DURAN, JOY ANN M.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 – 1st SEM 2021

5170091 4A

EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

I. Q: What is the historical background of the concept of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code?

A: Article 36 was derived from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law adopted by the
Roman Catholic Church, which took effect on Nov. 27, 1983. Psychological incapacity was
adopted as an additional ground for declaration of nullity of marriage in order to serve as a
solution to the problem of church-annulled marriages on grounds not recognized under
Philippine Civil Law. The framers of the Code intended to add another ground to those already
listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the
same.

II. Q: What is psychological incapacity?

A: The Family Code does not provide for a definition of the concept of psychological incapacity
nor any examples to illustrate the concept. Nonetheless, reference to the history, intent of the
framers and a long line of jurisprudence provides guidelines on the meaning of psychological
incapacity, to wit:

A. Canon 1095, New Code of Canon Law (1983)

1. Psychological incapacity deals with positing the object of consent – psychological
incapacity for marriage withdraws the object of matrimonial consent which is thus
rendered defective. To consent to something beyond one’s capacity is equivalent to
consenting to nothing; it means there is lack of consent not because the person himself
is incapable of consenting but because he consents to something beyond his capacity
to fulfill.
2. The cause of incapacity must be psychological – it must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
3. Incapacity to assume the essential matrimonial obligations should be existing at the
time of marriage – the judges must be satisfied that the problem itself was not caused
by the experience of married life and is not a later reaction to the marital situation
4. Incapacity to assume the essential matrimonial obligations should be caused by grave
disorders or abnormalities – quirks of temperament, such as egoism, laziness,
unskillfulness, wantonness, clumsiness, uncleanliness and the like are not to be
confused with psychic anomalies properly so-called; slight character flaws do not
render a person incapable of marriage.

B. Minutes of the Civil Code Revision Committee Meeting (1986)

1. Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent – it refers to a lack of appreciation of
one’s marital obligations, rather then to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
 consent. It is not a defect of the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be of help.
2. Psychological incapacity should be existing at the time of marriage – the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when
there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. It is enough to show that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so
that later on, if one can already comply with the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio.
3. Psychological incapacity in Civil Law is not the exact equivalent of psychological
incapacity in Canon Law – marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity are not automatically annulled in Civil Law.
4. The requirement that psychological incapacity be incurable is questionable at best – the
fact that the provision does not specify the requirement of incurability despite
suggestions during the deliberations that it contain such a statement would lead to the
conclusion that incurability as a requirement might not have been arrived at
unequivocally.
5. Psychological incapacity may be relative – it may relative or specific only to the spouse,
and may not manifest itself with respect to another spouse or person, thus may be
selective in its operation.

C. Jurisprudential Guidelines in Santos v. C.A., G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995

“Psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

D. Jurisprudential Guidelines in Chi Ming Tsoi v. C.A., G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

E. Jurisprudential Guidelines in Republic v. C.A. and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
 incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligations must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.

III. Q: What are the recent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity?

A: The following are recent jurisprudence that show the evolution of psychological incapacity:

A. 2018 Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

1. Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion Singson v. Benjamin L. Singson, G.R. No.
210766, January 8, 2018 –
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that
respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by
jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built
on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their children.”
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is
irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will." "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness."

2. Republic of the Philippines v. Katrina S. Tobora Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, January 11,
2018 –
We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases
they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were
based solely on Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice,
 did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano
despite being invited to do so.
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly
depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his
insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a
psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the
"psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to
affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the
factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No
other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged
psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we
reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

3. Abigael An Espina-Dan v. Marco Dan, G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018 –
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was
psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate
courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and basic
incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short period
that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed
addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in their
ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that she
helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support
and aid to respondent.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage" such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to."

4. Republic of the Philippines v. Martin Nikolai Z. Javier and Michelle K. Mercado-Javier,

G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018 –
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v. Molina,
these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a case-to-case basis, as no case is
on all fours with another.
 Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence to
support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He testified as to his own
psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle.
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for
purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling that Dr.
Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with Martin. Even if that were the
case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for this reason
alone. Because a marriage necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who
witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to
the psychologist.
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was
psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other independent evidence establishing
the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity.
While this Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that
they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and
childhood history.
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected to
several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos'
personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several-or to be accurate, more than 10-
counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009. These facts were
uncontroverted by the Republic.
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with
tendencies toward sadism. Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests administered on
Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he experienced
during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who was abusive of his
mother. This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic
values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual
practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel
with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. Other manifestations include
excessive love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of
psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar as the psychological
incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring
the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

5. Republic of the Philippines v. Liberato P. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 –
[T]he Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be viewed as a
stringent code which all nullity cases on the ground of psychological incapacity should
meet with exactitude, in consonance with the Family Code's ideal to appreciate
allegations of psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis and "to allow some
resiliency in its application" as legally designed.
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's psychological
report confirms, contrary to petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla personally
interviewed both spouses regarding their personal and familial circumstances before
and after the celebration of their marriage. Information gathered from the spouses was
then verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liezl's youngest sister, a close relation
privy to Liezl's personal history before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based
her psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the information she gathered. Her
findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the
 parties as individuals and as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an
independent informant. The courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and
utilized it as an aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to meet essential marital functions.
Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple will
not perforce result to the expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner advances.
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA
and the R TC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link between Liezl' s actions
showing her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations
and her histrionic personality disorder.

B. 2019 Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

1. Republic of the Philippines v. Cheryl Pauline R. Deang, G.R. 236279, March 25, 2019 –
As aptly pointed out by petitioner, the actuations of the spouses that allegedly
indicated their incapacity to perform marital obligations were not proven to have
existed prior to, or at least, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, as required
by jurisprudence. Emilio may have engaged in an extra-marital affair, gambled, failed to
support Cheryl and their son, is irritable and aggressive, and abandoned his family, while
Cheryl may have married Emilio simply in obedience to her parents' decision and had
the constant need for her parents' care and support. However, these acts, by
themselves, do not prove that both parties are psychologically incapacitated as these
may have been simply due to jealousy, emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or dire
financial constraints.
Furthermore, an examination of Dr. Lara's psychological report, which the courts a
quo significantly relied upon, actually fails to show that the APD and DPD which Emilio
and Cheryl allegedly respectively suffer were impressed with the qualities of juridical
antecedence and incurability.
Also, while it is not required that the expert witness personally examine the party
alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity, nevertheless, corroborating
evidence must be presented to sufficiently establish the required legal parameters.

2. Mary Christine C. Go Yu v. Romeo A. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, April 03, 2019 –
All the foregoing clearly show that petitioner unquestionably recognizes both
spouses' obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render
mutual help and support, provide for the support of the family, and manage their
household. The fact that she gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of
disappointment or disillusionment toward her husband and their marriage is not a
sufficient ground to have such marriage declared null and void.
Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which is
defined as a mental condition in which people have an inflated sense of their own
importance, a deep need for excessive attention and admiration, troubled
relationships, and a lack of empathy for others. The psychiatrist who examined
petitioner confirmed this definition by stating that in layman's terms, a person who is
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder is one "who is self-centered and [who]
has prioritized [his/]her needs over the other or significant person." Based on the above
definitions alone, how can petitioner claim that she is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder when, as previously discussed, through her own statements and
admissions in her petition and in her testimony in court, she has displayed full
knowledge and understanding of her and her husband's obligations and has, in fact,
committed positive acts towards building and sustaining a family?
 An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has
repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. Resultantly, it has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.

3. Rolando D. Cortez v. Luz G. Cortez, G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019 –
Petitioner argues that he might have neglected or refused to act in accordance with
the norms imposed or expected by society or might have found difficulty in performing
such acts, but his neglect, refusal or difficulty was made or committed without realizing
that he has marital obligations to perform as husband to respondent. Petitioner relies
on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Soriano which showed the antecedence,
gravity and incurability of his psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.
We find that the report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits
incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the
contrary, the report established that because petitioner was forced to marry
respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full obligations as a husband.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill
will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
Petitioner's claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to perform as
husband to respondent is not a consideration under Article 36 of the Family Code as
what the law requires is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or
comprehend essential marital obligations

4. Gerardo A. Eliscupidez v. Glenda C. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019 –
[T]his Court agrees with the OSG that the totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
The CA correctly pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report failed to explain in detail how
respondent's condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable
within the doctrinal context of "psychological incapacity." Said the CA:
X X X The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological
report that the Court can rely [on] as basis for the conclusion that psychological
incapacity exists. Verily, although expert opinion furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given
considerable weight by the court, the existence of psychological incapacity
must still be proven by independent evidence.
This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological
evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly
from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage. Verily, the guidelines set forth in
Santos v. Court of Appeals do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence
 that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

C. 2020 Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

1. Republic of the Philippines v. Ariel S. Calingo and Cynthia Marcellana-Calingo, G.R. No.
212717, March 11, 2020 –
In this case, Ariel presented the medical assessment of Dr. Lopez who found that
Cynthia is suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality
Disorder Features rooted on her disorderly filial relationship as she was subjected to
physical abuse and abandonment. Such findings were based on the testimony of Ariel
and their friends, Francisca Bilason (Bilason) and Ruben Kalaw (Kalaw).
However, this Court refuses to accept as credible the assessment of Dr. Lopez as
there was no other evidence which established the juridical antecedence, gravity, and
incurability of Cynthia's alleged incapacity. While jurisprudence recognizes the
dispensability of personal examination of the party alleged to be suffering from
psychological incapacity, it is but necessary to provide corroborative evidence to exhibit
the required legal parameters.
Unequivocally, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough
that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person.
Hence, contrary to CA's decision, the fact that Cynthia is "mabunganga" and had
extra-marital affairs are not sufficient indicators of a psychological disorder.

2. Maria Elena Bustamante Dytianquin v. Eduardo Dytianquin, G.R. No. 234462, Dec. 7,
2020 –
Applying the foregoing standards to the case at bar, the Court finds that, contrary
to the findings of the CA, the totality of the evidence presented failed to prove sufficient
factual or legal basis to rule that the parties' personality disorders amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Eduardo had the burden
of proving the nullity of his marriage to Elena based on psychological incapacity. He
failed to discharge this burden.
Eduardo's evidence consisted of his own testimony; the testimony of his brother's
wife, Losbanita De Juan-Dytianquin, who described Eduardo and Elena's relationship as
"not peaceful" owing to their frequent fights; and the aforementioned Report of Dr.
Tayag.
While the Report of Dr. Tayag submitted that Eduardo suffered from a Passive-
Aggressive Personality Disorder and was "obstructive and intolerant of others,
expressing negative or incompatible attitudes," the Court finds that the incapacity of
Eduardo is premised not on some debilitating psychological condition, but rather from
his refusal or unwillingness to perform the essential marital obligations. As Dr. Tayag
stated in her Report herself, Eduardo "is quite resistive and whenever arguments would
arise between him and the respondent [Elena], he would just leave the house and would
not even come home on his own accord such that it created more strain between him
and his wife, who eventually got tired of his attitude."
The Court has held that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted
in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
 same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag diagnosed Elena with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, characterized by "a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration and
lack of empathy along with manic-depressive features." She found Elena as someone
who is self-oriented, with a tendency to push away those who are unable to adjust to
her ways.
However, as found by the RTC, the existence of such Narcissistic Personality
Disorder was not sufficiently proven during trial. To this Court, Dr. Tayag's finding of
"careless disregard for personal integrity and a self important indifference to the rights
of other" on the part of Elena was even contradicted by the evidence on record, as
Eduardo himself admitted that whenever they would fight and he would leave their
house, Elena would fetch him and settle their issues.
As determined by the trial court, there was no showing that the behavior of either
party demonstrated a disordered personality which made them completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of a marital state. What is evident from these
circumstances is that while the alleged personality disorders of Eduardo and Elena
made it difficult for them to comply with their marital duties, the same did not make
them psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their essential marital obligations.

D. 2021 Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

1. Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 –
During the En Banc deliberations, the Court unanimously modified the
interpretation of the requirements of psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage found in Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court pronounced that psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal
concept. It refers to a personal condition that prevents a spouse to comply with
fundamental marital obligations only in relation to a specific partner that may exist at
the time of the marriage but may have revealed through behavior subsequent to the
ceremonies. It need not be a mental or personality disorder. It need not be a permanent
and incurable condition. Therefore, the testimony of psychologist or psychiatrist is not
mandatory in all cases. The totality of the evidence must show clear and convincing
evidence to cause the declaration of nullity of marriage.
 REFERENCES

Cruz-Abrenica, Maria Sophia Editha (2006). Re-examining the concept of psychological incapacity:
towards a more accurate reflection of legislative intent. 51 Ateneo L.J. 596
Franco, Maria Katrina C. (2021). The psychological incapacity to marry: key jurisprudence and survey
of cases from 1995 to 2019. IBP Journal, March 2021;46(1):39-78.
The LAWPHiL Project (2019). Gerardo A. Esculpidez v. Glenda C. Esculpidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22,
2019. Retrieved from https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/jul2019/gr_226907_2019.html
The LAWPHiL Project (2020). Republic of the Philippines v. Ariel S. Calingo and Cynthia Marcellana-
Calingo, G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020. Retrieved from
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/mar2020/gr_212717_2020.html
Supreme Court of the Philippines (2021). Press briefer in the case of tan-andal v. andal, G.R. No.
196359, May 11, 2021. Retrieved from https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/18420/