank'.
T h e issue of minority rights became a recurring theme in speeches of
M C A President Dr Ling Liong Sik. In apparent response to this line of
political argument, Dr Mahathir, when he was invited to the MCA
General Assembly in 1988, addressed the issue of minority rights. While
promising that the 'freedom and democratic rights' of minorities would
be protected, he cautioned that it would not be 'at the expense of the
majority'. Without using the term, he appeared to subscribe to the
doctrine that the rights of a 'silent majority' should not be circumscribed
in an effort to placate an 'activist minority'. He summarized his views of
minority rights with the statement, 'While the Govemment will not
suppress the freedom and rights of the minority groups and individuals,
the actions of the Utter should not jeopardise the general well-being of
society.' 59
Although the M C A had been reasonably successful in getting the
governmenl to agree to a financial rescue package for the insolvent
Chinese deposit-taking co-operatives in Febniary 1988, it had been
unable to make any headway on most other issues of great concern to the
Chinese community. In particular, the issues of the promotion of non-
Mandarin-speaking principals in Chinese-medium schools, of increased
services for the Chinese 'new villages', and many other questions related
to the implementation of the N B P were effectively placed 'off limits' for
political discussion and negotiation at the highest levels of the administra-
u o n . Because the MCA leaders were being largely ignored in policy
matters, some M C A members began making overtures to the
Semangat '46 faction and openly discussed the option of attempting to
realign Malaysian politics by affiliating with that faction. Instead, Dr Ling
dccided on remaining within the B N , but expressed his displeasure
with the processes of consultation and a c c o m o d a t i o n within the govern-
ment by taking an 'unpaid leave of absence' of six weeks and leaving the
country' during October and November 1988.
After the government's devastating defeat in the Johore Bahru by-
election, the government exhibited slightly more sensitivity to Chinese
demands. Plans for the expansion of Chinese schools were approved,
and Dr Mahathir made a widely publicized declaration in October that
the BN would honour all election pledges, 'although it may take some
time'. 60 For the 1986 election the BN had promised to repeal Section 21(2)
of the Education Act which gave the Minister of Education power to
c o n v e n vernacular Chinese and Tamil schools to the Malay medium of
instruction. The M C A also claimed that olher BN promises regarding
Chinese education and the 'new villages' remained unfulfilled. Disputes
over these matters had been contributing factors in the political crisis of
October and November 1987 which led to the mass detentions under the
ISA of leading dissidents and critics of the regime. 61 N o w , when the
Chinese and Indian votes were more cmcial in overcoming the political
250 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

challenge of Semangat '46, the earlier promises were being reiterated, but
without reference to any specific issue. This was apparently to avoid a
repetition of the counter-mobilization of Malay opinion as had occurred
in the escalating tensions of 1987. As before, the question of when the
election promises would finally be implemented was left to the indefinite
future.
After several decades of frustration and despair within the M C A and
among a number of other non-Malay political parties, some strategists
were openly counselling against any moves at political realignment.
Although competition between factions of the Malay community had
intensified demands for assertion of Malay supremacy in politics, there
were some who believed that the split in U M N O could also evolve
towards a two-party system where there would be a natural competition
for the support of politically agile minority groups. In such an environ-
ment, some reasoned, racial politics would become blurred and sensitivity
to minority interests would, of necessity, become essential for political
survival. For this reason, a number of leaders and policy analysis in non-
Malay parties, particularly within the M C A , hoped that the factional
divisions within the Malay society would be perpetuated and become a
permanent feature of the Malaysian political landscape.

E c o n o m i c R e c o v e r y and Salvage M a n a g e m e n t

The gradual reassertion of the political supremacy of Dr Mahathir and

the political coalition built around UMNO Baru was not just a matter of
astute political manoeuvring and the judicious and relentless exercise of
powers that derive from incumbency. It was also a product of an
economic recovery following a devastating two or three-year cycle of
recession. In 1980 Malaysia had experienced real growth in G N P of
7.8 per cent. It fluctuated between 5.9 per cent and 7 . 8 per cent until
1984, when it plunged to minus 1.0 per cent in 1985 and then recovered
slightly with 2.1 per cent growth in 1986. Economic recovery began
slowly in 1987 with a G N P growth of 4 . 8 per cent and finally full
recovery was achieved by 1988 with a growth rale of 8.7 per cent. 63 T h e
primary cause of Malaysia's economic slump was the depressed state of
the world economy, which in turn created a critical decbnc in the prices
of major export commodities, especially tin, palm-oil, rubber, and
petroleum. For Malaysia, the lean years of 1 9 8 5 - 7 coincided with Daim
Zainuddin's tenure as Minister of Finance. After a shaky start w h e n he
was accused of making decisions involving conflict of interest with his
private investments, he gradually emerged as a mainstay of the Mahathir
Administration in the formulation of a package of economic policies
designed to meet the challenge of the recession. Enjoying the complete
confidence of Dr Mahathir, he placed economic growth at the top of the
government's priorities and proceeded to make many hard decisions
based on his assessment of the h a n h economic realities facing Malaysia.

With falling government revenues and a decline in export earnings,

government spending was drastically curtailed while efforts were made to
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 251

reduce external borrowing. Much attention was given to the promotion of

foreign investment by offers of favourable joint ventures and through
relaxing the ethnic equity requirements of the Industrial Coordination
Act. Both corporate and individual income taxes were reduced, while the
tax base was broadened through more efficient collection of taxes from
those w h o previously had succeeded in avoiding income tax payments.
S o m e rather controvenial decisions were also made to order sututory
bodies, including the Employees Provident Fund, to make domestic
investments designed to stimulate the economy and promote key develop-
ment projeas. Perhaps the most difficult economic decisions for Finance
Minister Daim were those involving the Bumiputra corporations and
enterprises that had become so reliant on government contracts, direct
g o v e m m e n t funding, and various programmes of g o v e r m e n t subsidies.
During the Mahathir Administration, there had been a tremendous
build-up of public enterprises that were designed to provide the means
whereby Malays could gain a stake in the m o d e m industrial seciore of die
economy, in the form of employment, management positions and, ulti-
mately, ownership and control. These enterprises were known as Non-
Financial Public Enterprises ( N F P E s ) or 'off-budget agencies' because of
their autonomy, even though they were assisted and under-written with
public funds. By 1984, when Daim was appointed Minister of Finance,
the N F P E s were spending M $ 7 . 2 billion per year, a s u m which consti-
tuted 46 per cent of public expenditure. Under the constraints of a light
economy, Daim was forced to lake a hard line to stop this haemorrhage
of public funds to support inefficient and unproguble Bumiputra cor-
porations. He not only trimmed down N F P E grants and subsidies to the
level of M$3.5 billion by 1987, but he also forced them to improve
efficiency, become more competitive, and, ultimately, focus on the
bottom line of their financial pheeu. Daim wamed: 'A good management
team is able to adapt the company to changes in the economy and look

for altemarives, and not to make excuses one after another...................If you fail,
you must have the courage to resign. If you don't, you may be
sacked..............In Japan, if they fail, they commit hara kiri.' 64
S o m e of the most prestigious public enterprises which depended on
continuous and massive infusion of govenmient money were those formed
during the early years of the Mahathir Administration, the heyday of the
'Look East' policy. In 1986, under the pressure of budget deficits, Daim
Zainuddin began taking a hard look at the govemment stake in money-
losing enterprises. By January 1988 he had identified 60 financially weak
g o v e m m c n i - o w n e d companies and suggested three options: closure,
rehabilitation, or privatization. 65 The biggest drain on government rev-
enues came from the losses sustained by Heavy Industries Corporation
of Malaysia ( H I C O M ) and iu subsidiaries in cement, steel, and major
cars. While these heavy industries had been the pet projects of
Dr Mahathir in tbe years from 1982 to 1985, under a revised Industrial
Master Plan (IMP) formulated to address the problems of ailing indus-
tries, 66 some of the most prestigious industries came under critical
scrutiny for what was called 'structural adjustment'—meaning their re-
252 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

organization in order to transform money-losing enterprises into viable

and profitable enterprises in as short a period as possible.
Part of the problem with the heavy industries involved low produc-
tivity, low plant utilization, and depressed foreign and domestic markets,
the appreciating value of the Japanese yen, however, created a tremend-
o u s financial burden for many of the industries formed in the 'Look
East' era. Huge Japanese development loans had been offered at from
6 per cent to 8 per cent but were usually tied to escalating Japanese
currency rales. These initially low interest rates, when calculated in
Malaysian currency, had gradually increased to effecdve rates of between
18 per ccnt and 30 per cent, thus proving to be a crippling burden on
heavy industries attempting to become established during a period of
economic retrenchment and unstable world market conditions." 67
In 1988, the government had to budget M$532 million to cover the
M $ 2 7 8 nuUion in losses by HICOM in 1987, in addition to losses
sustained by other government-opcraied indusiries. A subsidiary of
HICO.M, Kedah Cement, became the first major pubhc enterprise to be
'restructured' after it reported losses of M$68 million in 1987, After
refinancing with Japanese loans of V17 billion (US$I38 million), a new
managemeni leam was installed, headed by a Malaysian Chinese from the
private sector.
Steel was another industry that absorbed large sums of public money.
Perwaja Trengganu had been founded as a joint Japanese-Malaysian
enterprise to produce steel. The plant in Trengganu had been constructed
at a cost of M$1.2 billion, with ihe object of producing hot briquette iron
using Malaysian ore and the low-cost natural gas produced from off-shore
petroleum operations. The new plant had been constructed with the
assistance of Nippon Steel using very- advanced and untested technology.
After operations began, it was discovered ihat the technology' was not
appropriate for Malaysia's low-grade, lumpy iron ore, and the plant
never met the technical specifications promised by Nippon Steel. While
steel could be produced by a higher proportion of scrap steel with
Malaysian ore as feedstock, the iron billets produced were of mixed
quahiy. Although the domesdc price of steel was set by the government,
the world price of sieel made the plant uneconomic. Eventually, Nippon
Steel made a payment of US$179.2 million plus a second payment of
M$47 million for its failure to meet technical specifications, and assisted
wiih a major Japanese bank syTidicaie refinancing and loan package for
Perwaja. These new loans i n a e a s e d the liabilities of Perwaja lo
M $ 2 . l billion, while its operating losses in 1987 continued at the level of
M$180 million. A new management team headed by Eric Chia, who had
been the head of Proton marketing operations, took over in 1987 to
restruoure and rationalize Perwaja. Because of recurring problems in the
steel industry, by the middle of 1989 the government embarked on an
ambitious plan to rationalize ihe whole steel industry involving three
state-owned and three private steel companies. N e w plant equipment was
purchased for Perwaja—four electric-are furnaces, a casting plant, and a
rolling mill. The mell shop was convened to using 95 per cent scrap and
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 253

5 per cent imported hot briquette iron produced by Sabah Gas Indus-
tries in Labuan. By 1989 the production of billet iron had reached
40 000 tonnes per month, while molten steel production had attained the
level of 80 000 tonnes a month.
Despite the increasing productivity of Perwaja, the enterprise continued
to sustain major losses. To address this problem, the government formu-
lated plans to rationalize the entire steel industry from smelting to semi-
finished products so as to reduce duplication and improve plant utilization
and efficiency. Even so, the prospects for Perwaja, as the primary steel
producer, remained uncertain. For 1989 Perwaja invested M$700 million
in additional plant equipment to add to its accumulated debt and losses of
M $ 2 . 6 5 billion. This lime, the Japanese banking consortium was un-
willing to invest further in Perwaja, leaving the govemment little option
but to proceed with a new financial restructuring which resulted in
51 per ccnt of the stock being held by a newly formed entity—the
Minister of Finance Incorporated—thus leaving the Malaysian Govem-
meni itself once again as the principal stock holder and guarantor of that
troubled industry. 68
T h e other major industry to be targeted for the 'structural adjustment'
programme under the revised Industrial Master Plan was car manufac-
turing. As recounted earlier in Chapter 4, Malaysia had embarked on
the production of a 'national car' in 1985 in a joint venture between the
HICOM subsidiary, Pcrusahaan Otomobil Nasional (Proton), and
the Mitsubishi industrial conglomerate of Japan. The automobile, known
as the Proton Saga, was viewed as the crowning achievement in the
Industrial Master Plan which was to bring Malaysia to the status of a
Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) wiihin a few short years..At.lhCi
time, the government realized that car production would be a losing
proposition for a few years, but it was expected that profits could be
realized as Malaysian content and production volume increased. Govern-
ment analysts projected an annual 10 per cent domestic market growth
from the 1983 domestic Malaysian market level of 90,000 cars per year,
thus assuming that the domestic market would increase to about 120,000
per year by 1986, of which the Proton Saga was expected to capture
about two-thirds, or about 80,000 units per year. In accordance with
these projections, the Proton plant was built so that its productive
capacity attained the level of 80,000 units per year for 1986 and about
120,000 for 1987. T h e increased capacity was for exports, which were
expected to reach 2 0 , 0 0 0 - 3 0 , 0 0 0 per year by 1987. Unfonunately, w i t h
the recession and other factors, the Malaysian domestic market shrank to
a level that was only 36 per cent of IMP projections for 1986. Further-
more, the expected export of the Proton Saga to the United Sutes was
repeatedly delayed because of problems in modifying the vehicle to meet
US specifications. the old-design engine provided by Mitsubishi for the
Proton Saga could not pass emission control standards. Even equipped
with the newest-version Mitsubishi Cyclone engine, there were oiher
problems of vehicle safety modifications, as well as the problems of
establishing a vast dealer network to compete on the North American
254 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

market. T h e reqiured modifications and the distribution network for the

Proion Saga were contracted to Bricklin Industries under the direction of
Malcolm Bricklin. He was the Canadian entrepreneur w h o had earlier
gone bankrupt in attempting to produce his own car for the North
American market; he was now back in business with his revived com-
pany, which had acquired distribution rights for the lowest-priced car on
the United States market—the Yugo—manufactured by Yugoslavia, in its
bid to find a short cut to advanced indusirial staius. For various reasons,
the US launch date for the i m p o n of the Proton Saga kept being
postponed until it receded into the indefinite future.
Operating at greatly reduced capacity, the Proion plant could only
produce vehicles at a loss. In 1987, with a production capacity of 10,000
per month, h was able to sell only about 2,000 per month in Malaysia
and less than 100 per month for expon to the small and scattered markets
of Bangladesh, N e w Zealand, Malta, Papua N e w Guinea, and Jamaica.
E f f o n s to secure the co-operation of Mitsubishi to promote world-wide
e x p o n of the Proton Saga ran into the complication that it competed
direcdy with Mitsubishi's Lancer model, upon which the Proton Saga
design had been based. Although Malaysian content had been increased
each year, the rising value of the yen made the Japanese-produced
components more expensive, escalated interest payments, and added to
the enormous debt denominated in yen. In 1987, the Malaysian tax-payer
was subsidizing the basic M$8.000 price for each Proton Saga sold by
about M$1,000 per unit, while independent industry analysts were
calculating that a subsidy of somewhere between 20 per cent and 50 per
cent would be required to break into the US car market. Proton reported
losses of M$46.5 million in 1986, MS39 million in 1987, and
M $ 5 2 million in 1988.69 What had been billed as Malaysia's 'Dream Car'
had turned into a financial nightmare.
Under the direction of Finance Ministcr Daim. a task force was set up
to propose a 'struciural adjustment' remedy for Proton's ailments. Appar-
ently, the first option explored M-as to turn the entire operational
management of the facility over to Mitsubishi and allow the Proton Saga
to becomc micgrated into its world-wide production and sales network.
For various reasons, perhaps related to the terms demanded by
Mitsubishi, this option was rejected. Instead, a Japanese management
team was recruited from Miuubishi Motor Corporation to replace the
existing Malay directors of Proton who either resigned or were dismissed.
Charged vriih the task of revitalizing the subsidy-dependent industry ww
the new managing director, Kenji Iwabuchi, assisted by K y o Fujioka,
appointed head of corporate planning. 70
Within a few weeks of taking office, the new management team
announced to numerous sceptics thai Proton Saga would break even in
1990 if exports reached established targets.71 Previously, great efforts had
been made to break into major export markets, only to discover that such
entry was extremely difficult and existing subsidies woukl most likely
need to be increased under more stringent competition. Earlier in the
year, the Proton, stripped of us second name because of the negative
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 255

connotation of 'Saga' in English, made its first entry to the European

market when it was introduced in Ireland. By August 19S6, production
was increased from 3,200 units to 4,000 units per month, partly in
response to & reviving domestic market. Elaborate plans were made for
introduction of the Proton to both the United States and the United
Kingdom, 7 2 but there remained the problems of production a m i , the
rising yen, safety and pollution certification, dealer networks, tariffs, and
non-trade barriers. To a number of observers, entry by the Proton to the
world's two largest car markets appeared to be too formidable to
surmount. Yet dial is precisely what the government decided was needed
as the only practical remedy for the loss-addicted industry.
In September 1988 Dr Mahathir went to Europe to promote the
concept of free trade for Malaysian goods in the period after 1992, when
the single European Common Market was scheduled to begin. After
stops in Germany and Belgium, he proceeded to London, w h m he bad
talks with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. These concluded with the
signing of a memorandum of undemanding providing for an initial
purchase by Malaysia of an estimated £1.5 billion of new British-made
weapons, including the expensive and technologically very advanced
Tornado fighter-bomber, the Rapier anti-aircraft defence system, and
other advanced armaments and weapons for dw Malaysian army. Because
the arms purchases were merely tbe fint insulment of a 10- to 15-yesr
package of arms purchases, British sources estimated that the complete
package would be worth about £7 billion, or approximately M$31 billion
at the 1988 exchange rate.73 The military purchases were to be paid for
largely through counter-trade in the form of oil and other commodities.
In justifying the arms agreement, Dr Mahathir explained that the new
arms agreement was necessary for Malaysian defence, but he also stressed
that it was part of a larger strategy to boost Malaysia's exports. 74
Less than a month after the arms deal with Britain had been signed,
the Proton made iu debut in the United Kingdom. Although Malaysia
had formulated plans for the sale of 48,000 Proton to Britain a year
before, 7 5 it was only after Dr Mahathir's arms talks with Margaret
Thatcher that the fint c a n actually arrived in Britain. What remained
unclear was whether the nussive arms deal bad been used to lever open
the remaining o b s u d e s to the import of the Proton to Britain. T h e
trade-arms linkage n u y also make it difficult to calculate real costs and
indirect subsidies in bodi t e u of exchanges. Malaysian car executives
were also aware that in 1992 the massive European Common Market
would be opened for Proton sales. Before then, they were expecting to
launch their product in the N o n h American market. Whether Malaysia
could compete and l u m a profit in such competitive environment
remained to be answered. At least, for the time being, t u n e of the
problems of the under-utilized Proton production facilities were finally
being addressed.
By mid-1988, the prices of tin. rubber, and palm-oil bad all recovered
to give Ihe economy renewed vigour. In addition, rates of foreign
investment increased as new money and capital entered the country.
256 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Malaysia's economic recovery had been impressive, but the high priority
given to condnued economic growth focused political attention on another
issue: access to the United States market for the full range of its products.
At risk was Malaysia's status as a preferred trading partner under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as provided by the tariff statutes
of the United States. The rise of protecuonist sentiment within the United
States, pardy as a result of the large trade with Asian states, had made the
US Congress much more willing to consider the termination of GSP
staius for couniries diat were engaged in 'unfair' trade practices or where
workers or citizens were abused or exploited by their govemment or by
their employers. Protectionist sentiment was particularly s u o n g among
American organized labour, and it was feared thai they might become the
most vocal opponents of extension of GSP status to Malaysia. At stake
were tariff concessions that would translate into 75,000 jobs in Malaysia. 76
Because Malaysia's GSP privileges came under review towards the end of
1988 by Congress and the federal agencies concemed with trade issues,
Malaysia began by preparing its GSP petition and other supporting
evidence for submission by Malaysia's Ambassador to the United States,
A l b e n Talalla,
Government concern over the renewal of GSP status may have been a
factor in the release from ISA detention of V. David and six others,
V. David was a prominent leader of the Malaysian Trades Union
Congress as well as a Member of Parliament of the D A P . He had been
one of the 106 people detained in October 1988 and was finally released
on 3 June the next year. Raiher than show his gratitude by keeping a low-
public profile, he instead sent a petition to the American Federation of
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) purport-
edly asking for Malaysia's GSP status to be revoked because of human
righis violations. 77 Although he had been released, others still remained in
ISA detention, including die leader of die D A P , Lim Kit Siang. V. David
apparently wished to remind his counterparts in the American labour
movement of some of the repressive political conditions encountered in
Malaysia, T h e action of V. David prompted an immediate scathing attack
by Dr Mahathir, w h o accused him of having "no loyalty to the rakyat
[common people] and the c o u n t r y . Even the Malaysian Trades Union
Congress joined in the chorus of criticism directed against the union
leader. Under such pressure, V. David sent a cable to the A F L - C I O
asking that his petition be dropped. He also stated to his critics that he
had no guilt or remorse over his action. Eventually, his explanations were
accepted by the Malaysian Trades Union Congress. On the part of the
g o v e m m e n t , there was no hint of guilt or remorse over Malaysia's record
of human righis, which was, in any event, assumed by Malaysia's leaders
not to be relevant to the renewal of Malaysia's GSP s u t u s . 7 8

Three weeks after Malaysia submitted its petition to the US Govern-

ment for renewal of its GSP s u t u s , Labour Minisier Lee Kim Sal made
the surprising announcement that Malaysia's labour laws were being
changed to permit workers in tbe electronics industry to be represented
by unions. H i t h e n o , the electronics industry had been one of the newer
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 257

expanding industries proteacd by laws prohibiting labour unions. With

the economic recovery generating a new momentum, large sums of
foreign funds were being invested once again in the electronics industry,
which also produced exports most affected by GSP status. Spokesmen for
the industry claimed that the decision was made without consultation
with them, but Lee Kim Sai claimed that they had been informed two
years earlier about a tentative decision to permit the formation of labour
unions among workers in the electronics industry. Four days after Lee
K i m Sai's announcement about electronics tmions, the bearings on
Malaysia's GSP status began in Washington, DC before the inter-agency
Trade Policy Staff Committee. The week after the hearings began,
Dr Mahathir himself appeared in the United States to address investors,
news editors, the United Nations General Assembly, and others to bring
the message that Malaysia was 'still democratic', a worthy and trusted
trading partner, and an excellent site for new foreign investment. In due
course, Malaysia's GSP status was renewed by the US President without
too much public criticism or dissent and without much attention to
Malaysia's human rights record. 79

Heart-felt R e s p o n s e s

As the year 1989 began, it was apparent that Dr Mahathir had not only
sun'ived a very serious challenge to his political leadership but had in the
process gready enhanced his power to the point where be was completely
undaunted by criticism and unassailable by opponents. While some
critics remained vocal, they were reladvely poweriess. Even institutional
restraints placed on the office of Prime Minister appeared to be of linle
import after the judiciary had been re-educated in the school of practical
policies so as to accept Dr Mahathir's perspectives on the doctrine of
'judicial restraint'. Other institutions—Parliament and the civil service—
too, merely added to or complemented the power and prestige of the
Prime Minister as it was being utilized to its legal and symbolic limits by
Dr Mahathir. That did nol mean that Dr Mahathir was unmindful of die
variety of political demands being generated or diat he ignored the
interesu of any substantial segment of the country. It did mean, however,
that those w h o sought to a f f e a public policy had to do so through the
processes and according to the terms and conditions defined by
Dr Mahathir. It was apparent to all but his most naive and bitter critics
that Dr Mahathir was at the zenith of his career and his political power.
T h e next stage of the political process scheduled for 1989 involved the
formulation of tbe broad policy objectives which would carry the country
into the twenty-first century. From such a commanding position of
power, Dr Mahathir would be in a position to put his s u m p on tbe future
in as decisive a fashion as T u n Abdul Razak had done when the N E P had
been formulated two decades eariier. It was, titerefore, a maner of some
surprise and much speculation when the Deputy Prime Minister, Ghafar
Baba, appeared to deliver Dr Mahathir's address to the h n i sessions of
the National Economic Consulutive Council ( N E C C ) formed to advise
258 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

the government and formulate policy opuons lo replace the N e w Eco-

nomic Policy due to expire in 1990. It was casually reported in the papers
that Dr Mahathir had checked into hospital for a check-up after com-
plaining of mild chest pains. T h e official announcement stated ihat
Dr Mahathir had been diagnosed as having 'a mild ischaemia [local
anaemia] in the from portion of the heart muscle' and would be in hospital
for about two weeks. 8 0 Very quickly, the capital was rife with rumours
that, contrary to reports, he had sustained a very serious hean attack.
Five days after the first announcement, the papers carried the announce-
ment dial Dr Mahathir was successfully recovering from heart bypass
surgery. 81
Although a spokesman for the government depicted Dr Mahathir as
opting for a local operation in order to show his faith that local medical
expertise was comparable with medical services in developed countries,
oral repons from members of the surgical team Indicate that his heart
attack had been so serious and so life-threatening that there was no
option but to operate as soon as possible. In preparation for the operation,
the precaution was taken of securing the services of an American h e a n
speciahst as consultant, who assisted the Malaysian team. On 24 January
the leam operated on Dr Mahathir to insull five coronary bypass arteries.
Despite the severity of the heart attack, the press continued to report his
condition as 'mild ischacmia'. 82
T h e implications of Dr Mahathir's illness were obvious lo all w h o were
politically astute. Even so, no local papers provided any candid analysis
or evaluation for their readers, Instead, medical sources were now quoted
as saying d u t Dr Mahathir would not return to work for about three
months and that his full strength would return in about six months. The
pubhc was left widt die impression that Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar
Baba would keep everything at a steady helm until Dr Mahathir could
return, with no important consequences for the govemment or for long-
range political considerations. While this aura of 'normalcy' was projected
by the government-conirolled press, a spate of rumours and specula-
lions circulated concerning the short- and long-term implications of
Dr Mahathir's h e a n attack. Very shortly, it became obvious that many
Malaysian political leaders were making uctical moves or trimming their
political saib to be able to respond to potential alternative scenarios
regarding Dr Mahaihir's likely continued tenure as Prime Minister.
T h e most immediate and publicized change of tack came from Musa
Hitam, w h o , on 30 January, just one week after Dr Mahathir's operation,
announced that he was joining U M N O Baru. Four other politicians from
Semangat '46 were also mentioned as about to join U M N O Baru 'to
restore unity'. 83 Because these moves had involved behind-the-scenes
negotiations over an extended period, Musa could sustain some credibility
when he later claimed that Dr Mahaihir's illness had no part in his
decision,
Musa's return to the fold of the reconstituted U M N O Baru was openly
praised and applauded by a number of prominent Malay leaders. At die
same time, he was criticized by others w h o objected to the f a n that there
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 259

appeared to be no penance conditions for bis earlier a a s of'rebellion and

defiance' against Dr Mahathir's leadership of the revived party. Further-
more, Musa was accused of being inconsistent and unrepentant, particu-
larly since he had api»rendy backed Harun Idris's campaign in tbe
Ampang Jaya by-election, which had resulted in Harun's defeat only two
days before the announcement of Musa's decision to join U M N O Baru.
Musa was not offered a Cabinet position to faciliute his decision to join
U M N O Baru; he gave the impression that he was not seeking one and
might even refuse to accept one if offered, at least for the moment. 8 4
Rather, it appeared that he desired to re-establish bis affiliation with the
largest and most viable Malay party on the Malaysian political scene,
panly to restore patronage s u t u s for his entourage of political followers,
but also, for himself, to be well positioned in case Dr Mahathir should
decide to retire or be unable to continue in office over the period of the
foreseeable future.
With Dr Mahathir in the hospital and later on extended recuperation
leave in England and Spain, there was an upsurge of sympathy for him
that extended beyond the Malay community. Traditional Malay norms
against attacking someone who was not able to defend himself meam that
there was a dramatic lowering of the level of poUtical acrimony expressed
in public. The sympathy factor may have played some part in the
Ampang Jaya by-election, which took place just five days after the
announcement of Dr Mahathir's coronary bypass operation. T h e relative
political calm descending on the capital during Dr Mahathir's absence
enabled Ghafar Baba to play a much more prominent political role and to
demonstrate his national leadership capabilities during this period.
Despite the apparent political calm, however, there was evidence of
increased competition between the three principal contenders for the
office of Prime Minister, should it become vacant in the near future.
Ghafar Baba had played a major role in the BN by-election campaigns
in Johore B a h m and Ampang Jaya, and gained much in political stature
for his contribution to the victory over Harun Idris in the latter campaign.
While Dr Mahathir was on leave, the government proceeded smoothly
with no major crisis but with clear signals that Ghafar Baba considered
himself to be the heir apparent to Dr Mahathir if any changes became
necessary at the highest level. The fact that Ghafar Baba had also had a
h e a n bypass operation had proven to be no serious impediment to the
vigorous pace of bis political aaivities. When Ghafar Baba's oldest son
died of a h e a n a t u c k while attending the vote count of die Ampang Jaya
by-election, 8 5 it sparked m m o u r s that Ghafar Baba bad been so dis-
tressed that he would become hesitant to accept the office of Prime
Minister, if it became vacant. Yet his subsequent political actions over
the next six months belied such ephemeral political speculations. In this
same period, Musa Hitam kept a rather low political profile, while Anwar
Ibrahim seemed even more eager than usual to grab the political spotlight
with public appearances and campaigns to promote Islam, to translate
more books into Malay, to increase adult literacy and the reading of
Malay literature, and to induce teachers to make 'learning fun'. In
260 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

addition, he made public pronouncements for freer trade in the Asia-

Pacific region, for youth employment and for Malay unity, as well as
entering the debate over Islamic responses to Salman Rushdie's novel
The Satanic Verses. Indeed. Anwar was even less constrained than before
to make pronouncements in all areas of public policy', whether they
concerned his ministry or not. How else could he retain his image as a
potential front runner in any contest for a future national leader?
When Dr Mahathir returned from his period of convalescence in
Britain and Spain, he was met by a massive crowd of well-wishers and
supporters at ihe airport. 86 While h had been only iwo and a half months
since his operation, he seemed fit and was obviously moved by the public
display of support for him and concern for his recovery. By his actions.
he appeared lo be most eager to return to the helm of government and
the centre of political affairs. Although ai first he kept to a restricted
schedule of work, it was not long before he was again making regular
public appearances, directing the campaign against his critics, and
exhorting and admonishing his countrymen and his party on various
public issues. Six weeks after his return, he left for a tour of the United
States in a campaign to follow up on the favourable decision on Malaysia's
GSP status and lo generate more invcsimeni in Malaysia's expanding
economy. 8 7 Perhaps, also, he hoped to promote a new export drive to the
United Stales for Malaysian industrial products, spearheaded by the
expected introduction of the Proton to the North American market.
Whether he could generate the same political and economic leverage in
Washington, DC and N e w York ihat he had earlier accomplished in
London remained to be seen.
There is plenty of medical evidence revealing that most heart bypass
patients undergo a psychic trauma some months after their operation,
colouring their outlook on the and how they relate to those most closely
associated with them in their everyday activities. The recuperadng patient
suddenly becomes much more aware of his mortality and the transient
and fleeting aspects of human endeavour. This common post-operative
syndnimc may account for the mixed signals given by Dr Mahathir to
those having contact with him.
In April, The Financial Times reported close sides of Dr Mahathir as
saying that he was enthusiastic about resuming his full duties as Prime
Minister and eager lo tackle remaining issues on the public agenda, Nol
only had he consolidated his power wiihin U M N O , pardy as a con-
sequence of his illness, but he was, moreover, in an unchallenged
position of power wiihin the country as a whole. 88 The impression
generated in that report was of a completely recovered and revitalized
Dr Mahathir w h o would play an even more dominant role in government
and who would remain in office fur as lung as he was fil, which most
likely would be for many years into the future.
At the same lime, others reponed that Dr Mahathir had mellowed and
was seeking reconciliation with old critics and political opponents. He
sought out those w h o had had hean operations lo discuss their experiences
during the period of his recuperation. He approved full government
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 261

payment for a specialist eye operation in the United States needed by the
86-year-old Tunku Abdul Rahman. This decision followed the withdrawal
of the pending suit by the Tunku, Hussein Onn, and Abdul Manan
Othman challenging the earlier court decision dercgiatering the original
U M N O . 8 9 Dr Mahalhir also approved the release widioui restriaive
conditions of the last two of the ISA detainees from the group of 106 w h o
had been incarcerated during O a o b e r and November 1987—Lim Kit
Siang and his son. 9 0 This decision may have been prompted as much by
US criticisms of Malaysia during the GSP hearings as by any funda-
mental change of altitude by Dr Mahathir towards his most outspoken
political critic. At d i t e levels, report! also circulated that Dr Mahathir
had taken initiatives to re-establish cordial relations with Musa Hitam. In
talks with Musa, he left the impression that Musa w i s the person he was
counting on lo eventually succeed him, even though he alto cautioned
that he had only a limited capacity to choose his successor. Whether this
meant that Dr Mahathir was planning for his own retirement from
politics was, at best, uncertain. Perhaps Dr Mahathir himself was unclear
about his intentions, but was, like many others, preparing for potential
alternative scenarios. In a political system structured so much around
patronage hierarchies linked to the apex of power, this meant that all the
Olher major aciors in the system also needed to keep their options open to
respond to any potential shift in the political landscape generated at the
highest level.

Opposition Relignments

Although the opposition to Dr Mahathir's leadership from within the old

U M N O had gradually rallied around the banner of Semangat '46, the
movement had never been unified under a single structure of leadership
and decision-making. Rather, it consisted of several clusters of prominent
Malay leaders and their often transient cluster of client followers. Musa
Hitam was at the centre of one cluster until hit defection to U M N O
Baru. T u n k u Abdul Rahman and Harun Idris were in the midst of
another cluster. But the most formidable and internally unified cluster of
opposition formed around the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh and his
nephew by marriage, the Sultan of Kelantan, Ismail Petra. As the
political climate in Kuala Lumpur turned hosdle, and some supporten
of the Semangat opposition were wooed back into the U M N O Baru fold,
the Razaleigh faction took refuge in Kelantan with the active support of the
young Sultan, w h o was q u a e willing to play an activist role in the con-
voluted factionalism of behind-the-scenes Malay politics.
T h e relations between Kota Bharu and Kuala Lumpur—the two
capitals—had always been s u b j e a to s o m e strain, but became much more
so when the Kelantan Sultan decided tu confer the highest state honour
on Mohamed Salleh Abas shortly after the latter had been removed from
office as Lord President by the combined octions of Dr Mahathir, the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and the impeachment Tribunal Later, when
five judges of the Supreme Court were also suspended on the initiative of
262 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Dr Mahathir, they were welcomed as heroes and feted at a Kelantan royal

banquet, where thcy were praised, honoured, and commended for their
defence of democracy and commitment to justice. 91
Because of tbe centiahzoi structure of the dominant BN coalition, and
because of tbe h e a w reliance of the states on federal funding, in effect,
the Menteri Besar or Chief Ministers in s u t e s controlled by the BN are
s e l e a e d widi the approval of die Prime Minister. This has meant diat
Chief Ministers often look as much to the Federal Govemment for
s u p p o n as they do to their o w n legislauve assembly or their support base
at the state level. This pattern prevailed in Kelantan where the Menteri
Besar, Mohamed Yaacob, was factionally aligned with Dr Mahathir.
while the Sultan was viewed as a protector and political ally of the
Razaleigh faction of the Malay opposition. In such circumstances, rela-
dons between the Kelantan Menteri Besar and the Sultan became
stiained, with the contest ai first being waged largely over symbolic
issues concerning ceremonial functions and real or alleged slights each
may have made against the odier. When Dr Mahathir undenook his bold
campaign in 1983 to curb the powers tbe Agong and all other Malay
Sultans, this merely added f u d to an already smouldering dispute in
Kelantan between the Sultan and the Menteri Besar. After Tengku
Razaleigh retreated to Kelantan to use it as a base from which to mount
bis challenge to Dr Mahathir, political divisions at the national level
became repplicated at thee state level, thereby setting the stage for more
direct and undisguised conflict with federal authority.
The factional competition within U M N O in Kelantan prompted PAS
to anempt to bring down the state government of Menteri Besar Mohamed
Yaacob in March 1988. Although Tengku Razaleigh and bis faction were
actively soliciting public support to mount a challenge to Dr Mahathir,
Tengku Razalngh was at tbe time unwilhng to join PAS in a 'no
confidence' vote against tbe Menteri Besar, since that move would give
the appearance that be had desened U M N O , tbe party he claimed he was
aticmpimg to 'revive'. For this reason, in the Kelantan Assembly, both
bitterly contesting U M N O factions joined forces to defeat the PAS effort
to oust tbe s u t e government. 9 2
The votes in tbe Kelantan Legislative Assembly given by the Razaleigh
faction to sustain Menteri Besar Mohamed Yaacob appeared to have done
nothing to diminish the conflict between tbe two U M N O factions in the
state. What had been a largdy s y m b d i c contest became much more
s u b s u n m e u b e n the Menteri Besar proposed to transfer some twenty
ticmor statee officers. C o o c e m e d about s u t e autcomny, some of the palace
circle prevailed upon tbe S u t e Secretary, Wan Mohamed Yusof, to
implement an alternative transfer list with a change of sixteen names.
The respective roles and powers of the State Public Services Commission,
the State Executive Council, and the State Legal Adviser all became
entangled in an escalating dispute over the assignment of key high-level
state officers, most likely on the basis of their perceived factional
sympathies or alignments. Dr Mahathir threatened to amend the state
constitution or bring the matter for direct court action if the Menteri
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 263

Besar's transfer list was not fully implemented. For their part, both the
Sultan and Tengku Razaleigh kept their political distance, allowing the
State Public Services Commission and the State Executive Council to
make countermoves against the ultimatums and threat of both Menteri
Besar and Prime Minister. This dispute continued at a reeling boil for
over a month before both sides finally negotiated a compromise agreement
to implement a 'balanced' transfer list for senior Mate officers. 93
While these disputes over patronage were still unresolved, the Razaleigh
group began pursuing a new strategy: to forge a new opposition coalition.
T h i s effort to find new political allies became more salient particularly
after some of the early stalwarts of Semangat '46 had been induced to
join U M N O Baru. With all options for reviving the old U M N O dtrough
the courts or through Parliament blocked o f f , Tengku Razaleigh set his
sights on forming a new political coalition with PAS. to April 1989, PAS
had held iu General Assembly, at which a new group of younger leaders
were elected. T h e new PAS President, Fadzil Noor, stated: 'Islam is a
religion of m o d e r a t i o n — N o w , we have a way t h r u o u g h election, so
please accept it. Pas is not an extremist party.' 94 T h e speech of outgoing
P A S President Haji Yusof Rawa gave support to the new suategy:

