Critical Perspectives on Women and Gender Critical Perspectives on Women and Gender brings books on timely issuesand controversies toan interdiseiplinary audience The series explores gender-related topics and illuminates the issues involved in current debates in feminist scholarship and across the disciplines — The Forbidden Modern Micelle Fine Civilization and Veiling Disruptioe Vrees: The Possibilities of Feminist Reseaet Title Susan D. Clayton and Faye J. Crosby Istce, Gender, and Airmative Action Janice Doane and Devon Hedges Fr Kl to Krist: yeni Fis te Sch forte Gast Enough” Maer : : Niliifer Géle Ji Dotan Presence and Desi Essays on Gn, Sey, Perform Juith Newton Shurting Ocvr: Feminism and the Politics of Cultural Critique Jill G. Morawski Practicing Feminism, Reconstructing Psychology: Notes on a Linuinal Scien Mary §. Gossy Freudian Slips: Woman, Whiting, the Foreign Tengue “Teresa L, Bbert Liaie Feminsin and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor sn Late Capitaine Niliifer Gite The Forbidden Modern: Civilization a Veiling Ann Arbor ‘Aida Hurtado ‘THE LINIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS The Color of Privilege: Thive Blasphemies on Race ‘nil Feninisn|Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1996 All ights reserved ‘Published in the United States of America by ‘The University of Michigan Press “Manufactured in the United States of America © Printed on acid-free paper 3007 2006 2005 2004 7 6 5 4 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means. lectronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written per- mission of the publisher. ACIP catalog record or this book is available {from the British Library, Library of Congress Cataloging,in-Publication Data ile, Nilifer, 1953 ‘The forbidden modern: civilization and veiling / Nilifer Gée, P. cm, — (Critical perspectives on women and gendes) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-472-09630-5 (alk. paper), — ISBN 0-472-06630-7 (pbk. ‘alk. paper) 1, Women—Turkey—Social conditions. 2. Muslim women—Turkey. 3. Women in Islam—Turkey. 4.Purdah—Turkey. 5, Veils—Turkey. LTitle. ML Series, HQ17267.G65 2996 1305.42'09561—de20 96-18179 ap To my grandmother, Zehra BozerAcknowledgments ‘The first stage ofthis study, the historical research, was realized in Patis in 1985 with the support of UNESCO. Wassyla Tamzali, as her name bespeaks, was the spiritual guide for this project, as she has been in other areas of my life, She redirected my attention to my own past and country, ‘The second stage, the fieldwork, took place in Turkey in 1087. Tam thank- ful to Pierre Kalfon, of UNESCO, who provided support and flexibility Jean-Pierre Thieck, who is no longer among us, and Vincent Duclere were among the first reacers of the original text in French, They made me believe that I had something to say. Ali Bayramojlu and Nihal incioglu encouraged me to make a book out of it; they also discussed! and com- mented on the Turkish version. I would not have had the courage to rewrite it for the US. audience without the catalytic role Miige Gigek played in my life. Knowing her means a gain in intellectual synergy and interpersonal harmony. During my sabbatical at the University of Michi- ‘gan in 4994 I benefited greatly from the exchanges with both my colleagues. and students, whose own preoccupations and comments made me turn toward! new questions, Tam thankful to Hiseyin Taping for his assistance in the translation to English. T miss Alain Touraine, whose personal curiosity, originality, and authority provided my intellectual frame during my ten yeers in Paris. My training, continues in Turkey, in a frameless society open to all kinds of atypical practices, Iam, above al grateful to these Turkish actors, in par- ticular to the Islamist women, ‘Absences for fieldwork, conferences, and a sabbatical writing reports and articles; new research projects: new international workshops; the ‘sound of the computer: piles of books and xeroxed articles; deadlines, pan= fes, and postponed vacations, ... 1 thank my husband, Avaf Savay Akat, ‘who helps to turn this mess into playfulneContents 4. Introduction 2. Woman: The Touchstone of Westemization 27 3. Kemalism: The Civilizing Mission 57 4 Yelling: The Symbol of Istamization 83 5. Conclusion 151 Notes 141 Bibliography 161 Index 169CHAPTER 1 Introduction: The Forbidden Modern (GBP that is, the wearing of a head covering and long, loose-ftting gowns—refers to the jather than its trivialization wi fo other symbol than th 3 contemporary veiling of Muslim ‘women underscores the insurmountabilty of boundaries between I and Westem civilization? In other words, w lity of the gender question and sexuality in Islamist extques of Western mot Islamism brings fort any. By the same token or the Islamicization of & Wray OFTHE and the polltcizaton of religion. MMe veiling eos cuts power elatons between (lS, soc nas wel as between ESO 55RD ‘This book explores the significance oft through a ai ranging from the most to the conflictual encounter ‘Women’s veiling is pursued as an analytic thread, one that interweaves the power relations concealed by the “civilizing process” between “East and ‘se EERE ‘of Islamism and illuminates the patterns of Western modernity through the Therefore, study of the “ in the elaboration of Iskemism on the one hand ancl modernism on the other | 4360 SESE2 The Forbidden Modern (GBRISAB nnot be adequately understood in isolation from the local con- communica bewreen ee te figures of women, of the same religion, nationality and gender, thus becomes on ofthe questions underying this study. Hence wil tempt to esti wnt "publ issue” between ” thereby trying to translate my own rept eee ' secs hc CS TED feet the methodological difficulties stemming from the shift in master-narra~ tives toa focus on agency and meaning within a highly polarized and polit cized context. These ficulties are not ited in time and spice to the con- ditions ofthe esearch; intead, they lead tothe more general question ofthe location of the researcher, tothe connection betweun inlets ad knowledge, culminating in the age-old social science problem ofthe con- rection Detwoon analysis and engagement, bien sratue nd agency ‘The third section reviews te QAR nto Gy the Otloman-Turkish elites during the nineteenth century ae testing the foundation ofa secular natonstate by Mustafa Kemal Attu in 1933) in onder to grap fom a hstoral perspective the eatemprary disp between sinmst and modernist teeta = me between menand women and ont _ ties the cherished concept of “universal ciation” held by Turki reformistlits, which came tobe synonymous with Western Saropeane ture The fourth section argues forthe need to locate and st "he fit section el that of slamist veling in erms ofthe intrigue an resistance fers tothe civilzng projet. the lami deity. co a rti“‘“‘CO™OC_O constructions of Um Implictertique of secular ways fife. on that resus n women's corporal —L—Lr—t——sSOsOSsSC owe their newly acquired class status and social recognition to their access. to secular education, also empower themselves through their claim on Islamic knGQ@IG0QORNGPOHERS. VElIGe student, as CEWTGARIEEB:s of GlamisMD acquire and aspire for “GABONE EAI)” of G8 diffekent Garces ehgioNwleNASEUANPTeir recently acquired visibility, both on university campuses and within Islamist movements, indicates SAG appropriation ofthis new symbolic capital and the emergence of a new fig- ‘ure, the female Islamist intellectual. Furthermore, women’s participation in Islamist movements symbol ‘izes 2 (USERTOBCORGIA nc ushers in ARMORY OF BOHEVE. Ifthe traditional way of covering oneself changes from one Muslim country toanother in terms of thf@HOAMOINEEBSSEE, the contemporary Islamist outfit is similar in all Muslim countries: itis through the symbolism of ‘women’s veiling that a commonality af identity and the Muslim commu nity (wna) is reconstructed and reinvented at the transnational level In sum, the veiling of women is not a smooth, gradual, continuous process growing out of tradition. On the contrary, itis the (GSS) ‘new interpretation of Islamic religion by the recently urbanized and ed- ‘cated social groups ¥:ho have broken away from traditional popular inter /protationsaand practieGs and politicized religions an assertion oftheir col- Iective identity against modernity. The veiling OF WOMEN IS HNEMOStSATERD G@Gi{or Re eontemporAeyGAMIE movement, which is grounded on this focal tension among Islamism, traditionalism, and modernist. The difference between the two profiles of Muslim women and the new significance of veiling were sharply underlined by the “Gaatlseaneis GHB Which erupt iGQRPUMUAKEP” The use of the traditional head- scarf by (GWRIGGINEass women IivIApn the fringes of modern city life has gone almost unnoticed, considered as a residual practice of tradi tionalism, while th€S@@pHON OHNE llamnistOullitbya group oF UNiveRsiED SRERISIA)p henomenon of thPOSEH9S3 PeHOD. is considered asa manip- Uulative tool of the rising Islamist fundamentalist movement and, conse~ quently, (SSI BROUOREE|s WER) BOlATZEe BOIGETAEPUW bets.een secular- ists and Islamists To distinguish the Islamist from the traditional way of covering, the GRRRSAAnASS MEAD labeted the new veiling of women as the “GUHA6 _The Forbidden Modern polvemicandhineat fe tteptenve alee of omer spartan Samat mevemet : sch en nt Peron dito, foto coming of ong nen soto, or sk scar In eves it employe as enoung if edopled fem (Crom Tenth a Neal hs wise th rane mist. Sd prt beta the Ottoman TuFksh erge and the West Labting the female Musi son oe AR tom ucel ths waite! henataneoeeee eer ange tate modem way of apeupaion = ot tosiplyperpening teen On rector he lihcomennsocelgous permease mento tn Tarksh-and hough eral te fer ome ton ellos cases) wed to dattuih women’s igs pol Gaston ant empowerment. Hence, te iabel “hban® al eve the hybrid and worogeive chuaeer of the lami vellng mover froundat on the power jms between Eat and Wes ioral and modem en ond women: Cota to he wana pace of Ihc ving or he lam hens which ones spe msn Mos lim? can lead to essentialist definitions and exclusionary standards, thereby turning the imagined community into an “oppressive communi- tarianism.” The “return of the repressed” can in turn be repressive. This, totalitarian tendency can be easily triggered by a search for the “total” Islamic identity, one freed from the “corrupt and dominating” offects of Western modlernity. The more one reinforces the relationship between the Introduction 21 “ pure" self and “total” community, the more Islamic politics becomes an imposed lifestyle, veiling a compulsory emblem, and women the moral ‘guardians of the Islamic identity and community. This would entail the control of the public sphere by means of canceling out individual choices in determining lifestyles, monopolizing the cultural code, and instituting an Islamist form ofthe colonization ofthe sof In other words, the totalitarian dimension emerges from the utopian ideal ofa single identity for the collectivity. The pairing ofa fixed identity and a utopian community presupposes a harmonious, a historial non ferentiated social order that avoids all subversive conflict. touchstones of this Islamic order in that they become, in their bodies and sexuality, atraitd‘anon between identity and commu. This implies that the integrity of the Islamic community will be measured and reassured by ‘women’s politically regulated and confined modesty and identity (such as compulsory veiling, restricted public visibility, and the restrained encounter between the sexes). Traditional gender identities and oles thus underlie Islamic authoritarianism, GRIF te ia wopae yenming foe he Hii implementation ofthe three pillars of Islam, the three D's of “din, diya xe deol" theligion,itework, an stat) leads to toalzing concep fons. deny i etait se dist 1d distinguishes them from other “new social movements.” limitation of Islamism as a political project and the autonomization of Islam within civil society will open up Islam as a space for diversity and AQMD However, gender cuestions ‘will remain the yardstick by which Islamic pluralism is measured ‘Thus, the direction in which Islamist movements evolve will hinge significa jon and recognition of women's identity and agency. ic politics can delimit women’s individuality and visibility at the same time that the politicization of women within Islamic polis pe MIIRIRIE stn women are empawe cred by sD ot asigns thom a “mitan:""issonary,"poltict entity, a by In which provides them a “professional,” "nel ga cee aa 7 rr reso Muslin worn _ ea re te i cure eared ev are the22 The Forbidden Modern as the "1? APORENASTMIWORIED, providing in for asserting their long-silenced difference, by questioning the equation between civilized and Westertized. It also ‘empowers them by supplying a collective identity. politics provides a or thy mn” and becomes a v jomen now ‘work as columnists and journalists: they attend political meetings, militate fechas pee eater eat a is thus emerging from within Islamism, ag aE errr ees en TD once rpc ered by their public and professional visibility, continue to follow and develop personal life strategies. At the same time, while never forgetting the primacy of their identi guage wives, women confront and criticize the Islamist ideology: 3m the mualirem (domestic inti- ‘mate) sphere forces women to question traditional gender identities ancl, ale definitions of “liit” and “illicit” behavior, thereby unveiling relations of power between Islamist men a Criticizing the "pseudopro- tectionism” of Muslim men, veiled women claim their right to “acquire ppersonality"—that is, “a life of their own”—and, consequently, provoke Never ee A oc A isa serene ne meine ce peers el periateaeereet sexes (social segregation of the sexes) arbidden Moder points to this encoui ‘which is taking place in practice but Islamism. Ibis these paradoxes, ambiguities, etween the Islamist utopia and personal strategies for women, between the quest for authenticity and that for native moder- nity —that I present in this book, Introduction 23, Postpublication: Engaging Nonengagement The readings and reactions to a book, which provide a context fer inquiry and discussion, can say more about a subject than the book itself And the ronpoliial engagement opens up a new space for understanding and dia- logue, which itself can become more engaging to the extent that sient fied by the author In the preface to the Turkish edition of this book, 1 wrote about my deliberate intention to not locate myself in the political debate and polar- ization, by then very fierce, between Islamists and secularstson te "head- scarf issue.” I also explained that I refused to adopt secularist, feminist Islamist, or leftist perspectives to explain the Islamist veiling movement (thereby facing a significant los of re to define my loca tone 9 egst y maining RMB shar csr not justified by an objective analysis using scienific-postivist arguments but, rather, by soc 3 rk nrc en te ea sociologist I wanted to understand the actors” point of view by employing SARA itrout being swayed by ideology, neither by syne Pathy nor aversion), and not as an ethical assertion of general principles {here again I would lose credibility by doing so). The metaphor Iused was that in my project Twas an artisan: as the carver works with the diamond to increase its brilliance, the researcher works with a mulifaceted social real ity to shed light on it. 1 do not know if Islamist veiling gained more clarity and ineligibility bocase of my work, but its certain that, according to the radical secular ists, because I studied it without denouncing it, 1 was responsible for Islamism’s increasing politcal force and intellectual legitimacy in Turkey On the other hand, for the radical Islamists I was not telling teir story exactly, not taking into account their “becoming” in the Future bat making a synchronistic analysis of their encounter with modemity, which, they Dolievesis ‘ amie utopia, of modernization, secularization, and the emancipation of woman, society, and the state as the most cherished and history-making public narrative of Tuekey—known simply as Kemal- on ara Jeftism, oF neoferninism, was sioyply dis- Toga category of “intellectual” define inthe Turkish experience by24. The Forbidden Modern master narratives, requires political engagement either in terms of critical ‘or supportive proximity to the state. Fence, my calling for with the subject of my stucly accounts for the loss ofthe in credibility 1 was disempowered since such credibility is defined through collective identity and the use of master-narratives (fostering the postmod= em trivialization of myself, ‘The shifting role ofthe intellectual from one who interprets universal and rational laws of change to one who studies emotion and interest-laden agency, examining ambiguous, paradoxical, multifaceted, polymorphous indigeneous practices in an effort to introduce actor, subjectivity, and non- Western particularisms is not easily acknowledged in the highly politicized ‘Turkish context. It is neither considered nor criticized as simple postmod- cem playfulness and relativism. Although in some of the reviews of my book I received the postmodern label, in general I was treated more “seri= ously." In some contexts giving voice to particularisms and studying. agency, especially with regard to Islamism, is almost synonymous with being “reactionary” and "fundamentalist*8 Thus, if one crosses over intel= Jectual and class boundaries, especially by working from within such cen- tral issues as Islam and women, the appearance of intellectual engagement becomes almost a matter of “impurity.” The readings of Moder Maren: endered by Turkish intellectuals and different segments of society provide feedback for further understanding of Islamist veiling and the power relations in which itis contextualized Overall Turkish readers (unlike many French ones), were not very recep tive to ambiguities within the text, and consequently, they have denied almost all double meanings, borrowings, and hybridizations. Both for the Islamists and the modernists it was either Islam or modernity, either Islamic women or feminist women.” I myself, as a by-product of these mutually exclusive rales and poriclary tot of Wester an seca las, was 4 ae vision interview (on a program similar to “Cross-Fire”), the Islamists were unwilling to match my physical appearance (uncovered and not very mod~ est for Islamist taste) with what I was saying, while the Kemalists felt betrayed because they had expected to hear a courageous political denouncement of Islamism. Audiences sympathetic to both sides of the debate expressed their anger and criticism in anonymous letters to me. AL first this book, and its author, were caught in the polarization between Islamists and secularists. Talk of “hidden agenclas” and “conspir- acy theories” obscured and hijacked other approaches. analyses, and inter- lectual Introduction 25 views. Gradually, however, the postion of obstinate SSSR 1 the ongoing polemics, within the proscribed terms, opened up a navel space for dialogue and interaction ‘The dialogue and recognition between different social nets is poss bile only when the walls of incommanicability are deconstructed and clomystifiedvehen the “other” is “desatanized.” As the Turkish edition of The Forbidden Modern contributed to lessening the distances between repre- sentations, it AEHBHREARS0 to the displacement ofthe termsofthe debate and the establishment of relations of exchange and reciprocity between Islamists, secularists Two anecdotes regarding encounters with two divergert types of women are very telling One concers the personal comments ofa very di tinguished novelist, Adalet Agaoglu, and th other those of an anonymos group of veiled students, Adalet Agno told me that she stopped reading thebook after the thi chapter, which depicted Kemalist wome1 who par- ticipated in the public space atthe expense oftheir individuality and sexu- ality. To emphasize this intrinsic tension, the chapter ended with references to her nowel Le Don for Dat in which the publicly “emancipated” hero- ine commits suicide upon discovering her own sexual desites. Agpoita criticized me for using her own novel to suggest that women fe her no longerhad anything to say. Her comments forced me to becomenware of a central question I had dismissed but which the book tse could not avoid “The suicide ofa Kemalist women atthe end of ane chapter and the sudden ruption ofthe veiled women inthe following one—along with the gap. the discontinuity, and the silence between the two chapters—allhinted ata reversal of a situation, at leat in the sense of «paradigmatic shift in self dlofintion. The veiled Muslim stucents were indeed intensely preoccupied by their new selfdefinitions. On their invitation F participated in a panel on “Modernization, Women ancl Islam” organized bythe Faculty of Theology at the University of Marmara. which three hundred students attended Half ofthe audience consisted of women dressed in Islamicouthits, who sat together inthe front sets ofthe conference room, Isat with the male pane clits but exchanged gazes with the female students, wondering if there really was a common langugage Beneath our radically distine corporal statements. I wondered i had something to say that would be received sympathetically, of if L was totally misdirected and misprosed by my research, Male Islamist commentators (also professors) were, in general, anguing,that Islam was recognizing full equality of eights for men and26 The Forbidden Moder ‘women. In response, female students asked me if males can truly defend ‘women’s rights and if they can speak on women’s behalf as well as women can themselves. Quoting the book, they addressed me with a host of ques- tions, ranging from "How does one combine domesticity with individual professional aspirations?” to “How do we preserve the difference of femi- nity in the public male domain?” Their questions made me think that they were far ahead of the book in elaborating their identities. Furthermore, they were using not only the book but also its author in their struggles with conservative male counterparts for their self affirmation, After the panel a group of female students came up to me and presented themselves play- fully as “modern salrem” and let me know that they had had a long debate with male students in their faculty club on the issue of the segregation of the sexes. These students had found a way to assert themselves and suc- ceeded in organizing a panel for “all.” 1 was used as a tool for them to transgress boundaries, Nonengagement had unintentionally become more engaging, CHAPTER 2 Woman: The Touchstone of Westernization In 1910, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was unclergoing profound changes, Ottoman princess Seniha Sultan, exasperated by the manner in ‘which the West represented the conditions under which Turkish women ‘were assumed to live, wrote a letter to her French friend Madame Simone de la Cherté: (My lear! We, Turkish women, are not known in Europe atall. I can even say that we are much less known than Chinese and Japanese women, Regardless of how far Peking and Tokyo are from Paris . Istanbul is nearby, though. ‘They make up really unimaginable stories about us. Not important! They anticipate us to be slaves, to be imprisoned in rooms, tolive only. behind lattice windows, to be chained up ane watched over by fero- cious black and other slaves who are armed from head to foot and ‘who are also thought to put us into sacks and then throw us into the Bosphorus from time to time. We are assumed to live in a group of ‘numerous rivaling wives, and they expect every Turkish man to have a harem of his own, that is, to have at least eight or ten wives.” ‘This letter exemplifies how the Western world, both in the waitings of travelers of the period and in the works of Orientalists, concerned itself with the disturbing yet simultaneously exotic difference of Eastern soci- ceties. Edward Said, in Orientalism, illustrates how the West creates its cul tureand identity by differentiating itself from the “East,” relegating the lat- ter to an “inferior” and “repressed” other. He asserts that Wester culture reproduces the very ideas and images related to the Orient in itragery as ‘well as in scientific and political discourses.* For Said the Western repre- sentation of the Orient, deemed the surrogate to even the darker sie of the cident, indeed helps the West to gain ils strength andl identity. 728 _ The Forbidden Moder ‘The narration on Ottoman women by the Princess of Belgiojoso, who was in exile in Turkey in 1853, offers an example of Western “astonish= ment” in regatel to so-called Eastern primitiveness: "The women do not hhave any sense of shame either for their children or for people around them: they can easily undress in front of their sons; they can freely talke about intimate issues in their presence."" The display of Otoman women’s {femininity and sexuality within the closed space of the harem in a “na ural” fashion is critically depicted from the standpoint of the “puritan” morality of the era. The princess proposed a modemization for the Ottoman state that requires essentially the abolition of Islam, which is con- sidered to be what separates the East from the “civilized” world. As she ‘maintained, the very constitution of a new family form similar to the Wes ‘ern model, in contrast to existing polygamous marriages, would be the ‘most substantial reform of all in this modernization attempt These convictions indeed spring from the Western ideology of human= ism, and they were exercised exclusively during the modernization attempts initiated by the Ottoman ruling elites during the nineteenth cer tury. So long as the West determined the very definition of modernity and formed its propulsive force on a global seale, on the strength of ideas orig- inating from the Enlightenment tradition and the industrial civilization it created, societies of the Orient lost their decision-making power, and were successively forced to define their culture and history in reference to the Western model. Those societies that were “weak” in terms of generating, social change and innovation as an indigenous structural process were thus, dependent on the impact of Western modemity and its local con- structs, Here the concept of “weak historicity” is useful in highlighting, this dependence in sociological terms rather than reducing it to economic para- meters. It gives priority to the analysis of social representation and agency in non-Western societies, which are not, of course, independent of the prob- lematic representations of Western modernity. 5 Itisthe societies that lagged behind in the process of social innovation, ‘or, more accurately, the making ofthe principles of modemity, that sought their histories constantly in reference tothe precepts of Western modernity Hence, as Iranian philosopher Daryush Shayegan argues, those societies left on the periphery of Western civilization are excluded from the sphere of history and knowledge, for they cannot participate any longer in the “carnival of change,” and this exclusion has in turn resulted in a sense of “cultural schizophrenia” in these cultures. Thus, the encounter of the East with the Western world resulted in at ‘Woman: The Touchstone of Westernization 29 least the disintegration of the Eastern identity, rather than in a reciprocal exchange between the two cultures. Hichem Djait,a Tunisian, expresses his, ‘opinion of the rise of the West and the decline of Islam as follows: “The his- tory of Islam does not act on the basis of its own dynamics: it rather seems to be a reversed and wilted reflection of the West."7 fwe examine the history of Turkey, ‘commitment especially by the Kemalists inthe service of establishing, a cul- tural liaison with the West. The Turkish case of modernization isan exeel- lent example in terms of the course of action taken in the adoption of the Western rationalist anc! universalist model and the principle of secularism itself, As much as anything else, these modernization attempts gave rise to a discussion of the question of the East-West opposition in a society in ‘which Islamic culture is cleeply embedded. The history of ideas in Turkey zeflects the opposition between the Islamic and Westernist viewpeints and their two distinct projects for society. Much more than anything else, out- looks regarding the social position of women lie at the center of these debates. For itis indeed the attitudes about the position women should ‘occupy in society that set the course of action a society can take and that ‘mark the limits of modernization in Muslim societies, Ths is why in these societies “the question of women” is not defined only in relation to the social conditions in which women live but is also related to the issues of culture and civilization. Although the most visible feature of the Turkish modernization movement is its transition from a patrimonial Islamic ‘empire toa secular national state, the increasing public visibility of women in social life and the principle of equality between men andl wamen has helped introduce the ideals of modernity into the collective imagination of 14 Muslim country. In contrast to the political transformation which tar= ggeted the state apparatus, the cultural renewals at the interperscnal level and between the sexes in fact have followed a slow, less striking, yet as 1 ‘will demonstrate, concurrently more weighty course of action, ‘The condition of women in Turkey has evolved along, with the histor= ieal course of modernization attempts, The question of women Les at the center of the modernization mentality. which favored the Westem notion ‘of universality in opposition to tradition, and pasticularly, Islam. While the Westernized elites defended the idea that Western universalism could only be achieved if women were emancipated from Islamic traditions, the con- servatives were suspicious, if not hostile, to attempts at “liberating” is possible to detect a voluntary ‘women from their traditional roles. ‘At the expense of oversimplification, its possible to evaluat: the his-30__ The Forbidden Modern tory of modernization in Turkey as the history of two conflicting cultural ‘models or two movements—the Westernist and the Islamist, The contents, Of these two movements were naturally subject to modifications as they faced changing social issues through time; consequently, the reformism of the Tanzimat Period (reforms initiated between 1839 and 1876 to western- ize the political, social, and economic structures of the Ottoman Empire) does not equal the Westernism of the republican era. The Westemist move _ments searched for the key to progress in Western universalism, whereas, for the traditionalist and later Islamist movements, only the revival of Islam and its application to everyday life and state governance could assure salvation ‘The position of women is the determining factor in these conflicts, framing the existing dualities, such as Islam/the West, traditional/mod- cer, equality /difference, and malremnamaliren (private /public), While for the Westernists equality between the sexes and the pasticipation of liber- ated women in the public realm is a prerequisite of “social development,” for the Islamists, the exit of women from private life, malin, isan attempt to undermine existing communitarian rules, which may result in the moral decay of society. In other words. the affinity between these two movements Originates in theit views with regard to the position of women in society.” Hence, discussions of the appropriate position for women in Mustim coun- tries directly refer to preferences for different social models. ‘Women and the Consciousness of Civilization ‘The social position of women began to be discussed with the onset of mod- emization attempts during the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876), along with the orientation toward the Westem social model. During this period the duality between the West and the East was formulated upon the differenti- ation of the material and spiritual definitions of civilization. For intellect alls ofthis period the fundamental question was to determine for which fea- tures of the reforms Islam would provide support and with which features it would conflict and, thus, to agree upon mutually shared reforms with Islam. The ultimate question that neetled to be answered was whether any ‘convergence existed between West and East, This duality existed in every. course of thought oriented toward Ottoman society during the period, As @ consequence, the social position of women was discussed within the boundaries of this framework from the time of the Tanzimat reforms to the Second Constitution (1908-1916). Those who emphasized the universality ‘Woman: The Touchstone of Westernization 31 ‘of Western civilization in their arguments criticized arranged marriages, polygamous marriages, and discrimination between the sexes; they defended the right of education for women and accepted romantic love as a basis for marriage. Those, however, who perceived the consequences of these Western-oriented reforms as a threat to the dominant cultural model stressed the importance of preserving the traditional position of women in society Thus, based on the impacts of the West upon the modemization of Ottoman society, two cultural and social propositions emerged. The first proposition sought to establish the future along with the support of the past; it argued that the cultural and moral inheritance of the pas: ought to be preserved, and, as a consequence, the impacts of Western civilization needed to be confined to technological, administrative, and material aspects. The second proposition, however, argued that the civilization maintained a totality in itself. Adherents to this proposition basically aim to transform or reinterpret traditions in the attempt to achieve modernity. Thus, for the reformists the education and liberation of women was a pre- requisite of civilization, while for the traditionalists the framing, of rela- tionships between men and women according to the Sharia was necessary to preserve the spiritual values and morality of society. The disputes of this period demonstrate that the issue of women’s role in society lay a the very center of these two conflicting viewpoints. "* Mahmud Esad (1856-1918), one of the representatives of the tradition- alist paradigm, criticized reformist intellectuals who attributed the reasons for backwardness to the Sharia and existing polygamous marriages. Dis- puting the reformists, he maintained that this tradition in fact originated from the very nature of human beings—that is, that polygamy isa natural Iaw—and it is the Sharia that legitimates this tradition. Defending polygamy as a practice compatible with nature, and even as a beneficial rule of society in terms ofthe elimination of prostitution, Bsad asserted that the superiority of Islamic civilization over Christian was to be sou ght in the spiritual world and moral codes."® Esad referred to the binary opposition of the spiritual and material components of civilization when he wrote: “there exist two sides of every Civilization, one of them is material and the other one is the spiritual side. ‘The spiritual side refers to the morality of this civilization. The material side, however, consists of sewing machines, railways and dreadnoughts, in short, itis the visible products of industrial inventions.” According to this distinetion, the spiritual side of civilization is composed of moral acquisi-32 _The Forbidden Matern tions, while the material side refers to industrial inventions and the pro- duction of goods. As maintained by this argument, it is possible to adopt the material side of Western civilization so long, as the moral civilization of the East is preserved in the society. The conservative outlook, which differ- cntiated the material and spiritual aspects of civilization in such a manner, ‘was ready to transfer the technology of the West, provided that the “belief system, morality and spirit” of the society would be provided by Eastern civilizations ‘The Westernists, who defended the idea that Western civilization is totality and cannot be separated into distinct parts, argued that moclern- ization could only be built upon universal values, not cultural pasticu- larisms. This outlook approached! civilization as a monolithic entity and rejected the distinction between cultural and scientific knowledge, Hence, fone of the representatives of this tradition, Semseddin Sami (3850-2914), argued that, “in case the West was inferior in the cultural realm, it would not be able to develop its material civilization.” ‘As for his Westernist and republican intellectual successors, Sami, t00, treated the education and! rights of women within the framework of the “civilization project.” Sami, who wrote that “the condition of any society is always symmetrical to the condition of women,” defended the idea that “the whole of humanity will be educated, once women are given the right ‘f education."*7 For him society would not be able to develop and attain Civilization so long.as half of the population (i.e, women) in the Ottoman society remained ignorant, idle, and uneducated. If they were educated in science and taught morality, they could transmit this knowledge to their children. Thus, the right to education for women was defended both as a ‘way to glorify their motherhood tasks andl in the name of civilization, In contrast to the naturalist arguments of the conservatives, Sami defined the position of women with reference to their social conditions and particularly in terms of their right to education. In his book Kadilar (omen he defended the icea that both women and men have similar int lectual faculties. Further, he maintained that societies will always minimize the possible services women can provide unless they acknowledge the intelligence of women. He even cited some of the possible occupations at ‘which women would be better than men “thanks to their natuzal inclina- tions": tailors, meclical workers, service workers, and accountants in trade. As a representative of the reformist outlook of the Tanzimat Period, Sami defended Islam, claiming that it did not act as a barrier to progress Woman: The Touchstone of Westemization 33 and civilization; indeed, it was the misinterpretations of Islam that give rise to certain problems. He stated that the hotly debated issues of the period. such as polygamy, veiling, the exit of women from malirem, and divorce ‘were not directly affiliated with Islam, and that these issues arose from a lack of knowledge concerning the “seal orders and laws” of Islam, He claimed that the ban on the exit of women from male and their slavery were all practiced prior to Islam, and that the religion of Islem itself ‘opposes such social traditions. In relation to the practice of slavery he fur= ther maintains that Islam does not order slavery at all ancl that the libera- tion ofa slave is regarded as one of the most important examples of a pious act; yet Islam did not abolish the institution of slavery. Sami emphasized the fact that the practice of veiling did not bar women, who are mentioned in the Koran, from taking part in meetings and other activities, voting, and ‘even going to war. As far as the question of polygamy was consicered, he backed the argument that the practice of polygamy was not invented by Islam and that, although Islam stated that “its pious to suffice oneself with ‘one wife,” this statement was not used in practice." ‘The different interpretations of Islam in relation to the position of women by the traditionalists and the Westernists became evident in the controversy that took place between traditionalist Esad and the famous female writer of the period, Fatma Aliye (1864-1924). Referrirg to the verse of the Koran that legitimized monogamous marriages, Aliye. the first “intellectual” woman to emerge from private education at home, attempted to falsify the arguments of Esad defending polygamy as a "nat- ural law,” confirmed by Seriat, the religious law.” As Aliye explained. in fact the rules set up initially by Islam have degenerated over time; islam in fact does not oppose the rights of woman, and it does not serve asa barrier to the “progress of civilization.” This controversy was first published in a periodical (°Malumat” 1896), and later Fatma Aliye developed her ideas in a book on Muslim women (in 1900) that was also translated into Arabic and French, ‘The position of women in society and women’s social functions were dis ‘cussed during the Tanzimat Period with regard to the determination of how far attempts at Westemization would go. Authors of this period, including Namuk Kemal (1840-1888) and Ahmet Mithad Efendi (1844-1912), used paired concepts such as Sark-Gurp (East-West) and Alafrangalk-Alaturkahk (oceidental style-oriental style) in discussing, dis- tinctions between the West and the East, These authors stressed the signif-34_ The Forbidden Modern ‘cance of the empire's constant orientation toward the West and the need to differentiate the good and the bad attributes of civilization (material and spiritual aspects) that Islam does not hinder progress. For instance, Nantck Kemal, an author who symbolizes this period in his weitings, “is neither a Sharia supporter nor an Easternist nor a Westernist without any reserva- tion,” and he was also aware of the dangers of “conservatism of the old” and “imitations of the new.”=" ‘The myth of the Golden Age of Islam, referring to the idea that the new rights that will be granted to women as a consequence of modemniza- tion attempts will not conflict with the practices of early Islam and that every novelty to be adapted from the West can be detected within the sources of Islam, exercised a profound influence upon the Westemnists of the period.*® The Westernist movement thus pursued the sources of legiti= macy within Islam. Ahmet Mithad Efendi and Namuk Kemal indeed referred to the religion of Islam as the zenith of civilization, with its empha- sis on moral values and on the training of honorable individuals + Jale Parla has suggested Tanzimat did not generate a “dualistic cul- ture” between Eastern and Western norms in Ottoman cultural lie, but it did provide a platform for discussion on the “orientation towards the West of which boundaries were definitive and confined” and which was “rei forced with various verses and haditis" (the tradition of the Prophet Muhammed—ic, nis sayings) “under the umbrella of a dominant Islamic cculture.”* Parla also notices a latent and ardent desire for a “father figure” among writers of the Tanzimat Period.** According to Parla, Tanzimat intellectuals aspired to resurrect a sultan, a father figure who would pre- serve the morality of the East at the societal as well as the familial level 2” The most serious threat to the authority of the father, however, did not spring from the science andl technology of the West but, rather, from “phys ical lust.” As a consequence of the detachment from Islam, Tanzimat intel Jectuals worried that lust would replace “spiritual love” and would seduce all youngsters, resulting in their “running after evil women.”* Departing, from the rules of Islamic training and aspiring for the West are all rendered equal to the arousal of sensual and sexual desires. Along these lines, Namuk Kemal wrote that “there exists no difference between dancing and flirting with the devil”; and “if what you assume to be civilization is seeing women in the streets almost naked or dancing at a gathering, these are all against ‘our morality. We do not want it, we do iot " ‘The importance assigned to the privacy (mahremiyet) of women during the Tanzimat Period can be seen in the laws confining women to invisi Woman: The Touchstone of Westernization 35 ity not only socially but physically as well. For instance, the population census recorded the physical attributes of men—age, height, eye color, beard, ete —while women are only registered by name and age, and, inter- cestingly enough, only by their relatives.» The civil code, too, served to pro- tect women’s privacy. The units of a house that are designated aswomen’s {quarters (nuakarr-i nisvan)—such as the kitchen, well, and courtyard—were by law not to be visible from neighboring houses. A neighbor who can see any part of the women’s quarters was obliged to block the view of these quarters with a partition." It is clear that ever since the Tanzimat Period the boundaries of West cermization have been determined with regard to the issues ofthe privacy of ‘women and the relationship between the two sexes. To put it differently, Westemization and the arousal of “civilizational” consciousress were directly dependent upon the relationship between the sexes, the allocation (of space, and lifestyles. The boundaries between mahrem and nanuhren, the interior and exterior of a house, and the regulations dictated in welation to these realms, as well as the lives of women, were affected asa corsequence of changes following the Tanzimat Period. Fashion magazines, free of the censorship exercised by Abdilhamid IK (1876-1909), provided space for articles on hair and skin care as well as the use of cosmetics in their pages; veiled women registered for Swedish physical exercise courses, and female students of the School of Fine Arts used Greek statues, covered with waist cloths, as their models.” The increasing education of women, their emer- sgence from their houses into the public realm, their interest in exercise and dancing, and all other activities undertaken by women after the Tanzimat Period symbolized not only the Western lifestyle but, more impertant, the increasing socialization and visibility of women, ‘The main reason why Westernists and conservatives focused their debates on the issues related to women is bound up with the degeneration of mahiren (privacy) itself. The female body, which long established the boundaries between the realms of mahren and nawairen, still influences social projects. Therefore, itis not mere coincidence that the Islamist move- ‘ment that emerged! in the 1980s in Turkey has chosen these two symbolic realms in narrating its ideological struggle. It was during the Tanzimat Period that the most salient difference between the West and the East was delineated, in terms of interior/exte- rior, mafirenv/armalrem, and thus relations between men and women. It ‘was also during this period that the very essence of Westernization was, conceived for the first time as “the project of civilization,” which meant36 _ The Forbidden Moder the transformation of Muslim traditional social organization and ways of life, Western Equali y Islamic Morality, and Turkish Tradition ‘The period of the Constitutional Monarchy, 1908-1919 (called the Second Constitution because of the short-lived efforts to institute a constitution in 1876-1878), was the time during which various intellectual outlooks flour- ished and the issues of citizenship and the equality of women in Ottoman society dominated the public agenda, regardless of the deterioration of the ‘empire, For T. Taskiran (1903-1979), this was a period of "Great Hopes,” while for Ziya Gikalp (1876-1924) it was the “New Life.” Furthermore, the intellectual outlooks that originated and crystallized during this period underlay the succeeding Kemalist reforms. ‘The three intellectual outlooks of the period, Islamic, Westemist, and ‘Turkist all defined their ideological bases in support ofthe “restoration” of the empire, while they diverged from one another in their approaches to the rights of women. Infact, all of the reformist movements of this period ‘were supporters of the idea of “progress” and were oriented toward the Wester model. The fundamental problem was to determine how far the Westemization movement would be tolerated by the Islamic culture. Hence, Ismail Kara suggests that it would be much more reasonable 10. regard the Islamic movement of the Constitutional Period not as an appo- sition to Westernization but, rather, as the Islamization of these attempts.» ‘The converging point of the Islamic, Western-oriented, and Turkist move- :ments of the period was their emphasis on the idea of progress and the fact that they were all Westernist reformist attempts in their basic orientations, However, they maintained different approaches tothe question of identity. ‘The definitive yet distinct reference points of identity and civilization dis- tinguish these outlooks—the Western universal, the Islamic, and the ancient Turkish values. Its therefore more productive to focus on the issue of civilization identity rather than of Westernization, which also leads us directly to the question of women. For the relationship between women and men as well as the organization and regulation of interior versus exte= rior provide a basis for cultural identity ‘Thus, the question of women remained powerful in determining, the limits of modernism (Le., the orientation toward the Western cultural model) set by the icleological movements of this period. Issues of nairem (private) life and the relationship between the sexes were among the most resistant of established cultural elements to the Western cultural model, due to the fact that they were regulated by religious law. Viesternists deemed the traditions of Islam a barrier against civilization, and they sought the liberation of women from the chains of these traditions, whereas the Islamists accused the Westernists of being, imitators and favored the [preservation of the moral values of a Muslim society and loyalty to Sharia, ‘The Turkists, however, sought the elements of an ideal society of the future in past Turkish life, and they did not confine moral identity to the religion of islam ‘Women as Human Beings ‘The radical Westernist movement of this period tried to define dvilization independently from religion and tradition. According to the arguments of Westernism, which were formulated on the premises of rationalism and positivism. civilization is a product of neither Islam nor Christianity. but, rather, isthe product of contemporary and universal humanist values. For thinkers with this outlook attempts to differentiate the good and bad aspects of civilization were nothing more than implicit anti-Westernism. Asstated by Abdullah Cevdet (1867-1932), one of the founders of Itilat we Tevnkki Cemiyeti (Union of Order and Progress), Western civilization is “a totality which must be accepted with its roses ancl thorns." For the radi= cal Westernists, Islamic traditions served as the most salient barrier in the ppath toward civilization. This is why Cevdet cited religious rulesregarding, veiling and polygamy, together with “degenerated traditions,” as the main reasons for the backwardness of Muslims as well as for the breakdown of the empire.” ‘The most radical criticism of traditionalist and religious morality appeared in the poems of Tevfik Fikret (3867-1915) Fikret, who wanted to replace religious morality with “Iuumanisme,” felt that iis reason that socks truth and argues for “Justice” in opposition to “the tyrannical God” who censlaves human beings. He stressed his profound belief in the transforma- tive power of reason. The Western radicalism of Tevfik Fikret lay in his attempts to detach the sources of morality from tradition and religion.” For Fikret the rights of women should be defined within the framework of human rights. The following verse from a Fikret poem represents a com= ‘mon view about the question of women in the Constitutional Petiod: