RULE 131

BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF

EVIDENCE AND PRESUMPTION

Reporter: Ermeline J. Tampus 3.5JD

 PRESUMPTION

-A conclusion made as to the

existence or nonexistence of a fact
that must be drawn from other
evidence that is admitted and
proven to be true.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRESUMPTIONS
OF LAW
1. Conclusive- not permitted to be
overcome by any proof to the contrary.

2. Disputable- law permits to be

overcome or contradicted.
(presumptions juris
tantum)
Section 3. Disputable presumptions.

– The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
 Disputable presumptions.
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
- Presumption of good faith

(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;

(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
All people are sane and normal and moved by substantially the same motives. When of age and
sane, they must take care of themselves. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or
overcome by another but because that person has been defeated or overcome illegally. There must be a
violation of the law (Vales v. Villa, G.R. No. 10028, Dec. 16, 1916).
 Disputable presumptions.
(e) Evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
The requisites for the presumption to apply are:
a. The evidence is material;
b. The party had the opportunity to produce it; and
c. The evidence is available only to the said party.
The presumption will not be applicable when:
a. Suppression of evidence is not willful;
b. Evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative;
c. Evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and
d. Suppression is by virtue of an exercise of privilege.

Failure of the prosecution to present a certain witness and to proffer a plausible explanation does not
amount to willful suppression of evidence since the prosecutor has the discretion/prerogative to determine
the witnesses he is going to present (People v. Jalbuena, GR. No.171163, July 4, 2007).

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is
produced;
 Disputable presumptions.
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her.

(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the
money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;

(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
Principle:
a. Innocence and not wrongdoing is to be presumed;
b. An official oath will not be violated; and
c. A republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or
agent at least to the extent of such presumption.

GR: Presumption applies to both civil as well as criminal cases

XPN: Petition for writ of amparo –presumption may not be invoked by the
respondent public officer or employee (Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 17-9-12-SC).
 Disputable presumptions.
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in
like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them;

(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;

(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;

(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the
place where the instrument is dated;

(u) That a writing is truly dated;

(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of 7 years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he or she is considered dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his or
her succession until after an absence of 10 years. If he or she disappeared
after the age of 75 years, an absence of 5 years shall be sufficient in order that
his or her succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division
of the estate among the heirs:
 Considerations:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing,
who has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for 4 years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been
known for 4 years; and

(4) If a married person has been absent for 4 consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead.
In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death[, under] the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage.
However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute summary
proceeding[s] as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse[;]
 Disputable presumptions.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;

(z) That persons acting as co-partners have entered into a contract of co-partnership;

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;

(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife[,] without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry;

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who
have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions
and their corresponding shares[,] including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal;
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within 300 days after such termination of the
former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:

Presumption of Paternity

(1) A child born before 180 days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within the 300 days after the termination of the former marriage; and

(2) A child born after 180 days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the 300 days after the termination of the former marriage;
That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within three hundred [(300)] days after
such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall
govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty (180) days after the solemnization
of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during [the
former] marriage, [provided] it be born within the three hundred [(300)] days
after the termination of the former marriage; and

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty (180) days following the celebration
of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during
such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred [(300)] days
after the termination of the former marriage[;]
 Disputable presumptions.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;

(ff ) That the law has been obeyed;

(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was
so printed or published;

(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of
the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;

(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him or her when such presumption is necessary to
perfect the title of such person or his or her successor in interest;
 Disputable presumptions.
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when 2 persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no
particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined
from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to
the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of 15 years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of 60, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under 15 and the other above 60, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived, if the sex be the same, the older; and
5. If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to
have survived;
Disputable presumptions.
 Disputable presumptions.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between 2 or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died
at the same time.
People v. Urzais
G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

Doctrine:
The application of disputable presumption found in
Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer
of the whole act.
Facts:
• Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act with homicide through the use of an unlicensed firearm.

• That on Nov. 13, 2002, in Cabanatuan City, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
with and abetting one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a
Isuzu Highlander car, colored Forest Green of one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at P500,000.00
and on the occasion of the carnapping, did assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one MARIO MAGDATO, by shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound on the head which caused his death.

• At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against him. His
two co-accused remain at large.
Facts:
• Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband’s disappearance and
discovery of his death.She narrated that her husband used to drive for hire their Izusu
Highlander.

• SP02 Figueroa of the PNP, Cabanatuan testified concerning the circumstances surrounding
accused-appellant’s arrest:

That their office received a “flash alarm” from Bulacan PNP about an alleged carnapped Isuzu
Highlander in forest green color.

Thereafter, their office was informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL
Subdivision, Cabanatuan City.

Thus, a team conducted surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set up outside its gate.

That a vehicle that fit the description of the carnapped vehicle appeared.
Facts:
• The officers apprehended the vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight
therefrom. When the officers noticed the accused-appellant’s waist to be bulging of something, he was ordered
to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered tucked there. The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle
matched that of the victim’s. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the back and on
its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant and led a case for illegal possession of firearm against
him.

• The accused interposed the defense of denial during trial. According to Lanurias, he had ordered an owner-type
jeepney from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. The brothers, however, allegedly delivered instead a green
Isuzu Highlander.

• Allegedly, his friend Angeles advised him to surrender the vehicle as it could be a "hot car." Accused-appellant
was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he eventually decided to
sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back. He eventually decided to
surrender the vehicle.
Facts:
• The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty. The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act. The CA upheld the RTC decision.

• On appeal to the SC, the accused is arguing that:

a. There is no direct evidence that he robbed and murdered the victim. He was convicted merely on
the sole circumstantial fact that he had the vehicle in his possession.

b. That the CA erred in relying on the disputable presumption created by law under Sec. 3(j), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he is
considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing of its owner. Accused-
appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold in the case at bar.
Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant assertion that

such presumption does not hold in the case at bar
is correct?
Probandum: Probans:
WON accused- -Testimonies of
appellant Urzais was the witnesses
guilty of the - Carnapped Izusu
violation of the Highlander
Anti-Carnapping
Act?
Ruling: YES.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things:

1. The fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused
stands charged; and

(2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable
to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to
prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating
the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence. Both lower courts solely
based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the
fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the
whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where
such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto.
Ruling: YES.
In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted
version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the
explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the
unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to
produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution
was unable to discharge.

The disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant’s explanation for his possession of the missing
vehicle. The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find
application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions
necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof,
should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.
Ruling: YES.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping.
Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds
the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not full the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
Thank You!!!
RULE 131
SECTION 5
ALMER RODPHIL L. TINAPAY
Five tips for a happy man’s life
1) Have a girl to help you at work
2) Have a girl to take care of you and to
love you
3) Have a girl who can make you laugh
4) Have a girl who spoils you

5) Siguraduhin na hindi magkakilala and

apat na babae na yun
 RULE 131 SECTION 5
•Section 5. Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings. – In all civil actions and
proceedings not otherwise provided for by the law or these Rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.
If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption that is founded upon
weightier considerations of policy shall apply. If considerations of policy are of
equal weight, neither presumption applies. (n)
 BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC VS.
OLIVARES
•Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross
Health Care, Inc., for the period of October 16, 2002 and October 15, 2003,
paying the amount of P11,117 and availed limitless consultation services of the
amounting to 1,000.
•The application was approve October 22, 2002
•In the health care agreement, ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were
excluded from the coverage
•38 days after the effectivity of the health insurance, respondent suffered
stroke and was admitted to the accredited hospital and incurred 34,217.20 in
hospital bills. The health care insurer refused to pay hence, Olivares filed a
complaint for collection of money.
•The health insurer claims that Olivarez prevented the release of the medical
records invoking Patient-physician confidentiality hence, the determination if
the illness what “an pre-existing condition” was not completed.
•MTC dismissed the claim and on appeal RTC held that it was the burden of
petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from
the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing
condition. It was not able to discharge that burden. CA upheld the decision of
the RTC
FACTUM PROBANS:
1. The Healthcare Insurance Contract
1. Terms and Conditions of the contract
2. Lack of medical records to prove pre-existing ailments

2. Letter of Dr. Saniel to petitioner dated February 14, 2003

FACTUM PROBANDUM:
1. Whether the burden of proof to contradict the disputable
presumption was dispensed with by the petitioner?
HELD:
No. The health insurers contention that the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should
apply in its favor is incorrect.
Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent
Neomi's stroke was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely
speculated that Dr. Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi,
based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a
disputable presumption at best.
HELD:
Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a)
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or
cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a
privilege. Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the
presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was
privileged communication between physician and patient.
HELD:
Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of
the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way
as to preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they
should be scrutinized by the courts with "extreme jealousy" and
"care" and with a "jaundiced eye." Since petitioner had the burden
of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own
assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing
condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report.
It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out.
The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the
strict standard required under our jurisprudence.
 Rule 131, Sec. 4
Rule on Presumption of legitimacy
or illegitimacy
KAREN GRACE M. AGUIMOD
Rule 131, Section 4

No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. -

There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the
spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his or her allegation. (4a)
Comparison
Q: What is the rule on presumption of
legitimacy or illegitimacy?

A: The rule is that there is no presumption of legitimacy

or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage
or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove
his or her allegation.
Q: What is the substantive basis in case of
legitimacy or illegitimacy?

A: Art. 169 of the Family Code provides for the law on

legitimacy or illegitimacy.

“Art. 169.The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after

three hundred days following the termination of the
marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such
legitimacy or illegitimacy”
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27,
2006

FACTS
Date of Marriage: Date of Marriage:
December 4, 1977 November 1, 1990
Died:
December 8, 1996

PABLO AGUAS ROSANNA H. AGUAS ROMEO DELA PEÑA

JEYLNN JANET JEFREN

AGUAS AGUAS DELA PEÑA

Born: Born:
October 29, 1991 November 15, 1996
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

FACTUM PROBANS
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
NAME OF WITNESS TESTIMONIES
LETICIA AGUAS – MACAPINLAC (Pablo’s 1. Rosanna abandoned the family abode
Sister) approximately more than 6 years before, and
lived with another man (Romeo Dela Peña)
whom she has been dependent for support.
2. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna
3. Janet was only adopted with no legal papers
on adoption
MARIQUITA DIZON (Pablo’s 1st Cousin and 1. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna
neighbor) 2. Jeylnn and Jefren were children of Rosanna
and Romeo
JESSIE GONZALES (neighbor) 3. Pablo was not capable of having a chid as he
was under treatment.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

FACTUM PROBANS
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
NAME OF WITNESS TESTIMONIES
DR. MANUEL MACAPINLAC 1. Pablo was infertile
2. Rosanna question his testimony based on
privileged communication
VIVENCIA TURLA (neighbor) 1. She known Pablo and Rosanna for more
than 30 years old
2. Jeylnn is real child of Pablo and Rosanna
3. Janet was only an adopted child
CARMELITA YANGU (neighbor) 1. She had been a neighbor of Pablo and
Rosanna for 15 years
2. Janet and Jeylnn were children of Pablo
3. She did not know whose child Jefren is.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

FACTUM PROBANS
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
NAME OF DOCUMENT
1. Marriage contract of Pablo and Rosanna Shows they are married on December 4, 1977
2. Jeylnn Aguas’ birth certificate Photocopy of alleged birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature and was able to authenticate
the certification from the Civil Registry showing
that she was born on October 29, 1991.
3. Janet Aguas’ birth certificate Photocopy of alleged birth certificate
4. Pablo’s Death Certificate Shows the date of Pablo’s death
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

FACTUM PROBANDUM
ISSUE
Whether or not Jeylnn and Janet are legitimate children
of Pablo and Rosanna in accordance with Art. 164 of
the Family Code in relation to Rule 131, Sec. 4 on
presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy and be
declared as primary beneficiary for Pablo’s death claim

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

RULING

฀ Only Jeylnn is legitimate child of Pablo and entitled for the

SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

฀ The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed

by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which
was verified from his specimen signature on file with SSS. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a competent
evidence of paternity.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

RULING

฀ Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly

personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.

฀ Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no

longer be contested.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

RULING

฀ The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however,

can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven.

฀ The Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative
weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way
by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy,
without probative weight.
 SSS vs AGUAS
GR NO. 165546. FEBRUARY 27, 2006

RULING

฀ The witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not

the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo.

฀ Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161 “Social Security

Law", as amended, only “legally adopted” children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family
has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a
dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
SECTION 6,
RULE 131
But first, JOKE
TIME!  Teacher: Bakit blank ang work
mo?