We need to show to the Malays and the people of this country a framework of
nationall unity based on Islamic values, not one tied down to ethnic and date
considerstions and parochialism.
This is why we are inviting these organisation and political parties to join us in
drafting a broad and more acceptable framework national unity to unite all
races.95

Nol only were the new PAS leaders more pragmatic about politics than
the defeated older faction, but they had already begun negotiations with
Tengku Razaleigh and his associates under the Semangat '46 banner.
Tengku Razaleigh and the new PAS leaders agreed to form a joint
movement called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah ( A P U , Organization for
the Uplift of the Muslim Community). 9 6 Al the sama time that talks were
underway with PAS, Tengku Razak alto proposed that the D A P join
Semangat '46 and PAS in a new broad multiethnic opposition coalition.
While the D A P did not formally join in Tengku Razaleigh's coalition
movement, talks were held to explore the possibilities limited co-
operation without the sacrifice of fundamental party principles. T h e PAS
objective of establishing an Islamic state was particularly difficult to
harmonize with the D A P pronouncement on religious freedom and
equality for all ciiizeos. Nevenheless, a climate of understanding and co-
operation was being cultivated between the leaders of P A S , the D A P , aod
the Semangat '46 group, despite their great differences on some of the
most sensitive and intractable issues of public policy.
On 13 May, the D A P had contested a by-election in Bentong, Pahang,
against the BN but gained only 30.7 per cent of the votes to the 60.05 per
cent won by the BN's M C A candidate. After that ejection, the D A P was
particularly worried since its support anwog the Chinese voters had
dropped substantially from its previous thowiog at the polls. The D A P
264 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

calculated thai it had lost about 8 per cent of its previous Chinese voters
to die M C A , and was espedally worried whether that was primarily
because of iis poUucal flination with the A P U coalition, The D A P leaders
suspecied that the Chinese fear of APU's Islamic and Malay image
prompted the shift of voter loyalty. T h e effort to forge a new multiracial
alterative for the next general election was not a matter of top priority
for many Chinese. 97
T h e PAS-Semangat '46 link was made official in May 1989 and by
June the registration of Semangat '46 as a legal party was finally approved
by the Registrar of Societies. Berjasa, the small Kelantan-based Islamic
party, abandoned its affiliation with the BN to join PAS and Semangat in
the new opposition coalition. A P U faced its Itrst test of public support in
a very favourable location when a state by-election was called in Telok
Pasu, Trengganu, where all but 3 of the 8,426 voters were Malays and
most were peasants. In a s h o n but intense campaign, the agreed PAS
candidate defeated the U M N O Baru nominee by a very thin margin of
141 votes. The new coalition had provided the margin of victory despite
the formidable election machine mobilized by U M N O . 9 8
One month later, the mettle of the new APU coalition was tested once
again—this time in the multi-ethnic constituency of Tambatan in Johore
where the voters were 58.4 per cent Malay, 35 per cent Chinese, and
6 . 3 per cent Indian. Semangat '46 nominated retired army general Ja'afar
O n n , the brother of Hussein Onn and the son of the first leader and
founder of U M N O , Dato Onn bin Ja'afar. While not a member of A P U ,
the D A P lent its support to the Semangat candidate. Even so, the BN
candidate, Abdul Kadir Annuar, won the election with about 60 per cent
of the votes, primarily because the Chinese voters were wary of the
Islamic coloration of the new opposition alignment. T h e tacit support of
the D A P for ihe A P U candidate had made it possible for the M C A lo
exploit the Chinese fears of an Islamic state which the M C A argued
would be the eventual outcome if A P U were to assume power at the
national level. 99 Even in its defeat, the A P U coalition revealed that it
commanded a substantial following at the national level, but if the pattern
were to be repeated elsewhere, it would find it difficult to gain sufficient
support among non-Malay voters to pose a major direat to the BN in
multi-ethnic constituencies. Whether it could eventually challenge the
BN on relatively equal terms would ultimately depend on how it dealt
with the communal issues and whether it could build voter trust and
confidence across Malaysia's primary fissure between Malays and non-
Malays. Both the rewards of office and the agony of defeat had helped to
m o v e many opposition politicians from ideological rigidity to a new
pragmatic realism cloaked in the ambiguities that had heretofore been the
hallmark of much of the political stance of the BN, How the contest
between two such political entities might unfold in the future would, in
most probability, depend on the political skills and acumen of both sets
of leaders.
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 265

T h e N e w E c o n o m i c Policy R e c o n s i d e r e d
As the year 1990 approached, political attention became increasingly
focused on the critical question of what direction government policies
should take for the decade leading into the twenty-first century. Drafted
in 1971, the N E P had established 1990 as the date for the attainment of
its twin objectives of poverty reduction and 'ethnic restructuring'. After
nineteen years of intense e f f o n s to improve the economic position of the
Malays and other indigenous peoples, that policy had effected a veritable
revolution in the reallocation of jobs, wealth, and political power to
Malays. Nearly all Malays benefited from the N E P , but some were better
able to capitalize on the new opponunities and gained far more advantage
than others. T h e benefits provided to Malays and other Bumiputras were
supposed to be derived from the growth increment in the economy so as
not to create economic deprivation for non-Malays. While the primary
emphasis of government policy had been directed to the economic uplift
of the Malays, the N E P had also promised to reduce and eventually
eradicate poverty . . . for all Malaysians, irrespective of race'.100 Whether
these twin N E P goals had been met, and how effective the government
had been in implementing its policies, were matters of much dispute, and
were, moreover, only the preliminary questions leading to the much
more crucial matter of what new goals and policies should replace the
N E P when it expired in 1990.
By 1988, nearly all panies had given much attention to the policy
issues posed b y t h e scheduled expiry of the N E P . Some parties, such as
the MCA, the M I C , and Gerakan, held public seminars and published
evaluations and proposals of their own. Others made their assessment
and began formulating their policy positions in less public f o m m s . If the
process of each party formulating a public policy position were allowed to
continue without any opportunity of a collective national dialogue, posi-
tions could easily have hardened to the point where national consensus on
the next cycle of public policy would have been all but foreclosed.
For this reason, the BN initialed off-the-record discussions among its
members during the latter half of 1988, and then agreed to form a
National Economic Consultative Council, patterned after the earlier
National Consultative Council which had helped to formulate the original
N E P in 1971. T h e first announcements concerning this new advisory
body indicated that it would consist of 112 members drawn from all
elected panies as well as from various interest groups, economic asso-
ciations, and cenain prominent individuals. As other groups agitated for
representation, the proposed number on the N E C C was first increased to
138 and finally lo 150, divided equally between Bumiputra and non-
Bumiputra representatives. This was an indirect acknowledgement that
the most difficult matters would involve the contrasting demands and
views of these two ethnic-cultural entities.
T h e initial allocation of representaion to the National Economic
Consultative Council provided for 50 members from political parties, 12
from chambers of commerce and industry, 7 from trade unions, 4 from
283 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

teachers' organizations, 3 from farmen and fishermen, plus 25 Bumiputra

individuals, 11 Chinese individuals, and 5 Indian individuals. T h e distri-
bution of political party members was as follows: U M N O — 1 0 ,
M C A — 1 0 , M I C — 8 , Gerakan—5, P P P — 5 , D A P — 5 , and the remaining
7 party members distributed among opposition parties. 102 Later, the
party representation was increased by 2 to 52 in order to give the minor
BN parties access to the Council. This distribution also meant that
Semangat '46 was unrepresented, and the official opposition in Parliament
had only 12 members to voice their diverse and contradictory concerns.
T h e official government position was overwhelmingly represented on the
N E C C with 45 party representatives plus numerous sympathetic repres-
entatives from organizations and individuals who were appointed to the
Council. The government team for the N E C C was headed by U M N O
Vice-President Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, w h o had been instrumental in
attempting to bridge the differences between the government and the
U M N O 'dissidents'. He was seen as a competent and non-abrasive Malay
leader, w h o would reflect the government position without antagonizing
too many people. Many of the 'individuals' appointed to the N E C C were
nominated on the recommendation of BN parties. Often they were
academics or intellectuals w h o acted as policy consultants to party
leaders. At the same time, a wide variety of non-party people were also
selected to the Council, many of whom were noted for their independent
judgemeni and their capacity to speak out on public issues. A m o n g the
individuals were such names as: Chandra Muzaffar, w h o had been
deuiined under the ISA in 1987 under Dr Mahathir's orders, and w h o
had been since its inception the President of Aliran. the social action
group; Jomo Kwame Sundaram, the political-economist who had been a
devastating critic of Dr Mahathir's industrialization strategies and his
lack of attention to poverty eradication issues; Lim Teck Ghee, the
Institute for Advanced Studies economist w h o was part of the M C A
'Think Tank'; Murugesu Pathmanathan, the economist and foreign
relations expert at the University of Malaya; and R. Thillamathan,
another economist from the University of Malaya. Both Pathmanaihan
and Thillainathan gave particular attention to issues affecting the Indian
community. Also on the list of individuals were the former Vice-Chancellor
of the University of Malaya, Royal Professor Ungku Aziz, and his
successor, the present Vice-Chancellor, Syed Hussein Alatas; the spokes-
man for Chinese education, Chong King Liong; the outspoken woman
lawyer and former Malaysian ambassador. Miss P. G. Lim; Bank Bumi-
putra Chairman, Basir Ismail; and the former Bank Bumiputra Chairman,
Nawawi Mat Awin. 1 0 3

Although the Democratic Action Party had been assigned 5 seats on

the N E C C , its leader, Lim Kit Siang, and his son, Lim Guan Eng, were
still under ISA detention. Initially, the D A P indicated that it would
participate on the N E C C , but when its two detained leaders were not
released, the remaining D A P members boycotted the N E C C sessions in
protest. After Dr Mahathir's return from his convalescence abroad, he
finally approved their release on 19 April. 104 Shortly thereafter, the D A P
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 267

representatives, including among its members Lim Kit Siang, decided to

participate in the sessions of the Council, which by then had already
made considerable progress through its agenda.
T h e first session of the National Economic Consultative Council was
held on 19 January with a plenary meeting addressed by Deputy Prime
Minister Ghafar Baba, w h o read a speech that Dr Mahathir had prepared
to deliver to the Council. The speech praised the N E P for its achieve-
ments and called upon the Council to 'cast aside interests of various
groups to formulate economic policy accepuble to the people' through a
sincere effort to look at the accomplishment and shoncomings of the
past policies and to improve upon it for die future. 105 Following that set
of instructions and pep talk, the Council proceeded to elect a chairman,
w h o was nominated by the leader of the BN team, Abdullah Badawi. The
affable and sometimes flamboyant Ghazali Shafie was s e l e a e d as Chairman
of the NECC. He had been Foreign Minister a decade earlier and was
one of the principal drafters of die original N E P . Although in semi-
retirement from politics, apparently he was chosen to impart to the
N E C C an emphasis on conunuity with the bold policy initiatives u k e n
almost two decades earlier.
At die early sessions of the Council, all members received a large
packet of materials s e l e a e d by the government containing articles and
repons on the N E P . Many of the items had been published before and
were readily available to the general public. N o w , all document presented
to the Council were covered by the restrioions of the Official Secrets Act.
Indeed, all repons, position papers, and proceedings were cloaked in a
veil of official secrecy, with all the attendant penalties for any violations
of ihe A a . This meant that the representatives-were to present their
views and the views of their constituencies to the Council, but were
enjoined, under threat of stiff penalties, from communication with anyone
about the progress or the acuvities of the NECC. Occasionally, the
government would make available to the press some announcement about
the activities of the Council, but, except for very general announcements
about the way the Council was organizing its work and its schedule for
the completion of preliminary studies, both the public and the news
media were kept in almost total darkness about the course of the
Council's activities and dedsions. T h e basic idea was to have a forum for
in camera discussions and negotiations, rather than an exercise in public
participation and the airing of public policy trial balloons. If a Royal
Commission had been formed to lour the country and hold public
hearings, followed by the formulation of appropriate proposals for
longer-term objectives and policies, the public not only would have been
more d i r e a l y involved, but it would have also very likely become
mobilized to defend or promote alternative sets of policy proposals. It
was this latter possibility diat was viewed by Malaysia's leaders as a
s p e o r e to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, the aaivities of the
Council proceeded in an air of temporarily suspended detachment from
the immediate fears and concerns of the Malaysian public. Only the ever-
present and ephemeral political rumours that circulated from 'un-named
268 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

sources' kept the poliiically conscious public alert to some of the trends
and themes being debated with vigour, passion, and occasional anger
within the chambers of the Council.
Even before the formation of ihe N E C C , both the M C A and
Gerakan had questioned the official government sutistics which gave the
ethnic breakdown for share capital and olhcr measures of the ethnic
distribution of wealth. How 'foreign' corporate wealth should be cat-
egorized was a mailer of some dispute, especially when Malaysians
invested in such corporations, as well as whether the Malay target of
30 per cent should apply for economic aggregates, or whether each sector
of the economy should be separately 'restructured' to meet the N E P ' s
30 per cent Malay targets. Gerakan spokesmen estimated that the Malays
had already achieved a 30 per cent aggregate ownership of the economy
by 1983. 106 The Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister's Depart-
ment was particularly sensitive to any challenge to the official statistics
being published on the ethnic distribution of economic benefits, par-
ticularly since such figures were so important in the argument about the
successes or shortcomings of the N E P . Those who argued for a con-
tinuation of the Malay/Bumipuira quotas either argued that the target had
not yet been reached, or that ihe targets should be set higher, perhaps to
50 or 60 per cent to match their majority proportion within the popula-
tion. Those who opposed the Malay/Bumiputra quotas argued that the
N E P was a temporary and remedial policy that was agreed to by the non-
Malays, and that once the targets were reached the system of ethnic
'affirmative action' quotas should gradually be dismantled as a matter of
fairness to all citizens. Thus, for both sides, ihe ethnic distribution
sutistics did not change the arguments, but they did lend support to one
side or the other. For this reason, the issues of d a u collection, analytical
categories, statistical techniques, and interpretation of data became sens-
itive and highly contentious.

After the first plenary meeting of the N E C C , the Council members

were divided up into five topical committees. Because of the challenge by
the M C A and Cierakan of the government's official statistics. Tan Peng
Khoon, from the M C A , was made chairman of the Committee on Data
Sundardization. Former Vice-Chancellor Royal Professor Ungku Aziz
was selected as chairman of the Committee on Poverty; U M N O
Vice-President AbduUah Ahmad Badawi was given responsibility for
the Committee on Social Restructuring; M I C Secretary-General
D. P. Vijandran was made chairman of the Committee on the Economy;
and finally, the chief executive of Permodalan Nasional, Bhd., Khalid
Ibrahim, assumed the chair for the Committee on Human Resources. 1 0 7
For die most pan, members of the N E C C were able to opt for whichever
committee they preferred to serve upon, subject to some persuasion and
second preference options to keep the Bumipuira and non-Bumipuira
categories equal. The assignments were also made to assure the dominant
represenution of the BN's leam on each committee.
While the terms of reference for the N E C C provided that it should
examine the past performance of the N e w Economic Policy and propose a
 PICKING UP THE PIECES 269

new policy for the future, there was much speculation and some concern
expressed by members as to whether the government already had a fairly
fixed view on whai policy would be appropriate to supplant the N e w
Economic Policy. A few of those selected were concemed thai the N E C C
might become an exercise in futility, with ils recommendations ignored if
they did not subscribe to policy options already being oudined by those
w h o were shaping government policy. Alienatively, the sceptics wondered
whether there was a strategy to create a deadlock between the govern-
ment and its critics, or between the Bumiputras and the non-Bumiputras,
so that the government could then impose its own views in an exercise of
'consensus by default'. Both these views of die sceptics were a product of
the lack of trust, and suspicions between the government and its critics,
generated in large measure by the secretive, manipulative, and author-
itarian style that characterized the government during the extended crisis
of authority following the challenge of the U M N O dissidents to
Dr Mahathir's leadership. While their past experience provided much
basis for their suspicions, on die matter of the future policy for the post-
N E P era, it seems likely that the governmcnt was itself a bit uncertain of
what policies it should pursue. Moreover, it had taken the precaution of
giving no representation on the council to its most persuasive and
powerful Malay political opponents. As a result, the govemmeni found It
extremely useful for 'moderate' politicians and 'reasonable' individuals
concerned with public policy or with economic and social analysis to sit
d o w n in a forum to explore options and test the reactions of various
political factions represented on the Council to a wide array of possible
policy instruments and strategics. While the government could keep iu
future options open, as the N E C C progressed in its work, it became
obvious that the government would also benefit from and be highly
influenced by the course of ihe debates and the recommendations that
were being generated by such a process.

