National Defence B-GA-441-001/FP-001

Défense nationale

TACTICAL LEVEL
AVIATION DOCTRINE

WARNING
Although not classified, this publication, or any part of it, may be exempt from disclosure to
the public under the Access to Information Act. All elements of information contained herein
must be closely scrutinized to ascertain whether or not the publication or any part of it may be
released.

Issued on Authority of the Commander 1 CAD 2000-12-01

 National Defence B-GA-441-001/FP-001
Défense nationale

TACTICAL LEVEL
AVIATION DOCTRINE

WARNING
Although not classified, this publication, or any part of it, may be exempt from disclosure to
the public under the Access to Information Act. All elements of information contained herein
must be closely scrutinized to ascertain whether or not the publication or any part of it may be
released.

Issued on Authority of the Commander 1 CAD

OPI: 1 Wing A7 Doctrine 2000-12-01

Canada
 B-GA-441-001/FP-001

FOREWORD

AUTHORITY
1. This publication, Tactical Level Aviation Doctrine, is
issued on the authority of the Commander 1 CAD. It is
effective upon receipt.

2. Suggestions for amendment should be forwarded to

Headquarters 1 Wing, Attention: A7 Doctrine.

AIM
3. The aim of this publication is to detail tactical level aviation doctrine.

SCOPE
4. Canadian tactical aviation resources encompass those helicopters whose primary
mission is to support the land forces. However, tactical aviation units and their resources
are part of the air force. When these units and/or resources are not placed under OPCON
of the land forces, tactical aviation conducts air operations for the air force. This
publication focuses primarily on all the doctrinal tactical aviation roles, tasks and
missions that support the land forces throughout the spectrum of conflict.
5. The keystone tactical aviation doctrine publication for “Tactical Helicopter
Operations” is the B-GA-440-000/AF-000. This publication, the B-GA-441-001/FP-
001, further details these tactical aviation tasks and missions at the tactical level.
6. The Canadian Forces operates only one helicopter fleet to support the land forces,
the CH 146 Griffon. Despite this limitation, the CF must still be familiar with and
cognizant of all doctrinal tactical aviation roles, missions and capabilities. This is
because the CF, through its military alliances and during coalition operations, can request
the aviation support of numerous types of helicopters. Therefore, this publication
addresses not only utility helicopter doctrine, but also the doctrinal use of other helicopter
types such as reconnaissance, transport and attack helicopters. This doctrine is based
mainly on Land Forces Doctrine, NATO STANAGs, and US Army Aviation doctrine.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

7. Attention is drawn to the terms and definitions contained in the Glossary. These
include terms and definitions from the NATO Glossary (AAP-6) and others specific to
this publication. Abbreviations and a Glossary can be found at the end of this
publication.

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REFERENCES

8. The primary references for the preparation of this publication were:

a. A-AD-121-F01/JX-000 CF Manual of Abbreviations;
b. AAP-6 (U) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions;
c. ATP-40 (A) Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace
Control in the Combat Zone;
d. ATP-41 (A) Airmobile Operations;
e. ATP-49 (C) Use of Helicopters in Land Operations;
f. B-GA-440-000/AF-000 Tactical Helicopter Operations;
g. B-GA-442-001/FP-001 Tactical Aviation Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures;
h. B-GA-443-001/FP-001 1 Wing WUSOPs;
i. B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Conduct of Land Forces Operations -
Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian
Army;
j. B-GL-300-002/FP-000 Land Force Tactical Doctrine;
k. CFACM 40-46 CH146 Standard Manoeuvre Manual;
l. CFACM 60-2605 Airlift Operations - Search and Rescue;
m. R-GL-F01-101 (FM 1-101) Aviation Battlefield Survivability;
n. FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield;
o. FM 1-115 Attack Helicopter Operations; and
p. B-GG-005-004/AF-011 CF Operations - NBC Defence.

9. Related reference publications include the following:

a. B-GL-331-003/FP-001 Military Symbols for Land Operations;

b. C-05-010-022/TP-001 General Procedures for Chemical
Decontamination of Aircraft;
c. AP 3000 British Air Power Doctrine; and
d. FM 90-4 Air Assault Operations.

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10. Family Of Tactical Aviation Publications. The tactical aviation doctrine, tactics
and procedures family of publications are as follows:

a. B-GA-440-000/AF-000. Tactical Helicopter Operations;

b. B-GA-441-001/FP-001. Tactical Level Aviation Doctrine;

c. B-GA-442-001/FP-001. Tactical Aviation Tactics, Techniques and

Procedures;

d. B-GA-443-001/FP-001. 1 Wing Unit Standing Operating Procedures

(WUSOPs);

e. B-GA-444-001/FP-001. 1 Wing Tactical Aide Memoire (TAM); and

f. B-GA-445-001/FP-001. 1 Wing CH 146 In-Flight Systems and

Procedures Handbook.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

CH Page Number(s) Change Date Date Entered Signature

No.
1

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

TITLE PAGE
FOREWORD i
RECORD OF CHANGES iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS v

1 INTRODUCTION
Role 1-1
Integration 1-1
Missions 1-1
Definitions 1-2
Capabilities and Limitations 1-3
Organization 1-5

2 COMMAND AND LIAISON

General 2-1
Mission 2-1

3 RECONNAISSANCE AND TACTICAL SECURITY

General 3-1
ERSTA 3-1
Reconnaissance 3-3
Recce Principles 3-4
Recce Methods 3-5
Recce Types (Route, Zone, Area) 3-5
Surveillance 3-9
Tactical Security 3-9

4 DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF FIRE

General 4-1
Firepower At The Tactical Level 4-1
Restrictive Fire Support Measures 4-3
Permissive Fire Support Measures 4-3
Airspace Control Measures 4-4
Air Defence Weapons Control Orders 4-4
Close Air Support and Forward Air Controlling 4-5
Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) 4-6

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CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

5 PROVISION OF HELICOPTER FIRE SUPPORT
General 5-1
Door Guns 5-2
Armed Helicopters 5-3
Attack Helicopters 5-5
US Army Aviation AH Organizations 5-5
US Army Aviation AH Doctrine 5-6
Roles of the AH Squadron 5-11
AH Capabilities 5-11
Limitations 5-12
Mission 5-12
Command Relationships 5-13
Operational Terms and Definitions 5-13
Aircrew Roles and Responsibilities 5-15
Employment Methods 5-16
AH Support to Urban Operations 5-17
AH Squadron Combat Service Support 5-18
5A AH 64A Apache and AH 64D Apache Longbow 5A-1
Characteristics

6 COMBAT AIRLIFT
General 6-1
Missions 6-1
Planning Considerations 6-4
Slinging Of Guns 6-4

7 AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
General 7-1
Definitions 7-1
Capabilities and Limitations 7-3
Mission 7-4
Key Personnel 7-4
Command and Control 7-6
Plans 7-7
Planning Process 7-15
Security 7-17
Timings 7-18

8 LOGISTIC AIRLIFT
General 8-1
Capabilities And Limitations of MTHs 8-1
Mission Planning Considerations 8-3
Missions 8-3
Air Movement Responsibilities 8-5

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CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

8A CH 47D Chinook Characteristics 8A-1

9 LOGISTICS AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

General 9-1
CSS Concept 9-1
Personnel 9-1
Maintenance And Logistics 9-1
Concepts Of Support 9-2
Planning 9-3
Vehicle And Aircraft Maintenance And Recovery 9-4

10 FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELLING POINTS

General 10-1
Definition 10-1
Purpose 10-1
Personnel 10-1
Planning Factors 10-2
Threat 10-2
Command, Control and Communications 10-3
Traffic Layout 10-4
Location 10-5
Emplacement 10-6
Movement Plan 10-6
Security 10-7
Relocation 10-7
Site Preparation 10-8
Support Equipment 10-8
Refuelling Operations 10-9
Personnel Requirements 10-10
Defence 10-10
Squadron Combat Service Support 10-12
OOTW 10-13
Night Operations 10-13
Cold Weather Operations 10-13

11 AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT
General 11-1
Definitions 11-1
CASEVAC Support For Operations 11-1
CH 146 CASEVAC Capabilities 11-2
Evacuation Of Casualties During Airmobile Operations 11-3
Mission Planning Considerations 11-4

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CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Introduction 12-1
CSAR 12-1
CSAR Imperatives 12-1
CSAR Operations 12-2
CSAR Mission Execution 12-4
Individual CSAR Preparation 12-6

13 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

General 13-1
Operational Concept 13-1
Planning Considerations 13-1
OOTW Missions 13-5
Peace Support Operations 13-6
Domestic Operations 13-7
Domestic Operations Missions 13-8

14 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

Introduction 14-1
Night And Reduced Visibility Operations 14-1
Night Effects On Tactical Aviation Operations 14-2
Urban Operations 14-3
Arctic And Cold Weather Operations 14-4
Mountain Operations 14-6
Jungle Operations 14-7
Desert Operations 14-8

15 OPERATIONS IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

General 15-1
Threat 15-1
Nuclear Warfare 15-1
Thermal Radiation Effects 15-2
Blast Effects 15-3
Nuclear Radiation Effects 15-5
Electromagnetic Pulse Effects 15-7
Biological Warfare 15-8
Chemical Warfare 15-8
NBC Defence 15-10
Helicopter Decontamination 15-13
Collective Protection 15-15

16 COUNTER-MOBILITY OPERATIONS
General 16-1
Aerial Mine Laying 16-1

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CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

17 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE
General 17-1
Radio Rebroadcast 17-1
Radio Relay 17-1
Aerial Service Dispatch 17-2
Aerial and Airborne Command Posts 17-2

18 PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF 18-1

NATO HELICOPTERS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS A-1

GLOSSARY B-1

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

ROLE
1. The role of tactical aviation is to support land force operations through the
provision of aerial firepower, reconnaissance, and mobility.

INTEGRATION
2. Tactical aviation (tac avn) supports all combat functions of the land forces.
Tactical aviation forms part of the combined arms team and must be fully integrated into
land force operations to achieve its full combat potential.
3. Air Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is defined as the employment of forces through
movement in combination with speed, firepower or fire potential, to attain a position of
advantage in respect to the enemy. Tactical aviation, through its inherent air mobility and
firepower, is an air manoeuvre element. Operations within the land forces concept of
ops, must take advantage of the vertical dimension of the battlespace, primarily by
integrating the mobility and firepower of tactical aviation.

MISSIONS
4. The Land Force Mission. The mission of the Land Force is to generate and
maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence policy
objectives.
5. Mission Objectives. This broad mission is broken down into a number of
mission objectives. They include:
a. Defence of Canada. This objective calls for deterring threats to and
defending Canadian territory, the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty,
and provision of military support to civil authorities;
b. Defence of North America. This objective calls for defence of the North
American continent in cooperation with the military forces of the United
States in accordance with standing continental defence arrangements; and
c. Contributing to International Security. This objective calls for
participation in multilateral land or joint operations anywhere in the world
under the auspices of the UN or NATO, or as part of a coalition. It may
also involve humanitarian aid and relief efforts, restoration of stability, or
participation in arms control and other confidence building measures.

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6. Tactical Aviation Doctrinal Missions. Tac avn conducts combat, combat

support, and combat service support missions and tasks by day and night throughout the
battlespace during both war and operations other than war (OOTW). The land force
commander determines how to best employ tac avn with the advice of the tac hel unit
CO, who is also the land force commander’s aviation and air advisor. The doctrinal
missions that can be accomplished by tactical aviation include:
a. command and liaison (C&L);
b. reconnaissance;
c. tactical security;
d. direction and control of fire;
e. provision of helicopter fire support (anti-armour and attack helicopter
operations);
f. combat airlift;
g. airmobile operations;
h. logistic airlift;
i. counter-mobility operations;
j. aeromedical support (CASEVAC and MEDEVAC);
k. communications assistance;
l. special operations (CSAR); and
m. operations other than war (OOTW, PSO, and Domestic Operations).

DEFINITIONS
7. These operations and missions are defined as follows:
a. Command and Liaison (C&L). The rapid transport of commanders,
staff, and liaison officers to save time in battle procedure and to provide
commanders with an aerial perspective of their area of operations (AO);
b. Reconnaissance. A mission to obtain information by surveillance or
other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy;
c. Tactical Security. The measures necessary to deny information to the
enemy and to ensure that a force retains its freedom of action and is
warned or protected against an unexpected encounter with the enemy or an
attack;
d. Direction and Control of Fire. The airborne adjustment of both indirect
and direct fire. This includes field artillery, mortars, naval guns, close air
support, and armed or attack helicopters;
e. Provision of Fire Support. The provision of fire from a helicopter to
attack and destroy (primarily armour) enemy targets;

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f. Combat Airlift. The air movement of combat personnel, supplies and/or

cargo over short or medium distances, normally in the brigade area of
operations (AO);
g. Airmobile Operation. An operation in which combat forces and their
equipment move about the battlespace in aircraft, normally helicopters,
under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in ground
combat. (ADTB). (Note. The US Army uses the term “Air Assault”,
instead of airmobile);
h. Logistic Airlift. The aerial transport of defensive stores, commodities and
combat supplies either directly to the user or to delivery points where
ground logistic units can store or deliver them;
i. Counter-Mobility. All actions taken to restrict the capacity of movement
of the opponent;
j. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). The movement of casualties to
initial treatment facilities and/or to medical facilities in the combat zone;
k. Aeromedical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). The timely, efficient movement
and enroute care by medical personnel of wounded and injured personnel
from the battlefield and other locations to medical treatment facilities;
l. Communications Assistance. The assistance to communications
provided by airborne radio rebroadcast (RRB), radio relay or service
dispatch (the delivery of plans, messages and documents that cannot be
delivered by other means). Communications assistance may include any
activity, which may be executed by signals personnel operating from a
helicopter platform;
m. Special Operations. Operations conducted outside of the normal combat
and OOTW missions and tasks that are normally associated with tactical
helicopter operations. They can include unconventional warfare,
clandestine and covert activities, and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR);
and
n. Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Operations during peacetime
and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two
organized forces.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

8. Capabilities. Tac avn significantly influences land force operations by:
a. conducting day, night, and limited visibility tactical helicopter missions
and tasks throughout the entire AO;
b. providing flexible, fast response and lethal anti-armour firepower to attack
armoured targets;
c. conducting operations against an enemy force from multiple directions;
d. providing near real time information throughout the area of operations;
e. increasing the tempo of friendly and enemy operations through speed,
mobility, and firepower;

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f. rapidly moving tactical units over long distances;

g. bypassing enemy positions, barriers, and obstacles to achieve surprise;
h. enhancing the command, control, and communications process;
i. moving supplies and equipment internally and/or externally to sustain
operations;
j. transporting IOR repair parts;
k. conducting CASEVAC, MEDEVAC and personnel replacement
operations;
l. conducting deep operations; and
m. providing CSAR coverage.

9. Limitations. Tactical helicopters are subject to operating limitations that the land
force commander must consider when planning their employment. These limitations
include:
a. extreme environmental effects that reduce the capabilities of helicopters to
perform the full range of their missions;
b. limited capability to secure unit assembly areas;
c. the requirement for adequate planning and coordination time to fully
capitalize on helicopter assets;
d. the vulnerability of helicopters to Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), Surface
to Air Missiles (SAMs) and small arms threats;
e. the requirement for helicopter-specific logistics support;
f. the availability of adequate Pick-up Zones (PZs) and Landing Zones (LZs)
in the battle area;
g. the requirement for and the availability of large quantities of aviation fuel;
h. the limited number of helicopters to support a large combat force;
i. battlefield obscurants such as smoke and dust;
j. the requirement for second line maintenance to be conducted in a secure
area;
k. the limited capability of tac hel units to rig loads for slinging. Supported
units must arrange for rigging support, provide manpower to load/ unload
internal loads; and
l. NBC contamination, which affects helicopter airframes and avionics
moreso than ground vehicles. NBC decontamination is a more time
consuming and labour intensive venture for helicopters.

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ORGANIZATION
10. Peacetime Organization. Doctrinal wing/squadron organizations have rarely
been fielded in Canada. From its beginnings, 10 TAG (Tactical Air Group) organized
itself into non-doctrinal Tactical Helicopter Squadrons. These composite squadrons were
structured to support the peacetime training requirements of the brigades, and did not
represent a normal brigade level grouping. The largest constraint on forming doctrinal
groupings, such as the Wing illustrated above, has been and continues to be the lack of
numbers and types of helicopters. 1 Wing has the resources to field only the doctrinal
Utility Squadron. Attack Helicopter and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter units exist
in coalition countries. During coalition operations, their use can be requested from the
affiliated division, or in cases where a divisional structure does not exist, they may be
grouped with the multi-national brigade as part of a special combat grouping.
11. Doctrinal Organization. Tactical doctrine encompasses the divisional level and
below. At the divisional level, tactical aviation provides a Wing formation to support the
division and its brigades. The doctrinal Wing organization is depicted at Figure 1-1. The
Wing is composed of a Wing HQ, an Attack Squadron, a Reconnaissance Squadron, a
Utility Squadron and an Aviation Maintenance Squadron.

HQ

A R U

Figure 1-1. The Doctrinal Aviation Wing

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CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND LIAISON

GENERAL
1. Command and Liaison (C&L) is a mission, which has broadened over the years
from its original intent. It was associated mostly with the CH 136 Kiowa as a Light
Observation Helicopter (LOH) task, but any helicopter capable of carrying passengers
can accomplish C&L.

MISSION
2. C&L is the rapid transport of commanders, staff, and liaison officers to save time
in battle procedure and/or to provide commanders with an aerial perspective of their area
of operations. This mission can be broken down into two basic tasks as follows:
a. Transporting Commander(s) and/or staff. The intent of this mission
can be twofold. The primary purpose is to speed up the mission planning
process by transporting commanders and/or their staff to/from orders
groups at the higher headquarters. In some circumstances, depending on
time and the threat, the flight may include an overflight of the
commander’s area of operations to obtain situational awareness of the
terrain. The scope of this mission can be broadened in the “commander”
sense of the definition from the higher levels of command, down to the
company and platoon commander level, depending on the time, space,
urgency and importance of the mission; and
b. Transporting Liaison Officers. Liaison officers can provide plans and/or
orders from higher headquarters to lower or flanking headquarters which
may require speed, or hand to hand delivery, and/or face to face
discussions or briefings for security reasons. Although secure means exist
to distribute this information, some commanders will prefer the personal
delivery by liaison officers of written orders, overlays and maps to
subordinate commanders. Helicopters provide speed to lessen the enroute
delivery time. During coalition operations, the role of the liaison officer in
providing the timely passage of information and orders could be vital to
the success of the overall mission planning process.

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CHAPTER 3
RECONNAISSANCE AND TACTICAL SECURITY

GENERAL
1. To operate effectively, land force commanders require timely and accurate
information about the enemy and the environment. Reconnaissance (recce) is the
primary means of providing this critical information. Recce allows follow-on forces to
manoeuvre more freely and rapidly to the objective. Recce also allows the higher
commander to keep other forces free from contact as long as possible and concentrated
for the decisive engagement. Tactical Security missions involve both information
gathering and protection of the main body. In order to enhance recce, tactical security
and surveillance capabilities, electro-optical, FLIR mission kits, such as ERSTA, can be
added to a helicopter.

ERSTA
2. General. The Electro-Optical Reconnaissance Target and Acquisition (ERSTA)
mission kit gives trained helicopter crews a greatly enhanced capability to conduct
reconnaissance, fire support and target acquisition tasks in support of land force
operations and combat functions across the spectrum of conflict. The ERSTA mission kit
is capable of functioning under day and night conditions. During joint operations, the
ERSTA mission kit will be interoperable with the CF Information Architecture and
compatible with other CF reconnaissance and surveillance systems (see Figure 3-1).
3. The ERSTA mission kit consists of three primary components:
a. the Sensor Package (SP) which includes a passive multi-spectral sensor
and an active laser range finder and designator mounted in a single
housing on the exterior of the airframe;
b. the Airborne Control Station (ACS) mounted in the cabin area of the
helicopter, which includes the sensor controls, image and data displays,
data link, recording equipment, computer and console; and
c. the Ground Station (GS) consisting of sub-components similar to the ACS
mounted on a console, in a vehicle or command post. Note that tac avn
ground stations are assigned to and are operated by aviation units, but
these are identical to the army units’ ground stations. Aviation and ground
units are able to transmit information through either ground station.
4. The ERSTA SP provides high-resolution imagery for detecting, recognizing and
identifying targets and is capable of ranging and designating targets. The ERSTA SP
functions are controlled from the ACS console. The ACS is capable of real and near-real
time transmission of SP imagery, data and message text through a data link to the GS or
other platforms supporting Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) protocol. The GS is
capable of receiving, recording and storing the imagery, data and reports transmitted by
the ACS. The products of the ERSTA mission kit are mission dependant. Trained crews

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will conduct reconnaissance, tactical security, or fire support tasks (through the use of
target acquisition (TA) to direct either artillery, armed helicopters or AHs onto the
identified and designated target). Exploitation of the ERSTA mission kit products and
the conversion of those products from data to information to knowledge are the
responsibility of the supported unit or ISTAR system.
5. The positioning of the GS and the transmission of imagery and data from the SP
will be dependent on a number of factors. These factors include the tactical situation,
the disposition of forces, the threat, the terrain and the mission, as well as the
interoperability of the ERSTA mission kit with the information architecture, or the
availability of interoperable ground based assets. For autonomous operations, the GS
will be positioned as required to receive the data link from the ACS and disseminate the
information to the supported commander, unit or agency. For joint operations, the GS
will be positioned as required to function within the available information architecture.
6. In the absence of a weapons system with the ability to engage and destroy a
threat, an ERSTA equipped helicopter is restricted to defensive manoeuvring in executing
reconnaissance, tactical security, and fire support tasks. The primary tactics for
performing reconnaissance and fire support missions are based on the use of covert flight
profiles both behind and forward of the FEBA, maximizing the exploitation of the SP
performance capabilities for operating at safe standoff distances. These tactics include
the ability to complete the mission using masking techniques and tactics to avoid
detection, and operating outside the effective engagement envelope of threat weapon(s)
system(s) whenever terrain and the tactical scenario permit.
7. For operations in a threat environment, helicopters employed on reconnaissance,
tactical security or fire support missions will normally be fitted with a defensive
electronic warfare systems (DEWS), infra-red suppression systems (IRSS), armoured
protection and door guns. Depending on the level of the threat and the availability of
equipment, the array of DEWS equipment will normally include a missile approach and
warning system (MAWS), a radar laser warning receiver (RLWR), and a chaff and flare
dispenser.
8. Reconnaissance, tactical security or fire support missions undertaken in a threat
environment will normally be conducted by a section of two ERSTA equipped
helicopters. This tactic is based on the concept of mutual support. The second
helicopter's primary task will be the protection of the other one conducting the mission.
9. The operational missions and tasks which may be undertaken by helicopters
equipped with the ERSTA mission kit are defined under the following combat functions:
a. Information Operations:
(1) reconnaissance, and
(2) tactical security;
b. Firepower:
(1) target acquisition and designation, and

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(2) direction and control of fire (AOP and FAC);

c. Protection:
(1) tactical security (screen, guard, flank and rear area security),
(2) support of combat search and rescue (CSAR), and
(3) road move security; and
d. Manoeuvre:
(1) tasks in support of airmobile operations, and
(2) tasks in support of insertion and extraction operations.

UAVs Legend: Data Link

Unconfirmed

Ground Int
Cell Users
Station
NDHQ
146401

JFHQ

146401
Land Force Areas

Battalions
Immediate targeting,
reporting, and Police
initial info gathering.
U.N.

Figure 3-1. ERSTA Concept of Operations – Information Flow

RECONNAISSANCE
10. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information by observation or
other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy. Information is a
by-product of all operations, acquired as they are in progress. Recce, however, is a
focused information collection effort. It is performed before and during other combat
operations to provide information used by the land force commander to confirm or
modify the concept of ops. Normally, a small, dedicated force is specifically assigned to
conduct the tactical recce mission for a larger formation. This dedicated force is
normally a combination of a ground force, specially trained to accomplish the three types
of reconnaissance: route, zone and area. With the unique characteristics of terrain
independence, speed, and long range electro-optical and FLIR systems, helicopters are
ideally suited to perform recce missions. Ground reconnaissance forces provide detailed
investigation and sustained presence. Ideally, the goal should be to combine and exploit
the strengths of each of these forces.

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Figure 3-2. OH 58D Recce Section

RECCE PRINCIPLES
11. The detailed procedures for employing and controlling a combined helicopter and
ground force recce operation is the responsibility of the designated land unit or sub unit
commander. The land force recce commander must consider the complexity of combined
recce operations and provide effective C2 and co-ordination for all forces directly
involved, including indirect fire support. The fundamental principles of recce are well
established and apply to both helicopter and land recce forces. These fundamental
principles are:
a. rapidly provide the commander with fresh, timely, and accurate
information on the enemy and the designated terrain;
b. use the required number of available reconnaissance forces required to
accomplish the mission;
c. focus on the recce objective;
d. gain and maintain contact with enemy forces;
e. develop the situation so the maximum information is obtained; and
f. avoid becoming decisively engaged with the enemy.

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RECCE METHODS
12. The three methods of conducting reconnaissance are by stealth, in force, and
dismounted. Each method has unique advantages and disadvantages. The recce methods
are detailed as follows:
a. Reconnaissance by Stealth. As the name describes, reconnaissance by
stealth strives to acquire information without exposing the recce force to
non-friendly forces. Surveillance is the primary task performed. Not only
does the stealth reconnaissance element avoid physical contact with the
opposing force, but it also avoids being detected. Helicopters gather
information through quiet and deliberate stand off techniques. This denies
the opposing force the opportunity of obtaining information on the recce
force;
b. Reconnaissance in Force. The purpose of reconnaissance in force is to
compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or
intention of the force by making the enemy respond to offensive action.
Armed/Attack helicopters, with their standoff target detection and
engagement ability, speed and lethal firepower, can employ this method
very effectively. This method can also determine the opponent’s
willingness to fight; and
c. Dismounted Reconnaissance. Aircrew may be required to dismount
from the helicopter, in extreme circumstances, when information is
required on a specific reconnaissance objective. This technique is time
intensive, can place the helicopter in a vulnerable position, and does not
make the best use of a helicopter resource.

RECCE TYPES
13. Recce is divided into three types of missions: Route, Zone, and Area. (Note that
Area Recce includes what some nations call a “Point Recce”, i.e. a bridge, where the
bridge is a very small, defined area). Helicopters conducting any of these recce missions
can employ anyone of these three recce methods. The three types of recce are detailed as
follows:
a. Route Recce.
(1) General. The objective of a route recce is to obtain detailed
information on a specific route and all aspects that could affect the
military use of that route. The assigned route may be a road or an
axis of advance. In either case, it should be well defined and have
a designated start and end point. Conducting a recce of a single
route normally requires only one section of helicopters. However,
there may be multiple route reconnaissances being conducted
simultaneously, thereby requiring multiple sections of helicopters.
The essential information required includes, but is not limited to:

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(a) the enemy situation,

(b) the condition of the route,
(c) the load classification of roads and bridges,
(d) the dominating terrain,
(e) the location and state of urban areas, and
(f) the restrictions, limitations, lateral routes, obstacles and
bypasses,
(2) Helicopter Only. In a no threat or a low threat situation, with the
ability to conduct long range observation and to traverse the route
rapidly, a helicopter section(s) can quickly complete a route recce.
Even though helicopters do not drive or physically test the route,
trained aircrew can acquire most of the essential information.
When necessary, the crew or specific passengers can dismount and
conduct detailed analysis inspections at critical points, and
(3) Helicopter and Ground Operations. When conducting a
combined helicopter and land force recce, helicopters can rapidly
scan the route for any obvious enemy and critical points of interest.
They can also inspect any dominating terrain adjacent to the route
while concurrently securing the flanks for the ground recce
element. This permits the land force element to advance rapidly
and to concentrate on the physical condition of the route and
critical points. The land force should actually drive the route and
conduct detailed inspections in those areas, such as forests and
urban areas, where helicopters cannot observe;
b. Zone Recce.
(1) General. The zone recce is the most time consuming and
comprehensive of the recce missions. Its objective is to provide
the land force commander with detailed information regarding the
zone before the next larger formation enters the zone. The level of
detailed information achieved will depend on factors such as the
commander's intent, and the time and recce troops available.
Within the constraints of these factors, the following tasks should
be inherent to zone recce:
(a) the detection of enemy activity,
(b) the inspection of all terrain within the zone to evaluate its
military use and suitability for traffic,
(c) the inspection and classification of all bridges, fords,
tunnels and other obstacle crossing sites,

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(d) the load classification of all routes, including overpasses

and underpasses,
(e) the location of all mines, obstacles, and barriers, and
(f) the location of bypasses for obstacles, barriers and urban
areas,
(2) A zone recce is normally conducted in advance of a larger force's
offensive manoeuvre. The recce force commander will have
conducted a thorough appreciation prior to the start of the recce
mission. The force conducting the recce needs to be agile and
afforded a great degree of freedom of how to accomplish its
mission. This facilitates the discovery of a path of least resistance
and opportunities may be exploited as they occur. Essentially, the
recce force preserves its parent formation's combat power by
"pulling" it through the zone. A single unit or a series of adjacent
units may conduct the zone recce. The dimensions of these zones
are not standard, but will be based on the type of terrain, the
capabilities of the recce force, and the time available to complete
the mission. Within the boundaries of the zone, phase lines will be
designated which are generally perpendicular to the axis of
advance to control and coordinate the advance. Additional control
measures, such as contact points, coordination points, or internally
generated boundaries/phase lines, may be used,
(3) Helicopters Only. In a no threat or a low threat situation, the use
of a helicopter section(s) can significantly increase the speed and
agility of the recce, thereby reducing the time required. However,
certain features will require the helicopter crews to dismount in
order to conduct detailed inspections, e.g. forest and tunnels. If a
zone contains numerous such features, their advantage of speed
will be diminished,
(4) Helicopter and Ground Operations. Ideally, helicopter and land
forces should be combined to conduct the zone recce mission. By
using advanced optics to observe and manoeuvrability to reposition
to successive vantage points, helicopters can easily cover large
open areas relatively quickly and detect any significant activity.
This enables the land recce force to expedite movement to the
critical points where a detailed reconnaissance is required.
Specifically, land and helicopter forces can compliment each other
by:
(a) helicopters reconnoitring terrain not easily accessible to
ground vehicles, such as steep terrain or marshes. Likewise,
land forces cover forests, urban areas, and other areas not
easily accessible to helicopters,

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(b) helicopters rapidly scanning the zone to locate large

moving enemy formations and checking specific key
points. The land force elements can then conduct a detailed
examination of critical points, while the helicopters secure
the flanks, and
(c) helicopters securing the far side of obstacles and locating
potential bypasses while land elements conduct detailed
inspections of these areas; and
c. Area Recce.
(1) General. The objective of an area recce is to obtain detailed
information on a specific feature such as a town, forest, valley or
other identifiable feature (i.e., a bridge). The entire focus of the
recce force will be the designated feature. The recce activity is
similar to that of a zone recce. Within the assigned area, the recce
force is required to perform the same tasks as the zone recce,
(2) Despite the similarities, the two main differences between the zone
and area recce are:
(a) the geometry of the boundaries. With a zone recce, the
boundaries are distinctly linear and box-shaped. The base
of the box is normally on the FLOT and designated the line
of departure (LD). The mission and forward movement
begins at the LD with the zone frequently covering the
recce elements higher formation's entire front. An area
recce is normally defined by circular or irregular, but
enclosed boundaries, and is a comparatively smaller area
than the zone recce, and
(b) the relative location of the recce area to friendly forces.
For the zone recce, normally, the recce force begins from
friendly territory at the LD and moves into terrain not
controlled by friendly forces. Frequently, friendly forces
follow the recce force through the zone. In contrast for an
area recce, the recce force must usually travel to the area,
which may or may not be in friendly controlled territory.
This travel may be accomplished by a tactical or
administrative road move to their assigned area. Enemy
contact is avoided en route to their area. Usually, friendly
forces do not immediately follow the force conducting an
area recce, and
(3) the decision to conduct a combined, ground and helicopter area
recce is the land force commander's, on advice from the aviation
unit CO.

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SURVEILLANCE
14. Surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of the battle area by visual,
aural, electronic, photographic or other means to detect, track and report enemy
movement, strength and avenues of approach for combat intelligence purposes.
15. Surveillance may include the observation of bridges, crossroads, built up areas,
points of tactical interest and avenues of approach. Surveillance is normally required as a
means of conducting reconnaissance, screens, guards, and rear area and flank security
missions.

TACTICAL SECURITY
16. General. Tactical security missions are conducted to gather information about
the enemy, and to provide early warning, reaction time, manoeuvre space and protection
for the main body. The main difference between tactical security and reconnaissance is
the protection of the main body. Protection can be achieved by directing field artillery
through AOP (Chapter 4), from controlling Close Air Support through FAC (Chapter 4),
and by fire support from AHs (Chapter 5). Tactical security missions are characterized
by reconnaissance to reduce terrain and enemy unknowns, gaining and maintaining
contact with the enemy to ensure continuous information flow, and providing early and
accurate reporting of information to the protected force. Tactical security missions are
defined by both the degree of protection offered to the main body and the physical
characteristics of the operation. Tactical security missions include screen, guard,
covering force, and area security missions.
17. Screen. The primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning to the main
body. Based on the higher commander's intent and the screen's capabilities, it may also be
required to destroy enemy reconnaissance and impede and harass the enemy main body
with indirect and/or direct fires. Screen missions are defensive in nature and are largely
accomplished by establishing a series of OPs, AOPs and conducting patrols to ensure
adequate surveillance of the assigned sector. The screen provides the protected force
with the least protection of any tactical security mission. The critical tasks of a screen
mission are as follows:
a. provide early warning of enemy approach;
b. maintain continuous surveillance of all battalion-size avenues of approach
into the sector; and
c. gain and maintain enemy contact and report enemy activity.

18. Guard. A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force.
Additionally, a guard force prevents enemy ground observation of, and direct fire against
the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to
accomplish its mission. A guard force normally operates within the range of the main
body’s indirect fire weapons. The main body force commander will assign a guard
mission when contact is expected or when there is an exposed flank.

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19. Covering Force. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and
guard forces. Additionally, a covering force operates apart from the main body to
develop the situation early, and to deceive, disorganize and destroy enemy forces. Unlike
screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained and capable of
operating independently of the main body.
20. Area Security. Area security is a form of security that includes reconnaissance
and tactical security of designated personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main
supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical points. An area security
force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It operates in an area
delineated by the headquarters assigning the area security mission. It screens,
reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. Area
security ops focus on the enemy, the force being protected, or a combination of the two.

21. Road Move Security. Road move security is a variation of route security that is
performed when conducting tactical security for the entire route is not feasible. This may
be because of the length of the route, the strength of the enemy forces, or the limitations
of available tactical security assets. The integration of air and land forces during road
move security operations works best. Aviation may conduct limited route reconnaissance
in conjunction with a zone reconnaissance forward of the scout platoons that are better
suited for the escort element. Aviation may additionally conduct a flank and a rear screen
as the road move elements move along the route.

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CHAPTER 4
DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF FIRE

GENERAL
1. Direction and control of fire has been an important mission of aviation since its
inception. This is because of the ability of recce helicopters to locate and accurately
identify enemy targets, for field artillery, close air support aircraft, and for armed and
attack helicopters.

FIREPOWER AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

2. At the tactical level of conflict, battles, engagements and other actions are planned
and executed to accomplish military objectives established by the operational level
commander. Tactical firepower consists of the coordinated and collective use of target
acquisition data, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft and other means against
enemy elements in contact or imminent contact. Tactical firepower includes direct fire
weapons, field artillery, mortars, close air support, armed and attack helicopters, naval
gunfire and offensive Info Ops. Manoeuvre commanders normally direct tactical
firepower in support of manoeuvre operations. Firepower and manoeuvre forces are
concentrated at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents
itself and when such a confrontation fits the larger purpose.
3. Fire Support Coordination. The integration and synchronization of fire support
with the land force commander’s battle plan is achieved through the process of fire
support planning and coordination. Formal planning and coordination binds the fire
support resources together in a common effort with the aim of attacking targets with the
most effective and efficient attack resource(s) in accordance with the commander’s
intent. In coordinating fire support, cooperation among the various fire support agencies
is necessary for the effective delivery of fire. This is accomplished through the Fire
Support Coordination Centre (FSCC). The G3 Aviation is part of the FSCC.
4. Control of Fire - AOP. Helicopter aircrew can conduct Air Observation Post
(AOP) missions to direct and adjust fire onto acquired and identified targets. AOPs can
operate either as a direct resource of the FSCC or under the control of a Forward
Observation Officer. Airborne adjustment of fire, whether these fires originate from field
artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, armed helicopters, attack helicopters, or close air support
(CAS), follows the same fundamentals as adjustment of fire from the ground. Airborne
platforms provide increased mobility and a much improved field of view, both of which
aid immensely in the conduct of direction and control of fire missions. The key to
successfully bringing fire onto a target is to accurately identify the target’s exact grid.
This capability is greatly enhanced by the target acquisition function of ERSTA.

