ATENEO DE DAVAO

COLLEGE OF LAW

CASE DIGESTS
(Pajuyo v. CA – Casilang v. Casilang)
Group 2

Submitted by:
Calicdan, Remus Ceasar S.
Mañacap, Daniel Dei D.
Nengaska, Patricia Anne Marie M.

Submitted to:
Atty. BJ Bonn Pusta
Property Law
II – Viada
 Pajuyo v. CA & Guevarra
G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004

Characters:
1. Colito Pajuyo – Buyer of a 250-square meter lot
2. Eddie Guevarra – Made executed a Kasunduan with Pajuyo to live in the latter’s house for
free.

FACTS:
The property in controversy in this case is a 250-square meter lot located at Barrio Payatas, Quezon
City, in which Pajuyo constructed a house where his family lived from 1979 to 1985. On 1985,
Pajuyo and Guevarra executed a Kasunduan wherein Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and
orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on
Pajuyo’s demand.

The controversy arose when Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded
that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused. Because of this, Pajuyo filed an ejectment case
against Guevarra.

In his defense, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot
where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No.
137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994,
Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo
has valid title to the lot.

The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of Pajuyo, while the CA reversed the inferior courts’ rulings
stating that Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot which the government owned.
Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter. Perez had no right
or title over the lot because it is public land. The assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo,
and the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and
Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pajuyo has the right to file the ejectment suit? -Yes

RULING:
Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of Jurisdiction to
Resolve the Issue of Possession. Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may
pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is
inseparably linked with the possession. The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only
provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment,
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or
material possession over the real property.

The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de
jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both parties
intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the
proper government agency.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession
in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better
right lawfully ejects him.
 Republic v. Jerry David
G.R. No. 155634, August 16, 2004

Characters:
• Jerry David – Employee of the SSS who applied for its Employees’ Housing Loan Program.
• SSS – David’s employer who granted him the subject property under a deed of conditional sale
• Buenaventura Penus – Alleged caretaker of the subject property

FACTS:
A Deed of Conditional Sale over the subject property was executed between David and SSS.

Under the terms and conditions of the deed, David was to “actually occupy and possess the
property at all times”. SSS then sent a letter to David rescinding the Conditional Sale when it found
that neither David nor his immediate family resided the housing unit, and that he allowed
Buenaventura Penus to possess and occupy the property.

David averred that Buenaventura Penus was a caretaker until and after the necessary renovations
and modifications on the house were made. The CA upheld the Deed of Sale stating that through
his caretakers, David was deemed to have occupied and possessed the property.

ISSUE:
W/N David occupied and possessed the property.

RULING:
David possessed the property but did not occupy it.

Actual possession is not the same as actual occupancy.

Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or
by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.

As such, actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over property of such
a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own-- as when David himself is physically in
occupation of the property (actual possession), or even when another person who recognizes the
former's rights as owner is in occupancy (constructive possession).

On the other hand, actual occupancy connotes "something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive." Unlike
possession, it can only be actual or real, not constructive.

Thus, while it may be conceded that respondent "possessed" the property through his caretakers,
there is no escaping the fact that he and/or his immediate family did not "actually occupy" it; and
that he allowed other persons to benefit from its use.
 Escritor v. IAC
G.R. No. 71283, November 12, 1987

Characters:
1. Simeon Acuna – contends that the subject land was obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation
2. Miguel Escritor – claimant; declared owner over the subject lot

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is Lot No. 2749 located at Atimonan, Quezon. Miguel Escritor as
claimant, declared his ownership over the lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his
deceased father to which the Court, in an order directed to the Land Registration Office, issued the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of Escritor.

The controversy arose when Simeon S. Acuna, the herein private respondent, filed a petition for
review of the above-mentioned decision contending that it was obtained by claimant Escritor
through fraud and misrepresentation. Thirteen years after the disputed decision was rendered, the
Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of Acuna, ordering Escritor to vacate the land.
Furthermore, Acuna filed a complaint for damages, arguing that Escritor was a possessor in bad
faith, to which the IAC granted. This conclusion was based on the statement of the cadastral court
in its August 21, 1971 decision, readjudicating Lot No. 2749 to Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel
Escritor forcibly took possession of the land in May, 1958, and benefited from the coconut trees
thereon

ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor was a possessor in Bad Faith. -NO

RULING:
It should be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958, Lot
No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor. In this decision, the said court found to its
satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the land by inheritance from his father who in turn
acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public, continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious
possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish Revolution.

On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this
well-grounded belief of ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot
be categorized as possession in bad faith.

As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his
title thereto is defective. Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor
was it proved that his successors in interest were aware that the title of their predecessor had any
defect.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should not
prejudice his successors-in-interest, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's
title or mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible
from one person to another, not even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides, "one who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..."

The reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects must,
therefore, be suffered only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled
with such consequences.

Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving
bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of good faith remains.
 Heirs of Rosendo Lasam v. Vicenta Umengan
G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006

Characters:
Isabela Cuntapay – deceased owner of the subject lot
Vicenta Umengan – occupant of the subject lot
Heirs of Rosendo – claimants of the subject lot

Facts:
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot owned by the deceased Isabela
Cuntapay.

The Heirs of Rosendo base their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father, was
the sole owner of the subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel,
which is not yet probated, bequeathing the same to him. Vicenta is allegedly holding the subject
lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo.

Vicenta countered that when Isabel passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children
by her first and second marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly
had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.

It was further alleged by Vicenta that her father purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject
lot of his siblings Maria and Sado. These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of
Sale dated March 3, 1975.

Issue:
Who has the better right over the subject property? -Vicenta

Ruling:
Considering that her purported last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect for not having
been probated, her six children are deemed to be co-owners of the subject lot having their
respective pro indiviso shares. The conveyances made by Maria and Sado of their respective pro
indiviso shares in the subject lot to Vicenta’s father are valid because the law recognizes the
substantive right of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/co-ownership among
the heirs.

Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent in case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same.

The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of
his heirs ‘becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion
which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-
owners of the estate which remains undivided.
 Heirs of Laurora vs. Sterling
G. R. No. 146815, April 9, 2003

Characters Involved:
1. Pedro and Leonora Laurora - occupants of the property
2. Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. - claimants of ownership over the property

FACTS:
Pedro and Leonora Laurora alleged that they were the owners of Lot 1315-G of the Yaptinchay
Estate located in Carmona, Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees and has possessed the land up to
the present.

On 15 September 1997, Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. bulldozed and uprooted
the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by means of threats and intimidation,
succeeded in forcibly ejecting Laurora. As a result of their dispossession, Laurora suffered actual
damages.

S.P. Properties, Inc. averred that Laurora were not the owners of the land because they disposed
of it sometime in 1976. Laurora requested the Department of Agrarian Reform for the transfer of
the lot to Juan Manaig. Thereupon, the heirs of the late Manaig sold the land to Golden Mile
Resources Development Corporation which likewise sold it to S. P. Properties, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for S.P. Properties, Inc. to forcibly eject Laurora from the
property

RULING: NO
A person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by the owners. If
such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves
prior possession -- in this case, Laurora -- can recover possession even from the owners
themselves.

Granting that Laurora illegally entered into and occupied the property in question, S.P. Properties,
Inc. had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants
therefrom.

Even if Lauroras were mere usurpers of the land owned by S.P. Properties, Inc., still they are
entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.
 Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. L-50264, October 21, 1991

Characters:
William Giger- owner of the subject lot.
Manuel Mercado- buyer of the subject lot.
Ignacio Wong- possessor of subject lot

FACTS:
The subject property of this case is Lot 3 which is situated at Conga, Davao del Sur which was
owned by William Giger, who in turn executed a pacto de retro sale with Manuel Mercado.
Mercado went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any person on the land
in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman and storekeeper
by occupation. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession

The controversy arose when Ignacio Wong upon going to the land in litigation to find out if there
were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner, Wong found none. So, in July,
1976, Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger. This led to
Mercado to file a complaint of forcible entry against Wong.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado has to right to file an ejectment suit against Wong.

RULING:
Under Article 531 of the Civil Code, It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action
of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right."

The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing,
unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make
use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has
not been effected.

Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from
vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro and
accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of Wong failed to pass the possession of the property
because there is an impediment which is the possession exercised by Mercado.

As provided for under Article 538 of the Civil Code, Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceeding.
 Cequena vs Bolante
G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000

Characters:
• Sinforoso Mendoza – declared the subject property for taxation purposes prior to 1954
• Margarito Mendoza – Sinforoso’s brother who subsequently declared the subject property for
taxation purposes
• Fernanda Cequena and Ruperta Lirio – daugters of Margarito Mendoza
• Honorata Bolante – daughter of Sinforoso and the present occupant of the subject property

Facts:
Since 1926, the tax declaration was in the name of Sinforoso. When Honarata came of age in 1948,
she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside
there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the
disputed lot for their livelihood.

In 1953, Margarito, also happens to reside in the lot. He also declared the lot for taxation purposes
in his name and paid its realty taxes beginning thereon. As a result, the tax declaration in the name
of Sinforoso was cancelled. On October 15, 1975, during the cadastral survey, Cequeña and
Bolante had a dispute on the ownership of the land. Cequeña now wants to compel Bolante to
vacate the lot because they claim to be the preferred possessor of the property by virtue of the tax
declaration of their father.

Issue:
Who is the preferred possessor? -Honarata Bolante

Ruling:
Article 538. xxx if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; xxx

It must be noted that Cequeña and Bolante were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
However, the court ruled that Bolante is the preferred possessor because she benefited from her
father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926. It shows that she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period than Cequeña who acquired joint possession only in 1952.

Hence, Bolante was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because she was
in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985.
 Sps. Apostol vs. CA
G.R. No. 125375, June 17, 2004

Characters Involved:
1. Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua - claimants of ownership over the property
2. Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol - occupants of the property

FACTS:
Spouses Chua alleged that they purchased the subject parcel of land. Spouses Apostol assured the
Spouses Chua that they would vacate the property within ten days from the execution of the sale.
Spouses Apostol then acknowledged that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of
its former owners. A Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvements was executed
in favor of Spouses Chua. Despite demands, Spouses Apostol refused to vacate the property.

Spouses Apostol alleged that they had been in possession of the property since 1973 and their
adverse claim over the property was annotated on June 20, 1979. As registered owners of the
subject lot, they have the right to take possession thereof and eject Spouses Chua from the
premises.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Chua has the right to eject Spouses Apostol from the property

RULING: YES
In this case, Spouses Chua were able to establish the fact that they have been in physical and
material possession of the subject premises from the time they purchased the same from Luz B.
Pascua on July 8, 1976. Therefore, they are in possession of the property in the concept of an
owner, and under the law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it (Art.
541, NCC).

Paulo Pascua had no right, therefore, to transfer ownership of the subject land to Spouses Apostol
because, Luz B. Pascua, the original owner, had already sold the same land to Spouses Chua during
her lifetime. And upon the death of Luz, Paulo Pascua had no right to adjudicate the subject lot to
himself because he even confirmed such sale and waived any rights, interest and participation over
the subject residential house and lot.

Hence, it is clear that Spouses Chua have priority of right and possession over the subject property
and have, therefore, the right to be respected in their present possession thereon.
 Olegario v. Mari
G.R. No. 147951, December 14, 2009

Characters:
• Wenceslao Olegario – father of Arsenio Olegario; filed a new tax declaration for a certain
50sqm parcel of land
• Juan Mari – father of Pedro Mari; declared ownership over parcel of land for tax purposes

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is a residential land divided into Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and
14356. Sometime around 1988, Juan Mari filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against Olegario’s because of their
encroachment into the disputed realty.

The Olegario’s contend that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or
thereabouts, or for more than 30 years already. Hence, they acquired ownership thereover by virtue
of prescription. They also impute negligence or failure on the part of respondent to assert his
alleged rights within a reasonable time.

On the other hand, Mari asserts that Olegario’s claim ownership was only in September 1989.
Hence, Mari asserts that prescription has not set in. Mari also contends that Olegario’s occupancy
has been illegal from the point of inception and thus, such possession can never ripen into a legal
status.

ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property. -Mari

RULING:
As previously mentioned, Juan Mari, had declared the disputed realty for tax purposes as early as
1916. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey house on the realty. He also planted fruit
bearing trees and bamboos thereon. The records also show that the 897-square meter property had
a bamboo fence along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in
possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 or long
before the Olegario’s entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the Mari is the preferred possessor because, benefiting
from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he has been in possession thereof
for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners acquired joint possession only sometime in
1965.

Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, the Olegario’s did not acquire
ownership. Firstly, they had no just title. Olegario did not present any document to show how the
titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether from Mari, his
predecessor, or any other person. Olegario, therefore, could not acquire the disputed real property
by ordinary prescription through possession for 10 years.
Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with
the element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. In other words, possession, to constitute the foundation
of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title, that is, it must be adverse.[29]

Olegario’s acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated by the owner
- did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued, it does not
start the running of the prescriptive period. Mere material possession of land is not adverse
possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is
accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature
and exercised under such circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under
a claim of right.
 Sps. Espiritu vs. Sps. Sazon
G.R. No. 204965, March 02, 2016

Characters:
Sps. Espiritu – currently in possession of the subject land
Sps. Razon – claiming ownership of the subject land

FACTS:
Sps. Espiritu are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Pampanga. Sps. Sazon filed a
complaint before the RTC for recovery of possession against Sps. Espiritu and Sps. Diaz. They
claim to be the owners of the subject land as they purchased the same from Sps. Diaz. They claim
that Sps Espiritu occupied and fenced the subject land. Upon investigation, Sps. Espiritu found out
that their title had been cancelled in light of the sale of the land by Sps. Diaz to Peco who in turn
sold to Sps. Espiritu. The RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Razon and was confirmed

ISSUE:
Who among the parties has the better right to possess the land

RULING:
The Sps. Espiritu have the better right to possess the land.

Article 538 of the New Civil Code states:

“Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except
in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal,
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.”

In this case, records show that prior to and during the institution of the complaint Sps. Espiritu are
in actual physical possession of the subject land, such possession appearing to have commenced
as early as the time when they fenced the same. As the present registered owners having a
subsisting certificate of title in their names, Sps. Espiritu have the right to be maintained in the
possession of the subject land until their title is nullified.
 Marcelo vs. CA
G.R. No. 131803, April 14, 1999

Characters Involved:
1. Sotera Paulino-Marcelo - claimants of the encroached portion
2. Servando Flores - buyer of the subject property which included the encroached portion

FACTS:
The subject property was originally owned by spouses Jose Marcelo and Sotera Paulino and they
had been in continuous possession of said property since 1939. Thereafter, they discovered in 1967
that a portion of said property had been encroached by Fernando Cruz.

Marcelo attempted to cultivate the disputed portion sometime in 1968, but was barred from doing
so by Flores who claimed that the area was part of the land he bought from Cruz. Marcelo asserts
that the property sold to Cruz covers only the palayero or riceland, which measure about 6,000
square meters, and that the parang, containing 7,856 square meters, has not been included.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Flores acquired the “parang” through acquisitive prescription

RULING: YES
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite
lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, mere possession with a juridical title, such as, to
exemplify, by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of
an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is
first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.

In the instant case, Flores took possession of the controversial portion in good faith and with just
title. This is so because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral part of that bigger
tract of land which he bought from Cruz under public document. As explicitly mentioned in the
document of sale executed in 1968, the parang was included in the sale to Flores.

