4

Contextual Factors

The issue of context has been, in the main, neglected in cognitive linguistic
and much other work on how conceptual systems change and vary. In most
recent work on conceptual systems, the issues of embodied cognition and the
universal nature of cognitive operations have been emphasized. By contrast,
my major goal in the chapter and in this book is to characterize some of the
contextual factors that are involved in shaping the conceptual system. My focus
is on metaphorical concepts, as well as on the interaction between metaphori-
cal aspects of the conceptual system and contextual factors. I propose that in
many cases metaphorical concepts do not arise from prestored mappings in the
conventional conceptual system, as is often assumed in the cognitive linguistic
literature on metaphor, but result from the priming effect of contextual factors
in real situations of discourse on the human mind to establish metaphors. I
begin to explore this issue in the present chapter, and continue the discussion
in Chapters 6 and 7, where I in addition focus on the closely related topic of
metaphorical creativity.

Cognitive Operations, Embodiment, and Context

The cognitive operations at our disposal produce a particular conceptual

system informed by and based on embodiment. But conceptual systems emerge
as a result of contextual factors as well. Both the cognitive operations and the
conceptual systems function under the pressure of a vast range of contextual
factors. Simply put, the cognitive operations and the resulting conceptual sys-
tems function in context. The conceptual system and the context in which it
emerges are in continuous interaction. As the conceptual system is influenced
by the context, it changes, and as a result of this change, it is this modified con-
ceptual system that is used in the next application of the system. 49

Zoltán Kövecses. Where Metaphors Come From.

© Oxford University Press 2015. Published 2015 by Oxford University Press.
50 Where Metaphors Come From

The cognitive operations we use are universal in the sense that all (cog-
nitively normal) human beings are capable of performing them. Much of the
embodiment on which conceptual systems are based is universal (but see Casa-
santo, 2009 and Chapter 5). Despite the universality of the operations and that
of embodiment, the conceptual systems vary considerably both cross-culturally
and within cultures, with individual variation as a limiting case. This is possi-
ble because the contexts are variable and in different contexts people often use
differential operations. In addition, the prominence of certain cognitive oper-
ations may be greater or smaller across groups of people. The changeability of
contexts and that of cognitive operations as affected by differential contexts
leads to differential conceptual systems.
Although I fully recognize the importance of universal embodiment in our
conceptual system and that of the universal availability of cognitive operations,
it seems to me that much of the work on (the metaphorical aspects of) concep-
tual systems does not pay sufficient attention to the role of contextual factors
in shaping what we know and how we think about the world. My major goal in
this chapter is to attempt to characterize some of the contextual factors that are
involved in this process and to show one possible way in which it can happen.
My focus will be on metaphorical concepts and on the interaction between met-
aphorical aspects of the conceptual system and contextual factors.

Universality in Human Knowledge

As we saw in Chapter 1, many of our most elementary experiences are univer-

sal. Being in a container, walking along a path, resisting some physical force,
being in the dark, and so forth, are universal experiences that lead to image
schemas of various kinds (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). The resulting image
schemas (container, source–path–goal, force, etc.) provide meaning for much
of our experience either directly (for literal concepts) or indirectly (in the form
of conceptual metaphors). Conceptual metaphors may also receive their bodily
motivation from certain universal correlations in experience, when, for instance,
people see a correlation between two events (such as adding to the content of a
container and the level of the substance rising), leading to the metaphor more
is up (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). When meaning making is
based on such elementary human experiences, the result may be (near-)universal
meaning (content)—though under a particular interpretation (construal), that
is, conceived of “in a certain manner,” to use Hoyt Alverson’s phrase (Alverson,
1991: 97). I assume that universal embodied experiences of this kind constitute
a major factor in shaping the conceptual system. This does not mean that all
embodied experiences actually shape concepts, but that they can potentially do
so. When universal embodied experiences affect the system in some way, they
contribute to establishing the universal aspects of the conceptual system.
 Contextual Factors 51

Context in Human Knowledge

In addition to (universal) embodied experience, another major factor in shap-

ing the conceptual system is context. The significance of context in shaping the
conceptual system is also noted by Barsalou, who states:
Variable embodiment allows individuals to adapt the perceptual symbols
in their conceptual system to specific environments. Imagine that differ-
ent individuals consume somewhat different varieties of the same plants
because they live in different locales. Through perceiving their respective
foods, different individuals develop somewhat different perceptual sym-
bols to represent them. As a result, somewhat different conceptual systems
develop through the schematic symbol formation process, each tuned opti-
mally to its typical referents. (Barsalou, 1999: 598)
Here Barsalou talks about “different locales,” a kind of context that, following
Kövecses (2005, 2010b), I will call the “physical environment.” As we will see
later, in addition to the physical environment, I recognize the influence of sev-
eral other contextual factors. I use the term “context” very broadly, to include
both the linguistic and the nonlinguistic context.
As noted in Chapter 1, I propose that both universal embodiment and
nonuniversal context affect the way people conceptualize the world in real
communicative/discourse situations. I call this influence, following Kövecses
(2005), the “pressure of coherence.” This is a principle that states, in effect,
that conceptualizers are under two kinds of pressure when they conceptual-
ize the world. Conceptualizers try to be coherent both with their bodies (their
basic embodied experiences) and their contexts (the various contextual fac-
tors), where the body and context function as, sometimes conflicting, forms of
constraint on conceptualization. The outcome of the two pressures depends on
which influence, or pressure, turns out to be stronger in particular situations.
With a conventional conceptual system in place and with the help of cog-
nitive operations, we conceptualize aspects of the world. In the course of this
conceptualization, the conceptual system is constantly modified and changed.
Changes can be effected in the already existing conceptual system in essen-
tially two ways. One is alternative construal, that is, the alternative application
of particular cognitive operations (e.g., metaphor vs. metonymy). The other
is differential experience (see later), which means that the various contextual
factors constantly influence the way we conceptualize the world. Since the con-
textual factors change all the time, the conceptual system changes with them.
Some of the work on nonmetaphorical concepts in cognitive linguistics can
be interpreted as recognizing the importance of this interplay. Work on the
differential salience of conceptual categories along the lines of Rosch (1978)
and Lakoff (1987), on culturally significant concepts, such as hara in Japanese
(Matsuki, 1995) and qi in Chinese (Yu, 1998), on the differential representation
52 Where Metaphors Come From

of categories in different contexts (Langacker, 1987; Barsalou, 1992), and on

mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985/1994, 1997) can all be considered as instances
of this type of work.

Three Issues Concerning Variation in Metaphorical Conceptualization

Cognitive linguists have, in general, paid more attention to the role of the body
than that of context in the creation of conceptual metaphors, supporting the
view of embodied cognition. In my own work, I attempted to redress the bal-
ance by focusing on what I take to be the equally important role of the context
(Kövecses, 2005). In particular, I suggested that there are a number of ques-
tions we have to deal with in order to arrive at a reasonable theory of metaphor
variation. The questions are as follows:
What are the dimensions of metaphor variation?
What are the aspects of conceptual metaphors that are involved in
variation?
What are the causes of metaphor variation?

The first question has to do with “where” metaphor variation can be found. My
survey of variation in conceptual metaphors indicated that variation is most
likely to occur cross-culturally, within-culture, or individually, as well as histor-
ically and developmentally. I called these the “dimensions” of metaphor varia-
tion. Conceptual metaphors tend to vary along these dimensions.
The second question assumes that conceptual metaphors have a number of
different aspects, or components, including the following: source domain, target
domain, experiential basis, relationship between the source and target, meta-
phorical linguistic expressions, mappings, entailments (inferences), nonlinguis-
tic realizations, blends, and cultural models. These either produce metaphor
variation (e.g., blends) or are affected by it (e.g., source domain, metaphorical
linguistic expressions, entailments).
The third question is the crucial one as regards the role of context in met-
aphorical conceptualization. It asks what the factors, or “forces,” are that are
responsible for variation in conceptual metaphors. I proposed two distinct,
though interlocking, groups of factors: differential experience and differential
cognitive styles. I found it convenient to distinguish various subcases of differ-
ential experience: awareness of context, differential memory, and differential
concerns and interests.
Awareness of context includes awareness of the physical context, social
context, cultural context, but also awareness of the immediate communicative
situation. Differential memory is the memory of events and objects shared by a
community or of a single individual; we can think of it as the history of a group
or that of an individual. Differential concerns and interests can also characterize
 Contextual Factors 53

either groups or individuals. It is the general attitude with which groups or indi-
viduals act or are predisposed to act in the world. Differential experience, thus,
characterizes both groups and individuals, and, as context, it ranges from global
to local. The global context is the general knowledge that the whole group shares
and that, as a result, affects all group members in using metaphors. The local
context is the specific knowledge that pertains to a specific situation involving
particular individuals. More generally, it can be suggested that the global con-
text is essentially a shared system of concepts in long-term memory (reflected in
conventional linguistic usage), whereas the local context is the situation in which
particular individuals conceptualize a specific situation making use of working
memory. (I discuss the global–local distinction further in Chapters 5 and 6.)
By contrast, the cognitive processes, discussed in Chapter 2, such as elabo-
ration, specificity, conventionalization, transparency, (experiential) focus, view-
point preference, prototype categorization, framing, metaphor vs. metonymy
preference, and others, though universally available to all humans, are not em-
ployed in the same way by groups or individuals. Since the cognitive processes
used can vary, there can be variation in the use of metaphors as well.
In sum, the two large groups of causes, differential experience and differen-
tial cognitive styles, account for much of the variation we find in the use of con-
ceptual metaphors. However, it is only differential experience that can prime, or
prompt, the use of particular conceptual and linguistic metaphors. The various
cognitive operations that make up the characteristic cognitive styles of either
individuals or groups can merely constrain them. For this reason, the survey
that follows is limited to the influence of differential experience on metaphor
creation and variation.

A Survey of Contextual Factors Affecting Metaphor Use

Let us now review how the contextual factors that constitute differential expe-
rience mentioned earlier can influence the creation of metaphors in particular
communicative situations.

Knowledge about the Main Elements of the Discourse

The main elements of discourse include the speaker/conceptualizer 1, topic/

theme of discourse, and hearer/addressee/conceptualizer 2. Knowledge about
any one of these may lead to the use of metaphors that are specific to a partic-
ular discourse situation.
Consider the following example that involves the topic of discourse—a
long article about cyclist Lance Armstrong in the January 25–27 issue of the
American newspaper USA TODAY. The article is about Armstrong’s confes-
sions concerning his doping and that his confessions up to that point had not
54 Where Metaphors Come From

been sufficient to redeem himself and clean up the sport of cycling. Several
experts who were interviewed thought that additional steps must be taken by
Armstrong to achieve this. One specialist in crisis management said this in an
interview: “To use an analogy from the Tour de France, he’s still in the moun-
tain stage, and will be for some time” (USA TODAY, 6W Sports, Weekly Inter-
national Edition, 2013). What we have here is that the specialist has extensive
knowledge about the topic of the discourse, which is Armstrong’s doping scan-
dal. That knowledge includes that as a cyclist Armstrong participated in several
Tour de France events and that this race has several “mountain stages.” In other
words, the topic of the discourse primed the speaker to choose a metaphor to
express a particular idea, namely, that, to come completely clean, Armstrong
has a long and difficult way to go. This idea was expressed by the mountain
stage metaphor, which is based on the mapping “impediment to motion → dif-
ficulty of action (making full confession and being forgiven)” in the ACTION
IS MOTION conceptual metaphor.

Surrounding Discourse

Sometimes it is the surrounding linguistic context (i.e., what comes before and
after a particular unit of discourse) that influences the choice of metaphors,
as in the sentence “The Americanization of Japanese car industry shifts into
higher gear,” analyzed by Kövecses (2005). The expression shift into higher gear
is used because the immediate linguistic context involves the “car industry.”

Previous Discourses on the Same Topic

Given a particular topic, a range of conceptual metaphors can be set up. Such
metaphors, that is, metaphorical source domains, often lead to new or modified
source domains in the continuation of the debate involving the topic by, for ex-
ample, offering a new or modified source domain relative to one of the former
ones. This commonly occurs in scientific discussion (for examples, see Nerlich,
2007) and can lead to the establishment of a chain of related metaphorical
source domains for a target.
However, often we are not aware of potential further “usurpations” of the
metaphor against our original intentions. This situation has its dangers and can
be the source of other people turning a metaphor against us in a debate over
contentious issues. A particularly apt illustration of this happening is provided
by Elena Semino (2008). Tony Blair used the following metaphor in one of his
speeches:
Get rid of the false choice: principles or no principles. Replace it with the
true choice. Forward or back. I can only go one way. I’ve not got a reverse
gear. The time to trust a politician most is not when they’re taking the easy
 Contextual Factors 55

option. Any politician can do the popular things. I know, I used to do a

few of them.
Obviously, Blair tries to present himself here as a forward-looking politician
who has clear and, what he takes to be, progressive goals and wants to reach
those goals. In setting up this image, he uses the conventional conceptual meta-
phors progress is motion forward and purposeful activities are journeys,
but he also employs a little trick to achieve this: he portrays himself as a car
without a reverse gear. In the same way as a car without a reverse gear cannot
move backward, only forward, he, the politician, can only move forward, that
is, can only do things in the name of progress. That is, he uses knowledge about
the target domains to effect changes in the source domain that he employs to
achieve his rhetorical purpose in the situation. (This example could also be ana-
lyzed as a case of conceptual integration, a la Fauconnier and Turner, 2002.)
As a result, we have in the source domain a car without a reverse gear that
cannot move backward, only forward, and we have in the target a politician
who can and wants to achieve progressive goals alone. However, the source
image can be modified somewhat. Let us suppose that the car gets to the edge
of a cliff. Wouldn’t it be good to have a reverse gear then? Semino (2008) found
an example where this is precisely what happens. Following the speech in which
Blair used the “car without reverse gear” image, an anchorman on BBC eve-
ning news remarked:
but when you’re on the edge of a cliff it is good to have a reverse gear.
The “edge of a cliff ” in the source symbolizes an especially difficult and dan-
gerous situation, where it is a good thing to have a car with a reverse gear. In
the target, the dangerous situation corresponds to the Iraqi war, where, in the
view of the journalist and others, it would have been good for Blair to change
his views and withdraw from the war, instead of “plunging” the country into it.
In other words, as Semino points out, a metaphor that a speaker introduces
and that can initially be seen as serving the speaker’s interests in persuading
others can be slightly but significantly changed. With the change, the metaphor
can be turned against the original user. This often happens in political debates.

Dominant Forms of Discourse and Intertextuality

It is common practice that a particular metaphor in one dominant form of dis-

course is recycled in other discourses. One example is Biblical discourse. Bibli-
cal metaphors are often recycled in later discourses assigning new values to the
later versions.
In some cases of intertextuality, intertextual coherence is achieved through
inheriting and using a particular conceptual metaphor at different historical
periods. One of the best examples of this is how several biblical metaphors have
56 Where Metaphors Come From

been recycled over the ages. As an example, let us take a bookmark I was given
in Durham cathedral a few years ago with the following text on it (the example
is first discussed in Kövecses, 2010a):
Almighty God
Who called your servant Cuthbert
from keeping sheep to follow your son
and to be shepherd of your people.
Mercifully grant that we, following his
example and caring for those who are lost,
may bring them home to your fold.
Through your son.
Jesus Christ our Lord.
Amen.

In the prayer, the basic conceptual metaphor is the one in which the shepherd
is Jesus, the lost sheep are the people who no longer follow God’s teachings, the
fold of the sheep is people’s home with God, and for the shepherd to bring the
sheep back to the fold is for Jesus to save the people. We can lay out these cor-
respondences, or mappings, more explicitly as follows:
Source: Target:
the shepherd → Jesus
the lost sheep → the people who do not follow God
the fold of the sheep → the state of people following God
the shepherd bringing back the → Jesus saving the people
sheep

This metaphor was reused later on when God called a simple man, called
Cuthbert, to give up his job (which, significantly, was being a shepherd) and
become a “shepherd of people.” Here it is Cuthbert (not Jesus) who saves the
lost people (a set of people different from the ones in Jesus’ times). Finally, in
the most recent recycling of the metaphor in the prayer said on St. Cuthbert’s
day, 20 March, 2007, the particular values of the metaphor change again. It is
the priests who live today who try to bring people back to the fold—again, a
set of people different from either those who lived in Jesus’ or Cuthbert’s times.
This type of intertextuality characterizes not only Christianity (and other
religions) through time but many other domains within the same historical
period. Thus a metaphor can provide coherence across a variety of discourses
both historically and simultaneously.

Ideology Underlying Discourse

Ideology underlying a piece of discourse can determine the metaphors that are
used. Goatly’s work (see, especially, 2007) shows that different ideologies can
 Contextual Factors 57

lead to the use of different metaphors relating to the same subject matter. I dis-
cuss an example in a later section of the chapter.

