Teaching Clinical Decision Making
Teaching Clinical Decision Making
TEACHING CLINICAL
DECISION MAKING
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.
GREGG HENRIQUES
When you look for it, it is everywhere—it permeates almost every aspect
of professional practice. Whether one is setting up one’s office, consulting on
a referral, deciding what assessment instrument to use, meeting a client for
the first time, reviewing and assessing the literature, or advocating for a par-
ticular treatment approach for a particular case, one is engaged in a form of
it. The “it” can be termed clinical decision making, and it’s not too much of a
stretch to say that the fundamental goal of doctoral training in professional
psychology or training in any advanced mental health discipline is to produce
budding clinicians who have the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that enable
them to make and carry out good clinical decisions.
Despite the centrality of this concept, professional psychologists are
generally less likely than some other health professionals, such as nurses and
physicians, to deliberately frame their work and teach their craft in terms of
clinical decision making, although there are exceptions (e.g., O’Donohue &
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14711-011
Clinical Decision Making in Mental Health Practice, J. J. Magnavita (Editor)
Copyright © 2016 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
273
Henderson, 1999). The failure to explicitly frame our training in this manner
may be a function of the old debate about clinical versus empirical judgment
or the fact that “clinical” is still used to denote one of the three broad prac-
tice areas (with “counseling” and “school” being the other two) or the fact
that conflict remains between the romantic and empirical visions of profes-
sional psychology. Whatever the reasons, it is my hope that this volume will
change the current state of affairs. Emphasizing clinical decision making is
apt because it encourages a deliberate, reflective, and intentional stance with
regard to how to go about one’s work as a professional psychologist.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.
Because clinical decision making is such a broad term, it has, not surpris-
ingly, many facets and can be approached from many different angles. For
example, Magnavita and Lilienfield (Chapter 2, this volume) offer a powerful
analysis that deconstructs the key elements of the clinical decision-making
process from the vantage point of cognitive psychology (Kahneman, 2011).
Part of that analysis includes a review of how people make decisions in gen-
eral. Perhaps most central to understanding general decision making is that
human’s process information via two related but separable streams of menta-
tion. The first stream is a fast, relatively automatic, perceptual, holistic, affec-
tive system of processing that sizes up a situation via “thin slicing” (Gladwell,
2005) and forms quick, intuitive judgments. The second system is a slower,
more explicitly self-conscious and deliberate form of thought, mediated largely
by processes of verbal justification. From an educator’s perspective, this is a
basic and central feature of the human mind of which students of profes-
sional psychology should be very aware. For example, a training exercise that
I find useful when the class is viewing video is to stop the tape as soon as the
patient (or client) appears on the screen and ask students for their report of
their immediate perceptions, feelings, and intuitions about the client. Often
trainees are initially reticent to say anything, generally because they don’t
want to appear as though they “judge a book by its cover.” But once they are
given permission, the associations flow, and we see that many impressions are
formed almost instantaneously. They first notice the obvious demographics
of the patient. Then they will notice how attractive they perceive the client
to be and the manner of dress, hygiene, and body position, all which serve as
indicators of socioeconomic status. Following that, a host of more imagina-
tive wonderings will begin. These impressions are examples of thin slicing,
an inevitable aspect of being human, and students need to be aware that they
will then begin to form narratives and expectations on the basis of this very
brief exposure.
Building on this basic formulation of the human mind, Magnavita
and Lilienfeld (Chapter 2, this volume) further articulate how individuals
develop heuristics, the general rules of thumb that are acquired over time that
help consolidate the massive amounts of incoming information into relatively
One of the most perplexing challenges for the field of professional psy-
chology has been its struggle to navigate the tensions between the cold logic
of science and the moral necessities of humanism. Indeed, in a seminal article,
Kimble (1984) empirically documented the split between science and human-
ism in the broader field. It is the obligation of professional psychologists to
understand the historical and epistemological issues that have contributed to
this split and to be informed by both scientific and humanistic lenses when
engaged in professional practice. First, by virtue of a core institutional identity,
professional psychology is grounded in science, which means that it embraces
the epistemic values and methods associated with science (Henriques &
Sternberg, 2004). As such, it is crucial that a scientific attitude is instilled in
budding professional psychologists. Some of the key ingredients of this atti-
tude are skepticism and critical thought, a worldview that frames cause and
effect with certain assumptions based on scientific plausibility, and reliance on
evidence acquired in a systematic way (see Lilienfeld & O’Donohue, 2012).
