Module 1:

I. Preliminaries
a. Remedial Law distinguished from substantive law
 Remedial law is not substantive law.
o Substantive law:

- creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties concerning

life, liberty, or property.
- Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights and duties
regarding life, liberty or property which when violated gives rise
to a cause of action (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
o Remedial Law:
- Does not create rights or obligations
- Remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcing those
rights and obligations created by substantive law
- Remedial law provides a procedural system for obtaining
redress for the invasion of rights and violations of duties and
- Remedial Law prescribes rules as to how suits are filed, tried
and decided by the courts.
- Adjective law, prescribes practice, method and procedure by
which substantive law is enforced and made effective.
b. Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive Application of Rules of Court
NOTE: Rules of Court has reference to the body of rules governing pleading, practice
and procedure promulgated by the SC pursuant to its rule-making powers under the
Constitution. Since Rules are not laws but only has the effect of law, if they are in conflict
with a positive law, the statute shall prevail. The Rules are subordinate to statute.
 NOT GOVERNED BY THE RULES OF COURT (EL-C-NI)
May be applied by analogy or in suppletory character
(a) Election cases
(b) Land registration cases
(c) Cadastral cases
(d) Naturalization cases
(e) Insolvency cases
 PROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF THE RULES OF COURT
1) Since the rules are not penal in nature, they are not to be given
retroactive effect, These laws look forward and not backward, no vested
right is prejudiced.
 2) the rules shall govern cases brought after they take effect and also to
cases that were pending unless the Court finds that the retroactive
application will cause injustice.
 WHEN ARE PROCEDURAL RULES INAPPLICABLE TO PENDING ACTIONS
1) Where a statute itself provides or, by necessary implication, provides that
pending actions are excepted from its operation.
2) If applying the new rule to pending proceedings would impair already
vested rights
3) When its application is not feasible or would work injustice
4) If its application would violate due process, or impair the independence of
the courts
i. In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong,
G.R. No. 150274, 4 August 2006
NOTE: The Rules of Procedure imposed in judicial proceedings are unavailing in
cases before administrative bodies.
o GENERAL RULE: the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot
be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right
may attach to nor arise from them.
o Procedural rules are deemed retroactive because they are construed to
be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Hence, no right could have been vested in them for lack of
judicial decision.
o Facts:
OMB found respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public
documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory
penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987).
The accused filed their appeal on the basis of the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto where appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases should be referred to the appellate court under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
The CA affirmed the ruling. The accused submitted their appeal. While
the same was pending, Secretary Datumanong issued memorandum
addressed to the accused that caused the dismissal of the accused from
service. The Secretary stated that as their was no petition for injunction
nor restraining order that may hinder the order, their dismissal from
service is immediately executory. The accused consequently filed an
instant petition before the SC citing the Secretary in contempt despite his
knowledge of their appeal pending before the CA. the accused, accused
him for abusing his discretion, and for unlawfully intervening with the
Court proceedings.
 o Issue:
Whether or not secretary Datumanong unlawfully interfered with the
proceedings before the Court.
o Held:
No. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 states that all provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and
that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the
penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one
month's salary is final and unappealable. This finds support in the Rules
of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all
other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review
under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27
of R.A. 6770." 
from the facts provided, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is
violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on
appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt
of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and
correction. It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on
March 2, 2000 affirming the dismissal that Secretary Datumanong issued
the memorandum and after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining
order was issued by the Court. It is clear from the above provisions that
the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for
one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence,
immediately executory.
the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as
being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
c. Applicability to pending actions; retroactivity
o GENERAL RULE: the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot
be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right
may attach to nor arise from them.
o Procedural rules are deemed retroactive because they are construed to
be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
 passage. Hence, no right could have been vested in them for lack of
judicial decision.

d. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court

i. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 30

- Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and concurrence.

ii. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)

- the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speed
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

e. Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court (Sarmiento v.

Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471, 5 February 2007)
(1) Reasons that would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (SM-
CLO))
(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances
(b) merits of the case
(c) cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of rules
(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory
(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby
(Sarmiento v. Zaratan, GR 167471, Feb. 5, 2007)
o FACTS:

o ISSUE:
 - Whether or not the RTC was correct in dismissing the appeal of
respondent on the ground that the RTC did not act upon the
motion for extension for lacking the required notice of hearing
o HELD: NO.

- cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all

parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the
ends of justice would be better served.
- technical rules should accede to the demands of substantial justice
because there is no vested right in technicalities. Litigations,
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds
is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very aims. As has been the constant rulings of this
Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from constraints of technicalities. Indeed, rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules
that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice must be avoided.
- The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion
in question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it
merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. There is
no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the
appeal.

(2) To relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure

to comply with the prescribed procedure and the mere invocation
of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel the Court to suspend procedural rules. (Cu-
Unjieng v. CA, 479 SCRA 594)
(3) Where substantial and important issues await resolution.
(Pagbilao, supra)
(4) When transcendental matters of life, liberty or state security are
involved.(Mindanao Savings Loan Asso. V. Vicenta Vda. De
Flores, 469 SCRA 416).
(5) The constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure necessarily carries with it the
power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law
through the amendment of the Rules of Court (Pinga vs. Heirs of
Santiago, GR 170354, June 30, 2006).
 ii. Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010 (POWER OF THE SC
TO SUSPEND THE RULES OF COURT) (The 60-day period to file an appeal from
receipt of ruling is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
 GROUNDS TO SUSPEND STRICT APPLICATION OF RULES OF COURT
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence (F.A.M.E-N) without
appellant's fault (failure of the counsel is so gross that it deprived his client
their day in court);
(10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.

 Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were
established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our
judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business

 FACTS:
 ISSUE:
- Whether or not the CA erred when it did not dismiss the petition for
certiorari despite its late filing (the respondents‘ petition for certiorari was
 filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plando‘s October 13, 2006
receipt of the resolution)
 HELD:
- Yes. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of
the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day
period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
- On the other hand, technical rules should accede to the demands of
substantial justice because there is no vested right in technicalities.
Litigations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and
not on technicality.
- Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and
the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant
rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities.
- Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
- However, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable and meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
- In the present case, the respondents‘petition for certiorari was filed
twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plando‘s October 13, 2006 receipt
of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they
should not suffer for Atty. Plando‘s negligence in failing to inform them of
the resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be
their December 6, 2006 notice. A client is bound by the acts of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Except when the failure of
the counsel is so gross that it deprived his client their day in court.
- notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect
or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment
valid and regular on its face.
iii. Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019 (power of the
sc to suspend rules of court)
DOCTRINE:
1. Under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court was
granted with the following:
 (1) the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights; and
(2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies.
The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
2. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the
Supreme Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the
invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is
not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional altering mechanism designed to enable
the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the
highest law of the land.
 FACTS:
 ISSUE:
o Whether or not the petitioner correctly filed the petition directly to SC
o WHETHER OR NOT THERE EXISTS A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY/
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE PRESENT PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION AT SC
 HELD:
o No. The constitutionality of the bundling project is q question of fact.
Since the SC in not a trier of facts. The SC cannot resolve this issue on
the first instance. It should have first been threshed out in the lower
courts. The alleged special and compelling circumstances were not
proven.
- while the SC has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC
and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary
writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek
resolution of questions of law. It is the primary functions of the
lowers to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance.
- Exceptions to required question of law, may file directly to
SC:
(1) Rule on Writ of Amparo
(2) Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
(3) Rules of procedure for Environmental Cases (kalikasan)
 WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS MAY BE
DISREGARDED
1. not iron-clad rule. The doctrine may be disregarded if warranted by the
nature and importance of the issues raised in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations.
2. Jurisprudence allows direct resort to a higher court in certain cases like
 a. when there are special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petitition
b. when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy
c. when demanded by broader interest of justice
d. when the challenged orders were patent nullities
e. when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called
for and justified the immediate and direct handling by the Court
f. when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time
g. when the issues raised are of transcendental importance
f. Distinctions: Civil Action, Criminal Action, and Special Proceedings
(1)Ordinary civil action is one by which one party sues another, based on a cause of
action, to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong, whereby the
defendant has performed an act or omitted to do an act in violation of the rights of
the plaintiff. (Sec. 3a) The purpose is primarily compensatory.
(2)Special civil action is also one by which one party sues another to enforce or
protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong. purpose of special proceeding is
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact
(3)A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or
omission punishable by law (Sec. 3[b], Rule 1). The purpose is primarily
punishment.
Personal Actions and Real Actions
(1) An action is real when it affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. All other actions are personal actions.
(2) An action is real when it is founded upon the privity of real estate, which means that
the realty or an interest therein is the subject matter of the action. The issues
involved in real actions are title to, ownership, possession, partition, foreclosure of
mortgage or condemnation of real property.
(3) Not every action involving real property is a real action because the realty may only
be incidental to the subject matter of the suit. Example is an action for damages to real
property, while involving realty is a personal action because although it involves real
property, it does not involve any of the issues mentioned.
(4) Real actions are based on the privity of real estates; while personal actions are
based on privity of contracts or for the recovery of sums of money.
(5) The distinction between real action and personal action is important for the purpose
of determining the venue of the action. A real action is “local”, which means that its
venue depends upon the location of the property involved in the litigation. A personal
action is “transitory”, which means that its venue depends upon the residence of the
plaintiff or the defendant at the option of the plaintiff.
II. General Principles
b. Nature and classification of Philippine Courts
Nature of Philippine Courts
- Philippine courts are both courts of law and equity. Hence, both legal and equitable
jurisdiction is dispensed with in the same tribunal. (US v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321)
- When the court relaxes the strict application of the rules where strong considerations
of justice are manifest, the court exercised its equity jurisdiction. Equity however only
applied when there is no specific law governing the issue.
- Classification of Philippine Courts
(1) Regular courts engaged in the administration of justice are organized into four (4)
levels:
(a)First Level (MTCs, MeTCs, MCTCs) – which try and decide
(1)criminal actions involving violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction and offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, and
(2)civil actions including ejectment, recovery of personal property with a
value of not more than P300,000 outside MM or does not exceed
P400,000 in MM;
(b)Second Level (RTCs, Family Courts) – courts of general jurisdiction; among
the civil actions assigned to them by law are those in which the subject of
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, or involving title to or possession
of real property where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000
outside MM or exceeds P50,000 in MM, except actions for ejectment (forcible
entry and unlawful detainer), or where the demand exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost, or
the value of the personal property or controversy exceeds P300,000 outside
MM or exceeds P400,000 in MM. RTCs also exercise appellate jurisdiction,
to review cases appealed from courts of the first level;
(c) Third Level (Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan) – CA is an appellate court,
reviewing cases appealed to it from the RTC, on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. Appeals to it decided by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction are a matter of right; appeals with respect to
cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are a
matter of discretion. Occasionally, CA may act as a trial court, as in actions
praying for the annulment of final and executor judgments of RTCs on the
ground of extrinsic fraud subsequently discovered, against which no other
remedies lies.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices act, and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees including those in GOCCs
in relation to their office. It also has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs whether in the exercise of their own
original or appellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases committed by
public officers or employees including those in GOCCs in relation to their
office.
 (d)Fourth Level (Supreme Court)
Petition for Review on Certiorari
o From CA
o From Sandiganbayan on pure questions of law
o From judgments or final orders of RTC (OJ)
 Constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance or regulation is in question
 Legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto
 Jurisdiction of lower court is in issue
 Only error or question of law is involved o From CTA
C.Petition for Certiorari
o Against COMELEC and COA
Local and Transitory Actions
(1) A local action is one founded on privity of estates only and there is no privity of
contracts. A real action is a local action, its venue depends upon the location of the
property involved in litigation. “Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof is situated” (Sec. 1,
Rule 4).
(2) Transitory action is one founded on privity of contracts between the parties. A
personal action is transitory, its venue depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the
defendant at the option of the plaintiff. A personal action “may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of non-resident defendant, where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff” (Sec. 2, Rule 4).
Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem
(1) An action in rem, one instituted and enforced against the whole world.
(2) An action in personam is one filed against a definite defendant. It is intended to
subject the interest of defendant on a property to an obligation or lien. Jurisdiction
over the person (defendant) is required. It is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person, and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court. The purpose is to impose through the judgment of a court,
some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. No other
than the defendant is liable, not the whole world, as in an action for a sum of money
or an action for damages.
 (3) An action quasi in rem, also brought against the whole world, is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the
claims assailed. An individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. It deals with status, ownership or liability or a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to
the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. Examples of actions quasi in rem are action for partition, action for
accounting, attachment, foreclosure of mortgage.
(4) An action in personam is not necessarily a personal action. Nor is a real action
necessarily an action in rem. An in personam or an in rem action is a classification of
actions according to foundation. For instance, an action to recover, title to or
possession of real property is a real action, but it is an action in personam, not
brought against the whole world but against the person upon whom the claim is
made.
(5) The distinction is important to determine whether or not jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is required and consequently to determine the type of summons to
be employed. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide a case against said defendant where the action is one in
personam but not where the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
(6) SC sums up the basic rules in Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, GR
161417, February 8, 2007: The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction
depends on the nature of the action – whether the action is in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 likewise apply
according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability. And action in rem is an action against the
thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result
of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
b. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (the technical knowledge and
experience of specialized administrative body)
 Exception to doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
o doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is
when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice.
 i. Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016
o FACTS:
o ISSUE:
- Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to
observe doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
o HELD:
- jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review
can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may
be dismissed for lack of cause of action
- Doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions,
one of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice
- court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for a
resolution on the merits. However, when there is already enough basis on
which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had, as in this case, the
Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order
to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the
ends of justice.
c. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
(1) Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
(2) The objective is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court(Omictin vs. CA, GR 148004, January 22, 2007).
i. Fabia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132684, 11 Sept 2002
ii. Lihaylihay v. The Treasurer of the Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 192223, 23 July
2018, Leonen
c. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
 These doctrine holds that courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with
each other’s orders
o An RTC has no power or authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of a writ of
possession issued by another RTC
 These principles also bar a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-
equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review.
 The doctrine of non-interference applies with equal force to administrative bodies.
o When the law provides for an appeal from the decision of an administrative body
to the SC or CA, it means that such body is co-equal with the RTC in terms of
rank and stature, and logically beyond the control of the latter.
i. Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, 15 June 2016
- The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of
justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought
by the injunction.
 FACTS
o In the CA Ruling: the court granted the petition and directed the Parañaque
RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. Citing the doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court, the CA found that the affirmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed
issuances would allow Petitioner Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to
evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated by the Makati
RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the
controversy, on the basis of technicality
 ISSUE
o WHETHER OR NOT THE ca VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE IN NULLIFYING THE
JUDGEMENT OF RTC MAKATI
 HELD: YES
o The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection
with this judgment
o Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
The law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the
law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be
a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort
to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify
the action of the issuing court.
o the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial
stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the
fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have
been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC
is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that
was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal
 court. Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC
was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
ii. Specified Contractors & Dev Inc v. Pobocan G.R. No. 212014-15, 212427-28,
212694-95, 212794- 95, 6 December 2016
- Non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable
cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
(Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding
of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
 FACTS:
the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen.
Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of 1 count of Plunder, and all the
petitioners, except Lim, of 16 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The
Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles,
De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at
the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his coaccused, who are public
officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c)
such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, 72 72 way more than
the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder. Hence, this
petition.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld
 HELD: YES
o this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the
Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there
is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is
based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality
as well.
o On the other hand, in order to contradict the doctyrine, it must be shown that the
Ombudsman must have exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
o Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief."
It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context
of a preliminary investigation which is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. It
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence. Therefore, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
III. Jurisdiction
a. Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
i. Cang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998
1. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court.
2. When the Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption, the applicable law
was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which requires the written consent of
the natural parents of the child. During the pendency of the petition, the
Family Code, which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code, took effect.
Still, under the Family Code, written consent of the natural parent is required.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Notwithstanding the
amendment, the written consent of the natural parent is still a requisite for
the validity.

b. Classification of jurisdiction
i. Original vs. Appellate
- Original jurisdiction: When actions or proceedings are originally & specifically
filed with a class of court.
- Appellate: When the court has power to review decisions or orders of a lower
court.
ii. General vs. Special
- General: those with competence to decide on their own jurisdiction and take
cognizance of all cases, civil and criminal, of a particular nature.
 It is general if it has competence to exercise jurisdiction over cases not
falling within the jurisidiction of any court, tribunal, person, or body
exercing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
- Special: those which have jurisdiction only for a particular purpose or are clothed
with special powers for the p0erformance of specified duties beyond which they
have no authority of any kind
iii. Exclusive vs. Concurrent
- Exclusive original:
(a) Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case at its
inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts, while exclusive
jurisdiction precludes the idea of co-existence and refers to jurisdiction
possessed to the exclusion of others.
(b) Court having original and exclusive jurisdiction:
 a. Municipal trial court has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer
b. RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which
the subject matter of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation
c. The CA has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgements of the RTC
d. Doctrines of hierarchy of courts and continuity of jurisdiction
• Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019
(1)In view of the principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction
continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of that jurisdiction. This
principle also means that once jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case.
(2) Even the finality of the judgment does not totally deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
case. What the court loses is the power to amend, modify or alter the judgment. Even after
the judgment has become final, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce and execute it
(Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96). Objection to jurisdiction over the
subject matter
(1) When it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the same. (Sec. 1, Rule 9).
The court may on its own initiative object to an erroneous jurisdiction and may ex mero
motu take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case and has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction.
(2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal. When the court dismisses the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is common reason that the court cannot remand
the case to another court with the proper jurisdiction. Its only power is to dismiss and not
to make any other order.
(3) Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading like a motion to
dismiss shall include all grounds then available and all objections not so included shall
be deemed waived. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
however, a defense not barred by the failure to invoke the same in a motion to dismiss
already filed. Even if a motion to dismiss was filed and the issue of jurisdiction was not
raised therein, a party may, when he files an answer, raise the lack of jurisdiction as an
affirmative defense because this defense is not barred under te omnibus motion rule.
d. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts

Jurisdiction In Civil Cases

1. SUPREME COURT
A. ORIGINAL
i. EXCLUSIVE
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the:
i. Court of Appeals
ii.Commission on Elections
iii. Commission on Audit
iv. Sandiganbayan
 ii. CONCURRENT
i. With the Court of Appeals
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the:
a. Regional Trial Court
b. Civil Service Commission
c. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
d. Court of Tax Appeals
e. Other quasi-judicial agencies
f. National Labor Relations Commission
ii.With the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
a. Petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against courts of the first
level and other bodies; and
b. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
iii. With the Regional Trial Court
a. Actions against ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls
B. APPELLATE
Petitions for review on certiorari against the:
i. Court of Appeals
ii. Sandiganbayan
iii. Regional Trial Court in cases involving:
i. the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or regulation
ii.the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or a penalty in
relation thereto;
iii. the jurisdiction of a lower court
iv. only errors or questions of law
2. COURT OF APPEALS
A. ORIGINAL
i. EXCLUSIVE
Actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Court
ii. CONCURRENT
i. With the Supreme Court
a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the:
a. Regional Trial Court
b. Civil Service Commission
c. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
d. Court of Tax Appeals
e. Other quasi-judicial agencies
f. National Labor Relations Commission
ii. With the Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court
a. Petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against courts of the first
level and other bodies
b. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
B. APPELLATE
i. ORDINARY APPEALS from the
i. Regional Trial Court
 a. except in cases exclusively appealable to
the Supreme Court
b. Family Courts
ii. APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW from
i. Court of Tax Appeals
ii. Civil Service Commission
iii. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
iv. Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Land Registration Authority
vi. Social Security Commission
vii. Office of the President
viii.Civil Aeronautics Board
ix. Bureaus under the Intellectual Property Office
x. National Electrification Administration
xi. Energy Regulatory Board
xii. National Telecommunications Commission
xiii.Department of Agrarian Reform under R.A. 6657
xiv. GSIS
xv. Employees Compensation Commission
xvi. Agricultural Inventions Board
xvii. Insurance Commission
xviii. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission
xix. Board of Investments
xx. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
xxi. Any other quasi-judicial agency, instrumentality,
board or commission in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions, such as voluntary arbitrator
iii. PETITIONS FOR REVIEW from the Regional Trial Court
in cases appealed from the lower courts

3. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

A. ORIGINAL
i. EXCLUSIVE
i. Actions wherein the subject matter is not capable of pecuniary
estimation
ii. Actions involving title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein, where the assessed value of such property exceeds PhP
20,000.- [in Metro Manila, PhP 50,000.-]
a. except forcible entry and unlawful detainer
iii. Actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or
claim exceeds PhP 100,000.- [in Metro Manila: PhP 200,000.-]
iv. Matters of probate, testate or intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds PhP 100,000.-[in Metro Manila: PhP 200,000.
v. Actions involving marriage and marital relations
vi. Cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
vii. Actions and special proceedings within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the former Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and
of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
 viii.Other cases where the demand or the value of the property exceeds
PhP 100,000.- [in Metro Manila: PhP 200,000.-]
a. exclusive of interest, damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs
ii. CONCURRENT
i.With the Supreme Court
a. Actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls
ii. With the Supreme Court & the Court of Appeals
a. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the lower courts and bodies
b. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
B. APPELLATE
All cases decided by lower courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions

4. METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL & MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

A. ORIGINAL
i. EXCLUSIVE
i. (1) Actions involving personal property
valued are not more than PhP 100,000.-
[in Metro Manila: PhP 200,000.-]
ii. (2) Actions demanding sums of money
not exceeding PhP 100,000.- [in Metro
Manila: PhP 200,000.-]
a. exclusive of interest,
damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and
costs
iii. (3) Actions in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction where the demand or claim
does not exceed PhP 100,000.- [in Metro
Manila: PhP 200,000.]
a. exclusive of interest,
damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and
costs
iv. (4) Probate proceedings (testate or
intestate), where the gross value of the
estate does not exceed PhP 100,000.-
[in Metro Manila: PhP 200,000.-]
v. (5) Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases
vi. (6) Actions involving title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value does not
exceed PhP 20,000.- [in Metro Manila:
PhP 50,000.-]
a. exclusive of interest,
damages, attorney’s fees,
 litigation expenses and
costs
vii. (7)Provisional remedies where the
principal action is within their jurisdiction
ii. DELEGATED
Cadastral or land registration cases covering
i. lots where there is no controversy or
opposition
ii. contested lots where the value of which
does not exceed P100,000.-
iii. SPECIAL
Petitions for habeas corpus in the absence of
all Regional Trial Court Judges in the province or city
iv. SUMMARY PROCEDURE
i. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases
a. irrespective of the amount
of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be
recovered
ii. All other court cases except probate
proceedings, where the total claim does
not exceed P10,000.- exclusive of
interest and costs

i. Katarungang Pambarangay (Sec. 399-422, Local Government Code)

NOTE: Particularly a condition precedent, just like earnest efforts and arbitration, NOT on
jurisdiction, as LGC on Barangay provides “authority to bring together the parties for an
amicable settlement”. Thus, an ADR, not jurisdiction to hear and decide a case.
• Condition Precedent
• See also Art. 151, Family Code – earnest efforts toward compromise between member of
the family
• Art. 2041 of the Civil Code
• Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018
• Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, 7 August 2017
• Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159411, 18 March 2005 ii. Jurisdiction over small
claims, cases covered by the rules on Summary Procedure
• Summary Procedure v. Summary Proceeding (Art. 100, 252, 253, Family Code)
iii. Section 5 (4) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution iv. B.P. 129 – Judicial Reorganization Act
of 1980, as amended by RA 115761
• Anama v. Citibank G.R. No. 192048, 13 December 2017
• Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas G.R. No. 204970, 1 February 2016
• Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011
v. Republic Act 7691 – An act expanding the jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC, MCTC, amending
B.P. 129
• Suapo et al v. Sps. De Jesus G.R. No. 198356, 20 April 2015
vi. P.D. 1606 as amended by Republic Act 8249; Republic Act 10660 – Sandiganbayan
vii. Republic Act 8369 – Family Courts Act
viii. Republic Act 8799, Sec. 5.2 – Securities Regulations Code
e. Aspects of jurisdiction
i. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
• Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao G.R. No. 195477, 25 January 2016
• Rivera v. Catalo, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422, 20 July 2015
• Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, 10 March 2014
• Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, 29 September 2014
ii. Jurisdiction over the Parties • David v. Agtibay, G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015
• Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, 31 March 2006
• Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, 3 September 2012
iii. Jurisdiction over the Issues
• Bernabe v. Vergara, G.R. No. L-48652, 16 September 1942
iv. Jurisdiction over the Res
• De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, 31 January 2006
• Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004
v. Estoppel Jurisdiction
vi. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, 15 April 1968
vii. Figueroa v People, G.R. No. 147406, 04 July 2008 – clarifying the ruling in Tijam
IV. Actions
a. Ordinary Civil Actions, Special Civil Actions, Criminal Actions, Special Proceedings
b. Personal actions and Real Actions
• Sps. Trayvilla v. Sejas G.R. No. 204970, 1 February 2016
• Heirs of Reterta v. Sps. Lopez G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011
c. Actions in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem
(1) real action a real action is an action affecting title to real property or any interest therein or
for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on, real property.
An action in rem, one instituted and enforced against the whole world.
(2) An action in personam is one filed against a definite defendant. It is intended to subject
the interest of defendant on a property to an obligation or lien. Jurisdiction over the person
(defendant) is required. It is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person, and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve
his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose is to
impose through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. No other than the defendant is liable, not the whole world, as in an
action for a sum of money or an action for damages.
(3) An action quasi in rem, also brought against the whole world, is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the
claims assailed. An individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. It deals with
status, ownership or liability or a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. Examples of actions
quasi in rem are action for partition, action for accounting, attachment, foreclosure of
mortgage.
(4) An action in personam is not necessarily a personal action. Nor is a real action necessarily
an action in rem. An in personam or an in rem action is a classification of actions according
to foundation. For instance, an action to recover, title to or possession of real property is a
real action, but it is an action in personam, not brought against the whole world but against
the person upon whom the claim is made.
 (5) The distinction is important to determine whether or not jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is required and consequently to determine the type of summons to be employed.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide a case against said defendant where the action is one in personam but not where
the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
(6) SC sums up the basic rules in Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank, GR 161417, February 8, 2007: The question of
whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature
of the action – whether the action is in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem.
(7) The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 likewise apply
according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an
action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. And
action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against
the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case.

In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1)
by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody
of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the
defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.

Rule 2 - Cause of Action

b. Meaning of cause of action

- SECTION 1. Ordinary Civil Actions, Basis of .— Every ordinary civil action must be based
on a cause of action.

Meaning of Cause of Action

(1) A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party (defendant) violates the
rights of another (plaintiff).

(2) It is the delict or wrong by which the defendant violates the right or rights of the
plaintiff (Ma-ao Sugar Central v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 666).

(3) The elements are:

 (a) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;

(b) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and

(c) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

Right of Action versus Cause of Action

(1) A cause of action refers to the delict or wrong committed by the defendants, whereas right of
action refers to the right of the plaintiff to institute the action;

(2) A cause of action is determined by the pleadings; whereas a right of action is determined by
the substantive law;

(3) A right of action may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, by estoppels
or other circumstances which do not at all affect the cause of action (Marquez v. Varela, 92 Phil.
373).

Failure to State Cause of Action

(1) The mere existence of a cause of action is not sufficient for a complaint to prosper. Even if in
reality the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant, the complaint may be dismissed
if the complaint or the pleading asserting the claim “states no cause of action”. This means that
the cause of action must unmistakably be stated or alleged in the complaint or that all
the elements of the cause of action required by substantive law must clearly appear from
the mere reading of the complaint. To avoid an early dismissal of the complaint, the simple
dictum to be followed is: “If you have a cause of action, then by all means, state it!” Where there
is a defect or an insufficiency in the statement of the cause of action, a complaint may be
dismissed not because of an absence or a lack of cause of action but because the complaint
states no cause of action. The dismissal will therefore, be anchored on a “failure to state a
cause of action”.

(2) It doesn’t mean that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It only means that the plaintiff’s
allegations are insufficient for the court to know that the rights of the plaintiff were
violated by the defendant. Thus, even if indeed the plaintiff suffered injury, if the same is not
set forth in the complaint, the pleading will state no cause of action even if in reality the plaintiff
has a cause of action against the defendant.

• Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009
CAUSE OF ACTION

FACTS:
Petitioners along with other heirs filed 8 complaints for quieting of title and recovery
of ownership and possession against defendant. The complaints were similarly
worded. Petitioners claimed they have been in OCENPO of the property for 90 years
until they were forcibly ousted from the same by armed men. Petitioners seek to
enjoin respondent from making any developments on the properties, and that the
latter recognize their rights to the lot and peacefully surrender the same.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action & res judicata. Respondents also alleged that the filing of complaint has
already prescribed for being filed beyond 1 year from their registration of the property
in 1967, and/or 10 years in their case of reconveyance based on implied trust.
Respondents maintained that the Complaints should be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action. Even assuming that petitioners were able to prove their allegations
of longtime possession and payment of realty taxes on the subject properties, and to
submit a sketch plan of the same, these cannot defeat a claim of ownership over the
parcels of land, which were already registered under the Torrens system in the name
of respondents and the other consortium members.
RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss. RTC held the property already
registered under respondents and petitioners failed to substantiate their claim. Upon
motion for clarification from petitioners, RTC ruled that the other complaints were
likewise dismissed for involving the same causes of action. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling after submission of consolidated notice of appeal from petitioners.
The appellate court found that respondents' titles to the subject properties were
indefeasible because they were registered under the Torrens system. Thus,
petitioners could not say that any claim on the subject properties casts a cloud on
their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same.
ISSUE
Whether or not it was proper to grant respondent’s motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
HELD:
No. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the
act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements
are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into
the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in
the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant.
From the facts provided, each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated
a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the
subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right
to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they
 may recover the same. Petitioners alleged that while the subject properties were not
covered by respondents' certificates of title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly
evicted petitioners therefrom. Hence, it is not simply a question of whether
petitioners' possession can defeat respondents' title to registered land. Instead, an
initial determination has to be made on whether the subject properties were in fact
covered by respondents' certificates of title. The respondents had violated their rights
as owner of the subject properties by evicting the former therefrom by means of force
and intimidation.

• Right of Action – Multi-Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 146726, 16 June 2006

The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the
law of pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former
is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is a formal statement of the
operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and
depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by
the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not
accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. ||| 

A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff's primary
right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject
to which they relate — person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty
have been violated.

In sum, one has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an

instrument when his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when
there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof by another
concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive
controversy between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal
interests. This may occur shortly after the execution of the instrument or much later.

• Consular Area Residents Association v. Casanova G.R. No. 202618, 12 April 2016

c. Test of sufficiency of cause of action

• Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, G.R. No. 129928, 25 August 2005

CAUSE OF ACTION; ONLY THE STATEMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT MAY BE

PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE THEREOF. — To
determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may
be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or
hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not
be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. The
test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of
action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict
in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.

 Test of the Sufficiency of a Cause of Action

 (1) The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative,
Inc. vs. David, 468 SCRA 63; Santos v. de Leon, 470 SCRA 455).

(2) To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court
may consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp., GR
172175, Oct. 9, 2006).

(3) In determining whether or not a cause of action is sufficiently stated in the complaint,
the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or to hold preliminary hearings to determine its existence (Diaz
v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302). The sufficiency of the statement of the COA must appear on the
face of the complaint and its existence may be determined only by the allegations of the
complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed and any attempt to prove extraneous
circumstances not being allowed (Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Roxas, 335 SCRA 540).

d. Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects

- SECTION 4. Splitting A Single Cause of Action; Effect of. — If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others

- Splitting a Single Cause of Action and Its Effects

(1) It is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of action (Sec. 4,
Rule 2). It is the practice of dividing one cause of action into different parts and making
each part the subject of a separate complaint (Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287). In
splitting a cause of action, the pleader divides a single cause of action, claim or demand
into two or more parts, brings a suit for one of such parts with the intent to reserve the
rest for another separate action (Quadra vs. CA, GR 147593, July 31, 2006). This
practice is not allowed by the Rules because it breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs
the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as an instrument of harassment,
and generates unnecessary expenses to the parties.

(2) The filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others and a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar to, or a ground for dismissal
of, the others (Sec. 4, Rule 2; Bacolod City vs. San Miguel, Inc., L-2513, Oct. 30, 1969).
The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion to dismiss. Hence, if the first action is
pending when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on litis
pendencia, there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause. If a final judgment had been rendered in the first action when the second action is
filed, the latter may be dismissed based on res judicata, that the cause of action is
barred by prior judgment. As to which action should be dismissed would depend upon
judicial discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the case.

The requisites of [litis pendentia] are: (a) the identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and the
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
 two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata
in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present,
namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.

As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the
same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the
same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
otherwise, it is not

• Marilag v. Martinez G.R. No. 201892, 22 July 2015

• Yap v. First E-Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 169889, 29 September 2009

• Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No. 167246, 20 July 2011

• Chu et al v. Cunanan G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011

• Riviera Golf Club Inc v. CCA Holdings B.V. G.R. No. 173783, 17 June 2015

e. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

- SECTION 6. Misjoinder of Causes of Action. – Misjoinder of causes of action is not a

ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party
or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.

- a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It
is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made
the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
 plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or
rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

- The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the
same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties
involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum
cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible,
without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.

- Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed,

the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with
separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not
motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous
adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. 

- Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Actions (Secs. 5 and 6, Rule 2)

(1) Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as many causes of action as a party
may have against another in one pleading alone (Sec. 5, Rule 2). It is the process of
uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action, subject to the following
conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;

Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any

right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the
court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant
from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest."||| (Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620,
[September 24, 1986], 228 PHIL 360-367)

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the cause of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC
provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction (totality
rule).
 (2) Restrictions on joinder of causes of action are: jurisdiction, venue, and joinder
of parties. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed
by special rules.

(3) When there is a misjoinder of causes of action, the erroneously joined cause of
action can be severed or separated from the other cause of action upon motion by a
party or upon the court’s own initiative. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
the dismissal of the case.

• Perez v. Hernano, G.R. No. 147417, 8 July 2005

• Danilo v. Pedro, G.R. No. 155736, 31 March 2005

• Totality Rule (BP 129, Sec. 33)

- Where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the claims of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions

• Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620, 24 September 1986

- REMEDIAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; SECTION 33(1) OF ITS

INTERIM RULES; SUBJECT TO REQUIREMENTS FOR PERMISSIVE
JOINDER OF PARTIES UNDER THE RULES OF COURT. — The Court rules
that the application of the totality rules under Section 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for
the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as
follows:

- Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any

right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may
make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest."||| (Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620,
[September 24, 1986], 228 PHIL 360-367)

VI. Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Actions

a. Natural and Juridical Persons, Entities Authorized by law

 SECTION 1. Who May Be Parties; Plaintiff and Defendant.— Only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term
"plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the
third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth,
etc.) — party defendant

SECTION 10. Unwilling Co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party who should be joined as
plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall
be stated in the complaint. (10

• Verzosa v. Fernandez, 49. Phil. 627 (1926)

b. Real parties in interest

SECTION 2. Parties in Interest.— A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)

- Real Party-in-Interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Sec. 2, Rule 3).

- The interest must be real, which is a present substantial interest as distinguished

from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or consequential interest
(Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624).

- It is an interest that is material and direct, as distinguished from a mere incidental

interest in question (Samaniego vs. Aguila, 334 SCRA 438).

- While ordinarily one who is not a privy to a contract may not bring an action to
enforce it, there are recognized exceptions this rule:

a. Contracts containing stipulations pour atrui or stipulations expressly conferring

benefits to a non-party may sue under the contract provided such benefits have been
accepted by the beneficiary prior to its revocation by the contracting parties (Art. 1311,
Civil Code).

b. Those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in the contract, in which they
had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result from it. For instance, Art.
1313, CC, provides that “creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to
defrauded them.” Further, Art. 1318, CC, provides that contracts entered into in fraud of
creditors may be rescinded when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims
due them. Thus, a creditor who is not a party to a contract can sue to rescind the
contract to redress the fraud committed upon him.

• Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, 29 April 2005

c. representatives as parties
 - SECTION 3. Representatives as Parties.— Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest.

A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or

administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (3a)

- The substitution of a party depends on the nature of the action. If the action is
personal, and a party dies pendent lite, such action does not survive, and such party
cannot be substituted. If the action is real, death of the defendant survives the action,
and the heirs will substitute the dead. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein may be enforced against the estate of the deceased defendant (Sec. 1, Rule
87).

• V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 186305, 22 July 2015

• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993

• Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

d. indispensable parties

- SECTION 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties.— Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants. (7)

- Without the presence of this party, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality (De
Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607).

- The presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical

power and when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed.

- The absence of indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only to the absent parties but even as to those
present.

- A person is not an indispensable party (IP) if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them.

- Also, a person is not an IP if his presence would merely permit complete relief between
him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of
the action.
 - Although normally a joinder of action is permissive (Sec. 6, Rule 3), the joinder of a party
becomes compulsory when the one involved is an indispensable party. Clearly, the rule
directs a compulsory joinder of IP (Sec. 7, Rule 3).

- Two essential tests of an indispensable party:

(a) Can a relief be afforded to the plaintiff without the presence of the other party; and

(b) Can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other
party?

• In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, G.R. No. 182645, 15
December 2010 (Resolution)

• Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, 23 March 2004

• Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004

e. necessary parties;

- SECTION 8. Necessary Party.— A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action. (8a)

- SECTION 9. Non-joinder of Necessary Parties to be Pleaded.— Whenever in any

pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set
forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the
reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary
party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding
in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. (8a, 9a)

- The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party(Sec. 9, Rule 3).

• Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10,
2016

f. indigent parties;

- SECTION 21. Indigent Party.— A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
 satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

- Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

- Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that
the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court.
If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)

• Spouses Algura v. City of Naga G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006

g. alternative defendants

- SECTION 13. Alternative Defendants.— Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of
several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the
alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief
against the other.

- Just as the rule allows a suit against defendants in the alternative, the rule also
allows alternative causes of action (Sec. 2, Rule 8) and alternative defenses (Sec.
5[b], Rule 6).

h. Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties

SECTION 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties.— Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. (7)

SECTION 6. Permissive Joinder of Parties.— All persons in whom or against whom any
right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint,
where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants
may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6)

- Joinder of parties is compulsory if there are parties without whom no final

determination can be had of an action (Sec. 7, Rule 3).

- Joinder of parties is permissive when there is a right or relief in favor of or against the
parties joined in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions,
 and there is a question of law or fact common to the parties joined in the action (Sec. 6,
Rule 3).

i. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

SECTION 11. Misjoinder and Non-joinder of Parties.— Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately. (11a)

- A party is misjoined when he is made a party to the action although he should not be
impleaded. A party is not joined when he is supposed to be joined but is not impleaded in
the action.

- Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just

- Misjoinder of parties does not involve questions of jurisdiction and not a ground for
dismissal

- Even if neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of the action,
the failure to obey the order of the court to drop or add a party is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint under Sec. 3, Rule 17.

- The rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint. What it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and
misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop
him unceremoniously later at the option of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the
original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the
subsequent dropping is requested because it has turned out that such inclusion was a
mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping is “on such terms as
are just”

• Divinagracia v. Parilla G.R. No. 196750, 11 March 2015

j. Class suit

SECTION 12. Class Suit.— When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest. (12a)

- Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attendant facts. A class suit
does not require commonality of interest in the questions involved in the suit. What is
 required by the Rules is a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
litigation.

- The subject matter of the action means the physical, the things real or personal, the
money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to the suit which is prosecuted and not the
direct or wrong committed by the defendant. It is not also a common question of law that
sustains a class suit but a common interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Ban & Trust Co., 58 SCRA 559). There is no class suit when
interests are conflicting.

- For a class suit to prosper, the following requisites must concur:

a. The subject matter of the controversy must be of common or general

interest to many persons;

b. The persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties;

c. The parties actually before the court are sufficiently numerous and representative
as to fully protect the interests of all concerned; and

d. The representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all (Sec.12, Rule 3).

k. Suits against entities without juridical personality

SECTION 15. Entity Without Juridical Personality as Defendant.— When two or more
persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they
may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known. In the
answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said
entity must all be revealed. (15a)

- An entity without juridical personality may be sued under a common name by which it is
commonly known when it represents to the plaintiff under a common name, and the latter
relies on such representation (Lapanday vs. Estita, 449 SCRA 240).

l. Effect of death of party litigant

SECTION 16. Death of Party; Duty of Counsel.— Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
 If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (16a, 17a)

SECTION 17. Death or Separation of A Party Who is a Public Officer.— When a public
officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns,
or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such
time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any
party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the
successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless
expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor
and accorded an opportunity to be heard. (18a)

- Upon the receipt of the notice of death, the court shall order the legal representative or
representatives of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within
thirty (30) days from notice (Sec. 16, Rule 3). The substitution of the deceased would not
be ordered by the court in cases where the death of the party would extinguish the action
because substitution is proper only when the action survives
- Where the deceased has no heirs, the court shall require the appointment of an executor
or administrator. This appointment is not required where the deceased left an heir
because the heir under the new rule, may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased. If
there is an heir but the heir is a minor, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for said
minor heir
- The court may appoint an executor or administrator when:

a. the counsel for the deceased does not name a legal representative; or

b. there is a representative named but he failed to appear within the specified period
(Sec. 16, Rule 3).

• Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005

• Gaffney v. Butler G.R. No. 219408, 8 November 2017

• San Juan v. Cruz G.R. No.167321, 31 July 2006 m. Death or separation of a party who
is a public officer

n. Incompetency or incapacity

SECTION 18. Incompetency or Incapacity.— If a party becomes incompetent or

incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be
continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal
guardian or guardian ad litem.(19a)
o. Transfer of Interest

SECTION 19. Transfer of Interest.— In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person
to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.

p. Notice to Solicitor General

SECTION 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.— In any action involving the validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree, rules or
regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor
General who may be heard in person or through a representative duly designated by him.
(23a)

sep 20, 2021

splitting of causes of action - bp 22 - cannot separate even independent civil action. deemed
instituted in criminal case. can this be applied retroactively? - yes.
when is an action deemed constituted? - upon the filing of complaint and payment of docket
fees
to add additional defendants - file leave.
when deemed instituted? - the date of the later pleading
who is a plaintiff?
who can be a defendant?
who are capacitated to be parties to a case?
only natural and juridical persons can be parties to a case? - no, also other entities allowed by
law
versoza v fernandez case ruling what is legal standing?
- This Court has consistently held that "[t]he authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the [Court of Appeals] is solely vested in the
Office of the Solicitor General[,]" with the private complainant's role as only that of a
witness.
- Granted, family affairs cannot always be subject to the State's inquiry, especially if no one
comes forward to shed light on ongoing abuses, or worse still, if the abused merely sees
the acts as matters of fact. Indeed, in child abuse cases, the parents or guardians may be
the abusers themselves. Those entrusted with the care and protection of the child could
very well be complicit in the abuse, if not its perpetrators. In these situations, allowing
another person to represent the abused becomes apparent and more urgent, which is why
barangay chairs, social workers, and concerned responsible citizens are enjoined to file a
complaint.90 When the abuse happens, no one else will protect them from such harm.
real party interest
 - Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real-party-in-interest -
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
- A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on the failure to state a cause of action. It
can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on
the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action

- can a minor be a party to a case even though he does not have legal capacity yet?
who is the legal guardian of a minor? does the minor have to execute an SPA? - no agent
are there exceptions to the rule where the agent can sue in his own name without the principal?
- Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue
or be sued without joining the principal. Thus, an agent may sue or be sued solely in
its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements occur: 1)
the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; 2) the agent acted for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal; and 3) the transaction did not involve the property of the
principal. When these elements are present, the agency becomes bound as if the
transaction were its own, consistent with Article 1883 of the Civil Code
can an unborn fetus’ parents file a suit for damages? - yes provided fully delivered or intra
uterine life
how can we sustain a taxpayer’s suit? what are the requirements?
can animals be parties to a case? - no. but people can represent them
can there be other parties to a case who are not parties in the contract but is a real party in
interest?
what is the rule on spouses? - shall be sued jointly.
what are the exceptions?
requisite for permissive joinder of parties?
who is an indispensable party?
- An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants .
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties
is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
- A person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he will not
necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice between the
other parties. He is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete
relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple
litigations
if the indispensable party is not impleaded, will it automatically dismiss the case? - the court will
direct the joinder
in what instance will the non inclusion of an indispensable party lead to a dismissal?
who is a necessary party?
if the necessary is not impleaded, will it invalidate the judgment?
unwilling co-plaintiff

what is a nominal party? what is a pro forma party?

- a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because
such party has any real interest in the subject matter or because any relief is demanded,
but merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on
the record
what is your remedy if there is a misjoinder and non joinder???? - sec. 11, rule 3
what is a class suit?
requisites of class suit
- For a class suit to prosper, the following requisites must concur: a. The subject matter of
the controversy must be of common or general interest to may persons; b. The persons
are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties; c. The parties actually before
the court are sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all
concerned; and d. The representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all (Sec.12, Rule 3
alternative defendant
can you sue a person whose name you do not know?
who is an indigent party?
what is the rule on venue in real actions?
where is the residence of a corporation?
rule on venue if non resident?
how is venue in civil cases different in criminal cases?

VII. Rule 4 - Venue

 VENUE is the place or the geographical area in which a court with jurisdiction may hear
and determine a case. It is the place where a case is to be tried.

a. Venue vs. Jurisdiction

• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005

 Venue is intended to accord convenience to the parties as it relates to the place
of trial. Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought.

 Jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to hear and determine a case.
Venue refers to the place where the case is to be heard or tried.

 Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue is of procedural law. A wrong

venue is a mere procedural infirmity, it is not a jurisdictional defect.

 Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, cannot be waived by the parties.

Venue may be waived if not invoked either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.

 Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties. Venue may be
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

 In case of lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, the court may dismiss the
action motu proprio but this does not apply to improper venue.

 Jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
since it is conferred by law although a party may be barred from raising it on the
ground of estoppel.

 LOOK FOR OMNIBUS MOTION RULE

 Under the omnibus motion rule, all available grounds for objection in attacking a
pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding should be invoked all at the same time;
otherwise, they are deemed waived. An exception to this is the court's power to dismiss
the case motu proprio based on Rule 9, Section 1.

 The Omnibus Motion Rule is a procedural principle which requires that every motion
that attacks a pleading, judgment, order or proceeding shall include all grounds then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 15,
Rules of Court).

 A motion to dismiss must invoke all objections which are available at the time of
its filing. If the objection which is available at the time is not pleaded in the motion,
that, ground is deemed waived. It can no longer be invoked as an affirmative defense
in the answer which the movant may file following the denial of his motion to dismiss.

 Under Sec. 1, par. 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), the following objections are not
deemed waived even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer:
 that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
 that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause (litis pendencia); 
 that the action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata); and 
 that the action is barred by the statute of limitations (prescription) 
  Two objections available at the time the motion is filed, namely, improper venue and
prescription were not included in the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied. May X
still allege in his Answer as defenses improper venue and prescription? 

A: Improper venue is deemed waived because it was available as a defense at the

time the motion was filed but was not invoked. Prescription, on the other hand, is not
waived and can still be interposed as an affirmative defense in the answer. It is a
defense that is not deemed waived under the explicit provisions of Sec. l of Rule 9.

b. Venue in civil cases vs. Criminal cases

 Venue is procedural, and not substantive. In civil cases, venue is not a matter of
jurisdiction. Venue concerns a rule of procedure. Improper venue is not equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Since venue is merely procedural, the parties to a civil case
can waive the venue of the case.

o In civil proceedings, venue may be waived by the defendant if seasonably

raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.

o “defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in

the answer are deemed waived.”

o Venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict

their access to the court. Unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action
may be tried by a court despite it being the improper venue.

 Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional. Venue in criminal cases is an essential

element of jurisdiction, where the information is filed in a place where the offense
was not committed, the information may be quashed for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.

o Venue is jurisdictional in a criminal case, it cannot be waived by

the parties.

• Nocum v. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022, 23 September 2005

NOTE ON BASIC VENUE ANALYSIS:

 In order to know the venue of a particular action, the basic and initial step is to
determine if the action is personal or real.
o If personal, the venue is deemed transitory (venue moves depending
on residence) and generally depends upon the residences of the parties.
o If real, the venue is local and the venue is the place where the property or
any portion of the same is situated.
 In determining venue, one must inquire into the primary purpose of the action,
not the title or heading given to such action. If there’s an action for the declaration
of the nullity of a deed of absolute sale involving real property in Makati and when the
 action is instituted for the recovery of the subject property, the action is real and the
venue is in Makati.
o If the action for nullity is not intended for the recovery of real
property however, it is a personal action and may be filed in the
court where the plaintiff or the defendant resides.

c. Venue of real actions

 Actions affecting title to, or possession of, real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof is situated.

 In a real action, the residences of the parties involved are irrelevant to the choice of
venue.

 Actions to recover possession or ownership of real property are real actions and
must be filed in the place where the real property is located.

o Actions for unlawful detainer, forcible entry, accion publiciana,

accion reivindicatoria, and for reconveyance of real property are real
actions and must be filed in the place where the subject property is
situated. The same applies to partition of real property and judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

o An action to recover possession of the leased rental property in Davao

and for the payment of accrued rentals must be filed where the real
property is located. The payment of accrued rentals is merely incidental to
the main case.

o Forcible entry & detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the
municipal court of the municipality or city wherein the real property
involved or a portion thereof is situated.

d. Venue of personal actions

 The venue in personal actions is where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants reside, at the
election of the plaintiff.

 “resides” means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff
or the defendant. Must be distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

 When there is more than one plaintiff or defendant in a personal action, the residence
of the principal parties should be the basis for determining the proper venue.

 The residence of a domestic corporation is the place, within the Philippines, where
its principal office is located.
 o A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term
is applied to a natural person.

o A corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place

where its principal office is located.

 An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
property mortgaged is a personal action, for it does not affect title to, possession of or
any interest in the real property. The action is for the recovery of money.

 An action to annul a deed of real estate mortgage filed by the mortgagor is a personal
action since the mortgagor is the owner of the property mortgaged, there is no claim of
ownership involved.

e. Venue of actions against non-residents

 Venue of actions against non-residents affecting the personal status of the

plaintiff; actions affecting property of the non-resident in the Philippines

 If the defendant is a non-resident, the venue is where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the non-resident defendant may be found at
the election of the plaintiff. Sec. 3 Rule IV may be liberally interpreted to allow the
plaintiff to commence and have the action tried either in the place where he/she
resides, or the place where the property is situated.

 SECTION 3. Venue of Actions Against Nonresidents.— If any of the defendants does

not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where
the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.

 This section applies when:

a. Any of the defendants is a non-resident and, at the same time, not found
in the Philippines; &

b. The action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; or

c. The action affects any property of the non-resident defendant located in

the Philippines

 Unless the court declares otherwise, it is submitted that a liberal interpretation of sec.
3, rule IV, giving the plaintiff a choice of venue in actions affecting any property of a
non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines would serve the interest of a
resident plaintiff, rather than of a possible absconding non-resident defendant. The
rule is against the causing of so much inconvenience to an aggrieved plaintiff.

F. WHEN THE RULES ON VENUE DOES NOT APPLY

• Ley Construction & Development Corp v. Sedan G.R. No. 222711, 23 August 2017

• Unimasters Conglomeration Inc v. CA G.R. No. 119657, 7 February 1997

 The rules on venue are not applicable in any of the following cases:

1. WHERE A SPECIFIC RULE OR LAW PROVIDES OTHERWISE

a. A quo warranto proceeding does not consider the residence of the

respondent

b. A petition for a continuing writ of mandamus filed in RTC that exercises

jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission
occurred

c. The civil as well as criminal action for damages in written defamation

filed with the RTC of territory where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.

- In case a public officer does not hold office in Manila, the action
shall be filed with the RTC of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published

- In case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the

action shall be filed with the RTC of the city or province where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published

2. WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE VALIDLY AGREED IN WRITING BEFORE

THE FILING OF AN ACTION ON THE EXCLUSIVE VENUE THEREOF

G. EFFECTS OF STIPULATION ON VENUE

 STIPULATIONS ON VENUE

o The parties may agree on a specific venue which could be in a place where
neither of them resides. In real actions, like unlawful detainer, the parties may
stipulate on a venue other than the place where the real property is situated.

o REQUISITES ON STIPULATIONS ON VENUE

1. The agreement is in writing

2. The agreement is made before the filing of the action

3. The agreement is exclusive as to the venue

o WRITTEN STIPULATIONS AS TO VENUE ARE EITHER RESTRICTIVE
(MANDATORY) OR PERMISSIVE.

o Restrictive written stipulations: the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon. The complaint is to be filed only in the stipulated venue. There must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose
and design that actions between them be litigated only in the place named
by them.

 Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude

parties from bringing a case in other venues.

 The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.

 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be

deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place.

 Words with restrictive meanings are only, solely, exclusively in this

court, in no other court save xxx, particularly, nowhere else
but/except, or words of equal import

o Permissive written stipulations: the parties may file their suits not only in
the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by the rules. The
complaint may be filed in the place designated by the rules or in the place
stipulated. The stipulated venue acts only as an additional forum.

o In unimasters, it was ruled that a stipulation stating that “all suits arising
out of this agreement shall be filed within the proper Courts of Quezon
City” is only permissive and does not limit the venue to the Quezon City
courts.

 The High Court held in this case that unless the parties make very
clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that
they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place and to disregard the prescriptions of
Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or
restrictive but merely permissive or complementary of said rule.

o A RESTRICTIVE STIPULATION ON VENUE IS NOT BINDING WHEN THE

VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT IS ASSAILED.

 The High Court held that in cases where the complainant assails only
the terms, conditions and/or coverage of a written instrument and
not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
shall still be binding on the parties and the complaint may be properly
dismissed on the ground of improper venue if the complainant files the
same in a venue other than that agreed upon.
  On the other hand, the High Court held that in a complaint directly
assailing the validity of the written instrument itself, the same
should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained
therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue.

 VENUE IN A CONTRACT OF ADHESION

o The High Court held that contracts of adhesion might be occasionally struck
down only if there was a showing that the dominant bargaining party left the
weaker party without any choice as to be completely derived of an
opportunity to bargain effectively. Venue stipulations in a contract of adhesion
follow this rule.

o Although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by

agreement of the parties in writing, such an agreement will not be held valid
where it practically negates the action of the claimants.

o The wisdom underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the

convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the
ends of justice, the transfer of venue must enhance the ends of justice.

 COMPLEMENTARY-CONTRACTS-CONSTRUED-TOGETHER RULE

o This rule mandates that the provisions of an accessory contract must be

read in its entirety and together with the principal contract between the
parties.

o Art. 1374 of NCC “the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted

together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all
from all of them taken jointly.

o The provisions of an accessory contract must be read in its entirety and together
with the principal contract between the parties.

 DISMISSAL BASED ON IMPROPER VENUE

o A motu proprio dismissal based on improper venue is plain error and

patently incorrect.

o IMPROPER VENUE IS NOT ONE OF THE GROUNDS WHEREIN THE COURT

MAY DISMISS AN ACTION MOTU PROPRIO ON THE BASIS OF THE
PLEADINGS.

 The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendencia, res judicata, and
prescription.
 o Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the
venue cannot be truly said to be improperly laid because the venue may still be
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue have
been devised.

o There should be a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent

raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue before dismissing
the petition.

 WHEN COURT MAY MAKE MOTU PROPRIO DISMISSAL BASED ON IMPROPER

VENUE

o The court may effect a motu proprio dismissal of the complaint based on
improper venue in an action covered by the rules on summary procedure.

 The court may dismiss the case from 1) an examination of the allegations
in the complaint, & 2) such evidence as may be attached thereto, on any
of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action.

 The dismissal may be made outright, which means that the court may do
so without the need for waiting for the filing of a motion to dismiss.

o In small claims cases, after the court determines that the action falls under the
rules for such cases, it may, from an examination of the allegations in the
statement of claim and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the
case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case

o In actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the court may dismiss the
case outright after examination of the complaint and such evidence attached
thereto. The dismissal may be based on any of the grounds for dismissal of a civil
action. A motion to dismiss is not required.
o An order granting the following is considered a dismissal with prejudice
and bars the refiling of the same action or claim:

(1) a motion to dismiss; or

(2) an affirmative defense

(a) that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment

or by the statute of limitations,
(b) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished, or
(c)that the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds
(Rule 15, Sec. 13).

 DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON IMPROPER VENUE

 o If a motion to dismiss based on improper venue is denied, the defendant cannot
appeal from the order of denial.

o An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory . It is not final

since there is still left something to be done. Only final orders or judgments
may be appealed from.

o The normal remedy is to file an answer and interpose the ground as an

affirmative defense, go to trial and appeal from the adverse judgment.

o on the other hand, if the denial to the motion to dismiss is tainted withy grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the remedy is certiorari and
prohibition.

 IMPROPER VENUE IS NOT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL

o If the facts of the problem show that the venue is improper, it would not be
procedurally correct to file a motion to dismiss bas on lack of jurisdiction because
venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction in a civil case.

 AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN RELATION TO VENUE OF CASES

o To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the SC may order a change of venue. Since the
constitutional provision doe s not distinguish, this rule could refer to both civil and
criminal cases.

H. RULE 8, SEC. 12

SECTION 12. Affirmative Defenses. —

(a) A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall
be limited to the reasons set forth under Section 5 (b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:

1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

2. That venue is improperly laid;

3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

4. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and

5. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a
waiver thereof.

(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30)
calendar days from the filing of the answer.
(d) As to the other affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Section 5 (b), Rule 6, the
court may conduct a summary hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days from the filing of the
answer. Such affirmative defenses shall be resolved by the court within thirty (30) calendar days
from the termination of the summary hearing.

(e) Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the
matters to be raised on appeal after a judgment on the merits

. (n)

Module 2:

I. Pleadings Rules 6 to 11, as amended by the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure

SECTION 1. Pleadings Defined. — Pleadings are the written statements of the

respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment. (1

a. Pleading vs. Motion (Rule 6, Sec. 1; Rule 15, Sec. 1)

b. Kinds of Complaint and when they should be filed

c. Pleadings allowed in small claims cases and cases covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure

d. Parts and contents of a pleading (Rule 7, Sec. 1-5, Rule 6, Sec. 3, Rule 6, Sec. 4, Rule 6,
Sec. 5)

• Efficient Use of Paper Rule A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC

• Ao-As v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128464, 20 June 2006

• Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007

• Judicial Affidavit Rule A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

• Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Co., G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012

e. Periods to file pleadings

f. Allegations in a pleading

i. Manner of making allegations ii. Complaint

• Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, 11 August 2008

• Lazaro v. Brewmaster Intl, Inc., G.R. No. 182779, 23 August 2010

iii. Pleading an actionable document

iv. Answer

• Specific denials

• Memita v. Masongsong, G.R. No. 150912, 28 May 2007

• Effect of failure to make specific denials

• Negative Pregnant

• Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, G.R. No. 87434, 8 May 1992

• Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing, G.R. No. L-22018, January 17, 1968

• Affirmative Defenses

• When a specific denial requires an oath

• Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 187487, June
29, 2015

• Filipinas Textile Mills v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003

g. Counterclaims

• Bangis v. Heirs of Adolfo, G.R. No. 190875, June 13, 2012

i. Compulsory • Metropolitan Bank v. CPR Promotions, G.R. No. 200567, 22 June 2015

• Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park Association, G.R. No. 133119, 17 August 2000

• Pinga v. Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, 30 June 2006

• Maceda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83545, 11 August 1989

• Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc., G.R. No. 153171, 4 May 2006

• North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Morales, G.R. No. 222821, August 9, 2017

ii. Permissive

• Alba v. Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, 13 January 2016

• Sy-Vargas v. Estate of Ogsos, G.R. No. 221062, October 5, 2016

H. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

i. Failure to plead defenses and objections
- deemed admitted except
1. the court has no jurisdiction over subject matter
2. when there is another action pending between the same parties for the same case
3. Res judicata
4. When the action is barred by statute of limitations
ii. Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim
- Compulsory or cross claim not set up shall be barred

i. Reply
• Casent Realty Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, 14
September 2007
 j. Rejoinder

k. Default
i. When a declaration of default is proper
• Momarco Import Co., Inc. v. Villamena, G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016
ii. Effect of an order of default • Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, 21 March
2006
iii. Relief from an order of default
• Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101789, April 28, 1993
iv. Default judgment and Relief from judgment by default
• Rule 37, Rules 40-41, Rule 38
• Rule 28, Sec. 3 (c)
• Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, 30 October 2006
• Jao & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93233 (Resolution), December 19, 1995
• Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371,
April 4, 2001
v. Effect of a partial default
vi. Extent of relief
vii. Actions where default are not allowed
viii. Extension of time to file an Answer
ix. Filing and service of pleadings – Rules 11 and 13, as amended
i. Payment of docket fees
ii. Periods of filing of pleadings
iii. Manner of filing
iv. Modes of service
v. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions; service of court-issued orders and
other documents
vi. Priority of filing and service/ Conventional service or filing of orders, pleadings, and
other documents
vii. When service is deemed complete
viii. Proof of filing and service
ix. SC Admin Order No. 251- 20 dated 11 September 2020 on the Guidelines on the
Implementation in the Philippines of the Hague Service Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters

l. Notice of Lis Pendens

• Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp., G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016

m. Amendments
• Barfel Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98177, June 8, 1993
• Godinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154330, 15 February 2007

n. Supplemental Pleadings
• Shoemart, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86956, October 1, 1990
• Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, 13 August 2012

II. Summons – Rule 14, as amended

a. Nature and purpose of summons
• De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014
 b. Duty to Issue, Validity of Summons, Form
c. Voluntary appearance
• Uy v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017
• Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017
d. Who may serve summons
e. On whom summons will be served
• Heirs of Manguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 150768 & 160176, August 20, 2008
• CCC Insurance Corp. v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., G.R. No. 156162, June 22, 2015
f. Personal service, Substituted service, and Constructive service
g. Extraterritorial service, when allowed
• Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No. 234808, November 19, 2018
• Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp. G.R. No. 172242, August 14,
2007
h. Service upon prisoners and minors; upon spouses
i. Service upon domestic or foreign private juridical entities
j. Proof of service

III. Motions – Rule 15, as amended

a. Motions in general
b. Form and Contents
c. Omnibus Motion Rule; Exceptions
d. Prohibited Motions; Exceptions
e. Litigious and Non-Litigious Motions
f. Motion Day
g. Motions for Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)

Judicial Affidavit Rule A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC Section 3.

Contents of judicial Affidavit. –
A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness and, if not in English or
Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness and
the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so
under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.