ELISEA LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC, GR No.

L-18008, 1962-10-30

Facts:

That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three
years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;

ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria

Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the
said partial decision is now final

That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of
her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria... that aside from her legal separation
from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years
now

That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years

Issues:

Wherefore,... petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are
had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal

Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change
of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to
allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her
husband, to continue... using her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by
the State.

Ruling:

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same
violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that
Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally
separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed
before the legal... separation.

But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of this opinion, the only reason
relied upon for... the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated
from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is
doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the specific provisions... of Article 372 of the New Civil
Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is
the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground... to
justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of the said Article 372.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as
petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued use of her husband's
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of
the conjugal assets.

This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes
upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had
been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958,
the conjugal partnership... between petitioner and her husband had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Code.) Consequently, there could be
no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Principles:

Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation". (Italics supplied)

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on
issued to the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their
marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be
permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by
the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. 
She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: 
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.   

HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her
husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It
must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958,
necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more occasion for an
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of
the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

 LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.
The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.

Facts:
Tanada seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to compel public officials
to publish or cause to be published in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders because it involves public interest.
Tuvera dismissed the case outright because Tanada has no legal personality to file
petition for mandamus since he is not an aggrieved party which what the law
requires that only a person who is personally and directly affected by non-publication
of laws would have the personality to file such. Tuvera further contends that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates and since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.

Issue:
Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.

Ruling:
No. The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1.There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon public officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves public officials with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" under Article 2 of the Civil Code
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted.

Facts:
Tanada requested for publication of presidential decrees for public purposes.
The government argued that while publication is necessary as a ruled, it is not so
when it is "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

Issue:
Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself

Ruling:
Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision, SC have come to the conclusion and so
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It
is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.SC holds therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
 REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III (October 5, 2005)
GR No. 154380
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

FACTS:
- On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
- In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
- Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. Although he admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case, he insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained
a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
- The OSG contends that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.
ISSUE:
- W/N respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

HELD/RATIO:
- The Court held that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. Article 26 (2) should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed
to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. The basis is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when
Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
 REPUBLIC vs. IYOY (2005)
GR No. 152577
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General)
Respondent: CRASUS L. IYOY

FACTS:
- Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City and had five children. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey,
U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the U.S.A.
- On March 25, 1997, respondent Crasus filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22. Conversely, Fely filed
her answer and counterclaim with the RTC on June 5, 1997.
- Respondent Crasus alleges the following:
 Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant”
 Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
 Respondent Crasus also questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition,
because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
- Fely on the other hand, alleges the following:
 She was already an American citizen since 1988 and that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
 Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint
and that she left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job.
- On October 30, 1998, the RTC declared the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void ab initio on the ground that it finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help
and support.
- Petitioner Republic filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the
RTC, saying in addition that Fely has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s
citizenship and thus Art. 26 par (2) of the Family Code shall apply.

ISSUE(S):

(a) W/N the totality of the evidence presented by respondent Crasus during trial is
sufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
(b) W/N Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
(c) W/N the Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
HELD/RATIO:
(a) The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding
of psychological incapacity of Fely; marriage of Crasus and Fely remains valid and
subsisting.
This Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no
basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. Article 36 of the Family

Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
This Court sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the same Code.
(b) Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is not applicable to the case at bar
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admittedthat she obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
(c) The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. That Article 48
does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages.
Furthermore, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, as
issued by the Supreme Court recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.
 FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN,** respondents.
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998
Facts:
In May 1941, Petitioner FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines. In July 1954, they got divorced and the petitioner got
married to a foreigner. Arturo remarried Respondent Bladina Dandanand were
blessed with six children. In 1972, Arturo died and the trial court was set to declared
as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano
case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country.
Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light
of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are
recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law.
The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate
was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina
and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the
other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage
to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during
the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal
to the Court of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the
Rules of Court.

Issue: whether or not the controversy cases involving who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases

Held:
The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
The Court note that on petitioner’s motion private respondent raised, among others,
the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. Reading
between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to
conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her
favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the
motion
but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not
grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion
with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines.” It main with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at
the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once
proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.
The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary
estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo’s
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that
the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
 SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS (2007)
GR No. 133743 and GR No. 134029

Petitioners: Edgar San Luis and Rodolfo San Luis

Respondent: Felicidad Sagalongos (alias Felicidad San Luis)

FACTS:
- Felicisimo T. San Luis, the settlement of whose estate is involved in the present
case has contracted three marriages during his lifetime.

First Marriage.On March 17, 1942, he married Virginia Sulit and they had six children.
Virginia died on August 11, 1963.
Second Marriage. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an
American Citizen, with whom he had a son. However, the latter filed a divorce in
Hawaii, USA and a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
was subsequently issued.
Third Marriage. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis
in California, USA. He had no children with her but he lived with her for 18 years up
to his death on December 1992.
- Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Consequently, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City praying that said letters
of administration be issued to her.
- Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis who was later joined by Linda, children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed motions to dismiss which the trial court denied. Thereafter,
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis separately filed motions for
reconsideration. The petitioners have the following arguments:
 The petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence, the latter being the
Governor of the said province.
 The respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only
a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
 Paragraph 2, article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.

- Respondent on the other hand, has the following oppositions:

 She submitted documentary evidence that while Felicisimo exercised the powers
of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang,
Metro Manila.
 She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued in Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.

She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
- On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court. The petitioners filed separate motions for reconsideration
which were denied. Hence, the current case appealing the ruling of the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES:
(a) W/N the venue was properly laid
(b) W/N respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration

HELD/RATIO:

(a) The Court found that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court. It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence” for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.”
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
(b) The Court held that the provisions of the Family Code need not retroactively
apply, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudence
allowing to rule in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage if
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA, it is found that the respondent
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved and therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree and the subsequent marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
The respondent would qualify as an interested person who has direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo. Her legal capacity to file the letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art. 144
of the Civil Code or Art. 148 of the Family Code.
 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO v. REDERICK A. RECIO
(G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001, Third Division)
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,  a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. Petitioner
— a Filipina — and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia. 
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couples’ wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending — respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down. 

MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Courts take cognizance of the divorce decree

COURT’S RULING:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known
by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.  In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant on 8 February 1961.

In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's
visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to

confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for
a few words.

She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,

native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here

follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,

Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently.

As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of
a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established
so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform
an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth
is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or

administrative case.

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to

such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue
of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of
25 January 1962.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration

GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Fact of the case:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa toenter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
thePhilippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961.
On thedate of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.The Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed

Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriageto a
Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying

aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4
of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether
the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas
Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through
anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
 DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358
January 30, 1995

Doctrine

Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.

Facts

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

contract worker. Heembraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in
January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with
Banez, (Marina and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the “guests”of Banez. The latter
made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitality extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez
executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,”for his “guests.”Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section
9(a)of the Immigration Act of 1940. In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
“concubinage”with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against
the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit. On March 25, 1982,
the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that
of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April
14,1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.

Issue

WON the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of her status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal –NO

Ratio

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s

entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained
through misrepresentation. Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez
disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary
visitor’s visa and for permanent residency. The civil status of an alien
applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who
claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman. Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.
This right is basedon the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation,
their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance
which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to
stay.The interest, which analien has in being admitted into or allowed to
continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to
protect it.There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the
right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the
Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw
her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and
exclusion of aliens.Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to
depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an
alien.DecisionThe Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September
27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and
the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
 ENRIQUEZ VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 3474, September 20, 1907

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. FRANCISCO

ENRIQUEZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION
The plaintiffs brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila on the 2d day
of June, 1902, asking that a deed made by Antonio Enriquez on the 27th of March,
1883, conveying to the defendant Carmen de la Cavada certain real estate in the city
of Manila, be annulled and set aside. Judgment was rendered in the court below to
the effect that the plaintiffs were the owners of an undivided half of the said real
estate, and that the defendant Carmen de la Cavada should pay to the plaintiffs
upward of 13,000 pesos, as rents and profits thereof. Both parties moved for a new
trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, but the plaintiffs in this court
have neither assigned as errors the rulings made against them by the lower court nor
have they discussed any such rulings in their brief. So much of the decision,
therefore, as is adverse to the plaintiffs we can not consider, and the questions to be
resolved are those presented by the appeal of the defendants.

The decision of the court below was based upon the following facts, deemed to be
established by the evidence, namely, that Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca
Villanueva were legally married prior to the year 1860; that in 1861 the property in
question was acquired by Antonio Enriquez; that it thereby became a part of the
property belonging to the conjugal partnership; that Doña Ciriaca Villanueva died in
1882; that upon her death an undivided half of the property passed to her heirs, the
plaintiffs; that when, in 1883, Antonio Enriquez undertook to convey the entire
property to the defendant Doña Carmen de la Cavada he, as a matter of law,
conveyed only one half thereof, and that the other half remained and now is the
property of the plaintiffs.

