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Copy Nr __ of __ Copies
Hqs 6RPSB, PRO6
Camp Aniceto Lacson, Victorias City,
Negros, Occidental
51PVN 285850
12 November 2011
PRO6-11-11-01

OPORD -01-11-11 “BALISWA”

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: HOTEL

References:

a. ITS-1 dated November 12, 2011

b. Maps Sheets Panay Island
c. PNP ISO Campaign Plan “Samahan 2011”

Task Organization: (Annex A):

I. SITUATION:

A. Enemy Forces

CNN remains the most potent threat to the security and development in the Island of
Panay. The Island of Panay confronts One (1) Regional Party Committee, the Kilusang
Rehiyon- Panay (KR-Panay) with Four (4) Front Committees namely; Central Front
Committee (CFC), Southern Front Committee (SFC), United Front Committee (UFC) and
the SECCOM EF.

Based on the latest OB, the total personnel strength of the CPP/NPA operating in
the Panay Island is placed at 176 politico-military personalities. They are equipped with
132 assorted firearms and dispersed in 69 affected barangays.

Based on the validated intelligence report from PRO6 forty (40) heavily armed CNN
where cited at the vicinity of Mount Tiguran, Padlusan National forest Reserve, San
Remegio, Antique believe to have a training camp and members of “TOTO” Group headed
by Ka “POGI” under the Southern Front Committee, Komite Rehiyon - Panay (KR-P)
operating in the municipalities of Guimbal, Tubungan, Igbaras, Miag-ao, Maasin, Janiuay,
San Joaquin, Alimodian and Leon all of Iloilo and Hamtic, Sibalom and San Remegio all of
Antique.

1. Enemy Capabilities and Weaknesses

a. The Enemy does not have the capability to hold the firefight for a long period
of time due to the limited ammunitions.

b. The Enemy does not have the capability to wage a conventional mode of
operation.

c. Some of the members of the enemy were undergoing training.

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d. However, it is capable of conducting guerilla type of Operations such as

ambuscades, landmines and sniping operation to the operating units.

e. The enemy has the mastery of the terrain, at the advantage position and
possible spotter or post in the community.

f. The enemy was heavily armed with M60 Machine gun, M14s with scope and
M16 rifles with Grenade Launchers.

2. Enemy Most Probable Courses of Action

a. The Enemy will shift its armed elements outside the area of operation to
preserve its forces and avoid decisive engagement with the operating
elements.

b. The Enemy will avoid the main effort and engage the support effort to divert
the operations so that they can extricate their important personalities in the
area.

c. In the absence of the regular armed insurgents in the area, the enemy will
disguise as students who are conducting study in the area.

3. Enemy Most Dangerous Courses of Action

a. The Enemy will conduct ambush, booby traps and sniping operation to
neutralize the operating elements.

B. Friendly Forces:

a. 3rd Infantry Division, Philippine Army

C. Attachment/Detachment:

1. Attachments:

a. Iloilo PPSC, IPPO

b. Antique PPSC, APPO
c. RCEO 6

2. Detachment: None

II. MISSION:

The 6th Regional Public Safety Battalion, PRO6 will conduct Combat Operation from
November 25 to 28, 2011 at the vicinity of Mount Tiguran (Padlusan National Forest
Reserves) in Iloilo, Panay Island to arrest/neutralize the enemy believe to be members of
“TOTO” Group headed by Ka “POGI” under the Southern Front Committee, Komite
Rehiyon - Panay (KR-P)
.
III. EXECUTION:

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Commander’s Intent:

I intend to neutralize/dismantle the members of “TOTO” Group headed by Ka

“POGI” under the Southern Front Committee, Komite Rehiyon - Panay (KR-P) and prevent
it from shifting forces and firearms outside the Panay Island.

End State: At the end of the Combat Operation the Toto Group headed by Ka
“POGI” under the Southern Front Committee, Komite Rehiyon - Panay (KR-P) will be
arrested/ neutralized and prevent the CTs recovery effort in the area. 6RPSB personnel
maintain high level of combat effectiveness.

A. Concept of Operation. (Annex “B” Operation Overlay):

I will do this by utilizing troops from 3 rd Maneuver Coy of 6RPSB, Iloilo PPSC and
Antique PPSC as maneuver and supporting elements.

The operation shall be sub-divided into Two (2) phases:

Phase 1 (Preparation Phase)

This phase shall cover the period from 12- 24 November 2011and all preparations
shall be made including but not limited to the following activities:

a. Formulation of Operation Plan/Order and Intelligence Preparation in the

Battlefield.
b. Issuance of warning orders.
c. Preparation of logistical and financial requirements.
d. Conduct rehearsals and refresher training to all personnel involve.
e. Conduct personnel accounting, briefing and equipment check.

Phase 2 (Operation Phase)

This phase shall cover the period from 25 November 2011 onward and cover the
period immediately prior to, during and immediately after the Operation and shall include
the following activities but not limited to.

a. Deployment of troops.
b. Establishment of Command Post and Advance Command Post.
c. Monitor and supervise the operations.
d. Conduct resupply if necessary.
e. Prepare for a worst case scenario that may arise during the operation.
f. Conduct debriefing after the combat operation.

1. Maneuver

a. Main Effort
Five (5) Teams from 3rd Maneuver Coy of 6RPSB will act as main effort to
arrest/neutralize the enemy at the training camp at GC 51P VN 14912 02642.

b. Supporting Effort 1

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One (1) Section from Iloilo PPSC will act as supporting effort one (1) to
secure and neutralize the listening and observation post at GC 51P VN 14228
03488 and block the retreating enemy.

c. Supporting Effort 2
One (1) Section from Antique PPSC will act as supporting effort Two (2) to
secure and neutralize the Advance Post at GC 51P VN 15015 03520 and block the
retreating enemy.

d. Reserve Force
One (1) Section from Iloilo PPSC to be stationed at the CP and will act as
reserve force to act as reinforcement to the operating troops if needed.

2. Fire
Operating personnel should avoid panic firing during the engagement to
avoid friendly casualty. Maximum utilization of grenade launchers and rifle grenades
should be made to demoralize the enemy and to counter the enemy snipers posted
in the camp.

3. Intelligence.

a. The intent of intelligence efforts is to acquire real-time information for combat

operation and to preempt any unusual acts that could affect the success of the operation.

b. Priority of intelligence efforts is the disposition and location of armed CTs and
other threat groups.
c. Intelligence operations must have the interplay of extensive and intensive
coverage utilizing humint and sigint apparatus.

5. Significant, Critical and Decisive Factors.

a. Significant to this operation is the determination of Danger Areas.

b. Critical to this OPORD is the ability of the operating personnel to achieve the
Operations goals and objectives within the stated time frame.

c. The decisive factor is the ability of troops to destroy CTs in the Area of
Operation.

B. Tasks to Maneuver Units:

1. 3rd Maneuver Coy, 6RPSB, PRO6.

a. Clear and Conduct Raid at Objectives M1, M2, M3, M4, M5 & M6 NLT
290500h November 2011.
b. Perform other tasks as directed.

2. Iloilo PPSC

a. Clear and Occupy Objectives S1, S2, S3 & S4 NLT 290500h November
2011.

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a. Perform other tasks as directed.

3. Antique PPSC

a. Clear and Occupy Objectives SA, SB, SC, SD, SE, SF, SG and SH NLT
290500h November 2011.
b. Perform other tasks as directed.

C. Tasks to Combat Support Units:

1. Intelligence

The Intelligence personnel should merge themselves to the community,

possible route of the enemy in order to gather information related to the activities,
disposition and location and possible withdrawal of the enemy for a hot pursuit
operation.

2. Air Support

Two (2) UH1H Helicopters shall be provided by TOG6, PAF and be stationed
at Camp Hernadez, Dingle, Iloilo, for air power support to the operating units in any
worst case scenario. Furthermore, shall serve as mode of air transportation for
evacuation of injured and wounded personnel in given location, and to tentative
locations for supply points.

3. Signal

Two (2) personnel from RCEO6 should man the base radios at the CP during
the duration of operation. All communication transmitted should be decoded to
avoid interception of the enemy. Communication discipline should be strictly observe
during the operation.

D. Coordinating instructions:

Unit commanders shall be responsible for the logistical and financial requirements of
their personnel.

1. PNP POP, OPSEC and respect to human rights and international

humanitarian law shall strictly be observed at all times.
2. No looting, burning and other forms of destruction to properties found in the
area.
3. Lateral coordination is highly encouraged.
4. Unit combat SOP must be properly observed at all times.
5. All operating troops must bring along with them a set of radio and cell phone
with sufficient load and batteries and should observe communication security
(COMSEC) procedure.
6. All troops are advice to identify Landing Zone in the area in case of medical
evacuation.
7. Specific areas where armed confrontation occurred shall be treated as a
crime scene and the operating unit should secure the area for the Crime
Scene Investigation (CSI) to be conducted by the SOCO.

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8. Operating troops must observe the time of sending SITREP every 0600H,
1200H and 1800H daily.

IV. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Supply

1). Class I (Sub Allow) - Initial seven (7) days dry ration.
2). Class II (OCIE) - PNP BDU
2). Class V (Ammo) - Individual personnel with one (1) basic load.

b). Transportation

1). Maximum utilization of organic vehicles during movement is highly

encouraged.
2). Additional Police vehicle will be provided upon request.
3). Use of civilian vehicles is authorized.

c) Medical Services:

1) Evacuation

a) Primary - San Remigio District Hospital

b) Alternate - Western Visayas Medical Center, Manduriao,
Iloilo City

2) Means of Evacuation:

a) Primary - By Vehicle
b) Alternate - By Helicopter
c) Personnel Services - Unit SOP

V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a) Command.

1. HQs 6RPSB, PRO6 (PSUPT MILKO LIRAZAN), Camp Aniceto Lacson,

Victorias City, Negros, Occidental. Contact number: ___________________.

2. Command Post (PSUPT JACOB CRISOSTOMO), San Remegio Police

Station, San Remegio, Antique. Contact number: ___________________.

3. Succession of command- Bn Cmdr, Dep Bn Cmdr, Chief Operation and

Chief Intel in that order.

b) Signal.

1) CEOI “ELEMENTS” is in effect.

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2) Current PNP Password and countersigns in effect.

Acknowledge:

LIRAZAN
PSUPT

OFFICIAL:

VILLAFRANCA
OPN

Annexes:

A. Task organization

B. Intelligence
Appendix 1 - Initial IPB
Tab “A”- Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO)
Tab “B”- Enemy Situation Template
Tab “C”- Analysis of Area of Operation

C. Operation Overlay

D. Movement Order

E. Fire Support
Appendix 1 - Air Support

F. Signal

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