Flores’ possession of the entire parcel which includes the portion sought to be recovered by
Marcelo was not only in the concept of an owner but also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While
it is true that the possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest Cruz may not have
been peaceful as it was indeed characterized with violence which resulted in the death of Jose
Marcelo, this cannot be said of Flores’ possession of the property, in respect of which no evidence
to the contrary appears on record.
 Mangahas v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95815 March 10, 1999

Characters:
1. Spouses Rodil – The original owners of the subject land
2. Spouses Cayme – The alleged buyers of the subject land
3. Servando Mangahas – The possessor of the subject land who argues that sale was made in
favor to him and not to the Spouses Cayme

FACTS:
The subject property of this case is an agricultural land with an area of 15.0871 hectares which
was originally occupied and possessed by the Spouses Rodil who later on sold the piece of land to
the Spouses Cayme in the presence of Servando Mangahas.

The controversy arose when Mangahas theorized that he entered into the possession of the land
under controversy, sometime in 1969, by virtue of a prior sale he inked with the spouses Rodil on
December 7, 1969, and since then, he has been in continuous occupation and possession in
concepto de dueño up to the present, enjoying the fruits thereof to the exclusion of all others, his
right thereto being evidenced by the "Kasulatan ng Pagtangap ng Salapi" dated December 7, 1969.

Mangahas denied having offered the same land for sale to the Spouses Cayme or ever receiving
the amount of P7,000.00, the consideration of the alleged sale of February 1, 1971. Furthermore,
Mangahas stressed that by prescription, he became the owner of subject property ipso jure, which
land became a private property by operation of law, and had been withdrawn and segregated from
the alienable and disposable part of the public domain.

ISSUE:
Did Mangahas gain ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription? -NO

RULING
Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed on February 25, 1985, the requirement of at least
thirty years continuous possession has not been complied with even if we were to tack Rodil's
period of possession.

As found by the lower court, Mangahas had admitted, contrary to his disclaimer, that the
possession of the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his supposed title, commenced
only in April 1955. Mangahas can not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission which he
has resolutely repudiated in his present petition. Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of Mangahas’ submission that subject land has ipso jure
become his private property.
 Cequena vs. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944 ; April 6, 2000

Characters:
Fernanda and Ruperta Cequena – daughters of Miguel Mendoza; claims the land
Honorata Bolante – daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza; in possession of the land

FACTS:
Prior to 1954, the subject land in Rizal was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza the father of Bolante. After Sinforoso died and on the basis of an affidavit,
the tax declaration was transferred to the name of Margarito Mendoza, the brother of Sinforoso
and the father of Fernanda and Ruperta. It is Bolante that currently occupies the subject land.
Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of Fernanda and Ruperta, had a dispute on the
ownership of the land. The trial court ruled in favor of Fernanda and Ruperta but was reversed by
the CA. The CA ruled that actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous
possession by Bolante of the land since 1985 proved her ownership of the disputed land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bolante owns the disputed land. -YES

RULING:
Bolante now owns the land due to acquisitive prescription.

Article 540 of the New Civil Code states that:

“Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion.”

In this case, Bolante showed that she had been in possession of the land for more than 10 years
since 1932. After Sinforoso’s death, she continued to reside therein even after she got married..
She even declared and paid realty taxes which, when coupled with proof of actual ownership can
be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. Her ownership was not disturbed until
1953 when Fernanda and Ruperta claimed the land. By then, Bolante’s possession had ripened into
ownership.

Thus, for being in possession in the concept of an owner for more than 10 years, Bolante has
acquired the subject land.
 Sps. Recto vs. RP
G.R. No. 160421, October 4, 2004

Characters Involved:
1. Spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto - buyers of the property
2. Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres - seller/owners of the property
3. Republic - claimant of the property

FACTS:
The subject property involved is a parcel of land known as Lot 806 situated in Barangay San
Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas. In 1997, Spouses Recto filed an
application for title over the subject property.

They alleged that in 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra and
Maria Medrana Torres. The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased parents. Maria, born
in 1917, declared that since 1945, her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became aware
of her father’s possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13 years
old. The possession of the subject lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by
Rosita.

Spouses Recto presented, among others, a Report from the DENR stating, among others, that the
entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone and released and certified as such on
December 31, 1925.

The Republic contended that Spouses Recto failed to – (1) offer in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3)
overthrow the presumption that subject property forms part of the public domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property was acquired by acquisitive prescription by Medrana sisters

RULING: YES
Rosita and Maria, the predecessors-in-interest of Spouses Recto, categorically testified that they,
and prior to them their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of
owners. At 13, they were undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive their father’s possession
of Lot 806 in the concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be worthy
of belief and credence. Considering that the judge below is in a better position to pass judgment
on the issue, having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying, her findings deserve the highest respect.

There is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public domain having been released and
certified as such on December 31, 1925. As further certified by the DENR, the entire area of Lot
806 is an agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area
nor within a forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed, and
riverbank protection.
Spouses Recto were thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original registration of title, to
wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando
G.R. No. 149117, December 16, 2004

Characters:
Heirs of Frando – the original possessors of the subject property
Heirs of Gamos – possessors of Lot. No 1855 by virtue of a patent grant

FACTS:
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of agricultural land located in Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon. Juliana Frando was in possession of the above-described property. Since 1925, she had
planted several trees and other plants thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao.
Sometime in 1946, the property was traversed by a national road that effectively divided it into
two portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855, respectively. The latter, Lot No. 1855, is the
subject of the present controversy.

Unknown to the Frando’s, a cadastral survey of the Municipality of Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon,
was conducted in 1958. According to the Bureau of Lands, during the said survey, Lot No. 1855
became the subject of a case which resulted to a free patent to be granted to Cerila Gamos on
October 27, 1969. The controversy arose when the heirs of Frando challenged the validity of the
free patent and the OCT granted to Gamos. As defense Gamos, along with her heirs alleged that
they had been in actual and open possession of the land as early as 1952.

ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property?

RULING:
It is the Heirs of Frando that has better right over the property. The denial of the sales patent
notwithstanding, Juliana Frando is deemed to have acquired equitable title to the property, because
the heirs of Frando adequately proved during trial her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Introduced in evidence was a Declaration of Real Property covering the same tract of land. The
Declaration had been issued to Basilio Frando, father of Juliana Frando, sometime in 1906.
Witness accounts of long time residents of the adjoining properties confirmed her possession for
a period not later than 1925; and her introduction thereon of various trees and other plants,
including bananas, cacao, pili and coconuts.

They also attested to the continued possession of the property by Frando's daughter, Salvacion
Gimpes; and subsequently by her children. Aside from showing the Order/Award, the children
bolstered their claim by introducing in evidence several Tax Declarations, sketch plans, survey
returns and the reports of the court-appointed commissioner.

While asserting possession of the property as early as 1952, the heirs of Gamos have not presented
any document or witness to prove their bare claim.
 Heirs of Crislogo vs. Ranon
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007

Characters:
Agrifina Ranon – possessed the subject land for more than 30 years
Heirs of Crisologo – intervened; claimed that they are the rightful owners of the subject land

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is a parcel of unregistered land in Ilocos. Ranon claims to be the
owner of said lot by prescription. That her family had been in continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of such since 1962; that they paid taxes thereto; and even built a house
where she and her family had resided. They however moved to Manila but continued to visit the
property from time to time. In 1986, a fire incident occurred which destroyed the house. The same
year, they discovered that the property was already in the name of Sps. Montemayor.

Sps. Montemayor alleged that they bought the parcel of land from del Rosario and Arzadon (heirs
in this case). The heirs however were able to repurchase the property from the spouses.

So between the heirs and Ranon, the heirs alleged that they are the owners through succession.
That Arzadon lived there until the fire incident; and that they paid taxes. They alleged that in 1977,
Marcelina, their predecessor filed an adverse claim against Ranon. The heirs argued that such filing
interrupted Ranon’s possession over the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ranon’s possession has ripened into ownership. - Yes

RULING:
Ranon’s possession has ripened into ownership.

Article 540 of the New Civil Code states that:

“Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion.”

In this case, the Court ruled that the possession of Ranon was in the concept of an owner. The
Court ruled it is sufficient that Ranon was able to subject the parcel of land to the action of their
will. They did not need to stay on it. The acts of Ranon over the subject land are consistent with
ownership. Finally, the Court ruled that the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by respondents of the subject property for a period of more than 30 years in repudiation of
petitioners’ ownership had been established.

Thus, being in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years,
Ranon;s possession ripened into ownership.
 Heirs of Reyes vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 158377, August 13, 2010

Characters Involved:
1. Amanda Reyes, et.al. - claimants of the property
2. Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. - present occupants of the property

FACTS:
The subject property is a parcel of residential land located in Pulilan, Bulacan. On July 9, 1955,
Leoncia and her three sons namely: Jose, Sr., Teofilo, and Jose, Jr., executed a deed whereby they
sold the land and its existing improvements to Spouses Francia for ₱500.00, subject to the vendors'
right to repurchase.

Alejandro, the son of Jose, Sr., paid ₱500.00 for the obligation of Leoncia, his uncles and his
father. The heirs of Spouses Francia executed a deed whereby they transferred and conveyed to
Alejandro all their rights and interests in the property. Alejandro executed a deed wherein he
declared that he had acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the Spouses Francia,
including the ownership of the property, after the vendors had failed to repurchase within the given
period.

Nevertheless, Alejandro, his grandmother and his father executed a deed, by which Alejandro
acknowledged the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time
for the same amount of ₱500.00. On September 2, 1993, Alejandro also died intestate.

In 1994, Amanda Reyes, wife of Alejandro, asked the heirs of Teofilo and Jose, Jr., to vacate the
property because she and her children already needed it. After the heirs refused to comply, she
filed a complaint against them, seeking their eviction from the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Alejandro acquired the property through acquisitive prescription

RULING: NO
According to Blatero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, if a sale a retro is construed as an equitable
mortgage, then the execution of an affidavit of consolidation by the purported buyer to consolidate
ownership of the parcel of land is of no consequence and the "constructive possession" of the
parcel of land will not ripen into ownership, because only possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of owner can serve as title for acquiring dominion.

In this case, Amanda Reyes did not present proof showing that Alejandro had effectively
repudiated the co-ownership. Their bare claim that Alejandro had made oral demands to vacate to
his co-owners was self-serving and insufficient. Alejandro's execution of the affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and his subsequent execution of the joint affidavit were really
equivocal and ambivalent acts that did not manifest his desire to repudiate the co-ownership.
The only unequivocal act of repudiation was done by Amanda Reyes when they filed the instant
action for quieting of title on September 28, 1994, nearly a year after Alejandro's death on
September 2, 1993. However, their possession could not ripen into ownership considering that
their act of repudiation was not coupled with their exclusive possession of the property.
 Marcelo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 131803, April 14, 1999

Characters:
Heirs of Marcelo – original possessors of the unregistered and untitled land
Fernando Cruz & Servando Flores – Buyers of the property
Jorge Sarmiento and Engracia Cruz – The one who sold the property to Fernando Cruz

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is a portion of unregistered and untitled land located in Sta. Lucia
Bulacan. The controversy arose when the Heirs of Marcelo filed an action for the recovery of the
said portion, arguing that an extent of 7,540 square meters thereof was encroached by Cruz and
Flores.

In their defense, Flores argues that the property was sold to her by Cruz who in turn argues that
the property was supposedly sold to him by the Sarmientos and Engracia de la Cruz.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Flores can be presumed as the owner of the property? -Yes

RULING:
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for
the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character.

In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of the controverted portion in good
faith and with just title. This is so because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral
part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Fernando Cruz under public document

As explicitly mentioned in the document of sale (Exh. I) executed in 1968, the disputed portion
referred to as parang was included in the sale to appellant Flores. Parenthetically, at the time of
the sale, the whole area consisting of the riceland and pasture land was already covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Fernando Cruz (Exh. F) and further surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4).
Hence, appellant Flores possession of the entire parcel which includes the portion sought to be
recovered by appellees was not only in the concept of an owner but also public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.
 Cequena vs. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944 ; April 6, 2000

Characters:
Fernanda and Ruperta Cequena – daughters of Miguel Mendoza; claims the land
Honorata Bolante – daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza; in possession of the land

FACTS:
Prior to 1954, the subject land in Rizal was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza the father of Bolante. After Sinforoso died and on the basis of an affidavit,
the tax declaration was transferred to the name of Margarito Mendoza, the brother of Sinforoso
and the father of Fernanda and Ruperta. It is Bolante that currently occupies the subject land.
Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of Fernanda and Ruperta, had a dispute on the
ownership of the land. The trial court ruled in favor of Fernanda and Ruperta but was reversed by
the CA. The CA ruled that actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous
possession by Bolante of the land since 1985 proved her ownership of the disputed land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bolante is presumed to possess the subject land with a just title

RULING:
No, Bolante is no longer presumed to possess the subject land with a just title.

Article 541 of the New Civil Code states:

“A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.”

In this case, the Court ruled that the presumption under Article 541 of the Civil Code is disputable.
It prevails until the contrary is proven. Since there has been a contrary claim against that of
Bolante’s possession, then the presumption of having just title over the land shall cease to be.

Therefore, the presumption in Article 541 of the New Civil Code being disputable, it ceased to
exist in favor of Bolante when Fernanda and Ruperta claimed ownership over the land.
 Mario Titong vs. CA
G.R. No. 111141, March 6, 1998

Characters Involved:
1. Mario Titong - claimant of the property
2. Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio - buyers of the subject property
3. Pablo Espinosa - seller of the subject property and adjoining owner of Titong

FACTS:
The subject property is a parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate. Mario Titong alleges
that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land and declared for taxation purposes in his
name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, Victorico and Angeles Laurio
with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately
two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.

Victorico and Angeles Laurio denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed
part of the agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Espinosa
on August 10, 1981.

Titong identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner. When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he
instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at
the southern of Titong' s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is entitled to the legal presumption that he possesses a just title over the
property

RULING: NO
When Titong "sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo
Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were
transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosa's rights of ownership over the land ceased
and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter.

In the case at bar, Titong's claim of ownership must necessarily fail because he has long abdicated
his rights over the land when he sold it to Laurio.

Titong has not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. Titong’s admitted
acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming
ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore
"tantamount to bad faith." To allow Titong to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to
the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the
property upon Titong.
 Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon
G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013

Characters:
Jose Casilang – Rosario’s Uncle
Rosario Casilang-Dizon – Daughter of Ireneo Casilang (Jose Casilang Sr.’s sibling)

FACTS:
The property subject to this case is the estate of the late Liborio Casilang which was divided into
3 parcels of land among his heirs upon his death. (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of 4,164 square
meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.
The controversy arose when Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao,
Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed
that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo. Wherein subject to a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim, Lot 4618 was adjudicated to Ireneo’s heirs

In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in
actual possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same "through intestate succession from
his late father. Furthermore, alleged in their complaint, the heirs of Jose argued that all eight (8)
children of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted
Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took
possession of it, because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing
an area of 1,308 sq m,10 of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime

ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property?

RULING:
It is the heirs of Jose who has better right over the property. Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618
under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed
verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora,
and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built
their houses thereon.

A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the
concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual
possession under a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual
possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an
alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition which the Court will not hesitate
to uphold.
Tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of ownership. They are merely
indicia of a claim of ownership, but when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
they can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription. In the absence of actual, public
and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.63
We have seen that there is no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618
to Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and
even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property.