Bata: Nagdrawing po ako ng

baka at damo

Teacher: (tinignan ang papel)

San ang damo?
Bata: Ubos na po,
kinain ng baka.

Teacher: (kamot sa ulo)

Eh nasaan ang baka?
Bata: Umalis na po,
kasi wala ng damo.
SECTION 6, RULE 131
PROVISION:
FEATURES
Replicates Rule 303 of the Unified Rules in Evidence
adopted in the US

The rule provides that the effect of a presumption in a

criminal case is permissive only by providing that the
court may not direct the jury to find a presumed fact
against an accused. If the court submits the question
of the existence of a presumed fact to the jury, it shall
instruct the jury that it may regard the basic fact as
sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but is not
required to do so. If a presumed fact establishes guilt,
is an element of the offense, or negates a defense, the
court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the
evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
EXAMPLE APPLICATION
Applying the new Section 6 to libel, it
seems that all that the prosecution needs
to do is to prove that the imputation of a
vice or defect was uttered or published
beyond a reasonable doubt.

That there was a defamatory

imputation is the basic fact which
must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
People vs. Ilagan
FACTS OF THE CASE (Prosecution)
FACTS OF THE CASE (Defense)
ISSUE OF THE
CASE
RULING OF THE COURT
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant
disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. What further militates
against according the apprehending officers in this case the presumption of regularity is the fact
that even the pertinent internal anti-drug operation procedures then in force were not followed.
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui that it will not presume to set an a priori basis on
what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment
operations.

However, given the police operational procedures and the fact that buy-bust is a planned
operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the
required witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and
inventoried the seized items according to the procedures in its own operations manual.

A review of the facts of the case negates this presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties supposedly in favor of the arresting officers. The procedural lapses committed by
the apprehending team resulted in glaring gaps in the chain of custody thereby casting doubt on
whether the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from accused- appellant Christopher were the
same drugs brought to the crime laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence.
 Examination to be done
in open court
Sec. 1, Rule 132

By: Samuel Mercado III

Joke time!

Bakit may black eye yung juice?

Joke time!

Kasi nasa pack sya!

Section 1, Rule 132.

Examination to be done in open court. – The examination

of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in
open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for
a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness
shall be given orally.
Note: No change from the old rule
Martires vs. Heirs of Avelina
G.R. No. 210789, December 03, 2018
Facts

● Avelina filed a case alleging that she is the rightful

owner of a parcel of land unlawfully transferred to
Martires.
● Subsequently, the court granted her motion for the
taking of her deposition and those of her witnesses in
New York City.
Facts

● Three years later, the heirs of Avelina filed their formal

offer of evidence which included Avelina’s deposition
and those of her witnesses.
● Martires opposed the introduction in evidence of the
depositions on the ground that he was never given
reasonable notice of the deposition-taking.
Factum Probandum Factum Probans

● The depositions should ● Depositions of Avelina

be admitted in evidence and her witnesses
● The court transcripts
under the exception in
which prove that
Section 1, Rule 132. Martires was given
reasonable notice of the
deposition-taking
Issue

● Should the depositions be allowed in evidence?

Section 1, Rule 132.

General Rule: The examination of the witnesses shall be done in

open court and their answers be given orally, and under oath or
affirmation.
Exceptions:
(a) the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
(b) the questions calls for a different mode of answer
Ruling of the Court

● Any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out

during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay:
the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered.
Ruling of the Court

● However, depositions may be used without the

deponent being actually called to the witness stand by
the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes.
Ruling of the Court

● These exceptional situations are governed by Section

4(c)(2) Rule 23 of the Rules of Court i.e., that the
witness resides at a distance of more than 100
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines.
Thank you
 Rule 132
Section 2
Proceeding to be recorded
Reporter: Joy M. Montecalvo
 Section 2
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded.- The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing,
including the questions propounded to a witness and his or her answers thereto, and the
statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to
the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of
recording found suitable by the court.

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist
or recorder and certified as correct by him or her, shall be deemed prima facie a correct
statement of such proceedings. (2a)
 01 2 03

It is required that Shall be recorded by Presumption of

everything that was means of shorthand or correctness/ regularity
said during trial or stenotype or by other of the transcript of
hearing be recorded. means of recording stenographic notes
found suitable by court
Fullero v. People,
GR No. 170583,
September 12, 2007
 Facts
● In 1977 Ernesto Fullero was employed as a telegraph
operator at the Bureau of Telecommunications Office in Iriga
City. In 1982, he became the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga
City Telecommunication’s Office. He was required to prepare
and submit his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet (PDS)) to the
Bureau of Telecommunication Regional Office Legazpi City.
He made it appear that he was a licensed engineer by saying
that he passed the Civil Engineering board of Examinations
on May 30 and 31 of 1985 with a rating of 75.8%.

● Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the BTO sued the

petitioner for unjust vexation as the latter kissed her on one
occasion. While the case was pending, her lawyer asked her
if Fullero was a licensed civil engineer since some persons
simply referred to petitioner as “Mr. Fullero” whereas in the
BTO, Iriga City, petitioner was known as “Engineer Fullero.”
Suspicious of the true status of petitioner, she went to the
Records Office of the BTO, Legazpi City, and requested if she
can see petitioner’s PDS. Upon being shown the PDS, she
observed that, under Item No. 18 thereof, petitioner appears
to be a licensed civil engineer having passed the board
examination for civil engineering given on 30-31 May 1985.
Unconvinced by the statement in the PDS that he is a licensed
civil engineer, she sought the advice of the PRC in Manila to
check the records of petitioner. Upon verification by the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), it was revealed that
Fullero took the exams on May 1984 and another in May 1985
with the general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.

She then filed a criminal case of Falsification of Public

Documents under Art. 171 of RPC against Fullero. The Trial Court
convicted Fullero, and the C.A. affirmed the decision in toto,
thus this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

Petitioner contended that the prosecution’s documentary

evidence, particularly Exhibit F which is the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case
filed by petitioner against Magistrado where petitioner
allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, lacks proper
identification as the stenographer or records officer was not
presented in court;
 ISSUE:
WON Transcript of Stenographic Notes are inadmissible as evidence
because of failure to present the stenographer or records officer in court
No. Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
explicitly provides that a transcript of the record of the
proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or
recorder and certified as correct by him shall be
Deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.

Petitioner failed to introduce proof that

Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17
March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against
Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a
civil engineer, is not what it purports to be.

Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier elucidated,

one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official
records made in the performance of duty by a public officer.
Exhibit F , being an official entry in the court’s records, is
admissible in evidence and there is no necessity to produce the
concerned stenographer as a witness.
Factum Probandum Factum Probans

(1) Certification issued by Jose A. Arriola, Director II, PRC, Manila, attesting that
petitioner’s name is not registered in the book of registry for licensed civil engineers;
(2) certifications issued by Francisco affirming that petitioner failed in the 30-31 May 1985
board examination for civil engineering;
Fulle is guilty of (3) PDS where petitioner stated that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for
civil engineering with a rating of 75.8%and which was signed by him;
falsification of public (4) certifications issued by Francisco attesting that petitioner failed the May 1990 board
document under examination for civil engineering;
paragraph 4, Article 171 (5) transcript of stenographic notes in the perjury case filed by petitioner against
Magistrado which states that, during the trial thereof, petitioner affirmed before
of the Revised Penal the court hearing the case that he is a licensed civil engineer;
Code (6) a letter signed and submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of theCSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, claiming to be a licensed civil engineer and applying
for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor;
(7) Order dated 20December 2001 of the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, finding petitioner
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
imposing upon him a penalty of six months suspension for falsifying his PDS which is
also the subject matter of the instant case;
(8) Certification submitted by the petitioner to the CSC,Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi
City, showing that he is a licensed civil engineer;
(9) the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner as the former’s superior;
and
(10) other documents bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.
 Section 3, Rule 132
(Rights and Obligations of a Witness)
JOKE TIME!

Sa presinto…
 Pulis: Ano ang itsura ng suspek?
 Saksi:
Naka-orange po siya at dilaw ang
buhok.
 Artist:(gumuhit) Bossing, hindi natin kayang
hulihin ‘to…
 Pulis: Bakit?
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. – A
witness must answer questions, although his or her
answer may tend to establish a claim against him or
her. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1)To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or
insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
(2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of
justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters
pertinent to the issue
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject
him or her to a penalty for an offense unless
otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to
degrade his or her reputation, unless it be to the very
fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue
would be presumed. But a witness must answer to
the fact of his or her previous final conviction for an
offense. (3a)
One-Day Examination Witness Rule

One-Day Examination of Witness Rule-A witness has to

be fully examined in one (1) day only. It shall be strictly
adhered to subject to the courts' discretion during trial
on whether or not to extend the direct and/or cross
examination for justifiable reasons. (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC)
Case: ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO
P. ROSETE, vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, 490 SCRA 125,
G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006
FACTS:
 Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before the RTC of
Quezon City a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance
with Damages against AFP-RSBS, Espreme Realty and
Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete,
Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, BPI, and Register of Deeds
of the Province of Mindoro Occidental, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-95-25803. It asked, among other things:
-Annulment of the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS
covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty
-Restore ownership and title of said lands to respondents,
and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of
said land under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the
same in the names of respondents.
 Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination giving notice that they will cause the deposition
of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete.
 Petitioners filed an Motion and Objection to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination. One of their contentions was that
since there are two criminal cases pending, and to permit the
taking of the deposition would be violative of their right
against self-incrimination because by means of the oral
deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations
of fact in the complaint which are also the allegations of fact
in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in declaring that the right

against self-incrimination would not be violated and the
taking of their deposition in the civil case.
RULING:

 NO. The right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness.
 In People vs Ayson, the Court treats a party in a civil case as
an ordinary witness, who can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when the incriminating question is
propounded. Thus, for a party in a civil case to possess the
right to refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must
also partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
 In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for
Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In order for
petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness
stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of
the nature of a criminal proceeding.
 They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an
ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually
asked of them. Only if and when incriminating questions are
thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the ground of
their right against self-incrimination.
FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS
The right against self-incrimination 1. Documentary Evidence: Civil
would not be violated and the Case No. Q-95-25803
taking of their deposition in the civil (Annulment, Specific
case. Performance with Damages)
docketed at Branch 77 of RTC of
Quezon City
Contents: 1. Character of the Suit
2. Nature of the
Proceedings.
The problem with new jeans
Juana was returning a pair of jeans that was too tight at the
customer-service of a shopping mall.
Clerk: “Was anything wrong with them?”
Juana: “Yes. They hurt my feelings.”
Reaction ni friend nung di nagets ang joke…
RULE 132. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 4. Order in the examination of
an individual witness

Reporter: Gomez, Rosalita

Section 4. Order in the examination Sec 4, Rule 132
of an individual witness.–
The order in which an individual
witness may be examined is as
follows:
(a)Direct examination by the
proponent;
(b)Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c)Re-direct examination by the
proponent;
(d)Re-cross[-]examination by the
opponent. (4)
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Definition of Terms:
 Examination – to find out facts from the
witness or to test his memory, truthfulness
or credibility by directing him to answer
appropriate questions.

 Proponent - the party who called the witness

to testify in his favor.

 Opponent - the party against whom the

witness was called.
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Definition of Terms:
 Friendly Witness - one who is expected to give
testimony favorable to the party who called for
him.

 Hostile Witness - one whose testimony is not

favorable to the cause of the party in a case.

 Party witness - refers to the plaintiff,

testifying as witness for themselves, as opposed
to ordinary witnesses

 Accused-witness - refers to the defendant or the

accused, testifying as witness for themselves, as
opposed to ordinary witnesses
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Direct Examination:
examination-in-chief of a
witness by the party presenting
him or her on the facts
relevant to the issue [Sec. 5,
Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Cross-Examination:
The witness may be cross examined by
the adverse party on any relevant
matter with sufficient fullness and
freedom which purpose is to test the
witness’ accuracy, truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse; and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue [Sec. 6,
Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Re-direct Examination:
Re-examination of the witness by
the party calling him/her which
purpose is to explain or supplement
his/her answers given during the
cross-examination. Questions on
matters not dealt with during the
cross-examination may be allowed by
the court in its discretion. [Sec.
7, Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Re-cross-examination:
Re-cross-examination of the
witness by the adverse party on
matters stated in his/her re-
direct and on other matters
allowed by the court in its
discretion [Sec. 8, Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Case Law:
• Cross Examination is an
indispensable instrument of criminal
justice to give substance and
meaning to the constitutional right
of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him and to show
that the presumption of innocence
has remained steadfast and firm
[People of the Philippines vs Pido,
G.R. No. 92427, August 02, 1991]
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
FACTS:
 Accused-Appellant Danilo Tuyor was the live-in
partner of complainant AAA’s mother, CCC.
 CCC had three children, including AAA, with a
different man before her cohabitation with
Tuyor.
 CCC and Tuyor have three children of their own.
 When AAA complained of stomach cramps to her
mother CCC, she was brought to a doctor where
they found out that AAA was pregnant.
 AAA then told her mother that Tuyor had raped
her several times. Thereafter, they went to the
police station to file a complaint against
Tuyor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 The medico-legal examination which the
Philippine General Hospital conducted showed
that AAA suffered hymenal laceration and was
indeed pregnant.
 Tuyor was arrested by barangay officials and
brought to the police station.
 Complaints for rape were filed against him.
 AAA testified that on July 17, 2007; sometime
in August 2007; September 14, 2007; September
29, 2007; and October 24, 2007. Tuyor raped
her and threatened her not to tell anyone
about what happened or Tuyor would kill her
siblings and her mother.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 Hence, AAA kept silent and never told anyone
about the incident.
 Tuyor pleaded not guilty in all the five (5)
charges.
 Tuyor was given ample time to present his
evidence, but he manifested through his
counsel that he would no longer be presenting
evidence.
 RTC found AAA's testimony as categorical,
straightforward, consistent and credible and
was fully convinced that Tuyor raped AAA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 According to the trial Court, AAA was able to
narrate four of the five crimes of rape in
detail: the act of Tuyor in inserting his private
organ into hers; how she struggled to fight back
against the accused; the pain she experienced
during the rape; the whitish substance which came
out from Tuyor; how Tuyor wiped her private part;
and Tuyor's threats after the crimes of rape.
 Tuyor appealed the case but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
 Tuyor argued that failure of AAA's testimony to
be consistent as to the exact date when she was
allegedly raped for the second time, is fatal and
should have been considered in favor of him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 Tuyor also argued that Dr. Madrid's testimony
should have been excluded for being hearsay
because she was neither present at the time
the medico-legal report was made, nor was she
present at the time of AAA's medical
examination.
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Factum Probans and Factum Probandum
Factum Probandum Factum Probans
(Ultimate Fact) (Evidentiary Fact)
Testimony of AAA as witness

Testimony of Dr. Bernadette Madrid of the

Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH)
Danilo Tuyor y Banderas is
GUILTY beyond reasonable
Other pieces of evidence:
doubt of Rape 1) Exhibit "A" - AAA's Certificate of Live Birth;
2) Exhibit "B' - BBB's Certificate of Live Birth, the alleged
offspring of AAA with [Tuyor];
3) Exhibit "C" - AAA's Affidavit;
4) Exhibit "E" - Medico[-]Legal Report No. 2007-4907;
5) Exhibit F - picture of AAA taken by the Child Protection
Unit of PGH
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020

ISSUE:
Whether Danilo Tuyor is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
RULING:
 Yes, Danilo Tuyor is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape.
 The medico-legal report falls under one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule under Section
44, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, "Entries
in official records made in the performance of
[her] duty [as] a public officer of the
Philippines, x x x are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.“
 Thus, the medico-legal report shall be given
weight and credence, even if Dr. Baluyut, the
physician who examined and prepared it, was not
presented in court.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 Also, the prosecution was able to establish
Dr. Madrid's expertise in the relevant
medical field, thus, his interpretation of
the entries made in the medico-legal report
is admissible as expert testimony.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 AAA's testimony must also be given due weight
and credence, taking into consideration the
women's honor doctrine which states, "[the]
well-known fact that women, especially
Filipinos would not admit that they have been
abused unless that abuse had actually
happened, because it is their natural
instinct to protect their honor”
 Further, it is a settled rule that rape may
be proven by the sole and uncorroborated
testimony of the offended party, provided
that her testimony is clear, positive and
probable.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 The Court gives the highest respect to the
trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses, considering its unique position
in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial
court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
 AAA's testimony with regard to the first,
second, fourth and fifth counts of rape
committed against her, was categorical and
straightforward and there could be no
substantial reason to overturn the weight given
by the RTC, and as affirmed by the CA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
Sec 4, Rule 132
VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020
 As regards the third count of rape, the elements of
the crime were not established because AAA was
crying profusely during her direct examination such
that the prosecution had to ask for a continuance
and when her examination continued before the RTC,
AAA no longer testified on the third count of rape.
 AAA's inconsistency as to the exact date of the
second rape does not in itself, cast doubt on
Tuyor's guilt.
 Based on AAA's testimony, the elements of rape under
Article 266-A were proven beyond reasonable doubt:
AAA's positive, categorical and spontaneous
testimony shows that on these four separate
instances, Tuyor had carnal knowledge of AAA through
force, threat and intimidation.
The problem with new jeans
One is enough
Reaction ni friend nung di nagets ang joke…
RULE 132. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 4. Order in the examination of
an individual witness

Reporter: Gomez, Rosalita

Section 4. Order in the examination Sec 4, Rule 132
of an individual witness.–
The order in which an individual
witness may be examined is as
follows:
(a)Direct examination by the
proponent;
(b)Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c)Re-direct examination by the
proponent;
(d)Re-cross[-]examination by the
opponent. (4)
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Definition of Terms:
 Examination – to find out facts from the
witness or to test his memory, truthfulness
or credibility by directing him to answer
appropriate questions.

 Proponent - the party who called the witness

to testify in his favor.

 Opponent - the party against whom the

witness was called.
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Definition of Terms:
 Friendly Witness - one who is expected to give
testimony favorable to the party who called for
him.

 Hostile Witness - one whose testimony is not

favorable to the cause of the party in a case.

 Party witness - refers to the plaintiff,

testifying as witness for themselves, as opposed
to ordinary witnesses

 Accused-witness - refers to the defendant or the

accused, testifying as witness for themselves, as
opposed to ordinary witnesses
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Direct Examination:
examination-in-chief of a
witness by the party presenting
him or her on the facts
relevant to the issue [Sec. 5,
Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Cross-Examination:
The witness may be cross examined by
the adverse party on any relevant
matter with sufficient fullness and
freedom which purpose is to test the
witness’ accuracy, truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse; and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue [Sec. 6,
Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Re-direct Examination:
Re-examination of the witness by
the party calling him/her which
purpose is to explain or supplement
his/her answers given during the
cross-examination. Questions on
matters not dealt with during the
cross-examination may be allowed by
the court in its discretion. [Sec.
7, Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Re-cross-examination:
Re-cross-examination of the
witness by the adverse party on
matters stated in his/her re-
direct and on other matters
allowed by the court in its
discretion [Sec. 8, Rule 132]
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Case Laws:
• Cross Examination is an indispensable instrument of
criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him and to show that the presumption
of innocence has remained steadfast and firm [People
of the Philippines vs Pido, G.R. No. 92427, August 02,
1991]
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
 This case involves a 5,000 square-meter parcel of
land denominated as Lot 5826-B, which is a portion
of a bigger parcel of land with an area of 22,618
square meters covered by an Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) under the name of Spouses Miguel Abad
and Agueda de Leon.
 The Spouses Abad had three children named Dionisio,
Isabel and Enrique who all took possession of the
land as co-owners upon the death of the spouses.
 However, the OCT of the land was cancelled and a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under
the name of Enrique Abad by virtue of an alleged
Extrajudicial Settlement and Waiver of Rights.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
 Dionesio and Isabel filed a civil case for an
annulment of the deed and the TCT with damages.
 Enrique later filed a manifestation that he had
entered into a compromise agreement with his
siblings Dionesio and Isabel.
 After a certain period, the trial court dismissed
the civil case concluding that the siblings had
forged compromise agreement.
 Dionesio and Isabel reinstated the civil case by
filing a motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that there had been no compromise
agreement agreed upon.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
 The civil case was finally dismissed on the
Manifestation of Dionesio and Isabel that a
compromise agreement had already been forged between
them and Enrique. Subsequently, a Deed of Partition
was notarized and executed whereby the said land was
divided among the three siblings, indicating the
5,000 square meters, more or less, to Isabel as her
share. Nevertheless, no segregation nor partition
was actually made, leaving the entire parcel of land
intact under Enrique’s name. Several years later, an
approved subdivision plan reflecting the partition
agreement which identified the 5,000 square meters
portion as Lot 5826-B.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
 Isabel died leaving Lot 5826-B to his son Jose
Eusebio Abad Gallardo, married to Dolores Lolita, by
virtue of Deed of Donation which she executed prior
to her death.
 When Jose died, Dolores used Lot 5826-B as security
for the P75,000.00 loan she contracted with Eufemia
Abad, an heir of Enrique, which transaction was
evidenced by a Kasunduan.
 It was alleged that P25,000 of the P75,000 which
Dolores loaned from Eufemia was used as payment of
the processing fee for the segregation of the title
of Lot 5826-B; that Eufemia processed the
segregation of the respective titles but initially
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
refused to give the title of the subject lot, upon
demand, unless the P75,000 loan was paid; that when
paid with the said amount, Eufemia refused to
receive the payment and demanded instead
P350,000.00, and would return only one-fourth of
the subject lot; and that the other heirs of
Enrique, who are petitioners in this case,
continuously disturbed the peaceful possession and
control of the possession of the Heirs of Jose
Eusebio over the subject lot.
 Hence, respondents heirs of Jose Eusebio filed a
complaint for specific performance, surrender of
title, redemption and consignation with damages.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
FACTS:
 The heirs of Enrique countered and averred that the
subject lot is exclusively owned by them through
hereditary succession.
 The trial court, acting upon the motion for judgment
on the pleadings, rendered the assailed decision in
favor of the heirs of Eusebio and ordered the heirs
of Enrique to comply with the Deed of Partition and
approved subdivision plan as well as to honor the
Deed of Donation executed by Isabel Abad in favour
of Jose Eusebio Abad Gallardo.
 Sec 4, Rule 132
Factum Probans and Factum Probandum

Factum Probandum Factum Probans

(Ultimate Fact) (Evidentiary Fact)

Deed of Partition and Amicable Settlement

The adduced evidentiary (between Enrique, Dionesio and Isabel)
facts are Admission by
privies that the subject lot Deed of Donation
belongs to the Heirs of Jose (executed by Isabel)
Eusebio
Kasunduan
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
ISSUE:
Whether the Deed of Partition executed
by Dionisio, Isabel and Enrique pursuant
to an amicable settlement as well as the
Deed of Donation executed by Isabel in
favor of Jose Eusebio need not be proved
and can be admitted as Admission by
privies.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
RULING:
 No, the Supreme Court held that the Amicable
Settlement and Deed of Partition executed by
petitioners' father (Enrique), aunt (Isabel)
and uncle (Dionisio) did not form part of the
records of the prior civil case as it was not
filed before the court nor was it judicially
approved.
 On the other hand, the Kasunduan was only
between one of the plaintiffs (Eufemia) and
one of the defendants (Dolores), the other
parties not being privies thereto.
 HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD VS. HEIRS
Sec 4, Rule 132
OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
RULING:
 Lastly, the Deed of Donation wherein Isabel
donated the subject lot to Jose Eusebio did not
at all involve petitioners or their predecessor-
in-interest, Enrique.
 Hence, the documents cannot be admitted as
Admission of privies. As such, respondents have
to introduce evidence to establish that said
documents are genuine and that they were truly
executed by the parties thereto.
 The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the
ruling of the Trial Court and directed the latter
to hear and decide the case on its merits with
dispatch
 RULE 132, SECTION 6
OLD PROVISION NEW PROVISION
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose Section 6. Cross-examination; its
and extent. — Upon the termination of the purpose and extent.– Upon the
direct examination, the witness may be cross- termination of the direct examination, the
examined by the adverse party as to many witness may be cross-examined by the
matters stated in the direct examination, or adverse party on any relevant matter, with
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness sufficient fullness and freedom to test his or
and freedom to test his accuracy and her accuracy and truthfulness and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or
freedom from interest or bias, or the
bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
reverse, and to elicit all important facts
facts bearing upon the issue.
bearing upon the issue.
How will the cross-examination be conducted?
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party:

- As to any relevant matters stated in the direct examination.

What is the purpose of cross-examination?