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5. Aviation Fire Support. Tactical aviation, as a manoeuvre force, contributes to

fire support by acquiring and identifying targets, designating targets by laser designation,
adjusting indirect fires, and providing direct fire support with armed and attack
helicopters (see Chapter 5). De-confliction of airspace and control of fire must be closely
coordinated through the applicable FSCC and Army manoeuvre forces.
6. SEAD. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) is an essential part of
operations employing air missions beyond the FEBA. It is the activity that neutralizes,
destroys, or suppresses enemy AD systems in a specific area by physical attack and
electronic warfare to enable CAS and helicopter operations to be successfully conducted.
It increases the probability of success and reduces the loss of friendly air power. Before a
CAS request is submitted, the benefits of the support are weighed against the SEAD
effort required to accomplish the mission. In some cases, SEAD may take priority over
other artillery missions. SEAD requires an integrated air and land force effort to locate
and suppress enemy air defence systems.
7. Planning. Fire support is utilized to support aircraft flying past areas of known
enemy positions. This fire support should be intense and of short duration because of
aircraft speed past specific points. They are planned on areas and scheduled at times
when flights are endangered. Fire plans may cover PZs, LZs, flight routes, and suspected
enemy avenues of approach to LZs. Fire support plans include lethal and, non-lethal
SEAD. Plans should ensure that friendly elements do not use ordnance, which obscures
aircrew vision, especially during NVG missions. Whenever possible, operations should
take advantage of the coordinated effects of all elements of the combined arms team.
Coordinating and synchronizing actions with CAS aircraft provides enhanced effects and
increased survivability.
8. Field Artillery. Field Artillery provides close support, SEAD, counter battery
fire, interdiction, attrition, coordination, and target acquisition to manoeuvre forces, as
required. Field Artillery units also have limited ability to destroy, neutralize, suppress, or
harass enemy targets including mobile armour. SEAD fire is designed to facilitate the
manoeuvre of air assets. SEAD delivery systems include guns, rockets, missiles, and
potentially non-lethal systems. These delivery systems can provide fire support under all
conditions of weather and in all types of terrain. They can shift and mass fire rapidly
without having to move, and the extended ranges of rockets and missiles enable the
commander to attack in-depth. A variety of gun munitions provide increased flexibility
in attacking targets.
9. Dedicated Fire Support. Land Force firepower assets are rarely assigned a
tactical task to provide dedicated fire support for SEAD. Rather, through the effective
use of tactical tasks, prioritization of fires, and the commander’s intent, specific fire
support tasks can be managed more efficiently. Because the exact location of every
enemy AD weapon cannot be known, some suppression assets should ideally be
immediately available to pilots or observers. Before an operation begins, units to support
the SEAD plan may be identified or may be planned for in the Attack Guidance Matrix
for Land Forces or in the ATO for Air Forces. The priority of fire for these identified
units shifts to providing fire support for SEAD when aircraft are used in the area via the

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FSCC. Suppressive fires are routinely planned against known and suspected SA-6, SA-8,
and SA-11 AD sites.
10. Fire Support Requests. Normal fire support request channels are used for the
engagement of targets of opportunity. Because of the mobility and small size of most AD
targets, aircrew use observed fire techniques and engage targets immediately upon
detection. Fire is adjusted on these targets by forward ground observers or attack or recce
helicopter pilots (AOP). Commanders may order the forward ground observer or AOP to
locate and bring under attack enemy AD systems in the vicinity of the target just before
the arrival of CAS aircraft.
11. Fire Support Coordination Measures. These measures are depicted on maps,
charts, and overlays either to reduce requirements for coordination or to restrict firing
into certain areas. Restrictive measures are those that restrict or prohibit firing into an
area. Permissive measures are those that reduce requirements for coordination and
thereby expedite the attack of targets. When a restrictive or permissive measure is used,
the graphic display contains the title (abbreviation) of the measure, the establishing
headquarters, and an effective date-time group.

RESTRICTIVE FIRE SUPPORT MEASURES

12. Restrictive Fire Area. An RFA is an area with specific restrictions and in which
fire that exceeds those restrictions is not delivered without coordination with the
establishing headquarters.
13. No-Fire Area. An NFA is an area into which no fire or effects are allowed. The
two exceptions to the NFA are when the establishing headquarters allows fire on a
mission by mission basis; or when a friendly force is engaged by an enemy located within
the NFA, and the commander returns fire in defence.
14. No-Fire Line. The NFL is a line short of which artillery or ships do not fire
except on request or approval of the supported commander, but beyond which they may
fire at any time without danger to friendly troops. Within a NATO force this line may be
referred to as the Fire Support Safety Line (FSSL).
15. Restrictive Fire Line. The RFL is a line between converging friendly forces that
prohibits fire, or the effects of fire, across the line without coordination with the affected
force.
16. Airspace Coordination Area. An informal ACA is normally used for immediate
air strikes, and can be established at the battalion level or higher. An informal ACA can
be established by using lateral, altitude, or timed separation. They are usually in effect
for a very short period of time. A formal ACA is a three-dimensional block of airspace
that provides lateral and altitude separation between aircraft and other fire support assets,
and is established by a brigade or higher.

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PERMISSIVE FIRE SUPPORT MEASURES

17. Fire Support Coordination Line. The FSCL is a line established and adjusted
by the appropriate land commander (usually the corps commander) within their
boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected
commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the
air and on the ground.
18. Free Fire Area. An FFA is a specific, designated area into which any weapon
system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

19. General. New airspace control measures are being adopted by NATO and
include the following:
a. Special Corridor (SC). An area established specifically to accommodate the
special routing requirements of specific missions. (ATP - 40(B));
b. Transit Corridor (TC). A bi-directional corridor in the rear area, air traffic
services not normally provided. (ATP - 40 (B));
c. Transit Route (TR). A temporary corridor of defined dimensions
established in the forward area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from
friendly Air Defence or surface forces. (ATP - 40 (B)); and
d. Standard use Army Aircraft Flight Route (SAAFR). A route established
below the coordination altitude to facilitate movement of helicopters in the
forward area in direct support of ground operations. (ATP - 40 (B)).

AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS CONTROL ORDERS

20. The definitions from A-AD-121-AAP/JX-001 for weapons control orders
(WCOs) are as fols:
a. Weapons Tight. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status
whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile;
b. Weapons Hold. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status
whereby weapons systems may only be fired in self-defence or in response to
a formal order; and
c. Weapons Free. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status
whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively
recognized as friendly;

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21. WCOs were created specifically for the use of ground-based air defence weapons
systems, such as Javelin and ADATS. AD WCOs are AD control measures used to
defend against air targets. That is why aircrew must know which WCO is in effect and
when it is effective. AD WCOs are not intended for non-AD units or helicopters.
22. However, within the air defence paragraph of an Op O, there will be an "All-
Arms Air Defence (AAAD) WCO" which will use the same definitions, but normally at a
different Weapons Control Status (WCS). It is directed at all other land force weapons
systems that could be used against air targets. Normally, the AAAD WCS will be
“Weapons Hold”. This is because the primary function of these other units is not air
defence. However, this does give these ground units the right to fire in self-defence at
any attacking aircraft. AD WCOs also have no effect on a ground unit's ability to engage
ground targets. For instance, even though Weapons Tight or Weapons Hold may be in
effect for AD units, this will not affect an infantry or a recce unit’s ROEs for engaging
enemy ground targets. Despite the fact that the low level airspace may seem to be a safe
place to fly with restrictive AD WCOs in effect, there may be unlimited engagements
going on between opposing ground forces.
23. ROEs will cover the firing of weapons from aircraft at ground targets, whether it
be from a CAS aircraft or a helicopter. Even if Weapons Hold applied to aviation, it
would give the crew the option of firing the door gun self-defence weapon in a self-
defence situation, but only in an AD scenario (i.e. engaging an air target). AD WCOs
have no affect on whether a helicopter door gun should engage enemy ground targets.
See B-GA-442-001/FP-001, Tactical Aviation TTPs, Chapter 4, for details on door guns.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLING (FAC)

24. General. CAS is air action against targets that are in close proximity to friendly
land forces and directly affects the course of the land battle. These missions require
detailed integration with the fire and manoeuvre of supported forces to increase
effectiveness and to avoid fratricide. The tactical air control system plans, directs, and
controls CAS missions, which are executed, based on preplanned or immediate requests.
25. Preplanned Requests. Preplanned requests are those for which a requirement
can be foreseen. They permit detailed planning, integration, and coordination with the
ground tactical plan. Munitions can be tailored precisely to the target.
26. Immediate Requests. Immediate requests are those requests received from
supported ground commanders to fulfill urgent, unforeseen requirements. Details of the
mission are generally coordinated while aircraft are held on alert or are airborne. The
brigade Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) transmits the request directly to the Air
Support Operations Centre (ASOC) at the division or corps headquarters over the air
request net. The TACP at each intermediate HQ level monitors the transmission. Each
intermediate TACP coordinates the request with the G3 and the Fire Support
Coordination Cell (FSCC) at their level to determine approval or disapproval of the
request. Silence by an intermediate TACP indicates approval by the associated HQ
unless a disapproval is transmitted within a specified time stated in the unit SOP.
(Normally, the time is 10 minutes). If any higher headquarters above the initiating level

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disapproves the request, the TACP at that headquarters notifies the ASOC and the
initiating TACP, giving the reason for the disapproval. The ASOC passes a copy of the
request to the Corps G3 Air, who is collocated in the TACAIR support element, for
coordination with the FSCC. When the request is approved, the ASOC orders the mission
flown. Response to immediate requests may involve launching general alert aircraft,
using ground or air alert sorties, or diverting airborne aircraft from other missions.
27. Use of CAS. To be effective, CAS must be employed against targets that present
the most immediate threat to the supported force, weighed against the aircraft's payload
or available weapons. Almost any threat encountered inside the FSCL and near the
FLOT may be suitable for CAS targeting, but the indiscriminate use of CAS may
needlessly increase the attrition of attack aircraft and increase the chances of fratricide.
No single category of target is most suitable for CAS application. Mobile massed armour
formations, however, present a threat to friendly ground forces and thus are prime
candidates for air attack.
28. CAS Control. A TACP advises the ground commander and his staff on the
integration of CAS operations with ground operations. The TACP also coordinates and
directs close air strikes in conjunction with a designated FAC and the applicable FSCC.
The Brigade TACP can consist of an ALO, the G3 Air and the G3 Avn. A CAS strike is
normally controlled by a ground or an airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC). When
ordnance is a factor to the safety of friendly troops, the aircraft's axis of attack should be
parallel to the friendly forces. The FAC identifies friendly positions in relation to the
target, locates and describes the target, talks the fighter onto the target and clears the pilot
to drop the requested ordnance. Helicopters have both VHF and UHF capabilities to talk
to CAS aircraft. The FAC is controlled by the applicable FSCC.

JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM (JAAT)

29. A JAAT operation is a coordinated attack involving a combination of aviation and
CAS, normally supported by field artillery or naval gunfire and, where possible, by
electronic warfare assets. JAATs normally operate in a coordinated effort with ground
manoeuvre forces against enemy armoured formations, command vehicles and AD
systems. The purpose of a JAAT is to create a joint team that can provide the land force
commander with a flexible combination of firepower that can move quickly across the
battlefield. G2, G3, artillery, aviation and air staffs will carry out the IPB, plan the
operation and prepare the fire plan, the Airspace Control Order and the AD Weapon
Control Order. A formation commander will usually delegate the planning and
coordination of a JAAT mission to the artillery advisor, who will then prepare and issue
the JAAT Mission Orders. Control of the JAAT is then delegated to an appropriate
aviation commander, who will deploy to execute the operation using assigned airborne
FACs, artillery observers, artillery, aviation and air forces. These attacks are usually
planned and coordinated at formation level and controlled down to the brigade level.

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CHAPTER 5
PROVISION OF HELICOPTER FIRE SUPPORT

GENERAL
1. Generating combat power on the battlefield requires combining the movement of
combat forces with the employment of their direct fire resources. The more immediate
the combat in time and space, the more intertwined are firepower and manoeuvre.
Helicopters armed with offensive weapons systems provide the land force commander
with a mobile and lethal manoeuvre element as part of a combined arms team. The
technology required for target identification, target designation and the weapons systems
themselves are very costly items, making these helicopters high value assets. In order to
protect them during their missions, they must operate in mutual support of ground units
during close operations, and be protected by SEAD (see Chapter 4) during deep and
special operations.
2. Since these are such high value assets, their control is normally retained
at a high level. In a war scenario, these are Corps and Divisional assets. They are used
as a manoeuvre firepower force by the corps and div commander(s) against lucrative
armour targets. The likelihood of brigades having attack helicopter support, in a corps or
a division size operation, is not very high. This is not the case, however, in OOTW. An
attack helicopter unit could be placed OPCON of a brigade group or a brigade, if that
were the largest size formation in an area of operations (see para 39). In this case, attack
helicopters could be used against a smaller number of targets.
3. In the 1980s, many CF army and tac hel personnel worked with US Army Cobra
helicopter units during NATO operations. Some still use this Cobra experience as how
attack helicopters operate. In those days, attack helicopter target identification and
engagement distances were limited to a maximum of 4 kms. At these distances, the
supported ground unit would easily be able to see the entire engagement from the attack
helicopter’s firing position to the target. Anti-armour missiles of this era were normally
wire guided (TOW), requiring the helicopter crew to remain in the hover to guide the
missile onto the target. Subsequently, the Hellfire missile was developed to hit targets by
means of laser designation. Since then, improved technologies have permitted increased
standoff and engagement distances to 8+ kms. The new Hellfire 2 missile on the AH
64D Apache Longbow is a fire and forget weapon. The RAH (Recce Attack Helicopter)
66 Comanche incorporates leading edge technology to further enhance aviation firepower
capability.
4. Definitions. Helicopters capable of performing fire support tasks include those
that possess effective “button-on” armament packages. Definitions relating to helicopters
capable of providing fire support are as follows:
a. Armed Helicopter. “A helicopter fitted with weapons or weapon
systems”. (AAP-6);
b. Anti-Armour Helicopter. “A helicopter armed primarily for use in the
destruction of armoured targets”. (AAP-6);

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c. Attack Helicopter (AH). “A helicopter specifically designed to

employ various weapons to attack and destroy enemy targets”.
(AAP-6); and
d. Armed Recce Helicopter. “A helicopter designed to enhance the
lethality and tempo of land force manoeuvre through armed
reconnaissance and the application of precision firepower”. (AS
Army).
5. Weapons systems are mounted on helicopters to give them the firepower
required to support the land forces and/or to protect themselves. There are a
variety of weapons systems that can be mounted from chin mounted gattling guns
to fire and forget missiles, which affect the role of the helicopter to which it is
mounted. Generally, these weapons fall into either a self-defence, a defensive or
an offensive category. Most utility helicopters can be equipped with a Defensive
Early Warning Suite (DEWS) and are capable of becoming armed helicopters with
add on missile, rocket and/or cannon mission kits.

Figure 5-1. An Armed Utility (Blackhawk) Helicopter

DOOR GUNS
6. A door gun is an add on mission kit, mounted externally on either or both
sides of a helicopter. A door gun gives a helicopter a limited capability of
providing suppressive or defensive fire when engaged in airmobile operations and
other operations, which require self-defence. Externally mounted door guns also
provide a visual deterrent. There can be situations when unexpected opposition is
encountered, particularly in a LZ during the landing or the deplaning phase of an

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airmobile. In these cases, door guns can provide some suppressive fire capability
for the limited period of time when the helicopter is in the LZ area and initiating
alternate/evasive actions. For airmobile operations, ROEs, arcs of fire and areas
of responsibility for each helicopter in the formation need to be assigned in order
to provide the best area of protective coverage and to limit the possibility of
fratricide. Operations that could utilize door guns are:
a. self-defence during reconnaissance or tactical security missions;
b. self-defence during special operations;
c. self-defence during operations other than war; and
d. self-defence during CASEVAC from hostile areas.
7. Door guns are purely defensive in nature. They do not and are not intended to
provide the offensive fire support, which is provided by armed or attack helicopters.
(For details on door gun ops, see the Door Gunnery chapter in Tactical Aviation TT&Ps).

Figure 5-2. C6 Door Gun

ARMED HELICOPTERS
8. General. Many nations have armed helicopters, which were not initially
designed for this role. These include the Lynx utility helicopter in the UK and the Kiowa
light observation helicopter in the US Army. The Lynx is mounted with TOW missiles
and the Kiowa Warrior can be mounted with Hellfire missiles, rockets and .50 calibre
guns. These add on weapon systems create a multi role use for these helicopters as well
as additional effective firepower to the land force commander.

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Figure 5-3. Example of Add On Weapons Systems

9. Armed Recce Helicopters (ARHs). The original intent of aviation was to

conduct the reconnaissance role by means of a recce or a Light Observation Helicopter
(LOH). The LOH would locate targets for armed or attack helicopters to engage. The
attack helicopters of the day, such as the Cobra, had very limited target acquisition
equipment and engagement distances were limited to 4 km. Advances in technology and
helicopter design allowed the attack helicopter to have a much better sensor suite. This,
combined with a longer weapons engagement range of 8 km, led to decreased use of the
LOH. With the Longbow Apache, and subsequently with the Comanche, the LOH recce
role is accomplished by the attack helicopter itself. The ability to detect and engage
targets with one platform has led to the creation of Armed Recce Helicopters (ARHs) and
Recce Attack Helicopters (RAHs).

Figure 5-4. RAH 66 Comanche

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ATTACK HELICOPTERS
10. General. Canada does not possess attack helicopters. The requirement for AH
support in coalition operations is provided, if available, by other coalition countries. In
order to know how AHs operate and how to employ them, attack helicopter doctrine is
detailed in this chapter. Since AH training and operations will most likely occur in
conjunction with US Army Aviation resources, their doctrine for the employment of AHs
is the basis for the following doctrine.

US ARMY AVIATION AH ORGANIZATIONS

11. AH Fundamentals. The basic US Army aviation unit for attack helicopters is the
Attack Helicopter Battalion (AH Bn). AH Bns are assigned to divisional aviation
brigades and corps AH Regts. They provide the supported comd with a highly mobile
and lethal anti-armour, anti-personnel, and anti-materiel capability during day and night
operations.
12. Heavy Division. There are two AH Bns per heavy division. Each battalion has
AH 64 Apaches, equipped with 24 attack helicopters (three companies of eight each).
The three AH Coys provide the AH Bn with an anti-armour, anti-personnel and anti-
materiel capability. The AH bn commander may task organize the company to
accomplish the mission. With eight helicopters per AH Coy, six helicopters should be
available for missions, based on a 75 percent serviceability rate. The two plane "lead-
wingman" section provides a high degree of task organization options, mission flexibility,
and mutual support between sections.

Figure 5-5. AH 64D Apache Longbow

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13. Light Division. The light division has one AH Bn organized the same as the
heavy division (three AH Coys) except that the light division is equipped with OH 58D
Kiowa Warriors.
14. Corps AH Regiment. The AH Regt of the corps aviation brigade is normally
allocated three AH 64 equipped bns. The AH bn is organized the same way as it is in the
heavy division.

US ARMY AVIATION AH DOCTRINE

15. General. US Army aviation doctrine states that success on the battlefield
depends on how well the tenets of Army operations doctrine are applied. These tenets are
as follows:
a. Initiative. Attack helicopters are offensive weapon systems. They
provide commanders the means to deliver massed firepower rapidly and
accurately, thus disorganizing enemy forces and allowing the friendly
force to gain or maintain the initiative. To be successful, the AH Bn must
be integrated into land force commander’s concept of operations. This
requires that commanders analyze the battlefield and decide early where
the AH Bns are employed;

b. Depth. The AH Bn can attack enemy forces anywhere on the battlefield.

Commanders must see and use the entire battlespace to strike the enemy to
prevent the concentration of forces at a point of its choice. The speed with
which attack helicopters can mass fire power at chosen points in the
battlespace allows the land force commander to influence the battle to a
depth that would otherwise be beyond reach;
c. Agility. The mobility and flexibility of attack helicopters expands the
reach of commanders to all areas of the battlefield. Terrain provides cover
and concealment for attack helicopters just as it does for armour and
infantry; however, it does not limit the mobility of the helicopter. The AH
Bn can attack the enemy's flanks and rear, thus providing ground forces
the time to manoeuvre and engage enemy forces from directions where
they are most vulnerable;
d. Synchronization. To survive and succeed on the battlefield, the AH Bn
must fight as an integrated member of the combined arms team. In
combat, the fire of other attacking weapons enhances the firepower of the
attack helicopter. This combined attack strengthens the total force by
overcoming limitations found in each weapon system. As a result, total
combat power is increased and survivability is improved. When the
enemy is simultaneously faced with an array of armour, infantry, artillery,
CAS, and attack helicopter units, it can no longer concentrate on
countering a single set of weapons from one direction at a time. Rather, it
is attacked throughout its depth with a variety of weapons; and

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e. Versatility. On the modern battlefield, the tempo of the fight is rapid,

violent, and extremely fluid. The AH Bn's primary mission is the
destruction of enemy armour or mechanized forces. The AH Bn, however,
must be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and tactical security
operations. Additionally, in OOTW, a subversive or less distinguishable
enemy may require the AH Bn to provide direct or indirect fire, in direct
support of friendly ground forces operating in an urban environment.
While the AH Bn can react quickly, it requires as much mission planning
time as other land force manoeuvre battalions.
16. Framework of the Battlefield. An AH Bn can conduct deep, close, and rear
operations during offensive and defensive operations. Conducting deep operations
allows corps and division commanders to influence close operations before the enemy
closes with friendly forces. During the conduct of close operations, an AH Bn allows
corps and division comds to weigh their main effort and brigade commanders to attack
the enemy in depth. An AH Bn also gives corps and division commanders the ability to
mass combat power rapidly against enemy ground penetrations and large airborne or
heliborne assaults into the corps or divisional rear areas.
17. Attack Helicopters in Combat Operations. With the AH Bn commander's
assistance, the land force commander determines where the AH Bn is used best. From
the land force commander's mission and intent, the AH Bn commander determines how
the battalion is employed. Some of the land force commander's options for employing
the AH Bn are:
a. to attack massed armour or light forces;
b. to attack in depth to extend the influence of the force;
c. to dominate avenues of approach;
d. to reinforce ground forces by fire;
e. to mass to defeat enemy penetrations;
f. to attack to protect the flanks of a moving or halted friendly main body;
g. to provide security for the movement and passage of lines by land forces;
h. to conduct reconnaissance; and
i. to perform search and attack missions.

18. Offensive Operations. The AH Bn gives the manoeuvre commander a viable

force that can rapidly concentrate firepower at the decisive time and place. AH Bns can
act as part of the main attack force by conducting deliberate attacks. They can also
conduct supporting attacks by cutting off enemy reinforcements and acting as part of the
reserves, ready to weigh the main effort and to exploit success.

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19. Advance to Contact. The advance to contact is used to gain or re-establish

contact with the enemy. It may be used when contact with the enemy has been
temporarily lost, or it may be used to initiate an attack. An advance to contact helps
develop the situation and maintain freedom of action. During an advance to contact, the
AH Bn operates with land forces and is critical to the success of the lead elements and the
main body. An advance to contact often results in a meeting engagement, that is, forces
engage each other by chance rather than by design. As part of the covering force or
guard, the AH Bn can destroy forward enemy elements identified by reconnaissance or
land forces. The mobility and firepower of the AH Bn permits the main body to
overwhelm the enemy and maintain the initiative.
20. Attack. The two types of attacks for attack helicopters are the hasty attack and
the deliberate attack. Each is discussed in the paragraphs that follow:
a. Hasty Attack. A hasty attack is an operation for which a unit has not
made extensive preparations. It is conducted with the resources
immediately available to maintain momentum or take advantage of the
enemy situation. For attack helicopters, a hasty attack is made on an
enemy force to retain the momentum of the entire force. Hasty attacks
conducted by the AH Bn are made with the foreknowledge of where the
engagement areas (EAs) and battle positions (BPs) are located. The exact
time, EA, and the threat to be encountered during the attack, however, are
not known until shortly before the mission; and
b. Deliberate Attack. A deliberate attack is conducted against an enemy
that is well organized and cannot be turned or bypassed. It is planned and
carefully coordinated with all concerned elements. The deliberate attack
is based on a thorough reconnaissance, an evaluation of all available
intelligence and relative combat strength, an analysis of various courses of
action, and other factors affecting the situation. To conduct a successful
deliberate attack, the AH Bn is integrated with the overall force concept of
ops. The AH Bn provides mobile and flexible combat capability and can
execute contingency plans as well as attacks that support the main effort.
During a deliberate attack, the AH Bn can conduct attacks on enemy
facilities and on counterattacking or withdrawing enemy forces.
21. Exploitation. An exploitation usually follows a successful attack and is made to
take advantage of weakened or collapsed enemy defences. It prevents the enemy from
reorganizing a defensive system or conducting an orderly withdrawal. An exploitation
can also be conducted to secure deep objectives. During an exploitation, an AH Bn is
employed as part of a larger force. The AH Bn strikes the enemy's flanks and rear areas,
disrupting its withdrawal and attempts to reorganize. The AH Bn operates as in an
advance to contact by following the land forces and is prepared to conduct hasty attacks
on counterattacking and withdrawing enemy forces. The AH Bn can also conduct deep
operations to further disrupt the enemy.

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22. Pursuit. A pursuit is an offensive operation taken after a successful attack or

developed during an exploitation. The pursuit takes advantage of enemy weaknesses and
its inability to establish an organized defence. As the enemy attempts to disengage,
friendly forces maintain pressure in an attempt to destroy the enemy force. A pursuit
requires unrelenting pressure, speed, mobility, and firepower to complete the enemy's
destruction. As land forces attempt to maintain contact and flank the enemy, the AH Bn
and air assault forces can manoeuvre deep to cut off the enemy as it attempts to
withdraw. The AH Bn and airmobile forces also can block entry to relieving enemy
forces.
23. Defensive Operations. A successful defence requires active and passive
elements working together to regain the initiative. The objective of a defensive operation
is to cause the enemy attack to fail; preserve the force, facilities, and installations; control
key terrain; gain time; or concentrate forces elsewhere. Other objectives may be to retain
captured terrain and degrade enemy forces so offensive operations can be resumed. The
AH Bn normally participates in two types of defence, the area defence and the mobile
defence, described as follows:
a. Area Defence. AH Bns normally conduct an area defence when directed
to defend specified terrain, when the enemy enjoys a mobility advantage
over the defending force, when well defined avenues of approach exist,
and the defending force has sufficient combat power to cover the likely
enemy avenues of approach in sector. The orientation of the area defence
is to deny the enemy designated terrain. Manoeuvre within an area
defence usually consists of repositioning between defensive positions or
within sectors and counterattacks. A perimeter defence is a form of area
defence, oriented in all directions; and
b. Mobile Defence. AH Bns conduct a mobile defence by allowing the
enemy force to advance to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack
by a striking force. The end state of the mobile defence is the destruction
of the enemy force. The commander conducts a mobile defence by
organizing his force into two subunits: a fixing force and a striking force.
The fixing force shapes the penetration or contains the enemy advance,
while the striking force conducts the decisive attack.
24. Deep Operations. Deep operations are operations that must be executed with the
utmost care, coordination and planning. Deep operations are activities directed against
enemy forces that currently are not engaged but that could influence division or corps
close operations within the next 24 to 72 hours. Deep operations occur during both
friendly offensive and defensive operations. The AH Bn conducts deep operations at the
corps and divisional levels. Deep attacks by corps AH Bns help the corps commander to
shape the battlefield and set the terms for close operations. Deep attacks conducted by
divisional AH Bns help the division commander to shape the battlefield and are used to
allow defending manoeuvre brigades to engage the enemy throughout its depth. The AH
Bn itself is a high value/high payoff target. To send it deep requires the recognition that
the target is worth the expenditure of the AH Bn and the combat support elements that it
takes to accomplish the mission. Coordination is a key factor to success. During Desert

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Storm, AH deep ops required real time red SA from JSTARS, SEAD from CAS, CSS
coordination to set up and resupply FARPs, MTH support to move FARPs and target
designation from special forces teams in the target areas.
25. Close Operations. The AH Bn may be part of the larger force's security
operation as a member of a covering force. Because of the speed and flexibility of the
AH Bn, it can rapidly concentrate combat power throughout the covering force area.
Employed well forward, it operates out of Forward Assembly Areas (FAAs) in the rear of
the covering force area. At corps level, the AH Bn may be attached or placed OPCON of
armoured recce regiments to increase their long range anti-armour capability. At
divisional level, the AH Bn is the primary long range anti-armour weapon system.
26. Main Defensive Area Operations. Once the fight has moved into the main
defensive area, the land force commander uses the AH Bn against the enemy's main
effort. The land force commander commits the AH Bn at a decisive place to exploit
success or ensure accomplishment of the mission. Using an AH Bn during the defence
often comes as part of a counterattack. The AH Bn counterattacks along with other
manoeuvre forces to strike the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield and help the
force to seize the initiative.
27. Other AH Engagements. The AH Bn can also be used for the following
purposes:
a. Attacking enemy depth battalions and regiments. While ground units
engage the enemy from battle positions where they can engage the leading
elements of the enemy attack, the AH Bn manoeuvres to attack the
enemy's follow-on battalions and regiments simultaneously, throughout its
depth;
b. Massing to defeat enemy penetrations. AH Bns attack enemy
penetrations along with other manoeuvre forces to defeat them and restore
the FLOT. While other manoeuvre forces attack the lead elements of the
penetration, the AH Bn attacks the penetration in depth, denying the
enemy comd the opportunity to mass, bypass, or withdraw. Once the
enemy is encircled, the AH Bn can attack enemy breakouts or any other
forces that may attempt to relieve the encircled enemy force; and
c. Attacking to defeat enemy flanking forces. The AH Bn can be used to
dominate avenues of approach into the rear and flanks of friendly forces.
The AH Bn reinforces the flank screen or guard to defeat the threat to the
flanks of the main body.
28. Rear Area Operations. Rear area operations are conducted to assure freedom of
manoeuvre and operational continuity from the corps rear boundary forward to the rear
boundaries of committed manoeuvre units. AH Bns, along with land forces, may be
given immediate missions to act as rapid reaction forces for incursions into brigade,
division, or corps rear areas. The AH Bn can rapidly react to enemy heliborne or
airborne operations into the friendly force's rear area. The AH Bn should attempt to
attack the enemy force in its assembly area or just as it arrives in its LZ. The AH Bn is

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especially valuable in rear operations when the enemy has air landed or air dropped light
armoured vehicles. Once the enemy force has dispersed, the AH Bn becomes less
effective in the fight. Major mechanized incursions into the rear area are attacked in the
same manner as they are during close or deep operations. The AH Bn attacks until the
force commander can respond with additional forces to defeat the penetration. During
rear area operations, coordination between field artillery, Air Defense Artillery, CAS, and
AH Bns must be accomplished by LOs working in the divisional and corps headquarters.
29. CF Organization Equivalents. In order to alleviate the need to compare US and
CF organizational equivalents for the remainder of this chapter, the CF Avn
organizational equivalents are substituted, when practicable, based on the following table:
US Avn Org CF Avn Equivalent CF Example Provides Sp to
a. Brigade Group 10 TAG Corps
b. Regiment Wing 1 Wing Division
c. Battalion Squadron 408 THS Brigade (Gp)
d. Company Flight B Flight
e. Platoon Section 2 X CH 146

ROLES OF THE AH SQUADRON

30. General. The AH Sqn is an aerial manoeuvre unit. It conducts attack,
reconnaissance, and security operations that complement other manoeuvre forces. The
AH Sqn enables the supported land force commander to mass fire power rapidly at the
decisive time and place to affect a battle's outcome. The land force commander
integrates the AH Sqn into the tactical manoeuvre plan with other manoeuvre units.
When employed with other combat assets, the AH Sqn can strike the enemy where and
when it is most vulnerable.
31. Mutual Support. An AH Sqn never fights alone. Attacks are coordinated with
other manoeuvre, combat support, CSS, and joint forces to form a combined arms team.
This team surprises and overwhelms the enemy at the point of attack. Attacks may be
conducted out of physical contact with other friendly forces but synchronized with their
concept of operations, or they may be in direct contact with friendly forces.
AH CAPABILITIES
32. General. The AH Sqn and other aviation assets dominate the third dimension of
the battlespace. This provides an invaluable manoeuvre capability to the land force
commander. The capabilities of an AH Sqn are as follows:
a. Mobility. AHs fully exploit all dimensions of the battlespace;
b. Speed. AHs move across the battlefield at speeds in excess of 3 kms per
minute. Typical planning airspeeds are 100 to 120 knots during daylight
and 80 to 100 knots at night. Speeds during marginal weather are reduced
commensurate with prevailing conditions;

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c. Range. The AH Sqn can attack targets up to 150 km across the FEBA. If
greater depth is required, additional fuel tanks can extend the range with a
corresponding reduction in weapons carrying capacity;
d. Versatility. The firepower available to the force commander is increased
but the employment concepts of the AH Sqn remain the same. In a pure
AH sqn, the traditional recce and attack missions are no longer aircraft
dependent. During the planning process, the AH Flt Comd task organizes
assets and designates specific helicopter mission responsibilities. There is
flexibility to maintain the traditional recce-weapon team employment
concept or focus assets as a pure AH force; and
e. Lethality. The weapons carried on AHs may vary to meet specific
mission requirements. Examples of AH weapons systems can be found at
Annex A to this chapter.
LIMITATIONS
33. Weather. Although fully capable of operating in marginal weather, attack
helicopter capabilities are seriously degraded in conditions below a 500 foot ceiling and
visibility less than 3 km. Because of the Hellfire missile's trajectory, ceilings below 500
feet require the attack helicopter to get too close to the intended target to avoid missile
loss. Below 3 km visibility, the AH is vulnerable to enemy Air Defence Artillery
systems. The Hellfire 2, since it uses radar for target identification and acquisition, is not
affected by clouds.
34. AH Sqn FARP Requirements. Helicopters consume large amounts of fuel,
ammunition, and repair parts and require a CSS distribution system across the entire
battlefield. An AH Sqn normally employs two FARPs (each one to completely refuel
and rearm one squadron); one active for that specific mission, and the other moving to or
setting up in a new location for future operations. (See Chapter 10 for FARP operations).

MISSION
35. The primary mission of an AH Sqn is to destroy enemy forces using fire and
manoeuvre. To accomplish this mission the AH Sqn attacks the enemy to destroy, attrit,
disrupt, or delay. The AH Sqn is most effective against massed, moving targets,
identified and confirmed and least effective against enemy forces in prepared, well
camouflaged positions. Without the support of land manoeuvre forces, the AH Sqn
cannot conduct missions that require the occupation of terrain. They can, however, deny
the enemy terrain for a limited time by dominating it with direct and indirect fire.
36. Mission Statement. The mission statement must include a concise "why" to fully
define success. Given the wide variety of potential enemies and potential theatres of
operations, the AH Sqn commander must base the unit's mission statement and end state
on a thorough IPB. The commander must also articulate an endstate that is
understandable and can be quantified on the battlefield. The following are examples of
the "what" in the AH Sqn’s mission statement:

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a. attack to destroy;
b. attack to attrit;
c. attack to delay;
d. attack to disrupt;
e. conduct reconnaissance;
f. provide tactical security; or
g. defend.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
37. The normal command relationship of an assigned AH Sqn in a coalition operation
is OPCON. The AH Sqn is OPCON to the gaining formation or unit when the squadron
is to be used for a specific mission or the effective time of the relationship is short.
Normally, control of the AH remains with the Aviation Group or AH Wing and shifts to
other groups as an allocation of aviation support by division and corps headquarters.
When the mission is completed, the AH Sqn returns to the control of its parent group or
AH Wing.

OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

38. Assembly Area. An assembly area is a location where the AH Sqn prepares for
future operations, issues orders, accomplishes routine maintenance, and completes re-
supply activities. The squadron main CP is located in or near the assembly area.
Assembly areas should be located out of enemy artillery range and be large enough for
dispersion of the unit. Assembly areas are normally located in the corps or division rear
area. However, corps and division aviation assets are normally dispersed over large areas
to preclude their becoming lucrative targets. Assembly areas are not located along an
axis of advance. Other considerations involved in selecting appropriate assembly areas
are:
a. security;
b. concealment;
c. accessibility to MSRs;
d. air avenues of approach;
e. location of friendly units; and
f. suitability of in and out routes.

39. Forward Assembly Areas. An AH Sqn occupies FAAs for extended periods
while awaiting orders to execute missions. FAAs are located near the controlling HQ to
improve command, control, communications and intelligence response times. The FAA
should be located out of range of enemy medium artillery. Limited maintenance

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personnel may be located in the FAA as they move forward to repair aircraft.
Considerations for selecting FAAs are the same as those for selecting assembly areas.
40. Holding Area. A Holding Area (HA) is a covered, concealed position that is
occupied for short periods. Occupation of an HA allows for final reconnaissance and
coordination of assets by the AH Flt Comd. It is located between the FAA and the
objective area. While occupying an HA, helicopters may be hovered or landed but they
are not shut down. AHs should consider moving to an alternate HA or returning to the
FAA if they have to wait longer than a few minutes. Units that occupy HAs should
ensure that:
a. helicopters maintain operating RRPM;
b. crews maintain radio listening silence;
c. separate HAs are established for each Flt;
d. helicopters remain at NOE altitudes at and near the HA;
e. helicopters establish positions that provide 360 degree security;
f. the HA is terrain masked and free of sources of rotor wash signature;
g. copilots dismount for face to face coordination with the AH Flt Comd and
recce helicopter aircrew; and
h. helicopters are dispersed and maintain section/flight integrity while
keeping intervisibility for security.