The correctness of this decision depends upon the question as to whether Antonio
Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were legally married in 1861. The court below
found, and the evidence sustains that finding, that a marriage ceremony was duly
performed between these persons in 1865, but held that the fact that prior to 1861
they had lived together as husband and wife, had been recognized as such, and had
had children who were baptized as the legitimate children of their lawful marriage
was sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that they were at that time legally
married.

A marriage ceremony having been duly celebrated between these persons in 1865, it
is necessary, in order to show that they were legally married before that time, to
prove that the same kind of a marriage ceremony had theretofore been celebrated.
Although, as held by the Supreme Court of the United States, by the common law of
England, a valid marriage might be contracted without the intervention of any
ecclesiastical or civil functionary (Traverse vs. Rheinhardt, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 563,
decided April 15,1907), yet such was never the law in these Islands during the
Spanish domination here. During the entire period of that domination no valid
marriage could exist unless some ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened in its
celebration, and the intervention of civil functionaries was limited to the short time
elapsing between the 8th day of December, 1889, when the Civil Code took effect
here, and the 29th day of the same month, when the provisions of Tittle IV, Book I, of
that code were suspended. During the time covered by the lives of Antonio Enriquez
and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva no valid marriage between them could be contracted by
their mere agreement to live together as husband and wife.

There is proof in this case that a marriage, valid in accordance with the laws then in
force in these Islands, was celebrated between these persons in 1865. In order to
show that they were before that time husband and wife, it was necessary to prove
that a marriage ceremony in which an ecclesiastical functionary intervened was duly
celebrated. No proof of any such marriage was offered. As has been said, the fact
that prior to 1865 they lived together as husband and wife and had children is not
evidence in this case to show that they were married prior to that time. Nor is the fact
that in the certificates of baptism of these children it is stated that they were the
legitimate children of the lawful marriage of their parents.

The court below said:

"Loss of the record of the first marriage, or some like reason, might have made the
second ceremony seem necessary and for that reason it was celebrated."
This consideration is to our minds entirely insufficient to explain the celebration of the
second marriage. If the former marriage had taken place, it must have been
celebrated before some priest or other officer of the Roman Catholic Church. The law
required that a record of such marriages should be kept in the parish registry, and if
such marriage in fact had been performed, it probably would have been easy to have
obtained a certified copy of such record. No evidence was offered in this case of any
attempt to obtain such record or that the records of the church where the ceremony
had been performed had been destroyed. In fact, no proof whatever was offered in
the case to show the celebration of such prior marriage, except the facts herein
before stated, that the parties lived together as husband and wife and had children
who were baptized as aforesaid. We hold that this evidence is insufficient to prove in
this case a prior marriage, where it appears that a marriage ceremony was duly
performed between the parties at a later date; and we therefore hold that Antonio
Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were not legally married prior to 1865, and
that, therefore, when this property was acquired by Antonio in 1861 it did not become
a part of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, but on the contrary was a
part of the capital which he brought to the marriage. Being a part of the capital
brought to the marriage by the husband, upon the death of the wifethe husband
surviving herno interest whatever therein passed to her heirs.

The judgment of the court below, which rests solely upon the proposition that at the
time of the death of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva one half of this property passed to her
heirs, can. not, therefore, be sustained. That judgment is reversed, without costs to
either party in this court, and judgment is entered acquitting the defendants of the
complaint, with the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Topic: IV. Persons and Personality, B. Commencement and termination of personality

 EUGENIO v. VELEZ
Facts of the Case:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity)
filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity)
filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy
in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed
before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were
then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a
funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
(Tomas Eugenio Sr.) Petitioner’s Objectives:
He wanted his right to be upheld in receiving the legal custody of the dead body of
Vitaliana Vargas because he contended that he was the spouse of Vitaliana
Legal Objective of the Petitioner:
To raise that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the law being used against
him was not applicable
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August
1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of
habeas corpus proceedings
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion
to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature
of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable
to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a
live person.
Habeas corpus- "that you have the body" is a recourse in law through which a person
can report an unlawful detention or imprisonment to a court and request that the
court order the custodian of the person, usually a prison official, to bring the prisoner
to court, to determine whether the detention is lawful.
(Hon. Alejandro M. Velez, Presiding Judge of RTC) Respondent’s Objectives:

Issues:
1. Propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. Jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the
dead.
3. Interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family
Code) which states:

Ruling:
1. A judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in
looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The
latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a remedy might have become moot and academic
due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody
remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
3. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines. 19
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case
at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to
the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the
duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults
and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses.
 Republic v. CA and Wong
G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992
Regalado, J.
286 332

FACTS:
- Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of MaximoAlcala
Sr. and Segundina Alcala.- When he was two and a half
years old and then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his
sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old,
they were, with the consent of their natural parentsand
order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. They
decided to adopt the children as they remained
childless after fifteen years if marriage.- Upon reaching
the age twenty-two, herein private respondent, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was
averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
friends, as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when
in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community, and he wants to erase any
implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is
being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to
his former surname.

ISSUE:
WON the reasons given by private respondent in his
petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and
proper to warrant the granting of said petition
RULING:
The reasons given in his petition for change of name
are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting
of said petition. The change of the surname of the adopted child is
more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. A change of name does not define or
effect a change in
one’s existing family relations or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom. Neither does it
alter one’s legal capacity, civil status or
citizenship.- The change of name is justifiable because
of the embarrassment and ridicule his family
name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino
and living in a Muslim community. Another justifiable
cause is his desire to improve his social and business
life.- In granting and denying petitions for change of
name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is
left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not
all best evidence available.- Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: a.
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; b. when the
change results as legal consequence, as in
legitimation; c. when change will avoid confusion; d.
having continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of
alien parentage; e. sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
In good faith and without prejudicing anybody; f.when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that change of name would
prejudice public interest.- Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
has its primordial purpose which is to give a person
an opportunity to improve his personality and provide
his best interest.- Concordantly, the Court held that a
change of name does not define or effect a change
in one's existing family relations or in the right sand
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is
only the name.
 Bellis v. Bellis (1967)
FACTS:
- Amos G. Bellis was born in and a citizen of Texas. He had five legitimate children
with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife
and three illegitimate children.
- August 5, 1952 – Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in an order and manner he
specified. He wanted 1) his first wife to get $240,000.00; 2) his three illegitimate
children to get P120,000.00 (or P40,000.00 each); and after these two have been
satisfied, 3) the remainder to go, in equal shares, to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives.
- July 8, 1958 – Amos died a resident of Texas.
- September 15, 1958 - His will was admitted to probate at the Court of First
Instance, Manila. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the will executor, paid
all bequests to the first wife and three illegitimate children. Their respective legacies
were released from time to time as how the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances.
- January 8, 1964 – Executor submitted and filed a report regarding the satisfaction
of the legacies of the first wife and three illegitimate children, and the project of
partition on the division of the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
legitimate children.
- January 17, 1964 – Two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma, filed
oppositions to the project of partition, saying that they were deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children and thus compulsory heirs of the deceased.
- Lower court overruled their oppositions and their motions for reconsideration have
been denied.

ISSUE:
- W/N the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the execution of the will

HELD/RATIO:
- Yes. The national law of Amos Bellis should apply. The decedent was both a citizen
of Texas and a resident thereof at the time of his death. Even if there was a conflict of
law between domicile and nationality rule, it would still refer back to Texas law and
would not result to the doctrine of renvoi. Given that the decedent executed two wills,
even if it is assumed that the intention of executing one as a separate Philippine will
was so that the Philippine law would govern, properties would still not be distributed
according to Philippine law as such is illegal and void; national law cannot be ignored
regarding those matters. Consistent with the provisions of Art. 16 of the Civil Code
which provides that “Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.”
 ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963, LABRADOR, J.

Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with
a conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private
international law rules.

Facts:
Edward E. Christensen executed a will bequeathing a part of his property
located in the Philippines to Maria Helen Christensen his acknowledge daughter. He
was a citizen of US and State of California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time
of his death. Lucy his other child alleged that under the State of California Law
acknowledge children shall not inherit. Furthermore, Article 16 of the Civil Code
states that in case of testamentary succession with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the deceased.
Thus, Helen shall not inherit. Helen Christen on the other hand alleged that since
there is no single American law to such issue for the disposition of property located in
the domicile of the deceased what shall govern is the State of California Law that
under Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, if there is no law to the contrary, in
the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. Moreover in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

Ruling:
Yes, Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced
with a conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as
private international law rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising
in succession planning and in administering estates.

Thus, Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that intestate and
testamentary successions with respect to order of succession and amount of
successional right is regulated by the national law of the deceased. While California
Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and
manner he desires. Furthermore, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that
if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where
the question of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to
the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law
Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the
conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is
referred back and forth between 2 states.
SC finds that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.
 RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR.
G.R. No. 162894; February 26, 2008

Ponente: Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga

Principle in Law: Nationality Theory

Facts:
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI
hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts.
Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract.
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s
money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Rouzie, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union against Raytheon. Rouzie
essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case, and Rouzie also averred that
BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one
company.
In its Answer, Raytheon alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into
any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner
also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales
Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause
of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.
The RTC denied Raytheon’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for
the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of
forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce
judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of failure to state
acause of action & forum non conveniens & prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim. The RTC denied Raytheon’s motion. The CA affirmed.
Raytheon’s contention:
(a.)The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.
(b) It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the
parties & witnesses involved are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to
be presented is located outside the Philippines, that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Issue:
(a.) Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
(b.) Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.

Ruling:
(A)
Yes. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.A
(B)
No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties
involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as
a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance
 Conflict of Laws Case Digest: HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA
538 SCRA 26 (2007)

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,

vs
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007

FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national
permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru
was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned
Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged
the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering &
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed
Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his
ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for
specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by &
between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The
claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard &
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings
was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was
correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for
specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country
by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non
conveniens.

HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are
involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does notautomatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the
“minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant
contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied
to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has
various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and,
in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the
litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually
referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by
law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of
an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant
must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it
because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly
vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for
specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather raise as grounds to
question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship
rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law
of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant
relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court
should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court
should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according
to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to
a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They
determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of
a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called
for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the
fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and
ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict
of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when
the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution
of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to
the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction
over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction
over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign
nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other
formalagreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the
RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether
a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the
propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter
of defense.
 Conflict Of Laws Digest: Bank Of America V. CA (2003)
120135 March 31, 2003

Lessons Applicable: forum non conveniens (conflicts of laws)

FACTS:

Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas) were engaged in the
shipping business owning 2 vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion
Because their business where doing well, Bank of America (BA) offered them to take
a loan for them to increase their ships.
BA acquired through them as borrowers four more ships: (a) El Carrier; (b) El
General; (c) El Challenger; and (d) El Conqueror. The registration, operation,
income, funds, possession of the vessel belonged to the corporation.
May 10, 1993: Litonjuas filed a complaint to the RTC Pasig claming that during its
operations and the foreclosure sale, BA as trutees failed to fully render an account of
the income. They lost all their 6 vessels and 10% of their personal funds and they
still have an unpaid balance of their loans.
BA NT&SA, and BA international filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens and lack of cause of action against them
RTC and CA: Dismissed

ISSUE:
1. W/N there is grounds of forum non conveniens
2. W/N there is litis pendentia

HELD: Denied

1. NO.
The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient',
emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping
Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine

depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; -
present
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and, - present
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision -
present
This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's
desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of
forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense
2. NO.
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must be:
(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions -present
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts - not shown
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other - not shown
It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and England
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR No.
193707, 2014-12-10

Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of
the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the
Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.[9] Respondent
and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality... of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.[10] To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor
child with... petitioner.
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an... information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.[16]  Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.
without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21]
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an... alien

Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's
contentions.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 15[35] of the New Civil Code stresses the... principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their... national
law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties.  Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law,
as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's
son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.[40]  In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by... such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.[41] While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of
Appeals,[42] has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them.  Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since
the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',[45] the Court held that a divorce obtained
in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not
liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioner's allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent's obligation to... support his child is specifically stated,[46]
which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in
light of the ruling in
Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,[47] to wit:
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable
to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis
 ORION SAVINGS BANK
vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI
G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen
Soneja to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean
national.
Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT
No. 9118] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the
unit and the parking slot were clean.
After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit
and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the
titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to
verify the status of the properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118
representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained
in possession of Perez.
Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez,
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult
Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

Issue:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal
property of spouses Kang?

Ruling:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal
principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei
sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one
person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the
property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from
the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach
or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is
no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the
supposed lack of spousal consent.
It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the Dacion
en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium
unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take
possession of the property even six (6) months after the supposed date of
execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the
condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon