7.) Government of USA vs.
Judge Purganan
G.R. No. 148571; September 24, 2002
Panganiban, J.:
RIGHT TO BAIL (extradition proceeding)
FACTS:
The US Government and the Philippines has an existing treaty namely the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. On June 16, 1999, the US Government sent notes to the Philippine
government requesting for the extradition of a certain Mark Jimenez. The note was
transmitted to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and was forwarded to the Secretary of
Justice. The request for extradition was granted and a TRO was issued.
The Secretary of Justice filed a Motion for Reconsideration and with 9-6 votes, the
decision was reversed. This decision was based on the fact that Jimenez was deprived
of his right to hearing and notice. On the other hand, the US Government mentioned
that the extradition was necessary because Jimenez was subject to a warrant of arrest
in Florida. He was charged with the crimes of conspiracy to defraud US, tax evasion,
wire fraud, false statement, and illegal campaign. Due to these reasons, the US
Government seek for the immediate arrest of the accused.
Respondent Jimenez filed an Urgent Manifestation to set the hearing for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the Court granted the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and fixed the bail of Jimenez at one million pesos.
The substantive issues in this case involved the power of the Supreme Court to handle
the petition for certiorari without the ruling of the CA and the interpretation of the law on
extradition.
ISSUES:
1. WON Private Respondent Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of his warrant of arrest
2. WON Private Respondent Jimenez is entitled to bail while his extradition
proceeding is pending
RULING:
1. No, he is not entitled to notice before the issuance of the warrant,
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination — under oath or affirmation — of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses
at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from
presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage — if he so desires — in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial
of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a)
they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is
at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform
or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.
2. No, he is not entitled to bail.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The constitutional
right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing that, constitutionally, “[n]o
one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case —
call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
Moreover, he cannot apply for bail to the Extradition Court (PH). Instead, he can apply
for bail before the court that will render the decision against the criminal offense he was
charged with.