Although the sessions of die N E C C remained closed, the cloak of

secrecy meant that the public could nol share in the discussions or
consideration of alternative proposals. Even so, the pronouncements of
top government spokesmen provided some informaiion on the progress
uf the N E C C and occasional indications of what way the political wind
was blowing. By the end of May 1989, all five committees had completed
their reports on the accomplishments and shortcomings of the N E P .
From various sources, it became clear that the top priorities of the N E C C
were being given to issues of 'national unity' and to economic growth and
productivity. Some were talking of more general statement of 'ethnic
restructuring' goals raiher than a new set of rigid formula of ethnic
targets and quotas for various sectors of the economy and for education
and social services. Bul the exact nature of these proposals and the
content of ihc speeches in the N E C C remained unreported in the press
and only became the subject of the ubiquitous rumours when some
specch generated dismay or anger among some members of the Council.
W h e n Dr Mahathir returned to work after his medical convalescence
abroad, the work of the N E C C was already well underway. H e , no
270 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

doubt, received a full report on its progress and may not have agreed
entirely with some of the trends developing or dte options being explored.
In any event, in mid-May he made a major speech which gave the
appearance of staking out a position on some of the main issues under
consideration. Although the speech was directed at the general public, it
could also be interpreted as instructions, or even as a warning, to the
N E C C not to deviate from what he viewed as fundamental considerations.
In that speech, Dr Mahathir stated:

The Malays have not yet achieved a standard of development that will enable
them to compete well with the other communities in the country, or with the rest
of the world........ As long as the achievements of ihe Malays have not reached a
level where their future is guaranteed, the Malays must ensure their future
through their success in politics.......
But we have not achieved the full targets of the NEP. The position of the
Malays has improved and made some people forget thai they are no longer in a
critical situation. This is bccause UMNO is still around to ensure that the Malays
are protected. If UMNO is no longer around, and ihe party in power has only 40
Malay MPs and the rest are from other races, as visualised by the splinter group,
then the Malays will no longer gel my protection. When this happens, we will go
back to the time when the British were in power and, in fact, worse than that. 108

If one reads between the lines, Dr Mahathir was warning against any
moves by the N E C C to abandon specific quota targets for ethnic restruc-
turing. At the same time, he was also painting a 'disaster scenario' for ihe
Malays if they failed to give him and U M N O Baru an overwhelming
mandate to protect the economic future of the Malays through the
decisive exercise of political power. His unstated assumption was that any
other Malay leaders, parucularly from the 'dissident facuon of U M N O ,
would willingly, or through incompetence, mongage the economic future
of the Malays for short-term political gain.
As the N E C C entered the last phase of its deliberations, it became
increasingly apparent that whatever its recommendations, these would
generate much political controversy. If the govemment decided to ignore
the N E C C recommendations to a substantial degree, it could do so only
at considerable political cost and risk. Furthermore, the N E C C Report
and the policies dial would emerge would very likely become the centre-
piece of Malaysian politics for the next decade and perhaps much longer.
It was also apparent that Dr Mahathir was determined to have a decisive
say in the content of diat centre-piece. Whether he also intended to
remain in office to defend the new policies and oversee their implementa-
tion until the next century was more ambiguous and therefore the topic
of endless political speculation.
PICKING UP THE PIECES 271
272 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
PICKING UP THE PIECES 273
274 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION
 9
Taking Stock

THE Malaysian political system has evolved over the course of almost half
a century, if one includes the formative period of the nationalist move-
ment. Between periods of turmoil and struggle were periods of relative
peace, but in both cases the cumulative effect was to stimulate new
patterns of social, economic, and political change. The nationalist
struggle, the attainment of Malayan independence, the Emergency period
and the struggle against Communist guerrilla insurrection, the formation
of Malaysia, the confrontation with Indonesia, the May 1969 racial riots
with the subsequent formulation of the Rukunegara and the N e w
Economic Policy were all contests that shaped political installations and
tested the mettle and innovative capacities of the country's leaders. The
evolving political system reflected the changing economic and social
patterns, but also became a determinative factor in meeting those
challenges. Political leaders, by mobilizing public support and utilizing
the political-administrative system, were gaining increasing capability to
shape the direction and content of social, economic, and political change.
While political leaders were responsive to their consutuents, there was
always an interactive relauonship between leaders and followers, with
both having varying degrees of freedom and limited options for political
choice. The balance between the autonomy of leaders and the political
initiauve and demands of followers can and docs shift over time; it
depends on many factors, such as the style and character of leadership,
the nature and capabilities of public institutions, the structure of conflict
and the nature of the political culture which shapes the behaviour of both
the public and its elites. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to
explore some of the longer-term patterns of political change and evaluate
the Malaysian political system against some performance criteria. Finally,
some of the issues and problems for the future will be identified with
some evaluation of possible prudential policy options.

In our overview, we will begin by exploring some of the basic societal

and economic configurations which shape the environment within which
the political system operates. Later, we will turn our attention to the
political system itself so as to discern its essential characteristics, consider
how it has changed over time, and evaluate its performance in the
Malaysian setting.
276 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

D e m o g r a p h y and E c o n o m i c C h a n g e s
Since 1950 the Malaysian population has grown from about 5 million to
17.363 million in 1969.' While the states of Sabah and Sarawak joined
Malaysia in 1963, their combined population was only about 1.3 million.
Interpolating from the larger population base, we can determine that in
39 years Malaysia's population has grown by about 2.75 times. In 1970
the population growth rate was 2.9 per cent per annum, but this figure
dropped to 2.2 per cent in the period between 1977 and 1984, suggesting
that exaggerated growth rates might taper off in ihe future. On this
assumption, the Population Reference Bureau in 1987 estimated that the
Malaysian population will be 20.2 million by the year 2000. 2
This population projection assumes a gradually declining population
growth rale. Yet, in 1985 Dr Mahathir Mohamad called for a higher
population growth rate when he announced that in order for Malaysia to
become an industrial power, it should aim for a target population of
70 million by the year 2100. 3 To accomplish this objective, government
policy has attempted to raise annual population growth from its 1 9 7 7 - 8 4
average rate of 2.2 per cent to the level of 3.2 per cent per annum. If
government policy were fully implemented, it would drastically lower the
age distribution of the population. Assuming a long-term 6 per cent
growth rate for the economy, a population growth of 3.2 per cent would
mean that more than half of the nation's economic growth would be
'invested' in population increase rather than in raising the standard of
having. With such a high population increase, the proportion of the
population in the economically productive age of 1 5 - 6 4 years would fall
to just over 50 per cent, while children in the "high cost' years of 0 - 1 4
would increase to 45 per cent. T h e net effect would be to increase
demands on public education, health, social services, bousing, and child
care facilities while decreasing the proportion of the earning population
w h o would bear those costs through taxes and personal support of the
coming generation. The longer-term effect of a broad-based population
pyramid would be to make it much more difficult in the future to sustain
high per capita growth rates. T h e population growth in the past and
alternative patterns of future growth are depicted in Figure 9 . 1 , with the
highest line representing the 'target' set by Dr Mahathir.
Because of Malaysia's ethiuc diversity, both social and political institu-
tions have reflected the cultural and ethnic divisions found within the
society. Although the ethnic divisions may seem immutable, over the
years the edinic balances have been gradually changing. Different birth
and death rates, the effects of migration, and the changing boundaries
when Malaysia was formed and when Singapore was expelled from the
union have all affected the ethnic balance. In addition, shifting definitions
of ethnicity have reclassified smaller and more ambiguous communities
to associate them for census and other purposes with the Malay/
Bumiputra ethnic conglomerate. For Malaya, and later Malaysia, the
shifting ethnic patterns of the past are depicted in Figure 9.2. T w o
projections into the future have been made by the Malaysian Chinese
277
278
 TAKING STOCK 279

Association, based on alternative sets of assumptions. Projection I assumes

falling growth rates for both Malays and non-Malays, but also assumes
that Malay growth will be substantially higher than non-Malay growth
rates. Projection II assumes that Malay rates will rise in response to
g o v e m m e n t efforts to raise fertility while non-Malay rates will continue
without much variation from past trends. These ethnic projections are
summarized in Figures 9.3 and 9.4. With either scenario, the Malay/
Bumiputra proportion of the population has been and will continue to
rise, thus asserting even more decisively in the future the pattern of
Malay dominance in the political system.
Malaysia has been blessed with abundant and valuable natural re-
sources. Some resources, such as tin and oil, are non-renewable, but
because they have heretofore been plentiful, they have provided the
wealth to sustain economic growth, helping to propel the country into the
ranks of the more economically advanced countries of Asia. Other
resources, such as m b b e r , palm-oil, and tropical products, depend
primarily on a combination of physical setting, capital investments, and
human resources. With industrial development and a more complex
economy, the mix of resources—natural, capital, and human—becomes
more complex and more interlinked. Finally, land and the forest resources
have been abundant in the past, but land is finite and forest resources,
particularly tropical hardwoods, take so long to regenerate that their
depletion is virtually irreversible. Under the pressures of rapid popula-
tion growth, both land and timber resources will become severely
depleted. Eventually, many of the primary assets of the past will become
the liabilities of the future.

In the years since independence, the economic performance of Malaysia

has been exceptionally high in comparison to most other Asian countries.
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have out-performed
the Malaysian economy, but not always by very much. Per capita income
has risen dramatically to improve the living standard of nearly all
Malaysians, even though income disparity has remained high and may
also have risen slightly over the years. With a buoyant economy and
rising incomes, the government has been able to use economic surpluses
to deal with major political crises, both by absorbing the costs of
expanded government operations and the delivery of new benefits for
deprived sectors of the population. Without an expanding and funda-
mentally sound economy, it is doubtful that Malaysia could have met the
challenge of the Communist insurgency in the years from 1948 to 1960.
For similar reasons, the N e w Economic Policy would have produced
m u c h more conflict if there had not been an expanding economic pie that
could be distributed so that all communities might experience some
improvements in their standard of living. While economic factors are
certainly not the only explanations for political behaviour, much of
politics revolves around the allocation of economic resources. A shrinking
e c o n o m y will ineviubly undermine the political support of any govern-
ment, while an expanding economy will make It possible to mollify even
disgruntled e l e m e n u in the population with s o m e prospects of economic
280
281
282
 TAKING STOCK 283

betterment despite relative deprivation in comparison to others. Since

independence, the Malaysian political system has been sustained by a
vigorous and nearly continuous expanding economy, which performance
has made it much easier for leaders to sustain public confidence and
build a stable base of political support in spite of many severe problems
and seemingly intracuble domestic conflicts.

Changes to the Party System

From the very first election in 1952, the party system has been organized
to mobilize voters along ethnic lines. Even the parties that claimed to be
'non-communal' tended to acquire a predominantly communal base of
support, even when some parties created a multi-ethnic leadership echelon
in an effort to represent all ethnic communities and thereby defuse
potential ethnic divisions within their own ranks. Nevertheless, the
ethnic pattern of political mobilization was set by the mass parties and by
the ethnically defined govemment policies which these parties pursued
after they came to power. The salience of ethnicity in politics was a
product of both existing public attitudes and tbe cumulative effects of
government policies. Together these faction forced all parties to compete
with the mass-based communal parties for public support and respond to
the political issues raised by those in power, especially regarding matters
of ethnic benefits and inter-ethnic relations. Over time, an ethnic political
coloration was imposed on all parties regardless of their ideological
predilictions.

After the first election in 1952, the basic pattem of political mobilization
became established and has persisted without f u n d m e n t a l change ever
since. T h e government's majority support has been based on the Alliance
pattern of ethnic parties united through inter-elite negotiation and tbe
distribution of patronage to the leaders and supporters of parties within
the ruling coalition. T h e benefits of coalition membership have been
contingent upon acceptance of the largely unwritten rules of inira-coalition
transactions and behavioural norms restricting public criticism of the
ultimate decisions and allocations. With this pattern, leaders of constitu-
ent panies can make ethnic appeals to mobilize political support, but
the ultimate policy outcome has normally been muted through inter-
ethnic bargaining and elite accommodation processes. This process of
Intro-coalition politics has produced a cycle of abrasive ethnic political
rhetoric and brinkmanship. This has usually been followed by the Prime
Minister issuing crisis warnings, then subsequent e f f o n s to defuse ethnic
tensions, often combined with a public campaign to generate pubUc
support for some compromise package of interlinked p o l i d e s d e e m e d to
be the product of inter-ethnic bargaining processes.

Although the Alliance system appeared lo be particularly fragile w h e n

it was formed, it has proven to be remarkably persistent and a stable base
of public support over the period of four dccades despite the recurring
cycles of political conflict and crisis. By dominating the relatively
moderate centre position along the ethnic spectrum, the Alliance has
284 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

forced opposition parties to the more communally extreme peripheries.

As a consequence, the opposition has become severely split between
those campaigning to reduce or eliminate Malay/Bumiputra privileges
and benefiis, and those w h o support even more extensive and exclusive
policies favouring some combination of Malay, Bumiputra, and Islamic
definition of ethnic rights, advantages, and privileges. The relative
stabihty of the party system and the alignment of the opposition parties
at opposite ends of the edmic spectrum are graphically depicted in
Figure 9.6.
Because the Alliance/Barisan Nasional system has depended on a
coalition of edmically based parties, its internal governing and bargaining
process became crucial to the whole political system. The leader of the
coalition, w h o also automatically became Prime Minister, not only headed
U M N O but also controlled and defined the process of inter-elite
bargaining within the multi-party coalition. As a consequence, the roles
of party leader, coalition leader, and Prime Minister were always per-
formed simultaneously by one person w h o had the problem of balancing
multiple, often contradictory roles. Each Prime Minister developed his
own style of leadership, which required forceful leadership of his o w n
p a n y while also preserving his capacity to aa as arbiter between the rival
claims of ethnically mobilized coalition partners. Any leader had to give
first priority to his leadership of the Malay community so as to retain
support from the U M N O party machine and the rank and file of Malay
voters. At the same time, the leader had to sustain an image of being a
fair and conciliatory national leader w h o could listen to diverse political
views and resolve often intense political differences diat were being
articulated, sometimes with militant tactics, by second-level ethnic Elites
widiin the government's coalition. Without inter-ethnic accommodation
and bonds of elite empathy across ethnic boundaries, the m i n i m u m of
consensus necessary to sustain both public and parliamentary support
could rapidly erode, placing the government in jeopardy and diereby
creating an extremely volatile political crisis. Each Prime Minister
developed his o w n techruques and leadership style to resolve these
seemingly contradictory roles and objectives.

T u n k u Abdul Rahman, while he was Prime Minister, used ihe institu-

tion of the Cabinet and the Alliance National Council to facilitate candid
political exchanges and fairly free multilateral discussion of policy alter-
natives. If consensus within the government coalition was not readily
forthcoming, contentious issues were often delayed so that further efforts
could be made to explore accommodative alternatives that would be
acceptable to all parties within the Alliance coalition. As Prime Minister
and leader of the Alliance, T u n k u Abdul Rahman preferred to act as a
court of final appeal, rather than an active partisan advocate of an
ethnically mobilized M a l a y - U M N O constituency. Towards the end of his
period of national leadership, when ethnic mobilization intensified,
T u n k u Abdul Rahman's public image of ethnic toleration and his defence
of ethnically accommodative policies caused him to lose Malay support
even within his o w n party. His loss of Malay support in turn emboldened
285
286 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

a younger, more communally militant faction within U M N O to seek his

enforced retirement. The May Thirteenth Crisis of 1969 was precipitated
by the results of the 1969 election, which generated such tensions within
the Alliance that the government's coalition became virtually moribund.
T h e ensuing ethnic riots provided the govemment with the jusrification
for the suspension of Parliament and the proclamation of emergency rule;
in turn, this provided the new Prime Minister, Abdul Razak Hussein,
with the added powers and the u m e to reconstruct a new multi-ethnic
political coalition. In contrast widi the Alliance system, the Barisan
Nasional operated with a different set of principles and with significantly
different processes of inter-ethnic political transacuons. These were shaped
by altered leadership roles and political styles generated by subsequent
Prime Ministers.
Following the 1969 crisis, multilateral elite bargaining within the
Barisan Nasional was virtually abandoned. In its place was substituted a
fragmented series of bilateral negotiations between the Prime Minister
and the leaders of consdtueni panies in the mUng coalition. T h e Barisan
Nasional Council was transformed into an institution of ritualized con-
formation for political agreements worked out by the Prime Minister. T h e
Cabinet became much more restrained in its discussions of policy pro-
posals. Cabinet meetings bccame the occasion for Prime Ministerial
policy pronouncements and political exhortation, but hide opponunity
was provided for dissenting views or consideration of policy alternatives.
T h e Cabinet was the place to raise issues of administrative jurisdiction
and inter-agency co-ordination but not to debate the major priorities and
policies initialed by the Prime Minister. When public protests became
organized against some policy initiatives, the Cabinet then could become
a venue for making partial adjustments and corrections to policy so as to
placate protesters, But, elite bargaining in the Cabinet was mirumized
and no longer preceded dte formulation of fundamental policy objectives.
O n e M C A leader expressed the changes in the consultative style after
T u n Razak became Prime Minister. 'It was a question of their [ U M N O ' s ]
doing something and getting away widi it. The role of the M C A was to
correct a situation, rather than initiate something.' 4 N o n e the less, inter-
elite bargaining continued, but it became focused on the role of the Prime
Minister w h o dispensed favours, patronage, and occasional policy con-
cessions in a w e b of bilateral arrangements and agreements designed to
further the policy agenda of the Prime Minister and to hold the govern-
ment's coalition together. Because of the dyadic nature of political
transactions, each participant could be aware of benefiis and costs for his
party or constituency, but there was no multilateral mechanism for
collective elite bargaining or a collegial supervision of the overall process.
As the sole linchpin in the process of eliite bargaining, only the Prime
Minister had the range of information enabling a relative assessment of
the overall policy implications of the entire process.

As the task of budding political support became more complex and

difficult, Prime Ministers demanded ever more prerogative powers and
large increases in discretionary distributive resources to reward their
 TAKING STOCK 287

supporters and to punish or withhold benefits from their political foes

and detractors. The logic of the new dyadic s t n i a u r e of elite bargaining
would lead to enhanced executive prerogatives and to an exponential
growth in dispensable patronage.
Malaysian parties have not been noted for their intemal party demo-
cracy. In part, this has been because party leaders needed constituent
support while also retaining freedom of action for intra-party manoeuvres
and political bargaining. All parties operate with some formal struaure of
party members w h o elect delegates w h o meet, usually annually, at a
general assembly to vote on resolutions and confirm or e l e a a state of
party leaders. Because of the powers given to party leaders to dispense
patronage, to admit or expel party members, and to administer party
discipline, incumbent leaders are seldom direcdy challenged by newer
aspiring candidates within a party. Factional divisions, when they have
o c c u n e d within esublished parties, usually result in the wholesale defec-
tion of the dissident faction to another party, rather than the displace-
ment through party e l e a i o n s of incumbent party leaders. Occasionally,
t w o or more parties have become symbiotically linked in competition
over the same constituency and through the periodic exchanges of
dissident factional leaders w h o quit or are expelled from one party only to
find new political life in the 'rival' party. T h i s has been true of the
relationship between the M C A and Gerakan as well as between a
number of the Muslim and indigenous native parties in Sarawak and
Sabah. Within the BN coalition, factional divisions within member
parties have frequently arisen because of allegations that party leaders
have been ineffective in protecting the interests of the party and its
constituents in the processes of intra-BN negotiations. T h e tension be-
tween the aspirations of party constituents and the capacity of party
leaders to effect desired political outcomes has meant that party leaders
often pursue the tactic of restricting the scope of party debates and
attempt instead to mollify potential criticism through the generous distri-
bution of patronage. Across the political spectrum, most incumbent party
leaders issue persistent and monotonous calls for 'party unity', asking
their constituents to give them a 'blank cheque' mandate on the argument
that this tactic will maximize their political bargaining power in Malaysia's
multi-ethnic and multi-party system. For party leaders, o p e n popular
democratic panicipation in the formulation of policy options merely
dissipates political power and imperils the capacity to strike favourable
agreements and secure a proportionate share of available patronage.
Wiihin most political parties, the formal trappings of democracy are
preserved while leaders operate with extraordinary powers and an ethos
of benevolent auihoriurianism.

For several years, U M N O proved to be an exception to the more usual

pattern of closed politics and highly structured authority from centralized
leadership. Perhaps because U M N O has been the dominant party in the
B N , and because it has always had strong grass-roots organization at the
state level, this party developed a fairly high degree of local autonomy.
Its members assumed that national U M N O leaders were ultimately
288 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

answerable and accountable to the rank-and-fire membership of the

party. National l e a d e n may not have approved of factional divisions
wiihin the party, but this was generally accepted within the party as
evidence of the party's broad base and state-centred organizational struc-
ture. T h e ancillary organizations, U M N O Youth and Wanita U M N O ,
both became acuve as pressure groups, taking independent stands from
the party and from national leaders on certain issues of special concern.
On communal issues, U M N O Youth periodically staged demonstrations
to pressure the government, usually asserting a hard line against any
compromises to BN partners that might concede too much to non-Malays
or diminish Malay rights or special advantages. Over time, a tradition of
political autonomy and independence became well established, not only
within U M N O Youth, but within the party as a whole. This spirit of
open criticism and political autonomy was exercised despite the party's
heavy dependence on the distribution of patronage and other valued
benefits from higher U M N O leaders who held the most imponant
government offices at both the national and state levels. 5
After the factional split in U M N O during 1987 and its legal demise the
following year, the reconstituted UMNO Baru acquired a constitution
which left no doubt dial open democratic politics would no longer be
tolerated. Instead, emphasis was placed upon leadership from the top and
'party unity', ostensibly to maximize the political power of the Malays,
w h o , by implication, could be protecied only by strong leaders supported
by an unfractious and uncritical but highly politicized constituency. T h e
pattern of benevolent authoritarianism and elite-dominated politics was
followed by all major parties in the Malaysian political system. These
authoritarian leadership patterns derived in part from the logic of ethnic
political mobilization and the processes of inter-elite bargaining, especially
the prevailing style operating within the B N .

Public Attitudes aod Political Culture

Just as the political party system became mobilized along ethnic lines, so
also has the political culture of the country developed within separate
ethnic compartments. That the Malays and the non-Malays would have
different attitudes, beliefs, and behavioural patterns by itself poses no
irresolvable problem, so long as the scparaic communities can also
develop a minimum c o m m o n consensus on the legitimate institutions,
processes, and principles for the nation's governance. Attitudes con-
cerning political power, political competition, the rights of citizens and
minorities, and the capacity to empathize across ethnic boundaries become
much more important than the shifting tides of support for individual
leaders or the immediate policy issues which generate surges of political
passion and fear, In evaluating the operation of a political system, some
attention must be given to those core beliefs and attitudes which affect
political transactions and sustain the institutions and political life of the
country.
In recent years, Malaysia's leaders have become preoccupied with
 TAKING STOCK 289

shaping and manipulating public attitudes and beliefs. As a consequence,

there appears to be a nascent fear among some power-holders of what
independent research on this topic might reveal. T h e most important
dimensions of Malaysian public opinion have not been explored in detail
widi systematic national samples, partly because of the difficulty in
obtaining the required approval from the Social and Economic Research
Unit ( S E R U ) in the Prime Minister's Department. Aggregate data on
longitudinal changes in public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour remain
even funher removed into an indefinite future. Without reliable empirical
data and systemic research on political culture, the analyst must rely on
intuitive speculation supported by fragmentary evidence from several
highly selective studies and by propositional inferences derived from
observed patterns of political behaviour.
In his book Asian Power and Politics, Lucian W. Pye characterizes
Malaysian politics as a 'confrontation of two incompatible cultures'. Not
o n l y do the Malay and the Chinese have different systems of values and
behavioural norms, but the assumptions about power and politics are
derived from different sources: the Chinese from Confucian patterns and
assumptions, the Malay from Islamic sources and traditional Malay ideas
of power and authority based on status, hierarchy, and ritual patterns of
deference. T h e Chinese relieves anxieties created by political conflict by
passing on rumours and seeking sympathy from bystanders, while the
Malay becomes silent and withdrawn on the assumption that 'talking
about trouble makes matters worse'. Pye observes that the Chinese feel
superior and cannot accept that a Chinese leader should submit to the
authority of a non-Chinese 'foreigner'. As a consequence, any Chinese
acting in a political leadership role is viewed by his constituents as an
imposter. This has made it difficult for the Chinese to function in the
political system as a minority, and it has meant that they have been
unable to solve political problems of consensus and effective minority
leadership. When agreements are made with Malay leaders, the Chinese
public dismiss their leaders as impotent, selfish, and very likely corrupt. 6

According to Pye, Malays expect their leaders to achieve a blend of

impartial detachment and self-centred arrogance. These traits are con-
sidered to be congruent with dieir instinctive understandings of social
hierarchy and rank. While leaders act as protecting patrons for their
client followers, leaders are often uncertain and ambiguous about how
power should be used. T h i s may be because Malays combine, in an
incongruent mix, traditional ideas of deferential accommodation, the
uncompromising and fatalistic ideals of Islam, and British legal norms
and aristocratic values. T h e confusions about power became more
ambiguous w h e n , in the colonial era, traditional r u l e n were reinstitu-
tionalized with an emphasis on s u t u s and hierarchy but without sub-
stantive powers. While the Malays exhibit highly deferential political
behaviour to support a society structured on status and hierarchy, they
also accept harsh disdpline and arbitrary rule from their superiors. 7
Summarizing the modal traits of Malay political culture, Pye observes the
following patterns:
290 MAI.AYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

The Malay ideal of authority calls for strenness, dignity, and paternatistic
concern; but it is also understood that those in authority can easily become
angered and do irrational things. Hence it is imperative not to provoke authority
but to s u y out of its way as much as possible. Rather than expecting that correct
conduct will be rewarded, as in Chinese culture, Malays tend to believe thai it is
prudent to avoid conspicuous aaions by relying on ritualized routines. The result
is a low level of must even among high officials.......

Continuing his analysis, Pye observes that the Malay concept of power
gives httle attention to cause and effect and rational calculations but
rather, assumes that power is governed by supernatural forces and its
e x e r d s e is therefore full of surprises. The invisible and unpredicuble
basis of power, he argues, makes leaders indulge in grandiose and
boastful rhetoric which leaves their 'audience uneasy about whether they
should laugh or be awed'. He concludes:

Indeed, the basic dilemma inherent in the Malay altitude toward power is dial
power has always been seen as on the borderline between comical pretentiousness
and reverential deference. The uncenainty that surrounded traditional concepts
of power, which were issodated with the supernatural, could be compounded by
the uncertainly regarding role relations in a 'loosely structured' society. A
'nobody' could suddenly be discovered to have astonishing abilities and, as if by
magic, could be insundy transformed into an awesome figure. But it was also
likely that the posturing wise man would have no answers and that disaster could
befall those who listened to him. 8

While the observations of Lucian Pye do reflect some important dimen-

sions of Malaysian political culture, his analytical inferences are based on
dated sources and proceed on the assumption dial many traditional
beliefs and attitudes persist to the present without significant alteration.
H i s interpretations must be treated as heuristic and propositional until
more sophisticated research accumulates rehable aggregate data on
Malaysian political opinion and behaviour.
From a cursory observation of Malaysian political life, it does appear
that Malaysia's 'two political cultures' are making some adjustments to
each other. Over time, there appear to be some areas of consensus and
c o m m o n understanding about politics, especially at d i t e levels. There has
been a greater appreciation of the importance of political bargaining, and
a concern for mechanisms to facilitate intercommunal understanding.
T h e years of experience widi electoral politics have given the public a
greater appreciation of the reality and the limits of political power.
Although a c o m m o n civic culture has not emerged, there appears to be
s o m e m i n i m u m consensus on the basic ingredients for a stable and
effective government in Malaysia's multi-ethnic setting. Basic social trust
does appear to be rather low, and there is little empathy extended beyond
communal boundaries. There is also little evidence to suggest that either
elites or the general public have much appredation for the role of and
benefits from open competition in a democratic political system. Instead,
large segments of tbe public and many leaders seem to assume that the
answers to nearly all political and social problems ultimatdy rest with
 TAKING STOCK 291

the Prime Minister armed with extraordinary powers at the apex of the
political system. There appears to be a common popular assumption that
order and social harmony ultimately depend on unconditional deference
given by citizens to a political hierarchy capped by a powerful, bene-
volent, and usually awesome leader. 9
Today the traditional hierarchical character of Malay society is b d n g
extended to other communities as well. Through the heavy use of
patronage, those political parties associated with the government have
acquired the proximate structure of hierarchical patron-client networks.
In addition, the elaborate structure of Malay titled ranking has been
extended to the non-Malay communities through the system of royal
tides and honours. Each Malay Ruler and each Governor of a non-Malay
state awards hundreds of life peerages, titles, and honours to 'meritorious'
citizens at royal or official birthday elebrations. With more royal families
and titled aristocracy than any other country in the world, die number of
people receiving such awards each year runs into die thousands. At times
it becomes extremely difficult to keep track of the appropriate utular
honorific to be attached to the name of diose acdve in public life. At any
public gathering, elaborate rituals of deference confirm the rank and
hierarchical standing of partidpeung public figures. Occasional public
rhetoric about equalitarian ideals is belied by the exaggerated rituals of
deference and status that are a pan of nearly all pubhc events and
ceremonies.

Political S o d a l i z a t i o n s
In the first decades after independence, the govemment proceeded on the
assumption that the basic beliefs and attitudes of the Malaysian public
were fairly well established by the primary socialization Malaysians
received within their family and within each ethnic community. T h e
early programmes of political indoctrination were mainly directed against
the Communist direat, which the government was careful not to define as
a communal conflict but raiher as an ideological contest being inspired
and supported from abroad. The Malaysian school system may have
imparted some c o m m o n values and beliefs about Malaysian political and
social institutions, but ideological and behavioural indoctrination was not
considered to be a responsibility of the schools or any other agency of
government.

Prior to 1969, Malaysian leaders responded to shifts io public opinion

from the detached perspective of the benevolent patron. For them, public
opinion was important, but far more important were the understandings
and agreements that could be made among the country's elites represent'
ing all major communities. T u n k u Abdul Rahman seemed to follow the
strategy of listening closely to divergent views but acting slowly, based oo
the assumption that time and talk could setde most vexatious problems.
Little efforts was made by leaders to form or reshape public attitudes and
beliefs, in part because these were assumed to be in fixed political allign-
ments which did not change basic political calculations of national leaders.
292 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Following the 1969 riots, the reshaping of public opinion and political
culture became a major objective of government policy. The first such
campaign involved the National Ideology or Rukunegara, formulated to
gain pubhc acceptance for the basic political agreements worked out by
the first generation of Alliance elites. The Rukunegara was vigorously
propagated as embodying the country's original 'Social Compact', which
was considered to be the m i n i m u m consensus necessary to sustain social
order and provide a stable government for the benefit of all.
By the time that Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister, assumptions
had changed: public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour could and should
be reshaped by co-ordinaied public campaigns and by exhorution and
example from national leaders. For Dr Mahathir, die first target for
transformation was the Malay community, w h o were to be prepared for
the m o d e m world by a fundamental psychic and attitudinal trans-
formauon. 1 0 Vet. the other commumties were to be transformed as well
so as to accept their supportive and compliant roles e n n s a g e d for the
' m o d e m industrial Malaysia' that was to emerge from a consistent pursuit
of the N e w Economic Policy and other long-range social policy objectives.
During the 1970s the government initiated many public media
campaigns to shape public opinion. Prime emphasis was given to gener-
ating political support for the government and building consensus for its
policies. Later campaigns emphasized changing behavioural motivations
and attitudes and providing 'moral instruction' about certain 'basic
values' which, if adhered to. were assumed to reduce ihe incidence of
social conflict. After Dr .Mahathir became Prime Minister, there were few
important aspects of public opinion, behaviour, and belief that were not
the urget of one or another of public media campaigns. The hortatory
political style perfected by Dr Mahathir reflected his earlier views that a
national political leader should play a major role in generating a new
political culture. It is significant to note that these recurring campaigns
to shape public opinion suessed consensus on key public policy issues,
but gave no anention to building legitimacy for well-defined collective
processes of political consultation or for constitutionally established insti-
tutional structures that could be utilized for resolving fundamental
conflict.

T h e Malaysian public was lold that power needed to be accumulated in

the hands of their benevolent leaders so that the country could enjoy
peace and prosperity. Both Malaysian leaders and the public were
oblivious to the research findings of Harold Lasswell, w h o discovered
that a high proportion of political aspirants w h o enter politics have basic
insecurities aod pcrsonality flaws that make them compensate by seeking
public recognition, and that tbey are propelled by private motiives that
are displaced on to thdr public roles and offices and are then rationalized
as being in the public interest. 11 The notion that Malaysian political elites
exhibit a complex mix of motives, ambition, self-seeking greed, arrog-
ance, charity, hypocrisy, deception, jealousy, self-sacrifice, pride,
humility, humour, honour, and vindictiveaess, in an ever-changing mix,
w a s certainly ignored in tbose persistent reports about the country's top
 TAKING STOCK 293

leaders which were being projeaed through the media and through
staged public e v e n u designed for the edification and polilical instruction
of the Malaysian public. Perhaps the Malaysian public should have
expressed relief and national pride that its leaders were exempt from the
behavioural motivations that drive Political Man in other societies. Or,
perhaps Malaysians were mesmerized by their traditional awe of leaders
into tacitly accepting the self-serving argument of their leaders that
substantive constitutional limitations and institutional restraints on power
were unnecessary impediments to effective rule, rather than an essential
ingredient of good government needed to channel the private motivations
of political office-holders to effective and accountable public purposes.

Institutional D e v e l o p m e n t and Change

Parliment

At i n d e p e n d e n t , the institution of Parliament was transplanted from the

British tradition to Malaysia without the cultural and social infrastructure
to support it. What is amazing is that it has survived with as much vigour
as it has. T h e fint generation of Malaysian elites were committed to make
it work, at least in outward ritual forms, and the next generation has
continued to rely on Parliament as a means to display their e k o o r a l
support and to provide the rituals of legitimacy for the government. T h e
survival of Parliament has occurred despite some vocal Malaysian critics
w h o proposed to abandon the parliamentary system in the wake of the
1969 riots. Although Parliament was suspended during a period of
emergency rule following those riots, the reconstitution of Parliament
became accepted as a primary condition for the r e t u r n to normal civil
government.
While Parliament does not operate very effectively as a forum for
public accountability or for the review of public policy, it does provide a
limited venue for the ventilation of criticism. T h e amount of time
devoted to questions and to criticism from the opposition has been
severely curtailed, and the Standing Orders of Parliament prohibit
treasonable or seditious words or 'words which are likely to promote
feeling of ill-will or hostility between different communities'. 1 2 T h e
interpretation of these limiutions is left to the Speaker of the H o u s e , w h o
is appointed by the government and is usually solicitous of its purposes
a n d political o b j e t i v e s . Parliamentary debate has usually been sharp and
sometimes acerbic, but it has seldom made any discernible impact cm
government policy or performance. With all public media either govern-
m e n t owned or licensed, the opposition receives o n l y slight and un-
sympathetic coverage in public reporting. Prior notice of bills and
government business seldom exceeds two days, and the opposition often
receive copies of bills just as debate is about to begin. so that thexe is no
Time for the opposition to study legislation and prepare informed analysts
and criticism. F u t h e r m o r e , Members of Parliament have neither the
time nor the staff to consult the public or give detailed study to legislative
294 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

proposals. Those on the government side of the Dewan Rakyat have the
advantage of prior knowledge of what is pending and the assistance of the
bureaucracy, especially if they also hold ministerial office. Members of
the government heap scorn and derision on the opposition for being
uninformed and 'irresponsible', but they have not responded to pleas
from the opposidon benches for more time to study bills before they are
hurriedly passed dirough all stages of parliamentaiy approval. The
argument that opposition Members of Parliament need staff assistance to
improve the quality and content of their criticisms and suggestions has
not been accepted by the government, which has acted in a largely
unilateral fashion to allocate both time and resources to the legislative
functions of Parliament. Many Members of Parliament supporting the
government seem to assume that as long as the government's agenda is
not impeded, the opposition should be given some limited time to
criticize, provided that the public takes hide heed of such debates.
T h e parliamentary committee system is not an imponant link in policy
review. Bills are often introduced and passed in a single day, with only
pro forma consideration by the Committee of the Whole, or by a hastily
assembled parliamentary' committee under the complete control of the
government. Parliamentary committees, when they are used, never hold
open public hearings on public legislation; no committee develops the
specialized expertise that would enable it to challenge the expertise of
the bureaucracy or exercise independent investigative functions to
make the public services direcdy accountable to Parliament. 13 Further-
more, in contrast to most Western parliamentary democracies, independ-
ent Parliameniary Commissions have rarely been utilized to evaluate
difficult policy options, or to solicit views and information from inde-
pendent experts and various functional and public interest groups. There
are no mechanisms of direct access to the legislative process for the
members of the general public and for organizations that represent the
sectoral components of Malaysian society. T h e idea of Parliament
launching an independent investigative operation to explore some
problem area of public policy has not been incorporated into the ethos
and practices of the Malaysian Parliament.

Except for one short period in 1969, the government has always
commanded a two-thirds majority in Parliament. T h e one exception
following the 1969 election was rapidly corrected by the co-optation into
the government of the Sarawak United People's Party to assure its two-
thirds majority. Except for 'entrenched' s e a s o n s of the Constitution
relating to Malay special rights and the Rukunegara amendments passed
in 1971, Parliament has the unimpeded power to amend the Constitution
by a two-thirds majority. With this majority always available and well
disciplined under the party whip, the government has been free and
easy in amending the Constitution whenever it suits its immediate
purposes. Constitutional amendments have been passed on the average of
o n c e a year up to 1987, 15 with the pace rapidly escalating after that date.
W h e n a dispute arose with Singapore, a constitutional amendment was
passed by Parliament in the period of three hours, expelling Singapore
 TAKING STOCK 295

from the Federation. 16 When the High Court ruled that the government
acted unconstitutionally in a dispute involving the Sarawak Chief
Minister, Parliament was promptly convened in emergency session to
pass constitutional amendments to depose the Chief Minister and impose
federal emergency rule on the state. 17 In both cases, Members of Parlia-
ment were informed only immediately preceding die debate and passage
of the amendments. When the courts m l e d against the government
during 1987 and 1988 in matters relating to the disputed election in
U M N O and in regard to individual challenges against orders made under
the Intemal Security Act, the government not only passed a series of
constitutional amendments to restrict the powers of the courts, but it also
initiated successful impeachment proceedings against the Lord President
and two oiher members of the Supreme Court. 18 While some consuiu-
tional amendments were made for technical reasons and with the acqui-
escence of the opposition, over the years an increasing number were
passed to assen the unimpeded power of the government. Successive
governments gave utmost importance to being able to change the Consu-
tution at will to suit their immediate purposes, many of which were
transparently partisan. Increasingly, the constitutional amendments
which were passed at the behest of the incumbent Prime Minister bad the
obvious efforts of aggrandizing the powers of the Prime Minister, of
subduing the opposition, some of whom were in his o w n p a n y , and of
prohibiting individuals from applying to the c o u n s to seek redress from
the extraordinary prerogative powers exercised by the Prime Minister.
Constitutionalism, it seems, depended merely on the existence of a
written constitution and not so much on its content or on extended
processes of consultation and consent necessary for iu amendment or
upon an insuiuuonal infrastructure to sustain it against the w h i m s and
manipulations of the government of the day. T h e idea of concurrent
majorities and open public debate over the merits of proposed constitu-
tional changes was not part of the political tradition of Malaysia.

In the Malaysian system, the prime role of Parliament has been to

provide the ceremony and ritual that symbolize the base of popular
public support which the government has been able to muster at the
previous election. Parliament remains important for demonstrating
the government's commitment to public participation in elections and
to the visible display of electoral support. Parliament has not been
considered by any prominent Malaysian leaders to require substantive
reforms that would enhance iu legislative and public accountability roles,
thereby generating increased political vitality within iu proceedings. An
expanded role of Malaysia's Parliament, if it were to c o m e , would not be
the p r o d u a of government initiative, but more likely would arise from a
more politically informed public c o n c e m e d about tbe directions of public
policy and tbe conduct of public officials. Malaysia's political ethos on
this dimension appears to have changed little since Malaysia first gained
its independence. If anything, the second generation incumbent tiaa
exhibit more implicit scorn for a revitalized Parliament than the first
generation.
296 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Elections

Despite severe crises, a guerrilla war, and ethnic conflict, Malaysia has
sustained the practice of free periodic elections. Although the 1969
e l e a i o n was suspended before it was completed, it was eventually
allowed to continue, and the period of emergency rule did not upset the
pattern of regular elections. Even so, the electoral system has been
systematically distorted by partisan gerrymandering of electoral consutu-
encies designed to minimize the electoral representation of non-Malay's
and to enhance the political fortunes of the Alliance/BN coalition.
Combined with the British pattern of single-member consutuencies, the
electoral system gives a tremendous eleaoral leverage to the plurality in
each constituency. This results in an exaggerated advantage for the Malay
community. Even so, because of ethnic geographical dispersion, the
electoral system has rewarded inter-ethnic coalitions, which has aided the
Alliance/BN coalition but also induced opposition parties to compete by
forming their o w n inter-ethnic political linkages. T h e election system,
despite its distonion of ethnic political representation, has muted ethnic
extremism by rewarding pluralities based on multi-ethnic support. 19
Funthermore, elections have become accepted as the foundation for the
Malaysian political system, and as such they have been the prime
instrument for preserving and sustaining the democratic component in
that system.

Federalism

T h e federal system began with traditions of state autonomy but also with
the substantive distribution of power preponderantly in favour of the
Federal Government. An inadequate constitutionally protected state tax
base makes the states heavily dependent on federal grants and budget
allocations. Federal powers to suspend s u t e constitutions and impose
emergency rule, and the power to amend the Constitution without the
participation or consent of die s u t e s , means that the Federal Government
can impose its will on any s u t e if it chooses to do so and is willing to pay
the political costs involved when federal authorities invoke extraordinary
powers. With a fairly centralized national party system extending to all
states and the extensive use of federal patronage at the s u t e level, the
power and the influence of federal authorities have become even more
pervasive.
Despite these trends towards centralization and the enhancement of
federal power, the states have retained substantial powers and remained
vigorous and autonomous components of the political system. Their
autonomy has been preserved in part by the substantial political influence
and substantive powers vested in the separate Malay Rulers, as well as by
the vitality of the grass-roots organization of certain parties able to
dominate or play a siginificant role at the state level. The topics of Land,
Agrictdture, Malay Religion, and Local Government remain as primary
issues for s u t e action and administration, despite federal encroachment
 TAKING STOCK 297

on all these subjects through pre-emptive federal legislation. Because of

the rising value and importance of land resources, especially umber and
mining, political competition at the state level has often been intense and
sometimes vicious. For a variety of economic and social reasons, enhanced
federal powers have not exunguished the autonomy and the unique
political configurations of individual states. Indeed, in the case of the two
Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah, their effective autonomy may even
have been enhanced in recent years due to the upsurge of indigenous
native sentiments, despite the pervasive supervisory role exercised by the
Federal Govemment. 2 0
Most opposition parties have been able to build a political base within
one or two states, thus enabling them to survive the shifting tides of
national trends. For this reason, the federal system, even with its
centralizing proclivities, has helped to preserve clusters of political
diversity where opposition parties can survive. T h e state-based opposi-
tion parties have sometimes become 'trapped' by their local constituency,
making it difficult for them to expand their role by acuve participation in
the national political arena. T h e overall political consequences of the
federal system have often been overlooked, but they are, none the less,
extremely imponant in keeping Malaysia on an essentially democratic
mode, despite many other countervailing trends.

Bureucracy

Malaysia's system of national economic planning and the increased

functions of the state for promoting economic development and the
'restructuring of society' has meant diat die bureaucracy has expanded
both in size and role. In addition, after the formulation of the N e w
liconomic Policy there has been a tremendous growth of quasi-public
enterprises which were formed by the government but treated as inde-
pendent agencies. T h e y are known as 'off-budget' Non-Financial Public
Enterprises ( N F P E s ) , and are counted as pan of die public sector. T h e
overall growth of the bureaucracy has outpaced tbe growth in the
Gross National P r o d u a . In 1960 total government expenditure was
M$93 million and constituted only 14 per cent of the G N P . By 1986,
government expenditures had risen to M$28.5 billion, which came to
4 1 . 7 per cent of the G N P . In the same year, the N F P E s also had
expenditures of M $ 2 2 b i l l o n , but a proportion of their expenditure came
from government funding, so there was some overlap in the two figures. 2 1
Together, these figures reveal that total public sector expenditures must
have been in excess of half the G N P .

At independence, the country inherited a relatively small, fairly effi-

cient. well-trained bureaucracy widi the higher levels filled almost
exclusively by English dvil servants. T h e process of Malaysianization of
the civil service rapidly filled most of the top p o s u with Malays. Over the
years, through the operation of Malay 'special rights' giving recruitment
and promotion preferences to Malays, the whole structure of government
services has become a bastion of Malay power and the major avenue for
298 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

Malay professional and economic advancement. This pattern is particu-

larly pronounced at the higher adminisirative and policy-making levels
where Malay dominance comes closer to reality.
As the bureaucracy has increased in size and the quasi-public Bumi-
putra agencies have mushroomed, the bureaucracy has assumed a much
more important role in economic planning, public policy initiadves and
in direct management of large sectors of the economy. Economic plan-
ning for both the states and the federal authorides is co-ordinated by the
Economic Planning Unit ( E P U ) in the Prime Minister's Department,
which in turn reports to the National Development Planning Council.
Not only has this structure created very centralized mechanisms for
economic and development planning, but it has also tended to centralize
the collection of data and conduct of research on all significant policy-
relaied questions. T h e whole structure of the bureaucracy and the
quasi-public agencies feeds information and policy- proposals into this
hierarchical and centralized planning and policy review process. T h e
increasing role of the bureaucracy in government planning and policy
initiatives makes it exceedingly imponant for elites to p i n access to the
bureaucratic structures of decision-making. The Malay bias of the
bureaucracy makes this easier for Malay elites, but non-Malay elites
affiliated with the BN coalition gain nominal access to various quasi-
representative bodies and consultadve organs,

Over the decades, the main public policy issues were alleged to have
been 'settled', thus gradually restricting the scope and purview of elite
bargaining. As the elite bargaining process became less mululaieral and
more dyadic and focused on the Prime Minister, policy initiatives were
more likely to derive from die inidadve of the Prime Minister or be the
product of a policy review process originating within the bureaucracy.
Issues of administrative policy and the distribution of benefits to consutu-
ents and chents became reladvely more important, while matters of
patronage acquired increased salience. For the non-Malay political Elites,
favoured access to the bureaucratic structures was often crucial to their
political survival. For this reason, much of 'elite bargaining, involved
Malay bureaucrats with non-Malay p o h u d a n s and c o n c e m e d quesdons
of administrauve implementation of national plans and the application of
ethnic distributive principles or quoias to the allocation of goods and
services. In nearly all planning and administrative decisions, there was
the application of an edinic calculus to the anticipated impact of projects
and programmes. Those w h o had political access could at least voice their
concerns and in the proccss often gain some adjustments and modifica-
tions to the end-product. While major policy-making has become more
centralized in the Prime Minister's Department, much of the substantive
inter-elite bargaining has also become more fragmentized by the growth
of these informal techniques of interest articulation through bureaucratic
channels.

T h e great expansion of government agencies and public bodies provides

the institutional framework for the extension of patron-client networks
beyond the immediate circle of individual loyalties and friendships of the
 TAKING STOCK 299

key actors of the political scene. T h e wide latitude for administrative

discretion and prerogatives and the high value of the resources at the
c o m m a n d and discretion of administrators not only increase incentives
and opportunities for corruption, but also provide the leeway to reward
political support and bargain with o t h e n w h o control political or material
resources. At the middle and lower levels, the patron-client linkages
often extend beyond ethnic boundaries and can involve multi-ethnic co-
operation to defend jointly shared interests. When the MCA's investment
arm, Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad, made joint business ventures with
companies owned or controlled by U M N O , shared profits frequently
depended upon favoured treatment by government officials. 22 Their
mutual reliance on common patron-client linkages muted ethnic com-
petition and facilitated limited inter-ethnic co-operation for very
pragmatic and non-symbolic objectives. T h e cumulative effects of these
changing patterns of politics and power have altered the role and functions
of the bureaucracy. In this process, the public services have gradually
acquired more of the charaaeristics of what has been depicted as an
emerging 'Patrimonial State'. 23

The Military

Malaysia gained its independence while a Communist guerrilla war was

being waged. In the circumstances, one might assume that the military
would have played a major policy role right from the birth of the new
nation. Yet, the British had a strong tradition of civilian control of the
military, with elaborate administrative techniques to assure that military
units served civil authority. These traditions and practices of civil
supremacy have been sustained in their basic principles through the first
three decades of independence and beyond.
T h e Malaysian armed forces are a well-trained professional force that
has been gradually increasing in size and acquiring more sophisticated
weapons. Until the late 1960s, it had little armour because it was
considered to be of linle use in fighting the guerrillas operating in the
jungles. With a shifting emphasis to external security, more armour has
been acquired by the armed forces. During the mid-1960s the Army
constituted about 33,000 men, increasing to 50,000 by 1971, 56,000 by
1977, and 80,000 by 1984. The small N a v y and Air Force which existed
at independence were substantially enlarged during the 1970s and 1980s.
By 1984 the N a v y was at a strength of 8,700, while the Air Force
consisted of 11,000 men. 2 4 T h e defence forces have always received good
pay in comparison to other public services, and conditions of service have
also been good, contributing to good morale. In 1987, defence expend-
itures amounted to 11.9 p e r c e n t of the budget and this figure represented
4 . 6 per cent of the nation's G N P . 2 5 This allocation placed Malaysia
among the middle ranks of military spenders in comparison to other
Third World countries on the basis of G N P .

T h e composition of the military has always been preponderantly

Malay. T h i s has been due to a combination of ethnic self-selection and
300 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

the designed recruitmem and promotion policies of the armed forces.

Along with the Monarchy, the military is seen as a fundamental bastion
of Malay power insuring the fundamental Malay stake in the nation. The
Army probably exceeds 90 per cent Malay in composition; the N a v y is
slightly more multi-ethnic; the Air Force has a greater proportion of non-
Malays, with Chinese being better represented dian in tbe other services,
paniculariy among its pilots. 26 The highest officers of the armed forces
are almost exclusively Malay, many of whom are closely related to Malay
political leaders and to the Malay royally. Close affiliation of the .Malay
officers with the Malay political establishment has been one of the
reasons w h y the military has given unwavering support to the govern-
ment of the day. The assignment of top military commands to those
related by blood and marriage to the incumbent Prime Minister has
merely strengthened the political loyally bonds between the nation's
highest political leader and the top of the military command structure. 27
In recent years, the military has come under pressure to become more
politicized. This has occurred when the Malay political establishment has
become factionally fractious. Of panicular importance were the occasions
when disputes arose pitting incumbent Malay leaders against the Malay
Rulers, The 1983 crisis over the powers of the King and the 1988 crisis
over the impeachment of the Lord President and the apparent attempt of
Dr Mahathir to influence die elecdon of the next King, were both
disputes which put the armed forces in a bind between their support for
the incumbent Malay political leaders and the traditional Malay Rulers,
w h o represent what has been called the 'native equadon of power,. T h e
factional cleavage within Malay society between Dr Mahathir and his
cridcs meant that both facuons were pressuring the armed forces to
abandon their traditional political neutrality and make an open commit-
ment to one side or the other in the unfolding political struggle. In
September 1988 the chief of the armed forces and Dr Mahathir's brother-
in-law, Maj.-Gen. 'Freddie' Hashim Mohamed Ali, presented his views
on how this affected the role of the military: 'Although the armed forces
have to be non-aligned in politics, this does not mean we should not
follow, and understand, the political s i t u a t i o n . . . because there are
groups wishing to politicize [us].' 28

Becausc of affinity' between the armed forces, especially among the

Malay officer class, and the Malay Rulers, this nexus became an increas-
ingly significant p a n of the amorphous structure of power after the
newer second generation of Malay elites came to power, having less
attachment to and fewer l i n k s with the traditional structure of Malay
authority represented by the Rulers. Because the Semangat *46 faction
led by Tengku Razaleigh appeared to be aligned with some of the most
politically active and vocal of the Malay Rulers, this generated political
tensions within the military. Although the armed forces were led by
Dr Mahathir's brother-in-law, 16 of the 20 top posts in the military were
held by Kelantanese Malay officers, many of w h o m were affiliated with
the Sultan of Kelantan, Ismail Petra, who is the nephew of T e n g k u
Razaleigh. W h e n rumours circulated dial Dr Mahathir was considering
 TAKING STOCK 301

detaining Tengku Razaleigh, there was much speculation about the

possible reaction of some officers in the military. Such speculation may
have been sufficient to dissuade Dr Mahathir from that course of action,
if, indeed, it was ever seriously contemplated. 29
Although these events reveal that the military has not intervened
directly to become eidier a ruler or a king-maker, it is s u b j e a to the
shifting tides of politics and is a nascent political actor even w h e n sitting
quietly in the wings. Since 1975, a number of Malaysian military officers
have received training at Indonesian military staff colleges, where they
have gained experience widi a military acdvely involved with political
affairs. While the Malaysian military remains commined to non-political
roles, it is also the mainstay of the political assertion of Malay dominance.
As such, there are clearly pressures building up for it to play a more
activist political role, particularly if fracuous disputes within the Malay
community were to seriously threaten the very Malay dominance which
the military symbolizes and is tacitly committed to protect.

The Courts

Except for the lowest levels and the Islamic Kadi's Courts, the Court
system in Malaysia is entirely an imported instituuon governed by
English legal tradiuons and praaices. T h e principles of die C o m m o n
Law and the institutional rules and procedures that govern the courts
derive directly from England. In order to apply Common Law in its
locally adapted form, Malaysian judges in the higher courts must bccome
fully trained in British law and acquainted with the legal principles that
evolved from British c o u n s . Because of its foreign origin and the lack of
public awareness of die essentials of a legal system based on time-
honoured precedent and an independent judiciary, the courts have
struggled to define a new role that will be true to their inherited
traditions, yet also reflecting the needs and concerns of a multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural Asian society.
British courts operate without judicial review, accepting the principle
of 'parliamentary supremacy' whereby Parliament is limtied, not by
direct court action, but by the deeply ingrained principles of the
'unwritten constitution' evolving over centuries. By contrast, the Malay-
sian courts inherited the British tradition, but also acquired a written
constitution that gave the courts some responsibility for interpreting the
Constitution through the power of judidal review. In the early years, this
power was exercised cautiously by the courts, in part because of the
provision for the appeal from the Supreme Court of Malaysia to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (the Law Lords) in London.
As part of the trend towards national autonomy, 1976 legislation
restriaed appeals to the Privy Council and by 1983, under Dr Mahathir's
leadership, the last judicial links with the Privy Council were completely
severed. T h i s move made it even more imperative for the Malaysian
judiciary to develop its o w n set of precedents for interpreting the O n s t i -
luiion and exercising its assigned responsibilities for judicial review. In
302 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

this enterprise, the courts were venturing into largely uncharted waters
and often without much public appreciation of or support for the crudal
role thai was demanded of them. Widi the accession to power of second-
generation political leaders, few of whom had training in the law, and
many of whom became preoccupicd with iheir e f f o n to maximize polit-
ical power so as to manage the compiexiues of a multi-ethnic society, the
s u g e was thereupon set for a confrontation over the roles and powers of
the judiciary. The earlier trend towards increasing nauonal judicial
autonomy was to be supplanted by a new trend that enhanced the role of
the executive in mailers pertaining to the interpretation of both ordinary
legislation and the Constitution.
T h e constitutional mechanisms designed to assure the independence of
the judiciary were of linle protection in any dispute with the executive.
T h e conduct of judges cannot be discussed by Parliament or state
legislatures. Judicial appointments are made by the King on recom-
mendation of the Prime Minisier and judges enjoy p r o i e a e d tenure; they
remain in office unul the age of 65 unless they are impeached for
misbehaviour or disability'. But if criticism of judges emanates from the
Prime Minister, there are no mechanisms for redress, while the powers of
appointment, transfer, and the initiation of impeachment proceedings all
originate with the Prime Minister. With public opinion passive on issues
of judicial autonomy, when the major crisis developed over the role of the
courts and the leadership provided by the Lord President, Salleh Abas,
the executive was able to use its full arsenal of powers to restructure the
courts by securing the impeachment of the more outspoken proponents
of judicial autonomy and appointing in their place those judges willing to
assume a more passive role acceding to the current views of the executive
on matters of constitutional and legislative inierpreutions. In most
Western c o u t r i e s , 'Court Packing' by the executive would generate a
crisis likely to bring down a government. In Malaysia, it was accepted
amidst feeble protests but without great public outery. T h e net result was
a quantum enhancement of executive power which was justified with the
self-serving argument that Malaysia needs 'strong leadership'.

TheMonarchy

T h e oldest political institution in contemporary Malaysia is that of the

Malay Rulers. Predating the colonial era, they were made over into a
keystone of the colonial system of 'indirect rule' and then transformed
again to accord with m o d e m requisites of a parliamentary system. Over
the existing nine Malay Rulers was created the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
(Paramount Ruler or King), w h o is elected by the Conference of Rulers
from among the Malay Rulers on the basis of seniority for a five-year term,
following which the King loses his seniority for purposes of election. T h i s
system of five-year routing kingship established a Ruler for the federation
as a whole. 3 0 What had been well established as a key institution of
government was deeply ingrained in Malay political culture. T h e Malay
R u l e n provided the mystique and legitimacy to assure support from the
 TAKING STOCK 303

Malay rakyat—the common folk. In traditional Malay political culture,

government (kerajaan) is the condition of having a r a j a . T h e kerajaan
ideal would question the legitimacy of any political entity without the
presence of such a ruler. When states without Malay Rulers joined the
federation, they acquired Ruler-surrogates in the form of an appointed
head of state known either as the Governor or Yang di-Pertua Negeri.
Bui the core of the system depends on the nine hereditary Malay Rulers
acting through the Council of Rulers, comprising the nine Malay Rulers
w h o are joined for certain deliberations by the four Governors. 31
Over the centuries, the Malay R u l e n have evolved through four stages.
Before the colonial era, they were in effect 'Oriental despots' legally
unlimited in powers but restrained in practice by custom and the very
practical problem of retaining their retainers and subjects. In the colonial
era, they became titular leaders, having lost most substantive powers, but
retaining considerable influence through their contact with colonial
authorities and their becoming the key link in the system of 'indirect
rule'. After independence, they retained their symbolic roles as Rulers,
but acquired some very limited powers for the protection of the Malays
and performed other roles that were somewhat ambiguous because they
were derived both from the Westminster model and the Malay model,
whatever that may have meant. Finally, after the constitutional crisis of
1983, when Dr Mahathir tried to restrict the powers of the King related
to parliamentary legislation, some of the earlier ambiguity of power and
role assignment was made more explicit, and in the process, the Rulers
acquired more defined power than they previously assumed they bad.
T h e crisis was resolved by giving the King the power to reject any bill,
provided he writes his reasons and transmits them to Parliament within
30 days. Upon subsequent repassage by Parliament, the rejected bill then
becomes law without royal assent. 32

As an institution, the Monarchy appears to be alert to public opinion

even while it 'floats above' most political issues by emphasis upon ritual
and its symbolic roles. There appears to be no formal institutional
mechanism to hold the King accountable, although there is some restraint
exercised from royal peers through informal consultations and the
Council of Rulers. 3 3 Since independence, the stature and influence of the
Monarchy has increased, with each Ruler attracting a political following
that extends beyond the court circle and across ethnic lines. Although the
Rulers are seen as a bastion of Malay supremacy, non-Malays have
increasingly accepted the role of the Rulers, in p a n because most Rulers
have shown themselves to be more moderate and even-handed on conten-
tious ethnic issues than many active Malay politicians. While the Rulers
are no longer the primary patronage-giver, they do distribute honour,
rank, and public recognition, and their vast personal wealth and invest-
ments make them ideal partners for joint ventures, especially for non-
Malay partners.

Because of its institutional legacy, its symbolic importance and its

considerable autonomous powers under the Constitution, the Monarchy
could become the most effective institution placing restraints on unbridled
304 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

executive power. Whether such a role is exercised will depend on the

perspective, will-power, and political skills of each individual King
during his limited learn of office. A choice can be made between two
alterative perspectives on the role of the King. A King can become an
accomplice and coadjutor of the Prime Minister through some political
alliance or some understanding on spheres of authority and shared
mutual benefits. Or the King can view his role as being the protector of
the Constitution and an impartial arbiter to ensure that those w h o enter
politics play on a 'level field' and abide by common rules, fair to all. In
1988 when the King, Sultan Mahmood Iskandar Shah of Johore, agreed
to press the impeachment charges against third President Salleh Abas and
later against five other Supreme Court judges, his actions suggested that
he had opted for the coadjutor role. On 25 April 1989, a new King was
sworn into office. Sultan Azlan Shah of Perak. w h o had earlier been Lord
President and was commonly assumed to be a man of independent
judgement and strong views on the matter of the role of both the courts
and the monarchy. Although he was the next in terms of seniority, his
election by the Rulers Council had not been unanimous. He refused to be
sworn in by the Lord President. Abdul Hamid Omar, w h o had been
appointed to fill the position following the impeachment of Salleh Abas.
Instead, Sultan Azlan Shah was sworn in before his peers, the Malay
Rulers. 34 It is impossible to know whether this symbolic act was an
indicator of his commitment to a more autonomous role above partisan
conflict for the Monarchy during his term as King. If it was, there could
be a lively test of wills in the indefinite future.

The Executive

T h e increasing size, complexity, and capacity of government has made

the task of the Prime Minister increasingly important over the years.
Matters of security, both domestic and foreign, are his ultimate respons-
ibility. Foreign affairs requires his participation in international
diplomacy and in negotiations with heads of foreign governments.
Increasingly, the Prime Minister is viewed as the nation's salesman, w h o
must secure favourable trade agreements, attract foreign investment, and
promote the sales abroad of the country's products.
In domestic politics, the Prime Minister is the key actor and at centre
stage at alt times. He acts as leader of the Malays, of U M N O , of the
Barisan Nasional, of the nation, and of the government. Sometimes these
multiple leadership roles conflict or produce ambiguous and contra-
dictory signals, He must oversee the building of his party machine and
those of his coalition partners. He must engage in intra-elite negotiations
to resolve conflicts and distribute benefits among his supporters and
within the component panics of the governing coalition. He is respons-
ible for the management of the economy as well as for long-term
economic and governmental policy planning. Legislative proposals must
be reviewed and co-ordinated. Public support for the policies of his
government depend primarily on his capacity to shape public opinion.
 TAKING STOCK 305

Finally, he must supervise an enormous administrative structure com-

posed of government departments, public agencies, and a vast array of
independent parastatal bodies that have all grown in complexity and
importance.
T h e increased responsibilities of the Prime Minister have been accom-
panied by a substantial increase in legal powers and the expansion of
executive prerogatives. These trends have also produced enlarged oppor-
tunities to reward supporters with patronage and privilege, as well as to
deny resources or apply coercive penalties to critics and opponents. The
.Malaysian political system has always operated with extensive patronage,
but the nature of that patronage has been changing. In the days of Tunku
Abdul Rahman, there was a clear pattern of patronage, but it was
dispensed to an immediate circle of friends, often through informal
agreements which might even be struck during a game of golf. T h e
patronage network seldom extended to a secondary entourage beyond one
or, at the most, two layers of middlemen. By the time of Dr Mahathir,
the patronage system had not only grown enormously, but it included
many intermediate layers of middlemen in a more extensive and institu-
lionalized system of rewarding loyalty and political support. T h e client
beneficiaries were less likely to be close personal friends of the Prime
Minister, partly because the patronage network had become so big, and
partly because of Dr Mahathir's more cautious reserve in inter-personal
relations w i t h associates. This system built up the political machine of
U M N O as well as other BN parties, but it proved to be an inadequate
tool of administrative control and had inherent difficulties in building a
stable base of political support.

W h e n used extensively, patronage is a double-bladed sword that can

cut both ways. For every patronage beneficence given out, there is a
bond of reciprocal obligation being constructed. Yet, at the same time,
there is also very likely the growth of a sense of relative deprivation
among those w h o fail to obtain benefits or w h o conclude that their
previous benefits have been demeaned or depreciated by comparison. By
its very logic, a patrimonial system requires ever more resources to
distribute, and as it becomes larger, it is also much more difficult to
manage without inadvertently creating centres of discontent and rivalry.
T h e instability of the system increases with size.
An apparent concern with alternative power centres made the Prime
Minister concentrate in his hands decision-making and power, which was
exemplified by his holding simultaneously several key Cabinet portfolios,
most notably H o m e Affairs and Defence, in addition to his overburdened
responsibilities for the Prime Minister's Department. T h e periodic re-
shuffling of the Cabinet has had as one of its objectives the prevention of
rival centres of power from growing and becoming entrenched. Fear of
delegation of powers or power-sharing among elites is a symptomatic by-
product of the patrimonial style of leadership. Such fears also generate
pressures for centralization of power and contribute to the conditions
which are likely to produce a succession crisis at the time when new
leaders must be chosen.
306 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

As the nation's leader, the Prime Minister has always stressed the
theme of 'unity'. In pan this reflects a concern for the effects of political
and ethnic divisions, but also an implicit recognition of the potentially
low level of legitimacy which supports the country's political institutions
and its leaders. In Malaysia, the 'unity' theme is of special concern to the
leaders of the Malays, because of the largely unstated fear that political
divisions within the Malay community may lead to an emasculation of
Malay political power. Even so, during the era of T u n k u Abdul Rahman,
calls by die Prime Minister for 'Malay unity' were issued relatively
infrequently and without great intensity. What was stressed instead was
inter-communal co-operation based on an acknowledgement of indigenous
rights for the Malays as well as inherent rights for the former immigrant
communities now accepted as citizens.
After 1969, prime ministers played the 'Malay unity' theme in their
public rhetoric with greater frequency and more intensity. By the time of
Dr Mahathir, 'Malay unity" and "Islamic unity' were virtually fused to
become the primary symbolic-ideological theme generated through the
public pronouncements of the Prime Minister. For politicians, 'unity' is
usually a code word meaning 'follow mc and my leadership'. The
intensity of the call for 'unity' usually is directly related to the extent of
the challenge posed by alterative leaders or policy options. If this is the
case in Malaysia, then the increasing intensity of political exhortation
from the Prime Minister reflects not only idiosyncratic differences in
leadership styles, but also changing configurations in the cleavage patterns
of Malaysian politics.
T h e increasing emphasis by successive prime ministers on public
image-making ceremonies, on exhortation, on moral instruction, and on
the generation of slogan-driven campaigns suggest that recent prime
ministers have assumed that they can mould the value system of the
Malaysian public. Leadership, it seems, is viewed as primarily a top-
down interactive relationship, rather than an open two-way reciprocal
process between leaders and the diverse disaggregated constituencies
which constitute the public. With the exaggerated prerogative powers of
the Prime Minister, including the .Ministers of his government, much of
pubhc policy is generated under a cloak of secrecy and with no effective
mechanisms of accountability or review, In addition, much public policy
appears to be anxiety-driven while some appear to be designed to
promote concealed objectives. These appearances may be more a product
of the lack of opportunity for public inputs into the policy process than
the actual content of those policies. T h e over-centralization of power and
policy initiatives with the Prime Minister makes him vulnerable to the
criticism that his subsequent public explanations of government actions
and policy too often appear contrived and self-serving.

Performance Criteria

On many dimensions, the Malaysian political system has performed

amazingly well, especially in comparison to other Third World countries.
 TAKING STOCK 307

It has suffered no military coups. It has retained constitutional continuity

since independence, despite the relatively short period when the Consti-
tution was suspended under Emergency decree in 1969 and 1970.
Elections have been held at regular intervals without interruption and
they have been competitive and relatively free of irregularities and voter
coercion.
T h e institutions of political representation are heavily biased in favour
of the Malays through a structure of 'multiple leverage' that has the effect
of maximizing Malay majorities and pluralities. Constituencies are gerry-
mandered to inflate Malay voting power; the single-member-district
system rewards pluralities and under-represents minorities; the party
system and coalition structures impose a 'Malay supremacy' formula on
the government and its public policies; and key Institutions like the
Monarchy, the civil service, and the army are structured with special
powers and responsibilities designed to reassure Malays that their political
numbers are translated into even more substantive real and symbolic
power. Although democracy exists in Malaysia in fairly vigorous form, it
would probably face serious challenge if the multiple-leverage system
failed to assure preponderant Malay over-representation and control in
Parliament and all other branches of government. Democracy, it seems,
must concede value rank to ethnic sensitivities and accumulated paranoia.

T h e level of corruption in Malaysia is a matter of much political

disputation between those in the government and the opposition, par-
ticularly the D A P . In pan, this may depend on what is included in the
definition of 'corruption', and partly on how one interprets government
reticence to pursue all allegations of corruption with a public investiga-
tion and tactics of full disclosure. Malaysia does appear to have a more
efficient, less corrupt civil service than its two largest neighbours and
most other Third World countries. There arc fairly effective mechanisms
to detect and prosecute those officials of government and parastatal
bodies w h o put their hands directly into the public till. T h e rising
number of prosecutions for embezzlement and criminal breach of t m s t is
testimony to the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures for such crimes.
What is more ambiguous is where discretionary powers of officials are
used to generate donations to party coffers or to reward friends,
relatives, and political supporters, or to obtain personal material benefits
through indirect mechanisms of 'prior knowledge' or untraceable recip-
rocal pay-back mechanisms, T h e lack of vigorous enforcement campaigns
against this latter form of corruption implies that it may be on the
increase. T h e dividing line between the prerequisites of power and the
misuse of power for partisan or personal advantage is frequently difficult
to draw, but also easily concealed. Whether the persistent and strident
accusations of widespread corruption made by the D A P and others 35 are
well founded, or are the product of deliberate distortions of the evidence
from a few highly publicized cases, cannot be known until more effective
and independent investigative mechanisms are in place to explore and
expose to public view all such allegations and suspicions.

In comparison to most other Third World countries, Malaysia has

308 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

maintained political stability and fairly low levels of political violence.

T h e Emergency and the guerrilla war with the Communists was costly,
both in terms of money and in loss of life, but even during that period,
there were no major civil disturbances threatening public order. With the
effective defeat of the guerrillas and their retreat to the Thai-Malaysia
border areas, civil order has been effectively sustained except for a short
period during the crisis of May 1969 and several other minor outbreaks
of political violence in scattered localities. Such violence was often the
product of local disputes or efforts by some political group or faction to
make a forceful 'display' of its political following. When issues of power
or crucial policy matters arc at stake, some political leaders, including, on
occasion, the Prime Minister, have engaged in the tactic of 'brinks-
manship' and 'contrived escalation' lo raise issues and increase bargaining
leverage with their political opponents. On such occasions, leaders have
openly or covertly encouraged their followers to stage aggressive and
threatening public demonstrations. Some of these events have produced
serious political crises. The spectre of mass communal rioting is an ever-
present threat, but in reality, with only one frightening exception,
Malaysia's political crises have always been resolved without serious
threat to public order and with a relatively low incidence of political
violence, particularly in comparison to most other Third World countries.

T h e economic management of the country has generated much con-

troversy and criticism over specific policies, but not real crises or
challenges affecting the stability and confidence of the country. Indeed,
despite problems in certain specific areas of die economy, the overall
economic performance of the country- has been exceedingly good for the
entire period after independence. In 1987 Malaysia ranked 73 above the
poorest out of 95 low- and middle-income countries and was about to be
classified as an 'upper-middle-income' country on the basis of G N P per
capita. In terms of G N P it was about equal to Mexico, South Africa,
Poland, and Brazil, with a G N P per capita of US$1,810. 3 6 In 1988, risk
analysis considered die stability of ihe country extremely good, the
economic outlook to be very good, and, especially for investment
purposes, both economic and political risks to be very low with a general
pattern of decline in risk since 1986. 37 On many other comparative
indices, Malaysia was approaching the economic, educational, and pro-
ductive characteristics of some of the poorer European countries such as
Yugoslavia, Portugal, and Greece.

In regard to issues of human rights and civil liberties, Malaysia can

also be compared against the record of many other countries. T h e
yearbook published by Freedom House reports on the status of political
rights and civil liberties in all countries of the world. For each country, a
large volume of evidence is collected, analysed, and then coded to
produce an array of variables. The coded data is then aggregated into two
measures, one for political rights and the other for civil liberties which
are depicted on a 'Civil Rights Restriction Scale' of 1 - 7 . Adding the two
scores gives an aggregate scale of 2 - 1 4 for the overall 'Status of Freedom'.
T h e Malaysian rankings for 1 9 7 2 - 8 8 are depicted in Figure 9.7. 3 8
309
310 MALAYSIAN POLITICS. THE SECOND GENERATION

During a time when major advances in freedom have been recorded in

every part of the world, Malaysia's record on political and civil rights has
gradually deteriorated. It was ranked in 198S in the same category as
Singapore, Sudan, Fiji, Nicaragua, and Morocco, hut with a better
record than Indonesia. Tunisia. and Uganda. Ranking belter (lower on
the scale) than Malaysia were Taiwan, Mexico, Nepal, and Thailand.
Overall, Malaysia was close to the median point in the ranking for all
countries of the world and had a slightly better ranking than average
when compared only to Third World countries. 39 Malaysia's record on
human rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms has obviously not
kept pace with most other indicators of economic and political develop-
ment. With improved economic conditions, a stable and effective govern-
ment and low levels of political violence, one would think that political
leaders could afford to be more relaxed and tolerant in matters involving
the freedoms and civil rights of their own citizens.

Ethnicity: A Persistent Problem

In Malaysia, the ethnic equation has been the predominant factor shaping
political alignments, determining the structure and roles of institutions,
and defining the basic priorities of public policy. Not only were institu-
tions formed to generate and administer certain types of public policy,
but in time, those policy outcomes had put their imprint on the insti-
tutions, having the effect of limiting policy options and making ethnicity
ever more institutionalized and rigid in its manifestations, this interactive
relationship between policy and institutions has been explored most
recently by Donald L. Horowitz. 4 0 He traces how policy became institu-
tionalized with elaborate structures and organizations as well as rules of
share allocation and quotas. The effects of ethnic policy in turn became
the causes and sources of new policy shaping the character of the political
system and limiting options for policy change or a fundamental re-
evaluation of policy options.

T h e natural tendency for vested interests to mobilize around self-

benefiting preference policies has occurred in Malaysia, just as in other
countries where ethnic preferences have been applied. 4 1 For this reason,
a serious problem of policy rigidity developed, reinforced by the 'sensitive
issues' amendments to the Constitution which prohibit public discussion
of many key features of public policy, including the system of ethnic
preferences for Malays. At the time that these constitutional arrange-
ments were made, the objective was to demobilize ethnic conflicts over
certain contentious issues that had produced political crisis. In effect, the
short-term strategy of an 'inter-ethnic cease-fire' was pursued at the
expense of long-term evaluations of overall social objectives. Public
policy, however, is not something that can be carved in stone. Rather, it
must be continuously re-assessed and adjusted incrementally to changing
conditions and revised priorities, the legacy of past policies must be
subjected to critical review, and this process is complicated e n o u g h ,
without having the future handcuffed to the past.
 TAKING STOCK 311

In 1971, when the government inaugurated the N B P , the decision was

made to follow a strategy to promote a more equitable distribution of
economic rewards and status roles among the compartmentalized ethnic
components of society. It was argued that previous social, economic, and
psychological impediments had been obstacles to the development of die
Malays. Therefore, it was argued, earlier economic or socio-psychological
handicaps experienced by Malays should be balanced by special rights
and ethnic preference policies 'so as to reduce and eventually eliminate
the identification of race with economic function'. 42 With target goals
defined by the N E P , a tremendous investment of public resources was
committed for a period of two decades to thii strategy and for the
attainment of the announced objectives by 1990.
Statistics published with each national plan reveal consistent progress
towards die ethnic restructuring targets of the N E P . T h e N E P strategies
have been remarkably successful in achieving or approaching most
enunciated targets. Even die most strident critics of Malaysia's system of
ethnic preferences do not deny that Malays, in aggregate, have benefited
from the new opportunities created by the N E P policies. T h e question of
whether some targets have already been reached or how soon they are
likely to be met is a matter of some dispute. Despite these controversies,
the precise statistics on specific N E P goal achievements are not essential
to assess the strategy of ethnic preferences and to explore potential
alterative policy options.
T h e major configurations of overall ethnic restructuring are beyond
doubt. Economically, the position of those categorized as Malay/
Bumiputra has improved relative to other communities, and there is a
m u c h greater ethnic balance in the professions and in most m o d e m -
sector employment categories. What hat also occurred are some unin-
tended 'side e f f e c t ' , both on the Malay community and on other
communities of the country. Furthermore, the costs of the policies have
been very high. Together, these considerations raise the question of
whether there are potential alterative policies which could more effect-
ively achieve both stated goals as well as other priorities which may have
been undervalued, ignored, or postponed.
T h e very success of the N E P has created a 'revolution of rising
expectations' among Malays and other Bumiputra in regard to j o b s ,
i n c o m e , and responsible position in government and business. W h e n
such expectations extend to Malays in all walks of life, the demand aod
aspiration levels clearly exceed die delivery capacity of government. Mass
alienation and frustration are likely to rise, especially when s o m e Bumi-
putra achieve the valued positions while others, for various reasons, are
unable to better themselves at the same rate or to the same degree as their
move favoured ethnic kin. A m o n g those can capitalize on the new
opportunities and obtain the prescriptive benefits. it is c o m m o n to
assume that, like 'riding an escalator', new levels of reward will be
achieved without much individual effort. In a substantial portion of
beneficiaries, a form of dependency syndrome can affect—and apparently
has affected—the motivation and calculus of personal responses to die
312 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