A witness on cross examination with sufficient fullness and freedom may be tested on:

1. His accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse;
2. Eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue
Can the right to cross-examine be waived?
Yes. The right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
 PEOPLE VS. MONJE
G. R NO. 146689, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002
Facts:

Fernando Monje, together with Lordino Maglaya, Christopher Bautista and Michael Castro were
charged with rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15-year old Imee Diez Paulino.
Michael Cordero, a tricycle driver, was the witness of the prosecution testifying that he saw the
victim back-riding with accused-appellant Fernando Monje with three (3) other persons in the
sidecar whom he did not know. After his initial cross-examination by defense counsel, witness
Cordero failed and refused to return to court for the continuation of his cross-examination. In other
words, except for his brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, so to speak,
and despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated
warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out and disregard his testimony
should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to court for his cross-
examination.
 PEOPLE VS. MONJE
G. R NO. 146689, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002
Issue:

Whether or not the accused may invoke the right to cross

examination, to meet the witness face to face.
 PEOPLE VS. MONJE
G. R NO. 146689, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002
RULING:
The cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the
party against whom he is called.

Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing

means for discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth
and accuracy of his testimony. The ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the
truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for
the accused, these objectives of cross-examination were never attained in this case
because of the continued failure and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-
examination. How can the truth be ascertained if the cross-examination is not completed?
 PEOPLE VS. MONJE
G. R NO. 146689, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002
RULING:

In the case before us, no less than the presiding judge himself recognized the need for
further cross-examination when he warned that witness Cordero should return otherwise
his testimony "not touched upon by the cross-examination would be stricken off the
record." And the cross-examiner was insisting on the constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. Even the other witness,
Jojit Vasquez, failed to appear when required as may be gathered from the order of the
trial court issued on that date. In the instant case, prosecution witness Cordero failed to
appear four (4) times for his cross-examination without justifiable reason, thus depriving
the cross-examiner of the right to confront him and test his credibility and shed light on
matters vital to the defense. Cordero's partial cross-examination, the same would not have
established an unbroken chain of circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused was the perpetrator of the heinous crime.
Section 7
 Warning
GUYS PLEASE EXTRA CAREFUL JUD MO.
GANIHA PAGNAOG NAKO SA MOTOR
DIHA SA GMALL NAAY LALAKI
NAGSUNOD NAKO. HADLOK KAAYO KAY
NAGPAGAWAS SYA'G GUNTING.
MAAYO NALANG GANI ABTIK KAYKO KAY
NAGPAGAWAS KO OG BATO. KUNG
PAPEL PA TO AKO GIPAGAWAS PILDI
UNTA KO
Rule 132
Section 7
 Section 7.
 Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent.– After the
cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he
or she may be re-examined by the party calling him or her
to explain or supplement his or her answers given during
the cross-examination. On re-direct examination,
questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-
examination may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
(7a)
Before and After
Before amendments Present
 Re-direct examination; its purpose  Re-direct examination; its purpose
and extent.- After the cross- and extent.- After the cross-
examination of the witness has examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re- been concluded, he or she may be
re-examined by the party calling
examined by the party calling him, him or her to explain or
to explain or supplement his supplement his or her answers
answers given during the cross- given during the cross-
examination. On re-direct examination. On re-direct
examination, questions on matters examination, questions on matters
not dealt with during the cross- not dealt with during the cross-
examination, may be allowed by examination may be allowed by
the court in its discretion. the court in its discretion. (7a)
“After the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he or she may
be re-examined by the party calling him or her to explain or supplement his or
her answers given during the cross-examination.”

 It means that a witness may be cross-examined again

by the same party.
 The purpose is to generally give the chance for the
witness to explain or supplement his answers
On re-direct examination, questions on matters not dealt
with during the cross-examination may be allowed by the
court in its discretion.

 General rule: In re-direct examination, matters dealt with

during the previous cross-examination are allowed to be
discussed
 Exception: If the Court allows in its discretion matters not
dealt with cross examination.
 People vs Dolandolan
G.R. No. 232157, January 08, 2020
 Information alleges that on the10th day of February, 1995, at night-time the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation and with the use of a sharp
pointed instrument, forcibly take, kidnap and deprive the complainant and
succeeded having carnal knowledge with her against her consent
 After his arrest and upon his motion, accused-appellant was released on
recognizance of his father on account of his purported minority.
 However, for failure of accused-appellant to file his counter-affidavit, the
case was returned to the RTC and the charge against him was maintained.
 Later, it was found that accused-appellant was charged with another rape
case filed by another minor woman in another city.
 When the father of accused-appellant failed to produce accused-appellant
despite the RTC's order, a warrant of arrest was issued on November 12,
1998.
 During her cross-examination, she averred that [accused-appellant] was just
strolling around the peryahan when, without talking to her, he kissed her
and forced her to go with him by threatening her with bodily harm.
[Accused-appellant] used a weapon which looked like a stick or a ballpen.
Although there were many people at the peryahan, she did not scream,
shout nor do any thin g to alarm other people around her because she was
already afraid.
 On re-direct examination, private complainant stated that at the time of the incident,
she was small and thin, while [accused-appellant] was older and bigger than her.
 She denied being brought to a sapa or a creek. She also [could not] say that
the alleged attack happened in a house; in fact she [could not] recall in what
area she was raped, but it was a vacant lot and it was dark. [Accused-
appellant] forced her, kissed her while holding the stick, and then inserted
his penis in her private part. It was at the place of [accused-appellant] where
her mother found her.
 On re-direct examination, private complainant stated that at the time of the incident, she
was small and thin, while [accused-appellant] was older and bigger than her.
 Issue: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Rape.
 Ruling: The Court finds merit in the appeal. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
 The reason is that there were several inconsistencies with the testimony of the
complainant.
 While the Court recognizes that a "truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free
testimony, considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory" the prosecution bears the
burden of reconciling and explaining any lapses, errors, or inconsistencies in said testimony
 In this instant case, the prosecution never bothered to explain or reconcile the evident inconsistencies
in AAA's testimony. In fact, the Court notes that during AAA's re-direct examination, the prosecution
focused solely on the age and physical size of AAA in relation to accused-appellant.
Factum Probandum Factum Probans
 That the complainant in this  Testimony of the complainant was used.
 However in this case the testimony of the
case was raped. complainant is full of inconsistencies so
the Factum Probandum was not proved
 (While the Court recognizes that a "truth-telling
witness is not always expected to give an error-
free testimony, considering the lapse of time and
treachery of human memory" the prosecution
bears the burden of reconciling and explaining
any lapses, errors, or inconsistencies in said
testimony )
 In this instant case, the prosecution never
bothered to explain or reconcile the evident
inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. In fact, the
Court notes that during AAA's re-
direct examination, the prosecution focused solely
on the age and physical size of AAA in relation to
accused-appellant.
Revised Rules of Evidence
Pampa-Good Vibes!!!
Pampa-Good Vibes!!!
 Rule 132
Section 8 – Re-cross-examination
Section 8, Rule 132
Section 8. Re-cross[-]examination. – Upon the
conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse
party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters
stated in his or her re-direct examination, and also on
such other matters as may be allowed by the court in
its discretion. (8a)
Q: What is the order in the examination of an
individual witness?
Q: What is the order in the examination of an
individual witness?
Q: What is the order in the examination of an
individual witness?
Q: What is the order in the examination of an
individual witness?
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
1. Direct examination – To establish the case of
the proponent of the witness. The purpose is
to elicit facts about the client’s cause of action
or defense.
2. Cross examination – As a rule, the scope of
this is not confined to the matters stated by
the witness in the direct examination. (Riano,
p. 318). The purpose of which is:
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
Cross examination –The purpose of which is:
a. To impeach the credibility of the testimony;
b. To impeach the credibility of the witness;
c. To elicit admissions; and
d. To clarify certain matters.
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
Cross examination –The purpose of which is:
a. To impeach the credibility of the testimony;
b. To impeach the credibility of the witness;
c. To elicit admissions; and
d. To clarify certain matters.
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
3. Redirect examination – The counsel may elicit
testimony to correct or repel any wrong
impression or inferences that may have been
created. It may also be an opportunity to
rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been
damaged (Riano, p.319).
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
3. Redirect examination – Its purposes are:
a. To afford opportunity to the witness to explain
or amplify his testimony during cross-
examination; and
b. To explain any apparent contradiction or
inconsistency in his statements.
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
4. Re-cross examination – It is limited to the new
matters brought out on the redirect examination
of the witness and also on such other matters as
may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
Q: What are the purposes of each stage of the
examination?
4. Re-cross examination – The purposes are:
a. To overcome the proponent’s attempt to
rehabilitate the witness; and
b. To rebut damaging evidence brought out
during cross-examination.
 [ G.R. No. L-32068, October 04, 1971 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA,

HON. GREGORIO PANGANIBAN, HON. JOSUE L. CADIAO, HON. FILOMENO
KINTANAR, HON. PAZ VETO PLANAS, AS ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS OF
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
RESPONDENTS.

.
 FACTS

• On 7 May 1970, Manila Electric Company (hereinafter

termed MERALCO) filed an application with the Public
Service Commission seeking approval of revised rate
schedules, with increased charges. The proposed new rates,
applicant contended, would give it a reasonable return of
below 12% of the present value of its properties devoted to
the public service, and implicated no additional burden to
small consumers (of 100 KWH or less per month)
constituting around 52% of petitioner's customers.
 FACTS

• In the meanwhile, on 18 May 1970, the Republic and other

oppositors filed an opposition to respondent MERALCO's
main application for increase in rate charges on the ground
that the increase in rate sought is excessive and
unreasonable and will bring about greater hardship to the
people, as well as directly cause increase in the cost of
production which will have to be unduly borne by the
consuming public, among others.
 FACTS
• After hearing on the merits of the petition, during which
respondent MERALCO adduced its evidence (morning and
afternoon, 27 May, 1, 2, 3 [morning only], 15, 16 [morning
only], 17, 18, 19 and 22 June and the oppositors on 23, 24,
and 25 June 1970), on 30 June 1970, respondent
Commission, through the Honorable Commissioner Enrique
Medina, Presiding, and the Honorable Associate
Commissioners Gregorio C. Panganiban and Josue L. Cadiao,
Members, promulgated a decision finding the proposed
rates reasonable and justified with minor adjustments.
 FACTS
BASIC ISSUE: The basic issue raised by oppositors-appellants is
that they were allegedly denied due process. It is averred that
the hearings on the merits were conducted with improper
haste, because of the avowed desire of Commissioner Medina
(to whom the hearing had been entrusted by the Commission
en banc) to finish the case before his impending retirement on
1 July 1970; and that to attain this purpose, hearings were
conducted morning and afternoon; that cross examinations
were curtailed, and oppositor Gonzalez was denied
presentation of witnesses.
 FACTUM PROBANDUM
The fact to be proved is whether the claim of denial of due process is
unfounded and must be overruled
 FACTUM PROBAN

• Public Service Commission Policy: its policy to allow

even individual consumers to cross examine
independently applicant's witnesses
Ruling:

Yes. The claim of denial of due process is

unfounded and must be overruled.
It is well to note here that the trial and hearings were not
continuous, and intervals of several days, sometimes of a week
or more, took place. The main outlines of the case for
respondent Meralco (the adverse effect of the floating rate on
the cost of operation) appeared from the testimony in chief of
applicant's witness Antonio Ozaeta, whose cross examination
was lengthy, occupying over 130 pages of the transcript.
Ruling:

Hearings were held morning and afternoon, but only once did they
proceed beyond 5 p.m., and most afternoon sessions starting at 2:00
p.m. ended at 4 or earlier. No undue restrictions were placed on
oppositors until the Public Service Commission, apparently
realizing that its policy to allow even individual consumers to cross
examine independently applicant's witnesses was unworkable and
would lead only to confusion, decided to limit the number of cross
examiners. This lay within the trier's discretion and should not be
interfered with in the absence of abuse, which is not here shown. As
pointed out by Francisco (Rules of Court) in his commentary on Rule
132, Section 8, "it is undesirable for more than one attorney to
cross examine the same witnesses, and the right may be denied
where the interests of the co-defendants are identical."
Ruling:

Here, the Commission's resolve to avoid unnecessary delay in

this particular case appears justified in view of the
unwholesome situation that could arise were the hearing
Commissioner to withdraw at the middle of the trial, since a
newcomer would not be able to proceed without first
acquainting himself with what had previously transpired; and
also because the evidence indicated that serious losses would
be incurred by the applicant public utility were it to continue
serving at the rates previously approved. While it is the
Commission's duty to protect the public, i.e., the persons who
are to use and pay for the service, still -
Ruling:
"Such service does not necessarily mean reduced rates. It could
be quite the contrary. So it is, that, at bottom, a just rate must
be founded upon conditions which are fair and reasonable both
to the public utility and the public itself."
It is finally urged that only five days elapsed between the time
the case was submitted for decision and the rendition of the
judgment. For itself, this datum is inadequate to support
oppositor's conclusion of bias. Hence, the claim of denial of
due process is unfounded and must be overruled.
 Rule 132, Section 9

RECALLING WITNESS

Reporter: Analou Dorado - Maypa

 Joke
Atty: Maari mo bang i-describe ang
nanghold-up sayo?