Physical Environment

This is the physical environment, or setting, in which a communicative ex-

change takes place. The physical setting includes the physical circumstances,
viewing arrangement, salient properties of the environment, and so on. These
aspects of the physical environment can influence the choice of metaphors.
As an illustration, let us see how the perceptual qualities characteristic of
a physical setting can have an effect on the creation and use of unconventional
metaphorical expressions. In her 2008 book, Semino has an interesting example
that bears on this issue. Semino analyzes the metaphors used by various par-
ticipants at the 2005 G8 summit meeting in Scotland on the basis of an article
about the summit. In conjunction with the summit a major rock concert called
Live 8 was also held. Some participants assessed what the G8 summit had
achieved positively, whereas some had doubts concerning its results. Semino
has this to say about one such negative assessment she found in the article re-
porting on the summit:

In contrast, a representative of an anti-poverty group is quoted as nega-

tively assessing the G8 summit in comparison with the Live 8 concert via a
metaphor to do with sound:
1.1 Dr Kumi Naidoo, from the anti-poverty lobby group G-Cap, said
after “the roar” produced by Live 8, the G8 had uttered “a whisper.”
The reference to ‘roar’ could be a nonmetaphorical description of the
sound made by the crowd at the concert. However, the use of ‘whisper’
in relation to the summit is clearly a (negative) metaphorical description
of the outcome of the discussions in terms of a sound characterized by
lack of loudness. Hence, the contrast in loudness between the sounds in-
dicated by ‘roar’ and ‘whisper’ is used metaphorically to establish a con-
trast between the strength of feeling and commitment expressed by the
concert audiences and the lack of resolve and effectiveness shown by the
G8 leaders.

Although in general I agree with this account of the metaphor used, I would
also add that the metaphor arises from the physical(-social) context in which
it is produced. Dr. Kumi Naidoo creates the metaphor whisper against a back-
ground in which there is a very loud concert and a comparatively quiet summit
meeting. We can think of the loudness and the relative quiet of the occasion as
perceptual features of the two events. In other words, I would suggest that the
particular metaphor derives from some of the perceptual features that charac-
terize the physical(-social) setting.
58 Where Metaphors Come From

As Semino points out, whisper is clearly metaphorical. It is informative to

look at how it acquires its metaphorical meaning. How can it mean ‘the lack
of resolve and effectiveness,’ as proposed by Semino? Or, to put the question
differently, why do we have the sense that this is indeed the intended meaning
of the metaphor? After all, “whisper” and “lack of resolve and effectiveness”
appear to be fairly different and distant notions. What is the conceptual path-
way that can take us from “whisper” to “lack of resolve and effectiveness”? My
suggestion is that the pathway is made up of a number of conceptual meta-
phors and metonymies that function at various levels of schematicity.
First, there is the highly generic metaphor intensity is strength of
effect. Second, a metonymy that is involved is the more specific emotional
responses for the emotions. Third, we have the even more specific metonymy
angry behavior for anger/argument. Finally, there is the metonymy that con-
nects emotions with actions: emotion for determination to act. My claim is
that we need each of these metaphors and metonymies to be able to account
for the meaning of the word whisper in the example. In all this the intensity
is strength of effect metaphor is especially important, in that it provides us
with the connection between the degree of the loudness of the verbal behavior
and the intensity of the determination, or resolve, to act. Since whisper is low
on the degree of verbal intensity, it will indicate a low degree of intensity of
resolve, hence the meaning of whisper: “lack of resolve (and effectiveness).”
Given these metaphors and metonymies in our conceptual system, we find it
natural that whisper can have this meaning.
In light of this analysis, the verb roar is not less but more metaphorical
than whisper. We can account for the meaning of roar (i.e., “strength of feeling
and commitment”) by making use of the same metaphors and metonymies,
except that the metaphors and metonymies take on the opposite values for roar.
In addition, we will also need a metaphor that applies to roar but does not
apply to whisper: angry behavior is angry animal behavior. The basic mean-
ing of roar is the sound of an animal (like a lion). The metaphor does not apply
to whisper because whisper is characteristically produced by humans. In other
words, contrary to Semino’s suggestion, we find roar not less but more meta-
phorical than whisper.
But the main conclusion from this analysis is that features of the physical
setting can trigger the use of certain metaphoric and metonymic expressions.
No matter how distant the literal and the figurative meanings are from one an-
other, we can construct and reconstruct the appropriate conceptual pathways
that provide a sensible link between the two. In the present example, the orig-
inal conceptualizer, then the journalist who reported on the event, and finally
the analysts of the discourse produced by the previous two can all figure out
what the intended meanings of the words whisper and roar probably are or can
be, given our shared conceptualization of (some of the perceptual qualities of)
the physical context.
 Contextual Factors 59

Social Situation

Social aspects of the setting can involve such distinctions as man vs. woman,
power relations in society, conceptions of work, and many others. They can all
play a role in which metaphors are used in the course of metaphorical concep-
tualization. (For examples, see Kövecses, 2005 and Chapter 6.)

Cultural Situation

The cultural factors that affect metaphorical conceptualization include the

dominant values and characteristics of members of a group, the key ideas or
concepts that govern their lives, the various subgroups that make up the group,
the various products of culture such as TV shows and films, and a large number
of other things. All of these cultural aspects of the setting can supply members of
the group with a variety of metaphorical source domains. I discuss a number of
examples in several later chapters (see Kövecses, 2005 and Chapter 6).

History

By history I mean the memory of events and objects in members of a group.

Such memories can be used to create highly conventional metaphors (e.g., in
the metaphorical idiom carry coal to Newcastle) or they can be used to under-
stand situations in novel ways. (For more discussion and examples, see Kövec-
ses, 2005 and Chapter 6.)

Interests and Concerns

Individuals and groups may be characterized by some major interests and con-
cerns in the way they conduct their lives. Either individuals or groups may be
dedicated to particular activities, rather than others. The commonly and habit-
ually pursued activities (of either groups or individuals) become metaphorical
source domains more readily than those that are marginal. (For an example for
this kind of influence, see Chapter 6.)
These are some of the contextual factors that do seem to play a role in
shaping metaphorical conceptualization, more specifically, in creating (often
novel) metaphors. Most of the time the factors do not function by themselves;
instead, they exert their influence on the conceptualization process jointly. Sev-
eral of the factors listed above can simultaneously influence the use of meta-
phors (see Chapters 6 and 7).
I now turn to the analysis of the concept of self to see how one of the
contextual factors mentioned previously, ideology, may influence its concep-
tualization. The examination of this example will lead to a need to reconsider
and refine the view presented so far concerning the influence of context on
metaphor creation.
60 Where Metaphors Come From

Ideology as Context: A Complication in the Context–Metaphor Relationship

In the cognitive linguistic view, a concept is assumed to be represented in the

mind by a number of other concepts that form a coherent whole, a functional
domain, that is, a mental frame. In other cases, however, a number of concepts
can hang together in a coherent fashion without forming a tight frame-like
structure. This happens in the case of worldviews or ideologies, where a number
of concepts occur together forming a loose network of ideas. Such loose net-
works of ideas can govern the way we think and talk about several aspects of
the world, and how we act in it.
As an example, consider the concept of the self, as it is used in western
societies. I distinguish between an analysis of the internal structure of this con-
cept from an analysis in terms of its external relations to other concepts. A
perceptive study of the internal structure of the self in western societies is Wolf
(1994). The study that follows investigates the external relations of the concept.
Here is a definition by Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self):
The self is an individual person as the object of his or her own reflective
consciousness.
We commonly refer to the self with the words I and me in English. These words
represent different aspects of the self—the subjective knower and the object
that is known (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self). The concept of the self seems
to be a universal and it is also lexicalized in probably all languages of the world.
How universal might the metaphorical conceptualization of the self be?
If we look at some of metaphorical linguistic examples, one can easily be led
to believe that what we have here is a unique—an English or a Western—
metaphor system of the self, or more generally, inner life. Linguistic examples
in (American) English, like hanging out with oneself, being out to lunch, being
on cloud nine, pampering oneself, etc. might suggest that the conceptual meta-
phors that underlie these examples are culture-specific conceptual metaphors.
But they are not. As it turns out, the same conceptual metaphors that underlie
such expressions show up in cultures where one would not expect them. Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) report that the metaphor system can be found in Japa-
nese. Moreover, many of the examples translate readily into Hungarian as well,
which indicates that the system is not alien to speakers of Hungarian either
(see Kövecses, 2005). In the text that follows I provide linguistic examples for
some conceptual metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson for English in
both Japanese and Hungarian. The Japanese examples come from Lakoff and
Johnson (1999: 284–287).

The physical-object self metaphor

JAPANESE:
Self-control is object possession
 Contextual Factors 61

Kare-wa dokusyo-ni ware-o wasure-ta.

He-TOP reading-LOC self-ACC lose[forget]-PAST
Lit.: “He lost self reading.”
“He lost himself in reading.”
HUNGARIAN:
Body control is the forced movement of an object
Alig tudtam elvonszolni magam a kórházig.
Hardly could carry-with-difficulty myself the hospital-to.
“I could hardly make it to the hospital.”
Self-control is object possession
Teljesen eleresztette magát.
Completely let-go-PAST herself
“She let it all hang out.”

The locational self metaphor

JAPANESE:
The scattered self metaphor
Attentional self-control is having the self together
Kare-wa ki-o hiki-sime-ta.
He-TOP spirit-ACC pull-tighten-PAST
Lit.: “He pulled-and-tightened his spirits.”
“He pulled himself together.”
The objective standpoint metaphor
Zibun-no kara-kara de-te, zibun-o yoku mitume-ru koto-ga taisetu da.
Self-GEN shell-from get out-CONJ self-ACC well stare-PRES
COMP-NOM important COP
Lit.: “To get out of self’s shell and stare at self well is important.”
“It is important to get out of yourself and look at yourself well.”
HUNGARIAN:
The self as container
Magamon kivül voltam.
Myself-on outside was-I.
“I was beside myself.”
The scattered self metaphor
Attentional self-control is having the self together
Szedd össze magad!
Pick-IMP together yourself.
“Pull yourself together!”
Self-control is being on the ground
Kicsúszott a talaj a lába alól.
Out-slipped the ground the foot-his from-under
“He lost his bearings.”
62 Where Metaphors Come From

Taking an objective standpoint is looking at the self from outside

Nézz egy kicsit magadba és meglátod, hogy hibáztál.
Look a little yourself-into and see that made-mistake-you.
“Take a look at yourself and you’ll see that you’ve made a mistake.”

The social self metaphor

JAPANESE:
The self as victim metaphor
Zibun-o azamuite-wa ikena-i.
Self-ACC deceive-TOP bad-PRES
Lit.: “To deceive self is bad.”
“You must not deceive yourself.”
The self as servant metaphor
Kare-wa hito-ni sinsetuni-suru yooni zibun-ni iikikase-ta.
He-TOP people-DAT kind-do COMP self-DAT tell-PAST
“He told himself to be kind to people.”
HUNGARIAN:
The subject and self as adversaries metaphor
Meg kellett küzdenie saját magával.
PART had-to struggle-he own self-with
“He had to struggle/ fight with himself.”
The self as child metaphor
Megjutalmazom magam egy pohár sörrel.
PART—reward-I myself one glass beer-with
“I’ll reward myself with a glass of beer.”
The self as servant metaphor
Rá kell kényszeritenem magam a korai lefekvésre.
Onto must force-I myself the early going-to-bed
“I must force myself to go to bed early.”

Given this similarity in metaphorical conceptualization, can we assume that

the concept of self is a uniform notion in languages/cultures of the world? If
not, in precisely what ways it varies, and why. This is the major issue I attempt
to explore below.

The networks of concepts associated with the self

In societies that emphasize the self, the concept is associated with a
number of other concepts, including:
Independence (personal)
Self-centered
Self-expression
Self-indulgence
Personal goals and desires
 Contextual Factors 63

Happiness (personal)
Achievement (personal)
Self-interest
Selfishness
Suspicion
Pride
Competition
Indifference

We can call a society with such a network of concepts individualistic. We can

characterize this network as follows:

¤ In such a society, individual people will regard themselves as being in-

dependent of others, that is, as autonomous.
¤ The self will view the world from his or her own perspective and finds
him- or herself in the center. In other words, the self is self-centered.
¤ The self is taken to be expressible and self-expression is encouraged.
¤ The self seeks pleasure; in other words, he/she is self-indulgent.
¤ Individual people will have their own unique personal goals and
desires.
¤ The self’s main goal and desire is personal happiness. This is most
explicitly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence
(“the pursuit of happiness”).
¤ Individual persons want to achieve their personal life goals, and they
regard the success of achieving them as the main measure of suc-
cess and happiness in life.
¤ The self is driven by self-interest. The interest of the self comes
before the interest of the others or the group.
¤ People are “naturally” selfish. In a world of limited resources, they
know that they accomplish life goals at the expense of others.
¤ The self views others with suspicion. This is because others are po-
tential rivals in the way of accomplishing life goals.
¤ The self is proud. They assume they are better and/or more impor-
tant than others.
¤ Individual people engage in competition against others in order to
achieve life goals. They regard fair competition as the only fair way
of accomplishing life goals.
¤ Such people feel indifferent to others. They feel that they have “won”
in a fair competition and that the others they have defeated “deserve
their fate.”

However, there are societies where the notion of the self goes together with
a different network of concepts. The network of concepts that follow can be
regarded as the opposite of the network above:
64 Where Metaphors Come From

Interdependence
Other-centered
Saving the other’s face
Self-denial
Social goals and desires
Happiness (social)
Achievement (social)
Interest (social)
Sharing
Trust
Humility
Cooperation
Care, Concern

Where such a network of concepts exists, we can call that society collectivistic.
It can be described in the following way:

¤ In such a society, the self will view himself or herself as interdependent

on each other.
¤ The self will look at the world from the perspective of the others. In
other words, the self is other-centered.
¤ The self will prefer to save the other’s face. The expression of the
self is taken to be secondary.
¤ The self is characterized by self-denial.
¤ The self’s goals and desires are shared ones—goals and desires that
have to do with the whole group.
¤ The major life goal of the self is happiness for the whole group; per-
sonal happiness is secondary.
¤ The self wants to achieve the betterment of the entire society. They
consider this as their primary objective.
¤ The self’s actions are motivated by the interests of the whole group.
Self-interest serves as secondary motivation.
¤ The self has the attitude of sharing in their relations to others. This
means that he or she tries to further the well-being of others in the
group and he or she will try to further the general well-being of the
group.
¤ The self trusts others in the group, as their goals and desires are
shared.
¤ The self’s attitude is that of humility toward other members of the
group and the group as a whole.
¤ The self cooperates with others in the group in order to promote the
well-being of members of the group and that of the group.
¤ The self cares for other members of the group and he or she is con-
cerned about the interest of the whole group.
 Contextual Factors 65

The concepts that characterize collectivistic societies can also be found in indi-
vidualistic ones, and the concepts that characterize individualistic societies can
also be found in collectivistic ones. After all, individualistic societies do have
the concepts used to characterize collectivistic societies, and probably we have
a similar situation with regard to the concepts that characterize collectivistic
ones. However, in both cases we have preferential tendencies as regards the
co-occurrence of the preceding concepts.
The two sets of concepts can be brought into correspondence with each
other in the following way:

Independence (personal) – Interdependence

Self-centered – Other-centered
Self-expression – Saving the other’s face
Self-indulgence – Self-denial
Personal goals and desires – Social goals and desires
Happiness (personal) – Happiness (social)
Achievement (personal) – Achievement (social)
Self-interest – Interest (social)
Selfishness – Sharing
Suspicion – Trust
Pride – Humility
Competition – Cooperation
Indifference – Care, Concern

Since the concepts come from the two ends of the same scale, they appear to
be each other’s opposites. For example, in the intended sense, independence is
the opposite of interdependence, personal happiness is that of social happi-
ness, suspicion is that of trust, and pride is that of humility. Thus, the concept
of the self seems to co-occur with two very different networks of concepts. In
the former, the self is highly emphasized and in the latter it is deemphasized.
This conclusion makes it necessary to propose a more refined view of con-
textual influence on metaphorical conceptualization than I suggested at the
beginning of the chapter. There my initial assumption was that differences in
contextual factors will lead to differences in metaphorical conceptualization.
But what we actually saw in the preceding paragraphs was that differences in
the contextual factor of ideology did not lead to differences in metaphorical
conceptualization—at least in the three languages/cultures we examined. In-
stead, the contextual factor of ideology led to a difference in the salience of
the concept of self. The self appears to be much more salient in individualistic
societies (characterized by the first network of concepts) than in collectivistic
ones (characterized by the second). In other words, contextual influence may
not necessarily affect metaphorical conceptualization but can affect other as-
pects of concepts (such as salience).
66 Where Metaphors Come From

Selfishness and the Brain

Selfishness is clearly a negative concept. How is it possible that individualistic

societies tolerate it and often even encourage it? The Hungarian neurobiologist
Tamás Freund (2005) provides an interesting answer from the perspective of
brain research. Freund suggests that in smaller communities, evolution favors
patterns of behavior that can be regarded as unselfish. This is because in a small
community the brain has all the necessary information about the commun-
ity, and the individual is capable of monitoring the behavior of others. Thus,
monitoring can function as a check or control over the behavior of others. In
large communities, however, this control does not work because the individual
brain has only a fragment of the information necessary to place any kind of
control over the behavior of other members of the community. Most of the be-
havior of most members in the community is hidden to each individual brain.
But even if it were accessible, the individual’s brain does not have the capacity
to remember what all the others have done and thus to keep track of the rele-
vant information concerning selfish behavior, and whether to punish individu-
als and eventually to exclude them from the community for selfish behavior. As
a result, individuals with a selfish pattern of behavior will have a better chance
to survive and reproduce. Overall, then, in small communities where the brain’s
capacity is sufficiently large to monitor other members’ behavior, cooperative
(unselfish) behavior is selected by evolution, whereas in the case of very large
communities where the brain’s capacity is not sufficiently large to monitor ev-
eryone’s behavior, competitive (selfish) behavior is selected by evolution.
Judging by the “human condition” in our large-scale Western communi-
ties, it is perhaps not overly pessimistic to predict that selfishness and greed will
sooner or later lead to irreversible crises. If so, what can be done to prevent
such situations? One of the possible solutions, Tamás Freund suggests, is to
change the (conceptual) environment itself that surrounds us. Since changes
in the environment are responsible for adaptation, if we change the nature of
the environment, individuals will adapt to the new environment. Unlike most
animals, human beings can do this. If we change the cultural, intellectual cli-
mate from the network of individualistic concepts to that of collectivistic ones,
we can be successful in this enterprise. It is, however, less clear how such a
large-scale restructuring of the conceptual environment could be implemented
in most Western societies dominated by the opposing set of values.

Conceptual Integration Theory and Context

Conceptual integration is claimed to be a more “elaborate” and “deeper” cog-

nitive operation than conceptual metaphor (see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002,
2008). As briefly shown in Chapter 2, conceptual integration makes use of
 Contextual Factors 67

four domains or mental spaces allowing for mappings not just from the source
domain to the target but also mappings from both (or more) of the input spaces
into the blended space and even from the blend into the input spaces. Indeed,
proponents of conceptual integration theory (CIT) think of metaphor as a
relatively superficial cognitive phenomenon in comparison to blending. What
interests me in this connection is the following question: Does the assumed
higher degree of cognitive elaborateness and depth of conceptual integration
make it immune to the “surface” effects of contextual factors that appear to
characterize metaphor, as shown earlier in this chapter?
In this section, I will go over some examples of conceptual blends and ask
if context plays any role in how they work. More specifically, one issue that can
be raised in connection with conceptual integration is why particular networks
(made up of a generic space, several input spaces, and a blended space) are
formed and expressed the way they are; in particular, why do they have the
input spaces and the particular figurative linguistic expressions they do? I think
part of the answer lies in the role of contextual factors I discussed earlier in
connection with metaphor.
Let us begin with an example of blending studied by Coulson and Oakley
(2000: 187). Coulson and Oakley take the newspaper headline “Tennessee
Tramples Kentucky” and analyze it as follows:
Processes of representational contracting and stretching are what Faucon-
nier and Turner (2000) refer to as compression and decompression, phe-
nomena which they see as central to blending theory. One place where
compression is quite frequent is in news headlines, such as Tennessee
Tramples Kentucky, or Overseas Absentee Ballots Boost Bush. In each case,
the representation in the blended space is interpretable because of meto-
nymic relationships between elements in the blended space and elements
in the inputs. For example, the blended space in the network for Tennessee
Tramples Kentucky is interpretable because of conventional metonymic
mappings between states, their universities, and their universities’ football
teams, as well as conventional metaphoric mappings between combat and
sports.
What seems to be missing from this analysis is an explanation of why we have
the particular metaphorical expression trample in the example. It is not suf-
ficient to say that it is present because of the sport is war/fight/combat con-
ceptual metaphor. There are many expressions that could be used based on this
metaphor (such as defeat, beat, overpower), but of all the possibilities trample
is used. I suggest the reason is that the phonological shape of the linguistic
context triggers the choice of trample over the other potential alternatives.
(On the role of phonological shape in the motivation of metaphorical expres-
sions, see Benczes, 2013.) Trample alliterates with Tennessee. This is admittedly
a very simple, almost trivial, effect of the linguistic context on the choice of
68 Where Metaphors Come From

a particular metaphorical expression, but it accounts, at least in part, for why

an expression is chosen, given the alternatives.
As a somewhat more complex example, consider a case that could be ana-
lyzed along similar lines. Another headline from the sports pages, taken from
Aitchison (1987), is “Cowboys corral Buffalos.” (Actually, Aitchison mentions
a number of similar headlines, such as “Clemson Cooks Rice,” “Air Force
torpedoes the Navy,” “Cougars drown Beavers.”) The “Cowboys Corral Buf-
falos” example could be analyzed as follows: Given the three input spaces (uni-
versities with their football teams, the competition between them, and a space
for the American West with cowboys and buffalos), we can set up a blended
space in which we have the cowboys blended with one university’s football
team and one of the opponents in the competition frame, the buffaloes with
the other university’s football team and the other opponent in the competition
frame, and finally the action of corralling with defeating, as represented in
Figure 4.1.
The issue here is why in one case the verb used for defeat is trample, in
another it is corral, in a third it is cook, in a fourth it is drown, and so forth.
My claim would be that, in many cases, the verbs vary because the linguistic
context in which the idea to be conveyed, say, that of defeat, varies. In this
case, unlike the previous one, it is the content, or meaning, of the immediate
linguistic context (and not its phonological shape) that facilitates the choice
of a metaphorical expression. As I pointed out earlier, this effect is due to the
metaphorical coherence of discourse—the pressure of what I termed linguistic
context above. Since the notion of the metaphorical coherence of discourse and

Input 1 Input 2 Input 3

university sports competition Wild West

university cowboys
opponent 1
football team 1
university buffaloes
opponent 2
football team 2
opp. 1 cowboys corall
defeats opp.2 buffaloes

university 1/opp.1/
cowboys
university 2/opp.2/
buffaloes
defeating/coralling

Blend
Figure 4.1  The “Cowboys Corral Buffaloes” blend.
 Contextual Factors 69

its effect on creating metaphors in discourse is not part of the conceptual tools
of CIT, it cannot account for this kind of variation in the use of metaphorical
expressions. At the same time, however, I do not wish to imply that the linguis-
tic context always produces this effect.
Coulson and Oakley (2003: 54) examine another example that is very simi-
lar to the corral, cook, drown, and so on, examples. It is a headline again: “Coke
Flows Past Forecasts: Soft Drink Company Posts Gains” from USA TODAY.
They describe the example as follows:

In (3) [the example in question] . . . “flows past forecasts” is an appropri-

ate metaphoric predication for the Coca Cola corporation’s profit, and an
appropriate literal predication for the Coca Cola corporation’s best known
product. So, while the “Coke” in (3) is mainly construed as a corporation,
it would appear to have some of the properties of the soft drink that cor-
poration produces. [italics in the original]

Although I agree with much of this analysis, I would add that the metaphor-
ical verb flows is used here, as opposed to several other alternatives, such as
goes, exceeds, surpasses, because both the immediate linguistic context and the
more general topic influences the choice of the verb. Since coke is a liquid, it
can flow, which is a semantic feature of the word. Thus, the word coke provides
the immediate linguistic context that may motivate the selection of a verb from
among the alternatives in the discourse. In addition to the immediate linguistic
context, the general topic, the subject matter of the discourse, may also play a
role. Since the topic is how the corporation makes profit with its best-known
product, Coca Cola, which is a liquid, this may trigger or prime the use of the
verb flow as well. In other words, in this case the linguistic context and the
topic of the discourse may jointly lead to the selection of a metaphorically
used word.
As a final illustration of a contextual effect, let us take one of the most
celebrated examples of CIT: “If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would
sink.” The input spaces have the Titanic and Clinton, respectively. The Titanic
corresponds to Clinton and the iceberg that hits the Titanic corresponds to
the scandal that hurt Clinton’s presidency. In addition, there is a conventional
metaphor at work here. As Turner and Fauconnier (2000: 135) note in connec-
tion with the example: “It is uncontroversial that cases like the Clinton-Titanic
example involve the basic metaphor purposeful activity is traveling along
a path toward a destination – the traveler projects to the agent, reaching the
destination projects to achieving the goal, and so on, . . . .” But, of course, the
sentence conveys more than the metaphors can account for; namely, that Clin-
ton is so strong that he survives the crisis that the scandal involved him in. This
reading does not come from the Titanic input space, where the Titanic sinks
as a result of its collision with the iceberg. It comes from the blended space
70 Where Metaphors Come From

that uses the Titanic scenario with Clinton as the Titanic, plus causal struc-
ture that is projected to the blend from the Clinton input space (i.e., where
Clinton survived the scandal). Thus, in the blend, we have the Clinton/Titanic
sinking the scandal/iceberg, rather than the scandal/iceberg causing the
Clinton/Titanic’s ruin.
The example shows very clearly a major advantage of CIT, as already
shown in Chapter 2; namely, that meaning does not always arise from simple
correspondences between source and target. What this type of analysis does not
show, though, is why we have the particular input spaces that we do in the net-
work of spaces. In other words, we can ask: Why is it that in order to talk about
the Clinton scandal, the speaker of the sentence uses the Titanic scenario, and
not some other potentially available scenario? In other words, it is not clear at
all what motivates the presence of Titanic input space in the network.
I believe that the model of metaphor creation in context can provide an
account for many such cases, though maybe not for all. In the present exam-
ple, the Clinton–Titanic blend came about because the Titanic movie was very
much in public awareness at the time the blend was created. Thus, in the view
I am proposing, it can be suggested that many of the metaphorical blends are
invented as a result of the influence of what I call the “immediate cultural con-
text” (more on this in Chapter 6). As a matter of fact, Turner and Fauconnier
themselves also draw our attention to the fact that the blend could not have
come about in 1992 without the Titanic catastrophe to begin with and without
the wide popularity of the movie inside the Washington Beltway during the
Clinton presidency. Thus Turner and Fauconnier provide the justification and
motivation for the emergence of the blend in this particular case, but I would
like to see this as falling out systematically from the framework that has been
developed in this chapter.
The four cases of blending that have been considered in the section seem to
result partially from the effect of context on the use of metaphors and blends:
the first from the influence of the phonological shape of the immediate linguis-
tic context, the second from the (semantic) effect of the immediate linguistic
context, the third from the combined effect of the linguistic context and the
general topic, and the fourth from the immediate cultural context. I suspect
that in many other cases of blending the other factors discussed in the chapter
can play a similar role.

Conclusions

A number of contextual factors have been identified in this chapter, but possi-
bly there are more. The workings of these factors suggest that conceptualizers
take advantage of the various factors that make up the immediate (local) and
nonimmediate (global) context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes
 Contextual Factors 71

place. We can think of this contextual influence on conceptualization as large-

scale priming by context that is occurring simultaneously (and competitively)
with the influence of entrenched embodiment. As a result of this interaction
(this “in vivo” priming), the abstract concepts in the conceptual system and the
system as such are constantly shaped and at the same time they shape the way
we conceptualize the world.
We can imagine these contexts as frames that are nested in one another,
such that the physical setting as the outermost frame includes the social frame
that includes the cultural frame, and so on, where in the “innermost” frame
we find the speaker/conceptualizer, the hearer/conceptualizer, and the topic, as
well as the diagram for the flow of discourse (functioning as the immediate lin-
guistic context, or cotext). This idea of contexts as nested frames bears resem-
blance to Langacker’s construct of “current discourse space,” which he defines
as “everything presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for
discourse at a given moment” (Langacker, 2008: 281). The contextual factors
I describe in this chapter can all trigger, prompt, facilitate, or simply prime,
singly or in combination, the use of conventional or unconventional and novel
metaphorical expressions in the discourse. We can represent the joint workings
of these factors in Figure 4.2 (taken from Kövecses, 2010b).
However, we also saw that different conceptual factors do not mechanically
and automatically lead to differences in the metaphorical conceptualization of
a concept. Rather, contextual influence may affect other aspects of a concept
used in context (e.g., its salience) and leave metaphorical conceptualization un-
affected. But at the present stage of research this cannot be a very strong claim.
A single concept in just three languages (no matter how radically different they
are) simply does not provide enough evidence for it. It is clear that there is a
great deal of need for further research in this area.
Finally, I also looked at the potential effect of the same contextual factors
on conceptual integration. One issue that is not addressed in the depth it merits

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

SOCIAL SETTING

CULTURAL CONTEXT

speaker/conceptualizer
hearer/conceptualizer
topic
f low of discourse

Figure 4.2  Some common contextual factors.

72 Where Metaphors Come From

by researchers in conceptual integration theory is why the networks they typi-

cally deal with are composed of the particular input spaces and the particular
metaphorical linguistic expressions they include. My suggestion is that all the
contextual factors that can play a role in metaphorical conceptualization can
also affect conceptual integration networks. In the chapter, we have seen a vari-
ety of different cases for how this happens.