'affirmative action' opportunities, For the beneficiaries, performance and

achievement norms have often been either overlooked, or applied
haphazardly and benignly.
Economic analysis of the N E P reveals that it has generated and
rewarded 'rent-seeking behaviour' and channelled much individual energy-
and activity into 'distributional coalitions'. 43 In effect, the favoured
beneficiaries, w h o act as trustees for their less fortunate ethnic kin,
become more motivated to collect 'quasi-rents' in the form of unearned
economic rewards, than they are motivated lo create new wealth and
improve productivity. Instead of responding to competitive economic
performance criteria, individuals and agencies become dependent on
subsidies and permanent institutionalized protectionism, which generates
enormous social costs, both for the economy and for the government. To
ensure the continuation and enlargement of rewards, the beneficiaries are
impelled to organize 'cartels' and 'distributional coalitions' to protect
their economic 'enclaves' and to strike non-competitive reciprocal bargains
with other centres of power and privilege. This in turn is but one of
many factors creating the conditions whereby wealth and income become
concentrated in the hands of the new- class of 'trustee' beneficiaries.
T h e number of N E P beneficiaries w h o succumb to a 'dependency
syndrome', to 'rent-seeking behaviour', and to participation in 'distribu-
tional coalitions' cannot be known. That some of these are recognized as
policy problems is revealed by the repeated exhortations of Prime Minister
Dr Mahathir for Malays to adopt competitive achievement norms, to
become technically proficient, to become more productive, to 'work
harder', to 'Look East", and to stand on their own two feet and not rely
on government handouts.
T h e first objective enunciated under the N E P was 'to reduce and
eventually eradicate poverty', while the second was 'to reduce and
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function'. 44
Yet, in practice, the ethnic restructuring objective completely over-
shadowed the eradication of poverty objective. T h e imbalance was
slightly rectified under Hussein Onn's administration, when somewhat
greater attention was devoted to poverty reduction, but even then, thai
goal was pursued within the ethnic preference context.
Although poverty reduction and degrees of inequality in society are not
the same issue, they are linked. On the basis of rather fragmentary
evidence, it appears that, after nearly two decades of N E P , the index of
inequality in society as a whole has been increasing, 4 5 while aggregate
inter-ethnic inequalities have been substantially reduced. Indeed, most
scholars studying this issue agree that the gap between the rich and the
poor has widened within each ethnic community. T h e success of the
N E P in giving new opportunities to Malays with the requisite resources
of education, experience, finances, and political connections, has also
meant that many more Malays have been left behind with meagre
benefits and few viable options for substantial improvements in their
economic position. Even so, not all the growth in inequality can be
attributed to the N E P , since, it is argued, rapid economic development
 TAKING STOCK 313

has as its inevitable by-product the elongation of class and the accumula-
tion of wealth. Whatever its causes, exaggerated inequality is a problem
that deserves a very high priority in the formulation of public policy.
Apart from the waste of human resources, exaggerated degrees of in-
equality foment alienation and discontent that can plunge a society into
debilitating forms of political and social pathology.
Perhaps the most obvious effect of the N E P has been its impact on the
non-Malay communities. Many of the well-to-do and advantaged non-
Malays have continued to prosper, either because their wealth and
economic power could be effectively mobilized to generate more wealth,
or because they have become secondary beneficiaries of the N E P system
through political access, through patron-client linkages, or through some
'Ali-Baba' relationship with Malays who are willing to trade their legal
preferences for immediate benefits through acting as a front for non-
Malay enterprises. But for most non-Malays, the N E P and the ethnic
preference system is an open and blatant form of racial discrimination.
T h e y may accept the abstract argument that Malays failed to benefit from
the policies of the colonial era. T h e y may also acknowledge that remedial
policies are needed to raise the economic position of the Malays to
promote social harmony. But they find it hard to accept that they should
be the ones to bear the brunt of what amounts to 'reparations' payments
for alleged misdeeds and negligent injuries committed by earlier genera-
tions and by colonial authorities long since departed from Malaysia.
W h e n the ethnic preference system blocks access to higher education and
to valued jobs for those w h o otherwise would be qualified, considerations
of inter-ethnic equity assume minor significance to tbe deprived indi-
vidual suffering immediate anguish and despair. Most non-Malays live
with a persistent anxiety over the direction of ethnic preferences policies
and wonder whether they or their children will ever be treated with full
equality in public policy, in access to goods and services, and in economic
and social relations. High levels of alienation and low levels of social trust
appear to be persistent and pervasive characteristics of political as well as
social relations on both sides of the Malay-non-Malay cleavage.

From the longer-term perspective, it is a paradox and a matter of irony

that the very policy that was designed to reduce the salience of ethnicity
and create a harmonious and integrated society in the future appears to
have as its major consequence the perpetuation of ethnic divisions in law,
in institutions, and in public policy. The strategies that were designed to
address the problem have instead focused on some of the consequences
and symptoms of ethnicity and in the process have turned subjective
identities and cultural differences into far more rigid exclusive categories
which became even more salient when linked to the distribution of highly
valued benefits and services.
E v e n though there is a legitimate role for 'affirmative action' pro-
grammes which take ethnicity into account, in die way Malaysian policy
has evolved there has been too many 'goods' offered in a single package
to too large a constituency. Most of the target beneficiaries were not able
to take advantage of most of the large package of preferential benefits,
314 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

while a relative few were able to accumulate a lion's share of substantive

benefits from the proffered advantages. When some 55 per cent of the
population can claim preference and 45 per cent cannot, it creates a series
of severe multiple cleavages along the same fracture line that political
institutions and even enlightened leadership find exceedingly difficult to
bridge. To change the quotas or to extend the quota system to all
communities merely generates conflicts along existing ethnic cleavages.
At the other extreme, to eliminate existing ethnic quotas would also
produce an explosive crisis of ethnic hostilities. Even though ethnicity
may seem intractable, its problems can be addressed by properly devised
policies. While ethnic differences and ethnic identities cannot be 'willed'
away by fiat or by turning a blind eye to problems generated by
ethnicity, strategies can be devised which will effect the gradual political
demobilization of ethnicity, not to eliminate it, but to reduce iu salience
and to decrease the intensity of ethnically defined conflict.
In the most definitive study of ethnicity yet to appear, Horowitz, in his
book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, devotes the last three chapters to strat-
egies of conflict reduction in societies divided by ethnicity. 4 6 While the
entire book should be read by all Malaysian policy-makers, these last
chapters deserve special attention both for Horowitz's analysis of policy
'pitfalls' and his evaluation of effective conflict reduction strategies. By
borrowing from some of his observations, and adding some of the present
author's o w n , the major features of an ethnic demobilization strategy can
be briefly sketched.
T h e basic goal of the N E P , that of reducing inter-ethnic disparities, is
but one of the techniques proposed for die reduction of eihnic conflict.
T h i s objective depends on some form of 'affirmative action' in public
policy, which, if the recipients are defined solely by ethnicity, generates
ethnic political mobilization and a heightened sense of inter-ethnic con-
flict. What is needed, therefore, is a system of 'affirmative action'
pluralized into smaller target groups. T h e definition of beneficiaries
should not be coterminous with legally defined ethnic categories. If some
target groups and programmes could be devised dial cross ethnic bound-
aries, then inter-ethnic co-opcration would be rewarded and the saliencc
of ethnicity would be reduced at least for that particular package of
benefits. Emphasis on other criteria, such as 'poverty', 'rubber small-
holders', 'padi cultivators', 'estate labourers', 'urban manual labourers',
and 'shifting cultivators' could be combined with ethnicity', or better yet,
created without ethnic identifiers to include a target beneficiary group
that was ethnically mixed but also in need of economic uplift and social
restructuring. Just as multi-ethnic political constituencies help to
ameliorate ethnic conflict in the political system, multi-ethnic beneficiary
constituencies will greatly reduce the monolithic ethnic mobilization
around one enormous preferential benefit package. With these changes,
the benefit constituencies will be made smaller and the benefit packages
will become more focused on unique problems inhibiting the advance-
ment of certain segments of society that may be economically or socially
'trapped' in low-productivity patterns. T h e policy instruments chosen to
 TAKING STOCK 315

implement the objectives can then address the unique or particular

circumstance of each constituency and will therefore be bolh more cost'
effective and more easily monitored for policy review and revision.
Ethnic calculations will need to be made, since inter-ethnic disparities
still need to be rectified. But many other worthwhile objectives can also
be factored into the specific benefit packages: poverty reduction, human
resource development, labour productivity, generation of new employ-
ment, environmental concerns, and many other goals that are already a
p a n of the public agenda. This form of pluralization of policy instruments
will reduce the aggregate political mobilization along the same over-
stressed fracture line, and provide a strong incentive system for building
lines of co-operation and interest constituencies to link ethnic c o m m u n -
ities through rewarding co-operative interaction. Ethnicity will certainly
not be eliminated, but its salience for political mobilization and con-
frontational politics will be gradually eroded.

T h i s strategy will require a political will, which may take some time to
develop in the Malaysian setting. T h e difficulty is that those w h o have
vested interests in the present system are also those having preponderant
power in defining future policy. This is the dilemma, however, which
any reform programme faces, whether in the Soviet Union with the
Perestroika reforms, the Union of South Africa with the reformers
seeking to abolish the system of Apartheid, or those in Canada working
for a new constitutional and inter-ethnic accord to establish the basis for
power-sharing in a multi-ethnic society. At some point, leaders, and their
publics, need to step away from the fray of current political battles and
their concerns for immediate short-term advantages to view, instead, the
larger image of the long-term needs of their society. What Malaysians
will eventually come to realize is that ethnic conflict and pockets of
prolonged and persistent ethnic alienation are debilitating for the long-
term welfare of the entire country. Fundamental reform is possible.
There is also nothing inevitable about ethnic conflict. It is largely the
product of deficient past public policies and it can be remedied through
careful crafting of future public policies.

Institutions and Congruent D e v e l o p m e n t

Public policy impacts on society; society impacts on government; govern-

ment shapes and delivers public policy. There is an interactive and
reiterative relationship between all the principal components of a political
and social system. Changes are occurring all the time, both as a con-
sequence of the purposive acts of key players, and from many factors
beyond the control of policy-makers or citizen activists. While change is
both normal and ever-present, it does pose continuing problems of
systematic congruity: are political and governmental institutions capable
of representing societal changes and of responding to emergent problems
and newly generated needs of the society it represent and leads?
M o s t Malaysians take pride in the prospect of Malaysia joining die
ranks of the N e w l y Industrializing Countries (NICs). Public attention is
316 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

focused upon economic indicators which measure the country's economic

development and make possible comparisons with other countries. Gross
National P r o d u a , Gross Domestic P r o d u a , Per Capita Income, Gross
National Savings, foreign investments and a host of other data measuring
economic development are regularly collected and published for analysis,
for cross-national comparison, and for policy evaluation. But what kind
of political data on Malaysia is systematically collected and summarized
into standardized indices to permit the same kind of longitudinal studies,
cross-national comparison and analysis for policy evaluation of political
development? Systematic and periodic data need to be collected on public
attitudes, perhaps with the methodological perspective and approaches
pioneered by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their five-nation
study of those public altitudes and behaviour patterns which contribute
to the development of a 'civic culture' and facilitate the operation of
democratic institutions. 47 Systematic data also needs to be collected and
indices generated to measure political participation, administrative effi-
ciency, levels of malapportionment in constituency delineation, measures
of administrative efficiency and overhead costs, measures of corruption
and malappropriation of public funds, levels of civil violence and respect
for international standards of human rights and civil liberties. If possible,
this data should be collected and analysed by an independent research
body to increase public confidence in the reliability of the data and to
ensure that no data is withheld or manipulated to suit the immediate
concerns of incumbent power-holders.

Even without more rehable and comprehensive poUtical data, it is,

none the less, possible to identify some of the imponant changes in
s o d e t y that are producing a significant i m p a a on aggregate political
behaviour and on poUtical institutions. One of the most i m p o n a n t
changes involves shifting political ahgnments and the changing patterns
of c o n f l i a rcvealed.by events from 1987 to 1990.
As a proportion of the population, the Malays are gradually becoming
a decisive majority. In addition, the Malaysian political system exaggerates
that majority through the 'multiple-leverage' mechanisms of single-
member-constituency elections, through over-representation of rural
areas, through blatant gerrymandering, and through the mechanisms of
the party coalition system and the 'ethnic protection' guaranteed by roles
assigned formally to the Monarchy and informally to the military. In
combination, the reality of Malay political power is overwhelming and
unassailable.
Game theory reveals that, as winning coalitions become larger than
they need to be to acquire power, then the number of players w h o must
divide the pay-off increase and the benefits are depreciated for the
individual 'winners'. As a result, there is an optimum size for a 'winning
coalition'—large enough to ensure victory, but not too large to depredate
the individual benefits distributed lo the winners. 4 8 T h e very size of the
M a k y electorate and its political enlargement through the operation of
'multiple-leverage' mechanisms has meant that 'Malay political power'
now exceeds the optimum size for effective unified political action. As a
 TAKING STOCK 317

consequence, factional divisions wiihin the winning coalition are not only
inevitable but represent 'rational' behaviour for those being short-changed
in the distribution of benefits—both material and psychic. Similarly, an
oversized patronage system means thai those on die periphery of the
patron-client network become alienated and are cross-pressured between
their pursuit of immediate but meagre benefits (in relation to other more
favoured clients) and their aspirations for improved opportunities with a
new winning coalition.
As society becomes more complex and diverse, the number of parties
may increase and factionalism will likely become more prevalent. Again,
coalition theory reveals that an increase in parties or factionalism also
increases the number of possible winning coalitions. T h e existence of a
major coalition that can defeat all other alternative coalitions by majority
vote likewise decreases. The increased political competition will make the
political system more responsive to shifts of demands and political
opinion, but it will also make the political system somewhat more
unstable. T h e priority placed on coalition creation will facilitate the
development of bargaining strategies and conflict-resolution techniques. 4 9
If there is a periodic transfer of power and the reversal of roles between a
government and the opposition, it should create a government more
supportive of civil and minority rights, just as it should also make for an
opposition that is more responsible because of the expectation that the
opposition with one day be pan of a government coalition, at which time
its criticisms, its promises, and its political rhetoric with be put to reality
testing and will require matching deeds and policies.

Beyond the well-documented principles of coalition behaviour, there

are also the changes that have occurred within Malay society. T h e N E P
and overall economic growth have produced a new Malay entrepreneurial
class, a new group of Malay university-educated professionals, a large
heterogeneous Malay industrial work-force, and even a category of Malay
educated-unemployed or underemployed. In short, Malay society no
longer constitutes three major social blocs: peasants, bureaucrats, and
schoolteachers. Instead, its social and economic composition is much
more varied and complex, which in turn generates a very broad range of
interests all demanding to be represented and a c c o m o d a t e d by its
leaders. T h e very successes of the government's development policies and
its ethnic restructuring programmes now make it more difficult for
leaders to generate the massive support base which they seem to expect
and believe they deserve. Even with the assistance of highly skilled
pubUc relations consultants and die mobilized resources of die mass
pubUc media, any prime minister will find diat emotional rhetoric and
calls for 'unity' will not reverse the process of political fragmentation
afflicting Malay society as well as all the other ethnic voting blocs of
earlier decades.

T h e net effect of all of these changes will have an impact on the role
and responsibilities of the Prime Minister. It will be increasingly difficult
to accommodate social and political diversity merely by making piece-
meal political concessions and by expanding die patronage system. Insti-
318 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION

tutionalized avenues of communication, multilateral bargaining and

political access will require elaboration and expansion. It is too much to
e x p e a any one man to be the ultimate source of political innovation, the
centre of political communication, the balancer of accommodation pro-
cesses, and the apparent originator of all important government policies.
With the trend towards centralization of power and of decision-making
resting with the Prime Minister, other institutions of government have
been allowed to atrophy. Other institutions can help to resolve conflicts,
generate valid political proposals, represent diverse interests, and build a
climate of pubhc trust and support that should case the overburdened
d u d e s of the Prime Minister. To make his job more effective, there needs
to be a revitalization of the Cabinet, an expanded role for Parliament, a
revived and autonomous role for the Courts, and perhaps even a more
clearly defined arbitor role for the Monarchy. While conflict and contro-
versy will not be eliminated. for they are the substance of politics, further
institutional development of other components of government will facil-
itate the resolution of many conflicts through established processes and
create the institutional framework for a more responsive and responsible
form of government. but without eliminating the need for the overall
national leadership which only a prime minister can provide.

For those concerned about tbe political and institutional development

of the country, careful attention will need lo be given to some recurring
systemic problems which require remedial action. For example, what are
tbe environmental faction and institutional characteristics which have
facilitated the accelerated growth of the patronage system and may be
contributing to some forms of political corruption? Unchecked, these
practices aa like a malignant growth sapping the vitality of the primary
representative institutions of government. Those w h o evaluate the per-
formance of government institutions for policy reforms will need to give
more attention to techniques of institutionalizing power and making those
w h o use it accountable. T h e apparent inordinate preoccupation of incum-
bent leaders with accumulation of power is understandable. But, the
institutions of responsible democratic government are required precisely
to check such pervasive and near-universal impulses of those w h o assume
the responsibilities of public office.

Special attention needs to be given to crisis-avoidance mechanisms and

procedures. Domestic crisis and the matter of the imposition of emergency-
rule or the suspension of existing civil institutions need to be given close
and critical scrutiny. A succession crisis is also made more likely when
procedures have not been established to deal with the demise a leader,
from whatever cause, or through leadership challenges, which should be
considered pan of the normal process in a free democratic system. Both
these issues need to be addressed without malice or partisan motivations,
perhaps through recommendations made by some neutral public interest
body. Such a body could be charged with formulating proposals for
appropriate institutional mechanisms, techniques. norms, and procedures
to govern such contingencies, which will inevitably happen sometime in
the indefinite future.
 TAKING STOCK 336

T h e increasing social and economic diversity should make ethnic

divisions somewhat more muted, particularly if public strategies of
creating mutual dependence are pursued. In a theoretical article on
consociational democracy, Pierre du Toil discusses the theoretical and
normative assumptions of such systems:

Power sharing and consensus politics do not have to be justified only by the
negative consequences of their alternative (that is, group domination, internal
strife, and civil war), but on a more positive basis as well. Power sharing among
societal groups can be justified because of the mutual dependence of these groups
upon each other and because of their lack of alternative sources of scarce values..
Power sharing is necessary not only because antagonistic groups tec each other as
potential enemies, but also because they are in fact each other's only potential
allies.
Consociational engineering, aimed at achieving the elusive goal of elite coopera-
tion, should not just concentrate on drawing up constitutional coalitions, mutual
vetoes, proportionality, and segmental autonomy, but should also adopt a wider
perspective and concentrate on institutional mechanisms which create, maintain,
and reinforce mutual dependence between societal g r o u p . 5 0

To ensure that political development keeps pace with economic

development, Malaysia's leaders and its public will need to give careful
attention to issues of reform to ensure an open and competitive political
system supported by a congruent and harmonious political culture. With
such institutions and with the cultivation of a civic culture sensitive to the
Malaysian social context, political competition, like its economic counter-
part, will be able to convert political demands and private motives into
responsive and effective public policies. By building bonds of mutual
dependence and interdependence through appropriate policies and insti-
tutions, Malaysia can look forward to continued economic development,
to a viable democratic political system, and to a society characterized by
increasing harmony, mutual respect, and a heightened concern for social,
political, and economic justice.
320 MALAYSIAN POLITICS THE SECOND GENERATION
TAKING STOCK 321
322 MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND OENERATION
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