Although a scientific attitude is crucial, it is not all there is to being a
professional psychologist. Indeed, the primary identity of professional psychol-
ogy is as an applied health service profession, and this means that the primary
charge of professional psychology is prescriptive (Henriques & Sternberg,
2004). Ultimately, the function of professional psychologists is to change an
existing state. This can be conceived as having the goal to move individuals
or systems toward more valued states of being, which requires having a broadly
philosophical—some might say metaphysical (O’Donohue, 1989)—position
regarding the values that are guiding one’s actions. The ethical code offered
by the APA prescribes some of the key values that all psychologists need to
consider in their professional behavior but, although essential, leaves much
ambiguity in the details of how to be an ethical, values-driven practitioner.
Because an individual psychologist has the potential for great influence over
When asked how he defined science, Robyn Dawes, well known for his
work on fostering empirically based decision making, answered,
I would define it as testing hypotheses through the systematic collection
and analysis of data whether via what are called “randomized trials,”
where we randomly assign people to be given a vaccine or not or to a
placebo group, all the way to informed observation. These are really the
two essences of science. (Gambrill & Dawes, 2003; cited in Lilienfeld &
O’Donohue, 2012, p. 59)
Dawes captured the methodological view of science. This view is
embraced by many psychologists, both researchers and practitioners alike.
Indeed, some argue that grounding psychology in the scientific method is
the defining and unifying feature of the discipline (see, e.g., Stam, 2004).
However, from the vantage point of a broad scientific humanistic philosophy,
the purely methodological view of science is inadequate. In isolation, the
scientific method (i.e., generating hypotheses and conducting studies) yields
data and information. However, the professional psychologist needs to oper-
ate first from knowledge and wisdom. The incompleteness of method is obvi-
ous on reflection. Consider the question of why we engage in the scientific
method in the first place. It generally is not solely for the specific data it yields
about the specific phenomena under investigation. Indeed, if the data gath-
ered were not generalizable at all, they would be largely irrelevant because
scientific findings from specific studies—in the absence of a nomological net-
work of scientific understanding—are essentially meaningless. The data and
information from scientific studies become meaningful only when they are
linked with data from other investigations and then placed within a network
of understanding. Thus, science must include attention to the conceptually
grounded meaning-making schema that organizes scientific knowledge.
both possible and useful to pull together, in a conceptually sound way, the
primary lenses that are offered from the major perspectives in psychotherapy
(i.e., behavioral, cognitive, existential, humanistic, psychodynamic, and
family systems). In addition, it allows a foothold for organizing the vast data
that researchers have gathered about human nature under the broad head-
ing of psychology and the more specific research on psychotherapy such that
those data can be brought to bear on real-life clinical situations in a holistic,
nuanced, and effective way (see also Melchert, 2014).
In this approach, concepts and theories are the bridges that link
data and information gleaned from the scientific method to wise practice.
Consequently, a major goal I have as a trainer of budding clinicians is to pro-
vide them with a broad framework that effectively maps the discipline, clears
up the current psychotherapy tower of Babel, and allows the key insights from
myriad perspectives and traditions to be coherently integrated into a whole.
Directly related to clinical decision making in a wide variety of contexts is
the approach to conceptualizing people based on analyzing five systems of
character adaptation and the biological, learning and developmental, and
sociocultural contexts in which the individual is immersed (Henriques, 2011;
see Figure 11.1). The systems of character adaptation refer to the hierarchical
arrangement of mental systems that enable an individual to respond to the
current situation. The character adaptation system theory (CAST) approach
refers to the hierarchical arrangement of mental systems that enable an indi-
vidual to respond to the current situation. From the most basic to the most
advanced, the five systems are as follows: (a) the habit system, which refers to
the basic procedural processes shaped by learning and stimulus control; (b) the
experiential system, which refers to the core of experiential consciousness that
is organized by the flow of perception, motivation, and emotional reactions;
(c) the relationship system, which is an outgrowth of the experiential system
context. For example, behaviorists have historically tended to think and focus
on habits, whereas humanistic and experiential practitioners have focused on
core emotions and experiences; psychodynamic practitioners have focused on
underlying relationship patterns and psychological defenses, and cognitive
and narrative therapists have emphasized semantic meaning making in vari-
ous ways. The CAST approach provides a way to understand how these are
all component systems of adaptation that can be effectively woven together
in to a more coherent whole.
How does this system influence clinical decision making? As O’Donohue
and Henderson (1999; cited in Lilienfeld & O’Donohue, 2012) pointed out,
“choosing appropriate treatment methods involves knowing and instanti-
ating causal relations” (p. 51). To do this, a clinician needs to be able to
understand the key variables and their hypothesized causal relations, and the
CAST approach guides students on how to accomplish this. To see this, let’s
continue with the example that was introduced earlier, that of a college stu-
dent who receives a referral for assessing the presence of ADHD and possible
accommodations. Let’s add the following background to the formulation and
then apply the CAST approach to fostering a conceptualization:
Tina is a 19-year-old college freshman. She grew up in a small rural
town in southwestern Virginia. She is a first-generation college student
and entered college with hopes of being a physician. She did extremely
well in high school and has always been very driven and conscientious.
However, her first semester at college did not go very well. She expe-
rienced difficulty making friends, and she was uncomfortable with the
drinking and party atmosphere. She focused a lot on her studies and
studied several hours a day, but she struggled to get the As she expected
(her first semester grade point average was 3.2). Now she is reporting
problems taking tests and staying focused and is worried that she has
ADHD. She is starting to have trouble sleeping; she can’t fall asleep
because she is constantly worrying about what she needs to do the next
day. She is also having nightmares about failing out of school. She
also is reporting frequent stomachaches, and she is now considering
whether she should transfer to a different college because it is closer
to home.
and contentious. The volume of information and the markedly disparate lines
of thought within our field makes this issue particularly daunting, and the
CAST approach offers a heuristic to delineate key psychological variables that
will enable the effective conceptualization of psychological problems. Here is
an example of a formulation that might emerge if one was to apply the CAST
approach:
Tina is at a key developmental time in her life and is experiencing signifi-
cant distress and psychological dysfunction due to a host of interrelated
variables. Perhaps most salient issue is that Tina seems to be struggling
with her identity and her sense of competence (Justification System),
which is generating significant levels of negative affect, especially anxiety
(Experiential System). It seems that her confusion is tied to her difficul-
ties in adjustment associated with the change in her social context, from
a rural setting to a university setting (Social Context). In the former con-
text, she likely shared many of the social values and was able to perform
in a way that was both personally and relationally affirming (i.e., she
achieved academically and had friends—Justification and Relationship
Systems). However, at college, the social values are deviating from hers
in a way that leaves her more likely to feel isolated and uncomfortable
(Experiential and Relational Systems). In addition, she is finding aca-
demic success more challenging than she expected. Thus, compared with
high school, she is having trouble in two key life domains, academic
and social. It seems that in an attempt to cope with her difficulties and
control what she could (Defensive System), she has tried to increase her
academic performance and has isolated herself a bit from her social con-
nections. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the intense pressure she has
placed on herself to succeed (Defense and Justification Systems) likely
created additional problems because her anxious arousal (Experiential
System) probably had the function of impairing her ability to perform in
high-stakes situations like taking tests, thus creating a vicious, anxiety-
producing cycle. As her general stress level increases, it seems likely that
her basic biological and habitual patterns (e.g., eating and sleeping) have
become disrupted, which will likely contribute to a dysfunctional spiral.
It will be crucial to assess Tina’s family history (past Social and Learning
and Developmental Contexts) and what her status as a first-generation
Professional psychology has long been torn between two visions, the
practice of psychology as an art versus an empirically based science. The artis-
tic vision promotes the image of the master clinician as a wise and insightful
healer guided by a deep intuitive knowledge. A prototype of such a clinician
was offered by Caldwell (2004; cited in Garb, 2005), who, on receiving an
award for his work in personality assessment, gave the following example of
successfully interpreting a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory:
We got a severe 4-6-8 profile on a young woman. I looked at the tortured
implications of the pattern and somehow said, “She will have something
like cigarette burn scars on her hands, where her father prepared her to
steel herself to the suffering of life.” The round burn marks were on her
hands and extended a little way up her arms. (Caldwell, 2004, p. 9)
In contrast to the vision of the master practitioner as a wise artisan, the
empiricist vision cautions psychologists against such ideals (Garb, 2005) and
emphasizes judgments and decision making based not on intuition and the
like but on existing empirical evidence. The practitioner’s skill is in know-
ing how to acquire, interpret, and apply good empirical data to the question
at hand. Empirically trained practitioners tend to dismiss with skepticism
anecdotes like the one in the previous paragraph and point out the incred-
ible biases of the human mind in seeing spurious patterns in nature. As a
consequence, proponents of the empirical tradition argue that there is a great
need to ground assessments and treatments in those validated by the scien-
tific method. As alluded to earlier, the empirical tradition is now explicitly
represented in “clinical science” training programs (Baker et al., 2009) that
collection. This accords very well with the methodological view of science
articulated by Dawes. The rationalist tradition, epitomized by individuals
like René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, argues that the best approach to
knowledge is achieved by using reason to arrive at conclusions about the most
justifiable claims. Whereas empiricists emphasize “show me the evidence,”
rationalists emphasize “show me the logic and rationale.” Consistent with
my emphasis on approaching human psychology and the profession from the
vantage point of conceptual coherence (Henriques, 2013a), my view is that
the rationalist position has not received enough attention in the identity of
professional psychology. This chapter can be characterized as a call for how to
teach clinical decision making grounded in a rationalist approach. Of course,
empirical data and the honed, artistic skills of the practitioner are valued, but
from this perspective, the central guiding key to wisdom that informs best
practice is a comprehensive system of justification.
Returning to the history of EBP, the competition for the core iden-
tity of practitioners and for the conceptual groundwork for making clini-
cal decisions in psychotherapy reached a fever pitch in the 1990s. Much
of it centered on the debate about the role and place of empirically sup-
ported treatments (ESTs) in psychological practice. For a host of reasons—
managed care being a primary one—pressure was mounting on the field
in the 1980s to demonstrate the effectiveness of psychotherapy interven-
tions. At the same time, there emerged interventions that offered models
and manuals for treatment that could be tested empirically relatively easily.
For example, A. T. Beck produced a model and treatment for depression,
the effectiveness of which he and his colleagues were able to test using a
randomized controlled design. Studies began to emerge that suggested that
cognitive therapy (or cognitive–behavioral therapy) was more effective in
reducing symptoms than either no treatment or control conditions like sup-
portive therapy. From the empirical–methodological perspective such find-
ings were exactly the kind of data needed to ground the field in science.
Many academics began to promote the idea that students of psychotherapy
must be taught empirical approaches and that such interventions ought to
be the first line of treatment in practice.
for more detailed critiques. The overall point here is that from a broad sci-
entific, humanistic, philosophically informed view, it is naive and a form of
scientism (i.e., an overreliance on power of the procedures and methods of
science) to believe that data and information derived from studies empha-
sizing sound scientific methodology should be the sole guide in clinical
decision making.
We can start unpacking the debate surrounding ESTs by considering
that virtually all ESTs are grounded in concepts from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Many have criticized the DSM,
which was produced largely by the field of psychiatry, as offering an overly
simplistic, medicalized descriptive categorization of psychopathology that
ignores psychosocial etiology and, as such, does not lead to effective treat-
ment plans because it is blind to the dimensions of functioning that are cru-
cial to understand in psychotherapy. Psychodynamically oriented clinicians
were so frustrated by what the DSM failed to capture that they developed
their own Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual to guide practitioners in assess-
ment and case formulation (PDM Task Force, 2006). Humanistic, critical,
and positive psychologists have all been critical of the DSM system in vari-
ous ways. Even biologically oriented scientists who study mental disorders
have started to abandon the DSM (including researchers at the National
Institute of Mental Health; see, e.g., Insel, 2013). The fact that the major
mental health research institution in the United States is abandoning the
DSM must raise a host of questions about the foundational validity of so
many EST research projects.
The conceptual structure of the EST movement does not implicitly
endorse just the DSM but also the medical model of treatment. By that I
mean that the EST model of psychotherapy assumes that psychological dis-
orders exist within individuals, are of a specific identifiable type, and are ame-
nable to specific interventions that result in helpful change. Conceptually,
the medical model places the disorder as the “figure” to be analyzed, along
with the impact of the specified and generalizable intervention. In the tradi-
tional medical model of researching disorder–intervention match, the per-
sonality of both the individual and the treating professional and the nature
The argument laid out so far is that if students are going to be informed
consumers of scientific research applied to professional practice, they must
operate from a broad scientific humanistic philosophy of the field. Such a
view will enable them to consolidate findings into meaningful information
that guides their decision making. Without such a framework, the field and
its practitioners are destined to endless debates because of foundational dis-
putes about assumptions that are not resolvable at the level of scientific data
gathering. Earlier I described how a broad scientific humanistic philosophy
is necessary to reflect on and make decisions about diagnoses and develop
holistic conceptualizations that elucidate key variables and their causal inter
relations in a way that leads to informed clinical decision making. In this
section of this chapter, the focus turns to therapy and how the unified system
offers a new way to approach the field of psychotherapy, one that is quite dif-
ferent from other approaches.
The field of psychology in general and the practice of psychotherapy in
particular have been “pre-paradigmatic,” meaning that there was no avail-
able broad framework from which professional psychologists could operate.
This is apparent when one considers that the emergence of the major schools
of thought were generally through a master practitioner gaining insights
based on useful techniques in the therapy room. Although they were all
students of human nature, the founders of the great therapy endeavors like
Freud, Rogers, and Beck largely started with observations about the thera-
peutic process and generalized from there about insights for the field of psy-
chology. These gurus then generated a following of individuals who tried to
apply their insights and argue for the best approach to psychotherapy on the
basis of this process.
The unified approach advocated for here works in the opposite direc-
tion. It specifically concerns itself with the construction of an integrative
metatheoretical framework that then can be used to assimilate and inte-
grate key insights and findings from both the science of human psychology
(e.g., personality, cognitive, affective, developmental, neuroscience, social,
made here that the proper considerations have been taken in setting up the
frame for the relationship.
A basic principle stemming from the argument thus far is that, as phi-
losophers often point out, “facts are theory laden.” Professional psychologists
must be aware that humans do not perceive the world directly as it truly is
(whatever that might mean), but we have perceptual and conceptual catego-
ries that enable us to actively make meaning out of the patterns in the world.
This is the first meaning of the word theory here. Because the background
conceptual structure “frames” what the practitioner sees in making decisions,
it is crucial that the practitioner be as fully aware of those structures as pos-
sible. This starts at the level of broad philosophy and worldview and includes
the views the professional psychologist has for how the world works, his or
her religious and political perspectives, beliefs about the nature of human
nature, and beliefs about humanity’s place in the universe at large. If these
sound deeply philosophical, they are. This is central because we relate to our
clients at the level of meaning and inevitably hear their stories through a
particular lens defined by our worldview.
Applied to Tina, consider how a Christian psychological practitioner
might hear and respond to her story differently than a secular skeptical prac-
titioner. To do so, let’s make the reasonable assumption, on the basis of Tina’s
story and the demographics of southern rural Virginia, that she was raised in
a socially conservative, Christian home. If so, it follows that some of her cur-
rent anxiety and confusion likely would stem from the potentially conflicting
messages she has received in the context of her transition from a socially and
religiously conservative environment where she felt comfortable to one that
is more secular and has looser mores regarding drinking and sexual activity. If
so, then it is highly likely that a socially conservative Christian psychological
practitioner will hear Tina’s story differently than a purely secular practitio-
ner. This is the case even when both practitioners are engaged in “secular”
psychotherapy and are appropriately ethical and sensitive about imposing
Relationship
SUMMARY
situation, why did you do what you did?” These basic questions provide the
frame for thinking about clinical decision making, and it is crucial that prac-
titioners of psychotherapy have solid justification systems that guide them.
The field of professional psychology has historically not attended
systematically to the process of clinical decision making as much as other
health care professions, such as nursing and medicine. In addition, the field
has often been characterized as being split between empirical and romantic
visions of practice, with the former emphasizing decisions grounded in data
derived from the scientific method and the latter emphasizing the deep, intui-
tive skills of the seasoned practitioner. It is time that we transcend this old
dichotomy and move toward a different conception of science and a more
rationalist approach to intervention. It has always been the case that the
only effective bridges between the worlds of research and practical knowledge
are found in concepts and theories. Thankfully, for the first time, there are
comprehensive, scientifically grounded visions for human psychology that
effectively bridge to the world of practice. Thus, we are set for a new era of
unification and synergistic growth between the fields of professional practice
and human psychology.
This chapter has outlined some of those emerging perspectives and
articulated how a unified view of practice and human psychology can give
rise to a scientific humanistic perspective on decision making that speaks
both to methodological issues of precision, reliability, and validity and to
broader philosophical questions. There is also now a model for conceptualiz-
ing the human condition that transcends the traditional midlevel paradigms
and affords practitioners a systematic approach to conceptualizing that is
grounded in scientific rationality.
APA attempted to bridge the disputes between clinical researchers and
practitioners with its guidelines for EBP, which emphasizes the three domains
of best available research, clinical experience, and patient values in the par-
ticular cultural and policy context as being the primary sources that practitio-
ners ought to be relying on when developing their interventions. However,
more specificity is needed in helping students approach their clinical deci-
sion making about psychotherapy interventions. The reason for this is that
The following list offers some of the key principles that guide effec-
tive psychotherapy. This attempts to breakdown the elements of TEST RePP
in a way that is congruent with the empirical literatures in psychology and
psychotherapy.
1. Set an appropriate, ethical frame. Psychotherapy is a relationship
that is grounded in professional obligations and constraints,
and it is crucial that all stakeholders involved understand the
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.
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