ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL

(BOOK II, 1-3; BOOK III, 4-5)

Sem. John Froeyx Sararaña

First year Philosophy

INTRODUCTION

T his excerpt is a discussion regarding the treatise of Aristotle on the soul. Its content
is merely focused of the Book II, lectures 1-3 and Book III, lectures 4-5.
ARISTOTLE was born in 384 B.C. in Stagira, studied at Macedonia court where
his father was a physician to the king. He was the teacher of the known man, Alexander
the Great. He was also a student of Plato for twenty years and after his predecessor’s
death, he founded his own school, the Lyceum. He was a great contributor to natural
sciences where he was coined as the Father of Biology. He was also the inventor of logic
and a father of numerous works which include one of his masterpieces, De Anima.1
Influenced by his predecessor and teacher, Plato, Aristotle articulated several
views regarding man in his early years. One of this view, like his teacher, was the
dualism of the body and the soul. In which, he proposed that a man is not just a body
but a combination of matter and form – the body and soul.
However, he also was a great contributor to natural sciences and held many
biological investigations. His scientific knowledge predominated his line of thinking.
That was why, he was able to express another organic concept as regards man. The soul
was, for him, the entelechy of the body – i.e. a substantial form. Not only that this
substantial form made man complete and whole, but also it perfected man and made it
alive. Simply put, he stressed that the soul was the principle of the life of all living
beings.
Conversely, unlike his teacher, Aristotle insisted that one can define the nature of
man not only by the fact that man is a being that acts as a unit consisting of body and
soul, but also he must define man as the unity of the body and soul. Aristotle perceived
both soul and body as constituting one substance.

1
Jesse A. Mann, et al.: Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism.
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. New York. (1966, pg. 110).
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 2

MATTER AND FORM: POTENCY AND ACT

We commonly perceive substance as what things are made of. For instance, a
table’s substance is wood. In a sense, Aristotle would define substance as one kind of
what is.2 This means that a substance is something that is existing. Aristotle noted that
substance can be classified into several senses:
1. Of matter as “that which in itself is not a ‘this,’” which means something
nonconcrete but which is potentially able to become a “this,” through form. In this
instance, it points out the body.3
2. Of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a
“this;”4
3. Of that which is compounded of both.5 One source would say:
Of this, there is one element, matter, which of itself is no particular
thing; another, the form or species which it is called “this particular
thing;” and a third, that which is from both of these.6

The first substance simply is the matter which is not particular. The second
substance is simply the form which is the particular one. The last substance is a
composite of both. Now, this matter is potentiality. This form is actuality. Whereas, the
latter [actuality] is divided into two parts: the knowledge and the act of knowing. 7
Generally, substances are considered as bodies, most specifically natural bodies since
these are the principles of others.
Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and
especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of other bodies. 8

Moreover, some of these natural bodies possess vitality, others do not. Vitality is
meant as something that can nourish itself, grow and decay. Every body that has life or
possess vitality is considered as a substance. As Aristotle noted, “…every natural body
which has life in it is a substance in the sense of the composite.” 9

2
Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufman: Ancient Philosophy, Philosophic Classics, 2nd Edition, Volume 1. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Simon &
Schuster/ A Viacom Company, New Jersey. ISBN 0132344939. (1997, pg. 371); Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 412a6.
Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey. (1991).
3
Ibid. (1997, pg. 371)
4
Ibid. (1997, pg. 371)
5
Ibid. (1997, pg. 371).
6
St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P.
Copyright © 1951 by Yale University Press. Revised Edition and Introduction Copyright © 1994 by Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame,
Indiana. (pg. 71).
7
Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufman: Ancient Philosophy, Philosophic Classics, 2nd Edition, Volume 1. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Simon &
Schuster/ A Viacom Company, New Jersey. ISBN 0132344939. (1997, pg. 371).
8
Ibid. (1997, pg. 371).
9
Ibid. (1997, pg. 371).
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 3

However, given that every natural body which has life is considered as a
substance, a soul cannot be a body. It will not itself be the body. This is merely because,
the body is a subject or matter. The body is not one of the factors existing in the subject;
rather, it is as the subject and the matter.
Hence, a soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body
possessing vitality or life potentially within it. Yet, a substance, as mentioned above, is a
kind of something that is existing or actual. Therefore, a substance must be in actuality.
In this case, the soul is the act of the body.
It is necessary, then, that the soul be a substance in the sense of the
specifying principle of a physical body potentially alive. 10…but
substance is actuality, and thus a soul is the actuality of a body. 11

Now, for Aristotle, there are two kinds of actuality corresponding, as mentioned:
knowledge and reflecting or the act of knowing. It is obvious that the soul is like
knowledge. For it remains in the body whether the body is asleep or awake. To be awake
is comparable to the act of knowing while to be asleep is comparable to knowledge
without use.12
In summary, for Aristotle, there are substances which may be matter, form and
the combination of both. Matter, for him, is not particular; form is particular. Likewise,
matter is potency and form is act for Aristotle. He argues that the soul is the form which
is the actuality of the body and in turn, the body is the matter which is the potentiality.

DEFINITION OF A SOUL
Simple as they are, the parts of the plants are organs. In other words, however
simple they are, the parts are organized. This might also be compared to a body,
described as a body which is organized.
Now, describing the soul as the first grade of actuality of a natural organized
body, seem to be the general formula applicable to all kinds of soul. 13 With this in mind,
we may be able to define what the soul is. According to Aristotle,

10
St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P.
Copyright © 1951 by Yale University Press. Revised Edition and Introduction Copyright © 1994 by Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame,
Indiana. (pg. 71).
11
Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufman: Ancient Philosophy, Philosophic Classics, 2 nd Edition, Volume 1. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Simon
& Schuster/ A Viacom Company, New Jersey. ISBN 0132344939. (1997, pg. 371).
12
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P.
Copyright © 1951 by Yale University Press. Revised Edition and Introduction Copyright © 1994 by Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame,
Indiana. (pg. 71).
13
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 412a27-412b9 412a6. Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by
Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. (1991).
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 4

It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the account of a thing.

That means that it is what it is to be for a body of the character just
assigned.14

A soul really is a substance in a sense that it corresponds to the definitive formula

of a thing’s essence. What is meant by the word, “definitive formula,” is that it is the
essential whatness of a body.15
The soul is the essential whatness of a natural body. The essential whatness of the
thing would have been its essence. Without this essence, the thing would cease to be
what it is supposed to be. The soul is the character which is required to make a thing’s
whatness.
…its ‘essential whatness,’ would have been its essence, and so its soul; if
this disappeared from it, it would have ceased to be an axe.16

The body and soul, matter and form, cannot be separable. This may be because
the soul will be the primary act of a physical bodily organism. Just like the pupil plus the
power of sight make the eye, eye, so the soul plus the body make the animal, animal.
However, some might be separable since the actualities are not of the body itself.
Aristotle also believed that the soul is the source of the certain psychic powers
that living things have. As have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, something
that possess vitality or life is able to nourish, grow and decay:
...we say that thing is living – viz. thinking or perception or local
movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and
growth.17

This is why we think plants also as living substances, for they are observed to
possess in themselves an originative power of self-nutrition, to increase and decrease in
size, go up or down in any direction. This power can be truly be separated from other
mentioned power. In the same way, we observe another originative power, the
possession of sensation of the animals. This form of sense is touch. Just as the power of
self-nutrition can be separated from other powers, so as the power of sensation and
touch be separated among other powers.
This power of self-nutrition can be isolated from the other powers
mentioned… Just as the power of self-nutrition can be separated from

14
Ibid. (1991).
15
Cf. Jesse A. Mann, et al.: Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism.
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. New York. (1966, pg. 118).
16
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 412b10-412b24. Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by
Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. (1991).
17
Ibid. (1991).
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 5

touch and sensation generally, so touch can be separated from all

other forms of sense.18

Furthermore, Aristotle believes that we live, perceive and think primarily because
of the soul. This leads to the point that the soul must be an account and essence, not
matter or subject. The third kind of substance, the composite one (matter and form), is
the living thing. In this case, the matter or body cannot be the actuality of the form or
soul but rather otherwise. It is the form itself which is the actuality of a certain body.
These two are inseparable. The soul cannot be without a body. Likewise, if the body is
without a soul, it is just relative to a body. But when it is entangled with the soul, its
essence, it becomes a definite kind of body, a more certain kind of body.
It follows that the soul must be an account and essence, not matter or
a subject. For, as we said, the word substance has three meanings—
form, matter, and the complex of both—and of these matter is
potentiality, form actuality. Since then the complex here is the living
thing, the body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which
is the actuality of a certain kind of body.19

FACULTIES OR FUNCTIONS OF THE SOUL

Aristotle named five faculties of the soul namely: the nutritive, appetitive,
sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking. Plants only have the nutritive faculty
while other things have additional, the sensory faculty.
Now, if any kind of living thing has the sensory faculty, it follows therefore that it
must also have the appetitive faculty. Merely because the appetite is the genus and the
species are desire, passion and wish.20
In plants, there is only the vegetative; in other living things, this and
the sensitive; but if the sensitive is present, so must the appetitive be.
For appetition means desire, and anger and will. 21

Knowing that the animals have the sensory faculty, perhaps the sense of touch (to
be precise), it also follows that they have the capacity for pleasure and pain which
18
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 413b4-413b13. Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by
Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. (1991).
19
Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufman: Ancient Philosophy, Philosophic Classics, 2nd Edition, Volume 1. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Simon
& Schuster/ A Viacom Company, New Jersey. ISBN 0132344939. (1997, pg. 371); Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 414a4-
414a28. Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey. (1991).
20
Cf. Jesse A. Mann, et al.: Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism.
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. New York. (1966, pg. 121).
21
St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P.
Copyright © 1951 by Yale University Press. Revised Edition and Introduction Copyright © 1994 by Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame,
Indiana. (pg. 90).
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 6

include their own pleasant and painful objects. Thus, whenever these are present, desire
is also present since it is an appetition of what is pleasant. 22
Additionally, certain kinds of animals possess the power of locomotion, and still
others, i.e. man and possibly another order of animate beings or superior to man
possess the power of thinking, which is mind.23
However, all beings have a sense of nutriment – plants, animals and men alike –
in as much as the sense of touch. For it is undeniable that all living things are nourished
by things that are dry and wet or hot and cold. As stated below:
Further, all have a sense of nutriment, inasmuch as touch in this
sense. For all living beings are nourished by things dry and wet or hot
and cold.24

MIND or NOUS

Aristotle considered the nous as the part of the soul with which the soul knows
and thinks. He was concerned with whether the nous is or is not part of the soul, in what
sense it is spoken of as different and separable, and how thinking, the activity of the
nous, takes place. He began with the analysis of thinking. He noted,

If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul

is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different
from but analogous to that.25

He said that if it’s like perceiving, it must in some way be potential and thus
capable of receiving the form or essence of an object. That is, the mind must “be related
to the thinkable as sense is to sensible.”26
Yet, on the contrary, the potentiality of the mind cannot be exactly like that of the
sense. Since, first, it is not attached to any physical organ and second, since it is not
27

limited to the particular kind of object corresponding to an organ, such as sound to the
ear or color to the eye.28
22
Cf. Jesse A. Mann, et al.: Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism.
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. New York. (1966, pg. 121).
23
Ibid. (1966, pg. 122).
24
St. Thomas Aquinas: Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P.
Copyright © 1951 by Yale University Press. Revised Edition and Introduction Copyright © 1994 by Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame,
Indiana. (pg. 90).
25
Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, 1, 414a4-414a28. Translated by J.A. Smith from Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan
Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. (1991).
26
Cf. Jesse A. Mann, et al.: Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism.
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. New York. (1966, pg. 49).
27
Ibid. (1966, pg. 49)
28
Cf. Ibid. (1966, pg. 49)
 ARISTOTLE: TREATISE ON THE SOUL | 7

Thus, Aristotle held that the mind could be considered as act in two ways: (1)
mind having “become all things” has knowledge, but this state is as potency to (2) mind
as exercising the power of understanding on its own initiative. 29
According to Aristotle, through the senses the soul perceives concretely the
qualities or the combined factors that constitute a material thing, Mind, he held,
apprehends the form or essence, or what might be considered the essential unity or
structure of the combined factors – its very being.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by

Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P. Yale University Press, 1951. Revised
Edition and Introduction, Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1994.
Aristotle. On the Soul. Translated by J.A. Smith. Complete Works of Aristotle.
Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Baird, Forrest E. and Kaufman, Walter. Ancient Philosophy, Philosophic
Classics, 2nd Edition, Volume 1. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997.
Mann, Jesse A. et al. Reflections on Man, Readings in Philosophical Psychology
from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1966.

29
Cf. Ibid. (1966, pg. 49)