ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

Ateneo Law School

LAND TITLES

MIDTERM EXAMINATION Atty. Lorenzo U. Padilla

SECTION 2-C/D October 20, 2020, 6:00 – 8:00 P.M.

Part I.
Explain your understanding.

1. Discuss the purpose of the Torrens system of registration and

the rationale for the presumption of validity of titles in the context of
good faith reliance upon the face of certificates of title (5%)?

A: The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible

conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative
thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens
Certificate of the Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such further inquiry. Thus, where innocent third persons relying
on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such. The Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that
the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told
later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only
be unfair to him. What is worse is that if there were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would
have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System,
should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder
once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied (REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 116111, JANUARY 21, 1999;
TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS. COUR OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 114299,
SEPTEMBER 24, 1999; CAPAY AND GONZALES VS. SANTOS, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 118862, SEPTEMBER 24, 1999). The real purpose of the Torrens
System of land registration is to quiet title to land and stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. 6 Indeed, titles over lands under the Torrens system should be
given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the country's
economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (HEIRS OF MARIANO
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BRUSAS, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 126875,
AUGUST 26, 1999).

2. What is the presumption regarding the ownership of lands

applied for in land registration proceedings, who carries the burden of
overcoming such presumption and what, generally, does he need to prove
(5%)?

A: The initial presumption is that all lands belong to the State.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration.
The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable (ARBIAS VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 173808,
SEPTEMBER 17, 2008).

3. (a) State the requirement of notice that the application for

land registration should contain, and explain the effect or the implication
of its absence in the judicial registration process (2.5%).

A: Applications for registration should contain a notification to

“all the occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known;
and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find
them. Lack of notice is a denial of due process to respondents. It is
elementary that no person can be denied his property without due
process of law (ADVIENTO VS. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ AND HEIRS OF
RAMOS, G.R. NO. 150844, AUGUST 20, 2008).

(b) Q: Define “extrinsic fraud” and differentiate it from

“intrinsic fraud” (2.5%).

A: Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic

fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.' But intrinsic fraud takes
the form of ‘acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the
use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of
the case’ (ADVIENTO VS. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ AND HEIRS OF RAMOS,
G.R. NO. 150844, AUGUST 20, 2008).

4. Would it be correct to argue that the Rules of Court, which

provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of
judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient,
considering that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings;
why (5%)?

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 A: No. Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to
ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not
expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other
specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in
ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent
of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of
a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary
proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence,
upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further
step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists
alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of,
and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration. Although it may be
observed that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not
contain any provision on execution of final judgments, it does not follow
therefrom that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should
necessarily apply in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is
precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution
of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply
for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases
in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure
that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance
of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section
39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the
issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied
on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment
and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All
these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or
review. The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do
their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the
prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such
applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of
our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the
imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in
the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate
such goal. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases
become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From
another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (REPUBLIC VS. NILLAS, G.R. NO. 159595,
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JANUARY 23, 2007; PASCUAL STA. ANA vs. EULALIO MENLA, G.R. No. L-
15564, April 29, 1961 ).

5. (a) How may an express trust be repudiated (2.5%).

A: In numerous decisions involving fiduciary relations such as

those occupied by a trustee with respect to the cestui que trust that as a
general rule the former's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot
ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession in such a case
requires the concurrence of the following circumstances: (a) that the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust and (c) that the evidence
thereon should be clear and conclusive." (SOTTO V. TEVEZ, G.R. NO. L-
38018, OCTOBER 31, 1978 , citing VALDEZ, ET AL VS. OLARGA ET AL., 51
SCRA 71)

(b) What is laches and why may laches defeat a registered owner’s
right to recover land covered by a Torrens title (2.5%)?

A: Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (EDUARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., G.R. NO. 121038, JULY 22, 1999; TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS.
COUR OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 114299, SEPTEMBER 24, 1999;
CAPAY AND GONZALES VS. SANTOS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 118862,
SEPTEMBER 24, 1999). The defense of laches is an equitable one and
does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but
only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff's long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all,
because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
defendant (EDUARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 121038,
JULY 22, 1999). Laches is "the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Fundamentally, "laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations." Concomitantly, "it is a better
rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or
bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result" (DE VERA, ET
AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMOS, G.R. NO. 97761, APRIL 14,
1999).

Part II.
Solve the problems.
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 1 X applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over a piece of
public agricultural land. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, relying
on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 (now Section 14, P.D. No. 1529), in
relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription, adjudicated confirmed
X's title to the land on the basis of the findings, inter alia, that 1.] x x x; 2.] x x
x; 3.] X has paid the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his
application in 1958; 4.] X has been in actual, open and continuous possession
of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] X has acquired
the land by prescription, to the exclusion of others occupying portions thereof.
Was it correct for both courts to appreciate acquisitive prescription in
favor of X in the context of this application; why?

A: No. Reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the

peculiar facts prevailing in this case. Tthe controlling statute when X
filed his application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236. In the
affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 in relation to the Civil Code's
provision's on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is
private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The
application for registration of private respondent is for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed
under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain. Suffice it
to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent
hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by
Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing facts, prescription in the
manner invoked by both courts can not be pleaded to bolster private
respondent/applicant's claim because “. . . [N]o public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from
the state.” Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however,
long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor. The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of
limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that prescription can be applied in the manner invoked
by the trial court and the appellate court, it must be pointed out that “. .
. [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code” provides that "(o)wnership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must
be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article
states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law."
Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years
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unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with
color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes
of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit anyright. It can not be said that X's
possession was con justo titulo y buena fe where his act of appropriating
for himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of
others who have been occupying portions of the disputed land
constituted acts of deprivation tantamount to bad faith. Indeed the
Supreme Court has ruled that the “. . . [c]oncealment and
misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any
claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of
extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional
omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical
possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.”
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. Suffice it to state
in this regard that to allow X to benefit from his own wrong would run
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur action: no man can be
allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. It need not be
overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not
similarly vest ownership over the property upon X because Article 1137
of the Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that “[o]wnership and
other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith.”
Needless to state, X's possession of thirteen (13) years falls way below
the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article 1137 (ALBA VDA. DE
RAZ, ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LACHICA, G.R. NO. 120066,
SEPTEMBER 9, 1999).

2. In support of her claim of ownership, in proceedings for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the applicant presented Deed of Sale. It stated that the vendor of the
subject property, JA, was the true and lawful owner of the subject property,
and that she sold the same to petitioner on 12 March 1993. Would the said
Deed of Sale constitute sufficient evidence for purposes of land
registration?

A: No. The Deed did not state the duration of time during which
the vendor (or her predecessors-in-interest) possessed the subject
property in the concept of an owner. Such documentary evidence does
not in any way prove the length and character of her possession and
those of her predecessor-in-interest relative to the subject property
(ARBIAS VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 173808, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008).

6
 3. X has been in possession of a parcel of registered land since 1942.
Such possession was known to the registered owners, Y and Z. Despite
knowledge of X's possession, Y and Z did not do anything to assert their right
over the subject property. Instead, it took them almost 45 years before
instituting the action for recovery of possession in 1986. Would the long
period of inaction on the part of Y and Z alone bar them from recovering
the property from X by reason of laches, considering the fact that the
title of Y and Z is evidenced by a Torrens title?

A: Yes. Their long inaction to possess or lay adverse claim to

the subject land has been converted into a stale demand, thereby barring
them from recovering the possession of the subject land by laches. While
jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of
a Torrens Title, the Supreme Court has, in a plethora of cases
categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to
recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Similarly, it cannot be denied that no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession, however, this legal guarantee may in
appropriate cases yield to the right of a third person on equitable
principle of laches. Accordingly, in an action brought to recover the
possession of certain land covered by a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a free patent, it was held that, while the defendant may not
be considered as having acquired title by prescription based on his long
continued possession for 37 years, the registered owner's right to recover
the possession of the property as well as the title thereto from the
defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction
and neglect, been converted into a stale demand, thus barring the
original owner of such titled land by laches. Applying these legal
precepts to the case at bench, it is clear that Y and Z are barred from
recovering the subject land from X. Their long inaction the neglect to
assert their rights over the said land have been lost by laches. To allow
then to do so would be inequitable and unjust to X. Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus jura subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights (EDUARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 121038, JULY 22, 1999).

4. On June 11, 1981, V and Others filed a complaint for

reconveyance with damages, claiming that they were the lawful owners and
actual possessors of a parcel of land, and that, sometime in the year 1977, they
discovered that lot, through fraud and illegal scheme, had been titled in the
name of D and Others, under Original Certificate of Titles No. FV-540, issued
on February 23, 1957, and that after discovery of the fraud, V and Others
demanded from D and Others to re-convey the land to them, but D and Others
refused to do so. On August 14, 1981, D and Others filed with the trial court
an answer to the complaint. As affirmative defense, D and Others alleged, inter
alia, that the action of V had prescribed long ago under the Torrens system. It
appears that the case was filed twenty-four (24) years after the

7
registration of title to the land. Would it be proper for the trial to sustain
the defense of prescription and, ex mero motu, dismiss the case?

A: Yes. Even assuming that the title was procured by fraud, the
action for re-conveyance filed by V and Others had prescribed because
the case was filed twenty-four (24) years after the discovery of the fraud.
An action for re-conveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be
barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action must
be commenced within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud, and
in case of registered land, such discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the date of the registration of the title. The registration
constitutes notice to all the world. Clearly, the action has prescribed
(VERACRUZ AND VERACRUZ VS. DUMAT-OL, ET AL., G.R. NO. 126830,
MAY 18, 1999).

5. X and Others are the actual occupants and residents of a portion

[of land], with the improvements thereon. X and Others are miscellaneous
sales patent applicants of their respective portions of the aforedescribed lot
occupied by them [(]some as far back as 1965[)] and have been religiously
paying taxes on the property. They filed an action for reconveyance with
damages based on the fact that the lot in question [(]Lot 3714[)] had been titled
under Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 issued by the then Land
Registration Commission on December 13, 1977, in the name of Spouses Y and
Z. Said OCT was issued pursuant to Decree of Registration No. N-168305 in
accordance with an alleged decision of the Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case
No. 18, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1562 dated August 6, 1941 penned by the Hon.
Lope Consing. X and Others contest the existence of the Consing decision and
cite the decision of the Hon. Eulalio Rosete dated April 18, 1980 [in] Civil Case
No. 6759 involving the neighboring lot (Lot No. 3715) likewise (formerly)
covered by OCT O-740 which makes the following observation regarding Lot
3714, which pointed out that, inter alia, that the lot was also declared public
land by the Cadastral Court in Expediente Catastro No. 18 G.L.R.O. Record No.
1562, because only the Directors of Land and Forestry were the claimants (Exh
WW-2-A). Are mere applicants for sales patent entitled to sue for
reconveyance of property allegedly covered by a void certificate of title in
the name of another?

A: No. In the present case, respondents have no clear

enforceable right, since their claim over the land in question is merely
inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for
sales patents on the land, they are not and they do not even claim to be
owners thereof. In fact, there is no certainty that their applications
would even be ruled upon favorably, considering that some of the
applications have been pending for more than ten years already. Second,
it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest.
Because they admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is
public in character and that it should revert to the State. In the present
dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
8
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
parents thereon, such persons have no personality to file the suit.
Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit
(TANKIKO, ET AL. VS. CESAR, ET AL., G.R. NO. 131277, FEBRUARY 2,
1999).

Part III.
Choose The Best Answers (1 Point Each)

1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50

C____ 1. D____ 11. A____ 21. A____ 31. A____ 41.

B____ 2. B____ 12. A____ 22. C____ 32. B____ 42.
B____ 3. A____ 13. A____ 23. A____ 33. B____ 43.
B____ 4. C____ 14. A____ 24. A____ 34. A____ 44.
D____ 5. A____ 15. B____ 25. A____ 35. A____ 45.
B____ 6. A____ 16. B____ 26. B____ 36. B____ 46.
B____ 7. C____ 17. B____ 27. B____ 37. A____ 47.
A____ 8. D____ 18. A____ 28. B____ 38. B____ 48.
D____ 9. A____ 19. A____ 29. D____ 39. B____ 49.
A____ 10. B____ 20. C____ 30. D____ 40. C____ 50.

C____ 1. Remedy available to persons aggrieved by judgment in judicial

proceedings for registration of title that is specifically available within six (6)
months from entry of judgment but not later than sixty (60) days from notice:
(a) motion to set aside default order; (b) motion for new trial; (c) petition
for relief from judgment; (d) petition to review or revise the decree of
registration. (SEC. 3, RULE 38, 2020 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE).

B____ 2. An action that does not aim or purport to re-open the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real
owner thereof: (a) action to quiet title; (b) action for reconveyance; (c)
reversion proceedings; (d) action for damages. (BASILISA S. ESCONDE vs.
SAMILO N. BARLONGAY, G.R. No. L-67583, July 31, 1987).

B____ 3. Must approve the survey plan accompanying an application for

registration of title to lands: (a) Land Registration Authority; (b) Lands
Management Bureau; (c) Register of Deeds; (d) Clerk of the Land
Registration Court. (SEC. 17, P.D. No. 1529).

B____ 4. Period within which to appeal the decision or judgment of a land

registration court: (a) 30 days from notice; (b) 15 days from notice; (c) 60
days from notice; (d) 1 year from entry of decree of registration.
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA de CEBU,
G.R. No. 77243, October 26, 1989).

D____ 5. The decree of registration may be reopened or revised under

Section 32, PD No. 1529 based on: (a) absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby; (b) any proceeding in any court
9
for reversing judgments; (c) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence (FAME); (d) actual, extrinsic or collateral fraud. (SEC. 32, PD.
NO. 1529).

B____ 6. For any loss, damage or deprivation title or interest in land caused
or occasioned by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive or
by any mistake in the resurveyed or subdivision of registered land resulting in
the expansion of area in the certificate of title: (a) compensation may be
sought against the Assurance Fund, provided the party responsible
therefor is insolvent; (b) no compensation may be sought from the
Assurance Fund; (c) compensation may be sought from the Assurance
Fund provided there is no negligence on the part of the person suffering
such loss, damage or deprivation; (d) no compensation may be sought
from the Assurance Fund unless the same is brought within six (6) years.
(SEC. 101, PD NO. 1529)

B____ 7. Always results in a judgment adjudicating title to the unregistered

lands involved therein: (a) ordinary land registration proceedings; (b)
cadastral proceedings; (c) petition to review or revise a decree of
registration under Sec. 32, PD No. 1529; (d) proceedings before the Lands
Management Bureau for awarding patents or grants to the applicants
therein. (SEC. 38, P.D. No. 1529).

A____ 8. How are “public agricultural lands” defined? (a) Public

agricultural land may be defined as those alienable portions of the public
domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands and, therefore,
includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that
these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands; (b) Public agricultural
lands are simply portions of the public domain which are neither timber
nor mineral, nor residential, commercial or industrial; (c) Public
agricultural lands are simply portions of the public domain which are
neither timber nor mineral, and the classification of lands into
residential, commercial or industrial is prescribed by the Local
Government Code of 1991 for taxation purposes, not by the Public Land
Act; (d) Public agricultural lands are simply portions of the public domain
which are neither timber nor mineral, but each of these categories of land
may, in terms of actual use, be classified as residential, commercial or
industrial. (ALBA VDA. DE RAZ, ET AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
LACHICA, G.R. NO. 120066, SEPTEMBER 9, 1999).

D____ 9. An action for reconveyance is available: (a) within one (1) year
from entry of the decree of registration; (b) after land registered under the
Torrens system had passed on to an innocent purchaser for value; (c) after
ten (10) years if based on implied or constructive trust, although it is
imprescriptible if founded upon an express trust or void contracts; (d)
within ten (10) years if based on implied or constructive trust, although it
is imprescriptible if founded upon an express trust or void contracts but,
in any event, before land registered under the Torrens system had passed
on to an innocent purchaser for value. (ROSA GICANO, ET AL. vs. ROSA
GEGATO, ET AL., G.R. No. L-63575, January 20, 1988).

A____ 10. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is

acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is
retained up to the end of the litigation; (a) therefore, the issuance of a decree
of registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as
10
such, does not constitute a separate proceeding; (b) nevertheless, the
issuance of a decree of registration, which comes after finality of the
judgment rendered therein, is no longer a step in the entire land
registration process; and as such, constitutes a separate proceeding; (c)
therefore, the issuance of the decree of registration, coming as it does
after litigation and being a function of the Land Registration Authority,
constitutes a distinct administrative procedure; (d) consequently, being
an administrative process, the issuance of the decree of registration is
beyond the ambit of the judicial process. (REALTY SALES ENT., INC. vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. L-67451, September 28,
1987).

D____ 11. Two vast tracts of land located in Binangonan, Rizal were covered
by three (3) sets of Torrens titles, as follows: [1] TCT No. 20408, issued in
the name of "R" on May 21, 1958; [2] TCT No. 303961, issued in the name of
"C" on October 13, 1970, which was derived from OCT No. 8629 also issued
on October 13, 1970; and [3] TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, in the name of
"Q" issued on July 27, 1971, which were derived from OCT No. 8931 which was
supposed to have been issued on June 12, 1942 pursuant to a sales patent but
reconstituted only in September 12, 1970. "R", "C", and "Q"'s predecessors-in-
interest were all in possession of various portions of the two parcels of land at
the time the proceedings for reconstitution of OCT No. 8931 was commenced
and terminated. "C" bought the disputed property from "B", the original
registered owner, by virtue of a deed dated October 9, 1970. The decree of
registration in favor of "B" was transcribed in the Registration Book only on
October 13, 1970, when the original certificate of title was issued. The TCT
in the name of "C" was also issued on that date. On the other hand, "R"
derived his title from "DM", whose decree of registration and original
certificate of title were issued in 1958, pursuant to registration proceedings
commenced by his father "EM" on June 24, 1927 and terminated in 1929, with
no appeal. Under the circumstances: (a) “Q” should prevail, since he
derived his rights from the earliest title; (b) “R” should prevail because,
although his certificate of title was issued subsequent to that of “Q”, it
was entered pursuant to the judicial registration proceedings whereas the
certificate of title of “Q” was the result of an administrative proceedings;
(c) “C” should prevail because he is an innocent purchaser for value, while
the certificate of title of “Q” is only the product of reconstitution
proceedings the validity of which does not appear from the facts; (d) “R”
should prevail because it[s title] is earlier in time than that of “C” and the
title of “Q” suffers from a fatal infirmity. (REALTY SALES ENT., INC. vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. L-67451, September 28,
1987).

B____ 12. Following the discontinuance under PD No. 1529 of all systems of
registration of titles to lands other than the Torrens system: (a) all lands
recorded under said other systems which are not yet covered by Torrens
titles shall be considered as registered lands under the Torrens system; (b)
all lands recorded under said other systems which are not yet covered by
Torrens titles shall be considered as unregistered lands; (c) all lands
recorded under said other systems which are not yet covered by Torrens
title shall be considered as “subject to better rights” under Section 113,
PD No. 1529; (d) all lands recorded under said other systems which are
not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered, but
may be registered thereunder pursuant to Section 113, PD No. 1529.
(SEC. 3, PD NO. 1529; PD NO. 892)
11
A____ 13. “The adjudication of land in a [ordinary] registration or cadastral
case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
from entry of the final decree”; (a) therefore, as long as the final decree is
not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has
not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion
of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set
aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another; (b)
nevertheless, the decision in a land registration case becomes final,
executory and, therefore, unalterable or immutable, “upon the expiration
of thirty days to be counted from the data of receipt of notice of the
judgment” as provided in Section 30, PD No. 1529; (c) nevertheless, the
decision in a land registration case becomes final, executory and,
therefore, unalterable or immutable, upon the expiration of FIFTEEN (15)
DAYS “to be counted from the data of receipt of notice of the judgment”
as declared by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Assoc. Benevola de Cebu
case, applying the uniform period for appeals under B. P. Blg. 129; (d)
nevertheless, the failure to appeal the judgment of the land registration
court precludes any remedy seeking review of the decree and marks the
end of litigation. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASSOCIACION
BENEVOLA de CEBU, G.R. No. 77243, October 26, 1989; DIR. OF LANDS,
ET AL. vs. TEODORA BUSUEGO, G.R. No. L-19090, December 28, 1964).

C____ 14. That which binds the land and quiets title thereto, subject only to
such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law: (a) patent or grant from
the Government; (b) judgment of the land registration court, whether in
an ordinary or cadastral proceeding; (c) decree of registration; (d)
certificate of title. (2ND PAR., SEC. 31, PD NO. 1529).

A____ 15. An ordinary land registration case is: (a) a special proceeding; (b)
a special civil action; (c) an ordinary action; (d) a case sui generis.
(PASCUAL STA. ANA vs. EULALIO MENLA, G.R. No. L-15564, April 29,
1961).

A____ 16. X owns a parcel of land that is the subject of pending land
registration proceedings. X entered into a pacto de retro sale involving the said
parcel of land in favor of Spouses M. What must the Spouses M do in order to
make the said transaction binding upon the land or against all persons who
may subsequently deal with the same or with X: (a) comply with Sec. 22, PD
No. 1529; (b) comply with Sec. 113, PD No. 1529; (c) file an opposition in
the pending land registration proceeding; (d) move for their substitution,
in place of the vendor a retro. (SEC. 22, P.D. No. 1529).

C____ 17. Can you oust from possession occupants of a judicially registered
parcel of land who entered upon the same after the judgment in the land
registration case had already become final and executory but before the
issuance of the decree of registration, by means of a mere motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession filed before the land registration court rather
than by instituting a ordinary action for ejectment: (a) Yes, because the
proceeding is in rem and, therefore, binds them as well; (b) No, because
the proper remedy against them is an ordinary action for ejectment; (c)
Yes, as long as they entered upon the land prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration; (d) No, since they entered upon the land after
judgment has become final and executory, they are no longer bound

12
thereby even if their entry into the land took place before the issuance of
the decree of registration.

D____ 18. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so because (a) when
once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land
thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the
proceedings being in rem; (b) the Court has no power in a subsequent
proceeding (not based on [actual] fraud and within the statutory period) to
adjudicate the same title in favor of another person; (c) a Torrens title
concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by the final
decree of registration, nor can title by adverse possession be acquired
against the registered owner; (d) all of the above. (ZOSIMO ROJAS, ET AL.
vs. CITY OF TAGAYTAY, ET AL., G.R. No. L-13333, November 24, 1959; J.
M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. DANNY VIBAT, G.R. No. L-18884, May 29,
1963).

A____ 19. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. (a) Therefore, a
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would
have disclosed; (b) Nevertheless, this presumption can be overcome by
proof of innocence or good faith; (c) Nevertheless, such presumption can
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains; (d)
But the rule is not absolute because no person can be expected to take
notice of all the facts which the public record contains. ]” (ENCARNACION
GATIOAN vs. SIXTO GAFFUD, ET AL., G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969).

B____ 20. Land covered by OTC No. 29, which includes Lot No. 1, embracing
a portion occupied by the City Hall of Tagaytay, was sold to X. Therefore: (a)
the said certificate should be deemed to exclude such building and the
land whereon it was erected because these are properties for public use
and are outside the scope and efficacy of the Torrens title, pursuant to
Section 44 of P. D. No. 1529; (b) the said certificate should be deemed to
include such building and the land whereon it was erected because
Section 44 of P. D. No. 1529 cannot be validly invoked to exclude it
therefrom; (c) the accessory follows the principal but X’s acquisition of
the land covered by OCT No. 29 cannot be held to mean that he acquired
valid rights over the City Hall of Tagaytay and the land on which it is
built; (d) X could not have acquired valid title over the City Hall and the
land whereon it is built because no one can claim lack of actual
knowledge relative to the location of the City Hall. (SEC. 44, PD NO. 1529;
ZOSIMO ROJAS, ET AL. VS. CITY OF TAGAYTAY, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-
13333, NOVEMBER 24, 1959).

A____ 21. The earliest moment an action for reconveyance may be filed is: (a)
before a judgment in a land registration case has been rendered; (b) after
judgment in a land registration case has been rendered, even before
issuance of a decree of registration; (c) after issuance of a certificate of
title, otherwise there will be no title to reconvey; (d) only after the lapse
of the one year period for reopening or review of the decree of
registration. (JOAQUIN CABRERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-
41805, June 30, 1988; also ILDEFONSO AGREDA, ET AL. vs. SANTIAGO
AGREDA, G.R. No. L-22312, May 31, 1971).
13
A____ 22. What is the consequence of fraud in procuring the issuance of a
free patent? (a) The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation because registration of a patent
under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title and does
not vest title where there is none, registration under this system not
being a mode of acquiring ownership; (b) Once a patent is registered and
the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it
ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and
the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent;
(c) The indefeasibility of a certificate of title can be invoked by one who
procured the title by means of fraud, where the ONE (1) YEAR period
prescribed in Sec. 32, PD NO. 1529 has lapsed because same applies not
only to tiles judicially issued but also to those obtained pursuant to
appropriate administrative proceedings; (d) Such a certificate of title,
being a veritable Torrens title, may only be recovered by the Government
from the patentee through an action for reconveyance founded of fraud,
which prescribes in FOUR (4) YEARS. (BAGUIO VS. REPUBLIC, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 119682, JANUARY 21, 1999).

A____ 23. May an action for reversion grounded on fraud in securing a free
patent be barred by prescription? (a) No. Such action is not barred by
prescription, since prescription does not run against the State; (b) Yes.
Being in the nature of an action for reconveyance founded of fraud, it
prescribes in FOUR (4) YEARS; (c) Yes. Being in the nature of an action for
reconveyance founded of fraud, which creates an implied or constructive
trust, it prescribes in TEN (10) YEARS; (d) No. The patent being in the
nature of a contract between the Government and the patentee, such
fraud avoids the same and actions based on void contracts are
imprescriptible. (BAGUIO VS. REPUBLIC, ET AL., G.R. NO. 119682,
JANUARY 21, 1999).

A____ 24. Intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case." So, where the fraud employed in a land registration
case consists in a deliberate misrepresentation by the applicant that the lots
applied for are not contested when in fact they are, there is (a) actual fraud; (b)
intrinsic fraud; (c) mere misrepresentation not amounting to fraud; (d)
constructive fraud. (PASCUAL LIBUDAN vs. JOSE L. PALMA GIL, G.R. No.
L-21163, May 17, 1972).

B____ 25. Where, after compliance with the publication and notice
requirements, half of the land applied for in the original application for land
registration is to be excluded therefrom: (a) the amendment involves a
substantial change in the area of the land applied for and is, therefore,
subject to the same requirements of publication and notice as in an
original application; (b) a new publication is not necessary since the
amendment consists in the mere exclusion of a portion of the area
covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published; (c) there is need for compliance anew with the requirements for
publication and notice because any amendment of the original application
requires the same; (d) it is discretionary upon the trial court to order
compliance anew with the publication and notice requirements. (VICTOR
14
BENIN, ET AL. vs. MARIANO D. SEVERO TUASON, ET AL., G.R. No. L-
26127, June 28, 1974)

B____ 26. A right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of

property, the legal title to which is vested in another: (a) express trust; (b)
implied trust; (c) resulting trust; (d) constructive trust. (PURITA
SALVATIERRA, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. No. 107797,
August 26, 1996).

B____ 27. A person who, without negligence on his part, sustains loss or
damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence
of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system or arising
after original registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or
memorandum in the registration book, and who by the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the
provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or
the estate or interest therein, may bring an action: (a) for damages solely
against the persons responsible therefor; (b) for damages against the
Assurance Fund; (c) for quieting of title; (d) for reversion. (SEC. 95, PD NO.
1529).

A____ 28. As to the period of availability of a petition for reopening or review

of a decree of registration based on actual fraud in cases where the land
subject thereof has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value: (a) it
may be filed at any time after the rendition of the Court's Decision and
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration; (b) it may be filed only after a decree has been issued but not
later that one (1) year thereafter, otherwise there would be nothing to
review; (c) it may be filed even before judgment has been rendered in the
land registration case as was done by the petitioners in the case of Yabut
Lee vs. Punzalan; (d) it may be filed only after judgment has become final,
because only in then may a decree of registration be expected to issue,
but before the expiration of one year from the actual entry of the final
decree of registration. (SISENANDO RIVERA vs. MANUEL V. MORAN, G.R.
No. L-24568, March 2, 1926; RODOLFO YABUT LEE vs. FLORENCIO P.
PUNZALAN, G.R. No. L-50236, August 29, 1980).

A____ 29. Where title to land was registered without notice to adjoining
owners and its occupants, the applicant having falsely attested to the absence
of any adverse claim, including the absence of any adverse possession of the
land, obviously to prevent contest on the application, what would be the legal
status of the title if one were obtained after the judicial registration process? (a)
Such absence of notice constitutes extrinsic fraud and grants a remedy to
a party deprived of his interest in land, by way of review of the decree of
registration; (b) Such absence of notice is a jurisdictional infirmity that
renders the title obtained thereby an absolute nullity; (c) the title will still
be valid because publication in the Official Gazette operates as
constructive notice to the whole world; (d) the title suffers from no
jurisdictional infirmity because publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
(ADVIENTO VS. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ AND HEIRS OF RAMOS, G.R. NO.
150844, AUGUST 20, 2008).

15
C____ 30. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance
of a decree of registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith: (a) holds the same free
from all encumbrances not noted on the title; (b) holds the same free from
all encumbrances not noted on the title but subject to what are known as
statutory liens; (c) holds the same free from all encumbrances not noted
on the title, subject to what are known as statutory liens, as well as to
what are actually known to him, including facts and circumstances
knowledge of which he should have known by the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (d) holds the same subject only to what appears in the four
corners of the certificate of title, with no obligation to go farther. (SEC.
44, PD NO. 1529; TIBURCIO VS. PHHC, L-13479, OCTOBER 31, 1959;
REVILLA VS. GALINDEZ, G.R. NO. L-19940, MARCH 30, 1960; MANACOP,
JR. VS. CANSINO, G.R. NO. L-13791, FEBRUARY 27, 1961, CITED IN
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. VS. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
G.R. NO. L-16257, JANUARY 31, 1963).

A____ 31. In an ordinary action for recovery of possession land, filed by the
registered owner under original certificate of title denominated as OCT No. P-
4991, can the defendants assail the validity of the said certificate of title by
raising following allegations as Affirmative Defenses: (1) that the defendant is
the true and lawful owner and in actual possession of the subject parcel of
land; (2) that the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid
property is due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name
which covers said Lot No. 118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has
been duly acknowledged and investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands; and
(3) that plaintiff has never been in actual possession of said Lot No. 118 and
therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate of Title No. P-4991,
which under the circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same to the
defendant? (a) No. The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the
original certificate of title issued in favor of the plaintiff, which is not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a torrens title; (b) Yes.
the issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently
issued, can be raised in an action for recovery of possession; (c) Yes. An
invalid title can be attacked collaterally, especially in an action for
recovery of possession where the issue of possession cannot be resolved
without addressing the issue of ownership; (d) Yes. An invalid certificate
of title can be assailed on grounds of fraud because the Torrens system
cannot be used as a shield for fraud. (EDUARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., G.R. NO. 121038, JULY 22, 1999).

C____ 32. May lots erroneously or fraudulently registered in the name of

another be reconveyed to the lawful owner even if it has already been acquired
by innocent purchasers for value? (a) Yes, on grounds of fraud, provided the
same is filed within FOUR (4) YEARS from discovery of the fraud; (b) Yes,
on grounds of implied or constructive trust, provided the same is filed
within TEN (10) YEARS from issuance of the erroneous or fraudulent
decree of registration; (c) No, because acquisition of erroneously or
fraudulently registered land by an innocent purchaser for value renders
the title indefeasible and bars an action for reconveyance; (d) Yes, on the
general principle that a registration under the Torrens system is not a
mode of acquiring title at the expense of the lawful owner. (OCHAGAVIA,
ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 125590, MARCH 11,
1999).
16
A____ 33. In an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the applicant presented
declarations of the subject property for the years 1983, 1989, 1991 and 1994,
as well as tax receipts of payment of the realty tax due thereon. What is the
probative value of such tax declaration and tax receipt for purposes of
substantiating his application? (a) The presentation of tax declarations of
the subject property for the years 1983, 1989, 1991 and 1994, as well as
tax receipts of payment of the realty tax due thereon, are of little
evidentiary weight and constitutes a mere indicia of a claim of ownership;
(b) For untitled lands, tax declarations and receipts are conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land even when not
supported by any other evidence; (c) The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest necessarily
proves ownership, as no person in his right mind will pay taxes on
property he does not own; (d) Tax declarations and tax receipts establish
the fact of occupation and possession for the period of time required by
law for the bona fide acquisition of ownership. (ARBIAS VS. REPUBLIC,
G.R. NO. 173808, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008).

A____ 34. What is the value of survey plans and technical descriptions in
proceedings for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? (a) They help in establishing the
identity of the property sought to be registered, but they are completely
ineffectual in proving that petitioner and his/her predecessors-in-interest
actually possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner for the
necessary period; (b) They constitute the best evidence as to the identity
of the land applied for as owned by the petitioner and his/her
predecessors-in-interest because they are required to be approved by the
Bureau of Lands; (c) They constitute evidence of ownership and
possession because nobody causes and pays for the survey of lands he
neither possesses nor owns; (d) They constitute evidence of ownership
and possession because no geodetic engineer would, even if paid, carry
out and obtain approval for for somebody who does not own and possess
the land surveyed. (ARBIAS VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 173808,
SEPTEMBER 17, 2008).

A____ 35. When the Director of Lands allows the filing of a public land
application for property that is “forest land”, would that be equivalent to a
declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain? (a) No.
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there
must be a positive act from the government, by way of an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain; (b) Yes. Such an act of the
Director of Lands is tantamount to a positive act of the government,
which is all that is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes; (c) Yes. The
classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of
government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the
Lands Management Bureau); (d) No. The decision of the director of lands
must be approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). (ITURALDE VS. FALCASANTOS, G.R. NO.
128017, JANUARY 20, 1999)
17
B____ 36. If land registration proceedings are in rem, those taking place
before the Lands Management Bureau leading to the issuance of patents or
grants from the Government over alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are: (a) also in rem; (b) in personam; (c) quasi in rem; (d) none of
the foregoing. (SEC. 2, P.D. NO. 1529)

B____ 37. Regional Trial Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over applications
for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests
therein, and over petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions;
(a) therefore, a land registration court, as distinguished from a court
exercising general jurisdiction, has limited jurisdiction; (b) therefore, a
land registration court, as distinguished from its counterpart under the
Land Registration Act, now exercises broader jurisdiction under the
Property Registration Decree; (c) therefore, a land registration court is a
court of specified jurisdiction, the exercise of which is confined to those
expressly indicated; (d) therefore, a land registration court exercises, on
the one hand, limited jurisdiction when sitting as a land registration
court and, on the other hand, general jurisdiction when acting as an
ordinary court. (TOMAS AVERIA, JR. vs. MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, G.R. No.
L-65129, December 29, 1986; ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD
EVANGELISM, INC. vs. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, G.R. No. L-32621, July
29, 1987; PHIL. NAT'L BANK vs. INT'L CORP. BANK, G.R. No. 86679, July
23, 1991; JESUS F. IGNACIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. No.
98920, July 14, 1995).

B____ 38. For purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles over

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, it is required: (a) that
such lands must have been classified as “alienable and disposable” since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, as well as possessed and occupied since then in
the character prescribed by law; (b) only that such lands must have been
possessed and occupied since June 12, 1945 or earlier in the character
prescribed by law and classified as “alienable and disposable” by the time
of filing of the application for registration of title thereto; (c) that such
lands should have been classified as “alienable and disposable” since June
12, 1945, regardless of when possession and occupation thereof by the
applicant commenced because, after all, the law refers to possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or by his predecessors-in-interest; (d)
that lands classified as “alienable and disposable” must have been
possessed and occupied in the character prescribed by law for at least
thirty (30) years, consistently with the rule on extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. (HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC, 587 SCRA AT 172).

D____ 39. The President, by decision premised on public interest, may direct
the Director of the Lands Managements Bureau, to cause to be made a
cadastral survey and, thereafter, for the Solicitor General to institute cadastral
proceedings in court, with respect to (a) alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain; (b) any lands of the public domain, even those classified as
mineral or forest lands; (c) any lands of the public domain excluding only
those classified as mineral or forest lands; (d) any unregistered lands,
including those otherwise claimed to be private. (SEC. 35[A], PD NO.
1529).

18
D____ 40. Not imprescriptible: (a) action for reconveyance based on void
contracts; (b) action for reconveyance based on express trust; (c) reversion
proceedings based on fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining lands of the
public domain; (d) action for reconveyance based on constructive trust.
(GICANO VS. GEGATO, G.R. No. L-63575, January 20, 1988).

A____ 41. Two certificates of title were issued to GA over the same parcel of
land, one under the Homestead Law in 1935 and another under the Cadastral
Act in 1936. Said titles were regularly issued and on their face both appear to
be valid. GA took advantage of the situation by selling the land to two different
persons surrendering to each purchaser the pertinent certificate of title. Both
purchasers apparently have acted in good faith, as there is nothing in the
evidence to show that they did otherwise. GA first sold the land to SC on
November 24, 1941, using the certificate issued in 1936, and SC registered it
in his name on the same date. Seven years thereafter, or on March 17, 1948,
GA again sold the land to the MB Brothers, using the certificate of title issued
in 1935, and the MB Brothers also registered it in their name on the same
date. Who of the two buyers should be considered as the rightful owner of the
land? (a) SC because the sale made by GA to SC is the valid one
considering that when GA sold the same land to the MB Brothers he had
nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to them is one first
issued covering the same property; (b) MB Brothers because the certificate
of title issued in 1935 is the valid one, being prior in time; hence, the
certificate of title issued in 1936 was invalid; the MB Brothers acquired
the valid title and, therefore, the sale to them should be considered the
valid one; (c) SC because the 1935 certificate of title was issued pursuant
to a homestead patent in an in personam proceeding over which, even if
earlier in time, an in rem proceeding prevails; therefore, the sale to SC is
the valid one, since the later derived his title from the 1936 certificate of
title issued pursuant to cadastral registration proceedings (d) MB Brothers
because although the 1935 certificate of title was issued pursuant to a
homestead patent in an in personam proceeding it, nevertheless, validly
registered the land which, therefore, could not be the subject of a valid
cadastral registration thereafter; it follows that the MB Brothers, having
derived their title from the 1935 certificate of title, acquired the valid
title from GA. (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAZARO
MANGAWANG, ET AL., G.R. No. L-18861, June 30, 1964).

B____ 42. Z filed a foreshore lease application over a parcel of land. On

February 25, 1968, Z filed a miscellaneous sales application over the land.
Since 1963 up to the present, Z has been continuously in possession of the
land on which he has been operating a dry-docking service under the style of Z
Slipways, Inc.. Improvements have been made thereon consisting of the
reclamation of a portion of the land, the construction of the fence thereon, and
the construction of a bridge over a portion under water. What is the nature of
the land involved? (a) The fact that the land is being used in his dry-
docking operations is evidence that the land is no longer foreshore land;
(b) The fact that the land is being used in his dry-docking operations is
evidence that the land is foreshore land; (c) If the land has been
reclaimed, it is no longer foreshore land; (d) There would have been no
need to reclaim a portion of the land if it had not been under seawater
and, therefore, that part, although it was formerly foreshore land, should
now be classified as reclaimed land. (BAGUIO VS. REPUBLIC, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 119682, JANUARY 21, 1999).

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B____ 43. May be set aside, upon proper motion founded on fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, within fifteen days from notice but before
judgment in a land registration case: (a) Order setting the case for Initial
Hearing; (b) Order of Default; (c) Opposition; (d) Decree of Registration.
(RULE 9, SEC. 3, 2020 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE).

A____ 44. X has been in possession of a parcel of registered land since 1942.
Such possession was known to the registered owners, Y and Z. Despite
knowledge of X's possession, Y and Z did not do anything to assert their right
over the subject property. Instead, it took them almost 45 years before
instituting the action for recovery of possession in 1986. Would the long period
of inaction on the part of Y and Z bar them from recovering the property from X
by reason of laches, notwithstanding the fact that the title of Y and Z is
evidenced by a Torrens title, which cannot be defeated by prescription or
adverse possession? (a) Yes. Their long inaction to possess or lay adverse
claim to the subject land has been converted into a stale demand, thereby
barring them from recovering the possession of the subject land by laches;
(b) No. Jurisprudence and the law have settled the imprescriptibility and
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title; (c) No. It cannot be denied that no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession; (d) No. The registered
owner's right to recover the possession of the property as well as the title
thereto from the defendantin possession thereof, no matter how long, has
cannot be barred by laches. (EDUARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 121038, JULY 22, 1999).

A____ 45. Original copies of the original certificate of title in files of the
Registry of Deeds, bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates
of title, constitute – (a) the registration book for titled properties; (b) the
primary entry book of titled properties; (c) the consolidated record of
titled properties; (d) the record book of titled properties. (SEC. 42, P.D.
NO. 1529).

B____ 46. Section of PD 1529 governing the registration of transactions

involving unregistered land: (a) Section 22; (b) Section 113; (c) Section 103;
(d) Section 105. (SEC. 3 AND 113, P.D. NO. 1529).

A____ 47. A deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the

Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration. Once registered, however -- (a) the land involved is
automatically brought under the operation of the Torrens system and is
considered registered thereunder for all intents and purposes, by virtue of
Section 103, PD 1529; (b) the land involved, if unregistered, may be
brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Section 14(a),
PD 1529; (c) the land involved may be the subject of subsequent dealings,
in whole or in part, to be registered under Section 113, PD 1529; (d) the
land involved is regarded as unregistered land until brought under the
operation of the Torrens system by virtue of section 3, PD 1529. (SEC.
103, P.D. NO. 1529).

B____ 48. A parcel of unregistered private land owned by Y is erroneously

included by the Director of the Lands Management Bureau in a free patent
granted to X. The free patent was registered pursuant to Section 103, P.D. No.
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1521, and a certificate of title is issued therefor. One year passed after the
issuance of said certificate of title. Thereupon, Y filed an application for
registration of title to the same parcel of land, not realizing that the same is
already included in the certificate of title issued in favor of X. X filed an
opposition in the land registration case, invoking prior registration of the land
in his favor. Will the said opposition be sustained? (a) Yes, because of prior
registration, albeit pursuant to administrative proceedings; (b) No,
because the prior title is an absolute nullity; (c) Yes, because X’s title is
now incontrovertible; (d) Yes, because Y’s remedy should be an action for
reconveyance. (AGNE VS. DIRCTOR OF LANDS, G.R. No. L-40399,
February 6, 1990).

B____ 49. Binding upon registered land and upon an innocent purchaser for
value even if not noted on the certificate of title: (a) Pacto de retro sale; (b)
Real estate taxes levied or assessed within 2 years before acquisition of
rights over the land by an IPV; (c) Third-party interests over
improvements thereon; (d) claims, liens, or rights not registered thereon.
(SEC. 44, P.D. NO. 1529). (SEC. 44, P.D. NO. 1529)

C____ 50. Spouses X and Y were owners of an unregistered land. In 1978,

Spouses X and Y went to the United States to visit their daughter Z. They
stayed there until 1981. On December 20, 1978, talking advantage of absence
from the country of Spouses X and Y, Spouses A and B applied to the land
registration court for registration of the said parcel of land in their name. In
1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to
Decree N-176768, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 139 to Spouses A and B. On January 10, 1980, the title
was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1981, Spouses X and Y filed an action for reconveyance with
damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T. No. 139, on the ground that the
actual fraud perpetrated by Spouses A and B in causing the registration of the
name in their absence created an implied or constructive trust. Since more
than one year has elapsed since the entry of the decree of registration, will the
action for reconveyance prosper? (a) No, because Sec. 32, PD No. 1529
expressly excludes “absence” from the country as ground for reopening or
review of the decree of registration and so should likewise bar an action
for reconveyance; (b) No, “actual fraud” is a ground for reopening of the
decree or registration, which must be filed within ONE (1) YEAR from
entry thereof, otherwise the title becomes incontrovertible; (c) Yes, the
action for reconveyance was properly grounded and timely, as it was filed
within TEN (10) YEARS from the issuance of the torrens title over the
property; (d) No, they should have filed an action to annul the judgment of
the land registration court based on extrinsic fraud, which is available to
them within FOUR (4) YEARS from its rendition. (SERNA AND RASCA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 124605, JUNE 18, 1999)

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