41. Attack Routes. AHs move from the HA via attack routes. Properly selected
attack routes allow attack helicopters to move undetected, ensuring initial surprise in the
attack. Recce hels select attack routes that provide cover and concealment and have
prominent terrain features to assist in navigation. When used properly, vegetation and
various terrain features can reduce helicopter noise and decrease the possibility of
detection. AH Flts may have multiple in and out routes.
42. Attack By Fire Position. If the enemy situation is vague, as in a movement to
contact, and the AH Sqn CO has been assigned a sector, Attack By Fire (ABF) positions
may be used. An ABF position is one from which a unit engages a target, without
manoeuvring over it, with the intent of inflicting some level of damage. ABF positions
are less restrictive than BPs, and better suited to a fluid battlefield. The CO must,
however, control all indirect fire into the sector and know the locations of all sqn AH Flts
to clear them.
43. Support By Fire Position. The Support By Fire (SBF) position is normally used
in conjunction with the ABF position, as a base of fire or overwatch position. It can be
used to engage a target while ground or air assets move to or around it. Engagements
from the SBF position may range from suppression to destruction of the target, but the
primary mission is to fix the target so another force may manoeuvre.

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44. Firing Position. AH pilots select the actual firing positions that provide the
optimal standoff distances and good fields of fire within their BP, ABF, or SBF. In and
out routes should be well concealed, and the background of the firing position should
reduce the risk of visual acquisition by the enemy. Selected firing positions must also
allow freedom of movement for the attack helicopters and permit them to hover without
raising dust or debris. To increase aircraft survivability, attack helicopter aircrew should
limit the number of engagements from a single firing position and move before they
receive effective counterfire.
45. Engagement Area (EA). The EA is an area in which the land force commander
intends to trap and destroy an enemy force with the massed fire support of all available
weapons. Selection of the EA begins with the IPB process. From this, the most likely
and most dangerous enemy course of actions is derived. These most likely enemy
corridors of advance are then combined with the best friendly terrain which maximizes
obstacles, stand off distances, enemy exposure, firing positions, and fire support to
provide the optimum coordinated fires and mass to engage the enemy force as it arrives
in the EA. The G2, G3, G3 Avn and an AH Sqn LO are all involved in the planning and
selection of EAs, for approval by the land force commander. A good EA should have at
least the four characteristics listed below:
a. Battle Positions (BPs). The EA should have several BPs for attacking the
enemy from various directions;
b. Obstacles to Movement. Obstacles, either natural or man made, are
desirable in the EA to slow target movement and permit the effective use
of direct and indirect fire;
c. Long Range Fire. To enhance aircraft survivability, an EA should allow
aircrew to engage targets at the maximum range that permits a high kill
potential; and
d. Continuous Target Visibility. Long range engagements require that the
target be in view during terminal guidance. As a rule, EAs should provide
an unobstructed view of the target from firing or designating positions.
Planning should concentrate on sensor ranges, not weapon maximum
standoff ranges, for EAs.

AIRCREW ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

46. General. The AH Sqn is a versatile organization that can conduct offensive
operations (attack, movement to contact), defensive operations (area defence, mobile
defence), reconnaissance, and security. In addition, the AH Sqn can conduct special
purpose operations such as airmobile security (an advance guard that is a combination of
attack, reconnaissance, and tactical security).
47. Recce Helicopters. The mission of the recce hel section(s) supporting the AH
Flt is to see the battlefield, find the enemy, coordinate its destruction, and provide
security against ground and air threats. Normally, recce hels in each task organized
grouping accomplish the recce tasks; however, both the recce and the attack aircrews

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must be able to perform them. Regardless of which aircrew is performing the mission,
the recce tasks must be performed. These tasks include:
a. requesting and adjusting indirect fire;
b. requesting and controlling CAS aircraft;
c. providing early warning and confirming the BPs;
d. coordinating operations and developing the enemy situation;
e. assisting the AH Flt Comd in controlling Joint Air Assault Teams (JAAT)
operations;
f. assisting with the movement of attack helicopters to the BPs;
g. designating targets for acquisition and engagement by laser guided
munitions;
h. handing over targets verbally or digitally;
i. maintaining enemy contact as attack helicopters move between BPs;
j. acquiring, identifying, reporting, and designating targets;
k. providing attack helicopters with local security and protection from air
threats while they engage targets; and
l. assisting AHs by confirming or selecting firing positions that provide good
concealment and safe standoff distances from AAAD weapon systems.
48. AHs. AHs destroy enemy forces and their supporting systems. Regardless of
which aircrew is performing the mission, the AH crew:
a. coordinates with the recce section;
b. moves to the BP, selects the firing position, and receives the target
handover from the AH Flt comd or the recce section lead;
c. acquires and engages targets;
d. moves to an alternate position and reengages; and
e. moves to a successive or supplementary position or HA or returns to the
FARP.

EMPLOYMENT METHODS
49. General. The AH Sqn CO employs the squadron through the coordination of the
AH Flts, CS, and CSS, and uses AH Flts to destroy enemy forces. To do this, one of
three methods of employment is utilized; continuous attack, phased attack, or maximum
destruction. Timing is critical in the employment of the AH. Employed too early, it may
have to be disengaged before mission completion because of low fuel. Employed too
late, it may miss part or the entire targeted unit and fail to destroy the enemy forces at the
critical time and place. The AH Sqn should only be employed when a lucrative target
has been identified and selected for engagement.

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50. Continuous Attack. To exert constant pressure on the enemy force, the AH Sqn
commander employs the AH Flts using the continuous attack method. This method
ensures that at least one flight is in the battle at all times. While one flight is in the battle,
the other two prepare to relieve the engaged flight as they remain in HAs or the FARP or
move between the FARP and the battle. Many times during a continuous attack the AH
Flt Comd on station may send only the AHs to rearm and refuel. This allows the recce
hels to remain in enemy contact, coordinate with the relieving AH Flt Comd, and
reconnoitre successive BPs. Multiple BPs, ABF positions, or SBF positions selected
during mission planning provide the flexibility needed for a coordinated battle handover
between flights. The continuous attack method provides the most flexibility and the most
efficient FARP operations. It also provides sustained helicopter fire support over long
periods.
51. Phased Attack. The phased attack method is a modification of the continuous
attack method and is used to increase the initial firepower of the squadron. Using this
method, the CO initially employs one flight to begin the attack and then quickly phases in
the second flight from a different BP. The third flight is phased into the fight when either
of the other flights is low on fuel or ammunition. The phased attack method may be
reversed, or the commander may vary how the phased attack is conducted. For example,
one flight may be employed to set up the fight and then exploit the attack with the other
two flights. If the phased attack method is used, helicopter turnaround times in the FARP
must be kept as short as possible. Because of FARP limitations, eventually the phased
attack method reverts to the continuous attack method.
52. Maximum Destruction. If the land force commander wishes to place as much
combat power as possible into the battle, the maximum destruction method is used. To
overwhelm the enemy with massed fire, the squadron deploys with all three flights in
contact from different positions. In this situation, the supported commander must realize
that the AH Sqn will be out of the fight for 20 to 90 minutes at the completion of its
initial attack. The exact time depends upon the distance to the FARP and the time it takes
to replenish fuel and ammunition after the initial engagement.

AH SUPPORT TO URBAN OPERATIONS

53. Attack helicopters can be employed in Urban Operations. However, there are
special planning considerations for this type of employment. Fields of fire are restricted
and buildings provide cover for enemy light forces to engage attack helicopters with near
impunity. This type of environment can negate the effectiveness of the long range,
precision munitions of the attack helicopter. Rockets and cannons can be used against
light structures; however, they may not have sufficient explosive power to be used
against well constructed buildings of reinforced brick and concrete. While there are
challenges for comds employing attack helicopters in urban environments, experience has
shown that attack helicopters are much more effective and flexible than mortars and
artillery in urban operations. The AH Sqn is well suited for employment on the outskirts
of an urban area, attacking forces that are attempting to bypass, envelop, or reinforce the
built up area. If employed in urban terrain, special consideration should be given to the
munitions selected. Collateral damage near targets engaged by Hellfires will be higher

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than near those engaged by 30 mm rounds. Consideration should also be given to high
energy, high altitude tactics, such as diving fire, to overcome the vertical restrictions of
urban terrain.

AH SQN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

54. General. Successful AH Sqn operations depend on close staff coordination. The
squadron staff must anticipate and coordinate AH Sqn CSS with higher echelon CSS.
55. Planning. Combat operations and CSS planning must be conducted at the same
time. Successful AH Sqn combat operations require timely reports that reflect the CSS
status of the squadron. Unlike other manoeuvre forces, the AH Sqn can be employed
anywhere within the division's or corps' area of operations. The AH Sqn coordinates its
support through the aviation group to the COSCOM/DISGP. To ensure the availability
of CSS, the COSCOM/DISGP, the aviation group, and the AH Sqn COs must maintain
close coord.
56. Coordination. Depending on the environment and the mission, AHs require fuel
and ammunition re-supply after every 1 1/2 to 2 hours of continuous operations. The
squadron staff must forecast support requirements based on the expected duration of the
mission. Requirements are processed through the aviation group staff and then sent to
the COSCOM/ DISGP. The COSCOM/ DISGP staff directs support to the AH Sqn from
the appropriate COSCOM/ DISGP unit.

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Annex A to
Chapter 5

AH 64A AND AH 64D

APACHE CHARACTERISTICS

AH 64A
1. Description. The AH 64A is a twin engine, tandem seat, four bladed attack
helicopter. With its crew of two, the pilot occupies the rear seat and a copilot/gunner
occupies the front seat. The helicopter is approximately 58 feet long with a 48 foot main
rotor span. The maximum gross weight is 21,000 pounds. The maximum airspeed (level)
is 164 knots and normal cruise speed is 100 to 120 knots.
2. Capabilities. The AH 64A has the following capabilities:
a. day, night, and limited adverse weather fighting capabilities;
b. combat survivability;
c. a wide array of firepower options; and
d. can be configured with an external 230 (US) gallon fuel tank to extend its
range on attack missions, or it can be configured with up to four fuel tanks
for ferrying/self-deployment missions.

3. Other performance factors:

a. the combat radius of the AH 64 is approximately 150 kms*;
b. the combat radius with one external 230 gallon fuel tank installed is
approximately 300 kms*;
c. the AH 64 is air transportable in the C-5, C-141 and C-17;
d. an onboard video recorder has the capability of recording up to 72 minutes
of either the pilot or CPG selected video. It is an invaluable tool for
damage assessment and reconnaissance;
e. the Apache's navigation equipment consists of a doppler navigation
system, and a GPS receiver;
f. the Apache has state of the art optics that provide the capability to select
from three different target acquisition sensors. These sensors are:
(1) Day TV. It views images during day and low light levels, black
and white,
(2) TADS FLIR. It views thermal images, real world and magnified,
during day, night and adverse weather, and
(3) DVO. It views real world, full colour, and magnified images
during daylight and dusk conditions.

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*Note: Both radii are temperature, PA, fuel burn rate and airspeed
dependent.
4. Armament Systems. The Apache has four articulating weapons pylons, two on
either side of the helicopter, on which weapons or external fuel tanks can be mounted.
The helicopter has a laser range finder designator. This is used to designate targets for the
Hellfire missile system as well as provide range to target information for the fire control
computer's calculations of ballistic solutions. A description of each system follows:
a. the M230A1 "Chaingun" 30mm cannon:
(1) used primarily against soft skinned and lightly armoured targets,
and for self-protection,
(2) single barrel, externally powered, hydraulically driven turret,
(3) maximum capacity: 1200 rounds; rate of fire: 600 to 650
rounds/minute,
(4) maximum range: 4,000 meters; maximum effective range: 1500
to1700 meters, and
(5) ordnance: M789 HE, dual purpose ammunition;

b. the FFAR System, 70mm:

(1) the maximum range is 9,000 meters; the most effective range is
3,000 to 4,000 meters,
(2) ordnance: HE, HE MPSM, white phosphorus, illumination, and
flechette, and
(3) maximum load: 76 rockets; and

c. the Hellfire Missile System:

(1) the Hellfire is a laser guided missile capable of defeating any
known armour,
(2) there are two types of engagements:
(a) the first type of engagement is autonomous. The helicopter
that fires the missile also provides the laser energy for the
missile,
(b) the second type of engagement is remote. The missile is
fired from one helicopter, but the required laser designation
is provided by another AH 64, a ground laser designator, or
an OH 58D, and
(c) the designating crew may offset a maximum of 60 degrees
from the gun to target line and must not position their
aircraft within a 30 degree safety fan from the firing
helicopter,

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(3) the minimum range is 500 meters,

(4) the maximum range is 8,000 meters, and
(5) the maximum load per helicopter is 16 missiles.

AH 64D APACHE LONGBOW

5. General. The AH 64D Longbow is the latest upgraded version of the Apache. It
can easily be identified by the mast mounted radome, which houses the detection portion
of the Fire Control Radar System. It is through this system that one Apache, with one
exposure can sweep of the battlefield ahead, and identify up to 1,000 targets. From these
1,000 targets, the onboard computer will classify the targets by types (i.e. wheeled vehs,
tracked vehs, air defence vehs, helicopters or fixed wing) and prioritize up to 256 the
most dangerous targets. This target information is then downloaded by a secure data
modem to other Longbows in the attack team and divided amongst the team members.
This target data is then programmed into each Hellfire 2 missile.

Figure 5A-1. AH 64D Apache Longbow with Hellfire 2 Missiles

6. Hellfire 2. The Hellfire 2 missile has a nose mounted RF seeker which will home
onto the target identified by the primary radome sweep. It is a fire and forget weapon. It
will actively seek the target and can be programmed for secondary missions, if the
primary target cannot be identified. This whole sequence takes less than 30 seconds from
the radome sweep to launch of the missile(s). As well, all missiles can be launched
simultaneously. If there are two flights of Longbows in the attack team, these sixteen
helicopters could launch all 256 Hellfires simultaneously.

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7. Information gathering package and information sharing. The Longbow

sensor package includes the Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS), the Fire
Control Radar (FCR), TV, FLIR, direct view optics and millimeter wave radar. The
Longbow is capable of sending and receiving target information as part of an ISTAR
team of battlefield information gathering systems. For example, it can interchange target
data with JSTARS aircraft, CAS aircraft and artillery.
8. Capability. The Longbow is the most advanced and lethal AH in the world,
entering the 21st Century. Its performance was regarded by the US Army as a quantum
improvement over existing systems. Its outstanding capability as an armed recce
helicopter is the main reason that all 750 US Army AH 64A model Apaches are being
upgraded to D models and why 67 of these AHs are being produced in the UK by
Westland Helicopters as the WAH 64. In addition to Hellfire missiles, the Longbow is
also capable of carrying four air to air missiles, mounted on the wing tips.

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CHAPTER 6
COMBAT AIRLIFT

GENERAL
1. Combat airlift operations normally involve the use of Utility Tactical Transport
Helicopters (UTTHs) and sometimes Medium Transport Helicopters (MTHs) to provide
land force commanders with the ability to rapidly move combat forces, supplies, and
equipment virtually anywhere within their area of operations.
2. Combat airlift operations are not conducted in direct contact with the enemy and
may or may not include other members of the combined arms team. Although the
concepts discussed below are focused on combat operations these missions are common
to OOTW. Combat airlift missions include:
a. airmobiles (see Chapter 7);
b. re-positioning combat forces on the battlefield;
c. tactical insertion;
d. tactical logistic re-supply;
e. movement of equipment (internal); and
f. slung loads (external).

MISSIONS
3. Re-positioning Combat Forces On The Battlefield.
a. Large Troop Movement. Aviation can be assigned missions to move
units on the battlefield for the purpose of re-positioning forces.
The transport of large numbers of troops should be planned utilizing the
same principles as if it were an airmobile mission. The difference is that
in these air movement missions, the force is not being moved into an area
where engagement with enemy forces is likely. It therefore does not
utilize all of the combined arms assets that would be included in an
airmobile operation; and
b. Passenger Transport. This mission differs from large troop movements
in that passenger transport missions normally are accomplished by one or
two helicopters. This also differs from a C&L mission because the
passengers have no command or liaison function.
4. Tactical Insertion. Tactical insertions normally involve the insertion of special
ops or advance recce troops for the purpose of recce and preparation for follow on events.
This could be the case for the preparation of airmobile operations where infantry troops
could be transported to an area short of the intended airmobile LZs and DZs, to ensure
that theses areas are secure for the airmobile. Insertions could also be used to bring in
troops with laser designators in advance of friendly air or aviation fire support. Insertion

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normally is accomplished by landing the helicopter and off loading troops, but deplaning
could also be accomplished by rappelling or parachute, depending on the threat and the
nature of the operation.
5. Tactical Logistic Re-supply and Movement of Equipment. UTTH tactical
logistic re-supply and movement operations normally occur from the DSA forward.
(MTH logistic transport operations, which normally occur between the COSCOM and the
DSA, are detailed at Chapter 8). Movement of IOR supplies and equipment on the
battlefield is an important mission for utility helicopters. Speed and mobility makes
UTTHs an asset for transporting priority supplies throughout the area of operations.
Logistic re-supply operations are discussed below, by type of supply:
a. Class I - Subsistence. The UTTH cannot be expected to move large
quantities of these items on the battlefield but it can be used to move
priority items. It operates under division control or equal level of
command to move these items from the DSA forward to the BSA and in
some instances, as far forward as the battalion level. Landing zones are
established at DSAs and BSAs specifically for these items;
b. Class II - General and Technical Stores. The probability of UTTHs
having to move these items is rare, as they are not normally required on an
immediate basis. One area where this may become a mission is during
humanitarian assistance operations, where provision of supply to remote
areas is required;
c. Class III - POL. UTTHs offer a limited capability for moving POL, due
to all up weight restrictions. This task is normally conducted by MTHs or
HLHs, which have a much greater lift capability. This function of moving
aviation POL items is normally part of Forward Arming and Refuelling
Point (FARP) Operations, which are described in detail in Chapter 10;
d. Class IV - Construction and Field Defence Stores. Land forces
preparing for a defense utilize a tremendous amount of these items, in
particular, wire. Helicopters can transport these supplies forward from the
DSA and BSA or equivalent, where it is used for battlefield preparations.
Movement by air allows for rapid preparation of defensive sectors;
e. Class V - Ammunition. In high tempo combat operations one can expect
to expend large amounts of ammunition. Helicopters can play a role in
keeping the force resupplied with ammunition, but this type of operation
would normally be focused on emergency re-supply;
f. Class VII - Major End Items. These items are not normally found within
the DSA/BSA . If required to be moved by air, MTHs or HLHs will
normally move them. If of sufficient urgency and light enough to carry,
UTTHs may be utilized to transport these items forward;
g. Class VIII - Medical Material. Transport of depleted medical supplies to
forward medical facilities can be conducted by UTTH; and

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h. Class IX - Repair Parts and Components. Helicopter resupply of IOR

repair parts and aircraft spares can be accomplished quickly, both day and
night.

Figure 6-1. A Lynx Slung Load

6. Slung Loads. Loads can be externally slung on most utility and cargo
helicopters by attaching external loads to a cargo hook(s) mounted on the bottom of the
helicopter. Slung loads have advantages and disadvantages over internal loads as
follows:
a. Advantages.
(1) pick-up time and drop off time for slung loads is much faster than
for internal loads; and
(2) more prepared loads can be moved in a given period of time; and
b. Disadvantages.
(1) load preparation is time consuming;

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(2) additional manpower and slinging equipment is needed to prepare

loads;
(3) enroute airspeeds are decreased; and
(4) unloading and loading of vehicles may be required at both the pick-
up and drop off points.
7. Slinging of Guns. Helicopters can re-position field artillery. A gun, its basic
ammo load and crew, can all be slung in a single load, depending on the size of the
helicopter. The slinging of guns can either be an administrative move, in the low threat
rear area, or a tactical move in the forward, higher threat area. Some tactical gun moves,
such as fire support for airmobile operations, are of short duration, where the guns are
inserted for limited fire mission support and then extracted. For slinging operations, the
supported unit must rig the loads and provide a marshaller and a hook-up person. Details
on marshalling and slinging procedures can be found in B-GA-442-001/FP-001 Tactical
Aviation TT&Ps.

8. CH 146 Slinging of Guns. Due to weight limitations, the tactical slinging of

guns is not feasible with the CH 146. When the requirements for both the Griffon and the
LG1 were published, it was determined that helicopter mobility of the LG1 was not a
priority, and this was not pursued in the specifications of either the gun, or the helicopter.
The Griffon is able to support gun sling training for administrative and training purposes
only. It is conducted to assist Gunners in maintaining currency with the skills necessary
to allow artillery airmobile operations in a coalition context. The slinging of guns is not
an activity conducted by the CH 146 in an operational theatre. The movement of
Canadian guns in a coalition scenario will be accomplished through the use of other
coalition helicopters.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
9. Combat airlift operations require detailed planning. For the transport of a large
number of troops, planning should be accomplished as if it were an airmobile operation
(Chapter 7). Mission planning for general support missions, passenger transport and
logistics resupply missions require detailed planning also. These missions can present a
high level of risk, depending on the area of operations. Often these missions are
accomplished by one or two sections of helicopters and the distances involved may be
great. Listed below are planning considerations for aircrew conducting tactical transport
missions:
a. Distance. Helicopters may be required to operate a long distance from
their squadron’s location. Consideration must be given as to where they
will be refuelled and where maintenance support will be, if needed.
Coordination with adjacent aviation units can be accomplished so
helicopters can refuel at another unit’s FARP. This allows the
helicopter(s) to continue their mission and increase their time on station;

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b. Airspace. Aircrew conducting transport missions must understand the

airspace structure that is currently active. The structure is published in the
Airspace Control Order (ACO). The squadron operations and flight CPs
must know what airspace structure the helicopter will utilize to ensure
safety of the proposed flight route;
c. Intelligence. Helicopters tasked for transport missions normally operate
across a large area of the battlespace and may straddle formation
boundaries. The Sqn IO must recognize this and utilize all available assets
in order to provide the aircrew with a detailed enemy situation. The IO
must evaluate potential threats that may affect the aircrew and recommend
changes to their mission, and to avoid potential threats;
d. Fire Support. For large scale troop movements, fire support should be
planned. Working with the supported formation’s FSCC, targets can be
developed to support the tactical transport plan. For small tactical
transport operations, fire support is probably not planned. However,
aircrew should understand how to contact fire support assets if necessary;
and
e. Communications. The parent unit maintains certain command and
control functions (i.e. maintenance, flight safety). Since these helicopters
often operate out of radio range from their main CP, alternate
arrangements must be made to keep the utility squadron aware of mission
status. Aircrew may conduct periodic situation reports when in radio
communications range, or arrange to provide SITREPs via the supported
unit’s net.

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CHAPTER 7
AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

GENERAL
1. Airmobile operations are classified by 1 CAD under “Combat Airlift” and are
grouped by the Land Forces under “Unique Operations”. For this reason and the fact this
mission is covered in great detail, it has been allocated its own chapter. Tactical aviation and
infantry units can be fully integrated with other members of the combined arms team to form
an airmobile force that encompasses both flexibility and responsiveness. It allows a land
force commander to mass combat power at the decisive time on the battlefield so it has a
devastating effect on the enemy. It requires detailed planning and precise synchronization of
all elements of the combined arms team.

Figure 7-1. Off Loading Airmobile Troops

DEFINITIONS
2. Airmobile Operation. An operation in which combat forces and their equipment
manoeuvre about the battlefield in aircraft, normally helicopters, to engage in ground combat
(ADTB). The number of helicopters involved in the operation does not define the airmobile.
All airmobile operations, regardless of the number of assets involved, must be planned and
executed as combined arms operations. The time required for planning may vary depending
on the estimate process, but the planning considerations should be the same.
3. Close Operations.
a. An airmobile operation may be conducted at any time during close operations.
The land force commander may request helicopter assets when speed and
mobility is needed to mass forces where they are most needed. Rapid
movement of forces during close operations allows friendly forces to maintain

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momentum and forces the enemy to fight in a changing situation. An

airmobile operation planned in support of close operations must be able to be
executed rapidly; and
b. Airmobile operations during close operations include:
(1) the reinforcement of committed or encircled forces,
(2) the seizure of key terrain/ key locations (i.e., bridges, road
intersections),
(3) the over flight of obstacles or barriers,
(4) the setting up of blocking positions,
(5) the conduct of tactical security missions (such as screens),
(6) the positioning of forces to prevent a penetration, and
(7) the support to economy of force missions.

4. Deep Operations.
a. Planning deep operations creates unique challenges for the Airmobile Force
Commander (AFC). In deep operations, the force most often lands behind the
enemy FLOT. In these operations, the Aviation Mission Commander (AMC)
must be prepared to provide support to the land force even after the final
insertion is complete. Re-supply, CASEVAC and extraction operations
during deep operations is likely accomplished by air. The AFC and the AMC
must plan carefully for these operations to prevent the land force commander
from becoming cut off from friendly forces; and
b. Airmobile deep operations include:
(1) raids to destroy high payoff targets (ammunition storage areas, C2
nodes),
(2) cutting off retreating enemy forces (pursuits),
(3) setting up blocking positions to shape the battlefield,
(4) seizing and holding key terrain, and
(5) the insertion or extraction of long range patrols.

5. Rear Area Operations.

a. Rear area operations offer a challenge to the land force and aviation
commanders because the location of the operation is determined by the
enemy. The land force commander must, during the planning process,
identify the most likely infiltration routes and targets that enemy forces,
airborne and special operations units may attack. In order to identify potential
PZs and LZs, flight routes and fire support targets. The land force

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commander then develops a plan to monitor these targets for any indications
of an attack;
b. rear area operations are coordinated with designated military police, CIMIC
and host nation authorities if required; and
c. the force conducting rear area operations may be given missions that include
the destruction of enemy forces in the rear area, secure key locations (i.e.
ammunition supply points, C2 nodes) and hold the enemy until a larger force
can move in to destroy the enemy force.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

6. Capabilities. An airmobile force provides commanders with many capabilities. An
airmobile can transport and rapidly concentrate large numbers of combat troops and take the
battle to the enemy. The airmobile force can:
a. attack from any direction, engage objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas,
overfly barriers, bypass enemy positions, achieve tactical surprise, and cause
the enemy to react prematurely or expose themselves to other attacking forces;
b. concentrate, disperse, or redeploy rapidly to extend its area of influence, to
develop enemy contact, or to decrease its vulnerability to enemy attack;
c. provide flexibility to the land force commander by allowing reliance on a
small, highly mobile reserve, while committing a larger portion of the force to
action;
d. maintain a rapid tempo of operations;
e. achieve deception and surprise by conducting operations in limited visibility
conditions or at night;
f. conduct independent operations (for a limited duration);
g. conduct operations over a wide area including the ability to react to rear area
threats; and
h. place combat forces at the decisive point in the battle in the most favourable
tactical position.
7. Limitations. Many of the limitations that affect an airmobile operation are similar to
those that limit aviation operations in general. The limitations that the AMC must consider
include:
a. adverse weather (heat, dust, snow, and visibility) can hinder helicopter
operations;
b. the requirement for adequate planning and preparation time for complex
operations, particularly at night;

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c. the availability of suitable landing and pickup zones, including enemy action
to deny use of landing zones through obstacles or mining;
d. enemy action through ground forces, EW, air defence during landing, take-off
or assembly. Enemy firepower may be sufficient to prevent landing at the
most advantageous location and time. Alternate plans must be implemented;
e. the type and quantity of supporting weapons, vehicles and heavy equipment
that can be lifted into the objective area, limits the mobility and firepower of
the lifted force;
f. the dependence on combat airlift to maintain operations;

g. problems of extraction of forces in contact with the enemy;

h. the enemy NBC capability and availability of NBC equipment; and
i. force protection once on the ground due to the light nature of the force.

MISSION
8. The mission of an airmobile is to move combat forces and their equipment to engage
in ground combat. (If ground combat is not involved, then the movement or repositioning of
troops is a troop movement mission. See Chapter 6).

KEY PERSONNEL
9. Airmobile Force Commander (AFC). This commander is a land force commander
who is charged with the overall responsibility and planning for and the execution of the
operation, and who normally requires tactical aviation advice.
10. Aviation Mission Commander (AMC). The AMC’s responsibility is to ensure that
the aviation effort is coordinated effectively. The AMC is appointed by the CO or a Flt
Comd, is subordinate to the AFC, and acts as the principal air adviser on aviation matters.
The AMC’s main responsibilities are:
a. controlling aviation elements;
b. establishing timely liaison with the AFC and lifted land force units;
c. assisting with the preparation of plans and orders for the airmobile operations;
d. liaising with field artillery, air defence, airspace control and tactical air control
agencies;
e. coordinating the preliminary operations;
f. providing technical information to the AFC; and
g. developing the aviation elements logistic requirements with the AFC.

11. Aviation Unit Commander (AUC). An AUC is the commander of a helicopter unit
or flight providing support for an airmobile operation.

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12. Lifted Unit Commander (LUC). The LUC is the commander of a land force unit
within the airmobile force and is subordinate to the AFC. The LUC’s primary responsibility
is the execution of the unit’s part of the ground tactical plan but may also include preparatory
and subsequent tasks by the AFC. Support elements, including aviation, may be allocated for
certain phases of an operation.
13. Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO). The ALO is the AMC’s representative to the AFC
and/or LUC. ALOs must be experienced pilots, knowledgeable in all aspects of aviation
employment and operations. Depending on the operation, their role is to co-locate with the
AFC/LUC and advise on all aviation matters. In the event that several helicopter units are
involved in an operation, there is the requirement for an ALO from each unit. The ALO
assists the AMC and LUC staff in developing the air movement table, selecting PZs, LZs,
primary/alternate flight routes, coordinating airspace, developing a fire support plan, and
executing PZ operations. The ALO does not replace the AMC during the planning phase of
the airmobile. The AMC interacts with the AFC and LUC directly on all matters. In the
absence of the AMC, the ALO acts IAW the AMC’s guidance.
a. ALO Considerations.

(1) Deploy Early. As soon as the aviation unit is given a Wng O to

conduct an airmobile, the CO must assign an ALO, brief the ALO and
send him/her ASAP to the LUC headquarters,
(2) AMC’s Intent. The ALO must understand the intent of the AMC for
using helicopters to support the airmobile. To do this, the ALO must
constantly contact the AMC and keep the AMC updated on the status
of the planning and receive guidance from the AMC,
(3) Keep the AMC Informed. The ALO must advise the AMC on all
changes and adjustments to the airmobile plan made by the AFC, and
(4) Decision Making. The ALO should not make decisions for the AMC
unless the AMC has delegated that authority. The ALO should take all
issues requiring a decision to the AMC, who should coordinate
directly with the AFC for resolution;
b. ALO Duties in the PZ. Supported usually by the LUC’s RSM, the ALO is
responsible for the setup of the PZ. They organize, control and coordinate PZ
operations. They execute mission changes IAW the AMC orders and
helicopter availability. They execute the bump plan if necessary and keep the
AFC, AMC and LUC informed of any PZ situation that may require
adjustment of the airmobile concept of ops. The ALO ensures the PZ is clear
of obstacles, marks the PZ and communicates to the helicopters on either the
lifted unit frequency, the aviation unit frequency or a separate PZ frequency,
whichever is appropriate; and
c. ALO Duties in the LZ. There may be requirements for the ALO to be lifted
into the LZ. This occurs only if there is a requirement for a planned extraction
after the objective has been secured. The duties are similar to those in the PZ

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except that the situation for extraction may be more critical and time
compressed. The ALO must remain informed of the casualty extraction
requirements. If possible, any helicopters that are utilized for resupply should
be used for evacuation of wounded on their return flight leg.
14. Flight Lead. The flight lead is responsible for assisting the AMC in selecting flight
routes (primary and alternate), developing timing for the routes, submitting route card data
for the production of route navigation cards, navigating the flight routes and ensuring that the
times are met IAW the air movement table.
15. Airmobile Planning Team. The staff of the squadron conducting the airmobile has a
significant responsibility during the planning and execution of the operation. Aside from the
positions already identified, the airmobile planning includes, the Deputy AMC (D/AMC),
Sqn Ops O and the Sqn IO, along with the Sqn Log Sp Flt Comd. Although not being in a
direct planning role as the actual AMC, the sqn staff interact continuously with the AMC to
ensure that the aviation assets are utilized to their maximum capabilities. The D/AMC acts
as the 2 i/c for the AMC during the planning and the operation. During the planning stage
the Sqn Ops O and IO should locate with the AMC. The D/AMC and the Sqn Ops O assist
the AMC and ALO in the development of the aviation concept of ops, prepare the aviation
plans and orders for the CO, coordinate airspace and assists in developing a fire support plan
to support the aviation mission. The IO must develop the enemy threat to the helicopters.
From the analysis, the IO coordinates with the AMC to develop a fire support plan to support
the inbound helicopters. The sqn staff produces an Op O for the aviation elements
participating in the airmobile.
17. Airmobile Security Element. This element may be made up of either attack or
armed helicopters along with reconnaissance helicopters. This helicopter unit’s primary
mission during an airmobile is to protect the airmobile force both enroute and once on the
objective. The helicopter commander manoeuvres the assets IAW the AFC’s plan, under the
control of the AMC. If attack helicopters are available, they can provide suppressive fire
around the PZ and the LZ, attack enemy positions encountered en route, or attack enemy
forces.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

18. The AFC must address command and control requirements early in the planning
phase of an airmobile. An effective C2 system must be established that allows control of
diverse and widely dispersed air and land force elements between the PZ and the LZ.
Command and control of an airmobile operation must be planned in detail. It must address
the location of key commanders, the location and composition of C2 nodes and the radio nets
utilized during the operation. The key to successful airmobile C2 lies in precise, centralized
planning and decentralized execution.
a. Command. The AMC is a crew member on the mission, but should not act as
an aircraft captain. The D/AMC should be located in a separate section, and
b. Radio Nets. A mix of air to air, air to ground, and ground to ground radio
nets are established to provide the necessary command and control for the

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airmobile operation. The radio nets established make C2 easier and contribute
to the success of the operation. Radio nets for the mission are:
(1) Supported Unit Command Net. This net is an FM net that is used
for unit to unit communications during an airmobile. It is used by the
AFC to communicate with subordinate unit commanders. It is also
used for the land force commander to communicate with the AMC,
(2) Aviation Unit Net. These nets can be either VHF/AM or UHF/AM
nets and are utilized for internal flight communications. Use of a net
provides the flight or element commanders with a dedicated frequency
with which to direct and control individual helicopters, or sections.
All aviation elements should monitor this net. It is used to pass
situation reports and mission changes between the land force and the
airmobile helicopters. The ALO uses this frequency to communicate
with the lift helicopter, providing information on PZ security status,
PZ hazards and changes to PZ operations,
(3) Tactical Air Net. This net is normally a UHF frequency for air to air
communications. All aviation elements (lift, recce and attack
helicopters, and CAS aircraft) monitor this net. The purpose of this
net is for the AMC to communicate with the commanders of the
air/aviation assets involved in the mission, and
(4) Fire Support Net. This is an FM net operated by the land force FOO
or AOP. All aviation elements must have access to this frequency in
order to call for fire support. The Fire Support Net becomes a very
busy net during an airmobile operation. All of the aviation elements
do not need to monitor this net, only those responsible for the direction
and control of fire. However, all aircrew must have the frequency and
call signs in case they pick up responsibility for directing fire due to
helicopter losses.
19. How and who monitors the nets is at the discretion of the AMC. With the capabilities
of the CH 146, the SCAN feature can be used to increase the number of frequencies
monitored. Close coordination must be done to ensure that the KY58 and HVQK features
are used to ensure mission security.

PLANS
20. The five basic plans that comprise an airmobile operation are the ground tactical plan,
the landing plan, the air movement plan, the loading plan and the staging plan. Airmobiles
are planned in reverse order of execution, beginning with the ground tactical plan and
working backward to the staging plan. Reverse planning is imperative as each successive
planning step has an impact on the step that precedes it to ensure that all aspects ultimately
support the AFC’s ground manoeuvre plan. The five plans are detailed as follows:

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a. Ground Tactical Plan. The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the
objective area that lead to accomplishment of the mission. The ground
tactical plan addresses the following areas:
(1) Organization for Combat. The mission, enemy situation, terrain,
manoeuvre forces and fire support assets all help airmobile planners
determine the organization of the force. Emphasis is placed on:

(a) utilizing firepower in the initial assault. This is especially

important if the AFC plans to land near the objective,
(b) ensuring that the force inserted is large enough to quickly
achieve the initial objectives. Aviation forces must be massed
in the LZ and build up a significant combat capability early to
prevent being defeated by repositioning enemy forces, and
(c) ensuring the AFC properly allocates their CS and CSS assets to
sustain the task force until follow on forces arrive,
(2) Fire Support. The AFC must consider relocating field artillery if the
LZ is out of range. Helicopters may be required to sling field artillery
and ammunition. The amount of field artillery available to support the
airmobile and their location are critical factors in determining the
ground tactical plan and the subsequent plans of the airmobile,
(3) Concept of Operations. The AFC develops a concept of operations
to accomplish the mission. Development of the concept of operations
must be done prior to development of the airmobile. Concept of
operations development by the AFC allows subsequent planning
phases of the airmobile to be accomplished. Development of the
ground tactical plan need not be complete to begin mission planning.
The land force concept of operations must be known in general. The
aviation planners should not wait for the completed land force Op O to
begin planning,
(4) As soon as the general concept of operations is approved by the AFC,
the aviation staff and can begin the airmobile planning process, and
(5) Commander’s Intent. The AFC must articulate early the intent for
the airmobile. The commander’s intent for the airmobile allows the
planners to clearly understand the rationale and end state and begin to
plan the subsequent plans. The commander’s intent for the airmobile
includes whether the force lands on the objective or near it and then
manoeuvres to it. The commander’s intent for the airmobile may
include surprise as a critical element, which leads to the development
of the fire support and SEAD plans. Intent varies based on the factors
of the estimate, but it is critical that the AMC receive the commander’s
intent as soon as possible after the mission is received,

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b. Landing Plan. The concept of operations and the ground tactical plan
directly impact on the selection of landing zones, the landing formation, the
number of troops, and the amount of firepower that must be lifted into the LZ.
The landing plan must be done in accordance with the development of the
ground tactical plan. The landing plan must support the land force
commander’s intent and concept of operations. The landing plan outlines the
distribution, timing and sequencing of helicopters into the LZ.
(1) LZ Selection. In coordination with the AMC and the ALO, the
AFC/LUC selects primary and alternate LZs. The number of selected
LZs is based upon the land force concept of operations and LZ
availability. The aviation planners advise the AFC on LZ suitability.
The considerations for selecting suitable landing zones are:
(a) Location. The LZ must be located in an area that supports the
ground tactical plan of the AFC. It may be located on the
objective, close by or at a distance,
(b) Capacity. The selected LZ must be big enough to support the
maximum number of helicopters that will be utilized in any one
lift,
(c) Enemy Disposition and Capabilities. The AMC must
consider Air Defense Artillery locations and weapons ranges
and the ability of the enemy to reposition ground forces to react
to the airmobile,
(d) Unit Tactical Integrity. Sections must land intact in the LZ,
and platoons must land in the same serial. This ensures
fighting unit integrity during the operation,
(e) Supporting Fire. LZs must be selected that are in the range of
fire support (artillery, CAS, naval gunfire),
(f) Obstacles. LZ selection must include avoiding obstacles in the
LZ,
(g) Identification from the Air. The LZ should be identifiable
from the air, and
(h) Landing Formations. What formation the helicopters land in
is dependent on a number of factors including size, shape,
wind, helicopter numbers, approach/departure routes and ease
of control. The proximity to the objective/enemy also
influences the formation,
(2) The Decision to Use A Single LZ or Multiple LZs is based upon the
ground tactical plan and the AFC’s intent. However, there are
advantages to using single or multiple LZs. The advantages of single
LZs are:

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(a) the control of operations is easier,

(b) it requires less planning and rehearsal time,
(c) it centralizes any required resupply operations,
(d) it concentrates supporting fires on one location,
(e) it provides improved security to follow-on lifts,
(f) it masses more combat power in a single location, and
(g) it may make the detection of the airmobile force by enemy
units more difficult because the operation is confined to a
smaller area of the battlefield, and
(3) The Advantages of Multiple LZs:
(a) the force is not grouped in one location,
(b) it forces the enemy to fight in multiple directions,
(c) it reduces the opportunity for the enemy to site weapons on one
position,
(d) it allows for the rapid dispersal of ground elements to
accomplish tasks in separate areas, and
(e) it makes the size of the airmobile force difficult for the enemy
to determine;
c. Air Movement Plan. The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical
and landing plan. It specifies the schedule and provides the instructions for
the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies from the PZ to the LZ. It
provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, air control points
(ACPs), airspeeds, altitudes, formations and fire support. The AFC develops
the air movement plan in conjunction with the AMC who in turn utilizes the
LUC, D/AMC, ALO, and flight lead(s). The air movement plan results in the
production of the air movement table and the mission card.
(1) Flight Route Selection. Depending on the operational area, a fixed
set of air routes will be in place from which the planning team must
select the best one. If none are usable, an airspace request must be
submitted to the appropriate HQ,

(2) Selection of Flight Routes, whether they are pre-existing or mission

specific, is always based upon the factors that come from the estimate.
The AMC and aviation staff must consider the location of friendly
troops, enemy disposition, air defense systems, terrain and the
locations of the PZ and LZ to select the best flight route. Selected
flight routes should always be laid over the enemy situational template
to ensure that the route selected best avoids known or suspected enemy
positions,

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(3) The planning team and the AMC must select primary and alternate
flight routes. Alternate flight routes are selected to provide the
airmobile force with a pre-planned, pre-coordinated method of moving
from the PZ to LZ if the primary route becomes compromised,
(4) Flight routes that pass through adjacent formation sectors must be
coordinated and approved by the adjacent formation to avoid potential
fratricide. This adds considerable time to the planning cycle as the
impact of this route on the adjacent battle may be significant, and
(5) When selecting flight routes, the AMC and planning team must
consider the following factors:
(a) Airspace Management. Flight routes are designed to provide
aviation units with manoeuvre space, free from friendly fire.
The routes must be planned so as not to conflict with field
artillery or ground manoeuvre forces. They should not overfly
friendly field artillery locations. Flight routes must be
coordinated with all forces to ensure prevention of fratricide,

(b) Support of the Landing Plan. Flight routes should provide

for approach to and departure from the LZ so as to minimize
the ability of the enemy to determine/target the LZ,
(c) Enemy Capabilities. To minimize enemy observation and
acquisition, flight routes should make maximum use of terrain,
cover and concealment and avoid known or suspected enemy
positions,
(d) Fire Support. Flight routes should be selected that are within
the range of friendly fire support assets, and

(e) Distance. To reduce helicopter exposure time and to reduce

the ability of the enemy to observe the airmobile, flight routes
should be as short as possible while still maintaining cover and
protection;
d. Loading Plan. The AFC bases the loading plan on the air movement plan
and the ground tactical plan. The loading plan ensures that troops, equipment
and supplies are loaded on the correct helicopter. It establishes the priority of
loads, the bump plan and the cross loading of equipment and personnel.
Detailed load planning ensures that the airmobile force arrives at the LZ
configured to support the ground tactical plan. Planning for the loading plan
must include the organization and operation of the PZ, the loading of
helicopters, and the bump plan. A bump plan ensures that essential troops and
equipment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case helicopters are lost
during the mission.

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(1) PZ Selection. The first step in the loading plan is selection of a

suitable PZ or PZs. Primary and alternate PZs should be selected
during this process. The number of PZs selected is based on the intent
of the AFC, the location of the airmobile force in relation to the PZ
and the size and capability of available PZs. The AMC, and ALO
select suitable pickup zones that support the intent of the AFC. PZ
selection should be based on the following considerations:
(a) Number. The AFC specifies the number of PZs based on the
factors discussed above. Multiple PZs may have an advantage
over single PZs because they avoid concentrating the force in
one location. However, multiple PZ operations require detailed
and precise planning,
(b) Size. Each PZ should accommodate all supporting helicopters
at one time,
(c) Proximity to Troops. PZs should be selected that are close to
the lifted unit so they are not required to travel a long distance,
(d) Accessibility. PZs should be accessible to vehicles that move
support assets and troops. However, they should be located in
an area that limits traffic from vehicles or personnel that are
not directly involved in PZ operations,
(e) Vulnerability to Attack. PZs should be masked by terrain
from enemy observation,
(f) Conditions. PZ selection needs to take into account the
surface conditions of the area. Excessive slope, blowing dust
or sand, blowing snow and large rocks all create potential
hazards to PZ operations, and
(g) PZ Formations. Like the LZ formations, the PZ formation is
dependent on size, shape, wind, the number of helicopters,
approach/ departure routes and ease of control,
(2) Aviation Involvement. The AMC must ensure that aviation expertise
is present on the PZ. The ALO or another designated representative,
should locate with the lifted unit during the PZ selection, set-up and
execution phase,
(3) PZ Control. Once the AFC selects the PZ, the ALO and the OIC of
the lifted unit organize, control and coordinate the PZ operation. The
ALO’s responsibility is to take into consideration helicopter factors.
For example, the PZ landing direction may change if the wind changes
significantly. Additionally, the aviation representative can offer
advice on surface conditions and their effect on helicopter operations.
Security of the PZ should always be considered and is the sole

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responsibility of the AFC through the LUC(s). Some of the ALO’s

responsibilities in the PZ are:
(a) to establish communications with helicopters,
(b) to control helicopter arrival to PZ,
(c) to advise the LUC(s) of changes due to helicopter problems,
(d) to be responsible for the execution of the Bump Plan,
(e) to control clearing the PZ of obstacles,
(f) to mark the PZ, dependent on the number and types of
helicopters to land at any one time and the loads to be lifted,
and
(g) to establish CASEVAC and slung load areas,

(4) PZ Communications. Communications must be by the most secure

means available. PZ operations may be conducted under radio silence
to avoid electronic detection. If under radio silence, it is imperative
that aircrew remain on schedule to allow the ALO to keep a smooth
flow of troops off of the PZ. PZ communications are accomplished on
either the established aviation unit net or a dedicated PZ frequency,
with transmissions kept to a minimum,
(5) PZ Marking. The ALO directs the marking of the PZ. PZ marking
must be done so the PZ is identifiable from the air. Far and near
recognition signals are needed, especially at night to allow the pilots to
orient on the PZ quickly. Touchdown points must be clearly marked
utilizing personnel or ground marking, and
(6) Disposition of Loads on the PZ. Personnel and equipment must be
positioned on the PZ to conform with the landing formation. Aircrew
must know the loading plan on the PZ and be prepared to accept troops
and equipment immediately on landing. PZ sketches depicting
location of loads in the PZ assist aircrew in loading troops and
equipment quickly once the helicopters arrive in the PZ. Aircrew
should, when possible, be provided a PZ diagram. Figure 7-2 shows
an example of a PZ diagram; and

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Bump Area

Casualty
SLUNG LOAD
Collection
Point

Figure 7-2. PZ Diagram

e. Staging Plan. The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes
the proper order for movement of personnel and helicopters to the PZ. Loads
must be ready before the helicopters arrive at the PZ. During mission
planning the ALO determines the time required to set up the PZ and selects
times (based upon the airmobile L-hour) that the PZ control group establishes
the PZ. During the staging plan the aviation unit is conducting mission
planning, orders, rehearsals and necessary checks to ensure that the mission
times are met once the mission is executed. During the staging plan, the
aviation unit should focus on:
(1) Mission Planning. Mission planning includes the coordination
between the AFC and the AMC, development of the aviation Op O,
issuing the Op O, an aircrew briefing, and rehearsals,
(2) Checks and Inspections. During the staging plan, the helicopters are
prepared for the operation. The SAMEO and element leads ensure that
all helicopters have sufficient fuel, the required security
communications, serviceable mission kits and equipment and that each
helicopter is prepared to accept the loads for the airmobile (internal or
external),
(3) FARP Operations. If a FARP is to be utilized during the airmobile
mission, it must be planned and positioned during the staging plan.
Consideration should be given to site selection, time required to be
operational, travel time, safety inspection criteria and night set-up
considerations (if applicable). (See Chapter 10 details FARP
operations), and

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(4) Routes to the PZ. The AMC must select flight routes to the PZ that
allow the helicopters to arrive at the PZ on time, in the proper landing
direction.

PLANNING PROCESS
21. The success of any mission depends largely on the planning process. The time
available for planning an airmobile operation varies; however, enough time must be allotted
for detailed planning and synchronization to occur. For company level operations, an
average of 24 hours should be allotted for planning. For battalion level airmobile, up to 48
hours should be allotted for planning. Airmobile operations involving small numbers of
helicopters and personnel may not require as much time to be planned successfully.
Airmobile operations may be conducted with less time to plan than this but the AFC/LUC
must understand that a much greater risk is assumed with a condensed planning time. The
battle procedure process for aviation mission planning is detailed in the Tactical Aviation
TT&Ps.
22. Airmobile planning begins when the aviation unit receives a warning order from
higher headquarters. The warning order should specify whom the AFC and lifted unit is.
This allows the aviation commander to dispatch an ALO early to the AFC headquarters and
prepare the aviation unit for the initial planning stages.
23. Initial Planning Conference (IPC). The initial planning conference is the first
meeting between the AFC staff and the aviation unit. The aviation unit should be represented
as a minimum by the AMC and ALO plus any additional members of the squadron that the
AMC selects to bring. The location of the IPC can be either at the LUC headquarters or at a
location selected by the AFC. The IPC should occur early in the planning process. As soon
as the AFC has a general idea of the intent and ground tactical plan concept of ops, then the
planning can start.
24. At the IPC, the AFC must make clear to the AMC and the LUC, the intent of the
operation and the critical information that must be gathered that directly affects their
decisions and dictates the successful execution of the operation. For the AMC, the
information passed, or directed to be collected, influences the abort criteria and the minimum
numbers and types of helicopters required to carry out the operation. Some of the points that
should be discussed during the IPC are:
a. what are the locations of air defense systems that can affect the mission and
range the PZ, LZ, and routes?;
b. what enemy ground forces have the ability to reposition and influence the
LZ?;
c. is the LZ in direct fire range of any enemy forces?;
d. the minimum number of helicopters required., thereafter the commander must
be notified if availability drops below the number determined;
e. the timings for various phases of the operation;

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f. the weather limits must be established with a go/no go time for the weather
call. The commander must be notified if weather is less than established
minimums at that time so alternate planning can be conducted; and
g. the preparation, marking, and movement to the PZ by the land force and
aviation forces.
25. The result of this initial planning is that the AFC must establish decision points that
affect the airmobile. If and when these decision points are reached they require the AFC to
do one of three things:
a. abort the mission;
b. change the concept of ops; or
c. accept the risk and continue as planned.

26. Mission Briefing. The mission briefing is the final coordination meeting of key
airmobile personnel. It is designed for personnel from the land force and aviation units to
brief the plan to the AFC. They are not planning sessions. The planning for the airmobile
should be complete by this time. Once this briefing is completed, the AFC approves the plan
and the formal orders are given soon after. For the aviation unit(s), the minimum attendees
should be the AMC, the AUC(s), and the ALO. The AMC should brief the aviation portion
of the operation.
27. Aviation Orders Development. Once the plan has been approved by the AFC and
orders are given, the LUC and AMC complete their planning/orders.
a. Aviation Orders. The AMC, along with his planning team, prepare the
aviation orders for the aviation portion of the airmobile. These orders may be
in the form of verbal, written or overlay orders. The order is approved by the
AMC and is planned in parallel with the airmobile mission planning process
by the LUC. The orders cover the aviation mission and shall include as a
minimum each element lead of the aviation portion of the mission to include
any transport, reconnaissance, and attack helicopter assets. The orders are
briefed to the AUCs along with any fire support or CAS personnel involved in
the airmobile. Maximum time must be provided to subordinate aviation
commanders so those aircrew executing the mission have sufficient mission
preparation time; and
b. Aircrew Briefing. The aircrew briefing covers the aircrew actions and
planning necessary to successfully accomplish the mission. Aircrew briefings
are normally given by the AMC. This briefing is an important portion of the
unit’s support to the airmobile.
28. Rehearsals. Rehearsals assist units in clarifying the concept of operations,
synchronizing the actions of each sub-element, orienting subordinates to the positions and
actions of other units and practicing any possible branches and sequels from the decision
support matrix. The aviation rehearsal focuses on synchronizing the aviation assets involved.
The squadron should conduct a rehearsal to synchronize its elements of the airmobile. It

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should have a representative from the lifted unit and a representative from the fire support
element. The type of rehearsal conducted is dependent upon time available and specific
operation taking the form of either a map or terrain model rehearsal. It must be focused on
synchronizing the assets involved and coming up with contingencies for the most likely
events that can affect the plan.

SECURITY
29. Airmobile security forces provide force protection for the airmobile. It encompasses
the entire range of planning and operations conducted to protect the land force as it moves
from the PZ to the LZ. It is planned and executed as an integral part of the airmobile
operation and is planned by the AFC. It is a highly synchronized operation often involving
many different types of units executing reconnaissance, tactical security, electronic warfare
and other missions in support of the airmobile force. Generally, once a route is secured, it
remains secured. Units involved in airmobile security are as follows:
a. Reconnaissance. Missions for recce helicopters include screening, route
reconnaissance of air axes and flight routes, PZs and LZs, direction and
control of fire and the coordination of the passage of lines. During the IPB
process, it is determined how these units are actually employed. If attack
helicopters are not available for direct fire support, reconnaissance helicopters
will be required to perform force protection by means of AOP and FAC,
b. Land Force Units. Land force units may also be employed in the airmobile
security role. Missions for these units include PZ security, reconnaissance of
routes, security of FARPs and passage of line coordination,
c. Attack Helicopters. Attack helicopter squadrons are capable of performing
the protection missions alone or in concert with reconnaissance helicopters.
Attack helicopters can also conduct overwatch and screening of the airmobile
force during movement along the flight route from the PZ to LZ, providing
protection from enemy ground fire or attacks. They can provide suppressive
fire, SEAD and may be used as a reserve force to counterattack threats to the
land forces. Attack helicopters may also be integrated in the concept of
operations for the ground tactical phase where they may be used to conduct
screen, guard or hasty attacks, and
d. Specialist Units. Specialist units or forces in the form of pathfinders, Long
Range Surveillance Units or UAVs can be utilized to provide intelligence
along the route of flight or at the LZ. Some of this information must be
requested from higher formations and are usually not readily available for
brigade level operations.

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TIMINGS
30. The hours designation, “H, L, Y” is dependent on numerous factors. The land forces
usually utilize the term “H” hour for all their operations. This may be an impractical timing
for the AMC to plan from, for the following reasons:
a. the time lapse between the arrival of troops and the helicopters in the LZ may
be of sufficient length that the timings are irrelevant to the AMC. This may
occur if the troops are being airlifted to await link-up with another force, time
to lift in the force spans many hours in which the ground troops may have to
re-organize and prepare for crossing the line of departure (LD);
b. coordination for fire support and tactical air support may be critical in which
case the “L” or “Y’ hour designation may be more fitting for aviation
planning considerations;
c. the “L” hour timing for the air movement is fixed, but the “H” hour is on call;
and
d. to ensure that there is no confusion between which “H” hour, the use of “L”
or “Y” hour distinguishes the ground timings from the air timings.

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CHAPTER 8
LOGISTIC AIRLIFT

GENERAL
1. Transport Helicopters. Utility Tactical Transport Helicopters (UTTHs) and
Medium Transport Helicopters (MTHs) are both transport helicopters capable of
conducting the logistic airlift of troops and supplies. Operationally, they differ both in
where they operate on the battlefield, and their load capacity or airlift capability. For
instance, a CH 146 Griffon operates mainly from the FEBA back to the Division rear area
and can carry an allowable cargo load of 2,000 lbs, while a CH 47D Chinook operates
mainly between the Division and Corps rear areas and can carry up to 20,000 pounds.
Combat airlift (Chapter 6) normally involves UTTHs, each transporting small numbers of
combat troops and supplies within the brigade area. Logistic airlift operations normally
involve the use of MTHs in the aerial transport of very heavy loads of defensive stores,
commodities and combat supplies in the corps and division areas and occasionally to the
BSA. This chapter focuses on the use of MTHs as the main logistic transport helicopter.

Figure 8-1. CH 47D Chinook Lifting Engineering Equipment

2. US Army MTH Squadron Organization. US Army Aviation MTH sqns consist

of three or four flights of sixteen CH 47 D Chinooks each. Each flight consists of two
sections of eight CH 47Ds. At the corps level, each squadron has four flights (64
Chinooks total) and at the division level there are three flights (48 total).

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3. Logistics. Logistics entails the essential capabilities, functions, activities and

tasks necessary to sustain all elements of the forces operating at all levels of war.
Aviation assists the land forces by the aerial delivery of combat supplies. Aviation forces
may support major manoeuvre forces, CS elements, or major CSS elements for the
manoeuvre force. MTHs may also support aviation specific sustainment requirements.
Because of their size and vulnerability to AAA, MTHs generally work between the
COSCOM and DISGP, but they can also move forward to the BSA in urgent situations.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF MTHs

4. Capabilities. By conducting logistic airlift operations, Medium Transport
Helicopters can significantly influence the land force commander's concept of ops by:
a. conducting day, night, and limited visibility combat, CS, and CSS
operations;
b. influencing the tempo of friendly operations;
c. moving large amounts of supplies and equipment to sustain combat
operations; and
d. quickly moving critical IOR repair parts forward.

5. Mission Planning Factors. Medium Transport Helicopters are subject to many

factors that the AMC must consider when mission planning. These factors include:
a. extreme environmental effects (such as high ambient temperatures and
high density altitudes) which may reduce the capabilities of the helicopter
to perform the full range of missions;
b. adequate time to plan and coordinate with the supported unit(s);
c. the MTH unit may be subject to inadequate CS/CSS because of its
extended range of operations and limited organic logistics support;
d. terrain may limit the availability of adequate PZs and LZs;
e. MTHs require large amounts of fuel and repair parts;
f. some units can provide only a limited number of helicopters to support a
large combat force;
g. obscurants (such as smoke, dust, fog and snow) can have a detrimental
effect on operations;
h. aircrew operational flying time restrictions could affect continuous
operations;
i. MTHs have a large, unsuppressed IR signature that makes them vulnerable
to IR missiles; and
j. MTHs require extensive maintenance support for extended operations.

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MISSION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6. Often MTH missions are accomplished by a single helicopter, and the distances
involved, particularly for corps aviation helicopters, may be great. Corps MTHs are
normally employed beyond the range of communications from their parent organization.
Planning considerations to conduct MTH logistic missions are listed below:
a. Distance. Consideration must be given to where these helicopters receive
fuel and maintenance support, while on a mission. Coordination with
adjacent aviation units can be accomplished so helicopters can refuel at
other units' FARPs;
b. Command and Control. For mission planning, a point of contact with
the supported unit must be provided to the aircrew;
c. Airspace Control. Aircrew must understand and comply with the
airspace structure that is currently active;
d. Intelligence. The Sqn IO must use all available assets to provide the
aircrew with a detailed enemy situation. The IO must evaluate potential
threats that may affect the mission and recommend changes to avoid
potential threats; and
e. Communications. Helicopters are under the control of the supported unit,
normally OPCON; however, the parent unit still maintains C2 functions for
certain areas. Since these helicopters are often operating out of direct
radio range from the parent main CP, alternate arrangements must be made
to keep the squadron aware of the mission status. Aircrew may provide
periodic situation reports when in communications range or arrange to
provide SITREPs via other means.

MISSIONS
7. General. The land force commander's estimate influences the missions that are
assigned to MTH sqns. With the aviation commander's assistance, the land force
commander determines how best to employ MTHs. Some of the common missions that
an MTH sqn conducts are:
a. Movement of Supplies. The aerial movement of large quantities of
supplies and equipment on the battlefield is an important mission. With
the lift capability of the MTH, air movement of large quantities of supplies
not only results in equipment arriving at its destination rapidly, but also
frees up ground transportation assets. The CH 47D can lift up to 20,000
pounds of cargo, either internally or externally. (Internal loads normally
bulk out before reaching the weight limit). Logistic resupply operations
are discussed by class of supply as follows:
(1) Class I - Subsistence. Helicopters from the corps MTH Sqn are
used to move these supplies from the COSCOM forward to the
DSA. Operating under division control, MTHs move them from

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the DSA forward to the BSA and, in special instances, as far

forward as a battalion area. LZs are established at DSAs and
BSAs specifically for these items,
(2) Class II – General and Technical Stores. Replenishing stockage
levels of these items may become a mission for MTHs in the corps
where they are transported forward from the COSCOM to the
DSA. Movement forward from the DSA is most likely
accomplished by ground transport,
(3) Class III - Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants - POL. Fuel can be
transported rapidly around the battlefield. The MTH's function in
moving POL is normally as part of a FARP operation. MTHs can
externally transport the Forward Area Refuelling Equipment
(FARE) system and sling up to five 500 (US) gallon fuel bladders.
A complete FARE system is capable of providing up to six
helicopter refuelling points. Once the FARE system is in place,
UTTHs or MTHs can resupply the FARP by externally moving
fuel bladders, and
(4) Class IX - Repair Parts and Components. MTHs can move
large or heavy IOR repair parts. Corps level MTHs can move
repair parts forward from the COSCOM to the DSA. Helicopters
operating under division control can expect to move repair parts
forward from the DSA to the BSAs; and
b. Resupply of Airmobile Forces. Airmobile forces normally go into an LZ
with only the minimum essential supplies. MTHs must be prepared to
follow up an airmobile by resupplying the airmobile forces. Helicopters
must be prepared to conduct rapid refuelling operations and return to a
designated PZ to load with air lifted supplies and await for the designated
launch time;
c. Movement of Personnel. MTH sqns provide the land force commander
with a robust airmobile capability for moving large numbers of combat
troops great distances. This enables the land force commander to rapidly
concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.
Each CH 47D can carry up to 32 combat equipped troops;
d. MEDEVAC and CASEVAC. The MTH can also be used to transport
patients or casualties and can be rigged to hold 24 stretchers;
e. Gun Moves. An MTH can readily move field artillery and their basic
ammunition load quickly from one firing position to another; and
f. Recovery of Downed Aircraft and Critical Equipment. Damaged
aircraft, whether fixed or rotary wing and critical equipment can be slung
back for repair.

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AIR MOVEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

8. Sending Land Force Unit. The unit that is preparing the loads (internal or
external) to be air moved is responsible for all facets of PZ operations. The
responsibilities of the sending unit include preparation of the PZ (marking, clearing,
communications), rigging of external loads, prioritizing loads, and tracking loads (where
the load is going and what the load consists of). The sending unit also provides the
aircrew with the correct destination for the loads (LZ location, frequency, call sign,
marking, and POC).
9. Aviation Unit. The aviation unit that moves the loads is responsible for ensuring
that the load is safe to fly and for moving it to the correct location. The moving unit also
notifies the receiving unit if any changes are made to the established plan.
10. Receiving Land Force Unit. The receiving land force unit is responsible for all
facets of LZ operations which include preparation of the LZ (clearing, marking,
signalling, communications), de-rigging the loads and loading the used rigging material
back onto the helicopter for return to the sending ground unit, if required.

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Annex A to
Chapter 8

CH 47D CHINOOK CHARACTERISTICS

1. The Chinook helicopter is the main logistic airlift or cargo helicopter used by
many nations to support their armies. These include Australia, the UK, the USA, the
Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. Since it is such a widely used helicopter, there is a good
possibility that it will be in theatre with Canadian Forces as part of a coalition force. The
Chinook proved its combat capability during the Falklands War, and the Gulf War. This
annex details the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the CH 47D:
a. Characteristics.
(1) the CH 47D is a twin engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed for
transportation of cargo, troops, slung artillery and weapons during
day, night, visual, and instrument conditions;
(2) the helicopter fuselage is approximately 50 feet long. With a 60
foot rotor span, on each rotor system, the effective length of a
CH 47D (with blades turning) is approximately 100 feet from the
most forward point of the forward rotor to the most rearward point
on the aft rotor;
(3) the maximum gross weight is 50,000 pounds;
(4) the maximum airspeed is 170 knots with a normal cruise speed of
130 knots. However, the airspeed for any given mission will vary
greatly depending on load configuration (internal or slung), time of
day, weather conditions, etc.;
(5) the minimum crew for tactical operations is four, two pilots, one
flight engineer, and one crew chief. For more complex missions,
such as NVG operations and airmobiles, commanders may
consider using five crew members and add one additional crew
chief;
(6) it can be operated in light or moderate turbulence; and
(7) it can be operated in IMC;

b. Capabilities.
(1) The cargo hooks (slung loads). The helicopter has three cargo
hooks for slinging loads, the forward hook, the aft hook and the
centre hook. The limits presented below are structural limitations
only:
(a) the structural limit of the forward and aft hook is 17,000
pounds;

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(b) the maximum single load that can be suspended as a

tandem load from the forward and aft hooks is 25,000
pounds; and
(c) the centre cargo hook is limited to a maximum load of
26,000 pounds;

(2) Load configuration. Consideration must be given to the

advantages and disadvantages of any particular external load
configuration. For example, while it is generally true that a
tandem load will ride better and permit a higher airspeed, it is also
true that a tandem load usually requires ground personnel to attach
the load to the helicopter’s cargo hooks. All appropriate references
must be researched to insure compliance with any directives
regarding load configuration, that is, many loads allow centre hook
or tandem hook attachment; and

Figure 8A-1. CH 47D Lifting a 155 mm M198

(3) Internal load.
(a) Seating. Troop seating arrangement for up to 32 fully
equipped combat troops is provided. This is broken down
by 10 three-man seats and 3 one-man seats. This total
number varies greatly due to the configuration of the
aircraft's interior. This factor requires extensive
consideration before committing a specific number of
helicopters with a specific combat load to a given mission.
Additionally, the troop commander's jump seat may be

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available, but is unwieldy and time consuming to use.

Troops are normally loaded and unloaded through the
lowered aft cargo door and ramp;
(b) Stretchers. The stretcher arrangement provides for up to
24 stretchers. These 24 stretchers are configured in six
tiers of four stretchers each. In this 24 stretcher
configuration, it may be possible to leave the three, one-
man seats in position. It is not necessary to remove the fold
up troop seats to install the stretchers;
(c) Cargo Loading (internal). The dimensions of the cargo
compartment are 366 inches long, 90 inches wide, and 78
inches high. These dimensions are uniform throughout the
cargo compartment; however, there are some restrictions
when fitting items through the two doors;
(d) Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System (HICHS).
CH 47D units have the necessary equipment for four
helicopters to be equipped with HICHS. This system
provides for quick loading, securing, and unloading of
palletized cargo. The system generally uses either the 463L
pallet (up to 3 simultaneously) or warehouse wooden
pallets (up to 10, depending on size). While cargo can be
carried without the use of the HICHS, this system expedites
the loading and unloading process; and
(e) Winch/Hoist System. The CH 47D is equipped with a
3,000 pound capacity, hydraulically operated winch that
can be employed in either of two modes. For the purpose
of loading and unloading cargo internally, this system is
used in the CARGO mode. This mode permits the
winching of cargo up to 3,000 pounds on a straight-line
pull, or up to 12,000 pounds, with the aid of pulley blocks.
The remaining mode, described as the RESCUE mode,
permits the use of this system as a rescue hoist (up to 600
pounds) and is not used for cargo loading; and
c. Limitations.
(1) the CH 47D endurance is 2.5 hours and 4.0 hours with one aux fuel
tank installed;
(2) the combat radius is approximately 225 kilometres;
(3) the combat radius with one aux fuel tank installed, is
approximately 350 kilometres;
(4) the helicopter shall not be started or shutdown in winds (including
gusts) in excess of 30 knots; and

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(5) continuous flight in light icing conditions below 5 degrees Celsius

is not recommended since blade damage can occur from
asymmetric ice shedding.

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CHAPTER 9
LOGISTICS AND
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

GENERAL
1. The aim of the Logistic Support Flight and the Maintenance Flight, the squadron’s
Combat Service Support (CSS) organization, is to provide the materiel, supplies and
technician skills to enable each squadron to accomplish its missions.

CSS CONCEPT
2. Supporting any operation requires the proper quantity and quality of resources in
order to provide the necessary elements for a successful mission. The planning
considerations for each mission will determine the level of support that is required and will
be confirmed during the recce. General and technical support to deployed operations, will be
a standard 14 days of supply (DOS) or IAW DCDS directives and 2nd line support
organization directives to the deployment.
3. It is essential that only the resources required be sent on a mission. Over-resourcing
an operation will have an impact on the ability of the Wing to provide for other missions with
the limited numbers of resources. Whether it is personnel, tools or other critical items, once
committed, it is very difficult to remove them from a theatre of operations (TOO). An exit
strategy (coordinated IAW DCDS requirements) for resources must be put into place during
the planning process for all missions to establish when they can be repatriated. Occasionally,
this may happen during an ongoing operation.

PERSONNEL
4. The Operational Readiness State (ORS) Model is a document that establishes the
number of personnel (rank, MOC and qualifications) and vehicles to support a specified
mission (number of aircraft, etc). The ORS is described in 3, 8 and 16 pack aircraft
configurations that can either be static or mobile. The number of personnel is established for
the basic capabilities and support tasks, any additional functions (FARP, DEWS, etc) would
require an additional module of personnel and equipment to the TO&E.

MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS

5. The support concept is composed of several elements that can be adjusted depending
on the requirements. This can be sub-divided into general functions of maintenance and
supply:
a. T&T Equipment (Tools & Test Equipment);
b. AMSE (Aircraft Maintenance Support Equipment);
c. Technical Publications;
d. Dep ADAM (Deployable Automated Data for Aircraft Maintenance); and

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e. COOP (Customer On-Line Ordering Processing).

6. The final composition of the deployment will be based on the mission requirements,
adjusted to each specific mission, from relying on weekly re-supply to self-sufficient in
aircraft spares for a period of time (up to 60 days).
7. The approach to quantifying the elements of maintenance is a stepped approach,
where a minimum baseline is required to support one to three aircraft. Additional aircraft
may require adjustment to the baseline whereas aircraft specific equipment (BFK, tow
wheels, etc.) will have fixed variable requirements.
8. The supply support will have a linear approach based on the quantity of aircraft
deployed and the estimated flying rate.

CONCEPTS OF SUPPORT
9. Aircraft Fly Away Box. This is a basic capability where aircrew can function
autonomously for up to 72 hours away from Main Operating Base (MOB). The box would
contain POL products and minimal tools to carry out basic preventative/servicing functions.
An extension of this capability would be the addition of support personnel and equipment
(i.e. F & S kits and essential AMSE). This capability would be exercised during a DART
deployment, for a period of up to 40 days. There are no provisions for major inspection
during this type of deployment.
10. Contingency Response - Kit (CRK). Two "Paul Bunyan type" containers with built
in storage that will contain T&T Eqpt (with limited special tools), Pubs and Dep ADAM
required to support three aircraft up to 2nd level inspections. To be employed in a static
posture, domestic or deployed, where maintenance workshop/facilities exist. The CRK is
capable of being moved within unit resources and is equipped to provide all requirements for
the first 60 days.
11. Special Equipment Shelters (SES). These are protected working environments and
can be located anywhere. A full compliment of SESs configured for the CH 146 is
composed of the following: AVN, AVS, Battery, ALSE, Metal, REF, AMCRO, MRP, and
COOP. The capabilities of SESs are to provide 2nd level workspace similar to garrison, in a
static low threat environment. All the T&T Equipment, Pubs and Dep ADAM can be found
in the SESs check lists with specific AMSE as required. The limiting factor is the COOP
SES which contains limited spares of consumables only, no repairables, it requires re-supply
from 2nd line support element. The COOP SES is better suited for domestic ops.
12. Special Equipment Vehicles (SEVs). These are SESs mounted on a prime mover
MLVW. SEVs have been designed and configured to support tactical (High Tempo)
mobility operations.
13. Contingency Response - Aircraft Spares (CRAS). BHTC (Bell COOP) controlled,
the CRAS is the composed of six "Paul Bunyan" type containers. The CRAS is employed in
a static posture where facilities exist to carry out all maintenance functions. The CRAS
consists of CH 146 specific spares and consumables scaled to support a three aircraft
deployment up to 2nd level inspections for an unlimited duration. A COOP terminal and

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IMARSAT are part of the kit. The CRAS is typically static but can be moved within unit
resources. It requires re-supply from a 2nd line support element.
14. Pack Up Aircraft Spares (PUAS). PUAC is BHTC (Bell COOP) controlled. The
PUAS is composed of one sea container and one MECC shelter employed in a static posture
where facilities exist to carry out all maintenance functions. The PUAS is designed and
configured to support an eight aircraft deployment in a static location. The sea container is
designed for the storage of COOP spares of repairables and consumables. The MECC shelter
provides a work environment and holds the COOP terminal and IMARSAT equipment. The
PUAS is not mobile and is beyond a unit’s capability to move.

PLANNING
15. Logistic and aircraft maintenance planning must be done in conjunction with
operational planning.
16. Fuelling Operations. Unit helicopters consume large quantities of fuel during each
mission. To ensure a continuous unit readiness posture, the unit’s logistical planners must
accurately plan for, and constantly monitor fuel consumption.
a. Requesting POL. The unit initiates requests for POL products. These reports
are processed through the supply chain of command, which consolidates user
needs and coordinates delivery. Aviation fuel is transported by the brigade
service battalion to delivery points for transfer to smaller squadron fuel
bowsers; and
b. Calculating Fuel Requirements.
(1) fuel requirements are based on both daily and mission needs. Daily
needs are calculated by multiplying the estimated daily hours each
helicopter will fly, by the consumption rate of that particular
helicopter. That total is then multiplied by the total number of
helicopters in the unit. The consolidated fuel total of unit helicopters
is the daily fuel quantity that must be requisitioned. Mission needs are
figured by applying the same formula used to calculate daily needs,
except that mission available helicopter totals are used instead of
organic totals and mission hours are substituted for daily hours.
Considering the fuel that is already in the helicopter tanks when the
mission begins, fuel totals derived may be adjusted. This gives the
true amount of fuel the FARP requires to support a given mission. The
CH146 Griffon has a fuel consumption rate of approximately 400 ltrs
per hr. Other NATO helicopter fuel consumption rates can be found in
Tactical Aviation TT&Ps, and
(2) accurate fuel planning requires continuous coordination between Ops
and the Log Sp Flt. The brigade must be integrated into operational
planning so sufficient fuel can be requested, and available, for all
missions.

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VEHICLE AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY

17. Each squadron has an integral maintenance flight; however, due to the number of
helicopters, ground vehicles, and other critical equipment, additional maintenance assistance
from outside the unit is required to sustain operations. Maintenance functions include
inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, rebuilding, recovering, and
evacuating equipment. Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible, and
at the lowest capable level. When equipment cannot be repaired on site, it is moved only as
far to the rear as necessary for repair. This concept ensures timely repairs and keeps the
maximum amount of equipment operational. Helicopter units use the principles of flexible
unit structure, direct support, and general support to implement this concept. The key to
maintenance management is sound planning and establishing a disciplined maintenance
management system to ensure that equipment remains operational.
a. Vehicle Maintenance. The squadron performs all integral vehicle and
equipment maintenance. Second line maintenance is performed at the GS
maintenance facility;
b. Aircraft Maintenance. Aircraft maintenance operations continue around the
clock. Damaged or inoperable helicopters that require time-consuming repairs
are handled in more secure areas toward the rear. Canadian Forces Technical
Orders (CFTOs) outline general aircraft maintenance procedures.
(1) aircraft maintenance functions are divided into two categories,
scheduled and unscheduled as follows:
(a) Scheduled Maintenance. The critical aspect here is the
continuous coordination and involvement between unit
operations and unit maintenance to accomplish the scheduled
maintenance, while also accomplishing the unit’s mission.
This cooperative effort requires a daily exchange of
information to reveal the continuously changing situation that
exists in any helicopter unit. Scheduled maintenance includes,
predetermined cyclic inspections of helicopter systems and
component replacement. These events are scheduled either on
a calendar or a flying hour basis, and
(b) Unscheduled Maintenance. Unscheduled maintenance is
required when a helicopter system, or component, malfunctions
or fails unexpectedly. It is also required to correct damage
incurred as a result of improper operation or battlefield activity.
Because unscheduled maintenance cannot be predicted, units
are doctrinally and organizationally prepared to make
unscheduled repairs as needed, and

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(2) additional maintenance considerations.

(a) Night Operations. Land force doctrine demands 24/7
operations. This requires a fully productive, continuously
running maintenance capability. Working on helicopters and
vehicles day and night dramatically shortens repair time and
maximizes the number of mission capable helicopters. This
around the clock maintenance capability ensures that
helicopters can be utilized on successive days, or nights, by
completing the required maintenance during those alternate
hours, and
(b) Other factors. Aircraft maintenance operations must be
carefully planned to permit completion in any environment;
c. Vehicle and Equipment Recovery. The goal of this operation is the timely
return of vehicles and equipment to operational status with the least
expenditure of resources. This required careful coordination of all parties.
Recovery operations are normally conducted according to certain general
principles. This action begins where, and when, the item becomes disabled.
When the operator detects an inoperable condition, the operator must assess
the damage or problem, and initiate action based, on his assessment and the
tactical situation. Utilizing the 1 Wing WUSOPs, the chain of command is
informed, considering all factors, such as communication ability, location, and
the location and availability of recovery equipment and personnel; and
d. Helicopter Recovery. Combat operations result in a greater demand for
operational helicopters and a large increase in the number of flying hours.
These increased requirements are complicated by higher attrition, and battle
damage rates, which create shortages of repair parts and replacement
helicopters. To offset these shortages and to maintain an effective combat
aviation force, the rapid recovery and repair of helicopters is essential.

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CHAPTER 10
FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELLING POINTS

GENERAL
1. This chapter describes Forward Arming and Refuelling Points (FARPs). It
provides a comprehensive view of the purpose, organization, operations and the planning
considerations for the setup of a FARP.

DEFINITION
2. A FARP is a temporary arming and refuelling facility organized, equipped, and
deployed by an aviation unit to support tactical operations. It is located closer to the
FEBA than the normal refuelling area of an aviation unit. It provides fuel and
ammunition for aviation units during operations away from their normal assembly area.
Due to the fluid situation of all aviation operations, the FARP must be austere, transitory,
and able to support specific mission objectives. It should be flexible enough to self-
deploy by vehicle or be inserted by air. Although the term FARP suggests rearming, in
the Canadian sense it is primarily a refuelling operation but should be able to rearm if the
helicopter is equipped with door guns and DEWS munitions.

PURPOSE
3. The FARP reduces transit time and increases the time on station thereby giving
the land force commander more time to apply continuous pressure on the enemy or
permit helicopters to remain on station longer, rather than waste fuel and time transiting
for fuel.

PERSONNEL
4. Personnel generally allocated for the FARP include:
a. the NCO i/c;
b. two maintenance personnel per refuelling point;
c. one driver/pump operator per vehicle or two maintenance personnel as
FARE pump operators if bladders are utilized; and
d. the following personnel may also be required:

(1) a weapon systems technicians for ammunition and flare handling

and reloading,
(2) in a rapid tempo of operations and/or in high density traffic, air
traffic control personnel and communications may be require to
coordinate helicopter arrival and departure from the FARP location
and, if collocated, into an HA, and

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(3) a security section consisting of infantry or integral squadron

personnel, situation dependent.

PLANNING FACTORS
5. Three basic principles must be satisfied when planning a FARP to support
aviation units. The FARP must:
a. meet unit mission requirements;
b. provide support throughout the mission under all conditions; and
c. avoid threat observation and engagement.
6. The intensity of the operation affects FARP activities. Factors that influence the
tempo of the FARP include the number of helicopters operating, distances required to
travel, loads required for each helicopter and duration of the operation. For example,
heavy loads requiring transport over short distances means that the helicopters will not
carry a full fuel load, since they require payload over endurance, resulting in frequent
refuelling. This would mean the FARP OIC and AMC require a good stagger into the
FARP and sufficient fuel to sustain the operation. FARP crews work continuously,
requiring replacement personnel to enable rest. On the other hand, a squadron task for a
single lift mission requires a single turn around through the FARP for numerous
helicopters. This results in a single peak period, a holding area as helicopters wait their
turn, and sufficient fuel to provide all helicopters at once.
7. A FARP should be set up if the distances between the area of operation and the
logistics support exceed 30 kilometers. Thirty kilometers is a general tradeoff distance
and a planning figure. A greater distance may leave the commander with inadequate fuel,
load capacity and time on station to complete the mission. The adequacy of the roads, the
availability of higher echelon's ground and aviation support, and the distances to POL
replenishment points affect how well the FARP can be supported and sustained. The
FARP should remain in one location for only 3 to 6 hours; however, these times can be
reduced or extended by the factors from the mission estimate. The size of the FARP
depends on the number of helicopters using the FARP and the type of refuelling
equipment (FARE or HLVW) that is available.

THREAT
8. An effective way to neutralize the effectiveness of aviation forces is to prevent
helicopters from rearming and refuelling. Therefore, a FARP is a high priority target. A
detailed threat assessment must be carried out to ensure that adequate protection and the
site location provides a good level of protection.
9. The survivability of a FARP in a threat environment depends on mobility and the
ability to displace rapidly. Careful site selection, effective camouflage, and minimum
personnel and equipment result in an austere, yet mission capable FARP.

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COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

10. Command. The OIC is responsible for the overall success of the FARP.
11. Sqn Ops O. The Sqn Ops O assists in executing the AMC's plan, which may
include deploying and operating a FARP. Either the AMC, D/AMC or Sqn Ops O
require consultation with the Log Sp Flt and Maint Flt Comds to ensure that the plan can
be supported logistically.
12. Log Sp Flt Comd. The mission of the Log Sp Flt Comd is to provide the fuel
and ammunition calculated by Sqn Ops. Requirements are then coordinated with higher
headquarters to ensure that the supply meets the demand.
13. Helicopter Control. Control of the helicopters within the FARP is important.
The proximity of the FARP to the battlefield restricts the use of electronic methods for
positive helicopter control. The most effective means of control is a thorough briefing
and well written standing operating procedures that outline the FARP procedures to be
followed by both aircrew and FARP personnel.
14. Air Traffic Control. The use of ATC in a FARP is estimate dependent. Under
some circumstances, such as during OOTW operations, ATC can provide the aviation
commander with a measure of safety and synchronization. ATC can manage the flow of
helicopters for a faster, safer, and more efficient operation. The communications
equipment that the team should have must allow them to contact the helicopter using the
FARP plus any communications for coordination of airspace. This includes VHF/AM
and FM plus UHF and possibly HF radios.
15. Visual Signals. Visual signals include hand and arm signals or lights. Ground
guides control the movement of helicopters within the FARP. Because ground guides
may direct allied helicopters, they must use standard hand and arm signals as per the
standard NATO marshalling signals.
a. flashlights and light wands are primary visual signals. The flashlight can
be used with colour coded disks to relay information. A separate coloured
disk, which is easily seen at night, can indicate the FARP situation or
supply availability. During daylight hours, signal flags of different colours
can serve the same purpose. Flashlights can be used with hand and arm
signals; however, the use of a light to relay information may violate light
discipline policy. For NVG operations, the use of various coloured lights
is ineffective because NVGs do not differentiate colours. Light wands can
be used for hand and arm signals as well as to mark departure, landing,
and arming and refuelling points;
b. chemical lights come in a variety of colours to include infrared, which can
be seen through NVGs. They can be used in the same manner as
flashlights and light wands. An effective technique for lighting the
landing area using chemical lights is to dig a shallow trench in the shape of
the landing area and place chemical or beanbag lights in the trench. The

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landing area can be seen only at a certain angle from the air. On the
ground, it is difficult to see; and
c. lights should be turned on or made visible just before the helicopter arrives
and turned off or removed when the helicopter departs.

TRAFFIC LAYOUT
16. Standard markings on departure and arrival points will improve the
procedural control of helicopters. Chemical lights, or beanbag lights can be used at night
to indicate the desired direction or helicopter movement or the location of ground guides.
The helicopter should move to the ground guide’s location and follow directions for
arming and refuelling. After the helicopter has been serviced, the ground guide should
direct it toward the departure end of the FARP. Figure 10-1 shows an example of a
FARP helicopter traffic flow, from the safe point, to the refuelling area, to the arming
point.
17. Additional helicopter control can be achieved by maintaining integrity of the
helicopter section or element during FARP operations. Selected waiting areas and
separate in and out routes also improve helicopter control.
18. Communications. The use of radios must be kept to a minimum to reduce the
enemy’s ability to target and engage electronic emissions. However, each FARP should
have two FM radios capable of secure voice transmissions. With these radios, personnel
can monitor an internal net and a command net. The internal net would provide
personnel with information about the current status of inbound helicopter and
ammunition requirements. The command designated net would provide information that
may affect the FARP’s operation.

Arming
Point

Armament
DEPARTURE Safe Point

ARRIVAL

Figure 10-1. FARP Helicopter Traffic

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19. Because FM radios are limited in range, the distances and location of the FARP
may prevent FARP personnel from monitoring or transmitting on the designated
command frequency. In such cases, the use of helicopters as re-transmitters is an option
as long as the risk factors are considered. These radios should be used to transmit only
when:
a. the FARP is under attack;
b. the FARP relocates or ceases operation;
c. the FARP is not operational at the scheduled time;
d. a request is made to re-supply; and
e. the status of the FARP changes. (In this case, the radio is used to send a
SITREP).
20. Radios are used only after helicopters have departed the FARP and then only as
necessary. When possible, outbound helicopters should relay critical messages from the
FARP to the squadron headquarters. FARP reports and other communications should be
made in person.

LOCATION
21. The FARP should be located as close to the helicopter’s AO as the tactical
situation permits. It is usually located as far forward as 15-25 km from the FEBA and
within the supported brigade’s AO. This location increases helicopter time on station by
reducing the travel times associated with refuelling. If possible, the FARP is kept outside
the threat of medium artillery. Movement and resupply of the FARP is conducted by
ground or aerial means. Fuel is normally supplied by squadron bowsers, however, during
coalition operations, an MTH can sling up to five 500 (US) gallon bladders into a FARP.
22. Aviation’s ability to move quickly requires that the FARP also be able to move
quickly to maintain support. The situation depends on whether the FARP is austere and
mobile, or static. In the static locations, the FARP may be given the time and assets to
harden itself for additional protection. Some factors to consider when locating a FARP
are:
a. Enemy. The enemy situation must be considered so the location provides
the best protection. In a forward deployed location the enemy’s weapons
systems and tactics must be considered. In a rear area operation the
activities of Special Forces or sympathizers must be known. In a PSO the
activities of the belligerents must be understood;
b. Terrain. A good FARP location allows for the tactical dispersion of
helicopters and vehicles. Tree lines, vegetation, shadows, and urban areas
should be used to conceal FARP operations. Terrain folds and reverse
slopes should be employed to mask the location from observation. Main
supply routes and air avenues of approach must be masked so the location
cannot be targeted electronically or visually. There same factors apply to
the selection of any holding area that is required;

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c. Friendly Forces. The Maint Flt and the Log Sp Flt Comds must
determine if enough personnel are available to operate the FARP and
conduct resupply. Also, the proper personnel skills must be available in
the proper numbers. Depending on the location of the FARP, the number
of soldiers required to provide security varies. Preferably an infantry unit
is tasked for protection of the FARP but in some cases, squadron personnel
have to provide FARP security; and
d. Time. The longer the aviation mission, the more security and supplies the
FARP requires. Planners must consider how long it takes to drive or fly to
the proposed FARP site. They must also plan how long it takes to set up
the site and how far the site is from the main supply routes. The FARP
should remain in one location for three to six hours.
23. The aviation squadron provides the ground commander with a rapid reaction force
that can quickly shift its efforts and engage enemy forces in rear areas. Depending on the
distance, the helicopter may require FARP support. A FARP located in the rear areas can
remain in one location longer than the recommended three to six hours. In these
instances and during a Peace Support Operation, pre-positioning FARE equipment at
likely locations or pre-inspection of likely FARP locations can be carried out to reduce
the time for deployment and briefing procedures.

EMPLACEMENT
24. Due to the size and quantities of materiel at a FARP, emplacement is usually
carried by ground vehicles. Air assets can be utilized to replace a FARP when time is
critical. The FARE, limited fuel, the advance party and the security team can be air lifted
in to await the main supply vehicles.
25. There may be instances where the location for a FARP is inaccessible to vehicles
and a limited refuelling capability is required. These situations may occur where one or
two helicopters are operating at a time in remote locations and fuel is required to extend
the AO. These types of sites can be set up and resupplied using two helicopters and
multiple lifts.

MOVEMENT PLAN
26. The movement of the FARP should be planned to include an advance party,
movement tables, a route reconnaissance, and alternate site locations. Detailed planning
of the move improves the accuracy of the FARP’s operational time. Planning should
include details about individual vehicles and trailer load plans.
27. An advance party and, if required, a security team should be sent to the proposed
site determining its suitability. If the site is not suitable for FARP operations, then time
should be available to move the FARP to an alternate location. If the site is usable, the
advance party identifies areas for the placement of equipment. When the remainder of
the FARP personnel and equipment arrive, the advance party guides each vehicle into
position.

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28. A sentry should be posted on each vehicle and in a dismounted position to warn
of approaching aircraft. They should be rotated often because scanning for long periods
dulls an individual’s ability to spot approaching aircraft. Vehicle horns are the standard
method of warning for an air attack.

SECURITY
29. The FARP should have enough internal security to defend itself against the
anticipated threat. Too much security equipment is too bulky and hinders the movement
of the FARP; however, inadequate security robs it of its ability to protect itself long
enough to move. Coordination may be required to receive additional protection from the
supported brigade if the threat dictates.
30. In some instances, air defence systems may deploy with a FARP for protection
against an air threat. If this is the case, airspace coordination is required to ensure that
friendly aircraft are not engaged and to allow the AD assets positive identification of
friend or foe. Where the AD assets are deployed depends on the terrain, but they should
be no closer than 3 km to provide standoff protection. An AD liaison officer should be
consulted for the optimal layout and procedures.
31. If the FARP is attacked, the personnel must be able to execute a denial plan. A
denial plan increases personnel survivability and allows personnel to regain control of the
situation.

RELOCATION
32. Several guidelines determine the relocation of a FARP. Situation dependent, it
should only be in a single location for no more than approximately 3 to 6 hours. If it is
moved, it should only do so after it has fulfilled the support requirements of the mission
helicopters, remembering that the helicopters are the paramount factor. A FARP may be
relocated for any of the following reasons:
a. the FARP comes under attack;
b. an order to relocate is received from sqn ops by radio or face to face with
authentication;
c. a pre-planned relocation time has been set;
d. a pre-planned specific event occurs, i.e. after servicing a specific flight or
number of helicopters; and
e. the last element to use the FARP delivers the message to relocate.

33. If time allows, a map reconnaissance and survey of the proposed site should be
conducted before a FARP site is selected. A site survey is important, since maps may not
be current and sites are not always as they are depicted on the map.

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34. Advance Party Actions. The advance party breaks down into a single unit
consisting of a communications vehicle, the FARP OIC, radio operator and two to three
personnel to assist in the site reconnaissance. Depending on the size of the FARP and the
length of time for the move to the new location, part of the refuelling assets may be taken
to act as a Rapid Refuelling Point until the main equipment arrives. The remaining
personnel and equipment may be required to continue operations while the advance party
is conducting its movement and reconnaissance or the FARP may be torn down and
prepare to move once the order has been given by the OIC.
35. Once the advance party arrives at the new location, security is set up, the site is
reconnoitered and if suitable, a site plan is made. If the site is unsuitable, the Squadron is
notified and an alternate location is requested. When the site is deemed suitable, the
advance party:
a. determines the landing direction;
b. determines and marks refuelling and rearming points, truck emplacement
and/or bladder emplacement; and
c. sets up any equipment available.
36. Once in place, the remaining FARP elements are called forward, breaking down
the FARP in accordance with WUSOPs. When the new elements arrive at the new site
they are directed to their specific locations by the advance party and the refuelling points
are set up.

SITE PREPARATION
37. The FARP site is swept for FOD before operational use. Sticks, stones and other
potential FOD hazards are removed to prevent injury to personnel or damage to
equipment. In addition, some brush and small trees may need to be removed from
landing and take-off areas. The use of pre-designated landing, takeoff, and hovering
areas will minimize accident or incidents. The areas around the rearming and refuelling
points and the pump assemblies should be cleared of dried grass and leaves to prevent
potential fires.
38. Helicopters may sink into wet, snow covered, thawing or muddy ground. A good
rule of thumb is that if the ground can support an MLVW then the ground will support a
UTTH.

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
39. Standard support equipment for the conduct of a FARP includes a fire
extinguisher located at each refuelling nozzle, and at the pump and filter assembly. A
water can and waste fuel pan is located at each refuelling point. This is to enable
operators to wash fuel off skin and clothes, wash dirt off fuel nozzles and contain fuel if a
spill occurs.

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40. A waste fuel pan is required to limit fuel spillage at each nozzle. Fuel spills will
be recovered. A Spill/HAZMAT Team is located at the FARP location to contain and
clean up any spills that do occur.

REFUELLING OPERATIONS
41. Site Layout. The setup of the FARP should take advantage of terrain features,
achieving maximum dispersion, avoiding obstacles and maximizing cover. When
planning the layout, consideration must be taken for the minimum spacing between
helicopters during refuelling. The minimum hub to hub spacing for most NATO utility
helicopters is 25 meters. Several FARP layouts are depicted at Figure 10-2.

WIND
DIRECTION

Fuel Supply

WIND
DIRECTION

Fuel Supply

WIND
DIRECTION

Fuel Supply Fuel Supply

Figure 10-2. FARP Setup Under Different Wind Directions

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PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
42. Three personnel are required to refuel a helicopter. One ground crew, operates
the nozzle, the Flight Engineer (or if no FE is available the Co-pilot) acts as fire guard for
the nozzle man, and one ground crew remains in front of the helicopter as the marshaller/
safety person. One person remains at the bowser or at the FARE pump for emergency
shutoff. The marshaller/safety person remains outside of the rotor disk at a point where
both the pilot at the controls and the refueller with the nozzle can be observed.
43. OIC FARP’s responsibilities during refuelling operations are to ensure that all
procedures are being followed and that the operation is being conducted in an effective
manner. Coordination between the refuelling parties, ATS and the Holding Area(s) to
ensure priority helicopters are cycled through quickly or fuel critical helicopters
(helicopters that are very low on fuel) are serviced is one of the main duties of this
position.
44. Personal equipment requirements for refuelling operations includes proper
uniform, goggles or some sort of face/eye protection, hearing protection, gloves and
proper safety boots.
45. If a refueller's clothes become soaked with fuel, the refueller must:
a. discontinue refuelling operations and leave the area immediately;
b. wet clothes with water before taking them off; and
c. wash fuel off the skin with soap and water as soon as possible.

DEFENCE
46. Enemy Detection. FARPs are detectable by various means, over flights,
electronic, thermal, infrared, radar or human intelligence. It is for this reason that FARPs
are best moved on regular, short intervals.

47. Defensive Measures.

a. Camouflage. Camouflage is important to prevent detection of the FARP.
Camouflage netting should be used when possible; however, its use may
interfere with the rapid deployment capability;
b. Concealment. FARP positions should be selected that offer natural cover
and concealment. Cover should be placed on windshield and headlights.
Vehicles and equipment should be placed under trees, bush, and
hedgerows or parallel to the tree line and in the shadow of trees. When
shadows are used, repositioning of vehicles and equipment may require
repositions during the day. Figure 10-3 shows a tactical FARP layout
utilizing local vegetation;

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Figure 10-3. FARP Use of Vegetation

c. Emission Control. Communications must be kept to a minimum.

Aircrew should be familiar with and use approved approach and departure
procedures. The operation of any power equipment, such as pumps,
should be delayed until the last possible moment. This reduces the chance
of infrared and acoustical signature cues being observed;
d. Track Discipline. During setup, vehicle movement should be kept to a
minimum to reduce the number of tracks made through the grass and dirt.
Hoses if possible should be curved so as not to stand out as a straight line,
which is easy to observe from the air;
e. Urban Emplacement. Placing a FARP in an urban site has both benefits
and hazards. The increased risk from wires and poles is a hazard to
helicopters. Benefits include the ability to hide equipment amongst
buildings which makes it more difficult to detect from the air as they form
to the surrounding area. The road network is also beneficial to hiding the
movement of vehicles;
f. Security. Ground security measures begin with the advance party. They
should start local security as soon as the site is selected and approved;
g. Mobility. The FARP must be placed to ensure rapid setup and preparation
for movement while still maintaining its mission;
h. Deception. The enemy understands the importance of FARP operations
and will be looking for them. Deception misleads the enemy by
manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions, causing the enemy
to deplete its resources by attacking false targets and missing intended
targets;

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i. Hardening. This reduces the effects of any attack on the FARP. The
effects of an attack can be reduced by careful site selection and digging in
vital equipment like hoses, pumps and bladders;
j. Redundancy. When possible, additional FARP assets should be
deployed. This may be in the form of additional bowsers located near but
not in use, multiple pumps being used in case of one being damaged and
additional hoses. It may also include the placement of a silent FARP in an
alternate location, to be used only in the event of the main location being
disabled; and
k. Dispersion. When the terrain is not suitable for concealment, dispersal of
equipment and refuelling points can make the site a less lucrative target.
Varying the patterns of the deployment avoids typical patterns that allow
easy detection/ identification.
48. Field Artillery. When planning for a mission, the AMC and the Sqn Ops O must
consider the protection of the FARP when planning for fire support. The Field Artillery
Commander, or his staff, and the Sqn Ops O must coordinate gun and FARP positions so
the in and out routes can be planned to not conflict with any protective fire that must be
utilized.
49. Engineers. Engineer support may be available or required in the setting up of a
FARP. Because of the time and labor required to dig in or protect a FARP with engineer
support, it is not usually used in mobile operations. Although, in PSO missions or for
semi-permanent or long term refuelling locations in war it may be beneficial to have the
engineers assist in the defence by digging in vital pieces of equipment like bladders,
pumps and ammunition storage areas. It must be remembered that whatever is used, the
mobility of the FARP must not be jeopardized. It is the job of the AMC and Sqn Ops O
to consider the usefulness of engineer support and to request it when possible if mission
analysis deems it necessary. Engineers can be used to:
a. prepare pre-planned FARP sites;
b. construct, maintain or improve access roads into and out of a FARP site;
c. spray dust suppressant;
d. clear areas for passage of vehicles and helicopters (ground handling);
e. build protection for fuel and ammunition caches (berms, dugouts, fences);
f. prepare buildings in urban areas to house FARP equipment (bowsers); and
g. advise and assist in field fortifications.

SQUADRON COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

50. During mission analysis, CSS requirements are considered. The Log Sp Flt Comd
should be kept abreast of future missions and tempo of operations for the squadron
through the Sqn Ops O. Due to the lead time required, POL stocks for the squadron must
be kept supplied at all times to offset unplanned higher tempos.

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51. Once a mission commences, the FARP must continuously update the squadron
with the fuel state and advise of any shortfalls that may be forecasted. If at all possible,
any resupply of the FARP should be done during a lull in combat or when vehicles can be
protected from enemy observation and indirect fire (night movements). The status of the
FARP supplies must be passed to the AMC to ensure he is kept abreast of any impact
shortfalls may have on the completion of the mission.
52. Two factors that determine the amount of fuel required in the FARP are: the total
number of helicopters to be supported and the duration of the mission. The mission fuel
can be calculated as follows:
Mission duration X (times) the number of helicopters requiring fuel (100%
serviceability) X fuel consumption in litres (or pounds) per hour. (A general rule
of thumb for the CH 146 is 720 pounds per hour or 400 ltrs per hour).

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW)

53. During OOTW, security may not be as much of a concern as supply lines and
means of transport for FARP supplies. In these operations, the supply lines may be long
and complex, especially with PSO, therefore FARPS may have to be located out of fixed
locations or airheads. Fixing at a single or reusable area allows for greater security if
required equipment can be established and maintained without undue transport and
logistics. Depending on the situation, in a PSO, pilfering of supplies, especially fuel,
may require the site to either be guarded continuously or set inside a secure area.

NIGHT OPERATIONS
54. The establishment of a FARP at night requires special considerations. Movement
of the FARP must be planned in detail and executed in an orderly manner. Delays occur
because of low light levels. Depending on the threat, light discipline is extremely
important, and personnel must guard against the tendency to ignore it.
55. Once the FARP is in location, it must remain blacked out until the helicopters
arrive. Use of pre-arranged signals or calls should be used to advise the FARP of
inbound helicopters so that FARP personnel can turn on light markers.
56. During night operations, the FARP location should be set up to ensure minimal
helicopters manoeuvring into and out of the refuelling point. The best system is a fly
through design where helicopters can approach and depart along the same route.

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

57. FARP operations are made more difficult during cold temperatures. These
difficulties are with both equipment and personnel and must be planned for by
commanders. Snow, ice and mud may reduce vehicle mobility, complicating FARP
movements. During cold temperatures, the breakdown and setup of the FARP takes more
time than in other environments.

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58. Low temperatures make it difficult for FARP personnel to keep warm and
function. Wind chill caused by helicopter rotor wash results in cold injuries even when
air temperatures are not in the critical range. Fuel accidentally spilled on bare skin or
soaked into clothing has a cooling effect as it evaporates, increasing the probability of
cold injury. The handing of nozzles and ammunition requires mittens or other protection
to ensure skin does not stick to the metal. Finally, during cold operations, static buildup
is increased, so good grounding of both man and equipment is vital. If the ground is
frozen, the placement of grounding rods may be difficult and time consuming. It is also
difficult to get a good ground, so salt water may have to be poured down the grounding
hole to get a good contact.
59. Marking of the FARP is made more difficult in snow. Marker panels or lights can
become obscured by falling snow or sink into the snow and become invisible.
Manoeuvring helicopters can cause whiteouts, making movement for all helicopters a
well planned and controlled operation. Re-circulating snow can also be an indicator to
enemy of the location. These problems can be minimized by packing down the snow
prior to helicopter arrivals.
60. Camouflage of the FARP can become difficult, especially where there is complete
snow cover. The use of white covers is possible, but the best solution is to avoid open
areas. Site the FARP along green tree lines or in urban areas.
61. Maintenance requirements for helicopters and FARP equipment is increased.
Fittings break, hoses become brittle and hard to position and bladders are difficult to fold.
If icing occurs, FARP personnel may have to de-ice the helicopters. In very cold
temperatures, the FARE is difficult to start and may have to be pre-heated.

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CHAPTER 11
AEROMEDICAL SUPPORT

GENERAL
1. Commanders of medical units in a theatre of operations use their resources to
effectively evacuate and treat sick, injured and wounded soldiers. A soldier's survival, when
wounded on the battlefield often depends on the time it takes to receive treatment. Quick,
responsive care is essential to protecting the lives of injured land force personnel. Under
current Canadian Forces structure, no dedicated aviation assets are attached to Field
Hospitals or formations for medical support missions. However, a squadron supporting a
formation or an operation provides dedicated helicopters and aircrew on standby for
casevac/medevac operations.

DEFINITIONS
2. The distinction between the terms MEDEVAC and CASEVAC must be clear in
order to understand aviation’s support to medical services. The two aeromedical support
missions are defined as follows:
a. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). MEDEVAC is defined as the timely,
efficient movement and en route care by medical personnel of wounded and
injured personnel from the battlefield and other locations to medical treatment
facilities (i.e. hospitals). The term MEDEVAC refers to both ground and air
assets. MEDEVAC assets are permitted to mount the Red Cross and are
protected under the Geneva Convention, Law of Armed Conflict. No
MEDEVAC helicopters are permitted to transport troops, combat supplies or
act in support of a combat operation not directly attributed to the provision of
medical services; and
b. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). CASEVAC is defined as the movement
of casualties to initial treatment facilities and/or to medical facilities in the
combat zone. It does not include en route care by medical personnel.
CASEVAC should only be utilized when a unit has a large number of
casualties (i.e. when the number of casualties exceeds the ability of the
MEDEVAC helicopters) or when MEDEVAC helicopters are not available.
CASEVAC helicopters are not protected under the Geneva Convention and
are not permitted to mount the Red Cross. They may be fired upon as hostile
aircraft. The CH 146 will normally only conduct CASEVAC missions (see
para 6).

CASEVAC SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS

3. Requesting CASEVAC helicopters is determined by the land force commander. If
MEDEVAC helicopter support is insufficient to meet the requirements for the evacuation of
casualties, or it is not available, then a request for CASEVAC support should be made.
Whether these helicopters are dedicated MEDEVAC support to the formation or CASEVAC,

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they receive their missions through the division or brigade G3 Aviation. Regardless of the
task organization, the ground commander requesting CASEVAC support must understand
the medical limitations provided en route to the treatment facility. The job of ensuring that
this is clear to the ground commander is a responsibility of the ALO dedicated to the
formation HQ.
4. Advantages of helicopters in the casualty evacuation role:
a. speed and range make it possible to move casualties by air relatively long
distances in a short period of time;
b. the ability to move patients quickly over rough terrain and get in to areas
ground ambulances may otherwise be unable to access; and
c. because of the range and speed, casualties can be transported to the medical
facility that can best deal with the patient’s condition.

5. Disadvantages of using helicopters in the casualty evacuation role:

a. no en route medical care in CASEVAC;
b. helicopters are taken away from performing other essential combat missions;
and
c. helicopters in the CASEVAC role are not protected under the Geneva
Convention.

CH 146 CASEVAC CAPABILITIES

6. The CH 146 can provide CASEVAC support to the brigade and the division. The
number of casualties that can be transported by the CH146 varies depending on the helicopter
configuration (i.e. seats in or seats out, other equipment that may be on board the helicopter)
and the urgency of the situation. Additionally, the severity of the wounds of the casualties,
as determined by the medical personnel or battalion medics, may determine the allowable
cargo load (ACL) for the helicopter for particular missions. CH146s can expect to be utilized
as far forward as possible to evacuate casualties.
7. For planning purposes, the CH146 casualty loads are:
a. Standard configuration:
(1) three stretchers on the left side; and
(2) four walking wounded maximum; and

Note: If a medical attendant accompanies the wounded, then the number of

walking wounded is reduced to maximum of three.
b. Emergency MEDEVAC configuration*:
(1) six stretchers, three on each side; and

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(2) one medical attendant (helicopter trained).

*Note: This configuration is only utilized in mass evacuations and requires
personnel trained in loading and unloading helicopters.

EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES DURING AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

8. General. During airmobile operations the AFC/ LUC staff and aviation squadron
plan for the utilization of lift helicopters to evacuate casualties from the landing zone.
Airmobiles with multiple lifts have the AFC plan for the lifting helicopters to pick up
casualties during successive lifts. On single lift operations, helicopters are designated to
remain on standby for CASEVAC operations. These helicopters normally standby at a
central location, most likely the PZ, FARP, or an established holding area.
9. Mission Planning. The evacuation of casualties on an airmobile requires detailed
planning in order to execute it successfully. During the planning stages of the airmobile, the
brigade G3, the AMC, the Sqn Ops O and the ALO are all involved in the planning. If the
AFC’s intent is to evacuate casualties, then the planning must include the following
considerations:
a. AFC’s Intent. The AMC must inform the AFC of the tradeoff between using
lifting helicopters and continuing with the airmobile insertion. If the lifted
unit takes casualties early in the operation, it may become necessary to reduce
the amount of lifting helicopters in order to accomplish casualty evacuation.
The AFC should determine the number of helicopters that can be bumped
from the air movement plan to pick up casualties. A decision may be made
not to bump any and conduct all CASEVAC after the force has been
completely inserted or, helicopters may be designated in each lift (i.e., the last
two helicopters) for casualty evacuation from the LZ. The AMC and the LUC
understand the AFC’s intent on casualty evacuation and advise on courses of
action;
b. Casualty Locations. The LUC should designate an area in the LZ where
casualties are to be brought. This facilitates rapid movement and minimizes
ground time in the LZ for the helicopters. The casualty point must be
designated and all members of the land force must know its location. The
aircrew, as they arrive at the LZ, are able to focus on the casualty point and
will be prepared to accept casualties;
c. Signalling. Night operations provide a significant challenge for evacuation
operations. Light signals should be planned so the helicopters arriving at the
LZ can be prepared to accept casualties. For example, a flashlight or chem lite
coming from the designated LZ casualty location may indicate that there are
casualties to be removed. This way the aircrew know that they must remain
on the LZ and be prepared to accept casualties;
d. Communications. Once established in the LZ, communications on the
aviation net or a pre-designated radio net can alert the flight of the necessity to
evacuate casualties from the LZ; and

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e. Designated Area For Dropping Off Casualties. The AFC must decide
where to transport casualties if they occur during the airmobile. Options
include the PZ, a medical station or another designated area. Considerations
for selecting a casualty collection point should be:
(1) Casualty Status. A site should be selected that is secure and has
medical personnel ready to accept casualties,
(2) Helicopter Availability. Helicopters conducting casualty evacuation
separate from the serial at some point. The AFC must be prepared to
effect the bump plan if the helicopters carrying casualties do not arrive
back at the PZ for the next lift,
(3) Confusion. A casualty collection point should be selected so it does not
interfere with the airmobile that is still in progress. Helicopters arriving
at the PZ full of casualties may cause confusion on the PZ as troops are
trying to load and casualties are being unloaded, and
(4) Drop Off Site. A site should be selected that allows the lifting
helicopters to quickly drop off the casualty and return to the PZ to
continue the tempo of the operation.

MISSION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

10. The air movement planning considerations that are listed in Chapter 6 apply to
medical evacuation operations as well. Units conducting these missions should refer to this
chapter to more thoroughly plan and accomplish the mission. In addition, the following
mission planning considerations should also be considered when preparing to conduct a
medical evacuation mission:
a. Landing Zones/Pick-up Zones. LZs /PZs for CASEVAC operations are the
responsibility of the supported unit. For example, battalion aid stations are
responsible for setting up the LZ/PZ for evacuation operations. LZ/PZ
selection criteria for the LZ/PZ follows:
(1) Location. The LZ/PZ must be in close proximity to the aid station.
Casualties may have to be carried by hand to the waiting helicopter.
LZs/PZs must be located such that they do not interfere with aid station
operations, blow dust and debris onto the aid station or require stretchers
to be carried long distances. As a rule, the LZ/PZ should be located
approximately 150 meters downwind from the aid station,
(2) Marking. LZ/PZ markings must be visible from the air. During the
day, marking of the LZ/PZ can be accomplished using a high visibility
orange panel (either worn by a ground marshaller or firmly fixed to the
ground away from the actual landing site), smoke or a signal mirror. At
night, a “T” or an inverted “Y” is used to designate the helicopter
touchdown point. Proper LZ/PZ markings ensure that the helicopter can

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quickly locate the LZ/PZ and results in rapid turn around times. All
approach aids must be oriented so that helicopters approach and depart
into wind,
(3) Communications. Air to ground communications should be maintained
between the helicopters and the LZ/PZ,
(4) Capacity. LZ/PZ selection is based on the number of helicopters
utilized for the evacuation operation. The distance from each helicopter
should be increased from those used for troop transport to reduce the
effect of rotorwash on adjacent helicopters and patients, and
(5) Obstacles. LZs/PZs should be free of obstacles more so than with troop
transport. Obstacles such as cables, wires, antennas, large rocks,
excessive slope and large ruts can make the location unsuitable.
Obstacles that can not be cleared from the location should be marked. If
communications are maintained with the aircrew, then advisories should
be provided to the crews as to hazards in the LZ/PZ;
b. Medical Support. As defined, CASEVAC operations do not provide any en
route medical treatment. Commanders and medical personnel must consider
this when determining if helicopters should be used to transport casualties;
c. Stretchers. Aircrew conducting aeromedical support operations must be told
what to do with stretchers. Helicopters may need to pick up stretchers at the
drop off location and return them to the casualty PZ; and
d. Airspace. If the division has MEDEVAC helicopters under OPCON or
attached to it, the Division HQ is responsible for planning the required
airspace measures. Helicopters conducting MEDEVAC/ CASEVAC missions
should check with the Division for the current medical evacuation airspace
structure. These procedures are also specified in the ACO.

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CHAPTER 12
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION
1. Special operations are those which do not typically fit into other combat mission
categories but which by their nature, may involve a high degree of risk. Combat Search
And Rescue (CSAR), deep insertions and extraction of Special Forces personnel, and
special intelligence gathering are some of the activities carried out in this mission area
(see Chapter 6 for tactical insertions). Helicopters performing these missions are
normally equipped with advanced systems and weapons and are crewed by specially
trained personnel. Special operations can involve any of the tactical aviation basic tasks.
Many coalition countries operate helicopter special forces, but not Canada.

CSAR
2. CSAR is not an operational task conducted by the CF. It is detailed in this
chapter to reflect the doctrine of other coalition members, such as US Army Aviation,
and in order that CF aircrew will be familiar with this coalition operation. CSAR is a
coordinated operation using pre-established procedures for the detection, location,
identification and rescue of downed aircrew in hostile territory, in crisis or wartime.
Combat experience has demonstrated the importance of commanders at all levels to plan
for combat search and rescue of downed pilots.
3. The recovery of downed aircrew and aircraft is secondary to the accomplishment
of the mission. Although an immediate response would be ideal, since it usually
increases the probability of survival and evading capture, mission accomplishment is the
priority.

CSAR IMPERATIVES
4. Immediate Recovery. The sooner that downed aircrew are located and rescued,
the greater their chances of not being captured as a PW and the better the chance of
surviving any injuries.
5. Detailed Planning. CSAR operations must be planned in detail. For operations
that are cross FLOT, this is essential. Helicopters are integrated into operational plans
for use as CSAR platforms. All aircrew must understand the immediate CSAR
procedures established for a particular mission.
6. Decision Process. A decision of whether or not to launch a CSAR mission if
aircraft are lost must first be made. This decision must be made rapidly, but with caution.
One does not want to lose more aircraft by committing assets into a high threat area
where more losses could result.

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7. Use of Available Resources. If an immediate CSAR is launched, consideration

must be given to the availability of aircraft/ helicopters to escort the rescuing aircraft, fire
support and EW assets that are available to support the operation.

CSAR OPERATIONS
8. CSAR operations can be placed into two separate categories, immediate and
deliberate. Commanders must recognize and prepare for both types of CSAR operations.
a. Immediate. Immediate CSAR is the rescue of downed aircrew during the
conduct of a mission. For example, during an airmobile, immediate CSAR
would be accomplished by having an empty helicopter available to follow
along to rescue downed aircrew. Immediate CSAR is the most effective
method because friendly aircraft are in the area, enemy forces have not had
the opportunity to react, and medical treatment, if required, will be most
beneficial. Certain factors must be considered when planning for
immediate CSAR:
(1) Continuation of the Mission. Immediate CSAR may take
helicopters away from the primary mission. Commanders must
consider the intent of the mission and decide if it is feasible to take
a helicopter away from an ongoing mission to conduct an
immediate CSAR mission. If the mission is an airmobile, then the
aviation mission commander must consult with the AFC prior to
executing immediate CSAR,

(2) Pick-Up Helicopters. Specific helicopters may be designated

with the responsibility to conduct immediate CSAR, or the
responsibility may fall on the nearest helicopter in support of the
downed aircraft,
(3) CSAR Helicopter Location. The helicopter(s) designated for
immediate CSAR may be a part of the mission and formation, or it
may be a spare helicopter. The commander must decide where to
position the CSAR helicopter so it can best support the pickup of
downed aircrew and not interfere with the ongoing mission, and
(4) Airspace. Separate airspace control measures may be developed
to allow CSAR helicopter(s) to extract downed aircrew without
interfering with the ongoing mission. If the CSAR helicopter uses
the same structure as the mission aircraft, then effective C2 must
be established to deconflict aircraft.
b. Deliberate CSAR. Deliberate CSAR is planned as part of an operation,
however, the AMC may utilize internal assets to conduct deliberate CSAR.
Deliberate CSAR will normally occur after the completion of the current
mission and includes a detailed plan for conducting rescue of downed
aircrew. Helicopters designated as CSAR helicopters must be integrated

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thoroughly into the plan. Planning considerations for aircrew conducting a

deliberate CSAR mission are as follows:
(1) Concept of Operations. Aircrew designated to provide CSAR
coverage must understand the operations that they are supporting.
If the helicopter is not supporting the parent headquarters, then it
should be placed under OPCON of the operational commander.
Aircrew must be integrated into the planning process and attend all
plans, orders and rehearsals. CSAR concepts may include:
(a) the CSAR helicopter moving as part of the operation,
following manoeuvre elements and maintaining a stand-off
distance to provide CSAR coverage if necessary,
(b) the CSAR helicopter moving forward to a holding area and
waiting a call to move forward and conduct CSAR if
necessary. Using this method, the commander may elect to
establish a restricted operations zone for the CSAR
helicopter, so the helicopter can stay airborne, and
(c) the CSAR helicopter remaining at another location
(assembly area, FARP) and assuming appropriate readiness
condition level as determined by the commander. The
commander must consider the factors of mission planning,
the complexity of the concept of ops and the threat
potential when considering how to utilize and plan for
internal CSAR,
(2) Communications Procedures. Aircraft that are shot down on the
battlefield may or may not be able to use the radios onboard the
aircraft to communicate. The commander must consider how
communications with downed aircrew will be established.
Communications may not be necessary for immediate CSAR,
(3) Command and Control. A C2 node and an AMC must be
designated for the CSAR operation. Procedures need to be devised
to form the CSAR force, move the force forward and conduct the
rescue of the downed aircrew. During the mission, the C2 node is
responsible for coordinating fires, de-conflicting security and the
rescue aircraft and controlling the rescue of the aircrew,
(4) Signalling. Signalling procedures must be developed. It may
become necessary for the downed crew to evade and leave the
aircraft site. Signal procedures must be coordinated during the
planning process to allow for quick pick-up of downed aircrew,
(5) Drop Off Location. CSAR crews must be thoroughly briefed on
the location to drop off downed pilots once they are rescued. If
they are not injured, they may be returned to the aviation unit. If

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injured, the crew must be taken to a medical facility. The CSAR

crews should have frequencies and call signs of medical treatment
facilities and have their locations programmed into their navigation
devices, and

(6) CSAR Team Make Up. The commander must determine the
make up of the team that will conduct the deliberate CSAR. The
deliberate CSAR should consist of the protection assets (fighter or
AH), if available, a C2 facility, and at least two helicopters for the
rescue operation. Utilizing two helicopters allows for faster search
times, a back-up helicopter, should the primary break down, and
the ability to move more dismounted personnel for security.

CSAR MISSION EXECUTION

9. Helicopters may work with other aircraft to conduct a CSAR mission in support
of an operation. In this case, helicopters would be moved forward to a holding area and
be directed to the pick-up site by the aircraft conducting the search. If the downed
aircrew is not located, then the helicopters will not be involved in the mission. This may
not always be possible and helicopter crews should be prepared to conduct a full CSAR
mission if called upon. Listed here are considerations for the execution of the CSAR
mission:
a. Intelligence Updates. Helicopters conducting the mission should use all
available intelligence sources to find out about the threat in the search
area. The Sqn IO can utilize other available sources to give aircrew the
most current threat situation;
b. Information on the Downed Aircrew. Aircrew conducting CSAR
missions should have access to the following:
(1) Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs). An ISOPREP contains
information, which is used to verify the identity of downed
aircrew, in a threat environment, for search and rescue purposes.
All aircrew, and any personnel who accompany them, must have a
completed ISOPREP on file prior to flying their first mission into a
hostile area. In the event of the downing or crash of an aircraft, the
agency responsible for providing CSAR capabilities will be
immediately informed of the event by telephone. The information
in the ISOPREPs and the crew's evasion plan of action will then be
forwarded to the CSAR agency. The Int Section will normally be
responsible for holding ISOPREPs on file,
(2) Evasion Plan of Action. This is the plan the downed personnel
will execute if immediate rescue is not available or feasible. It
discusses the nearest downed aircrew recovery points the crew will
move to for pick-up, signalling methods, authentication they will

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use and frequencies they will have loaded into their survival radio,
and
(3) Signalling Procedures. The signals that will be utilized by
downed aircrew to call for rescue assets are usually found within
the ACO;
c. Search Techniques. It may be necessary to conduct a search for downed
aircrew. If this becomes necessary, search aircraft should utilize the
following search techniques:
(1) Boundary Method. CSAR forces conduct the operation by
designating the entire search area within the confines of prominent
terrain features. The next step is to further reduce the search area
into sub-elements also defined by identifiable terrain features.
From the larger to the smaller scales, terrain features such as
mountains, rivers, small towns/villages, secondary roads and
natural or man made obstacles can be used to divide the operation.
The search track will be conducted systematically within the shape
of the terrain parameters until the isolated personnel have been
acquired,
(2) Grid Method. CSAR forces conduct the operation by designating
boundaries and search patterns using eight digit grid co-ordinates
to define the search area,
(3) Creeping Line Ahead Method. CSAR forces conduct this
operation by planning search routes along what is estimated to be
the isolated personnel’s track from isolation point to the extraction
point, IAW the evasion plan. These search areas will consist of a
series of connected rectangular boxes, defined in terms of length
and width, initiating at the isolation point and continuing to the
planned extraction point, and
(4) Feature Trace. CSAR forces conduct this operation by searching
along specific terrain features estimated to be used by the isolated
personnel, IAW their evasion plan. These features may include
rivers, roads, etc. Threat lines of communication and other high
traffic areas should be avoided; and
d. Code Words/Authentication. Once the isolated personnel are located,
the rescue aircraft must be prepared to authenticate and set up the rescue
operation. Once contact is made with the isolated personnel, the flight
crew must proceed cautiously. Locations should be given in code, or with
reference to terrain features. Threat EW assets may be monitoring so
giving the location of isolated personnel on an unsecure radio net will alert
the enemy to the location as well.

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INDIVIDUAL CSAR PREPARATION

10. CSAR planning should begin when the squadron deploys or immediately after
arrival in the area of operations. Squadron COs must place emphasis on the CSAR
process and ensure that their units are prepared in the event an aircraft is lost during the
mission. Procedures that should be followed to ensure aircraft are prepared for CSAR
are:
a. Single Aircraft Operations. Consideration should be given to determine
if single aircraft operations are desirable. Aircraft operating together
increase the possibility for immediate CSAR. The factors of the estimate
must be weighed for missions being flown to allow for the best decision;
b. Evasion Plan of Action. Each aircrew must have an evasion plan for
missions being flown into hostile areas. It may not be possible for
communications to be established once a helicopter goes down. The
aircrew must be prepared to conduct evasion in case communications are
not possible or the enemy situation dictates. A pre determined evasion
plan will help make successful CSAR possible;
c. ISOPREPs. All aircrew need to have current ISOPREP cards filled out
and accessible, in case they are needed;
d. Special Instructions (SPINS)/ Air Control Order (ACO). These
documents provide a wealth of information, particularly with the current
CSAR procedures. The SPINS and ACO will contain current
authentication codes, CSAR special procedures (i.e. word of the day,
colour of the day, etc), and other information. Aircrew must be familiar
with these procedures prior to executing missions; and
e. Survival Radios. Aircrew must ensure that their survival radios are
operational, have the appropriate frequencies programmed into them and
know how to operate them.

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CHAPTER 13
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

GENERAL
1. OOTW covers a wide range of activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to
combat operations. These operations can encompass all aspects of tactical aviation missions.
Aviation’s ability to move quickly and to operate in austere environments allows tactical
helicopters to play an important role in the conduct of OOTW. Types of OOTW include:
a. Counter-Terrorist Operations;
b. Counter-Drug Operations;
c. Humanitarian Assistance;
d. Disaster Relief;
e. Search and Rescue (SAR);
f. Peace Support Operations (PSO); and
g. Domestic Operations (Aid to the Civil Power, Assistance to the Civil
Authorities).

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
2. An OOTW operation may require the deployment of an entire squadron or portions
thereof, depending on the mission and the scope of the operation. The deployed aviation
assets may be independent of any ground force or it may be attached to support a specific
ground unit/formation, government organization or international organization/force. The
supported organization/formation will vary in size and command structure. Traditionally
though, helicopters that are deployed on OOTW are affiliated with an army formation/unit in
one way or another. Command and control is a function of the size and make up of the
operation and must be clearly understood to ensure proper support is provided.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3. Once given a mission to conduct any one of the OOTW operations, the Squadron CO
and his staff face challenges that may be different from those involved in conventional
operations. Some of the planning factors that COs must consider are:
a. Mission Analysis. As soon as the unit receives the Wng O/ Op O, mission
analysis begins. Careful mission analysis allows the CO to determine if the
unit is task organized correctly to meet the mission requirements;
b. Task Organization. The task organization for an OOTW is usually driven by
a higher HQ through the Op O. A mission analysis must still be conducted by
the CO to assess the squadron’s capabilities as directed, versus the mission. It
must be determined if the task organization is capable of accomplishing the
assigned mission. If not, the CO must notify the higher commander and

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request a modification to the force so the mission and intent can be met by the
helicopter unit;
c. Command Relationship. A helicopter unit may be deployed on an operation
without their parent brigade headquarters, or a flight may be attached to
another squadron headquarters from a foreign country. Further, it is possible
that helicopters may work for another service or non-military agency (i.e., the
RCMP). A clear understanding of the C2 relationship helps reduce confusion
throughout. Determining the command relationship early allows the aviation
unit to integrate with the headquarters they are attached to early, resulting in a
cohesive organization during the execution phase. An immediate task for the
CO or the ALO is to ensure that the C2 definition is clearly understood by the
supported organization when supporting a non-military/national operation;
d. Advance Party. Advance party personnel need to have a comprehensive
overview of their unit’s mission, the CO’s intent, capabilities, and
requirements prior to deployment. Advanced party personnel must interface
with the gaining commander, the unit being replaced, and the local population.
Advance party personnel should be carefully selected by the commander
keeping in mind the nature of the operation. Deploying to another country
with an undeveloped logistics base may require the advance party to be
heavily logistics weighted and contain translators, while other missions within
Canada (i.e. counter-drug operations) can have an advance party weighted
with operational personnel. Whichever the commander chooses, the advance
party must receive guidance from the commander prior to deployment, and
must keep the commander informed as to their actions and the current
situation in the area of operations;
e. Split Based Logistics Operations. The squadron often deploys on an
operation with a portion of the unit and into a theatre that has an immature
logistics base. Often, logistics operations are conducted in theatre and from
the unit’s home location. This is termed split based logistics operations. The
squadron/detachment commander who deploys on an operation that is
conducting split based operations must consider the type of support that must
be provided from the home unit. Special attention must be made to
communications between the theatre of operations and the home unit and to
the transportation means available to provide a timely flow of logistics to the
deployed unit;
f. Deployment. OOTW deployments deserve special consideration because
many times the squadron, or elements of the squadron, deploys alone and not
with the parent organization. The Sqn CO must ensure that the deploying unit
is fully supported during the preparation and execution phases of the
deployment. Special emphasis for deployment should be placed on the
following areas:

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(1) Early Involvement of Movement Control Personnel. COs must

coordinate early with the organizations providing movement control.
Early coordination ensures that air, rail or ship operations are
conducted smoothly,
(2) Packing Lists. Units need to identify a packing list and adhere to it.
Transport and shipping containers will be based upon the packing lists
submitted by the units. Careful attention needs to be placed on
developing load plans that make the best use of the space available in
the containers provided,
(3) Liaison. OOTW operations often require units to do missions they are
not routinely trained to do. Liaison officers must be selected and
deployed early to critical locations to provide the commander with
information and to assist the unit in conducting a smooth deployment.
Critical locations requiring liaison officers include transportation
nodes, adjacent, supporting and supported units and higher
headquarters, and
(4) Loading Teams. COs and Det Comds must anticipate the need for
teams to monitor the loading of equipment on to and off of ships or
planes, designate them early, and properly train them prior to mission
execution;
g. Logistics. During OOTW, logistics is a critical element. The logistics base
may be well developed or may be non-existent. COs and Det Comds must
determine the logistics available to support the mission. There must be a
priority for logistics dependent on the class of supplies. The following classes
must be considered in priority:
(1) POL. Host nation or supported agency POL may or may not be
available to supporting helicopters. Advance party operations must
include determining availability of fuel in the area of operation. The
advance party may have to establish contracts with local contractors or
host nation agencies to provide fuel for aviation tankers or provide fuel
from their own sources. If fuel is not available in the AO then
coordination with the higher headquarters for fuel resupply is needed,
(2) Ammunition. Consideration must be given as to how the squadron
obtains ammunition for door guns. Ammunition requirements are
based on an analysis of the threat. Advance parties should coordinate
with the higher headquarters to establish ammunition accounts and to
determine the procedures for ammunition requisition and resupply,
(3) Repair Parts. Repair parts accounts must be established with the
higher headquarters as soon as possible. The advance party should
make all necessary arrangements for repair parts ordering before the
unit arrives, including aircraft parts method of delivery. For an

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operation without an established system for ordering repair parts, the

unit should arrange for alternate methods of receiving these items, and
(4) Food and Water. Food and water must set up, prior to the arrival of
the unit, by the advance party. Food could be provided through
contracts or through the national logistics element. It is normally
preferred to use contracts and local procurement to minimize the
logistics tail, but in some cases the resources will have to be brought
into theatre and food imported,
h. Force Protection. Force protection is just as essential in many OOTW
operations as it would be in a warfighting situation. The siting of the aviation
assembly area should take the threat into account and make maximum
advantage of collocating with other units that could assist in providing
security. If that is not possible or the threat indicates the need for additional
security elements that cannot be provided internally, then extra security assets
must be requested. Coordination for any external security force should be
accomplished prior to deployment to the area of operations, if needed. The
protection threat in OOTW can range from deliberate infiltration or damage to
theft for criminal reasons to theft for life-sustaining reasons. The protection
measures must be designed in line with the threat and the ROEs. It must
always be remembered that physical protection, such as fences, berms,
watchtowers, lighting and the like, will help to reduce manpower
requirements. Military police and engineers should be consulted to assist in
designing appropriate physical security measures. At the same time, the Sqn
IO must maintain liaison with the military police concerning the threat;
i. NBC Protection. Normally NBC defence is not a high priority on OOTW,
but that could easily change depending on the belligerents. The squadron
must be prepared to protect its individuals at all times against asymmetric
attacks using weaponized biological or chemical agents, toxic industrial
chemicals or low level radiation caused by release other than attack. A
detailed threat analysis is required for virtually any theatre and additional
protective equipment may be required;
j. Military Police. The need for Military Police should be considered,
depending on the mission. If large numbers of civilian infiltrators and thieves
are expected then it may be better to have a military police detachment dealing
with detained personnel and coordinating handover to the local police or a
theatre civilian police (CIVPOL) organization. The MP would provide expert
advice to the squadron commander;
k. Rules of Engagement (ROEs). ROEs are designed to control the application
of force. These rules stipulate under what conditions troops can use force.
The ROEs are prepared and issued at the theatre, JTF, or national level. The
aviation unit commander must clearly understand the ROEs and ensure that all
the personnel in the unit understand them. All personnel should be briefed on
the current ROEs in effect prior to executing a specific mission; however,

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military personnel are always entitled to use force in self defence or in

designated circumstances to protect others from death or serious bodily harm;
and
l. Host Nation Considerations. Civil and military laws, airspace procedures,
radio frequency usage, ground convoy clearances, flight restrictions, customs,
passports, UN or NATO ID cards, and host nation contracting are all factors
that the CO must consider prior executing OOTW in another country.
A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) will normally be signed before the
Canadian elements arrive in theatre and it will cover many of the above noted
points. Airspace and flight restrictions may or may not be included. The CO
must adapt to local procedures in order to accomplish the tasked mission.

OOTW MISSIONS
4. Helicopters can expect to conduct many different types of missions in OOTW. These
missions can be conducted IAW the planning considerations listed in other chapters of this
publication. The uniqueness of each operation makes it impossible to list all of the missions
that tactical helicopters are tasked to accomplish, but the following is a list of missions that
can be expected:
a. Show of Force. This mission is carried out to demonstrate resolve in which a
force is deployed to defuse a volatile situation that may be detrimental to the
interests of peace and security. It may take or the simple presence of a
helicopter over the area, observing the situation. During OP KINETIC in
Kosovo, a nightly show of force was conducted using the nite sun. Flying at
200 to 1,000 ft AGL, helicopters made their presence known by illuminating
the night sky, over and around the environs of Pristina;
b. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. These missions relocate civilian
non-combatants from areas where they may be threatened. Personnel
evacuation may be conducted in a peaceful environment or during war;
c. Counter-Terrorist Operations. These operations are conducted by specially
trained RCMP personnel and tactical helicopter aircrew, formed as Joint Task
Force (JTF) 2;
d. Counter-Drug Operations. Military efforts towards counter-drug support
complement, rather than replace, the efforts of other government agencies, in
particular the Solicitor General. Tactical helicopter support to these missions
includes reconnaissance and air movement of counter-drug personnel. These
operations are usually short notice and require SOPs that are written in concert
with the counter-drug organization being supported (either provincial police or
the RCMP);

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e. Humanitarian Assistance. Whether in a domestic situation or during a PSO,

providing humanitarian assistance to those in need is a routine and an
important mission. Assistance missions include air movement of food, water,
and other critical supplies; and air movement of personnel, to include medical
personnel who provide essential care to the local population;
f. Disaster Relief. These operations may occur in Canada or abroad.
Helicopters may be called upon to assist the civilian population in the event of
natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, floods). Missions during
these operations range from air movement of supplies and personnel to fire
bucket missions. These operations tend to be complex and stressful for both
the planners and the operators. The effects of the civilian population, the
stress of large scale destruction and the usual lack of basic service support
facilities all add to increase the complexity. This destruction also places
demands on the unit by forcing personnel to operate in the most austere
conditions;
g. Search And Rescue (SAR). In most countries, peacetime SAR is a function
conducted by non-military organizations. In Canada, SAR missions are
conducted primarily by the specially trained aircrew and rescue personnel on
SAR units. Secondary SAR is carried out by tac hel units when primary SAR
resources either are not available or when distance and reaction time dictates
the use of closer tac hel resources; and
h. Airlift. Helicopters conduct airlift during all types of operations. During
OOTW, units can expect to be tasked to move troops, supplies, equipment,
diplomats, allied forces, and media.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (PSO)

5. PSO covers a wide range of activities that are normally conducted under the auspices
of the UN, with a view to preventing conflict or mitigating their effects on the affected
populations. Units participating in these operations work in concert with a variety of
organizations and formations including foreign military and Non Government Organizations
(NGOs) such as international civilian agencies, international organizations and private
organizations. Peace Support Operations include:
a. peacekeeping;
b. peacemaking;
c. peace enforcement;
d. peace building;
e. conflict prevention; and
f. humanitarian operations.

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6. PSO Missions. Due to the many organizations that will want to use the limited and
valuable aviation resources it is imperative that strict, unambiguous command and control
direction and priorities be given. Some aviation missions, which support PSO, include:
a. transporting personnel;
b. providing humanitarian aid;
c. command and liaison;
d. reconnaissance;
e. communications assistance;
f. security; and
g. show of force.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
7. General. This section is concerned only with domestic operations and is therefore
directed towards missions in support of a government under specific legislation. Although
domestic operations are only one aspect of aid and assistance rendered to the government and
the public, they are perhaps the most complicated and have a wide application to other
situations. Domestic operations include:
a. aid to the civil power;
b. armed assistance to other federal government departments;
c. armed assistance to the correctional services of Canada; and
d. protection of defence establishments and vital points.

8. In Canada armed assistance is based on several concepts which form an integral part
of our legal system. Possibly the most fundamental concept is that civil authority is always
supreme and cannot be usurped by the military. Accordingly, government domestic policy is
to use the CF as a force of last resort. Situations in which troops could be employed in
domestic operations and which could overlap are:
a. Assistance in the Maintenance of Order. This situation envisages a timely
requisition of the military by civil authorities to augment police forces when
they are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disturbances. This type of
operation could include a show of force to demonstrate the determination of
the civil authority to maintain order, but will normally mean augmentation,
assistance and relief of police forces to allow them to carry out their job; and
b. Assistance in the Restoration of Order. This function may be extensions of
the previous one or the result of a sudden increase in violence not anticipated
by the civil authorities. This is an operation that is normally carried out as a
last resort, when all police capabilities are exhausted. It requires the
employment of sufficient forces, including the necessary reserves, to restore

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the situation to the point where police forces can resume their normal
responsibilities.
9. A domestic operation may flow from another type of commitment in progress (i.e. a
flood situation may lead to looting and a call for aid from a government). It must be
remembered, however, that the governing legislation is quite different when forces change
from assisting in a civil emergency to conducting domestic operations. Domestic operations
involve the provision of armed assistance pursuant to an appropriate request to assist the civil
authorities in the enforcement of the laws of Canada. These operations invariably involve
violence or the threat of violence.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS MISSIONS

10. Helicopters tasked to support domestic operations can accomplish the following
missions:
a. Combat or Logistic Airlift. The same techniques are employed in the
airlifting of personnel in domestic operation as are employed for normal
combat operations. These forces may vary from a team of civilian technicians
to a mixed response force of police and military personnel;
b. Reconnaissance and Tactical Security. The same reconnaissance and
tactical security concepts apply in domestic operations as in normal tactical
operations. Aircrew must, however, pay special attention to the recognition of
characteristics that indicate crowd congregation, dispersal, etc as well as to
suitable avenues for approach of troops to the scene and for dispersal of
civilians from the area. Helicopters may be used for curfew control,
surveillance to locate snipers, conduct of searches for caches of rock, bottles
etc, or for traffic observation and control;
c. Airborne Command Post, Radio Relay and Liaison. Helicopters can be
used for the rapid movement of civil authorities to areas where problems
threaten to develop and can allow on-site assessments from the air and
issuance of instructions. Tactical helicopters may be used for radio relay or
transport of liaison personnel in areas where periodic disturbances to
communications may occur;
d. Airborne Public Announcements. The helicopter is a useful vehicle for
disseminating information. It can be used to drop leaflets or the loud hailer
may be used to transmit instructions and announcements;
e. Airborne Illumination Systems. Use of the nite sun or other illumination
devices may be used extensively in support of domestic operations. Tasks
may include crowd dispersal, search operations and general surveillance
operations;
f. Airborne Escorts. Helicopters can be used to provide surveillance prior to
and during movement of VIPs and troops, as well as being used as armed
escorts; and
g. Aeromedical Evacuation (CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC). Helicopters can
provide a platform for the rapid transport of casualties or medical patients.

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CHAPTER 14
OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

INTRODUCTION
1. The full range of tasks common to tactical aviation is normally applicable to all
operations and specific environments demand special attention and training to properly
conduct operations. A clear understanding of tactical aviation's capabilities and
limitation and the effects of various environments are necessary if optimum results are to
be achieved. Operations in an NBC environment, although part of operations in specific
environments, is detailed separately in Chapter 15.

NIGHT AND REDUCED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS

2. Reduced visibility can be caused by fog, precipitation, dust or smoke. Forces
may deliberately conduct operations in such conditions in order to achieve surprise,
create confusion, maintain momentum, enhance survivability or to respond to enemy
action. Operations under these conditions give friendly forces a tactical and
psychological advantage over the enemy and therefore often prove successful where
clear/daylight operations prove impractical.
3. Reduction of visibility has the following adverse effects on operations:
a. increased physical and mental stress on aircrew, which erodes combat
effectiveness through increased apprehension and fatigue;
b. engagement ranges of weapons are reduced and muzzle flash may reveal
weapon locations;
c. the recognition, identification and location of enemy forces and targets
along with objectives and landing zones will generally occur at much
shorter ranges;
d. navigation is more difficult and the speed of movement is reduced;
e. the presence of snow can create conditions that make the landing site
unusable due to recirculating snow. This detrimental effect to visibility is
magnified during night operations; and
f. many typical battlefield tasks require additional time to complete as
detailed planning, briefings and rehearsals become critical.

4. The ability to perform tasks at night has been eased through the use of NVGs
and HUDs while those tasks conducted in low visibility have been enhanced by precision
navigation systems. This being said, a high degree of specialized training and
proficiency along with proper planning and good leadership is required in order to
maximize the level of success in support of night/reduced visibility operations.

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NIGHT EFFECTS ON TACTICAL AVIATION OPERATIONS

5. During night operations, different visibility requirements are needed for each
task. There are two aspects to these visibility requirements, one being pure manual flying
and the other being observation/engagement ranges. For manual flying, which involves
such things as terrain avoidance, navigation and formation flight, the visibility must be
such that obstacles can be recognized early enough to avoid them. The tactical visibility
required for recognizing, identifying and engaging a target is greater than the visibility
required for manual flying. Observation ranges that are as great as possible are required
so helicopters will remain outside the range of enemy fire.
6. Equipment has met the visibility requirements for both the manual flying and
observation and engagement through NVGs and Electro-Optics (EO). These devices
with their narrow field of view impact on situational awareness coordination of tasks
within helicopter sections.
7. Visual navigation in conditions of reduced visibility is very difficult and requires
crews to examine all routes. Routes must be chosen that use prominent and easily
recognizable features for navigation as much as possible. They should also avoid
excessive turns and manoeuvring. The use of GPS and Doppler plus moving map
displays improves the accuracy of navigation, the visual aspects must not be overlooked
in the planning and execution.
8. Positive and detailed plans must be used both at departure points and in landing
zones (LZs). Aircrew must be thoroughly familiar with the planned control procedures
and proposed routes. In selecting LZs, greater stress must be placed on the factors that
ensure safe landings, those being larger LZs than in day/good visibility, easily
recognizable, and the approach must avoid excessive manoeuvring on final.
9. Planning techniques, though detailed for night operations, are similar to those
for day operations. Plans must be kept simple. Day reconnaissance must be performed if
tactical conditions permit. In addition, night reconnaissance should also be conducted.
Full scale rehearsals by both the ground forces and tactical aviation should be carried out.
Up to date intelligence, both friendly and enemy must be provided.
10. NVGs and EOs have greatly improved the ability of aircrew to operate at night.
Flying with these devices, however, is a high risk operation and they do not provide the
same operating conditions as daylight. The limitations caused by low illumination, time
of day and moon angle along with terrain conditions and surface debris must be
understood by the supported commander to avoid any misunderstanding aviation’s
capabilities.
11. Two critical aspects result from continuous operations. The first is fatigue. It is
an important limitation for any unit performing continuous operations. Although tactical
aviation units are capable of meeting surge periods of intense activity, continuous flying
at maximum rates quickly reduces the effectiveness of the tactical aviation unit. Sound
personnel planning and definite limits governing work and rest periods for both aircrew
and technicians are required to minimize the loss of personnel and material. The second
aspect is maintenance. Where it used to be that night and poor weather allowed aircraft

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repairs to be completed, that convenience is now greatly reduced. Continuous monitoring

of unserviceabilities is needed and scheduled 'down time' allotted for by the commander.
This must be forecast and passed on to higher and supported units.

URBAN OPERATIONS
12. General. Traditionally, urban warfare has been an infantry responsibility. The
principal reason being that built up, urban areas are considered hostile ground for tanks
and other combat vehicles. Fields of fire and observation are severely limited, defiles are
the rule and the potential of ambush is ever present. These limitations have similar
implications for the employment of tactical aviation. Enemy operating in an urban
environment can easily be concealed in numerous locations and can effectively employ
weapons at a very close range. The height of buildings adds a third dimension to the
application of firepower and creates problems for both the attacker and the defender.
13. Operational Tasks. The principles of employment of tactical aviation resources
are just as applicable in urban warfare as they are in other operations. The vulnerability
of helicopters in an urban environment should be viewed as a limiting factor to their
potential employment. However, like the tank, tactical helicopters possess unique
capabilities that may be exploited in urban warfare, despite the inherent risks.
14. Surveillance Support. A helicopter's mobility, combined with significant
technological advances in EO devices, makes it an obvious choice for surveillance.
These capabilities, however, are not well suited to ferret out a carefully concealed enemy
in a built-up, urban area. Instead, tactical aviation should be employed on flank security
on the periphery of urban areas where the observation capabilities can be used to best
advantage. As well, tactical helicopter resources are capable of assisting military police
to control refugees and conduct route surveys outside of urban areas. In a high threat
environment, the vulnerability of helicopters makes survey and photo missions of urban
areas questionable tasks. However, this is not the case in a low threat environment such
as Kosovo, where these missions were routinely flown both day and night.
15. Fire Support. Recce helicopters may be tasked to conduct air observation post
(AOP) missions and forward air controller (FAC) missions. Armed helicopters are
invaluable in providing the covering fire for the assault of cut-off forces and for
providing fire onto targets. The vulnerability of these resources however, dictates that
these tasks be carried out at maximum observation and engagement ranges.
16. Mobility Support. Tactical aviation resources enhance the mobility of the land
forces. They may be used to rapidly move:
a. anti-armour teams and infantry into blocking or cut off positions;
b. OPs, demolition teams and patrols;
c. infantry troops onto roofs or larger buildings;
d. reserves forward;
e. casualties to medical facilities; and

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f. combat supplies forward.

17. Command and Control. Restricted observation and the degradation of radio
communications pose special problems to the land forces. Tactical helicopters are
employed in command and liaison tasks and have the capability to establish radio-
rebroadcast stations quickly.
18. Planning. Tactical aviation must be included in the early stages of urban warfare
planning. Priorities for employment are established and effective coordination of control
and identification measures.
19. Selection of Landing Zones. The following points must be considered when
choosing an LZ:
a. the availability of LZs in an urban environment is quite limited. Finding
sufficient numbers of adequate and safe LZs, free of trees, electrical wires
and supporting poles, and loose garbage and war debris, presents a
problem. The large majority of LZs are, of necessity, in city parks or
recreation areas, which are not always free of hazards. Industrial areas
and factory yards may be used if parking, loading or storage areas are
large enough;
b. school buildings may be used as force headquarters, since they are
generally fenced which eases the problems of security. Additionally,
school grounds are normally large enough to establish a vehicle park and
LZ adjacent to the headquarters and are usually relatively free of hazards
to helicopter operations;
c. parks and recreation areas are usually surrounded by power poles, wires,
etc. Confined areas, loose garbage, steep approach angles and the high
density altitudes of summer present problems to helicopter operations.
These hazards can be reduced by limiting the number of helicopters
landing at an LZ at any given time. Ground marshallers can be used to
secure the area, assist in crowd control and mark the landing areas; and
d. in urban areas, buildings interrupt airflow causing turbulence,
unpredictable wind direction changes and calm air near the ground. In
determining the suitability of an LZ, allowance must be made for abrupt
variations in lift encountered under these conditions. As well, visibility is
often affected by industrial pollution and smoke.

ARCTIC AND COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

20. General. The effects of arctic winter conditions on operations also apply in
other areas under conditions of extreme cold. In most northern areas there is a scarcity or
a total absence of roads, railways, airfields and settlements. While some areas may be
forested, much of the terrain is treeless. In winter, ground and waterways are frozen and
snow covered, while in summer much of the terrain is bog. Days are long or continuous
in summer, while nights are long in winter. Winter weather is unpredictable, changes

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rapidly and is characterized by snow, extreme cold and high winds. In extreme cold,
survival of a force may be a more difficult problem than the defeat of the enemy or the
conduct of the operation. Limitations on movement restrict flexibility and increase
maintenance requirements. This, combined with the long lines of communication,
aggravates logistics problems.
21. Tactical aviation can be invaluable in arctic operations primarily because of its
ability to overcome the difficulties of movement and resupply under these extreme
conditions. Severe arctic conditions, however, also dictate major changes in normal
operating procedures for tactical aviation forces.
22. Tactical aviation planning must include climatological data for the planned area
of operations to establish the frequency of poor weather conditions. Units must become
adept at operating in long arctic nights and conditions of reduced visibility caused by low
cloud, whiteout, ice fog, arctic sea fog, sea smoke, radiation fog, advection fog, blowing
snow or snow reflectivity. Additional time must be inserted into planning an operation in
extreme cold due to the requirement for aircraft preheating and increase start time.
23. Tactical airfields, PZs and LZs require additional preparation to accept
helicopter operations. This preparation includes packing snow on the airfields, PZs and
LZs to reduce the effects of blowing snow during helicopter manoeuvring. Engineer
advice should be sought to assist in such work, but it could be done manually if
necessary.
24. Arctic temperature increases maintenance requirements. At the same time they
limit personnel exposure time and may degrade maintenance efforts. Wind chill becomes
very dangerous particularly in the area of rotorwash. Handling of metal objects also
becomes hazardous as skin will freeze to metal surfaces very rapidly. To sustain flying
operations, temporary shelters and covers with heaters are necessary to minimize
maintenance requirements and to facilitate working on helicopters.
25. The arctic environment also creates difficulties for communications and
navigation capabilities. Aurora Borealis and solar disturbances can disrupt high
frequency sky wave radio communications for periods of times lasting hours to days and
satellite coverage is complicated. Major errors in altimeter readings can be caused by the
cold conditions. Compass errors due to the weak horizontal magnetic field component
and the rapidly changing magnetic variation are also normal.
26. The lift capability of helicopters in cold weather is good because of the low
density altitude, however, this capability may still be reduced by the requirement to carry
extra equipment and survival gear for arctic operations.
27. Extreme cold results in low humidity, which causes static electricity to be
generated more quickly and at higher voltages than in a less dry environment. This could
be dangerous during external load or hoist operations and is critical during any refuelling
operation.

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MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
28. General. Mountainous areas are characterized by terrain, which has marked
differences in elevation, steep slopes, ridges and valleys. The nature of the terrain,
combined with unstable and rapidly changing weather patterns, affects all operations. In
mountain operations, control of the terrain, which permits movement, must be obtained in
order to achieve success.
29. Mountains provide excellent terrain masking to protect helicopters and to help
avoid radar and visual detection by the enemy. Helicopters offer the land commander a
means to overcome movement restrictions imposed by mountainous terrain. Flying
techniques and operations, however, must be adapted to suit the peculiarities of these
regions. Aircrew training and exposure to mountainous terrain is necessary to minimize
the psychological effects of disorientation, vertigo and apprehension associated with
operations in this environment.
30. The factors of weather, limited choice of LZs, potentially increased turnaround
times and poor communications must be considered when planning helicopter operations
in mountainous areas.
31. One important weather factor is air density. Increases in altitude and/or
temperature decrease the air density and thereby the lift capability of helicopters. When
airlift operations are being planned this factor must be considered. Winds are also an
important factor. Increased wind speeds are found at high altitudes and changes in speed
and direction may be frequent. Unpredictable air currents form around surface
irregularities and even moderate winds may create updrafts, downdrafts and turbulence
severe enough to either complicate or preclude landings.
32. Pressure changes may be erratic in mountainous regions and altimeter errors are
common. In addition, subzero temperatures may complicate operations and maintenance.
Clouds form easily in these areas and may reduce visibility and produce icing conditions.
Glare from snow surfaces can interfere with depth perception and cause difficulties in
assessing landing areas. A fresh snowfall, combined with low ceilings can cause “white
out” conditions.
33. The very nature of the terrain in mountainous areas limits the number of suitable
LZs. Generally there are fewer LZs and when available, they may require more
preparation than on normal terrain. The enemy can also be expected to target likely LZs.
Therefore they must be secured prior to usage. The effects of altitude and wind may also
reduce the availability of suitable landing areas. Winds, visibility or density altitude may
change rapidly, causing changes in landing direction or the need to use an alternate site.
Snow covered areas that appear suitable for landing may hide dangerous obstacles
beneath their surface. Special attention must be given to the selection and preparation of
landing areas during the preparation of operational plans. If necessary, troops may have
to be delivered by hoisting or rappelling.
34. The rugged terrain also limits the availability of locations from which squadrons
can conduct operations. When selecting a site the factors of defensibility, dispersal,
communications, and transport may come into conflict and weighed against the mission.

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JUNGLE OPERATIONS
35. Jungles are found mainly in the tropics and are characterized by heavy rainfall,
high temperatures and humidity. They may be evergreen rain forests, deciduous forests,
swamps or grasslands. The terrain in jungles is often rugged, containing swamps, deep
valleys and steep ridges. Streams and rivers are plentiful and the soil is soft.
36. The use of helicopters minimizes the problems of ground movement, navigation
and communication for land forces in the jungle environment. Safe and successful
tactical aviation operations in jungles require intensive aircrew and ground crew
indoctrination training. Maintenance requirements are increased in a jungle environment
causing erosion. High temperatures cause lubricants to break down and seals and gaskets
to distort resulting in leakage problems. COs must plan for increased maintenance
support requirements and must endeavor to protect equipment from these environmental
effects. Further aircraft maintenance is required, i.e. water washes, preservation, etc.
37. Hot, tropical air decreases air density and as a result, helicopters are not able to
lift the same loads that they normally could in a more temperate area.
38. Navigation, because of the general lack of readily identifiable landmarks, is
difficult. Reliance on dead reckoning is often necessary. Flying in instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) is impractical because of the lack of radio navigation
aids and the presence of thunderstorms in these climates.
39. Jungle weather is subject to rapid and often violent change. Thunderstorms
produce strong winds, turbulence, heavy rain and poor visibility. Heavy mist is common
in the early morning or following a rain. Storms are often preceded by squall lines then
followed immediately by low cloud layers. All of these can temporarily disrupt tactical
aviation operations, as helicopters require securing or missions delayed. These effects
are compounded by the scarcity of weather reporting facilities.
40. Special care must be taken in the storage and transfer of aircraft fuel because of
the accumulation of water due to condensation and subsequent fungus growth. This high
humidity also means that corrosion becomes a problem for aircraft parts. Increased
maintenance checks are required.
41. As in mountain operations, there is a scarcity of suitable landing sites in the
jungle. In most instances jungle growth must be cleared. Often rappelling or hoisting of
personnel is required to support combat operations.

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DESERT OPERATIONS
42. Deserts are arid expanses of mountains, rocky plateaus or dunes. Ranges of
barren hills and low mountains with deep, steep ravines characterize mountain deserts.
The ranges are separated by dry salt flats or salt marshes. Rocky plateau deserts have
relatively slight relief separating extensive flat surfaces of solid or broken rock at or near
the surface. Dune deserts are covered with sand or gravel, with dunes that may be
relatively close together or separated by large areas of flat ground. Steep canyons often
cut rocky plateau and dune deserts.
43. Characteristics. The principal characteristics of desert areas that affect combat
operations, regardless of surface configuration, are the lack of water and vegetation, the
extreme temperature variations and sandstorms.
44. Protection. Due to scant vegetation and the nature of the terrain, tactical
aviation units are difficult to conceal in the desert. Therefore they are vulnerable to
enemy activity and special attention to protection is required. Helicopters, vehicles and
equipment must be widely dispersed, camouflaged and located well away from supported
ground units. If possible, protective revetments, berms or dugouts should be constructed
if there is the threat of attack. Engineer assistance should be sought for this work.
Because of the lack of protective terrain, helicopters in flight are easily spotted, making
successful evasive action very difficult. The good visibility allows weapons to be used to
their maximum effective ranges.
45. Environmental Effects. These effects degrade both equipment and personnel
performance. Extremely high daytime temperatures decrease lift capabilities. They also
impose added stress on both aircrew and technicians thus limiting continuous operations.
The absence of significant cloud cover produces bright glare conditions. Observation can
be obscured by heat shimmer and mirages. High and violent winds are common and can
affect both visibility and maintenance requirements.
46. Maintenance. Maintenance requirements are increased due to sand and dust
causing erosion of windshields, rotor blades and engine parts. High temperatures cause
lubricants to break down and seals and gaskets to distort resulting in leakage problems.
COs must plan for increased maintenance support requirements and must endeavor to
protect equipment from these environmental effects. Further aircraft maintenance will be
required.
47. The lack of terrain features and poor reference points complicates navigation.
The inaccuracy of maps, contour presentation and the nature of the constantly changing
terrain make the use of electronic and visual navigation aids a necessity. Suitable landing
sites may be difficult to select from the air particularly in areas of soft sand and hidden
boulders.
48. Dry and sandy terrain inhibits radio wave propagation reducing radio ranges. In
addition storms are frequently accompanied by intense electrical disturbances that limit
the use of radio and navigational aids.

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CHAPTER 15
OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT

GENERAL
1. Canada’s position on NBC warfare is never to engage in offensive NBC
operations. This is not true of some other nations. Several “rogue states” have not signed
any agreements against the use of offensive NBC weapons, thus creating the possibility
of having to conduct aviation operations in a NBC environment. Biological and
Chemical warfare were real threats during the Gulf War.
2. This chapter serves as a planning guide by which aviation is employed in a
nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Helicopters may be the first to encounter
NBC conditions in the battlespace. Aviation can expect to conduct all or part of their
operations in an NBC environment. Tactics, techniques and procedures must be
developed that not only detail the normal helicopter combat missions, but also how to
conduct these missions in such an environment. All personnel must be trained and
exercised while wearing their NBC individual protective equipment (IPE) to be able to
operate effectively in NBC conditions.
3. NBC Effects. This chapter is not intended to list all the effects of NBC warfare,
which can be found in other publications, such as the B-GG-005-004/AF-011, CF
Operations, NBC Defence. It lists those NBC effects, which can affect helicopter
operations and aircrew.

THREAT
4. The NBC threat can exist anywhere, including Third World countries that have an
NBC capability, especially those with petrochemical industries. Some of these nations
have developed and fielded a large inventory of defensive equipment and have well-
trained chemical personnel. As part of their overall preparedness, they conduct
extensive, realistic training. However, NBC warfare imposes the same constraints on
personnel on both sides of a conflict.

NUCLEAR WARFARE
5. Threat nations have a wide range of systems that can deliver nuclear weapons.
No area on the battlefield is free from the threat of a nuclear strike. They have stated
priorities for nuclear strikes. They include the following, but there is not guarantee in the
future that this list will be all inclusive, or attacked in this order of priority:
a. enemy nuclear delivery means, aircraft, field artillery, missiles, and
rockets;
b. airfields;
c. division and higher level headquarters;

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d. defensive positions;
e. reserves and troop concentrations;
f. supply installations, especially nuclear ammunition storage points; and
g. command, control, and communication (C3) systems.

6. Aviation units are vulnerable to nuclear strikes and while they may not be directly
targeted, they could be co-located with high asset targets that may be attacked by nuclear
weapons.
7. An emerging nuclear threat is the hazard caused by Release Other Than Attack,
especially Low Level Radiation (LLR). These radiation releases could result from
deliberate attacks on installations such as nuclear power plants, or the deliberate release
of nuclear material, such as the demolition of an x-ray machine. In other cases LLR
could result from a nuclear source damaged by battle. The ability to monitor for LLR
and to monitor exposure of personnel will become increasingly important in
deployments.

THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS

8. General. The energy released from a nuclear detonation interacts immediately
with the surrounding air. Almost instantly, an intense light pulse is emitted. Also, the air
is heated to thousands of degrees Celsius, vapourizing even the unreacted bomb material.
The sphere of super-heated air is called the fireball and the heat and light are referred to
as thermal radiation. Thermal radiation continues to be emitted from the detonation for
several seconds to tens of seconds, depending on the yield of the weapon.
9. Materiel Damage. Thermal radiation is hazardous to ground support equipment
and supplies as well as personnel. Fuel stored in fuel bladders is especially vulnerable.
The black rubber in a fuel bladder absorbs thermal radiation and may become heated and
hardened. The blast may also puncture or stress the fuel bladders, causing them to leak.
Burning rubber, leaves, or grass might ignite the fuel, causing explosions and fires.
Personnel (fuel handlers) at FARPs must protect the fuel bladders by burying them or
covering them with tarpaulins.
10. Light Effects. Light mainly affects personnel. The effects of light on aircrew
range from flash blindness to retinal burns.
a. Flash blindness.
(1) The retina may receive more visible light from a fireball than is
needed for light perception but not enough to cause permanent
damage. Visual pigments of the photoreceptors bleach out and
vision is briefly impaired. This effect is called flash blindness. It is
sometimes referred to as dazzle. Flash blindness is more of a
hazard at night than during the day, because the pupil is larger and
admits more light at night. How flash blindness affects military
operations depends on the tasks of affected personnel. While the

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temporary loss of vision may be hazardous to ground soldiers, it

could be fatal for aircrew, and
(2) The severity of flash blindness is related directly to the yield of the
weapon, distance between the fireball and personnel, and
atmospheric conditions. Low visibility reduces the magnitude of
the visible light pulse. In the daytime, a 1-kt weapon could cause
flash blindness from a distance of 6 kms. At night, the same
weapon would produce flash blindness from a distance of 51 kms,
and
b. Retinal burns. An excessive amount of light focused on the retina can
cause retinal burns. The intense light burns the photoreceptors and causes
a blind spot. The damage is permanent, because photoreceptors cannot be
replaced. The degree of incapacitation would vary. For example, a person
looking directly at the explosion could suffer destruction of the fovea
centralis and be considered functionally blind. Another person with a burn
in the periphery of the retina might not be aware of the blind spot.
Personnel facing a 1-kt detonation could receive retinal burns from as far
away as 7 kms.

BLAST EFFECTS
11. The rapid expansion of the fireball creates a wave of compressed air. This is
referred to as a shock wave or a blast wave. The blast wave causes damage by two kinds
of pressure: dynamic pressure, referred to as winds, and static overpressure, referred to as
overpressure. The compressed gases produced by a nuclear explosion expand outward in
all directions from the point of detonation. This wave travels at about the speed of sound.
Blast effects are broken down as follows:
a. Dynamic Pressure:
(1) Wind velocity. The wind velocity can range from a few
kilometers per hour (kph) to hundreds of kph. The velocity
depends on the yield of the weapon, height of the burst, and
distance from the point of detonation. The wind velocity decreases
with distance. For example, a 160 kph wind occurs about 10 kms
from a 1 megaton (Mt) detonation, 6.5 kms from a 300 kt
detonation, or 1.5 kms from a 5 kt detonation. However, when a
nuclear burst first detonates, the observer is unable to predict the
wind force because he does not know the yield of the weapon or
the location of ground zero,
(2) Drag forces. The winds cause damage by drag forces. Drag forces
cause buildings to collapse and vehicles to overturn. They create
missiles from flying debris such as rocks, sticks, or glass
fragments. They also hurl exposed personnel against structures
and solid objects and blow down trees. For nuclear weapons, the

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time from the initial blinding flash of light until the blast wave
reaches the area can be several seconds or longer. For large yield
weapons at great distances, the time can be longer than 30 seconds.
Thus, personnel have some time to seek shelter before the blast
wave hits,
(3) Wind phases. Winds have both a positive phase and a negative
phase. During the positive phase, winds travel outward from the
point of detonation. As the fireball rises, a slight vacuum is
created. This causes the winds to reverse and blow back toward the
detonation. The velocities of this reverse wind are mild compared
to the positive phase. The reversal of the winds keeps missiles in
the air longer and possibly causes more damage. The missiles may
fall back to the ground and settle after the positive phase. They are
then picked up again by the negative phase. Because of the
turmoil, ground troops may not even notice the negative phase.
Aircrew may notice it more because wind reversal creates more air
instability for them to overcome, and
(4) Aerodynamics. The effects of high winds on helicopters have
been studied in wind tunnels and in open-air testing. Nuclear blast
winds have the same effects on aerodynamic surfaces and
airframes as any other type of high wind. Nuclear weapons can
produce enormous wind velocities, extreme turbulence, and wind
shear. The winds persist longer than those produced by
conventional munitions. Helicopters may experience sudden yaw,
pitch, roll, and lift changes. Extreme effects can include blade
flapping and bending, mast bumping, loss of tail rotor
effectiveness, flameout, and airframe crushing. These effects
dictate the need to land and shut down the helicopter whenever
known blast effects are to occur, and
b. Static Overpressure:
(1) Overpressure Force. The compressed gases create a force that
causes the ambient air pressure to increase. This is overpressure.
A conventional high-explosive munition also has an overpressure
effect; however, it is not as powerful and lasts only microseconds.
The nuclear explosion creates overpressure that can be hundreds of
times greater than the ambient air pressure. As with the winds, the
overpressure decreases as the distance from the point of detonation
increases,
(2) Aircrew Injury. Wind velocity and overpressure are interrelated.
For example, the wind velocity is about 55 kph at one pound per
square inch (psi) overpressure and about 255 kph at five psi. At
overpressures of .5 psi and greater, windscreens begin to shatter
and flying fragments can injure aircrews. At 55 kph, glass

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fragments are a significant hazard to the eyes and the throat. At

higher pressures, the wind velocity can cause casualties from
fragments penetrating the flight suit and skin. Also, with the
windscreen gone, external missiles may enter the cockpit and cause
injuries. The best protection available to aircrew is receiving an
early warning by radio. Aircrew can land in the lowest terrain
possible and can then place the rear of the helicopter in the
direction of the expected blast. This method increases the aircrew's
survivability. The distance from the blast determines the degree of
damage to the helicopter, and
(3) Airframe Damage.
(a) Airframes are vulnerable to overpressure effects. Glass,
Plexiglass, safety Plexiglass, or safety glass, begins to
shatter at .5 to 1 psi overpressure. At .5 to 2 psi, larger
windows that face the point of detonation shatter first. As
the overpressure increases (2 to 5 psi), all windows shatter.
Overpressure may cause glass to implode initially, then the
positive wind phase creates missiles of the glass fragments,
(b) Overpressure initially affects only the side facing the
detonation. However, the blast wave envelops the
helicopter within microseconds, exerting forces on the
opposite side as well. The sequential occurrence creates
buckling and twisting forces, resulting in skin wrinkling
and internal frame stresses, and
(c) Light damage to the airframe, other than glass, begins to
occur at 3 to 5 psi overpressure. On helicopters, the tail
boom weakens and may undergo slight separation.
Subsequent severe flight manoeuvres may result in tail
boom failure. On all aircraft, the fuselage and internal
frames undergo substantial stresses and skin panels rupture.
Airframes components may fail at these pressures.

NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS

12. Nuclear radiation consists of all types of ionizing electromagnetic and particulate
radiation; specifically, alpha, beta, neutron, and gamma. Nuclear radiation travels
outward in all directions from the detonation point. The effects of nuclear radiation are
categorized as initial and residual, detailed as follows:
a. Initial Effects. The initial effects are those manifested within 60 seconds
after detonation. They consist of all types of electromagnetic and
particulate ionizing radiation. For small yields, the initial radiation causes
numerous personnel casualties. However, a helicopter flown close enough
to the nuclear detonation for the aircrew to receive incapacitating dosages

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would probably not survive the blast damage anyway. This initial
radiation is a concern for aircrew on the ground, personnel in FARPs, and
aviation units;
b. Residual Effects. The residual effects are those that remain hazardous
after 60 seconds. The most important residual effects are fallout and
induced radiation or neutron-induced gamma activity:
(1) Fallout. The fireball continues to grow after a nuclear detonation,
stabilizing within several minutes. Because hot air rises, it also
gains altitude as it grows. The rising and cooling of the fireball
create an area of low pressure directly beneath the fireball. If the
point of detonation is close to the earth's surface, then dirt and
debris are drawn up into the fireball. Vapourized bomb material
then mixes with the dirt and debris. The mixture of radiological
dirt and debris, called fallout, begins to fall back to earth and may
cover hundreds of kms as it travels downwind. Fallout can result
in significant radiation dose-rate levels and communication
blackouts from large quantities of dust and debris in the
atmosphere. Large particles may also cause structural damage and
foreign object damage to helicopters, and
(2) Induced radiation or neutron-induced gamma activity.
Neutron radiation occurs only during the initial nuclear reaction.
However, neutrons can cause other elements to become
radioactive. The ground directly below the point of detonation will
most likely become radioactive. This induced pattern, usually not
exceeding 4 kms in diameter, presents a significant radiation
hazard for ground personnel for 2 to 5 days after the burst, and
c. Radiation Exposure and Sickness. Aircrew exposed to radiation may
exhibit certain symptoms. The onset of radiation symptoms, their severity,
and their duration generally depend on the amount of radiation the
individual receives and variables such as health, previous exposure, and
injury. Before directing aircrew into areas of suspected or known
radiation contamination, COs must evaluate how essential the mission is.
Aircrew can use radiac meters and dosimeters in aircraft to measure
radiation total dose and dose rates. COs can then evaluate the effects of
aircrew exposure and anticipate aircrew ability to perform future missions.
An individual exposed to radiation may have alternating periods of
performance degradation, combat effectiveness, and combat
ineffectiveness. For example, an undemanding task in the 500 to 800 rad
range may cause an individual's performance to be degraded initially for
up to two days, then the individual briefly regains combat effectiveness.
Thereafter, the individual's performance is again degraded and deteriorates
until combat ineffective occurs.

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(1) Radiation Exposure. Radiation exposure considerations are much

the same for aviation personnel as for ground personnel. However,
the aviation commander has the more difficult job of determining
when an aircrew becomes ineffective from radiation exposure, and
(2) Radiation Sickness. Aircrew must be alert to symptoms that
impair their ability to fly. Supervisors should observe their
personnel closely to detect behavior that may necessitate
grounding them. Initial symptoms of radiation sickness, such as
nausea, fatigue, and listlessness, may mimic those of other
illnesses. Flight Surgeons should monitor radiation exposure and
provide appropriate guidance to the CO.

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EFFECTS

13. The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect is a wave of electromagnetic energy
produced by a nuclear detonation when gamma rays make contact with the atmosphere.
The wave occurs immediately after nuclear detonation and travels outward in all
directions. EMP presents no significant biomedical hazard to humans. However, it can
damage electronic components. Because EMP is a form of electromagnetic energy, it
follows the path of least resistance into electrical equipment.
a. Component and Aircraft Systems’ Damage.
(1) Component Damage. EMP can affect any electrical component.
A sudden surge of EMP causes overvoltage, shorting out wiring
and transistors. EMP can enter through the casing of radios and
destroy them. It can destroy circuitry even with radios turned off
and antennas disconnected. The severity of the damage depends
greatly on component design. Testing continues to determine the
extent to which a system can be disabled by EMP damage. Not
every electrical component is destroyed by EMP. Some
components may only be temporarily disabled, and
(2) Aircraft Systems’ Damage. Aircrew should know which aircraft
electrical systems are critical and how failure of those systems
affects the flight. For example, some aircraft instruments may be
disabled, radios or navigational aids may not work, or visual or
targeting aids may fail; and
b. Communication Net Impairment. EMP affects communication nets.
Commanders must be prepared for EMP degradation by training with
backup units and alternate means of communications.

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BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
14. Biological warfare is the intentional use of biological agents to cause death or
disease in people, animals, or plants. Examples of these living organisms, called germs
(from which comes the term “Germ Warfare”), are viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Germs
can be dispersed over the battlefield by artillery, rockets, aircraft, sprays, vectors, or
covert operations. The possibility of biological warfare exists even though treaties
prohibit it. A biological agent is any living organism, toxin, or other agents of biological
origin that can incapacitate, seriously injure, or kill personnel. The threat considers
toxins to be chemical agents. The agents covered by biological treaties are
bacteriological agents.
15. Effects. Mild exposures to biological agents can severely degrade performance.
Many of the classical diseases have delayed effects, whereas the effects of most toxins
are immediate. Toxins can create area contamination as well as downwind and vertical
vapor hazards. Medical personnel, especially flight surgeons, must constantly monitor
aviation personnel to detect unusual symptoms that may indicate exposure to a biological
agent.
16. Protection. Commanders must be prepared to protect against biological agents
used by an enemy. Immunization is available for many of these agents to help protect
personnel against these diseases. Biological agent detectors are currently under
development and should be considered for deployment around static installations such as
helicopter assembly areas. In all cases personnel should be aware of the potential hazards
and maintain high levels of hygiene and sanitation to avoid spreading some of the agents.
Equipment, stores and supplies should be covered whenever possible to prevent
contamination. The squadron NBC officer must be trained on counter measures and kept
up to date on the threat in the AO.

CHEMICAL WARFARE
17. Most countries classify chemical agents in six major types: nerve, blood, blister,
choking, psychochemical, and irritant. In a nuclear war, chemicals may be used to
complement nuclear weapons. Normally, chemicals would be employed after a nuclear
strike when protective equipment has been damaged and personnel are physiologically
weak. A combination of agents can be used to complicate medical treatment and
compound the effects of individual chemical agents. Chemicals do not require pinpoint
targeting because of the potential for contaminating a wide area downwind of the attack.

18. Nerve Agents.

a. Effects. Even extremely low dosages of nerve agents can disable
personnel. The dosages can degrade the ability of aircrew to operate
helicopters and ground personnel to support aviation operations. Nerve
agents severely disable personnel in any occupation requiring dexterity
and high mental function. Nerve agent exposure is cumulative, so
repeated exposure to low dosages result in a cumulative increase in
personnel disabilities;

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b. Types. Nerve agents are lethal in either vapour or liquid form and they
can be employed as nonpersistent or persistent agents. They cause
casualties through any portal of entry: respiratory tract, skin, eyes, or
mouth. (They usually are ingested by mouth with contaminated food or
water.) After aircrew have flown into a vapour cloud, within two breaths,
they can inhale sufficient agents to cause initial convulsive movements of
extremities within 30 seconds. Progressively, one collapses and become
unconscious within one minute and experience flaccid paralysis,
respiratory failure, and die within two to three minutes. When agents are
ingested in contaminated food or water, symptoms may vary or be
delayed;
c. Miosis. Low dosages of a nerve agent also causes miosis. Symptoms of
miosis are pinpointed pupils, blurred vision, and eye pain. The victim
cannot adapt to night vision because the dark adaptation of the rods in the
peripheral portion of the retina is restricted. Miosis may last for hours or
several days. Full recovery may not occur for weeks. Symptoms of
miosis may be evident in the absence of any other nerve agent symptom.
(1) The absence of miosis does not exclude nerve agent poisoning,
especially in cases of ingestion or skin exposure. Miosis may
occur almost immediately after exposure, or it can be delayed 30
minutes or longer after a mild exposure. Recovery time depends
on individual reactions. Near vision, night adaptation, far vision,
and accommodation will slowly return to normal in varying
degrees,
(2) During bright daylight, the only effect of miosis on vision may be
dimness of vision. During periods of low visibility and at night,
dusk, and dawn, the impact of miosis may be significant. Aircrew
may not be able to fly, and
(3) The impact of miosis on personnel is not limited to aircrews.
Ground support personnel in air traffic services and AD units and
C2 facilities are also affected by miosis. This degradation of
support capability affects all aviation missions; and
d. Antidotes. The CF nerve agent antidote is an atropine autoinjector.
(1) Effect. The anti-nerve agent injection keeps the victim alive.
Nerve agents are powerful and require powerful antidotes to
counter their effects. Antidotes must not be used on a person
unless actually exposed to a nerve agent. However, some
personnel may panic during the initial encounter of chemical
warfare on the battlefield. Many symptoms of other chemical
agents, especially toxins, overlap nerve agent symptoms.
Therefore, personnel may misdiagnose the symptoms, and

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(2) The effects of atropine on aircrew are being studied. Serious side
effects may impact on a person's fitness for flying duty. When an
adequate dose of atropine is injected for lifesaving measures,
dryness of the mouth is a side effect. This side effect also occurs
even if no agent is present in the body and atropine is injected.
Three autoinjections may cause hallucinations. One autoinjection
probably will not seriously degrade an aircrew's ability to function.
Some side effects of atropine are denial of illness, loss of insight,
and loss of consciousness. Other symptoms include perceptual
difficulty, judgment and memory impairment, confusion, short
attention span, slurred speech, and restlessness. These reactions
are also similar to the symptoms experienced from incapacitating
agents such as psychochemicals, cocaine, and cannabis.
19. Protection. Even a mild exposure to agents may be fatal to aircrew, because
aircraft control may be lost. Also, the long-term, systemic effects of agents and
treatments can degrade performance, causing aircrews to be grounded. Flight Surgeons
must carefully monitor aircrew for symptoms of exposure to agents and advise the
commander. When personnel are not wearing NBC IPE and exposure to agents is
suspected, they may be temporarily grounded and observed for symptoms. However, in
the absence of actual symptoms, the tactical situation may preclude preventive
grounding.

NBC DEFENCE
20. Contamination Avoidance. Contamination avoidance, the first fundamental of
NBC defence, means taking the appropriate action to reduce all NBC hazards. The term
avoidance does not necessarily mean aborting a mission or cancelling an operation just
because contamination is present. Personnel go into hazardous areas only when
necessary. Brigades use the NBC warning and reporting system in addition to
reconnaissance, monitoring, and survey to help locate contaminated areas.
a. Contamination Transfer.
(1) All personnel should understand how they and their equipment
become contaminated and how contamination spreads to other
personnel and equipment. Contamination refers to the deposit or
absorption of hazards. A unit may be the target of a threat NBC
attack, or the downwind hazard from a contaminated unit may
cause agents to drift into another unit's area. Also, a unit may
move or fly into contaminated areas from which helicopters can
transport contaminated equipment or personnel; and
(2) Helicopters can transfer contamination from the ground into the
helicopter or vice versa. This transfer occurs when the rotor wash
picks up dust, sand, leaves, or other contaminated debris. The
debris or liquid droplets are then scattered throughout the
helicopter. Some agents are like a fine spray. Although suspended

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in the air, they can settle on personnel or equipment like dew.

Helicopter vibrations increase the settling of agents in remote areas
of the airframe such as panel points or rivets. Also, the type of
paint on the helicopter affects contamination. Alkyd based paints
absorb the agents like sponges. Newer paints are being developed,
such as agent-resistant coatings, that resist chemical agent
absorption; and
b. Limiting the Spread of Contaminants:
(1) When operating in a contaminated area, all personnel must take
steps to limit further exposure to the hazard. Aviation assets can
often find clear routes through a contaminated area so that
exposure to NBC hazards is reduced. If movement is not possible,
the unit must employ individual and collective protection measures
to prevent casualties. Almost any shelter that protects from the
weather also protects somewhat from fallout and liquid chemical
agents,
(2) Personnel can cover ground equipment in the FARP and rear areas
to avoid direct contact with contaminants and then discard the
covers to operate the equipment. Examples of covers are
tarpaulins, plastic bags, and cardboard boxes. If possible,
personnel should keep equipment in original containers; for
example, ammunition cans. Personnel can also place equipment in
covered vehicles or shelters and operate it from these locations.
These measures decrease the amount of contamination transfer and
may reduce the need for decontamination,
(3) A plastic curtain can be fastened with tape between the cabin area
and the cockpit when carrying contaminated personnel or
casualties to limit contamination transfer,
(4) Areas that provide natural cover should be used for sqn locations.
Aircrew can park helicopters near buildings in urban areas for
limited protection. If assault or medium helicopter units pick up or
deliver troops in contaminated LZs, aircrew must ensure that
doors, vents, and windows are closed to reduce contamination
transfer, and
(5) Placing a cover on the floor of the cargo area also helps reduce the
amount of contamination transfer to the interior of the helicopter.
Plastic covers, tarpaulins, paper, cardboard, clothing, or even
leaves can aid in limiting contamination transfer. However, covers
must be secured so that they do not present a FOD hazard. When
flying out of contaminated areas and into clean areas, aircrew
should open all doors and windows. About 20 minutes of flight

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rids the helicopter of accumulated vapour hazards, but liquid

contaminants remain a hazard, and
c. Avoiding Contaminants. The best way that aircrew can keep their
helicopter free from contamination is to avoid flying into contaminated
areas. However, aircrew have no onboard means of determining which
areas are contaminated. Therefore, they may be unable to avoid
contaminated areas. Contamination avoidance also applies to ground
support locations such as FARPs.
21. Protective Measures. Protection, the second NBC defence fundamental, is both
individual and collective. When the unit cannot avoid contamination, or is under direct
attack, personnel must take appropriate actions to survive. Specific actions are taken
before, during, and after an attack. To sustain operations in an NBC environment, unit
personnel must understand and practice individual and collective protection. Individual
protection involves those measures everyone must make to survive. These include acting
immediately upon observing a nuclear detonation, donning NBC Individual Protective
Equipment (IPE), and wearing other protective equipment and devices. Collective
protection provides a contamination-free working environment for selected personnel and
precludes the continuous wear of IPE.
a. Individual Protective Equipment:
(1) General. Personnel are issued IPE to protect themselves from a
chemical or biological hazard. IPE consists of the CB protective
mask, hood, overgarment, overboots, protective gloves, individual
decontamination kit, detection equipment, and antidotes,
(2) NBC Protective Flight Suits. All aircrew are issued NBC flight
suits when an NBC threat exists. These suits are charcoal
impregnated to protect against chemical agents,
(3) Aviation Life Support Equipment. All aircrew will be issued an
aircrew NBC suit, aircrew chemical protective gloves and
chemical protective overshoes in the correct sizes. Personnel
should ensure that they have the correct glove size so their tactile
sensitivity is not degraded,
(4) AC4 Mask. The aircrew AC4 NBC mask is a derivative of the CF
NBC mask, the C4. It has been modified with a different
suspension system and a microphone. The AC4 mask and blower
assembly provides a positive over pressure during the breathing
cycle. The AC4 hood provides chemical protection and a
comfortable fit under the helmet, and
(5) Overboots. Overboots make pedal control more difficult, but this
can be alleviated through training, and

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b. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP). Commanders select a

level of protection based on the chemical or biological threat, temperature,
work rate, and mission. The levels of protection are MOPP zero through
MOPP 4. Aircrew fly in NBC IPE at one MOPP level higher than the
current army threat level. Some of the reasons for this are as follows:
(1) personnel cannot detect agents with their senses,
(2) agent clouds travel vertically as well as horizontally,
(3) aircrew exposed to CB agents may be grounded for an extended
period,
(4) helicopters are not equipped with advanced warning or detection
devices,
(5) it is not practical to don CB equipment, including the mask, during
flight,
(6) aircrew exposed to sublethal dosages of CB agents during flight
may lose control of the helicopter and crash, and
(7) rotor wash may transfer droplets or contaminated dust inside the
cockpit, creating a skin contact hazard.

HELICOPTER DECONTAMINATION
22. General. There are three levels of decontamination: immediate, operational and
thorough. Decontamination procedures can be found in B-GA-442-001/FP-001, Tactical
Aviation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Chapter 13.

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION
23. Collective protection (COLPRO) is the process whereby protection from the
hazards of NBC contamination is provided collectively to a group of individuals, thereby
freeing them from the requirement to wear IPE. COLPRO facilities are required to
permit certain key facilities and organizations to perform their jobs; individuals who
cannot normally carry out their responsibilities if wearing the IPE, or individuals who
require relief from extended wearing of the IPE. There are three categories of COLPRO:
a. Fixed. These are fixed, static locations and normally consist of hardened
shelters and HQ buildings;
b. Mobile. Mobile COLPRO systems usually consist of vehicle or ship
installed/mounted installations; and
c. Transportable. Transportable COLPRO refers to systems that are usually
based on tentage-like equipment that is readily transportable by airlift.
They can also be a liner system that can be erected using a building or
other structure such as a sea container for its support.

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24. COLPRO generally provides a Toxic Free Area (TFA) for working or relaxation
through a combination of NBC filtration and an over pressurization system within the
facility itself. COLPRO is provided in two configurations:
a. Basic COLPRO. Basic COLPRO consists of a TFA. This type provides
the toxic free environment; however, it does not permit any openings to be
breached; therefore, no entry or exit can take place when contamination is
present; and
b. COLPRO with a Contamination Control Area. This COLPRO
incorporates a Contamination Control Area (CCA) along with the TFA.
The CCA allows for entry and exit when contamination is present. The
CCA consists of a Liquid Hazard Area (LHA), a vapour hazard area
(VHA) and an airlock that connects it to the TFA. This system ensures the
integrity of the TFA by allowing potentially contaminated air in the airlock
to be purged by clean air from the TFA out through the VHA and LHA
prior to someone entering the TFA.
25. As of the publication date, the CF has not purchased COLPRO, but is intending
to. As well, other coalition countries do have COLPRO equipment. Design criteria for
transportable COLPRO is provided in STANAG 4192. The size of the various areas of
the COLPRO vary depending on the size of the structure within which it is erected. As a
general guide, the following diagram (Figure 15-1) provides a standard layout and shows
the airflow required:

TFA
A ir F lo w A ir F lo w

A ir
L o ck
Air Flow

( o n ly o n e
door can be
C le a n D ir ty L in e
open)
LHA
A ir F lo w
A
ir
VHA Fl
ow

Figure 15-1. Example of a COLPRO Layout

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CHAPTER 16
COUNTER-MOBILITY OPERATIONS

GENERAL
1. The main method for aviation to stop or affect the mobility of vehicles on the
ground is through the deployment of scatterable mines. Canadian policy is not to use
anti-personnel mines.
AERIAL MINE LAYING
2. Aerial delivered anti-tank mines can support tactical operations by emplacing
tactical minefields, reinforcing existing obstacles, closing lanes, gaps, and defiles
protecting flanks and denying the enemy AD sites. An aerial delivered anti-tank
minefield can also be employed for flank protection of advancing forces and for
operating in concert with units performing screen and guard missions. The CH 146 does
not have a minelaying mission kit. Some coalition countries have this helicopter mission
kit capability.

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CHAPTER 17
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE

GENERAL
1. Maintaining command, control, and communications is important to any
operation. Land force unit communications may be restricted for a variety of reasons.
Helicopters can provide communication enhancement through airborne radio rebroadcast
(RRB) or radio relay. Helicopters can also provide service dispatch to deliver plans,
messages and documents that cannot be delivered by other means. Communications
support tasks may also include any activity, which may be executed by signals personnel
operating from a helicopter platform.

RADIO REBROADCAST
2. Radio rebroadcast (RRB) is the retransmission of a radio signal from one ground
station, on one helicopter radio, through a second onboard radio, to another ground
station, on another frequency. In order for RRB to function, the helicopter must be
equipped with two similar radios, each with an RRB feature. When setting up an RRB,
the helicopter crew establishes contact with each ground unit on the two separate onboard
radios, operating on two different frequencies. Once contact is made, the crew then
switches both radio sets to the “RRB” function and advises the two ground stations that
the RRB net is operating. This capability allows two ground stations, out of line of sight,
to communicate over long distances, through the helicopter. Once the relay is set up, it
will continue to operate until the crew turns it off, or the helicopter no longer is in line of
sight of both stations. The helicopter crew can monitor the conversation, but there is no
requirement to do so.

RADIO RELAY
3. Radio relay is very different from an RRB and any helicopter is capable of
conducting this mission, as long as the helicopter has communications with both ground
stations. Radio relay simply involves relaying the information sent from one station
through one of the helicopter crew, who simply repeats the verbal message “through me”
to the receiving station. For example, if G29 wanted to pass the message “your location
in figures 30” to G19, the helicopter pilot would say “G19, this is H13A, through me,
from G29, your location in figures 30. Over”. This message could be received on one
radio on one frequency and relayed on another radio on another frequency or it could all
be done on the same radio, on the same frequency. Radio relay can be requested from
either ground station. A helicopter crew that can hear both stations trying to contact each
other could also volunteer to relay the information. Radio relay can also be useful for
internal squadron communications where helicopters operating in the forward areas can
relay information through helicopters in the BSA to squadron operations.

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AERIAL SERVICE DISPATCH

4. The electronic transmission of messages and documents may not be possible
because of munitions employment or enemy jamming operations. Helicopters can be
used to deliver messages and documents in these cases or when radio listening silence is
imposed or equipment is inoperable. Messages include combat plans and orders, written
coordination and control measures, and graphics. Documents delivered include critical
reports or reports essential for sustaining combat operations.

AERIAL AND AIRBORNE COMMAND POSTS

5. Aerial and Airborne Command Posts are similar in scope and function to that of a
ground based CP. An aerial CP is a helicopter equipped with the necessary comms,
personnel and publications to carry on the functions of the helicopter unit’s CP, either
while the CP is moving, or when the CO wants an aerial CP. A similarly configured
helicopter can be used to provide an airborne command post for army commanders. This
type of command post is not intended to replace a ground unit’s CP, but instead to
augment the unit’s CP by providing the ground commander with a mobile CP when
required for manoeuvre operations.
6. Airborne command posts have not been used to any extent in Canada. The
CH135 had a command post mission kit consisting mainly of a radio console for army
commanders to utilize, but it was neither a high tech nor a high fidelity system.
Command posts have been used much more extensively in the US Army. Airborne
command posts are currently available in the UH 60, Blackhawk. Their use is detailed as
follows:
a. Utilization. Blackhawks can be configured with a command and control
console to provide manoeuvre commanders with an aerial C2 platform.
These helicopters will be placed under the OPCON of the manoeuvre
commander. Airborne command post helicopters can fly missions in
support of the division command group, ground brigade commanders, or
attack helicopter battalion commanders. Using an airborne command post,
the commander enjoys maximum mobility without sacrificing access to
information and without jeopardizing continuity of operations due to CP
relocation; and
b. Communications. The UH 60 C2 helicopter contains a command console
and a map board that can function as an airborne or ground CP, providing
communications in both secure and nonsecure modes. The helicopter
provides the using commander with:
(1) VHF/AM or FM secure communications;
(2) FM frequency hopping/secure communications;
(3) HF secure with Have Quick I and II communications;
(4) SATCOM; and
(5) HF non-secure communications.

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CHAPTER 18

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF NATO HELICOPTERS

Aircraft Type Category Pax Payload (kg)/Range (km) (Note 4) Weapons Normal LP Size Fuel Maximum
(Note 2) (Note Cruise (Note 5) Usage Usable
3) Speed Rate fuel
(kts) (ltrs/hr) (ltrs)
Radius of Action Radius of Action 120 Internal Payload at
50 km km Max Range
Internal U'slung Internal U'slung Internal Max
Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Range
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
BELGIUM
A 109 BA Armed 0 585 - 475 - 150 360 6 TOW 120 3 275 725

A 109 BA Recce/ 6 585 - 475 - 150 360 - 130 3 275 725

Liaison
ALOUETTE II 318C Recce/ 3 400 250 280 250 160 320 - 90 3 140 565
Utility
ALOUETTE III Utility 5 400 300 330 300 200 225 - 90 3 200 560
316O
CANADA
CH 146 Griffon Utility 8 1,500 1,500 1,450 1300 900 550 2 X 7.62 Machine 120 2 425 1,000
Guns
DENMARK
CAYUSE OH-6 Recce 3 360 200 300 200 240 550 - 100 1 100 227
FENNEC AS 550 Armed - - - - - - - 4 TOW 100 2 175 540
FRANCE
ALOUETTE II 313 Utility 2 300 350 160 160 80 400 - 5 3 170 565
ALOUETTE II 318 Utility 2 300 400 200 250 130 640 - 90 3 140 565
ALOUETTE III 316 Utility 5 300 650 300 550 360 500 - 100 3 200 560
COUGAR Transport 18/24 3,200 3,200 2,900 2,900 1,900 750 - 145 3 600 1,980
DAUPHIN Utility 7 900 0 750 0 200 730 - 145 3 380 1,125
FENNEC AS 55UN Utility 5 630 630 500 500 50 750 20 mm Cannon 120 3 230 730
(Air Force version)
FENNEC AS 355 Armed - - - - - - - 20 mm * * * *
Cannon
GAZELLE 341C Armed/ - - - - - - - 20 mm Cannon 120 3 170 530
Recce
GAZELLE 342M Utility 3 400 - 300 - 100 650 - 120 3 180 530
GAZELLE 342 M1 Armed - - - - - - - 4 HOT day/night * * * *
GAZELLE 342 ML1 Armed - - - - - - - 4 HOT or 130 3 180 530
4 MISTRAL
LYNX MK IV Armed - - - - - - - * 120 3 380 950
PANTHER Armed - - - - - - - * 135 3 380 1,125
PUMA 8a Transport 12/16 2,100 2,100 1,800 1,800 1,250 450 - 130 3 600 1,565
SUPER FRELON Transport 27 2,100 2,900 1,600 2,450 1,100 480 - 120 3 1,000 3,500

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Aircraft Type Category Pax Payload (kg)/Range (km) (Note 4) Weapons Normal LP Size Fuel Maximum
(Note 2) (Note Cruise (Note 5) Usage Usable
3) Speed Rate fuel
(kts) (ltrs/hr) (ltrs)
Radius of Action Radius of Action 120 Internal Payload at
50 km km Max Range
Internal U'slung Internal U'slung Internal Max
Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Range
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
GERMANY
CH-53 G Transport 36 6,500 6,500 6,000 6,000 5,500 360 - 120 4 1,200 2,230
UH-1D Utility 4-9 1,210 1,210 1,000 1,000 800 350 - 90 3 300 780
BO 105 M Recce/ 4 660 - 550 - 350 425 - 110 3 220 550
Liaison
BO 105 P Armed - - - - - - 320 6 HOT 100 3 240 500
GREECE
CH-47 Transport 44 12,690 12,690 12,690 12,690 - - * 120 3 2,700 5,083
OH-58 Utility 5 499 544 499 544 - - * 90 1 95 270
UH-1H Utility 11 2,041 1,814 2,041 1,814 - - * 90 2 362 791
ITALY
A 109 T/A (EOA 1) Recce/ 5 500 - 450 - 200 430 - 125 1 230 703
Liaison
A 109 T/B (EOA 2) Armed - - - - - - - Rockets 125 1 230 530
70 mm
- 8 TOW
A 129 Attack - - - - - Rockets 81 mm 125 1 360 900
AB 205 Utility 13 1,599 1,594 1,368 1,341 1,208 340 MG + Rockets 80 2 318 830
AB 206 Recce 2 316 396 238 318 171 326 Minigun 7.62 80 1 110 291
AB 212 Utility 13 1,513 1,482 1,249 1,232 1,091 303 MG + Rockets 80 2 318 768
AB 412 Utility 13 1,600 1,400 1,380 1,183 1,260 360 MG + Rockets 80 2 303 783
CH 47C Transport 38 9,300 8,700 8,500 7,500 7,500 450 MG 7.62 mm 90 3 1,300 3,960

NETHERLANDS
ALOUETTE III Utility 5 * * * * * * - 100 3 200 560
APACHE NAH-64D Attack 30mm Gun 100 2 478 1900
2.75 FFAR
AGM
BO-205CB/CB4 Utility 3 300/300 0/400 300/300 0/300 300/300 0/200 - 120 5 250 568
CHINOOK CH-47D Transport 33 10,500 9,000 * * * * - 120 3 1,000 3,558
COUGAR AS 532 Transport 28 4,500 3,000 4,000 3,000 3,500 3,000 - 130 3 500 1,950
U2
NORWAY
BELL 412 SP SAR 11 1000 600 500 - 120 1 400 1,216
PORTUGAL
ALOUETTE III Utility 5 400 300 * * * * 12 x 2.75" Rocket 90 2 210 550
S316O or 1 x 20 mm
Cannon
PUMA SA 330 Transport 18 2,400 2,100 * * * * - 120 3 660 2,250
Support

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Aircraft Type Category Pax Payload (kg)/Range (km) (Note 4) Weapons Normal LP Size Fuel Maximum
(Note 2) (Note Cruise (Note 5) Usage Usable
3) Speed Rate fuel
(kts) (ltrs/hr) (ltrs)
Radius of Action Radius of Action 120 Internal Payload at
50 km km Max Range
Internal U'slung Internal U'slung Internal Max
Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Range
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
SPAIN
B0-105 (HR-15) Recce 3 660 - * * * * 20 mm GUN 100 1 210 580
B0-105 (HR-15) Armed - - - * * * * 6 HOT 100 1 210 580
CHINOOK CH-47C Transport 33 9,000 9,000 * * * * - 120 6 1,300 3,885
(HT-17)
CHINOOK CH-47D Transport 33 9,000 9,000 * * * * - 120 5 1,300 3,885
(HT-17)
IROQUOIS UH-1H Utility 10 1,100 1,800 * * * * 40 mm M94 90 2 313 800
(HU-10) 2.75" M-20D
7.62 mm GUN
12.70 mm GUN
IROQUOIS UH-1N Utility 12 1,500 2,270 * * * * 90 2 340 800
(HU-18)
KIOWA CH-58A Recce 3 432 - * * * * 7.62 mm MG 90 1 85 240
(HR-12)

SUPER PUMA Transport 22 3,000 3,000 * * * * - 120 3 530 1,460

(HT-21)
TURKEY
AGUSTA BELL Utility 8 1,206 * * * * * 7.62 mm 80 2 - -
AB-204 MG-3
AGUSTA BELL Utility 11 1,542 * * * * * 7.62 mm 90 2 318 791
AB-205 MG-3
AGUSTA BELL Utility 12 1,650 2,270 * * * * - 130 2 583 1,458
AB-212
BLACK-HAWK Utility 14 3,674 3,629 * * * * - 145 2 560 1,370
UH-60
COBRA AH-1P Attack - - - - - - - 10 mm GUN 123 2 318 791
2.75" RP TOW
COUGAR AS-532 Utility 18-24 4,500 * * * * * - 139 3 600 1,980
IROQUOIS UH-1H Utility 11 1,542 -* * * * * 7.62 mm 90 2 318 791
MG-3
KIOWA B/C OH-58 Recce 2 408 - - - - - 7.62 mm MG 90 1 115 344
SUPERCOBRA Attack - - - - - - - 20 mm GUN 151 2 525 786
AH-1W 2.75" RP TOW,
Hellfire

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Aircraft Type Category Pax Payload (kg)/Range (km) (Note 4) Weapons Normal LP Size Fuel Maximum
(Note 2) (Note Cruise (Note 5) Usage Usable
3) Speed Rate fuel
(kts) (ltrs/hr) (ltrs)
Radius of Action Radius of Action 120 Internal Payload at
50 km km Max Range
Internal U'slung Internal U'slung Internal Max
Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Range
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
UNITED KINGDOM
CHINOOK HC Mk Transport 30-54 9,200 9,200 8,500 8,000 7,200 400 7.62 mm MG 135 5 1539 3718
2 7.62 mm Minigun
PUMA HC Mk 1 Transport 12-16 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,800 1,300 320 7.62 mm MG 130 3 690 1312
SEA KING Mk 4 Transport 20-27 2,720 2,472 2,350 2,350 0 1,016 - 100 5 675 3,750
LYNX AH Mk 7 Utility 9 1,020 940 680 680 450 550 7.62 mm MG 120 1 380 950
LYNX AH Mk 7 Armed - missile off - - - - 8 TOW 120 1 450 950
540 460 440 440 190 490
LYNX AH Mk 9 Utility 9 1,100 1,100 910 910 700 500 7.62 mm MG 145 1 550 950
GAZELLE AH 1 Recce - 280 215 200 135 200 510 - 130 1 190 440
GAZELLE AH 1 Liaison 1-3 305 240 225 160 225 530 - 130 1 190 440
UNITED STATES
OH-6 CAYUSE Recce 3 454 - * * * * - 90 1 83 231
OH-58C KIOWA Recce 3 408 - * * * * - 90 1 102 270
OH-58D KIOWA Recce - - - * * * * .50" MG 90 1 155 424
70 mm RP
HELLFIRE
STINGER
UH-1H IROQUOIS Utility 11 1,542 1,542 * * * * 7.62 mm MG 90 2 318 791
UH-60 Utility 14 3,674 3,629 * * * * 7.62 mm MG 120 2 560 1370
BLACKHAWK
CH-47C CHINOOK Transport 33 10,206 9,072 * * * * 7.62 mm MG 120 3 1,769 4,321
CH-47D CHINOOK Transport 33 10,886 9,072 * * * * 7.62 mm MG 120 3 1,515 3,916
AH-1F COBRA Attack - 1,088 - * - * - 20 mm Gun 120 2 370 985
2.75” RP
TOW
AH-64 APACHE Attack - - 2,700 - * - * 30 mm Cannon 140 2 478 1,400
70 mm RP
HELLFIRE
AH-1T SEA Attack - 1,365 1,365 * * * * 2.75” FFAR 140 2 466 1,223
COBRA 5” ZUNI
20 mm, TOW
SIDEWINDER
SIDEARM
AH-1W SUPER Attack - 1,814 1,814 * * * * 2.75” FFAR 140 2 525 1,165
SEA COBRA 5” ZUNI
20 mm, TOW
HELLFIRE
SIDEWINDER
SIDEARM

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Aircraft Type Category Pax Payload (kg)/Range (km) (Note 4) Weapons Normal LP Size Fuel Maximum
(Note 2) (Note Cruise (Note 5) Usage Usable
3) Speed Rate fuel
(kts) (ltrs/hr) (ltrs)
Radius of Action Radius of Action 120 Internal Payload at
50 km km Max Range
Internal U'slung Internal U'slung Internal Max
Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Range
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
UNITED STATES (Cont)
UN-1N HUEY Utility 8 907 907 * * * * 2 x .50Cal 110 2 350 786
Note M-60 MG
6 2.75FFAR
GAU 17
CH-46E SEA Transport 15 2,268 2,268 * * * * 2 x .50Cal 120 3 700 1,398
KNIGHT Note (2.7mm)
6
CH-53A Transport 30 6,305 6,305 * * * * 2 x .50Cal 130 4 1,050 2,414
SEA STALLION Note (2.7mm)
6
CH-53 D SEA Transport 30 5,715 5,725 * * * * 2 x .50Cal 130 4 1,165 6,987
STALLION Note (12.7mm)
6
CH-53E SUPER Transport 30 12,474 12,474 * * * * 2 x .50Cal 130 4 1,805 9,051
SEA STALLION Note (12.7mm)
6

NOTES:

(1) Units of measurement - kilograms (kg), kilometres (km), nautical miles per hour (kts), litres (ltrs).
(2) Aircraft Category - see Glossary.
(3) Number of passengers depends on aircraft configuration.
(4) Internal Fuel Tanks, Sea Level ISA conditions (USL configuration may influence radius of action).
(5) LP size - see Chapter 11.
(6) Combat loaded troops.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A AA Assembly Area
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAR After Action Report
AAAD All Arms Air Defence
AAH Anti-Armour Helicopter
AAM Air to Air Missile
ABCCC Airborne Command, Control and Communications
ABCA America, Britain, Canada and Australia
ABDR Aircraft Battle Damage Repair
AC Aircraft Captain/Aircraft Commander
ac Aircraft
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACC Air Component Commander
ACL Allowable Cabin/Cargo Load
ACM Airspace Control Measures
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Air Control Point
ACS Airspace Control System
AD Air Defence
ADC Air Defence Commander
ADA Air Defence Artillery
ADTB Army Doctrine Tactics Board
AFC Airmobile Force Commander
AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AGM Air to Ground Missile
AGL Above Ground Level
AH Attack Helicopter
AI Area of Interest
ALO Air Liaison Officer
AMC Aviation Mission Commander
AMO Aircraft Maintenance Organization
AMS Avionics Management System
AMSE Aircraft Maintenance Support Equipment
AMSFOR Airmobile Security Forces
AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
AO Area of Operations
AOP Air Observation Post
AOC Area Operations Centre
AOCC Air Operations Coordination Centre
ARH Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
ASAP As Soon As Possible
ASE Aircraft Survivability Equipment
ASOC Air Support Operations Centre
ASC Airspace Control

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ASRAAM Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile

AT Anti-Tank
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
ATO Air Tasking Order
AUC Aviation Unit Commander
AUW All-Up Weight
AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System

B BC Battery Captain
BDR Battle Damage Repair
BDZ Base Defence Zone
BP Battle Position
BSA Brigade Support Area

C C2 Command and Control

CAS Close Air Support
CATO Concealed Approach and Take Off
CEOI Communications Electronic Operating Instructions
CFSA Corps Forward Support Area
CL Coordination Level
CLA Creeping Line Ahead
C&L Command and Liaison
CMDS Counter Measures Dispensing System
CO Commanding Officer
COMD Commander
COMJAM Communications Jamming
COMSEC Communications Security
COOP Customer On-Line Ordering Process
COPPED Cover, Obstacles, Position of fire, Position of observation,
Enemy, Distance
COSCOM Corps Support Command
CP Command Post
CRAS Contingency Response Aircraft Spares
CRK Contingency Response Kit
CRSA Corps Rear Support Area
CS Close Support
C/S Call Sign
CSA Corps Support Area
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSS Combat Service Support
C2 Command and Control
C3 Command, Control & Communications

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D D/AMC Deputy Aviation Mission Commander

DC Dangerous Cargo
DCO Deputy Commanding Officer
DEWS Defensive Early Warning Suite
DF Direction Finding
DISGP Division Service Group
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DP Decision Point
DS Direct Support
DSA Divisional Support Area
DTC Data Transfer Cartridge
DTG Date Time Group

E EA Engagement Area
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter Measures
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter
EMCON Emission Control
EO Electro-Optical
EP Electronic Protection
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Rescue Beacon
EPM Electronic Protection Measures
ERSTA Electro-optical Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition
ES Electronic Support
ESM Electronic Support Measures
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
EW Electronic Warfare
EWO Electronic Warfare Officer

F FAA Forward Assembly Area

FAADS Forward Area Air Defence System
FAC Forward Air Controller
FARE Forward Area Refuelling Equipment
FARP Forward Arming and Refuelling Point
FC Fire Coordinator
FCO Fire Control Order
FCM Fire Control Measures
FE Flight Engineer
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FFA Free Fire Area
FFE Fire For Effect
FLET Forward Line Enemy Troops
FLIR Forward Looking Infra-Red
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FOB Forward Operating Base

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FOO Forward Observation Officer

FRAG O Fragmentary Order
FS Fire Support
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Centre
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSE Fire Support Element
FSO Fire Support Officer

G GPS Global Positioning System

GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun
GS General Support

H HA Holding Area
HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HCCR Hot Closed Circuit Refuelling
HELACK Acknowledgement to Helicopter Request Message
HELLSREP Helicopter Landing Site Report
HELQUEST Helicopter Request Message
HELTASK Helicopter Tasking Message
HF High Frequency
HICHS Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System
HIDACZ High Density Airspace Control Zone
HLVW Heavy Logistics Vehicle Wheeled
HLS Helicopter Landing Site
HTH Heavy Transport Helicopter
HUD Head-Up Display
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVQK Have Quick

I IAS Indicated Air Speed

IFF Identification Friend or Foe
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle
IGE In Ground Effect
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IIMC Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMINT Image Intelligence
IO Intelligence Officer
Info Ops Information Operations
IP Initial Point
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IR Infra-Red
IRSS Infra-Red Suppression System
ISB Initial Staging Base
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

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J JAAT Joint Air Attack Team

JC2IS Joint Command and Control Information System
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JSEAD Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
JTF Joint Task Force

K KIAS Knots Indicated Air Speed

L LD Line of Departure
LDO Laser Designator Operator
LEP Light External Pintle
LEPC Light External Pintle Connector
LLAD Low Level Air Defence
LLTR Low Level Transit Route
LO Liaison Officer
LOC Lines of Communications
LOH Light Observation Helicopter
LP Landing Point
LPH Light Pintle Head
LRSU Long Range Surveillance Units
LS Landing Site
LSVW Light Support Vehicle Wheeled
LTL Laser to Target Line
LUC Lifted Unit Commander
LUH Light Utility Helicopter
LZ Landing Zone

M MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence System

MBT Main Battle Tank
MCL Maximum Combat Load
MEZ Missile Engagement Zone
MLH Medium Lift Helicopter
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MLVW Medium Logistics Vehicle Wheeled
MOB Main Operating Base
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MPS Mission Planning Station
MRAAM Medium Range Anti-Armour Missile
MRAAW Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon
MSO Maintenance Support Officer
MSR Main Supply Routes
MTH Medium Transport Helicopter

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N NAI Named Areas of Interest

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NFA No-Fire Area
NFL No-Fire Line
NOCL Notice Of Crash Location
NOE Nap of the Earth
NORDO No Radio
NVD Night Vision Device
NVG(s) Night Vision Goggle(s)

O OGE Out of Ground Effect

OIC Officer In Charge
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OP Observation Post
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
Op O Operations Order
ORS Operational Readiness State

P PGM Precision Guided Munition

PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement
PL Phase Line
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
POC Point(s) of Contact
POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
PSO Peace Support Operations
PUAS Pack Up Aircraft Spares
PUP Pull Up Point
PZ Pick-up Zone

Q QRF Quick Reaction Force

R RAH Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter

RAS Rear Area Security
RCC Rescue Coordination Centre
RFL Restrictive Fire Line
RLWR Radar Laser Warning Receiver
ROA Restricted Operations Area
ROE Rules of Engagement
RON Remain Over Night
ROZ Restricted Operations Zone
RP Replenishment Point
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RRB Relay Rebroadcast Station
RSO Range Safety Officer

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RT Radio Telecommunications
RTB Return To Base
RV Rendezvous
RLWR Radar Laser Warning Receiver

S SA Safety Assistant
SAAFR Standard use Army Aircraft Flight Route
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue
SC Special Corridor
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
SES Special Equipment Shelters
SEV Special Equipment Vehicles
SHORAD Short Range Air Defence
SIC Subject Indicator Code
SIF Selective Identification Feature
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SMM Standard Manoeuvre Manual
SOI Signal Operating Instructions (see also CEOI)
SOP(s) Standard Operating Procedure(s)
SPINS Special Instructions

T TA Target Acquisition
TACAIR Tactical Air Support
TAC CP Tactical Command Post
TACOM Tactical Command
TACON Tactical Control
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
TAI Target Areas of Interest
TAMS Tactical Air Movement Section
TC Transit Corridor
TH Transport Helicopter
TI Thermal Imagery
TMRR Temporary Minimum Risk Route
T/O Take-Off
TO&E Tables of Organization and Equipment
TOW Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-Guided
TR Transit Route
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TUA TOW Under Armour

U UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UH Utility Helicopter
UMS Unit Medical Station
UTTH Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter

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V VNE Velocity Not to Exceed

VTOL Vertical Take Off and Landing

W WCO Weapon(s) Control Order

WCS Weapons Control Status
WFZ Weapons Free Zone
WP White Phosphorus

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GLOSSARY

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC). The timely, efficient movement and

enroute care by medical personnel of wounded and injured personnel from the battlefield
and other locations to medical treatment facilities.

AIRCRAFT CAPTAIN/ AIRCRAFT COMMANDER (AC). The aircrew member

designated by competent authority as being in command of an aircraft and responsible for
its safe operation and accomplishment of the assigned mission. (AAP-6).

AIRMOBILE OPERATION. An operation in which combat forces and their

equipment move about the battlefield in aircraft, normally helicopters, under the control
of a ground force commander, to engage in ground combat. (ADTB).

AIR MOVEMENT. Air transport of units, personnel, supplies and equipment including
airdrops and air landings. (AAP-6).

AIR OBSERVATION POST (AOP). An airborne position from which military

observations are made, or fire directed and adjusted, and which possess appropriate
communications. (AAP-6).

AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTRE (ASOC). An agency of a tactical control

system, collocated with a corps headquarters or an appropriate land headquarters, which
coordinates and directs CAS and other tactical air support.

AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA (ACA). A three-dimensional block of airspace

that provides lateral and altitude separation between aircraft and other fire support assets,
and is established by a brigade or higher.

AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER (ACO). When all airspace requests have been
correlated and conflicts resolved, the Air Component Commander will promulgate the
Airspace Control Order. Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) and procedures are
normally in force for the period of validity of the ACO. (See ATP-40(A)).

ANTI-ARMOUR HELICOPTER (AAH). A helicopter armed primarily for use in the

destruction of armoured targets. Also called ‘anti-tank helicopter’. (AAP-6).

ARMED HELICOPTER. A helicopter fitted with weapons or weapon systems.

(AAP-6).

ASSAULT AIRCRAFT. Powered aircraft, including helicopters, which move assault

troops and cargo into an objective area and which provide for their resupply. (AAP-6).

ATTACK HELICOPTER (AH). A helicopter specifically designed to employ various

weapons to attack and destroy enemy targets. (AAP-6).

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AVIATION. Helicopters and other battlefield aerial vehicles, together with their organic
support, employed in land operations.

CASUALTY EVACUATION (CASEVAC). The movement of casualties to initial

treatment facilities and/or to medical facilities in the combat zone.

CATERPILLAR MOVEMENT. Tactical movement in which the forward element

waits for the rear element to move to its position, before continuing its advance.

CHALK COMMANDER. The commander of all troops embarked under one chalk
number. (AAP-6).

CHALK NUMBER. The number given to a complete load and to the transporting
carrier. (AAP-6). (See also ‘Serial’).

CLOSE FORMATION. Formation spacing normally three to five rotor disc diameters
at night and not less than 5 rotors during the day between a/c in a section and ten rotors
between section leads in an element measured between tip-path planes between a/c.

COMBAT AIRLIFT/ TACTICAL TRANSPORT. The air movement of combat

personnel, supplies and/or cargo over short or medium distances, normally in the brigade
AOR;

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR). A coordinated operation using pre-

established procedures for the detection, location, identification and rescue of downed
aircrew in hostile territory in crisis or wartime.

COMMAND AND LIAISON (C&L). C&L is the rapid transport of commanders, staff,
and liaison officers to save time in battle procedure and to provide commanders with an
aerial perspective of their area of operations.

COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE. The assistance to communications by means of

radio rebroadcast, radio relay, airborne command post or the physical delivery of
operational material by helicopter (aerial dispatch).

CONTOUR FLIGHT. A flight technique designed to take advantage of terrain cover,

while enabling the pilot to maintain en route airspeeds ranging from 60 to 120 KIAS.
Flown at relatively constant altitudes AGL, between 15 and 50 feet, the flight path is
varied to make use of the available ground, obstacles and/or vegetation.

CONTROL. See “Operational Control”, “Tactical Control”.

COORDINATION ALTITUDE. An altitude that separates air operations from aviation

operations, normally expressed in feet, AGL.

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COUNTER-MOBILITY. All actions taken to restrict the capacity of movement of the

opponent.

CREWMAN. A member of the helicopter crew who travels in the cargo/passenger

compartment in certain Helicopters. His duties include taking charge of the chalk troops
from emplaning to deplaning.

DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF FIRE. The airborne adjustment of both indirect

and direct fire. These fires can come from artillery, mortars, naval guns, close air support
aircraft or armed/ attack helicopters.

ELEMENT. A sub-component of a large formation normally comprised of two or more

sections with a designated lead having responsibilities in conjunction with the formation's
operation, but subordinate to the formation leader. Elements should normally be
composed of helicopters with similar capabilities.

EXTENDED FORMATION. Formation spacing normally ten rotors to 1000 metres

between aircraft in a section and 300 to 1000 metres between section leads in an element.

F-HOUR. F-Hour is the time at which the first helicopter crosses the Forward Line of
Own Troops (FLOT) in a cross-FLOT operation.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE (FSCL). A line established by the

appropriate ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his control but
which may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air,
ground or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets.

FORMATION LEADER. The individual given responsibility for the planning and
conduct of the operation of the formation as a whole.

FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER (FAC). A qualified individual, who from a forward

position on the ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air
support of land forces.

FREE FIRE AREA (FFA). A specific, designated area into which any weapons system
may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.

H-HOUR. The specific time at which an operation or exercise commences or is due to

commence. It is also the time at which the Line of Departure is crossed by the leading
elements in an attack.

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HELICOPTER. See Anti-armour Helicopter;

Armed Helicopter;
Assault Aircraft;
Attack Helicopter;
Observation Helicopter;
Reconnaissance Helicopter;
Transport Helicopter; or
Utility Helicopter;

HELI-BORNE OPERATION. An operation in which helicopters act in support of a

formation, unit or organization to accomplish the movement of troops, supplies and/or
equipment.

HELICOPTER LANDING SITE. A site within a landing zone containing one or more
landing points.

HELICOPTER MUTUAL SUPPORT. The support provided by one helicopter for

another helicopter(s) during a mission.

HIGH DENSITY AIRSPACE CONTROL ZONE (HIDACZ). An area of intense

ground operations over which friendly aircraft may be at risk from friendly air defence
weapons. A HIDACZ is requested by a land force commander who then controls all the
air activity within it.

HOISTING. Lowering or raising troops or cargo by means of a winch or hoist under the
control of a helicopter crew member. (Also known as 'Winching' - NATO).

HOOK-UP MAN. The person responsible for attaching the external load and for
controlling the take-up of strain of the load slings.

HOUR. See F-Hour;

H-Hour;
L-Hour; or
Y-Hour.

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE (IFF). A system using electromagnetic

transmissions to which equipment carried by friendly forces automatically responds, for
example, by emitting pulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy forces.
(AAP-6). (See also ‘Selective Identification Feature’).

JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM (JAAT). A coordinated attack involving a combination

of aviation and CAS aircraft, supported by field artillery or naval gunfire.

LANDING LIGHT SYSTEM. Lighting equipment on the ground to assist approach

and landing.

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LANDING POINT. A point within a landing site where one helicopter or vertical take-
off and landing aircraft can land. (AAP-6).

LANDING SITE. A site within a landing zone containing one or more landing points.
(AAP-6).

LANDING ZONE (LZ). Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. (AAP-6).

LEAPFROG MOVEMENT. Tactical movement in which like elements are moved

successively through or by one another along the axis of movement of supported forces.
(STWG).

L-HOUR. In airmobile operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the heliborne
assault wave touches down in the landing zone (LZ).

LOGISTIC TRANSPORT. The aerial transport of defensive stores, commodities and

combat supplies either directly to the user or to delivery points where ground logistic
units can store or deliver them.

LOH. See Observation Helicopter.

LOOSE FORMATION. Normally five to ten rotor disc diameters between aircraft in a
section and 300 metres between section leads in an element measured between tip path
planes between helicopters.

LOW LEVEL FLIGHT. A flight technique that generally conforms to a straight line
and is flown at a constant altitude ASL and constant airspeed, normally in excess of 80
KIAS. Altitude AGL varies from 50 to 250 feet depending upon the variations in terrain
clearance.

LOW LEVEL TRANSIT ROUTE (LLTR). A temporary corridor of defined

dimensions established in the forward area to minimize the risks to friendly aircraft from
friendly air defence or surface forces.

MANOEUVRE. The employment of forces through movement in combination with

speed, firepower or fire potential, to attain a position of advantage in respect to the
enemy.

MARSHALLER. A person who directs the ground movement of aircraft by the use of
hand and arm or light signals.

MEDEVAC. See “AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION”.

MULTI-ROLE HELICOPTER. A Helicopter that is specifically designed to carry out

more than one role.

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NAP OF THE EARTH (NOE) FLIGHT. Flight technique is designed to make the
maximum use of the available terrain masking features. Airspeed varies from
translational to 60 KIAS at 15 feet (AGL). The slower airspeeds enable the pilot to
maintain minimum obstacle clearance while attaining maximum cover from vegetation,
topography and other visual obstructions. This profile may be most appropriate for
operations in close proximity to the enemy, high threat environments, or, on approach
and departures from areas under observation.

NO FIRE AREA (NFA). An area into which no fire or effects are allowed. The two
exceptions are when the establishing headquarters allows fire on a mission by mission
basis or when a friendly force is engaged by an enemy located within the NFA, and the
commander returns fire in self-defence

NO FIRE LINE (NFL). A line short of which artillery or ships do not fire, except on
request or approval of the supported commander, but beyond which they may fire at any
time without danger to friendly troops.

OBSERVATION HELICOPTER (OH). A helicopter used primarily for observation

and reconnaissance but which may be used for other roles. (AAP-6).

OPERATIONAL COMMAND (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to

assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces,
and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.
It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be
used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. (AAP-6).

OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to

direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to
retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign
separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself,
include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6).

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW). An operation during peacetime and

conflict that does not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces

PAYLOAD. The sum of the weight of passengers and cargo that an aircraft can carry.
(AAP-6).

RADIUS OF ACTION. The maximum distance a ship, aircraft, or vehicle can travel
away from its base along a given course with normal combat load and return without
refuelling, allowing for all safety and operating factors. (AAP-6).

RAPID REFUELLING. A means of refueling helicopters with engines running and

rotor(s) running or stopped.

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RAPPELLING. Descent by a rope or tape from a helicopter and controlling such

descent by a friction device applied by a descending individual or by a helicopter crew
member. (Also known as ‘Abseiling’).

READY POSITION. In helicopter operations, a designated place where a helicopter

load of troops and/or equipment waits for pick-up. (AAP-6).

RECONNAISSANCE. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information

by surveillance or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an
enemy.

RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER. A helicopter designed primarily for

reconnaissance operations.

RESTRICTIVE FIRE AREA (RFA). An area with specific restrictions and in which
fire that exceeds those restrictions is not delivered without coordination with the
establishing headquarters.

SECTION. A section normally constitutes two aircraft operating together in formation,

one designated as “lead” and the other as “wingman”. As a sub-component of a larger
formation, the section lead may be given responsibilities or tasks for his section, but
remains subordinate to the formation lead.

SECURITY. The condition achieved when designated information, material, personnel,

activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and
terrorism. (AAP-6).

SELECTIVE IDENTIFICATION FEATURE (SIF). Airborne pulse type transponder

that provides automatic selective identification of aircraft in which it is installed, to
friend-or-foe identification installations, whether ground, shipboard, or airborne.
(AAP-6). (See also ‘Identification Friend or Foe’).

SERIAL. An element or a group of elements within a series which is given a numerical

or alphabetical designation for convenience in planning, scheduling and control (AAP-6).
(See also ‘Chalk Number’).

SNAKE MOVEMENT. A type of caterpillar movement in which both elements are

continuously on the move.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS. An operation conducted outside the normal combat and

OOTW missions and tasks usually associated with tactical helicopter operations.

SPECIAL CORRIDOR (SC). An area established specifically to accomplish the

special routing requirements of specific missions. (ATP-40(B)).

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STANDARD USE ARMY AIRCRAFT FLIGHT ROUTE (SAAFR). A route

established below the coordination altitude to facilitate movement of helicopters in the
forward area in direct support of ground operations. (ATP-40(B)).

SURVEILLANCE. The systematic observation of the battle space by visual, aural,

electronic, photographic or other means to detect, track and report enemy movements,
strengths and avenues of approach.

TACTICAL AIR MOVEMENT SECTION (TAMS). Personnel who are concerned

with organization and control of loading within a pick-up zone/site.

TACTICAL CONTROL (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and
control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
(AAP-6).

TACTICAL REFUELLING. Refuelling during operations normally conducted away

from a fixed facility.
TACTICAL SECURITY. The measures necessary to deny information to the enemy
and to ensure that a force retains its freedom of action and is warned or protected against
an unexpected encounter with the enemy or an attack. (AAP-6).
TACTICAL TRANSPORT. See combat airlift.
TARGET ACQUISITION (TA). The detection, identification and location of a target
in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. (AAP-6).

TERRAIN FLIGHT. Flight close to the earth’s surface during which airspeed, height
and/or altitude are adapted to the contours and cover of the ground in order to avoid
enemy detection and fire. (AAP-6). This includes - low flying, contour flying and Nap of
the Earth (NOE) flying.
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER (TH). A helicopter used primarily for the carriage of
troops and/or equipment. (Also called ‘Cargo Helicopter’, ie. CH 47. See also ‘Utility
Helicopter’) Transport Helicopters are designated according to their maximum all up
weight, as follows:

Light 6-7.99 tonnes;

Medium 8-10.99 tonnes; and

Heavy 11 tonnes and over (AC 225 (Panel X)).

TRANSIT CORRIDOR (TC). A bi-directional corridor in the rear area. (Air traffic
control is not normally provided). (ATP-40(B)).

TRANSIT ROUTE (TR). A temporary, bi-directional corridor of defined dimensions,

established in the forward area to minimize risks to friendly aircraft from friendly Air
Defence. The dimensions are mission specific and the centre line will be defined in the
ACOs by a series of points.

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UTILITY HELICOPTER (UH). A multi-purpose helicopter capable of lifting troops

but may be used in command and control, logistics, casualty evacuation or armed
helicopter role. (AAP-6).

WEAPON(S) CONTROL ORDER (WCO). The order which promulgates the

Weapons Control Status. (See WCS).

WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS (WCS). Weapons control of AD weapons systems

is expressed as a status declared for a particular area and time. It defines the degree of
freedom to be afforded to AD weapon systems. AD weapons systems that are able to
engage targets in volumes of airspace allocated to friendly air activity automatically
adopt a specified restrictive WCS in the appropriate engagement arcs regardless of the
fact that a more permissive WCS might apply to them.

WEAPONS FREE. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby
weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly. (AAP-
6).

WEAPONS HOLD. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby
weapons systems may only be fired in self-defence or in response to a formal order.
(AAP-6).

WEAPONS TIGHT. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby
weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile. (AAP-6).

Y-HOUR. In airmobile operations the time at which the first helicopter in the first wave
departs the Pick-up Point or Pick-up Zone (PZ).

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