Biktima: Pandak po, panot, maitim, maraming

pimples at bungal din po..

Suspek: Waaww!! Sige manglait kapa!!

Perfect ka talaga teh?!! Ganda mo no??!
Aamin na nga sana pipintasan mo pa!
Baka gusto mong gawin ko na lang
MURDER ang kaso ko!!
 Section 9 – Recalling Witness.

After the examination of a witness by

both sides has been concluded,
the witness cannot be recalled without
leave of the court.
The court will grant or withhold leave in
its discretion, as the interests of justice
may require.
 When to Recall a Witness

After both parties have concluded the presentation of

their evidence, and after the witness may have been
subjected to:
- Direct examination
- Cross-examination
- Redirect examination and
- Re-cross examination.

Witnesses may be recalled but only with leave of court.

 Rationale – Leave of Court

 The court must be given the opportunity to

determine first whether or not the recall is
unnecessary or merely fictitious.
 Not requiring leave of court before a witness can
be recalled will actually be repugnant to the
right not to be detained longer than the interest
of justice.
 How to Recall a Witness

A. On Motion By a Party:
This is not a right but the recall must be addressed to the
discretion of the court and the recall must be on justifiable
grounds.

B. By the Court:
If there are matter it wishes to clarify.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. BAYANI S. RIVERA, Judge, Branch 129 , RTC of Kalookan
City, and WILFREDO L. SEMBRANO
GR No. 98376, August 16, 1991
Facts:
 A Special Civil Action of Certiorari was instituted to annul an order
rendered by the RTC, in a prosecution for arson involving accused
Wilfredo L. Sembrano who allegedly caused the fire which totally
burned and destroyed the second and third floors of the "I Love You
Restaurant and Sauna Bath".
 Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath was presented as
a witness to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability.
 Lee testified on direct examination at the hearing of December 8,
1987, and on April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined,
gave additional evidence on redirect examination, was again
questioned on recross-examination by the defense counsel, and
thereafter allowed to step down.
Cont.. Facts:

 Before the prosecution could rest its case, and after Lee had
completed his testimony, the defendant's original counsel, withdrew
his appearance and was substituted by Atty. Eduardo S. Rodriguez.
 Atty. Rodriguez then filed a Motion on June 8, 1988 to recall the
witness (Lee) for further examination, on the ground that after he
had reviewed the record of Lee's testimony, he came to the
conclusion that "there seems to be many points and questions that
should have been asked but were not propounded by the other
defense counsel who conducted the cross-examination. It was on this
averment, and counsel's reference to "the gravity of the offense
charged" and the need "to afford the accused full opportunity to
defend himself," that Lee's recall for further cross examination was
sought to be justified.
 Efforts were thereafter exerted to cause witness Lee to again
appear before the Court, to no avail.
 Private prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion" on the
inability to procure the re-appearance of witness Lee and to
dispense with the further examination of Lee.
 The RTC denied the motion to dispense with the recall of Lee, it
ordered the testimony of Lee for the prosecution be stricken off
the record for lack of complete cross-examination because the
witness could no longer be found, and the failure of counsel for the
accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the fault of the
defense.
 Hence, the action at bar, instituted by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
 Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court acted with grave abuse
of discretion in authorizing the recall of witness Benjamin Lee,
and in striking out said witness' testimony for want of further
cross-examination.

Factum Probandum: Factum Probans:

The defense has a T h e M o t i o n f i l e d by t h e d e f e n s e o n
v a l i d g ro u n d t o June 8, 1988 to recall Benjamin Lee
recall witness Lee fo r f u r t h e r ex a m i n a t i o n ( g ro u n d :
fo r f u r t h e r c ro s s "there seems to be many points and
ex a m i n a t i o n . questions tha t should ha ve been asked
b ut w ere not propounded by the other
d e fe n s e c o u n s e l w h o c o n d u c t e d t h e
cross-examina tion; and the need "to
a f f o r d t h e a c c u s e d f u l l o p p o rt u n i t y t o
d e fe n d h i m s e l f
Ruling:
The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or
exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that there is a
need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to
afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here,
"there seems to be many points and questions that should have been
asked" in the earlier interrogation.

There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the
recall of a witness. This is clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:

SEC. 9. Recalling witness.— After the examination of a witness by both

sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave
of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as
the interests of justice may require.
 To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for
recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer
discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of
the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's
discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall.

There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial

ground for the recall on the movant's part, that particularly identified
material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that
particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness
whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in
so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof.

Absent such particulars, there would be no foundation for a trial court

to authorize the recall of any witness.
 In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's
motion for recall on nothing more than said movant's general claim that
certain questions — unspecified, had to be asked.

The respondent Court acted whimsically, capriciously, and

oppressively, and, gravely abused its discretion, in ordering the striking
out of the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee after it appeared that he
could no longer be found and produced for further examination.
Rule 132 Section 10
Joehannah Em C. Liboon
Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. – A question which suggests to
the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question.
It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross-examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, is of feeble mind, or a deaf-
mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation[,] or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.

A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by
the witness, or contrary to that which he or she has previously stated. It is not
allowed. (10a)
Leading Questions

1. A leading question is one that is framed in such a way that

the question indicates to the witness the answer desired by
the party asking the question. In the words of Section 10 of
Rule 132, it is a question suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party.
2. Leading questions are not appropriate in direct and re-
direct examinations particularly when the witness is asked to
testify about a major element of the cause of action or
defense. Leading questions are allowed in cross and re-cross
examinations.
3. Leading questions are however, allowed in a direct
examination in the following instances:
(a) on preliminary matters;
(b) when the witness is ignorant, or a child years, or is
feeble-minded or a deaf-mute and there is difficulty in
getting direct and intelligible answers from such witness;
(c) when the witness is a hostile witness; or
(d) When the witness is an adverse party, or when the witness
is an officer, director, managing agent of a corporation,
partnership or association which is an adverse party
(Section 10, Rule 132,Rules of Court).
Leading Questions to a Child Witness

 Under the Rules of Court, a leading question may be

asked of a child only if there is difficulty of eliciting
from said child a direct and intelligible answer (Section
10[c], Rule 132, Rules of Court).
Misleading Questions

A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact

not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which
he has previously stated. It is not allowed (Section 10, Rule
132, Rules of Court) in any type of examination.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. RODITO DAGANIO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
[ G.R. No. 137385, January 23, 2002 ]
 FACTS:
The victim testified that her father raped her several
times in their house. Her first defilement was in the month
of December, but she could no longer recall what year it
was.
The second rape took place in the evening of
September 6, 1994. She was then 11 years old. That night,
her mother was in Pikalawag, Lanao del Norte. The victim
was playing with her younger siblings when the accused-
appellant told her to go inside the house. She obeyed him.
Inside their house, the accused-appellant first placed his
finger in her vagina because it was too small. Next, he
inserted his penis. Half of the penis penetrated her. After
the sexual assault, he warned her not to tell anyone about
the rape or he would cut her neck. Despite the threat, the
victim related her harrowing experience to her mother.
 Dr. William Canoy testified that he conducted a medical examination
on the victim on September 15, 1994. There were no fresh wounds in the
vagina, although he found edema (slight swelling emission of the skin)
around the victim’s labia majora and healed lacerations in the hymen at
6, 7, 1 and 8 o’clock positions. He opined that the edema could have
been caused by hard or blunt objects or by a man’s penis.8

The accused-appellant denied the accusations of the victim. He

claimed that on September 6, 1994, he was ill so he stayed in bed the
whole day. When asked if he sexually molested the victim on said date,
he replied that he did not know if he did because of his fever. He
declared that he loves Laureta and that their relationship before
September 6, 1994 was harmonious. He alleged that he never quarreled
with her. He claimed he did not know why she filed the rape case against
him
Factum Probans
Testimony of the mother and the child (rape victim)
Testimony of the Doctor and the Medical Exam
Birth Certificate of the Child

Factum Probandum
WON prosecution propounded leading questions on the victim is proper.

WON the minority and her relationship to the accused must be duly alleged and
proved to justify the imposition of the death penalty
 A rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight
when she accuses a close relative of having raped her.
Indeed, a young girl would not ordinarily file a complaint
against anybody, much less her own father, if it were not
true. Thus, the victim’s revelation that she had been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where
she could be compelled to give out details on an assault to
her dignity cannot be dismissed as mere concoction
 It is true that leading questions are generally not allowed and have little
probative value. However, Section 10, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court11 provides:
"Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. - A question which suggests to the
witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is
not allowed, except:

c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a

witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf mute.
 In the case at bar, the victim was twelve (12) years old when she
testified in court. When most children her age were already in Grade VI
of elementary education, she was only in Grade III. We can also glean
from her testimony that she could not grasp the legal concept of "rape."
Thus, the trial judge correctly allowed the prosecutor to ask leading
questions to ferret out the truth.
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts
in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons
are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took
effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment
of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect
children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste
of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
 JOKE TIME

Kapag magugunaw ang mundo, unang magugunaw

ang Pilipinas..

Bakit?
FILIPINO TIME eh..
 Joke time

Atty: idescribe mo nga yung nang hold up sa yo?

Pedro: Maitim, panot, pango, tigyawatin at bungal.

(tumayo ang akusado)

Akusado: SIGE! MANGLAIT KA PA, PERFECT

KA, PERFECT KA? AAMIN NA NGA,
PIPINTASAN PA!!!
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse
party's witness. — A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he or
she was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his or her general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he or she has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his or
her present testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the
witness, or the record of the judgment, that
he or she has been convicted of an offense.
 Under the rule, a witness may be impeached
through the following modes:

(a) By contradictory evidence;

(a) By evidence that his general reputation for

truth, honesty or integrity is bad; or

(a) By evidence that he has made at other

times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony.
 “ I was five
meters away
from where the
DIRECT EXAMINATION
accused shot
the victim”

DEFENSE COUNSEL
Miles away where the shooting took
place
The defense counsel now asks:
Q. You testified that you were present when D shot V, is
that right?
A. Yes Ma’am.
Q. Isn’t it true that, at the time of the alleged shooting
of V by D, you were in a wedding of your friend miles
and miles away?
A. That isn’t true, Ma’am. Absolutely not.
 Because of the denial, the defense
counsel now has the chance to prove
the contrary by a contradictory
evidence.
 Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R.
No. 132164, October 19, 2004

FACTS:
- Magdalena Gapuz, founder of “Mother and Child Learning Center”
and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher filed separate
complaints against Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of DECS
of Baguio City. Both complainants charged Belagan with sexual
harassment and various malfeasances.

- According to her, she was sexually harassed by Belagan.

- Magdalena then read in a newspaper that Belagan was being

charged by another DECS employee (Ligaya) of sexual indignities.

- Magdalena wrote a letter to the former DECS Secretary which

resulted to the respondent being placed under suspension.
 By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal.

 Some of the charges against her were unjust vexation, light oral
defamation, grave threats.

 Respondent claims that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena

casts doubt upon her character, integrity and credibility.

 The respondent cited:

“SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad”

 CA rules that Magdalena was an unreliable witness, her character being

questionable.
 issue:

Whether or not Magdalena’s derogatory record is

sufficient to discredit her credibility?
Factum probandum of petitioner
- Magdalena’s derogatory record is not sufficient to
discredit her
- Magdalena is a credible witness

Factum Probans of petitioner

- Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and
spontaneous manner.
Factum Probandum of respondent
- Magdalena’s derogatory record is sufficient to
discredit her
- Magdalena is not a credible witness

Factum probans of respondent

- numerous cases filed against Magdalena
 Ruling

HELD: NO.
Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio
City relate to acts committed in the 80’s. Surely, those cases
and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s
character or reputation.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much
weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of
one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too
remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be
determined is the character or reputation of the person at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the
path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again.
Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
 Not every good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved under this
provision. Only those which would establish
the probability or improbability of the
offense charged. This means that the
character evidence must be limited to the
traits and characteristics involved in the type
of offense charged.
RULE 132
Section 14
M A C ATO , R I Z Z M O N I Q U E
JOKE TIME
Rule 132, Section 14
How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. – Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that
he or she has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
or her present testimony, the statements must be related to him or
her, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he or she must be asked whether he or she made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be
in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him or her concerning them. (13a)
Rule on Laying of the Predicate
This rule provides for how to impeach a witness by evidence of inconsistent
statements.

Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his or her present testimony, it must be shown that:

1. The statements must be related to him or her, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present;

2. He must be asked whether he or she made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them;

3. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.
People vs. Sambahon
GR No. 182789 | August 03, 2010

Norlito Sambahon was charged and convicted of rape of his 13 year-old

stepdaughter, AAA.
In his Appellant's Brief filed before the appellate court, Sambahon
contended that AAA's testimony cannot be relied upon because she made
inconsistent statements by declaring during the preliminary examination
that she was raped by appellant in the room where she and her siblings were
sleeping, but in her testimony in court she stated that the rape occurred in
the room of her mother and appellant.
People vs. Sambahon
GR No. 182789 | August 03, 2010

FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS

Whether or not AAA’s testimony remains • AAA’s statements

unimpeached despite AAA’s inconsistent • Court records
statements under Section 14 of Rule 132.
People vs. Sambahon
GR No. 182789 | August 03, 2010
RULING:

Witness is not impeached.

Every witness is presumed to be truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just
because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to
reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be
made therefrom.

These considerations lie at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate,
which in essence means simply that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony
of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements,
whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting
declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by him that he
should be deemed impeached.
People vs. Sambahon
GR No. 182789 | August 03, 2010

In any event, the questioned inconsistency does not impinge on the essential elements of
the offense charged. What is important is that AAA's narration (both in the preliminary
examination and during the trial) of how she was forced and intimidated by appellant into
submission to his bestial cravings was indisputably consistent, direct, positive and
unwavering.
ANONG KUKO ANG LUMALANGOY?
ANONG KUKO ANG LUMALANGOY?

KUKO-dile
 RULE 132
Section 15
By: Princess Helen Grace M. Bebero
 1989 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE 2019 AMENDMENTS TO THE
1989 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. – Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. –
On any trial or hearing, the judge may excluded from The court, motu proprio or upon motion shall order
the court any witness not at the time under witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not
other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses authorize exclusion of (a) a party who is a natural
to be kept separate and to be prevented from person, (b) a duly designated representative of a
conversing with one another until all shall have been juridical entity which is a party to the case, (c) a
examined. person whose presence is essential to the
presentation of the party’s cause, or (d) a person
authorized by a statute to be present.

The court may also cause witnesses to be kept

separate and to be prevented from conversing with
one another, directly or through intermediaries, until
all shall have been examined.
 AMENDED PROVISION
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. – The court,
motu proprio or upon motion shall order witnesses excluded so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does
not authorize exclusion of (a) a party who is a natural person, (b) a
duly designated representative of a juridical entity which is a party
to the case, (c) a person whose presence is essential to the
presentation of the party’s cause, or (d) a person authorized by a
statute to be present.

The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be

prevented from conversing with one another, directly or through
intermediaries, until all shall have been examined.
GENERAL RULE: The court shall order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of
other witnesses

EXCEPTIONS:
1. A party who is a natural person;
2. A duly designated representative of a juridical entity
which is a party to the case;
3. A person’s presence is essential to the presentation
of a party’s cause; and
4. A person authorized by statute to be present.
 PURPOSE
• That the witness should not be able to hear the testimony of
other witnesses. Thereby preventing untruthful or unnatural
concert of testimony among them.

• This rule is intended to disallow a witness to shape his or her

testimony as to directly refute or corroborate another
witness’ testimony
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses.
xx The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and
to be prevented from conversing with one another, directly or
through intermediaries, until all shall have been examined.

WITNESS SEQUESTRATION
The efficacy of excluding or sequestering witnesses has long been
recognized as a means of discouraging and exposing fabrication,
inaccuracy, and collusion (6 Wigmore SS1837-1838).
 G.R. No. 193966 February 19, 2014

DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. and

KENNETH SY, Petitioners,
vs.
LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Respondent.
 FACTS
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Design Sources International, Inc. is a distributor of Pergo
flooring. Lourdes bought from Design Sources.
Lourdes discovered that the flooring installed had defect.
It was agreed that Design Sources would replace the
defective flooring.
Design Sources did not comply with the demand of Lourdes.
A complaint for damage against Design Sources.
 FACTS
DURING TRIAL
Kenneth Sy, one of the Design Sources' witnesses, testified
in open court.
Immediately after his testimony, the judge asked for the
presentation of the next witness who was Mr. Stephen Sy of
Design Sources. He was actually inside the courtroom.
This was objected by the opposing counsel because Stephen
Sy was here all the time when the witness Kenneth Sy was
cross-examined.
 Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
RTC
• "to allow Stephen Sy from testifying would work to the
disadvantage of Lourdes as Stephen Sy already heard the
testimony of witness Kenneth Sy."

CA
• It was the duty of respondent’s counsel to ask for the
exclusion of other witnesses, without which, there was
nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of
petitioners’ other witnesses
 ISSUE

WHETHER STEPHEN SY SHOULD BE

EXCLUDED AS WITNESS?
 FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS
Stephen Sy should be excluded to testify as witness Motion for the exclusion of witness
considering that he was already inside the
courtroom during the presentation of witness
Kenneth Sy

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. —

On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from
the court any witness not at the time under
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony
of other witnesses.
 RULING
No, Stephen Sy should not be excluded as witness.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there
was an order of exclusion from the RTC.

Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. – On any trial or hearing, the
judge may excluded from the court any witness not at the time under examination,
so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. xxx
 RULING
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the
parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a
witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony of
another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect
the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses.

The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen to

testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for exclusion of other
witnesses during the presentation of Kenneth's testimony.

Hence, Stephen Sy is not excluded as witness in the absence of court

order.
Lawyer Buang
Section 16

SILVANO M. CAMILLO, JR.

Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. – A witness
may be allowed to refresh his or her memory respecting a fact by
anything written or recorded by himself or herself, or under his or
her direction[,] at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his or
her memory and he or she knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded; but in such case[,] the writing or record must
be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he or she chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and
may read it in evidence. A witness may also testify from such a
writing or record, though he or she retains no recollection of the
particular facts, if he or she is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
Facts of the Case:
Benie Mon, armed with a gun, with intent to kill
and by means of qualifying aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot one Uldarico
Arroyo, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wounds which directly caused his death
Whether the CA erred
in affirming Benie's
conviction for murder
despite the fact that
the prosecution failed
to establish his guilt
for murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
Factum Probandum Factum Probans
The consistency of 1.Sworn Statement of the
Witness
testimony of witness
2.Gun and Bullet used
in the memorandum 3.Medical Certificate of
to prove the guilt of Uldarico Arroyo
the accused.
The Court has previously held that minor
inconsistent statements in a witness'
affidavit and in his testimony in court do
not necessarily affect his
credibility. However, in this case, the
detail as to whether the witness had
actually seen Benie poke the gun at the
victim's neck is a material detail as it
goes into the very execution of the
crime. Indeed, based on the foregoing
sworn testimony of Manolo, he did not
see the shooting — all that he saw was
Uldarico falling to the ground.
The inconsistency in the statements of the lone prosecution
witness vis-a-vis the expert testimony given is an
inconsistency on a very material point. This inconsistency,
together with his admission, on cross-examination, that he
really did not see the shooting of Uldarico, significantly
shows that his identification of Benie as the perpetrator of
the crime cannot be relied upon — especially in the face
of Ricky's testimony that Benie was in Capiz at the time of
the shooting of Uldarico.

BENIE MON Y ABARIDES @ "BALENTO" is hereby ACQUITTED of

the crime of murder as his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Thank you!
 Rule 132:
(Presentation of Evidence)

Section 18:
Right to inspect writing shown
to witness

GEROMO, LEILANE O.
Reporter
 Ngalan sa Instik nga gi Bisaya
• Bob Uy
• – Ihawon kada pista
• Cora Tan
• – hinginom og Kape
• Lino Gaw
• – di madala og kinamot
• Fe Yong
• – Katulgon
• Nany Wang
• – pangandoy sa tambok
• Fe Ang
• – naligsan
• Lim Tan
• – sakit sa tigulang
• Merry Sy
• – gigabaan
• Tino Lee
• – kay pisot man
• Andy Lim
• – wa kabayad sa kurente
• Macky Lo Uy
• – kay nasakpan man
 Rule 132
Presentation of Evidence

Section 18. Right to inspect writing

shown to witness. – Whenever a writing
is shown to a witness, it may be inspected
by the adverse party. (18)
REVIEW: Basic Requisites for the
admissibility of Documentary
Evidence

(1) The evidence must be relevant;

(2) The evidence must be

authenticated by a competent
witness; and

(3) The document must be formally

offered in evidence
What is Authentication?
• Authentication in the law
of evidence, is the process
by which documentary
evidence and other
physical evidence is
proven to be genuine, and
not a forgery.
 ERNESTO L. SALAS, Petitioner,
vs.
STA. MESA MARKET CORPORATION
and the HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO E.
DOMINGO, Respondents

G.R. No. 157766, July 12, 2007

 • Primitivo E. Domingo handed the
F management of his estate, including Sta.
Mesa Market Corporation (SMMC), to

A petitioner Ernesto L. Salas.

C • As estate manager, petitioner was primarily

tasked to ensure SMMC's continued viability
and profitability by redeveloping the Sta.
T Mesa market and restructuring the
corporation's finances.
S: • Domingo, on the other hand, bound himself
to transfer 30% of SMMC's subscribed and
paid-up capital stock to petitioner as part of
his compensation. But, if petitioner failed to
achieve a monthly market revenue of at least
₱350,000, he would be obliged to return the
shares of stock of SMMC to Domingo.
 • Shortly after the execution of the
contract, SMMC, under petitioner's
management, leased the Sta. Mesa
market to Malaca Realty Corporation.

FACTS • However, Malaca was financially

incapable of improving and expanding
the existing facilities of SMMC and was
unable to pay the monthly rent. Thus,
SMMC terminated its lease contract
with Malaca.

• As a result, its board of directors

became dissatisfied with petitioner's
management of the corporation.
Thereafter, it ended its management
contract with petitioner
 FACTS:
• Petitioner filed an action for specific
performance and damages against SMMC
and Domingo. He alleged that SMMC's
monthly market revenue had surpassed
₱350,000 by presenting the copies of SMMC's
audited financial statements yet Domingo
refused to comply with his obligation to deliver
30% of the subscribed and paid-up capital
stock of SMMC to him.

• The trial court considered copies of SMMC's

audited financial statements which showed an
improvement in the corporation's monthly
average gross income (from ₱251,790 in 1984
to ₱409,794 in 1985).

• The CA reversed the decision of RTC and held

that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity
of the audited financial statements.
 FACTUM PROBANS: FACTUM PROBANDUM:

• (mere copies of SMMC's • WON the mere copies of

audited financial SMMC’s audited financial
statements) statements be admissible
• balance sheet, in evidence without
• income statement, AND authentication of SMMC’s
external auditor?
• statement of cash flow
 RULING
• NO.
• Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as
general rule, private documents.

• Private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless

they are properly authenticated.

• For private documents, authentication was a

precondition to their admissibility in evidence.
 • During authentication in court, a witness positively
R testifies that a document presented as evidence is
genuine and has been duly executed or that the
U document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor
executed by mistake or under duress.

L • In this case, petitioner merely presented a

I memorandum attesting to the increase in the

corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by
a member of his management team.
N • The best proof available, in this instance, would have
G been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's
external auditor who prepared the audited financial
statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the
audited financial statements were never
authenticated.
AUTHENTICATION AND
PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

RULE 132 SECTION 19

Ruby Anne P. Trinidad

Joke TIME!
Pedro: Bakit ka umiiyak?
Juan: Namatay kasi ang elepante.
Pedro: Bakit alaga mo ba yon?

Juan: Hindi, pero ako ang huhukay para sa libingan niya.

Document
 It may be considered as synonymous with “writing”.

 Any substance having any matter expressed or

described upon it by marks capable of being read.

 It includes all material substances on which the thoughts

of men are represented by writing, or any other species
of conventional mark or symbol.
Documentary Evidence
For presentation of evidence, documentary evidence
is generally divided into two principal classes –

 Public writings/ documents

 Private writings/ documents
 Section 19 - Classes of documents.
For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;

(c) Documents that are considered public documents under treaties and conventions which are in force between the Philippines and the
country of source; and

(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered herein.

All other writings are private.

Notes for 19 (c)
The inclusion of Section 19 (c) is to implement treatises or
conventions to which the Philippines is a party.

Example:

Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for

Foreign Public Documents (“Apostille Convention”)
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (ALSO
KNOWN AS PHILTRUST BANK)
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
FORFOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

G.R. No. 150318 November 22, 2010

FACTS:
Forfom Development Corporation is the
registered owner of two (2) parcels of land subject
of the present controversy.

Plaintiff received a letter from the Department

of Agrarian Reform with the names Ma. Teresa
Limcauco and Ellenora Limcauco as addressees.
 Timeline

TCT 10896 & 64884 TCT 10896 & 64884 were Ellenora and Ma. Teresa As a consequence of the
were registered under transferred to Ma. Teresa (through her counsel) filed court order, both TCTs were
Forfom Dev’t Corp. Limcauco and Ellenora Limcauco a petition for issuance of cancelled. TCT 82760 was
respectively through a Deed of owner’s duplicate copy issude to Ma. Teresa which
Sale which was granted by the was later subdivided into
court different lots. TCT 75436
was issued to Ellenora

A Deed of Absolute Sale Sps. Raul and Elea

was executed by Ellenora Claveria mortgaged the
in favor of Sps. Raul and property to defendant
Elea Claveria Philtrust for a loan
amounting to 8M.
 Plaintiff instituted the present action against the defendants
Ma. Teresa Limcauco, Ellenora D. Limcauco, spouses Raul P. Claveria
and Elea R. Claveria, Philippine Trust Company and the Register of
Deeds of Angeles City.

The Complaint alleged conspiratorial acts committed by said

defendants who succeeded in causing the fraudulent transfer of
registration of plaintiff's properties in the names of Ma. Teresa
Limcauco and Ellenora D. Limcauco and the subdivision of the land
over which separate titles have been issued.
 Philtrust claims that the loans secured by the mortgage on the
subject property were granted to the spouses Claveria after Philtrust
was satisfied regarding the spouses' credit worthiness and capacity to
pay. In fact, according to Philtrust, the spouses Claveria were able to
maintain a satisfactory record of payment during the early period of
their transactions with the bank.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Forfom Development

Corporation declaring the Deeds of Sale and the new TCTs as void ab
initio and ordering the Register of Deeds of Angeles City to reinstate
Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of the plaintiff
 CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the claims by Philtrust
were not supported by evidence and that Philtrust
was negligent in its credit investigation procedures
and its standards for granting of loan.
ISSUE (FACTUM PROBANDUM):
Whether or not the documents presented by
Philtrust Bank is sufficient to prove that it is a
mortgagee in good faith and that the documents
presented is considered as a public document and
therefore, a prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
Factum Probandum Factum Probans

Whether or not the documents • Deed of Mortgage

presented by Philtrust Bank is • Promissory Note
sufficient to prove that it is a • Transfer Certificate of Title No.
mortgagee in good faith. 75533 ( with annotations of the
mortgage)
That the documents presented is • Notarized Answers to
considered as a public document Interrogatories where it was
and therefore a prima facie stated that Philtrust followed the
evidence of the facts stated therein standard operating procedures
pursuant to the Section 19 and 23 of in accepting the property as
Rule 132. security
RULING:
The Supreme Court reiterated in this case that the
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should prompt the vendee or mortgagee to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate. If the vendee
or mortgagee failed to do so before the execution of the
contract, the vendee or mortgagee is deemed to be in
bad faith and therefore cannot acquire any title under
some forged instrument.
RULING:
In this case, Philtrust presented the following documents (a) the
Promissory Note; (b) the Deed of Mortgage; and (c) TCT No. 75533
and the Answer to Interrogatories that it followed the standard
operating procedures in accepting the property as security.

It is settled that banks, their business being impressed with

public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than
private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered
lands. The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely
solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks.
RULING:
It is baffling to the Supreme Court how Philtrust can
argue that the promissory note and Deed of Mortgage
executed by the spouses Claveria, and the TCT of the subject
property, can prove its allegations that (a) the mortgage was
granted after it was satisfied of the spouses' credit
worthiness; (b) the latter was able to maintain a satisfactory
record of payment early on; or (c) it followed the standard
operating procedures in accepting property as security,
including having investigators visit the subject property and
appraise its value.
RULING:
As regards Philtrust's claim that the Answer to Interrogatories,
being a notarized document, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its
contents, the Supreme Court deem it necessary to clarify the doctrines
cited by Philtrust on this matter. The Supreme Court cited Rule 132
Section 19 for the classification of public document.

Notarized documents fall under the second classification of

public documents. However, not all types of public documents are
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
RULING:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. -- Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. XXXX

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public

officer" include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule
132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or
jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section
23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution, and of the date of the latter but is not prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
RULING:
As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories
which are required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only
portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is
the jurat. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents,
Supreme Court have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.

Philtrust, therefore, presented no evidence rebutting the

following badges of bad faith shown in the records of the case.
What are the ten things we can always
count on?
What did the zero say to the eight?
Why are parallel lines so tragic?

They have so
much in common
but they will
never meet. 

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-NC

Section 20, Rule 132
Gunda, Genevieve D.
 COMPARISON – AMENDED vs OLD PROVISION
2019 Amendment 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – SEC. 20. Proof of private document. — Before
Before any private document offered as any private document offered as authentic is
authentic is received in evidence, its due received in evidence, its due execution and
execution and authenticity must be proved by authenticity must be proved either:
any of the following means:
(a) By anyone who saw the document
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed executed or written; or
or written;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
signature or handwriting of the maker; or
Any other private document need only be
(c) By other evidence showing its due identified as that which it is claimed to be.
execution and authenticity.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.
RAUL S. IMPERIAL, PETITIONER,
V.
HEIRS OF NEIL BAYABAN, AND MARY LOU
BAYABAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 197626, October 03, 2018
 FACTS
A van and a tricycle figured in an accident along Sumulong Highway,
Antipolo City. The van was owned and registered under Imperial's
name, and was driven by Laraga. The tricycle was driven by Gerardo
Mercado (Mercado). On board the tricycle were the Bayaban Spouses,
who sustained injuries.
Because of the injuries sustained by the Bayaban Spouses, they had to
undergo therapy and post-medical treatment. They demanded
compensation from Imperial, Laraga, and Mercado for the hospital
bills and loss of income that they sustained while undergoing therapy
and post-medical treatment.
When neither Imperial, Laraga, nor Mercado heeded their demand,
the Bayaban Spouses filed a Complaint for damages impleading
Imperial, Laraga, and Mercado as defendants.
 FACTS
In their Complaint, they prayed for P311,760.75 as actual
damages, US$1,900.00 per month representing Neil's
unearned income as a second-mate seaman, P7,600.00
per month representing Mary Lou's unearned income as
pharmacist, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Neil died before the case proceeded to trial. He was
substituted by his heirs, namely, Mary Lou and their
children, Donna Grace and Dan Geofrey (the Heirs of Neil
Bayaban).
 FACTS
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bayaban
Spouses. It found Laraga negligent. As for Imperial, it
ruled that he failed to prove that he had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Laraga.
Imperial was presumed negligent and was likewise held
liable for damages to the Bayaban Spouses.
The Regional Trial Court held that the official receipts
presented in evidence substantiated the Bayaban
Spouses' claim for reimbursement of medical and hospital
expenses.
 FACTS
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court’s March 15, 2009
Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of Plaintiffs and against Defendants Raul Imperial and William Laraga,
ordering the said Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the following:
1. Actual damages in the amount of Php 462,868.83 for medical expenses
and Php 100,000.00 for lost earnings during medical treatment;
2. Moral damages in the amount of P 50,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 50,000.00;
4. Attorney's fees, inclusive of appearance fees, in the amount of Php
25,000.00, plus cost of suit.
 FACTS
Imperial appealed this Decision to the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals maintained his liability.
He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied.
Imperial filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
 FACTS
Imperial claims that the official receipts of the medical
and hospital bills are not competent evidence of the
actual damages allegedly sustained by the Bayaban
Spouses for not having been authenticated. He, therefore,
cannot be held liable for unsubstantiated claims for actual
damages.
Respondents argue that original receipts of medical and
hospital bills are sufficient proof of the actual damages
they have sustained; hence, they need not be
authenticated to be competent proof of their claims.
 FACTUM PROBANDUM

Whether or not the original receipts of the medical and

hospital bills presented by respondents Neil Bayaban
and Mary Lou Bayaban are not competent evidence of
the actual damages that they have sustained
considering that the receipts were not authenticated.
FACTUM PROBANS
 RULING
No. The original receipts of the medical and hospital bills
presented by respondents Neil Bayaban and Mary Lou
Bayaban are competent evidence.
Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public
or private. Public documents are those exclusively
enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court.
As for private documents, those not enumerated in Rule
132, Section 19, they must be authenticated, or their due
execution and authenticity proven, per Rule 132, Section
20 of the Rules of Court.
 RULING
Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not
among those enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19. These
official receipts, therefore, are private documents which
may be authenticated either by presenting as witness
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by
presenting an evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
 RULING
In insisting that Spouses Bayaban should have presented
as witnesses the persons who signed the official receipts,
Imperial ignores the first manner of authenticating private
documents. Respondent Mary Lou testified as to the
circumstances of the accident and the expenses she and
Neil had incurred as a result of it. The official receipts were
issued to her and Neil upon payment of the expenses.
Since the official receipts were issued to respondent Mary
Lou, her testimony, therefore, is a competent evidence of
the execution of the official receipts.
 RULING
With respondent Mary Lou testifying as to the execution
and issuance of the official receipts, they were duly
authenticated, contrary to Imperial’s claim. There being
no question that the official receipts were all in the
original, they were the best evidence of their contents
specifically, of the actual damages incurred by the
Spouses Bayaban. The Regional Trial Court correctly
admitted the receipts in evidence.
2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence
(A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC)

Section 21, Rule 132

“Ancient Document Rule”

Reporter: ANALYN V. FERNANDEZ

JOKE TIME:

Istepler 
BATA: Pabili pong ubas!!!
TINDERA: Wala kaming ubas.

KINABUKASAN……

BATA: Pabili pong ubas!!!

TINDERA: Wala nga kaming ubas!!! Isa pang tanung

iiiistepler ko na yang bibig mo!!!
KINABUKASAN ULIT……

BATA: May istepler kayo?

TINDERA: Wala bakit?

Bata: pabili pong ubas

Section 21. When evidence of
authenticity of private document
not necessary. – Where a private
document is more than thirty (30)
years old, is produced from a
“ANCIENT
custody in which it would naturally DOCUMENT
RULE”
be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no
other evidence of its authenticity
need be given.
Old Revised Rules on
Evidence v. 2019 xxxNO CHANGES
Amendments
FROM OLD AND
NEW RULExxx
 For a private document to be exempt from proof of
due execution and authenticity, it is not enough
that it be more than 30 years old.
It is also necessary that the following requirements
ANCIENT are fulfilled:
DOCUMENT 1) that it is produced from a custody in which it
would naturally be found if genuine; and
RULE 2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or
circumstance of suspicion

Heirs of Demetria Lacsa vs. CA, Songco et al, G.R. Nos. 79597-98, May 20,
1991)
 Ancient documents are considered from proper
custody if they come from a place from which they
might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody
is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate
ANCIENT origin or if the circumstances of the particular case
are such as to render such an origin probable. If a
DOCUMENT document is found where it would not properly
and naturally be, its absence from the proper place
RULE must be satisfactorily accounted for.

Cercado-Siga et al. vs. Cercado, Jr. et al., G.R. No. 185374, March 11,
2015)
Illustrative Case SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA and LIGAYA
CERCADO-BELISON
on: vs.
VICENTE CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C.
ANCIENT ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C.
ARALAR and VIOLETA C. BINADAS
DOCUMENT
RULE G.R. No. 185374 March 11, 2015
 FACTS:
Petitioners (Simplicia and Ligaya) claimed that they are the legitimate children of
the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 1929 in Pililla,
Rizal.

Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by
gratuitous title a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 7627 located at Barangay
Kinagatan, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of 6,032 sq. m. and covered by Tax
Declaration.
Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente and by virtue of
intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs;
that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation
of law.
FACTS:

Sometime 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a

notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora
Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs,
respondents herein.

Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not

married or if they were so married, then said marriage
was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of
their parents, Vicente and Benita.
FACTS:

Petitioners prayed for:

1) the declaration of the Deed as null and void;

2) for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente;
and
3) for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees
 FACTS:
Petitioners presented the following documents:

1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract;

2) Certification issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage
contract;
3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;
4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia;
5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and
6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and
Benita.
 FACTS:
Respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and
Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a
marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Binangonan, Rizal.

They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties- interest to institute
the case because:
1) failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to
Vicente;
2) marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid;
3) the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a
certified true copy; and
4) estopped by laches
FACTS:

Petitioners concede that the marriage

contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which
need not be authenticated.
ISSUE:

Whether the marriage contract

presented by the petitioners is
an ancient document as
provided under Section 21,
Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence?
 RULING: NO
Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that:
1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine; and
3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.

The marriage contract was executed in 1929, hence it is clearly more than
30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
 RULING: NO

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if

they come from a place from which they might reasonably
be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to
have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the
particular case are such as to render such an origin probable.
If a document is found where it would not properly and
naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for
 RULING:

"It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper place of
deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question
as to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper
place of deposit, that the investigation commences whether it was reasonable and
natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should
have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that while
there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be
many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree;
some being more so, some less; and in those cases the proposition to be
determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted
for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such
custody must be genuine."

Gibson v. Poor, 21 N.H. 440

RULING:

The requirement of proper custody was met when the ancient document in question
was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person
who would naturally keep it.

Here, Simplicia failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely
presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. "The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic
Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the
relationship of the person baptized."

As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage

contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the
marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the
contents of said document because she cannot read and write.
 FACTUM PROBANS RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

FACTUM PROBANDUM: Contrato Matrimonial or the - U.S. v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915) held
marriage contract; that church registries of xxx marriages xxx
Contrato Matrimonial (issued by Iglesia Filipina made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of
Independiente church)
celebrated in 1929, a Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
private document, are they kept by duly authorized public officials.
They are private writings and their authenticity
should be considered an must therefore be proved as are all other
ancient document which private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence
should be excluded from
the requirement of Requisites under ancient document rule:
1) Document is more than 30 years old;
authentication 2) Document is produced from custody in which it
would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) Document is unblemished by any alteration or
by any circumstance of suspicion.
 FACTUM PROBANS RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Certification issued by Iglesia Filipina It was held as private document
Independiente of its acceptance of
original marriage contract;
FACTUM Certification of non-production of LCR advice that petitioners may make a
PROBANDUM: record of birth of Simplicia issued by further verification with the NSO
because LCR submits a copy of the birth
the Office of the Municipal Civil
Contrato Matrimonial Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; certificate of every registered birth with
celebrated in 1929, a the NSO. The advice was not heeded.

private document, should Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; Held "as evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the
be considered an ancient dates therein specified, but not the
document which should veracity of the declarations therein
stated with respect to her kinsfolk. "
be excluded from the
Certification of non-production of Petitioners failed to present a
requirement of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the certification from NSO whether such
authentication Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of records do exist or not.
Pililla, Rizal; and
Joint Affidavit of two disinterested Affiants were never presented in court.
persons attesting that Ligaya is the child Thus, their statement is tantamount to
of Vicente and Benita. hearsay evidence.
RULING:
While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old
records, we simply cannot ignore the rules on evidence,
specifically the rule on authentication with respect to
private documents which is precisely in place to
prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the
body of evidence that will determine the resolutions
of an issue.

Petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage

between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not
have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of
nullity of the EJS of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.
THANK YOU!!!
Reporter: Ankash Sohail Butt
Yehey!!!
Public documents as evidence – Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
 It refers to governmental records which is sometimes
also known as official records.

 Can be misleading because these records need not be

open to the public.
 Public documents are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country
b. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments;
c. Documents that are considered public documents under treaties and
conventions which are in force between the Philippines and the country
of source; and
d. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
 A state paper or other instrument of public importance
or interest, issued or published by authority of
congress or a state legislature.
FACTS:
Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful,
adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land,
with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas
in the concept of an owner since 1942.

Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his

son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio).
On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of
Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato).

Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of

land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial
Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to
one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).
On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to T.A.N.
Properties. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. filed an Application
for Original Registration of Title on the said land.

T.A.N. Properties presented CENRO certification that the

subject land is within the alienable and disposable zone.
However, T.A.N. Properties only presented three
witnesses during the hearing: Anthony Dimayuga Torres
(Torres), respondent’s Operations Manager and its
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo
Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and
Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a

corporation could apply for registration of land
provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial
court ruled that the facts showed that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property.
CA affirmed RTC ruling in toto.
 Whether the land is alienable and disposable. –NO.
 FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS
Whether the PENRO, CENRO – way beyond its
CENRO and FMS – DENR authority
has the power to certify the
land in dispute as alienable PENRO – Must show that
and disposable as DENR Secretary approved
contemplated in Rule 132, the land classification
Section 23 of the Revised
Rules of Court. FMS – DENR – Has no
authority under DAO
(DENR-Admin Order)
The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumably belong to the State.
Anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming otherwise.
TAN submitted two certifications issued by DENR.
 (a) Certification by the CENRO (Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices) which
certified the subject land as within the Alienable and
Disposable Zone under Project 30.
 (b) The second certification in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court issued by FMS-DENR
(Forest Management Services of the DENR) which
stated that the subject area falls within an alienable and
disposable land.
The certifications are not sufficient.
 (a) CENRO – issues certificates of land classification
status for areas below 50 hectares. (It is the PENRO
that issues certificates for lands covering 50 hectares).
Here, the area of the subject land covers over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO
certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of
596,116 square meters which is beyond the authority
of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
 (b) FMS-DENR – has no authority under DAO
(DENR-Admin Order) to issue certificates of land
classification.
Moreover, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that

(1) the DENR Secretary had approved the land

classification and (2) released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that (3) the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must (4)
present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

TAN failed to do so.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x
x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring public lands as alienable and disposable.
The CENRO should have publication attached an official
of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land
alienable and disposable.
 WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals. We DENY the application for
registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
JOKE TIME
May lalake na hold up
• Holdaper: AKIN NA PERA MO!!!
• Lalake: “Di mo ba ako kilala!?”
• Holdaper: Hinde! Wala ako pake! Akin na pera mo!
• Lalake: Ako ang Congressman dito!!!
• Holdaper: Ah ganon ba? Ibalik mo pera NAMIN!!!
How to live healthy as a Law Student
RULES ON EVIDENCE
RULE 131. Section 24
Reporter: Joseph Artfel T. Lazo II

10-9-21
Changed (previous provision)
• Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(25a)
 REVISED VERSION
Section 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his or her deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.

If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a contracting party to a
treaty or convention to which the Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such
treaty or convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall
be in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to public documents
originating from the Philippines.

For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty
or convention referred to in the next preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his [or her] office.

A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence

without further proof, the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or convention
between a foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the
document itself from this formality. (24a)
You will notice that there are an additional 2 paragraphs added into the provision.

The first paragraph has included “or her” for political correctness

They also expanded the provision to cover various circumstances;

When the public documents are in a foreign country;
PH has a treaty with
PH has no treaty with
When documents are accompanied by a certificate
First Paragraph
• On the first Paragraph, we will see that this section is read in relation
to Section 19 of Rule 131
Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are
either public or private.
Public Documents are:

“(a) The written official acts, or records of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;”
How do we prove the public nature of the
documents?
• Official Publication – EX. Official Gazette
• By a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record –
EX. If Marriage Certificate, it is in the custody of the Civil Registrar,
• Or by his deputy (attested by)
• If the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has custody. –
EX. You are trying to prove the existence of a particular foreign law, you
can seek the Phil. Consulate.
SECOND PARAGRAPH

On the second paragraph, we have a situation where;

• The record is being kept in a foreign country.
• The Phil. and Foreign Country are contracting parties to a treaty or
convention
• The treaty/ convention is considered a public document
• Rule 132 Sec.19 (c)Documents that are considered public
documents under treaties and conventions
which are in force between the Philippines
and the country of source; and

• The certification shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty or

convention, subject to reciprocity granted to public documents
THIRD PARAGRAH

• On this paragraph, The documents are coming from a foreign country,

which is not a contracting party to a treaty or convention. Who will
then make a certificate?
It states that any of those enumerated below can do the certification;
• secretary of the embassy or legation,
• consul general,
• consul,
• vice-consul,
• or consular agent
• or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept

• Plus, It must be authenticated by the seal of his or her office.

FOURTH PARAGRAPH

The fourth paragraph provides for the Sufficiency of the Document,

• when the document is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent

(As The certificate is already prima facie evidence of the due execution
and genuiness of the document )

However, the certificate is no longer needed if, the treaty or convention

has abolished or exempted the document itself from this formality.
 CASE

[ G.R. No. 198393, April 04, 2018 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. RODOLFO M. CUENCA,

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROBERTO S. CUENCA,
MANUEL I. TINIO, VICTOR AFRICA, MARIO K. ALFELOR, DON M. FERRY
AND OSCAR BELTRAN, RESPONDENTS.
FACT
July 1987, The Republic through the PCGG, assisted by the OSG filed a
petition against Rodolfo Cuenca and others.
The complaint sought to recover from the respondents alleged ill-
gotten wealth which they acquired in lawful concert with each other
(which resulted from/to unjust enrichment during the Marcos Regime)
FACT
Relevant to the topic is the documents collected by the PCGG from the
Presidential Library in Malacanang which were to be used as evidences
against the respondents.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Republic’s complaint against Cuenca
and others citing among others, the supporting documents were
sourced from the Presidential Library in Malacanang.
It excluded those documentary evidences for failure to comply with the
best evidence rule and on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
When MOR was declined, This prompted the Petitioner to elevate the
case to the SC
RULING
The Supreme Court found no reversible error on the Sandiganbayan
ruling when it dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS

WON THE EXCLUDED DOCUMENTS WERE Public Documents;

PROPERLY PROVEN TO BE OFFICIAL The documents collected by the PCGG in
RECORDS? the course of its investigation to serve as
evidences does not make them per se
public records

-Republic failed to show, in case of a

public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office,

-an official publication thereof or a copy

attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record or by his deputy,
and accompanied,
FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS

WON THE EXCLUDED DOCUMENTS WERE Public Documents;

PROPERLY PROVEN TO BE OFFICIAL
RECORDS? -if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certification that such
officer has the custody, or in the case of a
public record of a private document, the
original record,

or a copy thereof attested by the legal

custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer
has the custody
FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS

WON THE EXCLUDED DOCUMENTS WERE Official Records;

PROPERLY PROVEN TO BE OFFICIAL PCGG TSN, while a public document, was
RECORDS? not attested by the legal custodian in
accordance to the requirement under
Rule 132, Sec. 24 and 25

-They should have had the document

attested by the officer or his deputy
having legal custody of the Records, that
the TSN in the copy of the original
• despite the Republic's claim that the excluded documentary exhibits
are public documents,
• the Sandiganbayan is correct in observing that the Republic failed to
show, in case of a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, an official publication thereof or a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certification that such officer has the custody, or in the case of
a public record of a private document, the original record, or a copy
thereof attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
By: Irvin Paul L. Cubelo
 What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document
or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he or she be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
 DAVID A. NOVERAS VS
LETICIA T. NOVERAS

FACTS:
 David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines.

 Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in

June 2005. On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.

 At the outset, SC finds that the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce
decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
DAVID A. NOVERAS VS
LETICIA T. NOVERAS

 The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence.

 Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to

the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

 Rule 39, Section 48(b) of ROC – Effect of foreign judgment or final orders.
DAVID A. NOVERAS VS
LETICIA T. NOVERAS

 Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or

record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.

 The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
 FACTUM PROBANS
 Whether or not the certificate of authenticity must be complied in order to prove
the authenticity of a foreign decree

 FACTUM PROBANDUM
 The Divorce Decree must be presented
 The Foreign law on Divorce must be presented
 An attestation from an officer that the copy is a correct copy of the original
 The attestation must be under the seal of the attesting officer
DAVID A. NOVERAS VS
LETICIA T. NOVERAS

 HELD:
In this case, based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence.
The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce
were not presented.
 It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification
where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient."
 In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree
was obtained.
 Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines.